1

Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Civil Appeal No 3045 of 2020

TATA Consultancy Services Limited .... Appellant

Versus

Vishal Ghisulal Jain, Resolution Professional,

SK Wheels Private Limited .... Respondent

J U D G M E N T

Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J

1. This appeal arises from a judgment dated 24 June 2020 of the National

Company Law Appellate Tribunal

1

. The NCLAT upheld the interim order dated 18

December 2019 of the National Company Law Tribunal

2

which stayed the

termination by the appellant of its Facilities Agreement dated 1 December 2016

with SK Wheels Private Limited

3

.

1

“NCLAT”

2

“NCLT” or “Adjudicating Authority”

3

“Corporate Debtor” or “Respondent ”

2

Factual Background

2. The appellant and the Corporate Debtor entered into a Build Phase

Agreement on 24 August 2015 followed by a Facilities Agreement on 1

December 2016. The Facilities Agreement obligated the Corporate Debtor to

provide premises with certain specifications and facilities to the appellant for

conducting examinations for educational institutions.

3. Clause 11(b) of the Facilities Agreement states that either party is entitled

to terminate the agreement immediately by written notice to the other party

provided that a material breach committed by the latter is not cured within thirty

days of the receipt of the notice. Clause 11(b) reads as follows:

“11. Termination

….

(b) Termination for Material Breach. Either party may

terminate this Agreement immediately by a written notice to

the other Party in the event of a material breach which is not

cured within thirty days of the receipt of the said notice

period.”

4. A termination notice was issued by the appellant to the Corporate Debtor

on 10 June 2019 which came into effect immediately. The parties have contested

the facts leading up to the issuance of the notice.

5. It has been submitted on behalf of the appellant that there were multiple

lapses by the Corporate Debtor in fulfilling its contractual obligations, which it

failed to remedy satisfactorily. The appellant notified the Corporate Debtor in its

email dated 1 August 2018 that it intended to invoke the penalty clause of the

Facilities Agreement for the alleged contractual breaches. Another email dated

3

17 September 2018 was sent to the Corporate Debtor regarding non-compliance

with the agreement. Following a site visit, the appellant i n its email dated 1

October 2018 directed the Corporate Debtor to take urgent steps to remedy the

breaches. On 11 October 2018, the appellant put the Corporate Debtor on notice

that it would be constrained to invoke the penalty and termination clauses of the

Facilities Agreement for the alleged non-compliance. On 13 October 2018, the

appellant addressed an email to the Corporate Debtor highlighting its concerns

regarding the insufficiency of housekeeping staff and their malpractices in respect

of entering attendance. Eventually on 19 November 2018, the appellant intimated

to the Corporate Debtor that it will deploy its housekeeping staff and deduct the

costs from the invoice. On 3 February 2019, the appellant wrote an email to the

Corporate Debtor raising issues of power supply and shortage of housekeeping

staff, among other deficiencies.

6. The Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process

4

was initiated against the

Corporate Debtor on 29 March 2019. The appellant has alleged that it came to

know about the CIRP against the Corporate Debtor when the Electricity Board

disconnected the supply of electricity to the Corporate Debtor on 24 April 2019.

7. On 29 May 2019, the Corporate Debtor in its email alleged that the

appellant had failed to make the requisite payments and the electricity was

disconnected as a result. In its response dated 30 May 2019, the appellant stated

that:

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“CIRP”

4

(i) It came to know that a CIRP was initiated against the Corporate Debtor

when the electricity was disconnected;

(ii) There were no amounts due to the Corporate Debtor; and

(iii) It made the payments for periods before March 2019. There was a

delay in making payments for March 2019 because the Corporate

Debtor requested a change in bank account details. No invoice was

raised for April 2019.

8. The appellant claims that the material breaches by the Corporate Debtor

have resulted in a liability of Rs. 20,78,500. It did not initiate recovery

proceedings on account of the moratorium imposed under Section 14 of the

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016

5

.

9. The appellant issued a notice of termination dated 10 June 2019 in terms

of Clause 11(b) of the Facilities Agreement. The termination notice stated thus:

“Despite of all our sincere attempts in settling the crucial

business issues, we have always received unvaried response

from your end and these occurrences of non- observation has

now culminated into breach of following terms and conditions

of the Agreement.

1. Not maintaining the minimum level of skillset of personal on

exam and non-exam days which is non- compliance as per

Annexure B, Table C, and also a process violation.

2. Furnishing and Designing guidelines (Annexure B, Table

D) not being adhered

a) Furniture broken condition

b) Temperature and ventilation in labs, server room and UPS

rooms not being maintained

c) Deploying housing staff

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“IBC”

5

d) Cleanliness and up keeping of the center

3. Branding and Navigation not in synchronization with

Annexure F of facility agreement

In view of all the aforestated events, consider this as a notice

of termination as per clause 11 (b) of the Agreement which

entitles Tata Consultancy Services Ltd. ("TCS") to terminate

the Agreement with immediate effect by issuance of a written

notice in the event of a material breach not being cured within

30 days.

Please take notice that the relationship between us as

Client/Service Recipient and you as Service Provider/

Vendor/LISP stands terminated with effect from 10th June.”

10. On behalf of the Corporate Debtor, it is submitted that certain routine

operational requirements were highlighted by the appellant from time to time,

which were rectified within a reasonable duration. The Corporate Debtor has

allegedly invested Rs. 8.35 crores to fulfil its contractual obligations. According to

the Corporate Debtor, the deficiencies raised by the appellant in its letter dated

11 October 2018 were remedied by the end of October 2018. The Corporate

Debtor has further submitted that certain other minor issues were cured by

February 2019. The deficiency in relation to the housekeeping staff provided by

the Corporate Debtor was allegedly cured when the appellant hired its own staff.

The Corporate Debtor has claimed that it complied with the directions of the

appellant intimated in its email dated 3 February 2019 in respect of changing

faulty batteries and providing cleaning products. The Corporate Debtor has

further submitted that while the electricity was disconnect ed by the E lectricity

Board in April 2019, it was eventually restored. It is stated that certain meetings

were held in April-May 2019 where the Resolution Professional

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informed the

6

“RP”

6

appellant that no prejudice would be caused to it and all the services and facilities

will be provided according to the agreement, but the appellant unilaterally

terminated the agreement with immediate effect on 10 June 2019. The Corporate

Debtor has contested the issuance of the termination notice on the ground that

no material breaches have occurred, and, in any event, a thirty days’ period is to

be given to a party to cure the defects before the agreement can be terminated

under Clause 11(b) of the Facilities Agreement.

Proceedings before the NCLT and NCLAT

11. The Corporate Debtor instituted a miscellaneous application

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before the

NCLT under Section 60(5)(c) of the IBC for quashing of the termination notice.

The NCLT passed an order dated 18 December 2019 granting an ad- interim stay

on the termination notice issued by the appellant and directed the appellant to

comply with the terms of the Facilities Agreement. The NCLT observed that

prima facie it appeared that the contract was terminated without serving the

requisite notice of thirty days. The conclusion of the NCLT is extracted below:

“Further whether the termination is good or bad in law, is a

matter of inquiry, which requires examination of the fact and

circumstances. In this scenario, we are of the prima facie

view that the termination of the contract even without serving

a notice to the corporate debtor is not correct.

In view of the same, we hereby stay the termination notice

issued by the respondent. Until then the respondent shall

adhere to the terms of contract without fail.”

7

Miscellaneous Application No 2954 of 2019

7

12. Aggrieved by the order, the appellant preferred an appeal

8

before the

NCLAT. The NCLAT by its order dated 24 June 2020 upheld the order of the

NCLT observing that it had correctly stayed the operation of the termination

notice since the main objective of the IBC is to ensure that the Corporate Debtor

remains a going concern. The NCLAT referred to Section 14 to highlight that a

moratorium is imposed to ensure the smooth functioning of the Corporate Debtor

to safeguard its status as a going concern. Further, it is the responsibility of the

RP under Section 25 of the IBC to preserve the Corporate Debtor as a going

concern. The relevant portions of the judgment are reproduced below:

“10…From the order it is seen that the Respondent herein

was appointed as Interim Resolution Professional (in short

IRP) to carry out the functions as per law. In view of Section

14 once a moratorium was imposed by the Adjudicating

Authority Interim Resolution Professional the Interim

Resolution Professional will be at the helm of affairs of the

company in view of the suspension of the Board of Directors

of the 'Corporate Debtor'. As on the date of the imposition of

moratorium the business and activities of the 'Corporate

Debtor' will have to be carried out for smooth functioning of

the company and the company shall remain as a going

concern. Apart from that the Resolution Professional shall

ensure for smooth running of the company as a going

concern and the Resolution Professional shall perform the

duties as per Section 25 of the I&B Code. Sub- Section (2)(a)

of Section 25, the Resolution Professional take immediate

custody and control of all the assets of the Corporate Debtor,

including the business records of the Corporate Debtor.

Further sub- section 2 (b) of Section 25 of the I & B Code

states that

"(b) represent and act on behalf of the corporate debtor with

third parties, exercise rights for the benefit of the corporate

debtor in judicial, quasi- judicial or arbitration proceedings;"

…

Further, the said provision sets out the duty of Resolution

Professional to preserve and protect the assets of the

'Corporate Debtor' and lays down the functions he may

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Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 237 of 2020

8

perform the same. In view of the duties cast upon the

Resolution Professional, the Resolution Professional to keep

the Corporate Debtor as a going concern and filed an

application being C.A. (M.B.)- 2954 of 2019 before the

Adjudicating Authority seeking stay of termination of notice

and sought direction to the Appellant to continue the Facilities

Agreement dated 01.12.2016.

11. The Adjudicating Authority after hearing the parties stayed

the termination of notice and directed the Appellant herein to

adhere to the terms of contract without fail. In view of the law,

after initiation of the CIRP the 'Corporate Debtor' shall

function and continue its business activities. It is the duty of

the Resolution Professional to keep the Corporate Debtor as

a going concern. It is the main objective of the Code to keep

the Corporate Debtor as a going concern. The Adjudicating

Authority rightly stayed the termination of notice and there is

no illegality in the Order passed by the Adjudicating Authority

dated 18.12.2019.”

The judgment of the NCLAT has given rise to the present appeal.

Submissions of Counsel

13. Ms Fereshte D Sethna, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

appellant, has made the following submissions:

(i) NCLT has misread the provisions of Section 14 of the IBC which relate

to the provision of goods and services to the Corporate Debtor once the

moratorium is imposed. In the present case, the appellant is availing of

the services of the Corporate Debtor, to which Section 14 has no

application;

(ii) As a result of the impugned order, the Facilities Agreement, which is a

determinable contract has become a non- terminable contract,

overlooking the mandate of Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act 1963;

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(iii) The termination notice was not issued to the Corporate Debtor because

it was undergoing CIRP but was on account of the material breaches of

the agreement. Multiple opportunities were given to the Corporate

Debtor to remedy the breaches before the termination notice was

issued;

(iv) The Facilities Agreement is not the sole contract of the Corporate

Debtor, termination of which would lead to its corporate death. The

Corporate Debtor is in the business of automotive part s, which is

evident from the main objects of its Memorandum of Association;

(v) The NCLT under Section 60 (5) (c) of the IBC cannot invoke its

residuary powers where there is a patent lack of jurisdiction. IBC does

not permit a statutory override of all contracts entered with the

Corporate Debtor. A third party has a contractual right of termination;

(vi) The duty of the RP under Section 25 of the IBC is not determinative of

the jurisdiction of the NCLT. Such a duty cannot be stretched to convert

a determinable commercial contract into a non- terminable contract,

forcing a contracting party to pay for deficient services that it is unwilling

to avail; and

(vii) In Gujarat Urja Vikas v. Amit Gupta & Ors.

9

, this Court had injuncted

a third party from terminating its contract with the corporate debtor

because there were concurrent findings of the NCLT and NCLAT

holding that the contract in question was the sole contract of the

9

(2021) 7 SCC 209; “Gujarat Urja”

10

corporate debtor, and the termination of the contract by the third party

was merely on the ground of initiation of CIRP without there being any

contractual default on part of the corporate debtor.

14. Ms Sowmya Saikumar, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the RP,

has urged that:

(i) NCLT is vested with the jurisdiction under Section 60(5)(c) of the IBC to

adjudicate issues relating to fact or law in respect of a company

undergoing CIRP;

(ii) The appellant’s argument that the contractual dispute can be decided

only through arbitration and the provisions of the Indian Contract Act

1872 and Specific Relief Act 1963 are attracted is incorrect. Section

238 of the IBC has an overriding effect over other laws. This Court in

Ashoka Marketing v. PNB

10

has held that two special laws containing

non-obstante clauses must be interpreted harmoniously by looking at

the purpose of the laws. Further, this Court has observed that a special

law enacted at a later date prevails over the earlier special law. Thus,

the provisions of the IBC would apply to the present dispute;

(iii) In Gujarat Urja (supra), this Court has held that the residuary

jurisdiction of the NCLT under Section 60(5)(c) of the IBC provides it a

wide discretion to adjudicate questions of law or fact arising from or in

relation to the insolvency resolution proceedings. It was further held that

Section 14 of the IBC is not exhaustive of the grounds of judicial

10

(1990) 4 SCC 406

11

intervention contemplated under the IBC otherwise Section 60(5)(c)

would be rendered otiose. One such ground of intervention is when the

status of the Corporate Debtor as a going concern is in jeopardy. Thus,

the NCLT has the power to exercise its jurisdiction under Section

60(5)(c) of the IBC to ensure that the Corporate Debtor survives as a

going concern;

(iv) The Corporate Debtor was not given a thirty days’ notice to cure the

breach in terms of Clause 11(b) of the Facilities Agreement. The

termination notice refers to a notice dated 3 October 2018, which has

not been placed on record. While a letter dated 11 October 2018 was

received by the Corporate Debtor alleging deficiencies, those were

cured by the end of October 2018. Th is is evinced by the fact that after

October 2018, no communication, except those dated 19 November

2018 and 3 February 2019, were received by the Corporate Debtor.

The Corporate Debtor had rectified any minor deficiencies that were

brought to its notice by the appellant promptly. Thus, the allegation that

there were material breaches of the agreement by the Corporate Debtor

is incorrect;

(v) The appellant became aware that CIRP has been initiated against the

Corporate Debtor and had immediately terminated the agreement

thereafter; and

(vi) The Corporate Debtor had two main sources of income – a dealership

of Maruti and the agreement with the appellant. The dealership was

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terminated before the initiation of CIRP, thus the only existing source of

income as of the date of initiation of CIRP was the Facilities Agreement,

for which the Corporate Debtor has incurred a substantial capital

expenditure of Rs. 8.35 crores. The termination of the agreement would

adversely affect the Corporate Debtor. In Gujarat Urja (supra), this

Court has held that the termination of an agreement which is the main

source of revenue generation of the Corporate Debtor is against the

objective of the IBC which envisages that the Corporate Debtor should

be preserved as a going concern.

Analysis

15. The rival contentions will now be considered.

16. Based on the appeal, two issues have arisen for consideration before this

Court:

(i) Whether the NCLT can exercise its residuary jurisdiction under Section

60(5)(c) of the IBC to adjudicate upon the contractual dispute between

the parties; and

(ii) Whether in the exercise of such a residuary jurisdiction, it can impose

an ad-interim stay on the termination of the Facilities Agreement.

17. Clause 12 (d) of the Facilities Agreement provides that the disputes

between the parties shall be a subject matter of arbitration. The clause reads

thus:

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“12 Miscellaneous

….

d) Governing Law, Dispute Resolution and Jurisdiction:- This

Agreement shall be governed and interpreted in accordance

with laws of India.

In case of disputes or differences between the Parties hereof,

shall be subject matter of arbitration under the Arbitration and

Conciliation Act 1996 and any subsequent related

amendments there to, unless settled amicably between the

Parties hereto, be referred to arbitration and such arbitration

shall be conducted in accordance with the rules of arbitration

of the Bombay Chamber of Commerce and Industry (“BCCI”),

which rules as modified from time to time, are deemed to be

incorporated by reference into this clause (the “Arbitration

Rules”) by an arbitration panel comprised of a sole arbitrator.

The arbitration panel as referred to above shall be appointed

by the BCCI. The arbitration panel shall deliver the award in

the arbitration proceedings within three (3) months from

reference of any dispute to arbitration. The venue of

arbitration shall be Mumbai, India.

The Parties agree that the award passed by the arbitration

panel shall be final and binding upon the Parties, and that the

Parties shall not be entitled to commence or maintain any

action in any court of law in respect of any matter in dispute

arising from or in relation to the Agreement, except for the

enforcement of an arbitral award passed by an arbitration

panel pursuant to this clause.”

18. Section 238 provides that the IBC overr ides other laws, including any

instrument having effect by virtue of law. The text of Section 238 stipulates thus:

“Section 238 - Provisions of this Code to override other laws

The provisions of this Code shall have effect, notwithstanding

anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for

the time being in force or any instrument having effect by

virtue of any such law.”

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19. In Indus Biotech (P) Ltd. v. Kotak India Venture (Offshore) Fund, a

three judge Bench of this Court , of which one of us was a part (Justice AS

Bopanna), held that Section 238 of the IBC overrides all other laws. This Court

was considering whether a reference to arbitration made under Section 8 of the

Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 in terms of the agreement between the

parties would affect the jurisdiction of the NCLT to examine an application filed

under Section 7 of the IBC. This Court observed thus:

“27. As noted, the issue which is posed for our consideration

is arising in a petition filed under Section 7 of IB Code, before

it is admitted and therefore not yet an action in rem. In such

application, the course to be adopted by the adjudicating

authority if an application under Section 8 of the 1996 Act is

filed seeking reference to arbitration is what requires

consideration. The position of law that the IB Code shall

override all other laws as provided under Section 238 of

the IB Code needs no elaboration. In that view,

notwithstanding the fact that the alleged corporate debtor filed

an application under Section 8 of the 1996 Act, the

independent consideration of the same dehors the application

filed under Section 7 of IB Code and materials produced

therewith will not arise. The adjudicating authority is duty-

bound to advert to the material available before him as made

available along with the application under Section 7 of IB

Code by the financial creditor to indicate default along with

the version of the corporate debtor. This is for the reason that,

keeping in perspective the scope of the proceedings under

the IB Code and there being a timeline for the consideration

to be made by the adjudicating authority, the process cannot

be defeated by a corporate debtor by raising moonshine

defence only to delay the process. In that view, even if an

application under Section 8 of the 1996 Act is filed, the

adjudicating authority has a duty to advert to contentions

put forth on the application filed under Section 7 of IB

Code, examine the material placed before it by the

financial creditor and record a satisfaction as to whether

there is default or not. While doing so the contention put

forth by the corporate debtor shall also be noted to

determine as to whether there is substance in the

defence and to arrive at the conclusion whether there is

default. If the irresistible conclusion by the adjudicating

authority is that there is default and the debt is payable,

the bogey of arbitration to delay the process would not

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arise despite the position that the agreement between the

parties indisputably contains an arbitration clause. ”

(emphasis added)

20. In Gujarat Urja (supra), a two judge Bench of this Court, of which one of

us was a part (Justice DY Chandrachud), held that a power purchase agreement,

which is a bilateral commercial contract, is an ‘instrument’ under Section 238.

Notably, the power purchase agreement provided that the disputes between the

parties relating to the agreement would be entertained by Gujarat Electricity

Regulatory Commission. But since Section 238 provides an overriding effect to

the provisions of the IBC over any instrument having effect by law, it was held

that the NCLT ha d jurisdiction over the dispute which arose in the context of

insolvency proceedings. The relevant extract of the judgment is set out below:

“82. It has been urged on behalf of the appellant that Section

238 does not apply to a bilateral commercial contract

between a corporate debtor and a third party and only applies

to statutory contracts or instruments entered into by operation

of law. The basis of this submission is that the word

“instrument” should be given a meaning ejusdem generis to

the provision “contained in any other law”. We do not find

force in this argument. Section 238 does not state that the

“instrument” must be entered into by operation of law; rather it

states that the instrument has effect by virtue of any such law.

In other words, the instrument need not be a creation of a

statute; it becomes enforceable by virtue of a law. Therefore,

we are inclined to agree with the view taken by NCLT.

Section 238 is prefaced by a non obstante clause. NCLT's

jurisdiction could be invoked in the present case

because the termination of PPA was sought solely on the

ground that the corporate debtor had become subject to

an insolvency resolution process under IBC .”

(emphasis added)

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21. Section 60(5)(c) grants residuary jurisdiction to the NCLT to adjudicate any

question of law or fact, arising out of or in relation to the insolvency resolution of

the Corporate Debtor. Section 60(5)(c) provides thus:

“Section 60 - Adjudicating Authority for corporate persons

…..

(5) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any

other law for the time being in force, the National Company

Law Tribunal shall have jurisdiction to entertain or dispose

of—

….

(c) any question of priorities or any question of law or facts,

arising out of or in relation to the insolvency resolution or

liquidation proceedings of the corporate debtor or corporate

person under this Code.”

Clause 12 (d) of the Facilities Agreement provides that any dispute between the

parties relating to the agreement could be the subject matter of arbitration.

However, the Facilities Agreement being an ‘instrument’ under Section 238 of the

IBC can be overridden by the provisions of the IBC. In terms of Section 238 and

the law laid down by this Court, the existence of a clause for referring the dispute

between parties to arbitration does not oust the jurisdiction of the NCLT to

exercise its residuary powers under Section 60(5)(c) to adjudicate disputes

relating to the insolvency of the Corporate Debtor.

22. The appellant has contested the reliance of the NCLAT on Section 25 of

the IBC to hold that the RP can invoke the jurisdiction of the NCLT to stay the

termination of the Facilities Agreement in pursuance of its duty to preserve the

Corporate Debtor as a going concern. The learned counsel has submitted that

the jurisdiction of the NCLT cannot be determined based on the duties of the RP.

17

Reliance was placed on the judgment of this Court in Embassy Property

Developments (Private) Limited v. State of Karnataka

11

, where this Court held

that the duties of the RP are entirely different from the jurisdiction and powers of

the NCLT. While the duty of the RP and the jurisdiction of the NCLT cannot be

conflated, in Gujarat Urja (supra), this Court has clarified that the RP can

approach the NCLT for adjudication of disputes which relate to the insolvency

resolution process. But when the dispute arises dehors the insolvency of the

Corporate Debtor, the RP must approach the relevant competent authority (para

72). We have discussed whether there is a nexus between the termination notice

and the insolvency resolution proceedings in the subsequent paragraphs.

23. It was also urged on behalf of the appellant that the NCLT and NCLAT

have re- written the agreement changing its nature from a determinable contract

to a non- terminable contract overlooking the mandate of Section 14

12

of the

Specific Relief Act 1963. It is a settled position of law that IBC is a complete code

and Section 238 overrides all other laws. The NCLT in its residuary jurisdiction is

empowered to stay the termination of the agreement if it satisfies the criteria laid

down by this Court in Gujarat Urja (supra). In any event, the intervention by the

NCLT and NCLAT cannot be characterized as the re- writing of the contract

between the parties. The NCLT and NCLAT are vested with the responsibility of

11

(2020) 13 SCC 308

12

“Section 14 - Contracts not specifically enforceable

The following contracts cannot be specifically enforced, namely:--

(a) where a party to the contract has obtained substituted performance of contract in accordance with the

provisions of section 20;

(b) a contract, the performance of which involves the performance of a continuous duty which the court cannot

supervise;

(c) a contract which is so dependent on the personal qualifications of the parties that the court cannot enforce

specific performance of its material terms; and

(d) a contract which is in its nature determinable.”

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preserving the Corporate Debtor’s survival and can intervene if an action by a

third party can cut the legs out from under the CIRP.

24. On behalf of the appellant, it has been further submitted that the NCLAT

misread Section 14 of the IBC, which has no application to the present case.

Section 14 of the IBC provides thus:

“Section 14 - Moratorium

(1) Subject to provisions of sub- sections (2) and (3), on the

insolvency commencement date, the Adjudicating Authority

shall by order declare moratorium for prohibiting all of the

following, namely:--

(a) the institution of suits or continuation of pending suits or

proceedings against the corporate debtor including execution

of any judgment, decree or order in any court of law, tribunal,

arbitration panel or other authority;

(b) transferring, encumbering, alienating or disposing of by

the corporate debtor any of its assets or any legal right or

beneficial interest therein;

(c) any action to foreclose, recover or enforce any security

interest created by the corporate debtor in respect of its

property including any action under the Securitisation and

Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of

Security Interest Act, 2002 (54 of 2002);

(d) the recovery of any property by an owner or lessor

where such property is occupied by or in the possession

of the corporate debtor.

Explanation.--For the purposes of this sub- Section, it is

hereby clarified that notwithstanding anything contained in

any other law for the time being in force, a license, permit,

registration, quota, concession, clearances or a similar grant

or right given by the Central Government, State Government,

local authority, sectoral regulator or any other authority

constituted under any other law for the time being in force,

shall not be suspended or terminated on the grounds of

insolvency, subject to the condition that there is no default in

payment of current dues arising for the use or continuation of

the license, permit, registration, quota, concession,

clearances or a similar grant or right during the moratorium

period;

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(2) The supply of essential goods or services to the

corporate debtor as may be specified shall not be

terminated or suspended or interrupted during

moratorium period.

(2A) Where the interim resolution professional or resolution

professional, as the case may be, considers the supply of

goods or services critical to protect and preserve the value of

the corporate debtor and manage the operations of such

corporate debtor as a going concern, then the supply of such

goods or services shall not be terminated, suspended or

interrupted during the period of moratorium, except where

such corporate debtor has not paid dues arising from such

supply during the moratorium period or in such circumstances

as may be specified.

(3) The provisions of sub- section (1) shall not apply to--

(a) such transactions, agreements or other arrangements as

may be notified by the Central Government in consultation

with any financial sector regulator or any other authority;

(b) a surety in a contract of guarantee to a corporate debtor.

(4) The order of moratorium shall have effect from the date of

such order till the completion of the corporate insolvency

resolution process:

Provided that where at any time during the corporate

insolvency resolution process period, if the Adjudicating

Authority approves the resolution plan under sub- section (1)

of section 31 or passes an order for liquidation of corporate

debtor under section 33, the moratorium shall cease to have

effect from the date of such approval or liquidation order, as

the case may be.”

(emphasis added)

Admittedly, the appellant is neither supplying any goods or services to the

Corporate Debtor in terms of Section 14 (2) nor is it recovering any property that

is in possession or occupation of the Corporate Debtor as the owner or lessor of

such property as envisioned under Section 14 (1) (d). It is availing of the services

of the Corporate Debtor and is using the property that has been leased to it by

the Corporate Debtor. Thus, Section 14 is indeed not applicable to the present

20

case. However, in Gujarat Urja (supra) it was held that the NCLT’s jurisdiction is

not limited by Section 14 in terms of the grounds of judicial intervention

envisaged under the IBC. It can exercise its residuary jurisdiction under Section

60(5)(c) to adjudicate on questions of law and fact that relate to or arise during an

insolvency resolution process. This Court observed:

“91. The residuary jurisdiction of NCLT under Section 60(5)(c)

of IBC provides it a wide discretion to adjudicate questions of

law or fact arising from or in relation to the insolvency

resolution proceedings. If the jurisdiction of NCLT were to be

confined to actions prohibited by Section 14 of IBC, there

would have been no requirement for the legislature to enact

Section 60(5)(c) of IBC. Section 60(5)(c) would be rendered

otiose if Section 14 is held to be exhaustive of the grounds of

judicial intervention contemplated under IBC in matters of

preserving the value of the corporate debtor and its status as

a “going concern”. We hasten to add that our finding on the

validity of the exercise of residuary power by NCLT is

premised on the facts of this case. We are not laying down a

general principle on the contours of the exercise of residuary

power by NCLT. However, it is pertinent to mention that

NCLT cannot exercise its jurisdiction over matters dehors the

insolvency proceedings since such matters would fall outside

the realm of IBC. Any other interpretation of Section 60(5)(c)

would be in contradiction of the holding of this Court in Satish

Kumar Gupta [Essar Steel (India) Ltd. (CoC) v. Satish Kumar

Gupta, (2020) 8 SCC 531 : (2021) 2 SCC (Civ) 443].”

25. Before the initiation of the CIRP, the appellant had on multiple instances

communicated to the Corporate Debtor that there were deficiencies in its

services. T he Corporate Debtor was put on notice that the penalty and

termination clauses of the Facilities Agreement may be invoked. This is evident

from the appellant’s communications dated 1 August 2018, 17 September 2018,

1 October 2018 and 11 October 2018. I n its email dated 13 October 2018 the

appellant specifically noted that the housekeeping staff being provided by the

Corporate Debtor was inadequate. The appellant was apparently constrained to

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deploy its own staff for housekeeping, evinced from its email dated 19 November

2018. The Corporate Debtor has admitted that the appellant was using its own

housekeeping staff and deducting the costs from the invoice. The appellant again

intimated the Corporate Debtor to change faulty batteries of the UPS and provide

cleaning products in its email dated 3 February 2019. The termination notice

dated 10 June 2019 also clearly lays down the deficiencies in the services of the

Corporate Debtor. The termination notice enumerated the following deficiencies:

“1. Not maintaining the minimum level of skillset of personal

on exam and non- exam days which is non- compliance as per

Annexure B, Table C, and also a process violation.

2. Furnishing and Designing guidelines (Annexure B, Table

D) not being adhered

a) Furniture broken condition

b) Temperature and ventilation in labs, server room and UPS

rooms not being maintained

c) Deploying housing staff

d) Cleanliness and up keeping of the center

3. Branding and Navigation not in synchronization with

Annexure F of facility agreement.”

26. In Gujarat Urja (supra), the contract in question was terminated by a third

party based on an ipso facto clause, i.e., the fact of insolvency itself constituted

an event of default. It was in that context, this Court held that the contractual

dispute between the parties arose in relation to the insolvency of the corporate

debtor and it was amenable to the jurisdiction of the NCLT under Section

60(5)(c). This Court observed that “….NCLT has jurisdiction to adjudicate

disputes, which arise solely from or which relate to the insolvency of the

corporate debtor… The nexus with the insolvency of the corporate debtor must

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exist” (para 69). Thus, the residuary jurisdiction of the NCLT cannot be invoked if

the termination of a contract is based on grounds unrelated to the insolvency of

the Corporate Debtor.

27. It is evident that the appellant had time and again informed the Corporate

Debtor that its services were deficient, and it was falling foul of its contractual

obligations. There is nothing to indicate that the termination of the Facilities

Agreement was motivated by the insolvency of the Corporate Debtor. The

trajectory of events makes it clear that the alleged breaches noted in the

termination notice dated 10 June 2019 were not a smokescreen to terminate the

agreement because of the insolvency of the Corporate Debtor. Thus, we are of

the view that the NCLT does not have any residuary jurisdiction to entertain the

present contractual dispute which has arisen dehors the insolvency of the

Corporate Debtor. In the absence of jurisdiction over the dispute, the NCLT

could not have imposed an ad- interim stay on the termination notice. The NCLAT

has incorrectly upheld the interim order of the NCLT.

28. While in the present case, the second issue formulated by this Court has

no bearing, w e would like to issue a note of caution to the NCLT and NCLAT

regarding interference with a party’s contractual right to terminate a contract .

Even if the contractual dispute arises in relation to the insolvency, a party can be

restrained from terminating the contract only if it is central to the success of the

CIRP. Crucially, the termination of the contract should result in the corporate

death of the Corporate Debtor. In Gujarat Urja (supra), this Court held thus:

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“176. Given that the terms used in Section 60(5)(c) are of

wide import, as recognised in a consistent line of authority,

we hold that NCLT was empowered to restrain the appellant

from terminating PPA. However, our decision is premised

upon a recognition of the centrality of PPA in the present case

to the success of CIRP, in the factual matrix of this case,

since it is the sole contract for the sale of electricity which was

entered into by the corporate debtor. In doing so, we reiterate

that NCLT would have been empowered to set aside the

termination of PPA in this case because the termination took

place solely on the ground of insolvency. The jurisdiction of

NCLT under Section 60(5)(c) of IBC cannot be invoked in

matters where a termination may take place on grounds

unrelated to the insolvency of the corporate debtor. Even

more crucially, it cannot even be invoked in the event of a

legitimate termination of a contract based on an ipso facto

clause like Article 9.2.1(e) herein, if such termination will not

have the effect of making certain the death of the corporate

debtor. As such, in all future cases, NCLT would have to be

wary of setting aside valid contractual terminations which

would merely dilute the value of the corporate debtor, and not

push it to its corporate death by virtue of it being the

corporate debtor's sole contract (as was the case in this

matter's unique factual matrix).

177. The terms of our intervention in the present case are

limited. Judicial intervention should not create a fertile ground

for the revival of the regime under Section 22 of SICA which

provided for suspension of wide- ranging contracts. Section 22

of the SICA cannot be brought in through the back door. The

basis of our intervention in this case arises from the fact

that if we allow the termination of PPA which is the sole

contract of the corporate debtor, governing the supply of

electricity which it generates, it will pull the rug out from

under CIRP, making the corporate death of the corporate

debtor a foregone conclusion.”

(emphasis supplied)

29. The narrow exception crafted by this Court in Gujarat Urja (supra) must be

borne in mind by the NCLT and NCLAT even while examining prayers for interim

relief. The order of the NCLT dated 18 December 2019 does not indicate that the

NCLT has applied its mind to the centrality of the Facilities Agreement to the

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success of the CIRP and Corporate Debtor’s survival as a going concern. The

NCLT has merely relied upon the procedural infirmity on part of the appellant in

the issuance of the termination notice, i.e., it did not give thirty days’ notice period

to the Corporate Debtor to cure the deficiency in service. The NCLAT, in its

impugned judgment, has averred that the decision of the NCLT preserves the

‘going concern’ status of the Corporate Debtor but there is no factual analysis on

how the termination of the Facilities Agreement would put the survival of the

Corporate Debtor in jeopardy.

30. Admittedly, this Court has clarified the law on the present subject matter in

Gujarat Urja (supra) after the pronouncements of the NCLT and NCLAT. Going

forward, the exercise of the NCLT’s residuary powers should be governed by the

above decision.

31. We accordingly set aside the judgment of the NCLAT dated 24 June 2020.

The proceedings initiated against the appellant shall stand dismissed for absence

of jurisdiction. The appeal is disposed of in the above terms with no order as to

costs.

32. Pending applications, if any, are disposed of.

…..….…………………………...............................J.

[Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud]

…...….…………………………...............................J.

[ A S Bopanna]

New Delhi;

November 23, 2021.

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