2024 INSC 706 1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 10648 OF 2024

(Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). 21172 of 2021)

SUSHMA .…APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

NITIN GANAPATI

RANGOLE & ORS. ….RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 10649 OF 2024

(Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). 1023 of 2022)

CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 10650 OF 2024

(Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). 21248 of 2021)

CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 10651 OF 2024

(Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). 337 of 2022)

CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 10652-10653 OF 2024

(Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). 17692-17693 of 2023)

J U D G M E N T

Mehta, J.

Civil Appeals @ SLP(Civil) Nos. 21172 of 2021

Civil Appeals @ SLP(Civil) Nos. 1023 of 2022

Civil Appeals @ SLP(Civil) Nos. 21248 of 2021

Civil Appeals @ SLP(Civil) Nos. 337 of 2022

1. Leave granted.

2

2. The appellant-claimants have preferred these appeals being

aggrieved by the common judgment dated 7

th April, 2021 passed

by the Division Bench of High Court of Karnataka in MAC appeals

1

filed by the appellant-claimants and respondent No.2-Reliance

General Insurance Limited (for short the ‘Insurer’) under Section

173(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short the ‘Act’). The

Division Bench of the High Court disposed of the appeals in the

following manner: -

“ORDER

1. Miscellaneous First Appeals filed by both the Insurance

Company and the Claimants are disposed of;

2. The modified compensation in all the appeals is as follows:

MFA No. Amount (Rs.)

102773 of 2016 (MVC 2277 of 2013) 21,81,718.00

102774 of 2016 (MVC 2278 of 2013) 74,720.00

102775 of 2016 (MVC 2279 of 2013) 59,54,392.00

102776 of 2016 (MVC 2280 of 2013) 7,01,400.00

102777 of 2016 (MVC 2281 of 2013) 15,000.00

3. Insurance company shall satisfy the award within four

weeks from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order;

4. Apportionment and disbursement of the compensation

amount shall be as per the award of the Tribunal;

5. The amount in deposit, if any, be transmitted to the

Tribunal forthwith, for disbursement to the claimants.”

1

In Miscellaneous First Appeal Nos. 102776, 102549, 102775, 102546, 102773, 102547,

102777 & 102550 of 2016 and 100204 of 2017.

3

3. Brief facts relevant and essential for the disposal of the

present appeals are that on 18

th August, 2013, a car bearing

registration No. MH-09/BX-4073 (for short ‘the car’) collided with

a 14-wheeler trailer truck bearing registration No. MH-09/CA-

0389 (for short ‘the offending truck’) which was left abandoned in

the middle of the highway without any warning signs in the form

of indicators or parking lights. The collision resulted into the death

of the passengers of the car, namely, Sunita, Ashtavinayak Patil,

Deepali and the driver Saiprasad Karande at the spot. One of the

passengers, namely, Smt. Sushma (wife of deceased- Ashtavinayak

Patil) survived the accident, however, sustaining grievous injuries.

The car was insured by respondent No. 4-IFFCO-TOKIO General

Insurance Co. Ltd. (for short the ‘Insurance Company’), whereas,

the offending truck was insured by respondent No.2-Insurer.

4. The injured Smt. Sushma and the legal heirs of the deceased

occupants of the car filed separate claim petitions under Section

166 of the Act before the VI Additional District and Sessions Judge

and Member, Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Belagavi

(hereinafter being referred to as ‘Tribunal’) claiming compensation

from the owner of offending truck i.e. respondent No. 1 and the

insurer of the offending truck i.e. respondent No.2-Insurer. No

4

relief was sought by the claimants against the owner and the

insurer of the car. The claimants alleged that since the offending

truck was left abandoned in the middle of the highway without

switching on the parking lights or indicators or without taking any

other precautionary measures to warn the incoming traffic, the

person in control of the said vehicle was fully responsible for the

accident.

5. The Tribunal, while deciding the claims held that it was a

case of contributory negligence by the drivers of both the vehicles.

The Tribunal observed that the driver of the car had contributed

to the accident because he failed to take appropriate preventive

measures so as to avoid collision with the offending truck which

was parked in the middle of the road.

6. As the appellant-claimants had not claimed compensation

from owner of the car, i.e., respondent No.3-Shri Vasant Ravan

Jadhawar and respondent No.4-Insurance Company of the car,

these respondents were exonerated and the claims against them

were dismissed.

7. The Tribunal computed the compensation as below: -

MVC No. Amount(Rs.)

2277 of 2013 22,25,000.00

2278 of 2013 30,000.00

2279 of 2013 66,02,500.00

5

2280 of 2013 87,500.00

2281 of 2013 12,500.00

8. The Tribunal held the owner of the offending truck ,

respondent No.1 and the respondent No. 2-Insurer jointly and

severally responsible to indemnify the claims of the appellant-

claimants and at the same time directed reduction of the

compensation awarded by 50% on account of contributory

negligence.

9. Aggrieved by the quantum of compensation awarded and the

reduction on account of contributory negligence, the appellant-

claimants filed appeals under Section 173(1) of the Act before the

High Court of Karnataka.

10. Upon hearing arguments advanced on behalf of the parties

and appreciating the material available on record, the Division

Bench of the High Court of Karnataka applied the rule of last

opportunity and held that had the driver of the car been cautious,

he could have avoided the accident. The High Court gave

imprimatur to the Tribunal’s observation with respect to

contributory negligence, however, it modified and enhanced

compensation awarded by the Tribunal while disposing of the

appeals vide judgment dated 7

th April, 2021 (supra). The High

6

Court affirmed the direction of the Tribunal holding the respondent

No.2-Insurer responsible to indemnify the claims to the extent of

50%.

11. The appellant-claimants have preferred these appeals by

special leave primarily aggrieved by the deduction of the

compensation awarded to them on account of contributory

negligence.

12. Thus, the core issue involved in these appeals centres around

the deduction of 50% compensation awardable to the appellant-

claimants, who have assailed the concurrent findings of the Courts

below on the aspect of contributory negligence whereby, the driver

of the car, i.e. Saiprasad Karande (deceased), was held jointly

responsible for causing the collision.

13. The challenge in these appeals is against the concurrent

findings of the Courts below. The scope of interference by this

Court in such concurrent finding while exercising jurisdiction

under Article 136 of the Constitution of India is well-established.

In the case of Sukhbiri Devi v. Union of India

2, this Court noted:

“3. At the outset, it is to be noted that the challenge in this

appeal is against concurrent findings by three Courts, as

mentioned hereinbefore. The scope of an appeal by special

leave under Article 136 of the Constitution of India against the

concurrent findings is well settled. In State of

2

2022 SCC OnLine SC 1322

7

Rajasthan v. Shiv Dayal

3

reiterating the settled position, this

Court held that a concurrent finding of fact is binding, unless

it is infected with perversity. It was held therein: —

“When any concurrent finding of fact is assailed in

second appeal, the appellant is entitled to point

out that it is bad in law because it was recorded

de hors the pleadings or it was based on no

evidence or it was based on misreading of material

documentary evidence or it was recorded against

any provision of law and lastly, the decision is one

which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably

have reached. (see observation made by learned

Judge Vivian Bose, J. as His Lordship then was a

Judge of the Nagpur High Court in Rajeshwar

Vishwanath Mamidwar v. Dashrath Narayan

Chilwelkar, AIR 1943 Nag 117 Para 43).”

4. Thus, evidently, the settled position is that interference

with the concurrent findings in an appeal under Article

136 of the Constitution is to be made sparingly, that too

when the judgment impugned is absolutely perverse . On

appreciation of evidence another view is possible also cannot

be a reason for substitution of a plausible view taken and

confirmed. We will now, bearing in mind the settled position,

proceed to consider as to whether the said appellate power

invites invocation in the case on hand.”

(emphasis supplied)

14. This Court while dealing with the exercise of power under

Article 136 to interfere with concurrent findings in Mekala

Sivaiah v. State of A.P.,

4 expounded: -

“15. It is well settled by judicial pronouncement that Article

136 is worded in wide terms and powers conferred under the

said Article are not hedged by any technical hurdles. This

overriding and exceptional power is, however, to be exercised

sparingly and only in furtherance of cause of justice. Thus,

when the judgment under appeal has resulted in grave

miscarriage of justice by some misapprehension or misreading

of evidence or by ignoring material evidence then this Court is

not only empowered but is well expected to interfere to promote

the cause of justice.

3

(2019) 8 SCC 637

4

(2022) 8 SCC 253

8

16. It is not the practice of this Court to re-appreciate the

evidence for the purpose of examining whether the findings of

fact concurrently arrived at by the trial court and the High

Court are correct or not. It is only in rare and exceptional

cases where there is some manifest illegality or grave and

serious miscarriage of justice on account of misreading or

ignoring material evidence, that this Court would interfere

with such finding of fact.

…

18. In Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of

Gujarat [Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat,

(1983) 3 SCC 217 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 728] , a two-Judge Bench of

this Court held that this Court does not interfere with the

concurrent findings of fact unless it is established:

18.1. That the finding is based on no evidence.

18.2. That the finding is perverse, it being such as no

reasonable person could arrive at even if the evidence was

taken at its face value.

18.3. The finding is based and built on inadmissible

evidence which evidence, excluded from vision, would

negate the prosecution case or substantially discredit or

impair it.

18.4. Some vital piece of evidence which would tilt the

balance in favour of the convict has been overlooked,

disregarded or wrongly discarded.”

(emphasis supplied)

15. In view of the above precedents, it is clear that this Court in

exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of

India has the power to interfere, even if the Courts below have

concurrently reached to a common conclusion with respect to a

certain factual aspect, subject to the condition that such a

conclusion is so perverse that no reasonable person could arrive

9

at such a conclusion even if the evidence was taken at its face

value.

16. Having considered the submissions advanced by learned

counsel for the parties and after going through the impugned

judgements passed by the High Court and the Tribunal as well as

upon appreciating the material placed on record, we feel that the

contentious finding whereby, the driver of the car, namely,

Saiprasad Karande (deceased) was held jointly responsible for

causing the accident along with the driver/owner of the offending

truck leading to the claims of the passenger -Sushma &

dependants of the deceased-passengers being deducted by 50% on

the principle of contributory negligence is perverse on the face of

the record.

17. In addition, we hold that the finding of the Courts below,

which reduced the claims of the legal heirs of the deceased and the

injured, other than the legal heirs of the driver-Saiprasad Karande

(deceased) is also invalid in the eyes of law. The Courts below

uniformly applied the principle of contributory negligence while

directing deduction from the compensation awarded to the

respective appellant-claimants, i.e. the dependents of passengers

and the injured as well as the dependents of the driver-Saiprasad

10

Karande @ 50%. Thus, the contributory negligence of the driver of

the car was vicariously applied to the passengers which is prima

facie illegal and impermissible.

18. In the case of Union of India v. United India Insurance Co.

Ltd.,

5 this Court dealt with the question whether the driver’s

negligence in any manner vicariously attaches to the passengers

of the motor vehicle of which he was the driver, and it was held as

below: -

“10. There is a well-known principle in the law of torts called

the “doctrine of identification” or “imputation”. It is to the

effect that the defendant can plead the contributory negligence

of the plaintiff or of an employee of the plaintiff where the

employee is acting in the course of employment. But, it has

been also held in Mills v. Armstrong [(1888) 13 AC 1, HL] (also

called The Bernina case) that that principle is not applicable

to a passenger in a vehicle in the sense that the negligence of

the driver of the vehicle in which the passenger is travelling,

cannot be imputed to the passenger. (Halsbury's Laws of

England, 4th Ed., 1984 Vol. 34, p. 74; Ratanlal and

Dhirajlal, Law of Torts, 23rd Ed., 1997, p. 511; Ramaswamy

Iyer, Law of Torts, 7th Ed., p. 447.) The Bernina case [(1888)

13 AC 1, HL] in which this principle was laid in 1888 related

to passengers in a steamship. In that case a member of the

crew and a passenger in the ship Bushire were drowned on

account of its collision with another ship Bernina. It was held

that even if the navigators of the ship Bushire were negligent,

the navigators' negligence could not be imputed to the

deceased who were travelling in that ship. This principle has

been applied, in latter cases, to passengers travelling in a

motor vehicle whose driver is found guilty of contributory

negligence. In other words, the principle of contributory

negligence is confined to the actual negligence of the

plaintiff or of his agents. There is no rule that the driver

of an omnibus or a coach or a cab or the engine driver of

a train, or the captain of a ship on the one hand and the

5

(1997) 8 SCC 683

11

passengers on the other hand are to be “identified” so as

to fasten the latter with any liability for the former's

contributory negligence. There cannot be a fiction of the

passenger sharing a “right of control” of the operation of

the vehicle nor is there a fiction that the driver is an agent

of the passenger. A passenger is not treated as a backseat

driver. (Prosser and Keeton on Torts, 5th Ed., 1984, pp. 521-

22.) It is therefore clear that even if the driver of the passenger

vehicle was negligent, the Railways, if its negligence was

otherwise proved — could not plead contributory negligence

on the part of the passengers of the vehicle. What is clear is

that qua the passengers of the bus who were innocent, — the

driver and owner of the bus and, if proved, the Railways — can

all be joint tortfeasors.”

(emphasis supplied)

19. It is clear from the ratio of the above judgment that the

contributory negligence on the part of a driver of the vehicle

involved in the accident cannot be vicariously attached to the

passengers so as to reduce the compensation awarded to the

passengers or their legal heirs as the case may be.

20. Thus, we have no hesitation in holding that the Courts below

committed gross error in law while reducing the compensation

awarded to the appellant-claimants, being the dependents of the

deceased-passengers and Smt. Sushma as the claims of these

claimants cannot be truncated by attaching the vicarious liability

with the driver. However, the claim of the dependents of the

deceased driver Saiprasad Karande would stand on a different

footing.

12

21. We shall now proceed to discuss whether the Courts below

were justified in fastening partial liability on the driver of the car

on the basis of contributory negligence in causing the accident.

22. The High Court, after adverting to the evidence available on

record, made the following observations on the aspect of

contributory negligence: -

“12. The Investigation Officer has filed charge sheet against

the driver of the car as also the driver of truck. Exhibit P4-spot

mahazar establishes the fact that the offending truck was

parked on the middle of the road. Undisputedly, accident took

place at 9.10 pm and the truck is a Heavy Goods Vehicle.

Exhibit P6-Photograph of the place of accident substantiate

that the offending truck was fourteen wheeled heavy truck

which was parked on the middle of the road. Though Shri G.N.

Raichur, learned counsel submitted that the truck was parked

on the extreme left of the road, however, perusal of the

photographs would clearly substantiate the fact that the

truck was parked on the middle of the road and on the

other hand, the learned counsel for the claimants

submitted that there was fog at the time of the accident.

There are no eye-witnesses to the incident. Taking into

consideration the facts in totality, it may be stated that if the

driver of the car was cautious, he would have avoided the

accident and accordingly, the rule of last opportunity would

be squarely applicable to the facts of the case and therefore,

the finding recorded by the Tribunal fastening 50%

contributory negligence on the drivers of both the vehicles in

question, is just and proper. In view of the same, the finding

recorded by the Tribunal on issue No.1 is, hereby, affirmed

and the appeals filed by the Insurance Company challenging

the liability are required to be rejected, accordingly rejected.”

(emphasis supplied)

23. On going through the above extract from the impugned

judgment, it is evident that the High Court recorded an affirmative

finding that the offending truck was parked in the middle of the

road. This finding as borne out from the evidence is not under

13

challenge and has attained finality. The accident took place on 18

th

August, 2013 which as per the Hindu calendar fell on Shukla

Paksha Dwadashi, and thus, there was not even a remote

possibility that the road would be illuminated by moonlight at the

time of the accident. The discussion of evidence by the Tribunal

and the High Court makes no reference to availability of

streetlights at the collision site and hence, there is no doubt that

at the time of the accident, the conditions on the road would have

been pitch dark making it virtually impossible for the incoming

vehicles to sight the stationary offending truck within a reasonable

distance.

24. Learned counsel for the appellant-claimants, urged that there

is neither any evidence nor any finding by the Courts below that

the offending truck was parked on the road after taking due care

and caution i.e. either by switching on the parking lights or by

putting any prominent markers around the vehicle so as to warn

the passing vehicles. Apparently thus, the offending truck was left

abandoned in the middle of the highway (as concurrently held by

both the Courts below) without taking due care and caution to

switch on the parking lights or to put in place any other

14

precautionary measures to warn the vehicles traversing the

highway in the dead of the night.

25. Common sense requires that no vehicle can be left parked

and unattended in the middle of the road as it would definitely be

a traffic hazard posing risk to the other road users.

26. We shall briefly refer to the statutory provisions applicable to

the situation at hand.

27. A highway or a road is a public place as defined in Section

2(34) of the Act: -

“2(34) “public place” means a road, street, way or other place,

whether a thoroughfare or not, to which the public have a right

of access, and includes any place or stand at which passengers

are picked up or set down by a stage carriage;”

28. Section 121 of the Act provides that the driver of a motor

vehicle shall make such signals and, on such occasions, as may

be prescribed by the Central Government.

29. Section 122 of the Act provides that no person in charge of a

motor vehicle shall cause or allow the vehicle or any trailer to be

abandoned or to remain at rest on any “public place” in such a

position or in such a condition or in such circumstances so as to

cause or likely to cause danger, obstruction or undue

inconvenience to other users of the public place or to the

passengers.

15

30. Section 126 of the Act provides that no person driving or in

charge of a motor vehicle shall cause or allow the vehicle to remain

stationary in any public place.

31. Section 127(2) of the Act provides that where any abandoned,

unattended, wrecked, burnt or partially dismantled vehicle is

creating a traffic hazard, because of its position in relation to the

public place, or its physical appearance is causing the impediment

to the traffic, its immediate removal from the public place by a

towing service may be authorised by a p olice officer having

jurisdiction.

32. Regulation 15 of the Rules of Road Regulation, 1989 which

were prevailing on the date of the incident provides that every

driver of a motor vehicle shall park the vehicle in such a way that

it does not cause or is not likely to cause danger, obstruction or

undue inconvenience to other road users. It casts a duty on the

drivers of a motor vehicle stating that the vehicle shall not be

parked at or near a road crossing or in a main road.

33. These legal provisions leave no room for doubt that the

person in control of the offending truck acted in sheer violation of

law while abandoning the vehicle in the middle of the road and

that too without taking precautionary measures like switching on

16

the parking lights, reflectors or any other appropriate steps to warn

the other vehicles travelling on the highway. Had the accident

taken place during the daytime or if the place of accident was well

illuminated, then perhaps, the car driver could have been held

equally responsible for the accident by applying the rule of last

opportunity. But the fact remains that there was no illumination

at the accident site either natural or artificial. Since the offending

truck was left abandoned in the middle of the road in clear

violation of the applicable rules and regulations, the burden to

prove that the placement of the said vehicle as such was beyond

human control and that appropriate precautionary measures

taken while leaving the vehicle in that position were essentially on

the person in control of the offending truck. However, no evidence

was led by the person having control over the said truck in this

regard. Thus, the entire responsibility for the negligence leading to

the accident was of the truck owner/driver.

34. In view of the above discussion, the view expressed by the

High Court that if the driver of the car had been vigilant and would

have driven the vehicle carefully by following the traffic rules, the

accident may have been avoided is presumptuous on the face of

the record as the same is based purely on conjectures and

17

surmises. Nothing on record indicates that the car was being

driven at an excessively high speed or that the driver failed to

follow the traffic rules. The High Court recorded an incongruous

finding that if the offending truck had not been parked on the

highway, the accident would not have happened even if the car was

being driven at a very high speed. Therefore, the reasoning of the

High Court on the issue of contributory negligence is riddled with

inherent contradictions and is paradoxical.

35. The Courts below erred in concluding that it is a case of

contributory negligence, because in order to establish contributory

negligence, some act or omission which materially contributed to

the accident or damage should be attributed to the person against

whom it is alleged.

36. In the case of Pramodkumar Rasikbhai Jhaveri v.

Karmasey Kunvargi Tak

6, this Court while referring to a decision

of the High Court of Australia in Astley v. Austrust Ltd.

7, went on

to hold that: -

“… where, by his negligence, if one party places another in

a situation of danger which compels that other to act quickly in

order to extricate himself, it does not amount to contributory

negligence, if that other acts in a way which, with the benefit of

hindsight is shown not to have been the best way out of the

difficulty.”

6

(2002) 6 SCC 455

7

(1999) 73 ALJR 403

18

37. In the very same judgment, this Court also referred to and

approved the view taken in Swadling v. Cooper

8, as below: -

“Mere failure to avoid the collision by taking some extra

ordinary precaution, does not in itself constitute

negligence.”

(emphasis supplied)

38. A three Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Archit Saini

and Another v. Oriental Insurance C ompany Limited and

Others

9, had the occasion to consider an identical fact scenario,

and after analysing the evidence available on record, it was held:-

“8. After having perused the evidence of PW7, Site Map (Ext.

P-45) and the detailed analysis undertaken by the Tribunal, we

have no hesitation in taking the view that the approach of the

High Court in reversing the conclusion arrived at by the

Tribunal on issue No.1 has been very casual, if not cryptic and

perverse. Indeed, the appeal before the High Court is required

to be decided on fact and law. That, however, would not permit

the High Court to casually overturn the finding of

fact recorded by the Tribunal. As is evident from the analysis

done by the Tribunal, it is a well-considered opinion and a

plausible view. The High Court has not adverted to any specific

reason as to why the view taken by the Tribunal was incorrect

or not supported by the evidence on record. It is well settled

that the nature of proof required in cases concerning accident

claims is qualitatively different from the one in criminal cases,

which must be beyond any reasonable doubts. The Tribunal

applied the correct test in the analysis of the evidence

before it. Notably, the High Court has not doubted the evidence

of PW7 as being unreliable nor has it discarded his version that

the driver of the Maruti Car could not spot the parked Gas

Tanker due to the flashlights of the oncoming traffic from the

front side. Further, the Tribunal also adverted to the

legal presumption against the driver of the Gas Tanker of

having parked his vehicle in a negligent manner in the middle

of the road. The Site Plan (Ext. P-45) reinforces the version of

8

1931 AC 1

9

(2018) 3 SCC 365

19

PW7 that the Truck (Gas Tanker) was parked in the middle of

the road but the High Court opined to the contrary

without assigning any reason whatsoever. In our view, the Site

Plan (Ext. P-45) filed along with the chargesheet does not

support the finding recorded by the High Court that the Gas

Tanker was not parked in the middle of the road. Notably, the

High Court has also not doubted the claimant’s plea that the

Gas Tanker/offending vehicle was parked without any indicator

or parking lights. The fact that PW7 who was standing on the

opposite side of the road at a distance of about 70 feet, could

see the Gas Tanker parked on the other side of the road does

not discredit his version that the Maruti Car coming from the

opposite side could not spot the Gas Tanker due to flashlights

of the oncoming traffic from the front side. It is not in dispute

that the road is a busy road. In the cross-examination, neither

has any attempt been made to discredit the version of PW7 nor

has any suggestion been made that no vehicle with flashlights

on was coming from the opposite direction of the parked Gas

Tanker at the relevant time.

9. Suffice it to observe that the approach of the High Court in

reversing the well -considered finding recorded by the

Tribunal on the material fact, which was supported by the

evidence on record, cannot be countenanced.

10. Accordingly, we have no hesitation in setting aside the said

finding of the High Court. As a result, the appellants would be

entitled to the enhanced compensation as determined

by the High Court in its entirety without any deduction

towards contributory negligence. In other words, we restore

the finding of the Tribunal rendered on issue No.1 against the

respondents and hold that respondent no.1 negligently

parked the Gas Tanker/offending vehicle in the middle of the

road without any indicator or parking lights.”

39. We are of the view that the aforesaid decision applies to the

case at hand on all fours and thus, the appellant-claimants cannot

be denied their rightful compensation on the ground that the driver

of the car, namely Saiprasad Karande (deceased), was jointly

responsible for the accident with the person in control of the

20

offending truck and hence, their claims should be reduced on the

principle of contributory negligence.

40. On a holistic analysis of the material available on record, it is

established beyond the pale of doubt that the offending truck was

parked in the middle of the road without any parking lights being

switched on and without any markers or indicators being placed

around the stationary vehicle so as to warn the incoming vehicular

traffic. This omission by the person in control of the said truck

was in clear violation of law. The accident took place on a highway

where the permissible speed limits are fairly high. In such a

situation, it would be imprudent to hold that the driver of a vehicle,

travelling through the highway in the dead of the night in pitch

dark conditions, would be able to make out a stationary vehicle

lying in the middle of the road within a reasonable distance so as

to apply the brakes and avoid the collision. The situation would be

compounded by the headlights of the vehicles coming from the

opposite direction and make the viewing of the stationary vehicle

even more difficult. Thus, the conclusion drawn by the Courts

below that the driver of the car could have averted the accident by

applying the brakes and hence, he was equally negligent and

contributed to the accident on the application of principle of last

21

opportunity is ex-facie perverse and cannot be sustained. Hence,

it is a fit case warranting exercise of this Court’s powers under

Article 136 of the Constitution of India to interfere with the

concurrent finding of facts.

41. We, therefore, hold that the person in control of the offending

truck insured by respondent No. 2-Insurer, was fully responsible

for the negligence leading to the accident.

42. As a consequence, the deduction of 50% of compensation

awarded to the appellant-claimants on account of contributory

negligence, as directed by the Tribunal and affirmed by the High

Court, cannot be sustained. The finding recorded by the Courts

below on this issue is reversed as being perverse and

unsustainable in the facts as well as in law. Resultantly, it is

directed that there shall be no deduction from the compensation

payable to the appellant-claimants who shall be entitled to the full

compensation as assessed by the Tribunal and modified by the

High Court by the impugned judgment.

43. It is further directed that respondent No. 2-Insurer shall be

jointly and severally liable along with the owner of the offending

truck to indemnify the awards.

44. The appeals are accordingly allowed. No costs.

22

Civil Appeals @ SLP(Civil) Nos. 17692-17693 of 2023

45. Leave granted.

46. In these appeals, the appellant-Malutai

10 has challenged the

apportionment of the compensation awarded by the Tribunal

between the appellant and the co-claimant

11. Modification in the

apportionment is sought on the ground that the co-claimant Smt.

Sushma has remarried after the claim was decided and thus, she

cannot claim equal share in the compensation.

47. Having considered the submissions advanced on behalf of the

parties, we are not inclined to interfere in the apportionment of the

compensation between the appellant-Malutai and co-claimant

(respondent No.5), as directed by the Tribunal and affirmed by the

High Court. Thus, the said prayer of the appellant-Malutai is

declined.

48. However, we reiterate the findings recorded in Civil Appeal @

SLP (Civil) No. 21172 of 2021 and connected matters and direct

that the claimants, being the mother and wife of the deceased-

10

Mother of the deceased-Ashtavinayak Patil

11

Smt. Sushma, wife of the deceased-Ashtavinayak Patil (respondent No. 5 in the present

appeals)

23

Ashtavinayak Patil, shall be entitled to full compensation without

any deduction on account of contributory negligence.

49. The respondent No.2-Insurer shall be liable to indemnify the

award, however, the apportionment of the compensation inter se

between the claimants as directed by the Tribunal shall not be

disturbed.

50. The appeals are accordingly disposed of. No costs.

51. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

…………………. ………………….……….J.

(PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA )

………………….. …………………………. J.

(SANDEEP MEHTA)

New Delhi;

September 19, 2024.