MAC.APP. 337/2018 Page 1 of 21

$~P-1

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

% Reserved on: 26.11.2025

Pronounced on: 28.01.2026

Uploaded on: 28.01.2026

+ MAC.APP. 337/2018 & CM APPL. 13041/2018

THE ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO LTD ..... Appellant

Through: Mr. Pankaj Seth and Ms. Shruti

Jain, Advocates.

versus

HAAZARI SINGH RAWAT & ORS ..... Respondents

Through: Mr. Dharmender Arya, Ms. Vaishnavi

Rao and Mr. Shashank Aggarwal,

Advocates for R-1 alongwith R-1 in

person.

CORAM:

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE PRATEEK JALAN

J U D G M E N T

1.This appeal has been filed by Oriental Insurance Company Limited

[“the Insurance Company”] against an award dated 16.12.2017, passed by

the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal [“the Tribunal”] in Suit No. 4267/2016.

By the impugned award, the Insurance Company was directed to pay a sum

of Rs. 13,75,000/- to respondent No. 1, who was the claimant before the

Tribunal.

MAC.APP. 337/2018 Page 2 of 21

A.FACTS

2.The proceedings before the Tribunal arose out of a road traffic

accident which took place on 26.04.2009, at about 11:45 PM. The claimant

was travelling on a motorcycle [bearing registration No. DL-3S-BK-5321]

as a pillion-rider. The motorcycle was being driven by Mr. Rakesh Kumar

[respondent No. 4 herein]. At a location situated at the roundabout of DND

Flyover and Ring Road, near New Friends Colony, New Delhi, the

motorcycle hit a parked truck [bearing registration No. HR-38E-6159] [“the

offending vehicle”]. It was alleged that the offending vehicle was parked in

the middle of the road and was not visible in darkness. The claimant and

respondent No. 4 both sustained injuries as a result of the accident.

3.The accident resulted in registration of an FIR bearing No. 193/2009,

dated 27.04.2009 in Police Station New Friends Colony. Although no

accused was named in the FIR, a chargesheet was later filed, on 14.07.2011,

against Mr. Sushil Kumar, who was the driver of the offending vehicle

[respondent No. 2 herein].

4.The claimant filed a claim for compensation under Section 166 of the

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 [“MV Act”] before the Tribunal, and a detailed

accident report was also submitted by the police authorities. In the said

proceedings, the driver, owner and insurer of the offending vehicle were

arrayed as respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3, and Mr. Rakesh Kumar [owner and

driver of the motorcycle] was arrayed as respondent No. 4.

5.The Tribunal returned a finding of rash and negligent driving against

the driver of the offending vehicle, and awarded compensation of

Rs.13,75,000/-, alongwith interest at the rate of 9% per annum, in favour of

the claimant. The award was made under the following heads:

MAC.APP. 337/2018 Page 3 of 21

Heads Amount awarded by the Tribunal

Pecuniary Loss

Expenditure on treatment Rs. 62,000/-

Expenditure on conveyance Rs. 25,000/-

Expenditure on special diet Rs. 25,000/-

Cost of nursing/attendant charges Rs. 25,000/-

Loss of income during the period of

treatment

Rs. 2,71,684/-

Non-Pecuniary Loss

Compensation for mental and

physical shock

Rs. 25,000/-

Pain and suffering Rs. 25,000/-

Loss of amenities of life Rs. 25,000/-

Disfiguration Rs. 25,000/-

Loss of future income Rs. 8,41,344/-

Loss of amenities or expectation of

life span

Rs. 25,000/-

TOTAL Rs. 13,75,028/-

(rounded to Rs. 13,75,000/-)

6.The Insurance Company, which was the insurer of the offending

vehicle, was directed to pay the compensation amount, and is in appeal

before this Court.

B.SUBMISSIONS BY LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE PARTIES

7.I have heard Mr. Pankaj Seth, learned counsel for the Insurance

Company, and Ms. Vaishnavi Rao, learned counsel for the claimant.

MAC.APP. 337/2018 Page 4 of 21

8.In support of the appeal, Mr. Seth submitted as follows:

a.The Medico-Legal Case [“MLC”] of the claimant indicated that he

was under the influence of alcohol, and the amount of compensation

should therefore have been reduced for contributory negligence.

b.While computing loss of future income, the Tribunal has applied the

multiplier of 16, which was applicable to the claimant’s age at the

time of the accident [35 years]. However, the Tribunal also granted

loss of income for the period of treatment, which was held to be 62

months. As the claimant has thus been compensated for loss of

income for the period of 62 months from the date of the accident, Mr.

Seth submitted that the loss of future income ought to have been

computed for the period thereafter, i.e. from the age of 40 onwards,

for which the applicable multiplier would have been 15.

c.The Tribunal erroneously assessed the claimant’s functional disability

at 100%, although his disability certificate signified only permanent

disability of 25% regarding his intellectual capability.

9.Ms. Rao, on the other hand, contended as follows:

a.The allegation of contributory negligence was misconceived as

against the present claimant, as his alleged intoxication was not

supported by any blood alcohol content report. In any event, she

submitted that he was not the driver of the motorcycle at all, and no

causation was established between his alleged negligence and the

occurrence of the accident.

b.The application of the multiplier must have reference to the date of

the accident, and not to any later point in time, in terms of the

MAC.APP. 337/2018 Page 5 of 21

decisions of the Supreme Court in Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar & Anr.

1

,

Kavin v. P. Sreemani Devi & Ors.

2

, Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport

Corporation & Anr.

3

, Reshma Kumari & Ors. v. Madan Mohan &

Anr.

4

, and National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi & Ors.

5

.

She argued that the multiplier is, in any event, a notional construct,

and is not intended to be applied mathematically.

c.Ms. Rao also prayed for enhancement of the compensation awarded

by the Tribunal on the ground of future prospects having been missed

in computation of loss of future income, and no compensation having

been awarded for future medical expenses.

10.Mr. Seth, in rejoinder, disputed the claimant’s assertion of future

medical expenses on the ground that it is unsupported by medical evidence.

Although he did not resist the award of future prospects on merits, he

submitted that no enhancement of the award can be granted, in the absence

of any cross-objection or cross-appeal by the claimant.

C.ANALYSIS REGARDING CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

11.On the question of contributory negligence, the case of the Insurance

Company is based upon the MLC report of the claimant prepared at Jai

Prakash Narayan Trauma Centre, AIIMS, Delhi, on 27.04.2009 [Ex. PW-

1/21]. It does record that the claimant was under the influence of alcohol.

However, the Tribunal has also noted that the blood alcohol content of the

claimant was not tested.

1

(2011) 1 SCC 343 [hereinafter, “Raj Kumar”].

2

(2025) SCC OnLine SC 1786 [hereinafter, “Kavin”].

3

(2009) 6 SCC 121 [hereinafter, “Sarla Verma”].

4

(2013) 9 SCC 65 [hereinafter, “Reshma Kumari”].

5

(2017) 16 SCC 680 [hereinafter, “Pranay Sethi”].

MAC.APP. 337/2018 Page 6 of 21

12.In any event, I am of the view that this is not relevant in the present

case, as the claimant was not the driver of the motorcycle at all. Further, no

causal link between the alleged contributory negligence and the accident has

been established as required by the judgment of the Supreme Court in Mohd.

Siddique v. National Insurance Co. Ltd.

6

, which held as follows:

“12. But the above reason, in our view, is flawed. The fact that the

deceased was riding on a motorcycle along with the driver and another,

may not, by itself, without anything more, make him guilty of

contributory negligence. At the most, it would make him guilty of being a

party to the violation of the law. Section 128 of the Motor Vehicles Act,

1988, imposes a restriction on the driver of a two-wheeled motorcycle,

not to carry more than one person on the motorcycle. Section 194-C,

inserted by Amendment Act 32 of 2019, prescribes a penalty for violation

of safety measures for motorcycle drivers and pillion riders. Therefore,

the fact that a person was a pillion rider on a motorcycle along with the

driver and one more person on the pillion, may be a violation of the law.

But such violation by itself, without anything more, cannot lead to a

finding of contributory negligence, unless it is established that his very

act of riding along with two others, contributed either to the accident or

to the impact of the accident upon the victim. There must either be a

causal connection between the violation and the accident or a causal

connection between the violation and the impact of the accident upon the

victim. It may so happen at times, that the accident could have been

averted or the injuries sustained could have been of a lesser degree, if

there had been no violation of the law by the victim. What could

otherwise have resulted in a simple injury, might have resulted in a

grievous injury or even death due to the violation of the law by the victim.

It is in such cases, where, but for the violation of the law, either the

accident could have been averted or the impact could have been

minimised, that the principle of contributory negligence could be

invoked. It is not the case of the insurer that the accident itself occurred as

a result of three persons riding on a motorcycle. It is not even the case of

the insurer that the accident would have been averted, if three persons

were not riding on the motorcycle. The fact that the motorcycle was hit by

the car from behind, is admitted. Interestingly, the finding recorded by the

Tribunal that the deceased was wearing a helmet and that the deceased

was knocked down after the car hit the motorcycle from behind, are all not

assailed. Therefore, the finding of the High Court that 2 persons on the

pillion of the motorcycle, could have added to the imbalance, is nothing

6

(2020) 3 SCC 57.

MAC.APP. 337/2018 Page 7 of 21

but presumptuous and is not based either upon pleading or upon the

evidence on record. Nothing was extracted from PW 3 to the effect that 2

persons on the pillion added to the imbalance.

13. Therefore, in the absence of any evidence to show that the wrongful

act on the part of the deceased victim contributed either to the accident or

to the nature of the injuries sustained, the victim could not have been

held guilty of contributory negligence. Hence, the reduction of 10%

towards contributory negligence, is clearly unjustified and the same has

to be set aside."

7

13.In these circumstances, the Tribunal was not required to reduce the

compensation on account of contributory negligence.

D.CHOICE OF MULTIPLIER

14.In order to appreciate the rival contentions of the parties on this point,

it is necessary to refer to the judgments of the Supreme Court, by which the

concept of the multiplier has been established. In Sarla Verma, the Court

was concerned with computation of loss of dependency in the cases of fatal

accidents. It held as follows:

“18. Basically only three facts need to be established by the

claimants for assessing compensation in the case of death:

(a) age of the deceased;

(b) income of the deceased; and

(c) the number of dependents.

The issues to be determined by the Tribunal to arrive at the loss of

dependency are:

(i) additions/deductions to be made for - arriving at the income;

(ii) the deduction to be made towards the personal living expenses

of the deceased; and

(iii) the multiplier to be applied with reference of the age of the

deceased.

If these determinants are standardized, there will be uniformity

and consistency in the decisions. There will lesser need for detailed

evidence. It will also be easier for the insurance companies to settle

accident claims without delay.

7

Emphasis supplied.

MAC.APP. 337/2018 Page 8 of 21

19. To have uniformity and consistency, Tribunals should

determine compensation in cases of death, by the following well

settled steps:

xxx xxx xxx

Step 2 (Ascertaining the multiplier)

Having regard to the age of the deceased and period of active

career, the appropriate multiplier should be selected. This does not

mean ascertaining the number of years he would have lived or

worked but for the accident. Having regard to several

imponderables in life and economic factors, a table of multipliers

with reference to the age has been identified by this Court. The

multiplier should be chosen from the said table with reference to

the age of the deceased….

xxx xxx xxx

42. We therefore hold that the multiplier to be used should be as

mentioned in column (4) of the Table above (prepared by applying

Susamma Thomas, Trilok Chandra and Charlie), which starts with

an operative multiplier of 18 (for the age groups of 15 to 20 and 21

to 25 years, reduced by one unit for every five years, that is M-17

for 26 to 30 years, M-16 for 31 to 35 years, M-15 for 36 to 40

years, M-14 for 41 to 45 years, and M-13 for 46 to 50 years, then

reduced by two units for every five years, that is, M-11 for 51 to 55

years, M-9 for 56 to 60 years, M-7 for 61 to 65 years and M-5 for

66 to 70 years.”

8

15.The issue was considered thereafter in Reshma Kumari, which

affirmed Sarla Verma, and further held as follows:

“37. If the multiplier as indicated in Column (4) of the Table read

with para 42 of the Report in Sarla Verma is followed, the wide

variations in the selection of multiplier in the claims of compensation

in fatal accident cases can be avoided. A standard method for

selection of multiplier is surely better than a criss-cross of varying

methods. It is high time that we move to a standard method of

selection of multiplier, income for future prospects and deduction for

personal and living expenses. The courts in some of the overseas

jurisdictions have made this advance. It is for these reasons, we think

we must approve the Table in Sarla Verma for the selection of

multiplier in claim applications made under Section 166 in the cases

of death. We do accordingly. If for the selection of multiplier, Column

(4) of the Table in Sarla Verma is followed, there is no likelihood of

the claimants who have chosen to apply under Section 166 being

8

Emphasis supplied.

MAC.APP. 337/2018 Page 9 of 21

awarded lesser amount on proof of negligence on the part of the

driver of the motor vehicle than those who prefer to apply under

Section 163-A. As regards the cases where the age of the victim

happens to be up to 15 years, we are of the considered opinion that in

such cases irrespective of Section 163-A or Section 166 under which

the claim for compensation has been made, multiplier of 15 and the

assessment as indicated in the Second Schedule subject to correction

as pointed out in Column (6) of the Table in Sarla Verma should be

followed. This is to ensure that the claimants in such cases are not

awarded lesser amount when the application is made under Section

166 of the 1988 Act. In all other cases of death where the application

has been made under Section 166, the multiplier as indicated in

Column (4) of the Table in Sarla Verma should be followed.”

9

16.The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in Pranay Sethi,

specifically upheld the application of the multiplier, as provided in Sarla

Verma.

17.While the above cases deal with fatal accidents, the judgment in Raj

Kumar laid down the method of calculation of compensation in personal

injury cases. In this context, it also computed loss of future earnings by

applying the multiplier method.

18.Having regard to the aforesaid judgments, it is clear that the multiplier

method is used for calculation of loss of dependency in fatal accident cases,

or loss of future income in personal injury cases. This is intended to

standardise and simplify the process of computation by abstracting from real

life variations. The principle, as expressly acknowledged in Sarla Verma,

was to avoid the need for detailed evidence, and expedite settlement of

claims

10

. While discussing the selection of the multiplier, the Court clarified

that the multiplier should be chosen with reference to the age of the victim,

and is not intended to ascertain the number of years he would have lived or

9

Emphasis supplied.

10

Sarla Verma, paragraph 18.

MAC.APP. 337/2018 Page 10 of 21

worked, but to account for several imponderables in life and economic

factors. Reshma Kumari again emphasised uniformity and consistency as the

hallmark of this exercise

11

. Paragraph 37 of Reshma Kumari, as set out

above, makes this position clear, and the Constitution Bench in Pranay Sethi

has also concurred. The ratio of these decisions is, therefore, that individual

variations should not influence the choice of multiplier, which should be

based upon the age of the victim alone.

19.Although this results in an apparent anomaly, in a case like the

present, there is in fact no such incongruity. The multiplier has not been

devised as a method of precise quantification of actual damages in each

case. Application of the age-appropriate multiplier of 16 in the present case

does not signify that the claimant has to be compensated for loss of income

only for the next sixteen years, i.e. until the age of 41. The multiplier is

instead an abstract and notional concept, which seeks to obviate the

necessity of accounting for uncertainties in individual cases. Understood

thus, the multiplier is uniform for a given age, regardless of the specific facts

of a particular case. It does not require adjustment for particular factual

situations, like in the present case.

20.It may be noted that, in Raj Kumar and Kavin also, the Supreme Court

granted both, loss of income for the period of treatment, and applied the

multiplier based on the age of the deceased on the date of the accident.

While the issue raised by Mr. Seth in this case was not specifically discussed

in those judgments, they provide some guidance as to the correct

methodology to be adopted.

11

Reshma Kumari, paragraph 30.

MAC.APP. 337/2018 Page 11 of 21

21.For the aforesaid reasons, I affirm the Tribunal’s choice of multiplier,

i.e. 16, based upon the age of the claimant, at the time of the accident.

E.ASSESSMENT OF FUNCTIONAL DISABILITY

22.In Raj Kumar, the Supreme Court has described the process of

computation of functional disability in three steps:

“13. Ascertainment of the effect of the permanent disability on the

actual earning capacity involves three steps. The Tribunal has to first

ascertain what activities the claimant could carry on in spite of the

permanent disability and what he could not do as a result of the

permanent disability (this is also relevant for awarding compensation

under the head of loss of amenities of life. The second step is to

ascertain his avocation, profession and nature of work before the

accident, as also his age. The third step is to find out whether (i) the

claimant is totally disabled from earning any kind of livelihood, or

(ii) whether in spite of the permanent disability, the claimant could

still effectively carry on the activities and functions, which he was

earlier carrying on, or (iii) whether he was prevented or restricted

from discharging his previous activities and functions, but could carry

on some other or lesser scale of activities and functions so that he

continues to earn or can continue to earn his livelihood.”

23.The process thus requires assessment of the loss of earning capacity

based on the impairment suffered by the victim, with reference to the

victim’s profession/vocation.

24.In the present case, the Tribunal has acted on the basis of a disability

certificate, which showed that the claimant had suffered 25% permanent

disability regarding his intellectual capabilities. Although the said certificate

does not appear on the record of the Tribunal transmitted to this Court, it has

been recorded in the Tribunal’s order dated 13.12.2017, and also in the

impugned award.

MAC.APP. 337/2018 Page 12 of 21

25.Evidence as to the claimant’s occupation was given in the claim

petition, which stated that the claimant was in private service. This was

reiterated in the affidavit of evidence filed by his wife [PW-1]. In cross-

examination by learned counsel for the Insurance Company, she stated that

her husband was in a position to move, but could not remember things. She

also filed an additional affidavit of evidence on 16.09.2017, stating that the

claimant was not in a position to depose due to his medical condition. The

claimant thereafter gave evidence as PW-3, which was on the same lines as

the evidence given by his wife. He was also cross-examined, but not on this

aspect. The Tribunal put some questions to him, regarding his financial

needs in respect of which he stated as follows:

“COURT QUESTIONS REGARDING FINANCIAL NEEDS:

At the time of accident, I was doing a job but after the accident, I am

not doing anything. I live in my own house. My brothers give me

financial help. I have no objection if some amount of compensation

payable to me is paid in cash to me and if some amount is kept in

bank FDR. I do have any bank account but I will soon open one. I

undertake to place on record a copy of the passoook, two

photographs and attested specimen signatures of the all the

claimants.

COURT OBSERVATIONS:

The witness is very slow in responding to the questions.”

12

26.The Tribunal has, on the basis of this evidence, recorded as follows:

“(iv) Loss of future Income: 25%permanent disability of

intellectual impairment.

The injured examined himself as PW3 and his examination

revealed that he was very very slow in reaction. He had stated at the

time of noting his financial needs that he was not doing anything.

The injury has rendered him jobless and his physical condition

showed that he had no prospects of getting any job in future.

His disability is thus, taken as 100% for whole body. As the

minimum wages for an matriculate on date of accident were

12

Emphasis supplied.

MAC.APP. 337/2018 Page 13 of 21

Rs.4382/- per month. As per Ex.PW3/1 aadhar card of the injured

the age of injured was 35 years on the date of the accident, hence

multiplier of 16 is applied.”

13

27.In the facts and circumstances of the present case, I am of the view

that this assessment does not call for interference by this Court. The

claimant had admittedly suffered head injuries in the accident, and was

found to be intellectually impaired to the extent of 25%. The Tribunal,

which had occasion to observe the demeanour of the claimant in the witness

box, has characterised his reactions as “very very slow”. Although the exact

nature of the claimant’s occupation does not find mention in the evidence,

the Tribunal’s assessment was that he had been rendered jobless by the

accident, and that he would have no prospects of securing employment in

future. It may also be recalled that his injuries required treatment for over 5

years. On a holistic consideration of all these facts, I do not find any ground

to interfere with the Tribunal’s assessment.

F.GRANT OF FUTURE PROSPECTS

28.Paragraphs 59.3 and 59.4 of Pranay Sethi deal with the award of

future prospects while assessing loss of dependency, as follows:

“59.3. While determining the income, an addition of 50% of actual

salary to the income of the deceased towards future prospects, where

the deceased had a permanent job and was below the age of 40

years, should be made. The addition should be 30%, if the age of the

deceased was between 40 to 50 years. In case the deceased was

between the age of 50 to 60 years, the addition should be 15%.

Actual salary should be read as actual salary less tax.

59.4. In case the deceased was self-employed or on a fixed salary,

an addition of 40% of the established income should be the

warrant where the deceased was below the age of 40 years. An

addition of 25% where the deceased was between the age of 40 to 50

13

Emphasis supplied.

MAC.APP. 337/2018 Page 14 of 21

years and 10% where the deceased was between the age of 50 to 60

years should be regarded as the necessary method of computation.

The established income means the income minus the tax

component.”

14

29.The same principle has been applied in personal injury cases also

15

.

30.Mr. Seth did not therefore object to the grant of future prospects of

40% in the present case. It is so ordered.

G.ASSESSMENT OF LOSS OF FUTURE INCOME

31.The Tribunal had computed this head of damages on the basis of

minimum wages of Rs. 4,382/- per month, being the minimum wages

payable to a matriculate, as on the date of the accident. As the claimant was

35 years of age, the multiplier of 16 was applied. As a result of the aforesaid

discussion, the loss of future income is re-computed as follows:

Heads Amount

Monthly Income [A] Rs. 4,382/-

Annual income [Ax 12 = B] Rs. 52,584/-

Addition of future prospects [40% of B= C] Rs. 21,033.6/-

Annual income (including future prospects)

[B + C = D]

Rs. 73,617.6/-

Loss of future earnings after accounting for

functional disability (per annum)

[100% of D = E]

Rs. 73,617.6/-

Loss of future income (after applying the

applicable multiplier) [E x 16]

Rs. 11,77,881.6/-

(Rs. 11,77,882/-

approx.)

32.Loss of future income would therefore require enhancement from

Rs.8,41,344/- to Rs.11,77,882/-.

14

Emphasis supplied.

MAC.APP. 337/2018 Page 15 of 21

H.COMPENSATION FOR FUTURE MEDICAL EXPENSES

33.Ms. Rao submitted that the Supreme Court in Raj Kumar and Kavin

has permitted compensation on an assessment of future medical expenses,

which the Tribunal has failed to award in the present case. However, she was

unable to point to any evidence before the Tribunal supporting this claim or

even to establish that the claimant would require continued medical care for

conditions arising out of the accident. At the time of hearing, I had put it to

Ms. Rao that the matter could be remanded to the Tribunal for this purpose,

so that evidence could be led, as it was in the case of Kavin, where the

injured was in a permanent vegetative state. However, Ms. Rao, upon

instructions, declined the suggestion of a remand. In these circumstances, I

do not consider it appropriate to grant any amount on this account.

I.MODIFICATION OF AWARD

34.AS a result of the above, the award of the Tribunal requires

modification to the following extent:

S.

No.

Heads Amount

awarded by

the Tribunal

Amount

awarded by

the Court

Difference (+/-)

Pecuniary Loss

1.Expenditure on

treatment

Rs. 62,000/- Rs. 62,000/- NIL

2.Expenditure on

conveyance

Rs. 25,000/- Rs. 25,000/- NIL

3.Expenditure on

special diet

Rs. 25,000/- Rs. 25,000/- NIL

4.Cost of Rs. 25,000/- Rs. 25,000/- NIL

15

Sidram v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., [(2023) 3 SCC 439], paragraph 31.

MAC.APP. 337/2018 Page 16 of 21

nursing/attendant

charges

5.Loss of income

during the period

of treatment

Rs. 2,71,684/- Rs. 2,71,684/- NIL

Non-Pecuniary Loss

6.Compensation

for mental and

physical shock

Rs. 25,000/- Rs. 25,000/- NIL

7.Pain and

suffering

Rs. 25,000/- Rs. 25,000/- NIL

8.Loss of

amenities of life

Rs. 25,000/- Rs. 25,000/- NIL

9.Disfiguration Rs. 25,000/- Rs. 25,000/- NIL

10.Loss of future

income

Rs. 8,41,344/- Rs.11,77,882/-(+)Rs.3,36,538/-

11.Loss of

amenities or

expectation of

life span

Rs. 25,000/- Rs. 25,000/- NIL

TOTAL Rs. 13,75,028/-

(rounded to

Rs.13,75,000/-)

Rs.17,11,566/-(+)Rs.3,36,566/-

J.ENHANCEMENT OF THE AWARD IN THE ABSENCE OF CROSS -

OBJECTION IN THE APPEAL

35.A question however arises as to whether enhancement of

compensation can be granted in the present case, as the claimant has not

filed any cross-objection or cross-appeal. Mr. Seth drew my attention to the

judgment of the Supreme Court in Rajana Prakash& Ors. v. Divisional

MAC.APP. 337/2018 Page 17 of 21

Manager & Anr.

16

,to submit that no such order should be passed. I have

dealt with this very issue in a recent judgment in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.

v. Shanti& Ors.

17

wherein I have held as follows:

“27. The aforesaid re-computation gives rise to a further issue,

which is, whether the award passed by the Tribunal can be

enhanced on an appeal by the insurance company, when the

claimants have not filed any cross-objection or cross appeal.

28. This question came up for consideration before a two Judge

Bench of the Supreme Court in Ranjana Prakash& Ors. v.

Divisional Manager &Anr. wherein the Court held as follows:

“8. Where an appeal is filed challenging the quantum of

compensation, irrespective of who files the appeal, the

appropriate course for the High Court is to examine the

facts and by applying the relevant principles, determine

the just compensation. If the compensation determined

by it is higher than the compensation awarded by the

Tribunal, the High Court will allow the appeal, if it is

by the claimants and dismiss the appeal, if it is by the

owner/insurer. Similarly, if the compensation

determined by the High Court is lesser than the

compensation awarded by the Tribunal, the High Court

will dismiss any appeal by the claimants for

enhancement, but allow any appeal by the owner/insurer

for reduction. The High Court cannot obviously

increase the compensation in an appeal by the

owner/insurer for reducing the compensation, nor can

it reduce the compensation in an appeal by the

claimants seeking enhancement of compensation.”

29. However, a later order of a three-Judge Bench of the

Supreme Court in Surekha & Ors. v. Santosh & Ors.

18

, reads as

follows:

“1. Leave granted. This appeal takes exception to

the judgment and order dated 4-1-2019 [Shriram

General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Surekha, 2019 SCC

OnLine Bom 12] passed by the High Court of

Judicature at Bombay, Bench at Aurangabad in First

Appeal No. 2564 of 2016, whereby the High Court,

16

(2011) 14 SCC 639.

17

MAC.APP. 891/2013, decided on 11.12.2025 [hereinafter, “Shanti”].

18

(2021) 16 SCC 467 [hereinafter, “Surekha”].

MAC.APP. 337/2018 Page 18 of 21

even though agreed with the stand of the appellants

that just compensation amount ought to be Rs

49,85,376 (Rupees forty-nine lakhs eighty-five

thousand three hundred seventy-six only), however,

declined to grant enhancement merely on the ground

that the appellants had failed to file cross-appeal.

2. By now, it is well-settled that in the matter of

insurance claim compensation in reference to the

motor accident, the court should not take

hypertechnical approach and ensure that just

compensation is awarded to the affected person or the

claimants.

3. As a result, we modify the order passed by the

High Court to the effect that the compensation amount

payable to the appellants is determined at Rs 49,85,376

(Rupees forty-nine lakhs eighty-five thousand three

hundred seventy-six only), with interest thereon as

awarded by the High Court.

4. The appeal is allowed in the above terms.

Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.”

30. While the aforesaid order does not refer to Ranjana

Prakash, the appeal therein arose from a judgment of the Bombay

High Court in Shriram General Insurance Company Limited v.

Surekha & Ors

19

. In the said judgment, the Bombay High Court

found that the compensation payable to the claimants required

enhancement, but declined such relief in the absence of a cross-

objection or cross-appeal, relying on Ranjana Prakash. It is thus

evident that Ranjana Prakash, was expressly considered by the

Bombay High Court in the judgment, which was under challenge

before the Supreme Court in Surekha. The three-Judge Bench of the

Supreme Court nevertheless reversed the view taken by the High

Court, which in turn was based upon Ranjana Prakash.

31. In these circumstances, I am of the view that the judgment

in Surekha now holds the field, and this Court is entitled to award

just and reasonable compensation to the claimant, by ordering

enhancement of the award, even in the absence of a cross-

objection or cross-appeal.

32. This view is further strengthened by the principle that a

Court is required to grant just and fair compensation to the victim

of road accident, unrestrained by strict rules of pleadings and

19

(2019) SCC OnLine Bom 12.

MAC.APP. 337/2018 Page 19 of 21

evidence, established by a judgment of the Supreme Court in

Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh & Ors

20

.

33. I am fortified in this view by several judgments which rely

upon the Supreme Court’s order in Surekha, including by this Court

in The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Ali Sher Khan & Ors.

21

, by

Rajasthan High Court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Moti

Lal

22

, by the Bombay High Court in United India Insurance Co.

Ltd. v. Rukmini Deepak

23

, and by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in

National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nakkala Seshaiah

24

.”

25

36.In addition to the judgments cited in Shanti, Ms. Rao also drew my

attention to the judgments of the Allahabad High Court and Karnataka High

Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Lajjawati

26

and National

Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sujatha & Ors.

27

respectively, which follow the view

taken in Surekha.

37.Mr. Seth however relied upon an order of the Supreme Court in The

Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sardar Singh & Ors.

28

, dated 07.01.2021,

which reads as follows:

“Learned counsel for the petitioner Insurance Company makes a threefold

submission:

a) In an appeal of the insurance company without there being a cross appeal

or cross objection, the amount has been enhanced by the High Court which is

contrary to the law laid down in Ranjana Prakash & Ors. vs. Divisional

Manager & Anr., 2011 8 SCALE 240.

b) The deceased driving motor cycle was a minor and thus the factor of

contributory negligence should have been taken into account.

c) An amount for loss of consortium has been granted of Rs. 1 lakh contrary

to the amount set forth in National Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Praney Sethi

& Ors., (2017))16 SCC 680.

20

(2003) 2 SCC 274.

21

2023 SCC OnLine Del 916.

22

2025 SCC OnLine Raj 364.

23

2025 SCC OnLine Bom 2589.

24

2025 SCC OnLine AP 3782.

25

Emphasis supplied.

26

2022 SCC OnLine All 1798.

27

Miscellaneous First Appeal No. 1492/2017, decided on 09.07.2025.

28

SLP(C) No. 14319/2020.

MAC.APP. 337/2018 Page 20 of 21

Issue notice limited to the aforesaid extent.

In the meantime, the operation of the impugned order is stayed.”

38.It may be noted that the above order is an interim order, and the

proceedings remain pending before the Supreme Court. In view of

discussion above, which considers both Ranjana Prakash and Surekha, I am

of the view that this Court is bound to enhance the awarded amount, even in

the absence of a cross-appeal or cross-objection by the claimant.

K.CONCLUSION

39.For the reasons aforesaid, the impugned award in the present case

stands enhanced by Rs. 3,36,538/-,from Rs. 13,75,000/-to Rs. 17,11,566/-.

40.By an interim order dated 06.04.2018, the Insurance Company was

directed to deposit the amount awarded with the Tribunal. It was also

directed that 40% of the amount was to be released to the claimant in

accordance with the directions contained in the Tribunal’s award.

41.The impugned award provided for disbursement of the awarded

amount to the claimant within a period of 125 months, i.e. 12 years and 5

months. Around 8 years have passed since the impugned award.

42.As the proceedings have resulted in enhancement of the award, the

following directions are passed:

a)The Insurance Company is directed to deposit the enhanced amount of

Rs. 3,36,566/- with the Tribunal,alongwith interest, within a period of

8 weeks from today. Interest will be computed at the rate of 9% per

annum, as granted by the Tribunal, from the date of filing of the

detailed accident report, i.e. 27.07.2009.

MAC.APP. 337/2018 Page 21 of 21

b)The balance amount which ought to have been released to the

claimant under the orders of the Tribunal, but has not been released

due to the interim orders of this Court, be released to him forthwith.

c)The remaining amount shall continue to be released in terms of the

directions given by the Tribunal.

d)The enhanced amount to be deposited in terms of this judgment will

be disbursed in accordance with further directions of the Tribunal. The

claimant will appear before the Tribunal on 09.02.2026 for

consideration of this issue.

43.The appeal, alongwith the pending application, stands disposed of

with the aforesaid directions.

44.Statutory deposit be refunded to the Insurance Company.

PRATEEK JALAN, J

JANUARY 28, 2026

‘PV/Ainesh’/