2026 INSC 510 1

NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2026

(@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL) No. 9445 of 2023)

SUSANTA KUMAR DALEI @SUSANTA KUMAR

DALAI …..Appellant (s)

VERSUS

STATE OF ODISHA (VIGILANCE) …..Respondent (s)

J U D G M E N T

PRASANNA B. VARALE, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The present criminal appeal arises out of a judgement and order

dated April 10

, 2023, passed by the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack

in CRLMC No. 1505 of 2022 whereby the High Court dismissed the

discharge application of the Appellant herein.

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BRIEF FACTS

3. The factual matrix of the case is that an FIR was lodged on

23.07.2001 against the Appellant along with other accused persons

under Sections 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the P.C. Act, 1988

(Hereinafter referred to as ‘PC Act’) and under Sections 471/477A/

120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Hereinafter referred to as

‘IPC’), and 27 of the Orissa Forest Act. It is in the F.I.R. that M/s

Keshari Traders of Jeypore was appointed as Raw Materials Procurer

(Hereinafter, referred to as ‘R.M.P’) by the Managing Director,

O.F.D.C., Ltd., Bhubaneswar in, Letter No. 34244, dated 27.12.1999

in pursuance of the order of the Government in Forest and

Environment Department Vide letter No. 22249, dated 23.12.1999 to

salvage wind faller timber from the Chitrakonda and Kalimela Ranges

of Jeypore Forest Division. The RMP started salvage operation during

January, 2000 and has lifted 204.3890 Cum timber (7154 Cft.) from

the Depot of to Rajhmandri (Andhra Pradesh) by depositing royally

amount of Rs. 10,20,245.00 and commission of Rs.2,47,001/-. The

Government of Orissa the O.F.D.C. has imposed total moratorium on

felling of standing trees in the Forest in G.O. No. 22464/F & E., dated

25.11.1997. In the back drop of such Government policy the

application of M/s Keshari Traders has been entertained and

recommended by the Forest Department as well as O.F.D.C., Officials

for salvage operation of timber in Jeypore Forest Division under the

pretext of Naxalite problem, intervening salvage clearance of

departmental officials without any basis. The tender of M/s Keshari

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Traders was accepted out of three tenderers only for the purpose of

transportation of salvage Timber from Forest Floor to the Depot of

O.F.D.C.. Further, in the F.I.R. it is mentioned that the Government

has approved the Terms and conditions for salvage operation by the

R.M.P. formulated by a high power Committee constituted for the

purpose. The approved Terms and Conditions were sent to the

P.C.C.F, Orissa, Conservator of Forest, Koraput, D.F.O., Jeypore,

D.M. (C), O.F.D.C., Malkangiri alongwith the appointment order. As

per sub-Clause-4 under the clause Depot of approved terms and

conditions after receipt of the timber at the Depot of the O.F.D.C., the

sale value of the timber has to be collected from the R.M.P. and then

the R.M.P. will be allowed to lift the timber from the Depot. But in

gross violation of the aforesaid approved terms and conditions the

R.M.P. was allowed by the Forest Department and O.F.D.C. officials

to lift 204.3890 Cum of timber mostly of teak and other valuable

species including some live trees by depositing a meager amount of

royalty of Rs. 10,20,245.00 fixed by the D.F.O., Jeypore by showing

the trees as defective and under girth. The cost of the timber lifted

has been assessed by the Enquiry Committee consisting of Shri

B.K.Patnaik, Director, Commercial, O.F.D.C., and Shri P. Singh IFS.,

Chief Conservator of Forest, Orissa and they assessed the amount as

Rs.. 45,01.000/-. Therefore, without assessing the market value and

without selling the timber at competitive rates to the highest bidder,

the R.M.P. was allowed to lift the timber by depositing royalty for

which the Government has sustained minimum loss of

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Rs.34,80,755/-. Further, during verification and enquiry Committee

comprising C.C.F, Orissa and Director (C), O.F.D.C. by Special Task

force constituted by Government with two Conservators of Forests

and the joint verification conducted by Vigilance Organisation it is

found that irregularties have been committed by both the Forest

Department and O.F.D.C. Officials in the process of enumeration,

passing conversion and lifting of the salvage timber by the R.M.P.,

and it came to light that a total volume of 371.7684 Cum. Worth of

Rs.41,54,245/- have been felled illegally by R.M.P. and were

transported in the disguise of faller trees only, in connivance with the

Forest and O.F.D.C. Officials. It is alleged that the Appellant accused

alongwith other accused persons committed the offence, in order to

derive pecuniary benefit for themselves and for the firm by abusing

their official position, but for which the aforesaid clandestine deal by

the Firm with the Government officials, which amounts prima facie

all the accused persons have committed the criminal misconduct

under Sections 13(2) read with 13(1) (d) of the Prevention of

Corruption Act, 1988 and under Sections 471/477-A/ 120-B of the I

PC and 27 of Orissa Forest Act, 1972.

4. Cognizance of the offences was taken by the learned court of

Special Judge (Vigilance) Brahmapur. After completion of the

investigation, the charge-sheet no. 4/24.03.2007 was submitted on

24.03.2007 against the present Appellant and the co-accused

persons under section 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of PC Act, Section 471,

477-A, 120-B of IPC and Section 27 of Odisha Forest Act.

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5. The present Appellant along with co-accused Bimbadhar Sahu,

Range officer Chitrakonda range had filed an application under

Section 227 of Code of Criminal Procedure (Hereinafter ‘Cr. P.C’) to

discharge them for the commission of alleged offences and

prosecution also filed an objection to the same.

6. The petitions under Section 227 of the Cr. P.C filed for

discharging the accused persons namely, Susanta Kumar Dalai and

Bimbadhar Sahu were rejected. The petition filed by the Appellant to

rescind cognizance was also rejected. Ld. Special Judge(Vigilance)

vide order dated 21.03.2022, observed that there is a prima facie case

well made out in the form of sufficient material to presume that the

accused persons have committed the offence under section 3(2) read

with 13(1)(d) of PC Act and sections 471/477-A/120-B of IPC.

7. The Appellant made an application under Section 482 of Cr. P.C

and an application challenging the order passed by the Learned

Special Judge (Vigilance) Jeypore in rejecting the application for

discharge under Section 227 of Cr. PC.

8. Hearing of the application under CRLMC No. 1505 of 2022 along

with other related applications was concluded on 19th October,

2022. The Court held that no case is made out for interference with

the Vigilance prosecution and accordingly ordered the dismissal of

the CRLMCs.

9. Aggrieved by the said judgement of the High Court, the

appellant is before us.

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CONTENTIONS

10. Ld. Counsel for the Appellant, Mr. P. Vamshi Rao vehemently

argued that the Appellant, a Forest Range Officer, has been falsely

implicated in Berhampur Vigilance P.S. Case No. 27 of 2001

registered under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the

Prevention of Corruption Act, Sections 471, 477-A and 120-B IPC,

and Section 27 of the Odisha Forest Act. It was further argued that

neither the FIR nor the statements recorded under Section 161

Cr.P.C. disclose any prima facie case against the Appellant. It was

submitted that M/s Keshari Traders was appointed as RMP by higher

authorities and the OFDC, and the Appellant had no role in such

appointment. The RMP was authorized only to extract salvage timber

and firewood, not to fell green standing trees. Reliance was placed on

the joint verification report dated 11.06.2000, which showed that the

timber originated from Poddu cultivation areas and consisted mostly

of old, dry and previously fallen trees. Another verification report

dated 26.06.2000 assessed the value of timber at Rs. 20,58,861,

contrary to the prosecution’s alleged loss of Rs. 45,01,000, which was

stated to be imaginary and based on assumptions. The counsel for

the Appellant further contended that reports of Andhra Pradesh

forest officials also confirmed that the timber appeared old, dry and

decayed, ruling out fresh illicit felling. It was argued that all royalty,

commission and taxes demanded by OFDC had been duly deposited

before transportation of timber. No material, according to the

Appellant, connected him with the alleged offences or conspiracy.

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Challenge was also made to the sanction orders under Section 197

Cr.P.C. and Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act on the

ground of non-application of mind. Lastly, it was submitted that

proceedings against similarly placed co-accused officers had already

been quashed by the High Court, and therefore the Appellant was

also entitled to discharge.

11. Per contra, Ld. counsel for the respondent, Mr. Suvendu

Suvasis Dash vehemently argued that the petition lacks merit and

raises no substantial question of law warranting interference under

Article 136 of the Constitution. It was also argued that investigation

revealed large-scale illicit felling of live standing green trees in the

guise of salvage operations and illegal transportation of timber to

Andhra Pradesh. The respondent contended that although salvage

operations were permitted only for naturally fallen or uprooted trees,

the Appellant and other accused officials, in conspiracy with M/s

Keshari Traders, abused their official positions and allowed

clandestine felling of valuable green trees for pecuniary gain. The

counsel for the respondent further submitted that the Government of

Odisha had imposed a complete moratorium on felling of standing

trees since 1992 and that OFDC alone was authorized to undertake

salvage operations under strict guidelines. Despite this, during the

Appellant’s tenure as Forest Range Officer, a large number of trees in

Kalimela and Chitrakonda Ranges were illegally felled and removed

at minimal royalty. It was contended that the investigation

established a prima facie case under the Prevention of Corruption

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Act, IPC and Odisha Forest Act, and therefore the charges were

rightly framed. The plea of parity with co-accused officers whose

proceedings were quashed was opposed on the ground that those

cases were decided on their own facts and mitigating circumstances.

ANALYSIS

12. Heard Ld. Counsel for the appellant as well as Ld. Counsel for

the respondent. We have also perused relevant documents on record

and the judgment passed by the High Court.

13. The High Court vide its judgement dated. 10.04.2023 dismissed

the application of the Appellant-accused while observing as under:

“13. To restate the facts before winding up, the Court finds that the

learned counsel for the petitioner in CRLMC No.1134 of2021 referred

to a copy of the order of the Govt. in Forest and Environment

Department. On a reading of the said order, it is made to appear that

the departmental proceeding has been dropped on the ground that

the action against Mr. Susanta Nanda on the same issue was closed.

In fact, the said accused and the Vigilance prosecution against him

was quashed in CRLMC No.2577 of 2008 since the Vigilance

Department did not dispute him of having any role to play in the

appointment of the RMP. In other words, the departmental action

against the said petitioner was closed after the proceeding vis- à-vis

the accused in CRLMC No.2577 of 2008 was quashed. It is claimed

that since there is exoneration of the petitioner in the departmental

proceeding, the Vigilance prosecution should be brought to an end.

While contending so, Mr. Samantaray cited a decision of this Court

decided in CRLMC No.3407 of 2010 (Minaketan Pani Vrs. State of

Odisha). In the aforesaid decision, this Court found the petitioner

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therein to have been fully exonerated and hence on such ground

quashed the prosecution. In the present case, the departmental

proceeding was closed since another accused was let off after the

order in CRLMCNo.2577of 2008. Moreover, considering the

representation of the said petitioner and in view of the closure of the

departmental proceeding against the co-accused, the action against

him was dropped which is not a decision on merit or a case of

exoneration of charges honorably. Nevertheless, the Govt. Granted

the sanction in order to criminally prosecute the petitioner which is

also challenged on the ground for not properly considering the

materials on record. According to the Court, such an aspect is to be

examined during trial. What were the materials placed before the

Govt. and whether there was judicious application of mind at the time

of according sanction is a matter to be examined by the Vigilance

court. The plea of parity referring to exoneration of two other accused

persons in CRLMC No.2577 of 2008 and CRLMC No.3033 of 2011

cannot be entertained since they stood allowed under the mitigating

circumstances found in their favour. The need of sanction under

Section 197 Cr.P.C. is raised by Mr.Samantaray by placing reliance

on the decision of the Apex Court in D. Devaraj Vs. Owa is Sabeer

Hussain decided in Criminal Appeal No. 458 of 2020 and disposed

of on 18th June, 2020. Since it is a Vigilance prosecution and

large scale felling of trees and removal of timbers has been

alleged leading to a loss to the Govt. exchequer, whether, it

was an act in failing to exercise due diligence or an error in

judgment or otherwise, having regard to the entirety of the

materials and circumstances under which action was taken

and sanction was accorded by the Govt. to crimin ally

prosecute the petitioners, the Court is of the view that the plea

of immunity in terms of Section 197 Cr.P.C. shall have to be

examined during trial. …What was the role played by the said

petitioner is a matter of evidence. Furthermore, the above

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petitioner cannot claim discharge on the ground that he had

retired from Govt. service by the time FIR was lodged and that

he was not in picture when the RMP was allowed Cooperate.

All such questions are factual based which needs

determination only after a ppreciating the entire of the

evidence.…. Moreover the above petitioner is one of the

partners of the RMP which was involved in the salvage

operation. The allegation is about clandestine felling of live

trees and removing them from the forest area under the excuse

of salvage clearance which was at the instance of the RMP of

which the said petitioner happens to be one of its partners.

The Court is also not inclined to go into the details in order to

segregate the role played by the said petitioner as in any case

he is stated to be a partner of the RMP….”

[Emphasis supplied]

14. On perusal of the FIR, it is revealed that the Appellant i.e.,

Susanta Kumar Dalai was then working as a Range Officer in

kalimela range and it was alleged that he along with other high

officials and private firm namely M/s Keshari Traders conspired

together by abusing his official position in allowing them to do

clandestine felling of live trees in order to derive monetary benefit for

themselves and for the firm.

15. It can be safely stated that firstly, the nature of accusation is of

joint accusation against all the accused persons including the

Appellant and this factum is revealed from the perusal of the FIR and

the charge sheet. It also reveals further that there is no specific

material against the Appellant nor the Courts below recorded any

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finding or observation for not considering the case of discharge

against the Appellant on an independent assessment of the material

qua the Appellant. Secondly, on the backdrop of similar set of

accusations against the other accused persons, the plea for discharge

by those accused persons is favorably entertained by the Court qua

those accused persons. On this fact situation, there was no reason

for the High Court to single out the Appellant from the other co-

accused persons and rejecting his claim when the Appellant claimed

parity with the other accused persons. In our opinion, the reasons

assigned by the High Court rejecting the claim of the Appellant

neither stand to reason nor sustainable on the facts of the matter.

16. In Neelu Chopra and another Vs. Bharti 2009 10 SCC 184 , it

has been held that:

9. In order to lodge a proper complaint, mere mention of the sections

and the language of those sections is not the be all and end all of the

matter. What is required to be brought to the notice of the court is the

particulars of the offence committed by each and every accused and

the role played by each and every accused in committing of that

offence.

We are of the opinion that material on record in the present case

do not satisfy such a requirement for implicating the Appellant in the

criminal proceeding which is pending against him. In the absence of

allegations indicating specific role played by the Appellant towards

commission of the alleged offences, continuance of criminal

proceeding against the Appellant shall not serve any useful purpose

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and rather would amount to abuse of process of court. Therefore, in

order to secure ends of justice, criminal proceeding, against the

Appellant is liable to be dropped.

17. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335;

AIR 1992 SC 604, it has been held that:

102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant

provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law

enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the

exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent

powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and

reproduced above, we have given the following categories of cases

by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either

to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure

the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any

precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible

guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad

kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the

complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in

their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a

case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other

materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable

offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section

156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the

purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

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(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint

and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the

commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable

offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation

is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as

contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd

and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person

can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for

proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the

provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal

proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the

proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or

the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of

the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide

and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior

motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to

spite him due to private and personal grudge.

In the present case, the allegations are vague and do not specify

the Appellant’s role. This falls squarely within the first category

mentioned above. Even if the entire prosecution case is taken as true,

there is no material that specifically links the Appellant to the alleged

offence. Therefore, the discharge petition deserves to be allowed. If

there's any indication that the Appellant was roped in simply because

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they were part of a larger group or due to political/personal vendetta,

and there is no clear act or role assigned, it can be observed that the

continuation of proceedings amounts to harassment and abuse of the

process of law.

18. The Court is not convinced that continuing the criminal case

against the Appellant would be fair or just. The Appellant has

approached this Court saying that the allegations made in the

chargesheet are unclear, general, and do not mention any specific

wrongdoing by them. After carefully checking the records, the Court

agrees with this argument.

19. In any criminal case, there must be clear and specific material

that shows the accused might have committed the crime. A case

cannot be allowed to continue based only on guesses or vague

statements. In this case, the material does not show any direct

involvement of the Appellant in the crime. The accusations are made

against a group of people together and do not explain what exactly

the Appellant is supposed to have done. Such broad and general

claims, without mentioning the Appellant’s individual role, are not

enough to continue with the trial.

20. We are of the opinion that the presence of general allegations,

without any overt act or specific imputations against the accused,

cannot be sufficient to proceed to trial. The law is well settled that at

the stage of consideration of discharge, though a d etailed

appreciation of evidence is not warranted, the Court must be satisfied

that there exists sufficient ground for proceeding against the

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accused. In this case, even if the entirety of the material produced by

the prosecution is accepted as true, it does not disclose the

commission of any offence by the Appellant. The allegations appear

to be cast in a net wide enough to implicate all, without regard to

individual acts or culpability. This is impermissible under law.

21. Furthermore, it is not in dispute that two co-accused, namely

Indian Forest Service officers who were similarly situated and even

more prominently placed in the administrative chain of events, have

already been discharged by the High Court. A comparative

examination of the roles ascribed to the discharged co-accused and

the present Appellant shows no distinguishable basis that would

justify differential treatment. The principle of parity, which is a

fundamental tenet of criminal jurisprudence, requires that similarly

situated accused persons be treated alike. When the allegations and

evidence against the Appellant are not even qualitatively stronger

than those against the discharged co-accused, the continuation of

proceedings against the Appellant alone would be arbitrary and

violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

22. This Court is further persuaded by the broader consideration

that the criminal process must not be permitted to degenerate into

an instrument of oppression. The law must act as a shield for the

innocent, not as a sword in the hands of the vindictive. Where the

material does not disclose the commission of an offence, the Court is

duty-bound to interdict the proceedings at the threshold. The

criminal trial is not a mere formality, nor a ritualistic procedure to be

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endured regardless of merit. It entails stigma, hardship, and

irreparable harm to the reputation and liberty of the individual.

Where the materials do not establish even a grave suspicion, the

accused must not be compelled to undergo the ordeal of trial.

23. In this regard, the Court notes with approval the observations

made in Yogesh v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 10 SCC 394 that:

27. From the material on record, it is manifestly clear that it was the

family members of the appellant, one of their employees and a friend

who had all allegedly entered into an agreement to eliminate the

deceased. However, as noted above, Accused A-1, A-2, A-4, A-11 and

A-12 already stand discharged from the charges framed against

them under Sections 120-B and 302 IPC vide orders dated 7-7-2006

and 14-5-2007, passed by the High Court and the Sessions Judge

respectively. While discharging the said accused, both the courts

have come to the conclusion that there is no material on record to

show that they had hatched a conspiracy to commit murder of Kunal.

Thus, the stand of the prosecution to the effect that the parents, sister

and friends of the appellant had entered into a criminal conspiracy

stands rejected by virtue of the said orders of discharge.

Furthermore, in its order dated 7-7-2006, the High Court has opined

that the circumstances, relied upon by the prosecution, even if

accepted in their entirety, only create a suspicion of motive, which is

not sufficient to bring home an offence of murder. As noted above, the

State's petition for special leave against the said judgment has

already been dismissed.

It can be seen that while the standard of proof at the stage of

framing of charge is not that required for conviction, there must at

least exist a grave suspicion against the accused. The material before

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us does not cross even that threshold in the case of the present

Appellant. The allegations, far from being grave, are devoid of

specificity or legal relevance.

24. In light of the aforesaid consideration, we are of the opinion that

the appeal deserves to be allowed and Appellant is entitled for his

discharge from the offences alleged against him. Accordingly, the

appeal is allowed and disposed of.

........................................J.

[PANKAJ MITHAL]

.........................................J.

[PRASANNA B. VARALE]

NEW DELHI;

MAY 18, 2026.