2026 INSC 773 1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3454 OF 2019

TEHRI HYDRO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

LTD. …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

S.P. SINGH & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

R. MAHADEVAN, J.

1.The present Civil Appeal arises from the judgment and order dated

25.10.2017 passed by the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital

1

in First Appeal

No. 33 of 2009, whereby the High Court directed the appellant to pay ad

valorem court fee on the decreetal amount of Rs. 2,34,03,602.05 within two

weeks.

2.The aforesaid first appeal was preferred by the appellant challenging the

judgment dated 24.11.2008 passed by the District Judge, Dehradun

2

in L.A.

Case No. 125 of 2003. By the said judgment, the Reference Court partly

allowed the reference and held that the respondents are entitled to the statutory

benefits under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894

3

i.e., the additional amount at the

1 Hereinafter referred to as “the High Court”

2 Hereinafter referred to as “Reference Court”

3 In short, “Act”

2

rate of 12% per annum on the compensation agreed from the date of notification

till the date of the award or taking possession, whichever was earlier, solatium

at the rate of 30% on the compensation, and statutory interest at the rate of 9%

per annum for the first year and thereafter at the rate of 15% per annum from

the date of taking possession till the date of payment. The Reference Court

further directed that interest be calculated only up to the date of payment made

by the Special Land Acquisition Officer and after giving credit for such

payment, the further interest be computed.

3.The brief facts of the case are that the State Government issued a

notification dated 07.03.1992 under Section 4 of the Act for acquisition of land

situated at Banjarawala Mafi, Dehradun, for rehabilitation of the Tehri Dam

oustees. Possession of the acquired land was taken on 29.01.1996 and the

Special Land Acquisition Officer passed the award on 03.12.1997. Dissatisfied

with the award, the respondents sought a reference under Section 18 of the Act

contending that although the acquired land measured 31.18 acres, compensation

had been awarded only for 29.43 acres, besides claiming the statutory benefits

under the Act.

3.1.By judgment dated 24.11.2008, the Reference Court rejected the claim for

enhancement of compensation in respect of the remaining 1.75 acres of land but

granted the statutory benefits, namely, the additional amount at the rate of 12%

per annum on the agreed compensation, solatium at the rate of 30%, and

3

statutory interest at the prescribed rates. Aggrieved only by the grant of these

statutory benefits, the appellant preferred First Appeal No. 33 of 2009 before the

High Court under Section 54 of the Act. The appeal was valued at Rs.

2,34,03,602.05. However, the appellant paid a fixed court fee of Rs. 10/- on the

footing that the appeal did not involve any challenge to the determination of

compensation.

3.2.By order dated 20.05.2009, the High Court directed the Stamp Reporter

to examine the sufficiency of the court fee paid. In his report dated 21.05.2009,

the Stamp Reporter opined that since the appeal questioned only the grant of

statutory benefits, namely, the additional amount, solatium and statutory

interest, no ad valorem court fee was payable and the fixed court fee paid

was sufficient. However, by order dated 25.07.2017, the High Court expressed

a prima facie view that the court fee paid was insufficient and called upon the

appellant to file objections. The appellant reiterated that the appeal was

confined exclusively to the grant of statutory benefits and did not challenge the

determination or enhancement of compensation, and therefore, only a fixed

court fee was payable. Rejecting the said plea, the High Court, by the impugned

judgment dated 25.10.2017, directed the appellant to pay ad valorem court fee

on the decreetal amount of Rs. 2,34,03,602.05 being the amount under

challenge in the appeal, within two weeks.

4

3.3.Aggrieved by the impugned judgment and order directing payment of

ad valorem court fee, the appellant has preferred the present appeal.

4.Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the impugned judgment

of the High Court proceeds on an erroneous understanding of the nature of the

proceedings before the Reference Court as well as the scope of Section 8 of the

Court Fees Act, 1870. The submissions of the learned counsel are two-fold.

4.1.Firstly, it was contended that the grant of solatium and other statutory

benefits under the Act does not amount to a determination or enhancement of

compensation by the Reference Court. The expression “determination of

compensation” necessarily contemplates an adjudicatory exercise involving

assessment of market value after evaluation of relevant evidence and factors

prescribed under Section 23(1) of the Act. Solatium under Section 23(2), the

additional amount under Section 23(1-A) and statutory interest under Sections

28 and 34 are statutory incidents of compulsory acquisition. Once the market

value is determined, these benefits follow automatically in accordance with the

percentages prescribed by the statute. The Reference Court does not undertake

any independent exercise to assess or quantify the amount of solatium; it merely

gives effect to a statutory mandate.

4.2.In support of the aforesaid proposition, reliance was placed on the

decision in State of Gujarat v. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal & others

4

, wherein

4 (1977) 1 SCC 46

5

this Court explained the distinction between market value and solatium while

dealing with the concept of compensation. Reliance was also placed on Union

of India v. Shri Ram Mehar and others

5

, wherein this Court held that market

value, like solatium, is only one component of compensation. Further reliance

was placed on the Constitution Bench decision in Sunder v. Union of India

6

,

which recognized that solatium is a statutory component payable as a

consequence of compulsory acquisition.

4.3.It was submitted that in the present case, the Collector, while making the

reference, had specifically recorded that although the compensation had been

settled through negotiation, the agreement did not exclude payment of statutory

benefits. The grievance before the Reference Court was that the Special Land

Acquisition Officer had failed to extend these statutory benefits. The Reference

Court neither reassessed the market value nor examined the adequacy or

inadequacy of the compensation already agreed between the parties. It merely

interpreted the terms of the agreement and held that the respondents were

entitled to the statutory benefits, specifying only the statutory percentage

prescribed by the Act. Thus, there was no enhancement or fresh determination

of compensation.

4.4.Secondly, learned counsel submitted that Section 8 of the Court Fees Act,

1870, is attracted only where an appeal challenges an enhancement or renewed

5 (1973) 1 SCC 109

6 (2001) 7 SCC 211

6

determination of compensation. It has no application where the dispute concerns

only the entitlement of landowners to statutory benefits. The High Court, by the

impugned judgment, erroneously assumed that the appeal challenged the

quantum of compensation awarded by the Reference Court and consequently

directed payment of ad valorem court fee on the amount in dispute.

4.5.It was submitted that such an approach overlooks the true nature of the

controversy. The market value of the acquired land had been settled by mutual

agreement and was never in dispute. The Reference Court had not reassessed

evidence, enhanced the market value, or awarded any additional compensation

under Section 26 of the Act. It merely declared the respondents’ entitlement to

statutory benefits flowing from the statute. The appeal before the High Court

was confined to the legal question whether, in the facts of the case, the

respondents were entitled to statutory benefits such as the additional amount,

solatium, and statutory interest. Neither the compensation agreed between the

parties nor its quantification was questioned. Therefore, there was no “enhanced

compensation” attracting Section 8 of the Court Fees Act.

4.6.Learned counsel further submitted that the reliance placed by the High

Court in Indore Development Authority v. Tarak Singh and others

7

, is

misplaced. That decision dealt with a case where the Reference Court had

enhanced the compensation payable for the acquired land and therefore, Section

8 of the Court Fees Act was rightly held applicable. The said decision has no

7 (1995) Supp (3) SCC 25

7

application to the present case, where there has been no enhancement of market

value or compensation and the dispute is confined to the entitlement to statutory

benefits.

4.7.It was also submitted that although there is no direct pronouncement of

this Court on the issue, persuasive guidance is available from the Full Bench

decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Kesireddi Appala Swamy v.

Special Tahsildar, Land Acquisition Officer, Central Railway, Vijayawada

8

.

Interpreting Section 48 of the Andhra Pradesh Court Fees and Suits Valuation

Act, 1956 which is substantially similar to Section 8 of the Court Fees Act, the

Full Bench held that ad valorem court fee is not payable where the dispute

relates only to statutory benefits such as solatium. Similar reasoning was

adopted by the Madras High Court in Moulvi Abun Naser Khuthubuddin Syed

Shah Mohammed Rakher Khadiri v. the Special Tahsildar

9

, while interpreting

Section 51 of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955.

4.8.In conclusion, learned counsel submitted that statutory benefits such as

solatium, additional amount, and statutory interest are only components of

compensation mandated by the statute and not the result of any judicial

determination of compensation by the Reference Court. Since there was neither

any enhancement of compensation nor any award under Section 26 increasing

the market value of the acquired land, the appeal before the High Court could

8 AIR 1970 AP 139

9 AIR 1986 Mad 229

8

not be treated as one against enhanced compensation. Accordingly, Section 8 of

the Court Fees Act had no application, and the High Court erred in directing

payment of ad valorem court fee as a condition for entertaining the appeal.

5.Learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that the

respondents – landowners sought a reference under Section 18 of the Act

claiming enhancement of compensation together with all statutory benefits,

including the additional amount under Section 23(1-A), solatium under Section

23(2), and statutory interest in accordance with the provisions of the Act. By

judgment dated 24.11.2008, the Reference Court partly allowed the reference

and enhanced the compensation payable to the respondents. Aggrieved thereby,

the appellant preferred an appeal under Section 54 of the Act before the High

Court. However, instead of paying ad valorem court fee, the appellant paid only

a fixed court fee of Rs. 10/-. Therefore, by the impugned judgment dated

25.10.2017, the High Court, following the decision of this Court in Indore

Development Authority (supra) and the judgment of the High Court of

Uttarakhand at Nainital in First Appeal No. 113 of 2013 dated 13.09.2017

[Power Grid Corporation of India Ltd v. Gurbachan Singh and others], which

was subsequently affirmed by this Court in SLP (C) Nos. 16753 – 16754 of

2018 dated 04.09.2018, held that an appeal under Section 54 challenging the

award of the Reference Court necessarily attracts ad valorem court fee under

Section 8 of the Court Fees Act.

9

5.1.It was further submitted that the controversy stands concluded by the

judgment of this Court in Indore Development Authority (supra). In that case

also, the acquiring authority challenged the award passed on a reference under

Section 18 after paying only fixed court fee. Rejecting the contention, this Court

held that the Reference Court functions as a civil court while determining

compensation under the Act; by virtue of Section 26(2), its award is deemed to

be a decree within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure;

an appeal under Section 54 is, in substance, an appeal seeking to avoid or

reduce the decree determining compensation; and consequently, Section 8 of the

Court Fees Act mandates payment of ad valorem court fee on the amount sought

to be reduced.

5.2.Learned senior counsel submitted that Section 8 of the Madhya Pradesh

Court Fees Act, which fell for consideration in Indore Development Authority

(supra) is pari materia with Section 8 of the Court Fees Act applicable in the

present case. Therefore, the ratio laid down therein squarely governs the present

appeal and is binding on this Court.

5.3.It was further submitted that the appellant’s attempt to distinguish

statutory benefits from compensation is contrary to the authoritative

pronouncement of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Sunder (supra). In

that case, while considering whether interest is payable on solatium, this Court

undertook an exhaustive analysis of Sections 23, 26, 28 and 34 of the Act and

10

held that the expression “every award under this Part” occurring in Section 26

encompasses all components awarded under Section 23; the amounts payable

under Sections 23(1), 23(1-A) and 23(2) together constitute the compensation

awarded by the Court; these statutory components cannot be segregated from

the award for the purpose of determining the nature of compensation; and

solatium forms an integral part of compensation. Reliance was also placed on

the approval accorded by the Constitution Bench to the decision of the Punjab

and Haryana High Court in State of Haryana v. Kailashwati

10

, wherein it was

held that solatium under Section 23(2) constitutes an inseparable part of

compensation and consequently, interest under Section 28 is payable on the

aggregate compensation, including solatium.

5.4.It was therefore submitted that the appellant’s argument that the

additional amount under Section 23(1-A), solatium under Section 23(2), and

statutory interest under Section 28 are independent statutory benefits, distinct

from compensation is directly contrary to the law declared by the Constitution

Bench in Sunder (supra) and cannot be accepted.

5.5.In view of the binding decisions of this Court in Indore Development

Authority and Sunder (supra), the High Court rightly held that the appellant,

while challenging the award of the Reference Court under Section 54 of the Act,

10 AIR 1980 P&H 117

11

was liable to pay ad valorem court fee under Section 8 of the Court Fees Act.

Therefore, the impugned judgment calls for no interference.

5.6.Accordingly, it was submitted that the appeal is devoid of merit and

deserves to be dismissed.

6.We have heard the learned counsel appearing for both sides and perused

the material placed on record.

7.On 12.02.2018, when the matter was taken up, this Court passed the

following order:

“Issue notice.

The difference of amount of Court fees be deposited before the High Court

within three weeks from today, subject to aforesaid deposit, there shall be stay of

operation of the impugned judgment. The amount, so deposited be kept in a

fixed deposit account until further orders.”

8.The facts giving rise to the present appeal are not in dispute. The lands

belonging to the respondents were acquired under the Land Acquisition Act,

1894; possession was taken and an award was passed by the Land Acquisition

Officer. Upon a reference made under Section 18 of the Act, the Reference

Court granted the statutory benefits contemplated under Sections 23(1-A), 23(2)

and 28 of the Act. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant preferred an appeal under

Section 54 of the Act before the High Court. Significantly, the appellant did not

dispute the determination of the market value of the acquired land, but confined

its challenge only to the statutory benefits awarded by the Reference Court.

12

While filing the appeal, the appellant paid only a fixed court fee of Rs.10/-

instead of ad valorem court fee on the amount sought to be excluded from the

award.

9.The short but important question that arises for consideration is whether

an appeal under Section 54 of the Act challenging only the statutory benefits

awarded under Sections 23(1-A), 23(2) and 28 of the Act, attracts ad valorem

court fee under Section 8 of the Court Fees Act, or whether payment of a fixed

court fee would suffice.

10.The answer to the aforesaid question lies in a conjoint reading of the

relevant provisions of the Court Fees Act, 1870 and the Land Acquisition Act,

1894, which are as follows:

Court Fees Act, 1870

8. Fee on memorandum of appeal against order relating to compensation.

The amount of fee payable under this Act on a memorandum of appeal against

an order relating to compensation under any Act for the time being in force for

the acquisition of land for public purposes, shall be computed according to the

difference between the amount awarded and the amount claimed by the

appellant.

Land Acquisition Act 1894

23. Matters to be considered in determining compensation

In determining the amount of compensation to be awarded for land acquired

under this Act, the Court shall take into consideration

Firstly, the market-value of the land at the date of the publication of the

[notification under Section 4, sub-section (1)]

13

Secondly, the damage sustained by the person interested, by reason of the taking

of any standing crops or trees which may be on the land at the time of the

Collector's taking possession thereof

Thirdly, the damage (if any) sustained by the person interested, at the time of the

Collector's taking possession of the land, by reason of severing such land from

his other land;

Fourthly, the damage (if any) sustained by the person interested, at the time of

the Collector's taking possession of the land, by reason of the acquisition

injuriously affecting his other property, movable or immovable, in any other

manner, or his earnings;

Fifthly, if, in consequence of the acquisition of the land by the Collector, the

person interested is compelled to change his residence or place of business, the

reasonable expenses (if any) incidental to such change

Sixthly, the damage (if any) bona fide resulting from diminution of the profits of

the land between the time of the publication of the declaration under Section 6

and the time of the Collector’s taking possession of the land.

(1-A) In addition to the market-value of the land, as above provided, the Curt

shall in every case award an amount calculated at the rate of twelve per centum

per annum of such market value for the period commencing on and from the

date of the publication of the notification under Section 4, sub-section (1), in

respect of such land to the date of the award of the Collector or the date of

taking possession of the land, whichever is earlier.

Explanation – In computing the period referred to in this sub-section, any period

or periods during which the proceedings for the acquisition of the land were

held up on account of any stay or injunction by the order of any court shall be

excluded.

(2) In addition to the market value of the land, as above provided, the Court

shall in every case award a sum of thirty per centum on such market-value, in

consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition.

26. Form of awards

(1) Section 26 renumbered as sub-section (1) thereof and sub-section (2) added

by Act 19 of 1921, Section 2. Every award under this part shall be in writing

signed by the Judge, and shall specify the amount awarded under clause first of

sub-section (1) of section 23, and also the amounts (if any). Respectively

awarded under each of the other clauses of the same sub-section, together with

the grounds of awarding each of the said amounts.

(2) Every such award shall be deemed to be a decree and the statement of the

grounds of every such award a judgment within the meaning of section 2, clause

(2), and section 2, clause (9), respectively of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

14

(5 of 1908). Section 26 renumbered as sub-section (1) thereof and sub-section

(1) thereof and sub-section (2) added by Act 19 of 1921, Section 2.

28. Collector may be directed to pay interest on excess compensation

If the sum which, in the opinion of the Court, the Collector ought to have

awarded as compensation is in excess of the sum which the Collector did award

as compensation, the award of the Court may direct that the Collector shall pay

interest on such excess at the rate of [nine per centum] per annum from the date

on which he took possession of the land to the date of payment of such excess

into Court.

Provided that the award of the Court may also direct that where such excess or

any part thereof is paid into Court after the date of expiry of a period of one

year from the date on which possession is taken, interest at the rate of' fifteen

per centum per annum, shall be payable from the date of expiry of the said

period of one year on the amount of such excess or part thereof which has not

been paid into Court before the date of such expiry.

54. Appeals in proceedings before Court.

Subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908)

applicable to appeals from original decrees, and notwithstanding anything to

the contrary in any enactment for the time being in force, an appeal shall only

lie in any proceedings under this Act to the High Court from the award, or from

any part of the award of the Court and from any decree of the High Court

passed on such appeal as aforesaid an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court

subject to the provisions contained in section 110 of the Code of Civil

Procedure, 1908, and in Order XLV thereof.

11.The Court Fees Act, 1870 is a fiscal statute enacted to regulate the levy of

fees on proceedings instituted before courts. Its object is twofold: first, to secure

revenue connected with the administration of justice, and secondly, to regulate

recourse to civil proceedings through a prescribed fee structure. Being a fiscal

enactment, its provisions are required to be construed strictly. Section 8 thereof

is a special provision governing the computation of court fee payable on a

memorandum of appeal against an order relating to compensation under any law

15

providing for compulsory acquisition of land. It expressly mandates that the

court fee shall be computed according to the difference between the amount

awarded and the amount claimed by the appellant. The provision makes no

distinction between the various constituents of compensation, nor does it carve

out any exception where the appeal is confined to one or more statutory

components thereof.

12.Equally, the scheme of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 does not permit

any such distinction. Section 23 provides a complete code for determination of

compensation. While clause first of sub-section (1) requires determination of the

market value of the acquired land, sub-sections (1-A) and (2) mandate payment

of the additional amount and solatium respectively. Section 28 further

authorises payment of statutory interest on the excess compensation determined

by the Court. These statutory additions are neither optional nor collateral; they

are mandatory incidents of compensation flowing directly from the statute.

Consequently, the award passed by the Reference Court comprises one

composite determination of compensation under the Act.

13.This statutory position has consistently received authoritative recognition

from this Court. In Narain Das Jain v. Agra Nagar Mahapalika

11

, this Court

explained that solatium is not a collateral sum but an intrinsic component of

11 (1991) 4 SCC 212

16

compensation awarded for compulsory acquisition of property. The following

paragraphs are pertinent:

“6. Section 23(2) of Land Acquisition Act, as it then was, provided that in

addition to the market value of the land, as provided in sub-section (1) of

Section 23, the court shall in every case award a sum of rupees fifteen per

centum on such market value in consideration of the compulsory nature of

acquisition. Solatium, as the word goes, is "money comfort", quantified by the

statute, and given as a conciliatory measure for the compulsory acquisition of

the land of the citizen, by a welfare State such as ours. The concern for such a

citizen was voiced by the Law Commission of India in its Report submitted in

1957 on the Need for Reform in the Land Acquisition by observing as follows:

"We are not also in favour of omitting Section 23(2) so as to exclude

solatium of 15 per cent for the compulsory nature of the acquisition. It is not

enough for a person to get the market value of the land as compensation in

order to place himself in a position similar to that which he could have

occupied had there been no acquisition; he may have to spend a

considerable further amount for putting himself in the same position as

before..... As pointed out by Fitzgerald the community has no right to enrich

itself by deliberately taking away the property of any of its members in such

circumstances without providing adequate compensation for it. This

principle has been in force in India ever since the Act of 1870. The Select

Committee which examined the Bill of 1883 did not think it necessary to

omit the provision but on the other hand transferred it to Section 23.”

7. The importance of the award of solatium cannot be undermined by any

procedural blockades. It follows automatically the market value of the land

acquired, as a shadow would to a man. It springs up spontaneously as a part of

the statutory growth on the determination and emergence of market value of the

land acquired. It follows as a matter of course without any impediment. That it

falls to be awarded by the court "in every case" leaves no discretion with the

court in not awarding it in some cases and awarding in others. Since the award

of solatium is in consideration of the compulsory nature of acquisition, it is a

hanging mandate for the court to award and supply the omission at any stage

where the court gets occasion to amend or rectify. This is the spirit of the

provision, wherever made.

…

11. Before parting with the judgment, we need to clarify that solatium in the

scheme of Section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act is part of the compensation

and Sections 28 and 34 of the said Act provided payment of interest on the

amount of compensation. This Court recently in Periyar and Pareekanni

17

Rubbers Ltd v. State of Kerala, AIR 1990 SC 2192 has ruled that compensation

is recompense or reparation to the loss caused to the owner of the land and that

payment of interest on solatium is to recompensate the owner of the land the loss

of user of the land from the date of taking possession till date of payment into

court. Therein the land owner was held entitled to interest on solatium.

Attention, however, may be invited to Dr. Shamlal Narula v. Commissioner of

Income-tax Punjab, [1964] 7 SCR 668. The quality of the sum paid as interest

was held somewhat different. It was ruled therein that the statutory interest paid

under the Act is interest paid for the delayed payment of compensation amount

and in no event can that be described as compensation for owner's right to

retain possession, for he has no right to retain possession after possession was

taken under Sections 16 and 17 of the Act. The quality of the receipt of interest

can be left by us here, whether it be a recompense for the loss of user of land or

is a sum paid for the delayed payment of compensation. Solatium being part of

compensation must fetch statutory interest from the date of dispossession of the

land owner till date of payment."

The above observations leave no manner of doubt that solatium is an

inseparable component of compensation and not an independent statutory claim.

14.Similar recognition of the indivisible character of compensation is also

found in Shree Vijay Cotton & Oil Mills Ltd v. State of Gujarat

12

and Periyar

& Pareekanni Rubbers Ltd v. State of Kerala

13

.

15.The Constitution Bench in Sunder (supra), placed the matter beyond any

pale of controversy by holding that the expression “compensation” under the

Land Acquisition Act includes not merely the market value determined under

Section 23(1), but also the additional amount payable under Section 23(1-A),

solatium under Section 23(2), together with the statutory interest payable

thereon. The Constitution Bench expressly rejected any attempt to

12 (1991) 1 SCC 262

13 (1991) 4 SCC 195

18

compartmentalize these statutory components for different legal purposes. The

relevant paragraphs are usefully extracted below:

“14. Question of payment of interest would arise only when the compensation is

not paid or deposited on or before the date of taking possession of the land. It is

inequitable that the person who is deprived of the possession of the land on

account of acquisition proceedings is not given the amount which law demands

to be paid to him; any delay thereafter would only be to his detriment. There

must be a provision to buffet such iniquity. It is for the purpose of affording

relief to the person who is entitled to such compensation when the payment of

his money is delayed that the provision is made in Section 34 of the Act. That

section is extracted below:

“34. Payment of interest.—When the amount of such compensation is not

paid or deposited on or before taking possession of the land, the Collector

shall pay the amount awarded with interest thereon at the rate of nine per

centum per annum from the time of so taking possession until it shall have

been so paid or deposited:

Provided that if such compensation or any part thereof is not paid or

deposited within a period of one year from the date on which possession is

taken, interest at the rate of fifteen per centum per annum shall be payable

from the date of expiry of the said period of one year on the amount of

compensation or part thereof which has not been paid or deposited before

the date of such expiry.”

15. When the court is of the opinion that the Collector should have awarded a

larger sum as compensation the court has to direct the Collector to pay interest

on such excess amount. The rate of interest is on a par with the rate indicated in

Section 34. This is so provided in Section 28 of the Act which is extracted below:

“28. If the sum which, in the opinion of the court, the Collector ought to

have awarded as compensation is in excess of the sum which the Collector

did award as compensation, the award of the court may direct that the

Collector shall pay interest on such excess at the rate of nine per centum

per annum from the date on which he took possession of the land to the date

of payment of such excess into court.

Provided that the award of the court may also direct that where such excess

or any part thereof is paid into court after the date of expiry of a period of

one year from the date on which possession is taken, interest at the rate of

fifteen per centum per annum shall be payable from the date of expiry of the

said period of one year on the amount of such excess or part thereof which

has not been paid into court before the date of such expiry.”

19

16. Thus interest has to accrue as per Section 34 and Section 28 of the Act on

the compensation awarded, whether it is as per the award initially passed by the

Collector or by the court later. What is meant by “the compensation” awarded?

Both sides cited different definitions for the word “compensation” as contained

in different lexicographics. In Words and Phrases (Permanent Edn.) different

connotations of the word “compensation” have been delineated. One of them

relates to the law of eminent domain, where compensation means recompense in

value, a quid pro quo, and must be in money. Another is relating to the property

taken for public use. Then it is the fair market value at the time of taking it.

From the constitutional perspective the word “compensation” for the property

taken was understood as the just equivalent of the value of the property. But

when compensation is regarded as a statutory obligation the aforecited

definitions need not detract the courts in fathoming the real import of it. The

exercise can be done with the aid of the provisions in the statutes. So what the

court, in the context of land acquisition, has to decide is how the Act has

designed the compensation vis-à-vis the liability to pay interest. In this context

we have to read Section 23 of the Act. …..

23. In deciding the question as to what amount would bear interest under

Section 34 of the Act, a peep into Section 31(1) of the Act would be

advantageous. That sub-section says:

“31. (1) On making an award under Section 11, the Collector shall tender

payment of the compensation awarded by him to the persons interested

entitled thereto according to the award, and shall pay it to them unless

prevented by some one or more of the contingencies mentioned in the next

sub-section.”

The remaining sub-sections in that provision only deal with the contingencies in

which the Collector has to deposit the amount instead of paying it to the party

concerned. It is the legal obligation of the Collector to pay “the compensation

awarded by him” to the party entitled thereto. We make it clear that the

compensation awarded would include not only the total sum arrived at as per

sub-section (1) of Section 23 but the remaining sub-sections thereof as well. It is

thus clear from Section 34 that the expression “awarded amount” would mean

the amount of compensation worked out in accordance with the provisions

contained in Section 23, including all the sub-sections thereof.

24. The proviso to Section 34 of the Act makes the position further clear. The

proviso says that “if such compensation” is not paid within one year from the

date of taking possession of the land, interest shall stand escalated to 15% per

annum from the date of expiry of the said period of one year “on the amount of

compensation or part thereof which has not been paid or deposited before the

date of such expiry”. It is inconceivable that the solatium amount would attract

only the escalated rate of interest from the expiry of one year and that there

20

would be no interest on solatium during the preceding period. What the

legislature intended was to make the aggregate amount under Section 23 of the

Act to reach the hands of the person as and when the award is passed, at any

rate as soon as he is deprived of the possession of his land. Any delay in making

payment of the said sum should enable the party to have interest on the said sum

until he receives the payment. Splitting up the compensation into different

components for the purpose of payment of interest under Section 34 was not in

the contemplation of the legislature when that section was framed or enacted.

…

26. We think it useful to quote the reasoning advanced by Chief Justice S.S.

Sandhawalia of the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in

State of Haryana v. Kailashwati [AIR 1980 P&H 117 : (1980) 82 Punj LR 122] :

(SCC p. 119, para 10)

“Once it is held as it inevitably must be that the solatium provided for under

Section 23(2) of the Act forms an integral and statutory part of the

compensation awarded to a landowner, then from the plain terms of Section

28 of the Act, it would be evident that the interest is payable on the

compensation awarded and not merely on the market value of the land.

Indeed the language of Section 28 does not even remotely refer to market

value alone and in terms talks of compensation or the sum equivalent

thereto. The interest awardable under Section 28 therefore would include

within its ambit both the market value and the statutory solatium. It would

be thus evident that the provisions of Section 28 in terms warrant and

authorise the grant of interest on solatium as well.””

16.The same principle was reiterated in Gurpreet Singh v. Union of India

14

,

wherein, this Court observed that once compensation is determined, the decree

represents one composite award of compensation comprising the market value

together with all statutory additions. The following paragraphs are apposite:

“54. One other question also was sought to be raised and answered by this

Bench though not referred to it. Considering that the question arises in various

cases pending in courts all over the country, we permitted the counsel to address

us on that question. That question is whether in the light of the decision in

Sunder [(2001) 7 SCC 211 : 2001 Supp (3) SCR 176], the awardee/decree-

holder would be entitled to claim interest on solatium in execution though it is

not specifically granted by the decree. It is well settled that an execution court

cannot go behind the decree. If, therefore, the claim for interest on solatium had

14 (2006) 8 SCC 457

21

been made and the same has been negatived either expressly or by necessary

implication by the judgment or decree of the Reference Court or of the appellate

court, the execution court will have necessarily to reject the claim for interest on

solatium based on Sunder [(2001) 7 SCC 211 : 2001 Supp (3) SCR 176] on the

ground that the execution court cannot go behind the decree. But if the award of

the Reference Court or that of the appellate court does not specifically refer to

the question of interest on solatium or in cases where claim had not been made

and rejected either expressly or impliedly by the Reference Court or the

appellate court, and merely interest on compensation is awarded, then it would

be open to the execution court to apply the ratio of Sunder [(2001) 7 SCC 211 :

2001 Supp (3) SCR 176] and say that the compensation awarded includes

solatium and in such an event interest on the amount could be directed to be

deposited in execution. Otherwise, not. We also clarify that such interest on

solatium can be claimed only in pending executions and not in closed executions

and the execution court will be entitled to permit its recovery from the date of

the judgment in Sunder [(2001) 7 SCC 211 : 2001 Supp (3) SCR 176] (19-9-

2001) and not for any prior period. We also clarify that this will not entail any

reappropriation or fresh appropriation by the decree-holder. This we have

indicated by way of clarification also in exercise of our power under Articles

141 and 142 of the Constitution of India with a view to avoid multiplicity of

litigation on this question.”

17.Once this legal position is accepted, the consequence under the Court

Fees Act necessarily follows. As already stated above, Section 26 of the Act

declares that every award of the Reference Court shall be deemed to be a decree

within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Consequently, an appeal under Section 54 is nothing but an appeal against such

decree. Since the decree itself comprises market value together with all statutory

components forming part of compensation, an appellant who seeks reduction or

exclusion of any one of those quantified components necessarily seeks

modification of the decree itself. The character of the appeal cannot vary merely

22

because the appellant chooses to challenge only one constituent of the decretal

amount.

18.The controversy is, in our considered opinion, concluded by the judgment

of this Court in Indore Development Authority (supra). This Court

unequivocally held that the award passed by the Reference Court is a decree and

that an appeal under Section 54 challenging such decree attracts Section 8 of the

Court Fees Act. The Court further held that where the acquiring authority seeks

to avoid the enhanced compensation awarded by the Reference Court, it is liable

to pay ad valorem court fee computed on the amount sought to be avoided. The

principle laid down therein is not confined to appeals questioning enhancement

of market value alone. The underlying rationale is that the appeal is directed

against the decree awarding compensation. Since statutory benefits themselves

form an inseparable part of the compensation awarded under the decree, an

appeal seeking deletion or reduction of those statutory benefits equally seeks

reduction of the decretal compensation. The relevant paragraphs are profitably

quoted as under:

“8. It is true that the appellant is not the claimant. But when the appellant seeks

to avoid the decree, which is made by the reference Court, it must be construed

that the appellant is seeking to avoid the amount of higher compensation

determined by the reference Court, as claimed by the land owners. Therefore,

the appellant is required to pay the Court fee on the memorandum of appeal to

the extent on which the appellant seeks to avoid the higher compensation

awarded by the reference Court under the Central Act. When its legality is

challenged by filing the appeal under s.54, the difference of the amount for

which appeal is filed, ad valorem court fee under s.8 is required to be

23

paid. Article 11 of Schedule II has no application, since it is expressly covered

by s.8 of the M.P. Court fee Act.

9. The decision of this Court in Diwan Bros. vs. Central Bank of India, Bombay.,

1976 (Suppl.) SCR 664, relied on by Shri V.R. Reddy has no application to the

facts in this case. Therein, the Special Tribunal was constituted and an

application was to be made to the Tribunal for determination of the disputes. In

view of the specific language, this Court held that the criteria prescribed under

sub-section (2) of s.2 of the CPC has not been satisfied. Therefore, the order is

not a decree and the application is not a plaint as required by CPC. Therefore, it

was held that fixed court fee was required to be paid on memorandum of appeal.

But, as stated earlier, since the Act has treated the Court under the Central Act

as an established civil court of original jurisdiction and conferred the power

and jurisdiction to determine conclusively the objection regarding the

measurement or compensation or title to receive the compensation between the

contesting parties, it is a Civil Court under the CPC and the award of the Civil

Court is deemed under s.26(2) to be a decree within the meaning of sub-section

(2) of s.2 of CPC.

10. So, the appellants are required to pay ad valorem court fee. The appellants

are granted two months' time from today for payment of the deficit court fee. The

appeals are accordingly disposed of. No costs.”

The ratio of Indore Development Authority (supra), therefore, squarely governs

the present controversy and leaves no room for application of the fixed court fee

prescribed elsewhere.

19.Pertinently, SLP (C) Nos. 16753 – 16754 of 2018 [Power Grid

Corporation of India Ltd v. Gurbachan Singh and others] preferred against

the judgment and order dated 14.02.2018 passed by the High Court of

Uttarakhand at Nainital in First Appeal Nos. 109 of 2013 and 113 of 2013, were

dismissed by this Court on 04.09.2018. Though dismissal of the Special Leave

Petitions does not amount to a declaration of law under Article 141 of the

24

Constitution, it nevertheless lends support to the view taken by the High Court

in directing payment of ad valorem court fee.

20.It is true that certain earlier decisions of the High Courts, including

Moulvi Abun Naser Khuthubuddin Syed Shah Mohammed Rakher Khadiri

(supra) and the Full Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in

Kesireddy Appala Swamy (supra), referred to by the learned counsel for the

appellant, had proceeded on the premise that statutory benefits were

independent of compensation and therefore did not attract ad valorem court fee.

However, those decisions were rendered prior to the authoritative

pronouncements of this Court in Indore Development Authority, Sunder and

Gurpreet Singh. In view of the law subsequently declared by this Court, the

distinction sought to be drawn between market value and statutory benefits can

no longer be treated as laying down good law.

21.There is yet another aspect of the matter. As noticed earlier, the Court

Fees Act is a fiscal statute enacted to secure public revenue. It is well settled

that there can be no estoppel against a statute. An erroneous acceptance of

deficient court fee by the Registry or even by the Court cannot confer any

vested right upon the litigant nor dispense with compliance with the statutory

mandate. Whenever deficiency is noticed, the Court is fully empowered to

require payment of the deficit court fee. At the same time, before any adverse

consequence follows, the appellant must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to

25

make good the deficiency. This principle has recently been reiterated by this

Court in Vinod Infra Developers Ltd. v. Mahaveer Lunia

15

and Manjula v.

D.A. Srinivas

16

, wherein it has been held that rejection of proceedings on the

ground of deficit court fee can follow only after an opportunity has been granted

to rectify the defect.

22.It is also significant that no material has been placed before this Court to

indicate that the State of Uttarakhand has enacted any amendment to Section 8

of the Court Fees Act excluding statutory benefits from computation of court fee

or prescribing payment of a fixed court fee in appeals under Section 54 of the

Act. On the contrary, the State continues to be governed by the unamended

provisions of the Court Fees Act. The legislative practice in certain other States,

such as Maharashtra and Haryana, where specific statutory amendments have

been introduced either excluding statutory benefits or prescribing a fixed court

fee, only reinforces the conclusion that any such exemption must flow from an

express legislative provision. In the absence of any such amendment applicable

to the State of Uttarakhand, the plain language of Section 8 must receive full

effect. The Court cannot read into the statute an exemption which the legislature

has consciously chosen not to provide. To hold otherwise would amount to

supplying a casus omissus, which is impermissible in the interpretation of a

fiscal statute.

15 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1208

16 2026 SCC OnLine SC 831

26

23.Applying these settled principles to the facts of the present case, it is

evident that the appellant sought deletion of the additional amount under

Section 23(1-A), solatium under Section 23(2) and statutory interest under

Section 28. Each of these amounts forms an integral part of the compensation

awarded by the Reference Court and consequently forms part of the decretal

amount. The appeal was therefore, one relating to compensation within the

meaning of Section 8 of the Court Fees Act. The appellant was accordingly

liable to pay ad valorem court fee on the value of the relief claimed, and

payment of a fixed court fee of Rs. 10/- was legally impermissible.

24.We accordingly hold that the additional amount under Section 23(1-A),

solatium under Section 23(2) and statutory interest under Section 28 constitute

integral and inseparable components of the compensation awarded under the

Land Acquisition Act, 1894. An appeal under Section 54 seeking reduction or

exclusion of any such component is an appeal against the decree of the

Reference Court relating to compensation and consequently attracts ad valorem

court fee under Section 8 of the Court Fees Act. We therefore find no error in

the view taken by the High Court that the memorandum of appeal was liable to

be accompanied by ad valorem court fee and that payment of a fixed court fee

was contrary to law. The impugned judgment of the High Court, therefore,

warrants no interference.

27

25.The Civil Appeal is accordingly dismissed.

26.Since the appellant has complied with the order dated 12.02.2018 passed

by this Court by depositing the deficit court fee before the High Court, the High

Court shall proceed with the First Appeal in accordance with law. The amount

deposited in the fixed deposit pursuant to the order of this Court, shall be

transferred to the account of the High Court.

27.There shall be no order as to costs.

28.Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

…………………………J.

[R. MAHADEVAN]

.…………………………J.

[MANMOHAN]

NEW DELHI;

JULY 31, 2026.