REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICITON

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1289 OF 2008

(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.1585 of 2007)

Superintendent of Police, Karnataka …Appellants

Lokayuktha and Anr.

Versus

B. Srinivas …Respondent

JUDGMENT

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

1.Leave granted.

2.Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a learned

Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court accepting the

petition filed by the respondent under Section 482 of the

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the ‘Code’). Prayer

in the petition was to quash the order dated 12.6.2000 passed

by the Superintendent of Police, Karnataka Lokayuktha and

investigation pursuant to the said order, including lodging of

the first information report.

3.At the relevant point of time the respondent was working

as an Engineer-in-Chief of Rural Development Engineering

Department, Bangalore. The Lokayuktha police had

registered a case in respect of offences punishable under

Section 13(1)(e) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of

Corruption Act, 1988 (in short the ‘Act’).

4.Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

Search was conducted in the house of the respondent on

15

th

/16

th

June, 2000 and certain records and documents were

seized. Documents relating to the respondent, his son-in-law,

his daughter and son were seized. The Superintendent of

Police had authorized the Inspector of Police to conduct

investigation. The petition was filed essentially on three

grounds; firstly, the authorization given by the Superintendent

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of Police to conduct the investigation was contrary to the view

expressed by this Court in State of Haryana and Ors. v.

Bhajan Lal and Ors. (1992 Supp (1) SCC 335). The basis for

such stand was that no reason had been indicated as to why it

was entrusted to the Inspector. When the petition was finally

heard in the year 2006, second stand taken was that there

was inordinate delay of 6 years in filing the charge sheet. The

High Court accepted both the stands and quashed the

proceedings. The third stand was that exaggerated figures

were shown in the chargesheet. This aspect does not appear

to have been dealt with by the High Court. It, however,

permitted the prosecution to take action on the facts afresh

keeping in view certain aspects referred to in the judgment.

5.In support of the appeal, Mr. Sanjay Hegde, learned

counsel for the appellants submitted that the High Court

erroneously exercised jurisdiction under Section 482 of Code.

When the petition was initially filed, there was no question of

any delay. An amendment had been sought for in the petition

and prayer was to quash the order passed by the

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Superintendent of Police and further part of the investigation

done by the Inspector of Police-respondent No.2. It is pointed

out that the High Court erroneously observed that there was

delay in filing the charge sheet. In any event, the delay was

occasioned on account of the part played by the respondent

and delay, if any, alone cannot be a ground to quash the

legitimate proceedings. Further, it is pointed out that the High

Court has erroneously held that no reasons were indicated.

Reference is made in the order passed by the Superintendent

of Police to contend that reasons in fact had been indicated.

6.Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent submitted

that though the High Court has not specifically referred to this

aspect, the fact that after completing investigation the amount

of alleged disproportionate asset which was initially stated to

be more than one crore has been sealed down substantially

cannot be lost sight of. Further, it is submitted that delay

itself can be a ground to quash the proceedings. It is also

submitted that the High Court has rightly observed that

reasons are not discernible from the order passed by the

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Superintendent of Police while authorizing investigation by the

Inspector.

7.We shall first deal with the question of alleged delay. It

is of some significance to note that an FIR was lodged on

12.6.2000 and few days thereafter the petition under Section

482 was filed. On the basis of FIR the house of respondent

was searched on 15

th

and 16

th

June. The petition was filed on

11.7.2000. Application seeking permission to substitute

additional grounds was filed in the year 2005. It is not a case

where charge sheet had not been filed or that there was no

explanation for the delay. There is no general and wide

proposition of law formulated that whenever there is delay on

the part of the investigating agency in completing the

investigation, such a delay can be a ground for quashing the

FIR. It would be difficult to formulate inflexible guidelines or

rigid principles in determining as to whether the accused has

been deprived of fair trial on account of delay or protracted

investigation would depend on various factors including

whether such a delay was reasonably long or caused

deliberately or intentionally to hamper the defence of the

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accused or whether delay was inevitable in the nature of

things or whether it was due to dilatory tactics adopted by the

accused. It would depend upon certain peculiar facts and

circumstances of each case i.e. the volume of evidence

collected by the investigating agency, the nature and gravity of

the offence for which accused has been charge sheeted in a

given case. The nexus between whole and some of the above

factors is of considerable relevance. Therefore, whether the

accused has been deprived of fair trial on account of

protracted investigation has to come on facts. He has also to

establish that he had no role in the delay. Every delay does

not necessarily occur because of the accused.

8.A 7-Judge Bench of this Court in P. Ramachandra Rao v.

State of Karnataka (2002 (4) SCC 578) affirmed the view taken

in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak (1992 (1) SCC 225)

and clarified confusion created by certain observations in

‘Common Cause’ a Registered Society v. Union of India (1996

(4) SCC 33), ‘Common Cause’ a Registered Society v. Union of

India (1996 (6) SCC, 775), Raj Deo Sharma v. State of Bihar

6

(1998 (7) SCC 507) and Raj Deo Sharma (II) v. State of Bihar

(1999 (7) SCC 604). It was observed that the decision in A.R.

Antulay’s case (supra) still holds the field and the guidelines

laid down in said case are not exhaustive but only illustrative.

They are not intended to operate as hard and fast rules or to

be applied like a straitjacket formula. Their applicability

would depend on the factual situations of each case. It is

difficult to foresee all situations and no generalization can be

made. It has also been held that it is neither advisable nor

feasible nor judicially permissible to draw or prescribe an

outer limit for conclusion of all criminal proceedings.

Whenever there is any allegation of violation of right to speedy

trial the Court has to perform by balancing the act by taking

into consideration all attending circumstances and to decide

whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a given

case. As noted above, one month after the order relating to

investigation and lodging of FIR, a petition under Section 482

of Code was filed before the High Court.

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9.It is interesting to note that while the High Court

quashed the proceedings because of alleged delayed

investigation, it permitted the authorities to take decision to

continue the proceedings. Therefore, the first ground on

which the High Court interfered cannot be maintained.

10.The other question relates to the alleged deficiency in

authorization made by Superintendent of Police authorizing

the Inspector to investigate the case. The High Court placed

strong reliance on Bhajan Lal’s case (supra), more

particularly, in para 134. Though the High Court referred to

certain decisions of this Court, the decision in State of M.P.

and Ors. v. Ram Singh (2000 (5) SCC 88), was not followed. It

is to be noted that in Ram Singh’s case (supra) the view

expressed in Bhajan Lal’s case (supra) has been explained

after referring to the relevant para.

11.The order passed by Superintendent of Police reads as

follows:

8

“KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA

NO: KLA/PW/SP/City.Dn./99-2000 Superintendent of Police

City Division,

M.S. Buildings, Dr. Ambedkar

Veedhi, Bangalore-560 001.

Dated: 12th June, 2000.

M E M 0

Sub: Possession of Disproportionate Assets

to the known source of income by

Sri. B. Srinivasa, Engineer-in-chief,

Rural Development Engineering Department-reg.

Ref: Report of Sri. M.D. Khalander Presently

working as police Inspector, Police Wing,

City Division, Karnataka Lokayukta.

I have gone through the report of Sri. Md.

Khalander, presently working as Police Inspector, Police

Wing City division, Karnataka Lokayukta, Bangalore

relating to Inquiry report (IE) receipt of credible

information that Sri. B. Srinivas at present working as

Engineer-in-chief, Rural Development Engineering

Department has acquired properties disproportionate to

his known source of income to the extent of about Rs.

1,13,000,00/- and thereby committed offence U/s. 13

(12)(e) R/W. 13(2) of the P.C. Act, 1988.

9

From the materials placed before me with the

application of my mind I am satisfied that a prima facie

case is made against Sri B. Srinivas U/s 13(1)(e) r/w 13

(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

Therefore by virtue of the power vested in me, S.G.

Ramesh Superintendent of Police, Police Wing City

Division, Karnataka Lokayukta, Bangalore, order under

the provisions of S.C. 17 of the Prevention of corruption

Act, 1988, Sri. M.D. Khalander Police Inspector, Police

Wing City Dn. Karnataka Lokayukta Bangalore to

register a case U/s. 13(1)(e) read with 13(2) of the P.C.

Act, 1988 against Sri B Srinivas, Engineer-in-Chief,

Rural Development Engineering Department, Bangalore

and investigate the said case.

Further U/W.18 of the Prevention of Corruption

Act, 1988, Sri. M.D. Khalander is authorised to inspect

the Bankers books, so far as it relates to money on

behalf of such person and take or cause to be taken

certified copies of the relevant entries therefrom and the

Bank concerned shall be bound to assist the Police

Inspector, Police wing City Dn., Karnataka Lokayukta,

Bangalore in the exercise of his powers under this

section.

To:

10

M.D. Khalander Sd/-

Police Inspector, Superintendent

Police Wing, City Division, of Police, City

Division,

Bangalore Office of the Lokyukta

Bangalore.”

12.In Ram Singh’s case (supra) this Court indicated the

position lucidly after referring to Bhajan Lal’s case (supra) in

para 14. The same reads as follows:

“14. It may be noticed at this stage that a

three-Judge Bench of this Court in H.N.

Rishbud v. State of Delhi (AIR 1955 SC 196)

had held that a defect or illegality in

investigation, however serious, has no direct

bearing on the competence or the procedure

relating to cognizance or trial. Referring to the

provisions of Sections 190, 193, 195 to 199

and 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure

(1898) in the context of an offence under the

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, the Court

held:

“A defect or illegality in investigation, however

serious, has no direct bearing on the

competence or the procedure relating to

cognizance or trial. No doubt a police report

which results from an investigation is provided

in Section 190 Cr.P.C as the material on which

cognizance is taken. But it cannot be

maintained that a valid and legal police report

is the foundation of the jurisdiction of the

court to take cognizance. Section 190 Cr.P.C

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is one out of a group of sections under the

heading ‘Conditions requisite for initiation of

proceedings’. The language of this section is in

marked contrast with that of the other

sections of the group under the same heading,

i.e., Sections 193 and 195 to 199.

These latter sections regulate the

competence of the court and bar its

jurisdiction in certain cases excepting in

compliance therewith. But Section 190 does

not. While no doubt, in one sense, clauses (a),

(b) and (c) of Section 190(1) are conditions

requisite for taking of cognizance, it is not

possible to say that cognizance on an invalid

police report is prohibited and is therefore a

nullity. Such an invalid report may still fall

either under clause (a) or (b) of Section 190(1),

(whether it is the one or the other we need not

pause to consider) and in any case cognizance

so taken is only in the nature of error in a

proceeding antecedent to the trial. To such a

situation Section 537 CrPC which is in the

following terms is attracted:

‘Subject to the provisions

hereinbefore contained, no finding,

sentence or order passed by a court

of competent jurisdiction shall be

reversed or altered on appeal or

revision on account of any error,

omission or irregularity in the

complaint, summons, warrant,

charge, proclamation, order,

judgment or other proceedings

before or during trial or in any

inquiry or other proceedings under

this Code, unless such error,

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omission or irregularity, has in fact

occasioned a failure of justice.’

If, therefore, cognizance is in fact taken, on a

police report vitiated by the breach of a

mandatory provision relating to investigation,

there can be no doubt that the result of the

trial which follows it cannot be set aside

unless the illegality in the investigation can be

shown to have brought about a miscarriage of

justice. That an illegality committed in the

course of investigation does not affect the

competence and the jurisdiction of the court

for trial is well settled as appears from the

cases in - ‘Parbhu v. Emperor’(AIR 1944 PC (73)

and - ‘Lumbhardar Zutshi v. R. (AIR 1950 PC

26).”

It further held:

“In our opinion, therefore, when

such a breach is brought to the

notice of the court at an early stage

of the trial, the court will have to

consider the nature and extent of

the violation and pass appropriate

orders for such reinvestigation as

may be called for, wholly or partly,

and by such officer as it considers

appropriate with reference to the

requirements of Section 5-A of the

Act. It is in the light of the above

considerations that the validity or

otherwise of the objection as to the

violation of Section 5(4) of the Act

has to be decided and the course to

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be adopted in these proceedings,

determined.”

In Bhajan Lal case (1992 Supp (1) SCC 335)

this Court had found on facts that the SP had

passed the order mechanically and in a very

casual manner regardless of the settled

principles of law. The provisions of Section 17

of the Act had not been complied with. As

earlier noticed the SP while authorising the

SHO to investigate had made only an

endorsement to the effect “Please register the

case and investigate”. The SP was shown to be

not aware either of the allegations or the

nature of the offences and the pressure of the

workload requiring investigation by an

Inspector. There is no denial of the fact that in

cases against the respondents in these

appeals, even in the absence of the authority

of the SP the investigating officer was in law

authorised to investigate the offence falling

under Section 13 of the Act with the exception

of one as is described under sub-section (1)(e)

of the Act. After registration of the FIR the

Superintendent of Police in the instant appeals

is shown to be aware and conscious of the

allegations made against the respondents, the

FIR registered against them and pending

investigations. The order passed by the SP in

the case of Ram Singh on 12-12-1994 with

respect to a crime registered in 1992 was to

the effect:

“In exercise of powers conferred by

the provisions on me, under Section

17 of the Prevention of Corruption

Act, 1988, I, P.K. Runwal,

14

Superintendent of Police, Special

Police Establishment, Division I,

Lokayukta Karyalaya, Gwalior

Division, Gwalior (M.P.), authorised

Shri D.S. Rana, Inspector (SPE),

Lak-Gwl (M.P.) to investigate Crime

No. 103 of 1992 under Sections 13

(1)(e), 23(2) of the Prevention of

Corruption Act, 1988 against Shri

Ram Singh, DO, Excise, Batul

(M.P.).”

Similar orders have been passed in the other

two cases as well. The reasons for entrustment

of investigation to the Inspector can be

discerned from the order itself. The appellant

State is, therefore, justified in submitting that

the facts of Bhajan Lal case were

distinguishable as in the instant case the

Superintendent of Police appears to have

applied his mind and passed the order

authorising the investigation by an Inspector

under the peculiar circumstances of the case.

The reasons for entrustment of investigation

were obvious. The High Court should not have

liberally construed the provisions of the Act in

favour of the accused resulting in closure of

the trial of the serious charges made against

the respondents in relation to commission of

offences punishable under an Act legislated to

curb the illegal and corrupt practices of the

public officers. It is brought to our notice that

under similar circumstances the High Court

had quashed the investigation and consequent

proceedings in a case registered against Shri

Ram Babu Gupta against which Criminal

Appeal No. 1754 of 1986 was filed in this

Court which was allowed on 27-9-1986 by

setting aside the order of the High Court with

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a direction to the trial court to proceed with

the case in accordance with law and in the

light of the observations made therein.”

13.If one looks at the order passed, which formed the

subject matter of challenge in Ram Singh’s case (supra) it is

crystal clear that the order passed in the present case by the

Superintendent of Police is more elaborate and as rightly

submitted by learned counsel for the appellant, the reasons

are clearly discernible. Even otherwise, the effect of Section

19(3) of the Act relating to prejudice has been completely lost

sight of by the High Court. The second reason indicated by the

High Court to quash the proceedings also has no substance.

14.The inevitable conclusion is that the order passed by the

High Court is indefensible and is set aside. However, it would

be in the interest of justice if the trial is completed on the

basis of the charge sheet filed as early as practicable

preferably by the end of February, 2009.

15.The appeal is allowed.

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……….………….……………….J.

(Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)

………………….…………………J.

(Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA)

New Delhi,

August 18, 2008

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