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PETITIONER:

SURENDRA PAL SINGH

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

THE BOARD OF REVENUE FOR RAJASTHAN AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT13/05/1993

BENCH:

YOGESHWAR DAYAL (J)

BENCH:

YOGESHWAR DAYAL (J)

KULDIP SINGH (J)

CITATION:

1994 AIR 1439 1993 SCR (3) 722

1993 SCC Supl. (3) 229 JT 1993 (3) 465

1993 SCALE (2)889

ACT:

Rajasthan Tenancy Act 1955-S. 221-General powers of superin-

tendency and control of Board of Revenue over all revenue

courts, held includes both administrative and judicial

powers--Ch.III-B, Ss 225,230-Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling

on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1973.

HEADNOTE:

Proceedings were commenced under Chapter III-B of the

Rajasthan Tenancy Act 1955 for determining the ceiling area

for Raghubir Singh, the father of the appellant. In a

revision application in the first round of litigation. The

Board of Revenue directed that the ceiling area for Raghubir

Singh may be determined according to the old law, i.e. Act

of 1955, and not according to the Rajasthan Imposition of

Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1973.

Thereafter, by his order dt. 5.5.76, the SDO held, inter

alia, that tile father and the son, appellant, constituted

two separate units and each of them was entitled to get 62

bighas and 8 biswas.

Aggrieved by the SDO's order, Raghubir Singh filed an appeal

before Revenue Appellate Authority, which was dismissed. He

then filed a revision application under S.230 of the Act of

1955 before the Board of Revenue for Rajasthan.

He urged that he was in possession of 112 bighas only and

sought permission to adduce additional evidence, which was

disallowed. However, the Member of the Board held inter

alia that the provisions of the old law applied to the case,

but the SDO had committed an error of law in determining the

ceiling area under the new Act of 1973. The Board further

held that there is no provision for separate units in

Chapter III-B of the Act of 1955, and remanded the case to

the SDO, Hanumangarh, for fresh determination of the Ceiling

area for Raghubir Singh.

Before the High Court, it was urged that the State having

not appealed against the order of the SDO dated 5.5.76, it

became final, and the Board of

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Revenue had no jurisdiction to set aside that part of the

SDO's order which had gone against the State and in his

favour. It was submitted that the power of general

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superintendence and control over all revenue courts which

vested in the Board could not be exercised to the detriment

of the writ petitioners much less by way of suo motu

exercise of powers.

The High Court dismissed the petitions.

Before this court it was submitted that the State not having

filed an appeal, or a revision, the Board of Revenue could

not, while hearing the revision petition of Raghubir Singh,

set aside the orders of the SDO and Revenue Appellate

Authority under S.221 of the Act of 1955.

Dismissing the appeal, this court,

HELD:.....(1) S.221 is not subject to the other provisions

of the Act. It is clear from the language of Section 221 of

the Act 1955 that the Board of Revenue has general powers of

superintendence and control over all revenue courts. It is

both administrative as well as judicial powers. It is open

to the Board to exercise its powers of superintendence on

all its subordinate courts in order to regulate the

functioning of the subordinate courts so as to keep them

within their respective spheres of jurisdiction. If the

subordinate court disregards any specific provision of law

and does something illegal it is open to the Board of

Revenue to interfere and set the matter right. (727-E)

Karan Singh v. Board of revenue, Rajasthan 1962 Raj LW 178

and Permessar Singh v. Kailaspati AIR 1916 Pat. 292 (FB),

distinguished.

Kana v. Board of Revenue ILR (1955) 5 Raj. 55, approved.

(2) There is no restriction on the powers of the Board to

set aside the order of the SDO provided it comes to the

conclusion that interest of justice requires exercise of

such powers. (728-D)

(3) In not determining the ceiling area according to the Act

of 1955, the SDO committed a grave illegality in not merely

ignoring the law but also ignoring the directions of the

Board of Revenue itself. (728-F)

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JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1367 of 1980.

From the Judgment and Order dated 19.7.1979 of the Rajasthan

High Court in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 769 of 1979.

Subhash Mallick and S.K. Jain for the Appellant.

B.D. Sharma for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

YOGESHWAR DAYAL,J. This is an appeal against the judgment

of the Rajasthan High Court dated 19th July, 1979 passed in

D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 681 of 1978 (Raghubir Singh v.

The Board of Revenue for Rajasthan and others) and D.B.

Civil Writ Petition No. 769 of 1979 (Surendrapal Singh v.

The Board of Revenue for Rajasthan and others). These writ

petitions were decided by the aforesaid common judgment.

The first writ petition was filed by the father Raghubir

Singh whereas the second writ petition was filed by his

minor son Surendrapal Singh through his next friend Shri

Jagjit Singh, maternal grand-father of the minor. The

relief claimed in both the petitions before the High Court

was the same, namely - for setting aside of the order dated

6th August, 1977 passed by the Board of Revenue for

Rajasthan, Ajmer.

The facts of the case briefly are-that proceedings under

Chapter III-B of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act (Act No. 3 of

1955) (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act of 1955) were

commenced for determining the ceiling area for Raghubir

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Singh. The Sub-Divisional Officer, Hanumangarh, by his

order dated 10th August, 1972, determined the ceiling area,

but an appeal by Raghubir Singh, the Revenue Appellate

Authority, set aside the order of the sub-Divisional Officer

on March 6, 1973 and remanded the case. The matter was

taken to the Board of Revenue for Rajasthan by a revision

application and the Board by its order dated 14th April,

1975 directed that the ceiling area for Raghubir Singh may

be determined according to the old law i.e. Act of 1955 and

not according to the new law i.e. Rajasthan Imposition of

Ceiling on Agricultural Holding Act, 1973 (hereinafter

referred to as 'the Act of 1973).

In pursuance of the direction of the Board, the Sub-

Divisional Officer, Hanumangarh, by his order dated 5th May,

1976 held that Surendrapal Singh, (appellant herein) aged 12

years, was a minor son of Raghubir Singh and used to

725

study in Punjab and further held that the land in possession

of Raghubir Singh was ancestral. The Sub-Divisional

Officer, then came to the conclusion that the father and the

son constitute two separate units and each one of them was

entitled to get 62 Bighas and 8 Biswas. It was thus held

that Raghubir Singh and his son Surendrapal Singh are

entitled to retain 124 Bighas and 16 Biswas only and the

surplus land measuring, 4 Bighas and 6 Biswas may be

resumed.

Aggrieved by the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer,

Raghubir Singh filed appeal before the Revenue Appellate

Authority, Bikaner, who by his order dated 6th September,

1976 dismissed the same and upheld the order of the Sub-

Divisional Officer. Dissatisfied with the order of the

Revenue Appellate Authority, Raghubir Singh filed a revision

application under Section 230 of the Act of 1955 before the

Board of Revenue for Rajasthan.

On behalf of raghubir Singh it was urged before the Board

that the petitioner was in possession of 112 Bighas only and

not 129 Bighas and 3 Biswas as held by the lower courts. He

sought permission to adduce additional evidence in support

of his contention. The application for adducing additional

evidence was disallowed. However, the member of the Board

came to the conclusion that Surendrapal Singh (appellant

here in) was born to Raghubir Singh on 14th March, 1963 and

was only 13 years of age when the ceiling proceedings were

finalized by the Sub-Divisional Officer on 5th May, 1976.

He further held that the provisions of the old ceiling law

applied to the case but the Sub-Divisional Officer had

committed an error of law in determining the ceiling area

under the new law i.e. the Act of 1973. The Board went on

to hold that there is no provision for separate units in

Chapter III-B of the Act of 1955. In the ultimate analysis

the Member of the Board found that there was a gross and

patent illegality in the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer

and, consequently, set aside the order of the Sub-Divisional

Officer dated 5th May, 1976 as well as the order of the

Appellate Authority dated 6th September, 1976 and remanded

the case to the Sub-Divisional Officer, Hanumangarh, for

fresh determination of the calling area for Raghubir Singh.

Before the Division Bench of the High Court in the writ

petitions it was urged on behalf of Raghubir Singh that no

appeal having been filed by the State from the order the

Sub-Divisional Officer dated 5th May, 1976, the said order

became final and the Board of Revenue had no jurisdiction to

set aside that part of the Sub-Divisional Officer's order

which had gone against the State and in his favour. It was

submitted that the power of general superintendence and

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control over all revenue courts vested in the Board could

not be exercised to the detriment of the

726

writ petitioners much less by way of suo motu exercise of

powers.

The High Court by the impugned judgment dated 19th July,

1979 upheld the order of the Board of Revenue for Rajasthan

and dismissed the writ petitions.

Surendrapal Singh, the erstwhile minor son of Raghubir Singh

has come up to this Court by way of special leave which was

granted and hence the present appeal.

Mr. Subhagh Mal Jain learned senior counsel appearing on

behalf of the appellant submitted that the State having not

filed an appeal under section 225 of the Act of 1955 and or

revision under Section 230 of the Act of 1955, the Board of

the Revenue could not, while hearing the revision petition

filed by Raghubir Singh, set aside the orders of Sub-

Divisional Officer and the revenue appellate authority under

Section 221 of the Act of 1955. Section 221 of the Act of

1955 provides as under:-

"221.Subordination of revenue courts.- The

general superintendence and control over all

revenue courts shall be vested in, an all such

Courts shall be subordinate to the Board; and

subject to such superintendence, control and

subordination-

(a) x x x (omitted)

(b) all Additional Collectors, Sub.-

Divisional Officer, Assistant Collectors and

Tehsildars in a district shall be subordinate

to the Collector thereof,

(c)all Assistant Collectors, Tehsildars and

Naib-Tehsildars in a sub-division shall be

subordinate to the Sub-Divisional Officer

thereof, and

(d) All Additional Tehsildars and Naib-

Tehsildars in a tehsil shall be subordinate to

the Tehsildar thereof."

The contention of learned counsel for the appellant is that

the section confers executive powers of superintendence and

control on the Board and it does not vest any power of

superintendence on the Board on judicial side. For this

purpose he relied or the decision of the Division Bench of

the Rajasthan High Court reported as 19 RLW 178: Karan Singh

v. Board of Revenue, Rajasthan. The Division

727

Bench in that case was concerned with the interpretation of

Section 9 of the Land Revenue Act. Section 9 whereof

provides as under:-

"9 Subject to the other provisions of this

Act, the general superintendence and control

over all revenue courts and over all revenue

officers shall be vested in, and all such

Courts and Officers shall be subordinate to,

the Board."

In that case also the High Court took the view that it is

not correct to say that Section 9 is limited to the

executive control and superintendence of the Board over

subordinate revenue courts and it does not apply to judicial

proceedings. The contention on behalf of the appellant to

that effect was negatived but on merits the High Court held

that it was not appropriate for the Board to exercise the

powers conferred by Section 9 of the land Revenue Act in

view of the fact that the Board had appellate jurisdiction

and it could not, therefore, make use of its powers of

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superintendence and control and the order of the Board could

not be held proper with reference to Section 9 of the Land

Revenue Act. This case has no application for

interpretation of the present Section 221 of the Act of

1955. Section 221 of the Act of 1955 is not subject to the

other provisions of the Act. It is clear from the language

of Section 221 of the Act of 1955 that the Board of Revenue

has general powers of superintendence and control over all

revenue courts. It is both administrative as well as

judicial powers. It is open to the Board to exercise its

powers of superintendence on all its subordinate courts in

order to regulate the functioning of' the subordinate courts

so as to keep them within their respective spheres of

jurisdiction. If the subordinate court disregards any

specific provision of law and does something illegal it is

open to the Board of Revenue to interfere and set the matter

right. A similar question arose before the Rajasthan High

Court in Kana and others v.Board of Revenue. Rajasthan: ILR

(1955) 5 Raj. 55 where the High Court had to construe the

power of the Board of Revenue, Rajasthan, conferred on it by

the Rajasthan Board of Revenue Ordinance (NO.XXII of 1949).

There also there was similar provision like Section 9 of the

Land Revenue Act and it was held that Section 12 of the said

Ordinance must be held to give powers to the Board to revise

judicial orders also passed by courts in appropriate cases.

It was observed at page 63 of the report-"of course, -such

powers would generally not be exercised where a party had

remedy by way of appeal and revision, and did not avail of

it. At the same time, the power is there, and-it may be

exercised sparingly in extraordinary case,, where interest

of justice requires that the Board should exercise the

power".

Under Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1955 there

was provision of superintendence by High Court in these

terms :-

728

Each of the High Courts has superintendence

over all the courts for the time being subject

to its appellate jurisdiction."

These words have been consistently interpreted to mean that

the High Court had power in appropriate cases to interfere

with the judicial orders of the courts.

Reference may in this connection be made to Parmessar Singh

v. Kailaspati AIR 1916 Pat. 292 (F.B.). In the Government of

India Act of 1935, there was provision under Section 224 for

superintendence by the High Courts', but subsection(2) made

it clear that this superintendence would not be construed as

giving to the High Court any jurisdiction to question any

judgment of any inferior court which was not otherwise

subject to appeal or revision. Section 221 of the Act of

1955 is similar to Section 107 of the Government of India

Act, 1915 and there is no section like sub-section (2) of

Section 224 of the Government of India Act of 1935 in the

Act of 1955. Thus there is no restriction on the powers of

the Board to set aside the order of the Sub-Divisional

Officer provided it comes to the conclusion that interest of

justice requires exercise of such powers. The Board noticed

that there was no provision for separate unit in Chapter

III-B of tile Act of 1955 and the applicant Raghubir Singh

and his son Surendrapal Singh constituted one unit and not

two units and the case was remanded to Sub-Divisional

Officer, Hanumangarh, for de novo determination of the

ceiling area for the appellant in law. The High Court also

did not go into the merits of the controversy nor we have

thought it advisable to into it and it would be for the Sub-

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Divisional Officer, Hanumangarh to decide it in the light of

the observations of the Board. It is clear from the

judgment under appeal that the Board had by its order dated

14th April, 1975 directed that the ceiling, area may be

determined according to old law i.e. Act of 1955 and it

spite of it the Sub-Divisional Officer committed the grave

illegality on not merely ignoring the law but also ignoring

the directions of the Board of Revenue itself.

The appeal consequently fails and is dismissed with costs.

U. R. Appeal dismissed.

729