IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH

<>

AT JABALPUR

<>

BEFORE

<>

HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VIVEK AGARWAL

<>

&

<>

HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE B. P. SHARMA

<>

ON THE 14

<>

th

<>

OF JANUARY, 2026

<>

CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 8682 of 2022

<>

THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

<>

Versus

PURUSHOTTAM @ GUDDA

<>

Appearance:

<>

Shri Manasmani Verma - Government Advocate for the appellant/State.

<>

Shri Kamlesh Kumar Mishra - Advocate for the respondent.

<>

JUDGMENT

<>

Per

<>

: Justice Vivek Agarwal

<>

This Criminal Appeal under Section 378 of Cr.P.C. is filed by the

State Government being aggrieved of the judgment dated 10.02.2022

passed by learned 1

st

Addl. Sessions Judge, Lakhnadaun, District Seoni

(M.P.) in Sessions Trial No. 201100 of 2016, whereby learned trial

Court has acquitted the accused from the charges under Sections 498-A,

304-B of IPC and under Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act.

2

<>

. Shri Manasmani Verma, learned Government Advocate

submits that the marriage of deceased Milan Yadav was performed with

accused Purushottam @ Gudda S/o Krishna Yadav on 27.04.2016. Milan

Yadav died on 07.11.2016 due to burn injuries within less than 07

months of her marriage. It is thus, submitted that, there is a presumption

1 CRA-8682-2022NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:3599

under Section 304-B IPC that death occurring under unnatural

circumstances was a result of demand of dowry and cruelty on the basis

of unfulfillment of demand of dowry. Thus, it is submitted that, present

is a case, where FIR was promptly recorded on 14.11.2016, and the

prosecution witnesses noted that there was a demand of dowry related

harassment which resulted in death of deceased Milan, it is a fit case to

show indulgence and reverse the finding of acquittal.

3

<>

. Shri Kamal Kumar Mishra, learned counsel for the accused

submits that, if statements of prosecution witnesses are minutely

examined, then they have not supported the prosecution case. They have

in fact admitted that there was no demand of dowry. Milan and

Purushottam were living in a very cordial manner as husband and wife.

It is submitted that, allegation of the prosecution that there was demand

of a Splendor Motorcycle is not substantiated though the evidence of the

prosecution witnesses and therefore, acquittal does not call for any

interference.

4

<>

. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and going

through the records. Suraj Yadav (PW-1) stated that, Milan Yadav was

his younger sister. In the month of November, this witness Suraj Yadav

was at Tirodi, at his in-laws house, when he had received a call from his

mother Girija Bai that in turn, Purushottam had informed her that Millan

had put herself on fire. After receiving the phone call, this witness (PW-

1) alongwith his wife Kiran had visited Seoni, where his mother Girija

2 CRA-8682-2022NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:3599

Bai, cousin Deepak and other members of the family had come to

Lakhnadaun and at Lakhnadaun when they reached Hospital, they were

informed that Millan was taken for performance of postmortem. This

witness has admitted that, at that time, they had stayed in the house of

Purushottam. After postmortem, they had received the dead body and

last rites were performed promptly.

5

<>

. In his cross-examination, this witness (PW-1) stated that,

Milan had studied up to 6

th

-7

th

class. He further states that, after being

satisfied that, Purushottam was a proper match for their sister, they

performed marriage of Milan with Purushottam. In para-7 of his cross-

examination, PW-1 admits that, at the time of marriage, there was no

talk of exchange of dowry. He admits that, whatever was given at the

time of marriage in the form of gift was voluntarily given. He further

states that Milan stayed in her in-laws house for about six months and in

between he and his family members had visited Lakhnadaun on 02-04

occasions. In para-8 of his cross-examination, this witness (PW-1) states

that, whenever, he or his family members used to visit accused and

Milan than their behavior used to be a cordial and they extended all

courtesies. He admits that, their marital life for last 06-07 months was

cordial. In para - 9, this witness admits that, there was no dispute or

altercation between husband and wife. In para-10, this witness admits

that two days prior to her death, Milan had visited them and Purushottam

had visited them to take back Milan. They had given proper treatment to

3 CRA-8682-2022NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:3599

Milan and her husband and had happily given them a send-off. In para-

11 this witness admits that during the life time of Milan, they had never

lodged any report in regard to demand of dowry. He admits that, even

after death, he or his family members had not lodged any report in

regard to demand of dowry. He further admits that, at the time of

performance of third day's rituals and thirteen day's rituals, he and his

family members had participated in them. In para-14, this witness admits

that, at the time of cremation or thereafter, neither he himself, nor his

family members had stated anything in regard to demand of a

motorcycle and consequential harassment to Milan. He further admits

that, there was no specific reasons for not participating in her third day

rituals or thirteen days rituals. He admits that, no complaint was ever

made to their community organization in regard to demand of dowry. He

further admits in para-16 that after 08-10 days, police personnel had

called him and had said that had prepared a case and then they were

interrogated. Prior to such interrogation they had never lodged any report

at Lakhnadaun or Seoni Police Station in regard to demand of dowry. In

para-17 of his cross-examination, this witness states that, the day on

which Milan died police personnel had recorded statement of this

witness and his family members. At that time, this witness admits that,

they had stated that Milan and her husband were residing cordially.

Thus, it is evident that, this witness (PW-1) has not supported the case of

prosecution.

4 CRA-8682-2022NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:3599

6

<>

. Girija Bai (PW-2), mother of the deceased Milan Yadav, after

having stated that, there was a demand of motorcycle, in para-5 of her

cross-examination, she stated that, there was no demand of dowry at the

time of marriage. She further stated that whatever gifts were given to

Milan were given voluntarily. She further stated that, Milan stayed in her

in-laws house for about six months. Her daughter and son-in-law were

residing cordially. There was no dispute amongst them. She admits that,

during the lifetime of her daughter, there was no dispute between

accused and their family. In para-6 of her cross-examination, this

witness admits that, after marriage Milan visited them at Seoni on 03

occasions. She used to stay there for 02-04 days and when accused used

to come, then they used to send her in ' Vida' in a cordial and happy

atmosphere. She further admits that, she is stating for the first time in the

Court as about the incident which took place. She denied her case diary

statements (Ex.D-1).

7

<>

. Ravi Prakash Yadav (PW-3), stated that Milan was his sister.

She was daughter of his real uncle. This witness was declared hostile. In

his cross-examination, this witness admitted that, for the first time, he is

stating before the Court that, Milan sustained burn injuries. In the cross-

examination, this witness has not supported the prosecution story.

8

<>

. Chanda Yadav (PW-4), stated herself to be a real sister of

Milan Yadav. She too has not supported the case of prosecution in her

cross-examination. She admitted that, it was never stated in her case

5 CRA-8682-2022NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:3599

diary statement (Ex.D-3) that on 05.11.2016, when Purushottam had

visited them, then they had said that, they being poor persons will not be

in a position to give Splendor Motorcycle in dowry.

9

<>

. Teena Prajapati (PW-5) is friend of Milan, after having stated

that, Milan used to inform her about demand of dowry admits in cross-

examination, that after marriage of Milan, this witness never visited her

at Lakhnadaun. She denied her case diary statements contained in Ex.D-

4 and expressed surprise that, how police recorded such case diary

statement. She has also not supported the prosecution case.

10

<>

. Meera Gaur (PW-6) was declared hostile. She too has not

supported prosecution case. Nandkishore Yadav (PW-7) stated that,

Milan Yadav was his sister-in-law. He admitted that, police had obtained

his signatures on 05-06 blank papers.

11

<>

. Dr. Rajesh Daheria (PW-10) stated that, he was posted as

Medical Officer at Civil Hospital, Lakhnadaun. He had conducted

postmortem. According to him, she died because of asphyxia on account

of burn injuries which resulted in cardiorespiratory arrest.

12

<>

. Smt. Bhawana Marawi (PW-11), City Superintendent of

Police, is the Investigating Officer of the case. She admits that, she had

not enclosed marg investigation statements of Kiran Bai and Girija Bai.

She further admits that, she had recorded the statements under Section

161 Cr.P.C. of the witnesses in her office. In para-17 of her cross-

examination, this witness admits that, during investigation, when she had

6 CRA-8682-2022NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:3599

interrogated neighbors of the deceased then, they had only informed her

that, deceased sustained burn injuries but had not informed her anything

about any harassment.

13

<>

. Thus, it is evident that, none of the prosecution witnesses,

could substantiate the demand of dowry. None of the prosecution

witnesses could substantiate any harassment related to dowry. Suraj

Yadav (PW-1) & Girija Bai (PW-2) on the contrary, stated that, the

relationship of Milan with Purushottam was very cordial till the end. It is

true that death of a young married woman, within few months of

marriage is most unfortunate, but every such death can not termed as

dowry death.

14

<>

. When these facts are taken into consideration, then we are

constrained to observe that, as informed by Shri Manasmani Verma,

learned Government Advocate that such appeals are filed when proposal

is forwarded by the Dy. Director, Prosecution to the Law Department

and then, it is the Law Department which gives opinion for filing of

appeals when the Advocate General's Office is bereft of its discretion

and they are bound to file appeal.

15

<>

. We are constrained to observe that, neither the Dy. Director

Prosecution, District Seoni, namely Shri Ramesh Kumar Uike applied

his mind nor the Law Department which is bestowed with the work of

giving free and fair opinion gave any fair opinion to file appeal but

mechanically advise, filing of appeal which reflects poorly on the

7 CRA-8682-2022NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:3599

functioning of the Law & Legislative Affairs Department of the State of

Madhya Pradesh and reflects that there is an urgent need for a radical

surgery in the department, because their Officers are acting in a

mechanical manner and despite being Judicial Officers, have failed to

discharge their function as Judicial Officer while giving opinion.

16

<>

. At this stage, Shri Manasmani Verma, learned Government

Advocate draws attention of this Court towards the Provisions contained

in Clause (b) of Section 378 (1) of Cr.P.C., he draws attention to the

word 'may' used in this clause to say that, State Government may, in any

case, direct the public prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court.

In view of such submissions, it is submitted that, since word 'may' is

used, it is the discretion of the State Government.

17

<>

. When submission of Shri Manasmani Verma, learned

Government Advocate is tested on the touchstone of the provisions

contained in Section 378(1) of Cr.P.C., then it is well settled law that

decisions of State Government to prefer or not to prefer an appeal

against acquittal is administrative in nature. This point has been

considered and dealt by the Hon'ble Full Bench of High Court of Punjab

and Haryana in the case of Lal Singh Vs. State of Punjab; 1981CRLJ

<>

1069

<>

.

18

<>

. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of J & K Vs.

<>

Shubam Sangra (2022)20 SCC 1

<>

, in para 42 & 43 has noted as under:

"42. It is a well settled principle of interpretation that

8 CRA-8682-2022NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:3599

the word ‘may’ when used in a legislation by itself does not

connote a directory meaning. If in a particular case, in the

interests of equity and justice it appears to the court that the

intent of the legislature is to convey a statutory duty, then the

use of the word ‘may’ will not prevent the court from giving it

a mandatory colour. This Court in Bachahan Devi Vs. Nagar

<>

Nigam, Gorakhpur, reported in (2008) 12 SCC 372

<>

, held as

under:

“18. It is well settled that the use of the word

“may” in a statutory provision would not by itself show

that the provision is directory in nature. In some cases,

the legislature may use the word “may” as a matter of

pure conventional courtesy and yet intend a mandatory

force. In order, therefore, to interpret the legal import of

the word “may”, the court has to consider various

factors, namely, the object and the scheme of the Act, the

context and the background against which the words

have been used, the purpose and the advantages sought

to be achieved by the use of this word, and the like. It is

equally well settled that where the word “may” involves

a discretion coupled with an obligation or where it

confers a positive benefit to a general class of subjects in

a utility Act, or where the court advances a remedy and

9 CRA-8682-2022NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:3599

suppresses the mischief, or where giving the words

directory significance would defeat the very object of the

Act, the word “may” should be interpreted to convey a

mandatory force. As a general rule, the word “may” is

permissive and operative to confer discretion and

especially so, where it is used in juxtaposition to the

word “shall”, which ordinarily is imperative as it

imposes a duty. Cases, however, are not wanting where

the words “may”, “shall” and “must” are used

interchangeably. In order to find out whether these words

are being used in a directory or in a mandatory sense, the

intent of the legislature should be looked into along with

the pertinent circumstances.”

43. Similarly, this Court in Dhampur Sugar Mills Ltd.

<>

Vs. State of U.P. reported in (2007) 8 SCC 338

<>

, held:

“36. ….In our judgment, mere use of word “may”

or “shall” is not conclusive. The question whether a

particular provision of a statute is directory or mandatory

cannot be resolved by laying down any general rule of

universal application. Such controversy has to be decided

by ascertaining the intention of the legislature and not by

looking at the language in which the provision is clothed.

And for finding out the legislative intent, the court must

10 CRA-8682-2022NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:3599

examine the scheme of the Act, purpose and object

underlying the provision, consequences likely to ensue

or inconvenience likely to result if the provision is read

one way or the other and many more considerations

relevant to the issue.”

19

<>

. Thus, it is evident that, while filing an appeal against

acquittal, State is required to apply its mind and there is no unfettered

discretion bestowed to the State to file appeals against acquittal in a

mechanical manner. This exercise of unfettered discretion without being

backed by any reason and grounds amounts to not only multiplicity of

litigation for which State is the biggest culprit, but also it impinges on

the aspect of finality of judgment and has an impact of causing anxiety

and uncertainty in the mind of the litigant. Such discretion should be

exercised only when there exist compelling and substantial reasons to

interfere with the judgment of acquittal.

20

<>

. The Hon'ble Calcutta High Court, in the case of the Deputy

<>

legal Remembrancer on behalf of the Government of Bengal Vs. Karuna

<>

Baistobi & another 1894(22) Supreme(Cal) 76; equivalent citation 1895

<>

ILR (Cal)164

<>

has noted that the "law restricting the right of appeal

against a judgment of acquittal prevents personal vindictiveness from

seeking to call in question judgments of acquittal by way of appeal. The

Government shall interfere only where there is a grave miscarriage of

justice".

11 CRA-8682-2022NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:3599

21

<>

. Hon'ble Calcutta High Court noted that "The law by limiting

the right of appeal against judgments of acquittal to the Local

Government, prevents personal vindictiveness from seeking to call in

question judgments of acquittal by way of appeal, and evidently intends

that such interference shall take place only in cases where there has been

a miscarriage of justice so grave as would induce the Local Government

to move in the matter. We think it is a most salutary principle, quite as

necessary for the well being of society as the repression and punishment

of crime, that interference with judgments of acquittal should take place

only in cases where there has been a miscarriage of justice of a grave

nature".

22

<>

. Similarly in the case of Emperor Vs. Sakharam Manaji

<>

Vanjari 1919 SCC OnLine Bom. 151; AIR 1920 Bom 217

<>

, it is held that

the power of appeal is one that should be exercised sparingly by

Government and though the discretion to exercise that power appertains

to Government, yet the High Court may in its discretion, refuse to grant

leave.

23

<>

. However, when word 'may' as used in Section 378(1)(b) of

Cr.P.C. is taken into consideration, then law is well settled that though

word 'may', may grant discretionary power to be exercised by the State,

but it will not absolved the State from taking into account, considerations

which are relevant for the purpose of the statutory question, then its

action will be invalid.

12 CRA-8682-2022NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:3599

24

<>

. In the case of Nasir Ahmad Vs. Assistant Custodian General,

<>

Evacuee property, AIR 1980 SC 1157

<>

, it is held that at time statute

conferring discretion on an authority may seek to structure discretion by

expressly laying down the considerations which have to be taken in to

account by the concerned authority for exercising the discretion. In such

a case, if the power is exercised without taking into account these

considerations, then its act will be invalid. It has been ruled that, a

decision arrived at by an authority ignoring the factors or guidelines laid

down in the statute will be clearly invalid.

25

<>

. It is also well settled that, many a times, statutes conferred

discretionary powers but do not mentioned the considerations regulating

its exercise. Even in a case where the statute does not prescribes any

considerations, but confers powers in a general way, the Court may still

spell out, the relevant considerations from the subject matter, scope and

purpose of the statute in question for the exercise of the power, and

quash an order if the concerned authority does not take these into

account. It is the function of the Courts to assess whether the authority

have ignored any relevant consideration in taking a decision in exercise

of its discretionary power.

26

<>

. When tested, then statute itself provides that unless there is a

case of grave miscourage of justice, Government should not lightly order

for filing an appeal against the judgment of acquittal. But in the present

case, we fail to see that any application of mind was made before

13 CRA-8682-2022NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:3599

(VIVEK AGARWAL)

<>

JUDGE

<>

(B. P. SHARMA)

<>

JUDGE

<>

deciding to file appeal and such acts of indiscretion on the part of the

concerned Dy. Prosecution Officer and the officials of the Law

Department calls for imposition of exemplary cost of Rs.50,000/- on the

State for filing an appeal without there being any basis or without they

be able to show that there is any grave injustice caused to the victim.

27

<>

. Accordingly, we dismissed this Criminal Appeal with a cost

of Rs.50,000/-, which may be recovered from the concerned delinquent

officials, who gave opinion to file this Criminal Appeal in a mechanical

manner. Let this cost be deposited in the Red Cross Society, Jabalpur for

utilization of poor persons.

AR

14 CRA-8682-2022NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:3599