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CASE NO.:

Writ Petition (civil) 317 of 1993

PETITIONER:

T.M.A. Pai Foundation & Ors.

RESPONDENT:

State of Karnataka & Ors.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 31/10/2002

BENCH:

Ruma Pal.

JUDGMENT:

RUMA PAL, J.

With

Writ Petition (Civil) Nos. 252 of 1979, 54-57, 2228 of 1981, 2460, 2582

2584, 3362, 3517, 3602, 3603, 3634-3636, 8398, 8391, 5621, 5035, 3701

3704, 3715, 3728, 4648-4649, 2479, 2480, 2547 and 3475 of 1982, 7610, 4810,

9839 and 9683-84 of 1983, 12622-24 of 1984, 119 and 133 of 1987, 620 of

1989, 133 of 1992, 746, 327, 350, 613, 597, 536, 626, 444, 417, 523, 474, 485,

484 355, 525, 469, 392, 629, 399, 531, 603, 702, 628, 663, 284, 555, 343, 596,

407,737, 738, 747, 479, 610, 627, 685, 706, 726, 598, 482 and 571 of 1993, ----

--------------(D. No.1741), 295 and 764 of 1994, 331, 446 and 447 of 1995, 364

and 435 of 1996, 456,454, 447 and 485 of 1997, 356, 357 and 328 of 1998, 199,

294, 279, 35, 181, 373, 487 and 23 of 1999, 561of 2000, 6 and 132 of 2002,

Civil Appeal Nos.1236-1241 and 2392 of 1977,687 of 1976, 3179- 3182, 1521-

1556, 3042-3091 of 1979, 2929-2931, 1464 of 1980, 2271 and 2443-2446 of

1981, 4020, 290 and 10766 of 1983, 5042-5043 of 1989, 6147 and 5381 of

1990, 71-73 of 1991,1890-1891, 2414 and 2625 of 1992, 4695-4746, 4754-

4866 of 1993, 5543-5544 of 1994, 8098-8100 and 11321 of 1995, 4654-4658 of

1997, 608,3543 and 3584-3585 of 1998, and 5053-5054 of 2000, 5647-5656 of

2001, and 2334 of 2002, Special Leave Petition (C) Nos.9950-9951 of 1979,

11526 and 863 of 1980, 12408 of 1985 8844 of 1986, 12320 of 1987, 14437,

18061-18062 of 1993, 904-905 and 11620 of 1994, 23421 of 1995, 4372 of

1996, 10360 and 10664 of 1997, 1216, 9779-9786, 6472-6474 and 9793 of

1998, 5101, 4480 and 4486 of 2002 and T.C.(C) No. 26 of 1990, T.P. (C)

1014 of 1993.

I have had the privilege of reading the opinion of Hon'ble the

Chief Justice. Although I am in broad agreement with most of the

conclusions arrived at in the judgment, I have to record my

respectful dissent with the answer to Question 1 and Question 8 in

so far as it holds that Article 29(2) is applicable to Article 30(1). I

consequently differ with the conclusions as stated in answer to

Questions 4, 5(b) and 11 to the extent mentioned in this opinion.

Re: Question 1

What is the meaning and content of the

expression "minorities" in Article 30 of the Constitution of

India?

Article 30 affords protection to minorities in respect of limited

rights, namely, the setting up and administration of an educational

institution. The question of protection raises three questions : (1)

protection to whom? (2) against whom? and (3) against what? The

word minority means "numerically less". The question then is

numerically less in relation to the country or the State or some other

political or geographical boundary?

The protection under Article 30 is against any measure,

legislative or otherwise, which infringes the right's granted under that

article. The right is not claimed in a vacuum it is claimed against a

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particular legislative or executive measure and the question of

minority status must be judged in relation to the offending piece of

legislation or executive order. If the source of the infringing action is

the State, then the protection must be given against the State and the

status of the individual or group claiming the protection must be

determined with reference to the territorial limits of the State. If

however the protection is limited to State action, it will leave the group

which is otherwise a majority for the purpose of State legislation,

vulnerable to Union legislation which operates on a national basis.

When the entire nation is sought to be affected, surely the question of

minority status must be determined with reference to the country as a

whole.

In Re: Kerala Education Bill,1957 1959 SCR 995,

p.1047, the contention of the State of Kerala was that in order

to constitute a minority for the purposes of Articles 29 (1) and 30

(1), persons must be numerically in the minority in the

particular area or locality in which educational institution is or

is intended to be constituted. The argument was negatived as

being held inherently fallacious (p.1049) and also contrary to the

language of Article 350-A. However, the Court expressly

refrained from finally opining as to whether the existence of a

minority community should in circumstances and for the

purposes of law of that State be determined on the basis of the

population of the whole State or whether it should be determined

on the State basis only when the validity of a law extending to

the whole State is in question or whether it should be

determined on the basis of the population of a particular locality

when the law under attack applies only to that locality. In other

words the issue was - should the minority status be determined

with reference to the source of legislation viz., the State

legislature or with reference to the extent of the law's

application. Since in that case the Bill in question was

admittedly a piece of State legislation and also extended to the

whole of the State of Kerala it was held that "the minority must

be determined by reference to the entire population of that

State". (p.1050)

In the subsequent decision in DAV College V. State of

Punjab (I) , this Court opted for the first principle namely that the

position of minorities should be determined in relation to the

source of the legislation in question and it was clearly said:

"Though there was a faint attempt to

canvas the position that religious or

linguistic minorities should be minorities in

relation to the entire population of the

country, in our view they are to be

determined only in relation to the particular

legislation which is sought to be impugned,

namely that if it is the State legislature

these minorities have to be determined in

relation to the population of the State."

In D.A.V. College V. State of Punjab (II), Punjabi had

been sought to be enforced as the sole medium of instruction and

for examinations on the ground that it was the national policy of

the Government of India to energetically develop Indian languages

and literature. The College in question used Hindi as the medium

of instruction and Devnagri as the script. Apart from holding that

the State Legislature was legislatively incompetent to make

Punjabi the sole medium of instruction, the Court reaffirmed the

fact that the College although run by the Hindu community which

represents the national majority, in Punjab it was a religious

minority with a distinct script and therefore the State could not

compel the petitioner-College to teach in Punjabi or take

examinations in that language with Gurmukhi script.

But assuming that Parliament had itself prescribed Hindi as

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the compulsory medium of instruction in all educational institutions

throughout the length and breadth of the country. If a minority's

status is to be determined only with respect to the territorial limits

of a State, non-Hindi speaking persons who are in a majority in

their own State but in a minority in relation to the rest of the

country, would not be able to impugn the legislation on the ground

that it interferes with their right to preserve a distinct language and

script. On the other hand a particular institution run by members

of the same group in a different State would be able to challenge

the same legislation and claim protection in respect of the same

language and culture.

Apart from this incongruity, such an interpretation would be

contrary to Article 29(1) which contains within itself an indication

of the 'unit' as far as minorities are concerned when it says that

any section of the citizens residing in the territory of India or any

part thereof having a distinct language, script or culture of its own

shall have the right to conserve the same. Merely because

persons having a distinct language, script or culture are resident

within the political and geographical limits of a State within which

they may be in a majority, would not take them out of the phrase

"section of citizens residing in the territory of India". It is a legally

fortuitous circumstance that states have been created along

linguistic lines after the framing of the Constitution.

In my opinion, therefore, the question whether a group is a

minority or not must be determined in relation to the source and

territorial application of the particular legislation against which

protection is claimed and I would answer question 1 accordingly.

Re: Question 8

Whether the ratio laid down by this Court in the St.

Stephen's case (St. Stephen's College vs. University of Delhi

[ (1992) 1 SCC 558)] is correct ? If no, what order?

In St. Stephen's College , the Court decided (a) that the

minorities right to admit students under Article 30(1) had to be

balanced with the rights conferred under Article 29(2). Therefore

the State could regulate the admission of students of the minority

institutions so that not more than 50% of the available seats were

filled in by the children of the minority community and (b) the

minority institution could evolve its own procedure for selecting

students for admission in the institutions. There can no quarrel

with the decision of the court on the second issue. However, as

far as the first principle is concerned, in my view the decision is

erroneous and does not correctly state the law.

Article 30(1) of the Constitution provides that "All minorities,

whether based on religion or language, shall have the right to

establish and administer educational institutions of their choice".

Article 29(2) on the other hand says that "no citizen shall be

denied admission into any educational institution, maintained by

the State or receiving aid out of State funds on grounds only of

religion, race, caste, language or any of them".

Basically, the question is whether Article 30(1) is subject to

Article 29(2) or is Article 29 (2) subject to Article 30(1)? If Article

30(1) does not confer the right to admit students then of course

there is no question of conflict with Article 29(2) which covers the

field of admission into "any educational institution". The

question, therefore, assumes that the right granted to minorities

under Article 30(1) involves the right to admit students. Is this

assumption valid? The other assumption on which the question

proceeds is that minority institutions not receiving aid are outside

the arena of this apparent conflict. Therefore the issue should be

more appropriately framed as: - does the receipt of State aid and

consequent admission of non-minority students affect the rights

of minorities to establish and administer educational institution of

their choice?. I have sought to answer the question on an

interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution so that no

provision is rendered nugatory or redundant ; on an

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interpretation of the provisions in the context of the objects which

were sought to be achieved by the framers of the Constitution;

and, finally on a consideration of how this Court has construed

these provisions in the past.

Both Articles 29 and 30 are in Part III of the Constitution

which deals with 'Fundamental Rights'. The fundamental rights

have been grouped and placed under separate headings. For

the present purposes, it is necessary to consider the second,

fourth and fifth groups. The other Articles in the other groups are

not relevant. The second group consists of Articles 14 to 18

which have been clubbed under 'Right to Equality'. Articles 25

to 28 are placed under the fourth heading 'Right to Freedom of

Religion'. Articles 29 and 30 fall within the fifth heading 'Cultural

and Educational Rights'.

The rights guaranteed under the several parts of Part III of the

Constitution overlap and provide different facets of the objects

sought to be achieved by the Constitution. These objectives have

been held to contain the basic structure of the Constitution which

cannot be amended in exercise of the powers under Article 368 of

the Constitution. Amongst these objectives are those of Equality

and Secularism. According to those who have argued in favour of

a construction by which Article 29(2) prevails order Article 30,

Article 29(2) ensures the equal right to education to all citizens,

whereas if Article 30 is given predominance it would not be in

keeping with the achievement of this equality and would

perpetuate differences on the basis of language and more

importantly, religion, which would be contrary to the secular

character of the Constitution. Indeed the decision in St. Stephens

in holding that Article 29(2) applies to Article 30(1) appears to

have proceeded on similar considerations. Thus it was said that

unless Article 29(2) applied to Article 30(1) it may lead to "religious

bigotry"; that it would be "inconsistent with the central concept of

secularism" and "equality embedded in the Constitution" and that

an "educational institution irrespective of community to which it

belongs is a melting pot in our national life". Although Article

30(1) is not limited to religious minorities, having regard to the

tenor of the arguments and the reasoning in St. Stephens in

support of the first principle, I propose to consider the argument on

'Secularism' first. .

Article 30 and Secularism

The word 'secular' is commonly understood in

contradistinction to the word 'religious'. The political philosophy of

a secular Government has been developed in the west in the

historical context of the pre-eminence of the established church

and the exercise of power by it over society and its institutions.

With the burgeoning presence of diverse religious groups and the

growth of liberal and democratic ideas, religious intolerance and

the attendant violence and persecution of "non-believers" was

replaced by a growing awareness of the right of the individual to

profession of faith, or non-profession of any faith. The democratic

State gradually replaced and marginalised the influence of the

church. But the meaning of the word 'secular State' in its political

context can and has assumed different meanings in different

countries, depending broadly on historical and social

circumstances, the political philosophy and the felt needs of a

particular country. In one country, secularism may mean an

actively negative attitude to all religions and religious institutions;

in another it may mean a strict "wall of separation" between the

State and religion and religious institutions. In India the State is

secular in that there is no official religion. India is not a theocratic

State. However the Constitution does envisage the involvement of

the State in matters associated with religion and religious

institutions, and even indeed with the practice, profession and

propagation of religion in its most limited and distilled meaning.

Although the idea of secularism may have been borrowed in

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the Indian Constitution from the west, It has adopted its own

unique brand of secularism based on its particular history and

exigencies which are far removed in many ways from secularism

as it is defined and followed in European countries, the United

States of America and Australia.

The First Amendment to the American Constitution is as

follows:

"Congress shall make no law respecting an

establishment of religion, or prohibiting the

free exercise thereof."

In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment

of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation

between Church and State'. 'Reynolds v. United States', (1878)

98 U S 145 at p.164.

The Australian Constitution has adopted the First Amendment

in S.116 which is based on that Amendment. It reads: "The

Commonwealth shall not make any laws for establishing any

religion, or for imposing any religious observance, or for prohibiting

the free exercise of any religion, and no religious test shall be

required as a qualification for any office or public trust under the

Commonwealth".

Under the Indian Constitution there is no such "wall of

separation" between the State and religious institutions. Article 16

(5) recognises the validity of laws relating to management of

religious and denominational institutions. Art. 28 (2) contemplates

the State itself managing educational institutions wherein religious

instructions are to be imparted. And among the subjects over

which both the Union and the States have legislative competence

as set out in List No. III of the Seventh Schedule to the

Constitution Entry No.28 are:

"Charitable and charitable institutions,

charitable and religious endowments and

religious institutions".

Although like other secular Governments, the Indian

Constitution in Article 25(1) provides for freedom of conscience

and the individual's right freely to profess, practice and

propagate religion, the right is expressly subject to public

order, morality and health and to the other provisions in Part III of

the Constitution. The involvement of the State with even the

individual's right under Article 25(1) is exemplified by Article

25(2) by which the State is empowered to make any law.

"a) regulating or restricting any economic,

financial, political or other secular activity

which may be associated with religious

practice;

(b) providing for social welfare and reform

or the throwing open of Hindu religious

institutions of a public character to all

classes and sections of Hindus.

As a result the courts have upheld laws which may

regulate or restrict matters associated with religious practices if

such practice does not form an integral part of the particular

religion .

Freedom of religious groups or collective religious rights

are provided for under Article 26 which says that:

"Subject to public order, morality and health,

every religious denomination or any section

thereof shall have the right

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(a) to establish and maintain institutions for

religious and charitable purposes.

(b) To manage its own affairs in matters of

religion;

(c) To own and acquire movable and

immovable property; and

(d) To administer such property in accordance

with law.

The phrase "matters of religion" has been strictly

construed so that matters not falling strictly within that phrase may

be subject to control and regulation by the State. The phrase

'subject to public order, morality and health' and "in accordance

with law" also envisages extensive State control over religious

institutions. Article 26 (a) allows all persons of any religious

denomination to set up an institution for a charitable purpose, and

undisputedly the advancement of education is a charitable

purpose. Further, the right to practise, profess and propagate

religion under Article 25 if read with Article 26(a) would allow all

citizens to exercise such rights through an educational institution.

These rights are not limited to minorities and are available to 'all

persons'. Therefore, the Constitution does not consider the setting

up of educational institutions by religious denominations or sects

to impart the theology of that particular denomination as anti-

secular. Having regard to the structure of the Constitution and its

approach to 'Secularism', the observation in St. Stephens noted

earlier is clearly not in keeping with 'Secularism' as provided under

the Indian Constitution. The Constitution as it stands does not

proceed on the 'melting pot' theory. The Indian Constitution,

rather represents a 'salad bowl' where there is homogeneity

without an obliteration of identity.

The ostensible separation of religion and the State in the field

of the States' revenue provided by Article 27 (which prohibits

compulsion of an individual to pay any taxes which are specifically

appropriated for the expenses for promoting or maintaining any

particular religious or religious denomination) does not, however, in

terms prevent the State from making payment out of the proceeds

of taxes generally collected towards the promotion or maintenance

of any particular religious or religious denomination. Indeed, Article

290(A) of the Constitution provides for annual payment to certain

Devaswom funds in the following terms: "A sum of forty-six lakhs

and fifty thousand rupees shall be charged on, and paid out of the

Consolidated Fund of the State of Kerala every year to the

Travancore Devaswom fund; and a sum of thirteen lakhs and fifty

thousand rupees shall be charged on, and paid out of the

Consolidated Fund of the State of Tamil Nadu every year to the

Devaswom Fund established in that State for the maintenance of

Hindu temples and shrines in the territories transferred to that State

on the 1st day of November, 1956, from the State of Travancore-

Cochin." This may be compared with the decision of the U.S.

Supreme Court in Everson V. Board of Education (330 IUS 1)

where it was held that the State could not reimburse transportation

charges of children attending a Roman Catholic School.

Article 28 in fact brings to the fore the nature of the word

'secular' used in the preamble to the Constitution and indicates

clearly that there is no wall of separation between the State and

religious institutions under the Indian Constitution. No doubt

Article 28(1) provides that if the institution is an educational one

and it is wholly maintained by the State funds, religious

instruction cannot be provided in such institution. However,

Article 28(1) does not forbid the setting up of an institution for

charitable purposes by any

religious denomination nor does it prohibit the running of such

institution even though it may be wholly maintained by the State.

What it prohibits is the giving of religious instruction. Even, this

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prohibition is not absolute. It is subject to the extent of sub-Article

(2) of Article 28 which provides that if the educational institution

has been established under any endowment or trust which

requires that religious instruction shall be imparted in such

institution, then despite the prohibition in Article 28(1) and despite

the fact that the education institution is in fact administered by the

State, religious instruction can be imparted in such institution.

Article 28(2) thus in no uncertain terms envisages that an

educational institution administered by the State and wholly

maintained by the State can impart religious instruction. It

recognises in Article 28(3) that there may be educational

institutions imparting religious instruction according to whichever

faith and conducting religious worship which can be recognised by

the State and which can also receive aid out of State funds.

Similarly, Article 28(3) provides that no individual attending

any educational institution which may have been recognised by

the State or is receiving State aid can be compelled to take part

in any religious instruction that may be imparted in such

institution or to attend any religious worship that may be

conducted in such institution without such person's consent.

Implicit in this prohibition is the acknowledgement that the State

can recognize and aid an educational institution giving religious

instruction or conducting religious worship. In the United States,

on the other hand it has been held that State maintained

institutions cannot give religious instruction even if such

instruction is not compulsory. (See. Tllinois V. Board of

Education 1947 (82) Law Ed.649).

In the ultimate analysis the Indian Constitution does not

unlike the United States, subscribe to the principle of non-

interference of the State in religious organisations but it remains

secular in that it strives to respect all religions equally, the equality

being understood in its substantive sense as is discussed in the

subsequent paragraphs.

Article 30(1) and Article 14

'Equality' which has been referred to in the Preamble is

provided for in a group of Articles led by Article 14 of the

Constitution which says that the State shall not deny to any person

equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within

the territory of India. Although stated in absolute terms Article 14

proceeds on the premise that such equality of treatment is

required to be given to persons who are equally circumstanced.

Implicit in the concept of equality is the concept that persons who

are in fact unequally circumstanced cannot be treated on par. The

Constitution has itself provided for such classification in providing

for special or group or class rights. Some of these are in Part III

itself [Article 26, Article 29(1) and Article 30(1)] Other such Articles

conferring group rights or making special provision for a particular

class include Articles 336 and 337 where special provision has

been made for the Anglo-Indian Community. Further examples are

to be found in Articles 122, 212 and other Articles giving immunity

from the ordinary process of the law to persons holding certain

offices. Again Articles 371 to 371(H) contain special provisions for

particular States.

The principles of non-discrimination which form another

facet of equality are provided for under the Constitution under

Articles 15(1), 16 (1) and 29 (2). The first two articles are

qualified by major exceptions under Articles 15 (3) and (4), 16

(3),(4),(4A) and Article 335 by which the Constitution has

empowered the Executive to enact legislation or otherwise

specially provide for certain classes of citizens. The fundamental

principle of equality is not compromised by these provisions as

they are made on a consideration that the persons so 'favoured'

are unequals to begin with whether socially, economically or

politically. Furthermore, the use of the word 'any person' in

Article 14 in the context of legislation in general or executive

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action affecting group rights is construed to mean persons who

are similarly situated. The classification of such persons for the

purposes of testing the differential treatment must, of course, be

intelligible and reasonable the reasonableness being

determined with reference to the object for which the action is

taken. This is the law which has been settled by this Court in a

series of decisions, the principle having been enunciated as

early as in 1950 in Chiranjit Lal Chowdhury V. Union of India

and Others 1950 SCR 869.

The equality, therefore, under Article 14 is not

indiscriminate. Paradoxical as it may seem, the concept of

equality permits rational or discriminating discrimination.

Conferment of special benefits or protection or rights to a

particular group of citizens for rational reasons is envisaged

under Article 14 and is implicit in the concept of equality . There

is no abridgment of the content of Article 14 thereby but an

exposition and practical application of such content.

The distinction between classes created by Parliament and

classes provided for in the Constitution itself, is that the

classification under the first may be subjected to judicial review

and tested against the touchstone of the Constitution. But the

classes originally created by the Constitution itself are not so

subject as opposed to constitutional amendments.

On a plain reading of the provisions of the Article, all

minorities based on religion or language, shall have the right to

(1) establish and (2) administer educational institutions of their

choice. The emphasized words unambiguously and in

mandatory terms grant the right to all minorities to establish and

administer educational institutions. I would have thought that it is

self evident and in any event, well settled by a series of decisions

of this Court that Article 30(1) creates a special class in the field

of educational institutions a class which is entitled to special

protection in the matter of setting up and administering

educational institutions of their choice. This has been affirmed in

the decisions of this Court where the right has been variously

described as "a sacred obligation" , "an absolute right" , "a

special right" , "a guaranteed right" , "the conscience of the

nation" , "a befitting pledge" , "a special right" and an "article

of faith"

The question then is does this special right in an admitted

linguistic or religious minority to establish and administer an

educational institution encompass the right to admit students

belonging to that particular community?

Before considering the earlier decisions on this, a semantic

analysis of the words used in Article 30(1) indicates that the right

to admit students is an intrinsic part of Article 30(1).

First Article 30(1) speaks of the right to set up an

educational institution. An educational institution is not a

structure of bricks and mortar. It is the activity which is carried

on in the structure which gives it its character as an educational

institution. An educational institution denotes the process or

activity of education not only involving the educators but also

those receiving education. It follows that the right to set up an

educational institution necessarily includes not only the selection

of teachers or educators but also the admission of students.

Second - Article 30(1) speaks of the right to "administer"

an educational institution. If the administration of an educational

institution includes and means its organisation then the

organisation cannot be limited to the infrastructure for the

purposes of education and exclude the persons for whom the

infrastructure is set up, namely, the students. The right to admit

students is, therefore, part of the right to administer an

educational institution.

Third, - the benefit which has been guaranteed under

Article 30 is a protection or benefit guaranteed to all members of

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the minority as a whole. What is protected is the community right

which includes the right of children of the minority community to

receive education and the right of parents to have their children

educated in such institution. The content of the right lies not in

merely managing an educational institution but doing so for the

benefit of the community. Benefit can only lie in the education

received. It would be meaningless to give the minorities the

right to establish and set up an organisation for giving education

as an end in itself, and deny them the benefit of the education.

This would render the right a mere form without any content.

The benefit to the community and the purpose of the grant of the

right is in the actual education of the members of the community.

Finally, - the words 'of their choice' is not qualified by any

words of limitation and would include the right to admit students

of the minority's choice. Since the primary purpose of Article

30(1) is to give the benefit to the members of the minority

community in question that 'choice' cannot be exercised in a

manner that deprives the community of the benefit. Therefore,

the choice must be directed towards fulfilling the needs of the

community. How that need is met, whether by general

education or otherwise, is for the community to determine.

The interpretation is also in keeping with what this Court

has consistently held. In State of Bombay v. Bombay

Education Society , the Court said:

"surely then there must be implicit in

such fundamental right the right to impart

instruction in their own institutions to the

children of their own Community in their

own language. To hold otherwise will be

to deprive article 29(1) and article 30(1) of

the greater part of their contents."

In Kerala Education Bill, 1957, it was said:

"The minorities, quite understandably,

regard it as essential that the education of

their children should be in accordance with

the teachings of their religion and they

hold, quite honestly, that such an education

cannot be obtained in ordinary schools

designed for all the members of the public

but can only be secured in schools

conducted under the influence and

guidance of people well versed in the

tenets of their religion and in the traditions

of their culture. The minorities evidently

desire that education should be imparted to

the children of their community in an

atmosphere congenial to the growth of their

culture. Our Constitution makers

recognised the validity of their claim and to

allay their fears conferred on them the

fundamental rights referred to above."

The issue of admission to minority institutions under Article

30 arose in the decision of Rev. Sidhajbhai Sabhai where the

State's order reserving 80 per cent of the available seats in a

minority Institution for admission of persons nominated by the

Government under threat of derecognition if the reservation was

not complied with, was struck down as being violative of Article

30(1). It was said that although the right of the minority may be

regulated to secure the proper functioning of the institution, the

regulations must be in the interest of institution and not 'in the

interest of outsiders'. The view was reiterated in St. Xaviers

College when it was said:

"The real reason embodied in Article 30(1)

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of the Constitution is the conscience of the

nation that the minorities, religious as well

as linguistic, are not prohibited from

establishing and administering educational

institutions of their choice for the purpose

of giving their children the best general

education to make them complete men and

women of the country."

In St. Stephen's College, the Court recognised that:

"The right to select students for admission

is a part of administration. It is indeed an

important facet of administration. This

power also could be regulated but the

regulation must be reasonable just like any

other regulation. It should be conducive to

the welfare of the minority institution or for

the betterment of those who resort to it."

However, in a statement which is diametrically opposed to

the earlier decisions of this Court, it was held:

"The choice of institution provided in Article

30(1) does not mean that the minorities

could establish educational institution for

the benefit of their own community people.

Indeed they cannot. It was pointed out in

Re, Kerala Education Bill that the minorities

cannot establish educational institution only

for the benefit of their community. If such

was the aim, article 30(1) would have been

differently worded and it would have

contained the words "for their own

community". In the absence of such words

it is legally impermissible to construe the

article as conferring the right on the

minorities to establish educational

institution for their own benefit"

(P.607)

This conclusion, in my respectful view, is based on a

misreading of the decision of this Court in Kerala Education Bill.

In that case, there was no question of the non-minority students

being given admission overlooking the needs of the minority

community. The Court was not called upon to consider the

question. The underlying assumption in that case was that the

only obstacle to the non-minority student getting admission into

the minority institution was the State's order to that effect and not

the "choice" of the minority institution itself and a minority

institution may choose to admit students not belonging to the

community without shedding its minority character, provided the

choice was limited to a 'sprinkling'. In fact the learned Judges in

St. Stephens case have themselves in a subsequent portion of

the judgment (p.611) taken a somewhat contradictory stand to the

view quoted earlier when they said:

" the minorities have the right to admit

their own candidates to maintain the

minority character of their institutions. That

is a necessary concomitant right which

flows from the right to establish and

administer educational institution in Article

30(1). There is also a related right to the

parents in the minority communities. The

parents are entitled to have their children

educated in institutions having an

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atmosphere congenial to their own

religion."

The conclusion, therefore, is that the right to admission

being an essential part of the constitutional guarantee under

Article 30(1), a curtailment of that fundamental right in so far as it

affect benefit of the minority community would amount to the an

infringement of that guarantee.

An Institution set up by minorities for educating

members of the minority community does not cease to be a

minority institution merely because it takes aid. There is nothing

in Article 30(1) which allows the drawing of a distinction in the

exercise of the right under that Article between needy minorities

and affluent ones. Article 30(2) of the Constitution reinforces

this when it says, "The State shall not, in granting aid to

educational institutions, discriminate against any educational

institution on the ground that it is under the management of a

minority, whether based on religion or language". This

assumes that even after the grant of aid by the State to

an educational institution under the management of the

minority, the educational institution continues to be a minority

educational institution. According to some, Article 30(2) merely

protects the minority's right of management of the educational

institution and not the students who form part of such institution.

Such a reading would be contrary to Article 30(1) itself. The

argument is based on the construction of the word 'management'.

'Management' may be defined as 'the process of managing' and

is not limited to the people managing the institution. In the

context of Article 30(1) and having regard to the content of the

right, namely, the education of the minority community, the word

'management' in Article 30(2) must be construed to mean the

'process' and not the 'persons' in management. 'Aid' by definition

means to give support or to help or assist. It cannot be that by

giving 'aid' one destroys those to whom 'aid' is given. The

obvious purpose of Article 30(2) is to forbid the State from

refusing aid to a minority educational institution merely because it

is being run as a minority educational institution. Besides Article

30(2) is an additional right conferred on minorities under Article

30(1). It cannot be construed in a manner which is destructive of

or as a limitation on Article 30(1). As has been said earlier by

this Court in Rev. Sidhabhai Sabhai, clause (2) of Article 30 is

only another non-discriminatory clause in the Constitution. It is a

right in addition to the rights under Article 30(1) and does not

operate to derogate from the provisions in clause (1). When in

decision after decision, this Court has held that aid in whatever

form is necessary for an educational institution to survive, it is a

specious argument to say that a minority institution can preserve

its rights under Article 30(1) by refusing aid.

I would, therefore, respectfully agree with the conclusion

expressed in the majority opinion that grant of aid under Article

30(2) cannot be used as a lever to take away the rights of the

minorities under Article 30(1).

Articles 29(2) and 30(1)

Article 29(2) says that "No citizen shall be denied

admission into any educational institution maintained by the State

or receiving aid out of State funds on grounds only of religion,

race, caste, language or any of them".

It is because Article 30(1) covers the right to admit students

that there is an apparent conflict between Article 29(2) and Article

30(1). There are two ways of considering the relationship

between Article 30(1) and Article 29(2), the first in the context of

Article 14, the second by an interpretation of Article 29(2) itself.

Article 29(2) has not been expressed as a positive right.

Nevertheless in substance it confers a right on a person not to be

denied admission into an aided institution only on the basis of

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religion, race etc. The language of Article 29(2) reflects the

language used in other non-discriminatory Articles in the

Constitution namely, clauses (1) and (2) of Article 15 and clauses

(1) and (2) of Article 16. As already noted both the Articles contain

exceptions which permit laws being made which make special

provisions on the basis of sex, caste and race. Even in the

absence of clauses (3) and (4) of Article 15 and clauses (3),(4)

and 4(A) of Article 16, Parliament could have made special

provisions on the forbidden bases of race, caste or sex, provided

that the basis was not the only reason for creating a separate

class. There would have to be an additional rational factor

qualifying such basis to bring it within the concept of 'equality in

fact' on the principle of 'rational classification' . For example when

by law a reservation is made in favour of a member of a backward

class in the matter of appointment, the reservation is no doubt

made on the basis of caste. It is also true that to the extent of the

reservation other citizens are discriminated against on one of the

bases prohibited under Article 16(1). Nevertheless such legislation

would be valid because the reservation is not only on the basis of

caste/race but because of the additional factor of their

backwardness. Clauses (3) and (4) of Article 15 like clause 3,4

and 4(A) of Article 16 merely make explicit what is otherwise

implicit in the concept of equality under Article 14.

By the same token, Article 29(2) does not create an absolute

right for citizens to be admitted into any educational institution

maintained by the State or receiving aid out of State funds. It does

not prohibit the denial of admission on grounds other than religion,

race, caste or language. Therefore, reservation of admissions on

the ground of residence, occupation of parents or other bases has

been held to be a valid classification which does not derogate from

the principles of equality under Article 14. [See: Kumari Chitra

Ghosh v. Union of India : 1969(2) SCC 228) . Even in respect

of the "prohibited" bases, like the other non-discriminatory Articles,

Article 29 (2) is constitutionally subject to the principle of 'rational

classification'. If a person is denied admission on the basis of a

constitutional right, that is not a denial only on the basis of religion,

race etc. This is exemplified in Article 15(4) which provides for :

"Nothing in this article or in clause (2) of

article 29 shall prevent the State from

making any special provision for the

advancement of any socially and

educationally backward classes of citizens or

for the Scheduled Castes and the Tribes."

To the extent that legislation is enacted under Article 15

(4) making special provision in respect of a particular caste, there

is a denial of admission to others who do not belong to that

caste. Nevertheless, Article 15(4) does not contradict the right

under Article 29(2). This is because of the use of the word 'only'

in Article 29(2). Article 15(4) is based on the rationale that

Schedule Castes and Tribes are not on par with other members of

society in the matter of education and, therefore, special provision

is to be made for them. It is not, therefore, only caste but this

additional factor which prevents clause 15(4) from conflicting with

Article 29(2) and Article 14.

Then again, under Article 337, grants are made available

for the benefit of the Anglo-Indian community in respect of

education, provided that any educational institution receiving such

grant makes available at least 40% of the annual admissions for

members of communities other than the Anglo-Indian community.

Hence 60% of the admission to an aided Anglo-Indian School is

constitutionally reservable for members of the Anglo-Indian

community. To the extent of such reservation, there is necessarily

a denial of admission to non-Anglo Indians on the basis of race.

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Similarly, the Constitution has also carved out a further

exception to Article 29(2) in the form of Article 30 (1) by

recognising the rights of special classes in the form of minorities

based on language or religion to establish and administer

educational institutions of their choice. The right of the minorities

under Article 30(1) does not operate as discrimination

against other citizens only on the ground of religion or

language. The reason for such classification is not only

religion or language per se but minorities based on religion and

language. Although, it is not necessary to justify a classification

made by the Constitution, this fact of 'minorityship' is the obvious

rationale for making a distinction, the underlying assumption being

that minorities by their very numbers are in a politically

disadvantaged situation and require special protection at least in

the field of education.

Articles 15(4), 337 and 30 are therefore facets of

substantive equality by making special provision for special

classes on special considerations.

Even on general principles of interpretation, it cannot be

held that Article 29(2) is absolute and in effect wipes out Article

30(1). Article 29(2) refers to 'any educational institution' the

word "any" signifying the generality of its application. Article 30(1)

on the other hand refers to 'educational institutions established

and administered by minorities'. Clearly, the right under Article

30(1) is the more particular right and on the principle of 'generalia

specialibus non derogant , it must be held that Article 29(2) does

not override he educational institutions even if they are aided

under Article 30(1) .

Then again Article 29(2) appears under the heading

'Protection of interests of minorities'. Whatever the historical

reasons for the placement of Article 29(2) under this head, it is

clear that on general principles of interpretation, the heading is at

least a pointer or aid in construing the meaning of Article 29(2). As

Subba Rao, J said "if there is any doubt in the interpretation of the

words in the section, the heading certainly helps us to resolve that

doubt." Therefore, if two interpretations of the words of Article

29(2) are possible, the one which is in keeping with the heading of

the Article must be preferred. It would follow that Article 29(2)

must be construed in a manner protective of minority interests and

not destructive of them.

When 'aid' is sought for by the minority institution to run its

institution for the benefit of students belonging to that particular

community, the argument on the basis of Article 29(2) is that if

such an institution asks for aid it does so at the peril of

depriving the very persons for whom aid was asked for in the first

place. Apart from this anomalous result, if the taking of aid implies

that the minority institution will be forced to give up or waive its

right under Article 30(1), then on the principle that it is not

permissible to give up or waive fundamental rights, such an

interpretation is not possible. It has then been urged that Article

29(2) applies to minority institutions under Article 30(1) much in

the same way that Article 28(1) and 28(3) do. The argument

proceeds on the assumption that an educational institution set up

under Article 30(1) is set up for the purposes and with the sole

object of giving religious instruction. The assumption is wrong. At

the outset, it may also be noted that Article 28(1) and (3) do not in

terms apply to linguistic minority educational institutions at all.

Furthermore, the right to set up an educational institution in which

religious instruction is to be imparted is a right which is derived

from Article 26(a) which provides that every religious denomination

or any section thereof shall have the right to establish and

maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes, and not

under Article 30(1). Educational institutions set up under Article

26(a) are, therefore, subject to clauses (1) and (3) of Article 28.

Article 30(1) is a right additional to Article 26(a). This follows from

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the fact that it has been separately and expressly provided for and

there is nothing in the language of Article 30(1) making the right

thereunder subject to Articles 25 and 26. Unless it is so construed

Article 30(1) would be rendered redundant . Therefore, what

Article 30 does is to secure the minorities the additional right to

give general education. Although in a particular case a minority

educational institution may combine general education with

religious instruction that is done in exercise of the rights derivable

from Article 26(a) and Article 30(1) and not under Article 30(1)

alone. Clauses (1) and (3) of Article 28, therefore, do not apply to

Article 30(1). The argument in support of reading Article 30(1) as

being subject to Article 29(2) on the analogy of Article 28(1)and

28(3) is, I would think, erroneous.

For the reasons already stated I have held the right to

admit minority students to a minority educational institutions is an

intrinsic part of Article 30(1) . To say that Article 29(2) prevails

over Article 30(1) would be to infringe and to a large extent wipe

out this right. There would be no distinction between a minority

educational institution and other institutions and the rights under

Article 30(1) would be rendered wholly inoperational. It is no

answer to say that the rights of unaided minority institutions

would remain untouched because Article 29(2) does not relate to

unaided institutions at all. Whereas if one reads Article 29(2) as

subject to Article 30(1) then effect can be given to both. And it is

the latter approach which is to be followed in the interpretation of

constitutional provisions. In other words, as long as the

minority educational institution is being run for the benefit of and

catering to the needs of the members of that community under

Article 30(1), Article 29(2) would not apply. But once the

minority educational institution travels beyond the needs in the

sense of requirements of its own community, at that stage it is no

longer exercising rights of admission guaranteed under Article

30(1). To put it differently, when the right of admission is

exercised not to meet the need of the minorities, the rights of

admission given under Article 30(1) is to that extent removed

and the institution is bound to admit students for the balance in

keeping with the provisions of Article 29(2).

A simple illustration would make the position clear. 'Aid' is

given to a minority institution. There are 100 seats available in

that institution. There are 150 eligible candidates according to

the procedure evolved by the institution. Of the 150, 60

candidates belong to that particular community and 90 to other

communities. The institution will be entitled, under Article 30(1)

to admit all 60 minority students first and then fill the balance 40

seats from the other communities without discrimination in

keeping with Article 29(2).

I would, therefore, not subscribe to the view that Article

29(2) operates to deprive aided minority institutions the right to

admit members of their community to educational institutions

established and administered by them either on any principle of

interpretation or on any concept of equality or secularism.

The next task is to consider whether this interpretation of

Article 29(2) and 30(1) is discordant with the historical context in

which these Articles came to be included in the Constitution.

Before referring to the historical context, it is necessary to keep

in mind that what is being interpreted are constitutional

provisions which "have a content and a significance that vary

from age to age". Of particular significance is the content of the

concept of equality which has been developed by a process of

judicial interpretation over the years as discussed earlier. It is

also necessary to be kept in mind that reports of the various

Committees appointed by the Constituent Assembly and

speeches made in the Constituent Assembly and the record of

other proceedings of the Constituent Assembly are admissible, if

at all, merely as extrinsic aids to construction and do not as such

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bind the Court. Ultimately, it is for this Court to say what is

meant by the words of the Constitution.

The proponents of the argument that Article 29(2) over-

rides Article 30(1) have referred to excerpts from the speeches

made by members of Constituent Assembly which have been

quoted in support of their view. Apart from the doubtfulness as to

the admissibility of the speeches, in my opinion, there is

nothing in the speeches which shows an intention on the part of

the Constituent Assembly to abridge in any way the special

protection afforded to minorities under Article 30(1). The

intention indicated in the speeches relating to the framing of

Article 29(2) appears to be an extension of the right of non-

discrimination to members of the non-minority in respect of State

aided or State maintained educational institutions. It is difficult to

find in the speeches any unambiguous statement which points to

a determination on the part of the Constituent Assembly to curtail

the special rights of the minorities under Article 30(1). Indeed if

one scrutinises the broad historical context and the sequence of

events preceding the drafting of the Constitution it is clear that

one of the primary objectives of the Constitution was to preserve,

protect and guarantee the rights of the minorities unchanged by

any rule or regulation that may be enacted by Parliament or any

State legislature.

The history which preluded the independence of this country

and the framing of the Constitution highlights the political context

in which the Constitution was framed and the political content of

the "special" rights given to minorities. I do not intend to burden

this judgment with a detailed reference to the historical run-up to

the Constitution as ultimately adopted by the Constituent

Assembly vis--vis the rights of the minorities and the importance

that was placed on enacting effective and adequate constitutional

provisions to safeguard their interests. This has been adequately

done by Sikri, C.J. in Keshavanand Bharati V. State of Kerala

on the basis of which the learned Judge came to the conclusion

that the rights of the minorities under the Constitution formed part

of the basic structure of the Constitution and were un-amendable

and inalienable.

I need only add that the rights of linguistic minorities

assumed special significance and support when, much after

independence, the imposition of a 'unifying language' led not to

unity but to an assertion of differences. States were formed on

linguistic bases showing the apparent paradox that allowing for

and protecting differences leads to unity and integrity and

enforced assimilation may lead to disaffection and unrest. The

recognition of the principle of "unity in diversity" has continued to

be the hall mark of the Constitution a concept which has been

further strengthened by affording further support to the protection

of minorities on linguistic bases in 1956 by way of Articles 350-A

and 350-B and in 1978 by introducing clause (1-A) in Article 30

requiring "the State, that is to say, Parliament in the case of a

Central legislation or a State legislature in the case of State

legislation, in making a specific law to provide for the compulsory

acquisition of the property of minority educational institutions, to

ensure that the amount payable to the educational institution for

the acquisition of its property will not be such as will in any manner

impair the functioning of the educational institution". Any judicial

interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution whereby this

constitutional diversity is diminished would be contrary to this

avowed intent and the political considerations which underlie this

intention.

The earlier decisions of this Court show that the issue

of admission to a minority educational institution almost invariably

arose in the context of the State claiming that a minority

institution had to be 'purely' one which was

established and administered by members of the minority

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community concerned, strictly for the members of the minority

community, with the object only of preserving of the minority

religion, language, script or culture. The contention on the part of

the executive then was that a minority institution could not avail of

the protection of Article 30(1) if there was any non-minority

element either in the establishment, administration, admission or

subjects taught. It was in that context that the Court in Kerala

Education Bill held that a 'sprinkling of outsiders' being admitted

into a minority institution did not result in the minority institution

shedding its character and ceasing to be a minority institution.

It was also in that context that the Court in St. Xaviers College

(supra) came to the conclusion that a minority institution based on

religion and language had the right to establish and administer

educational institution for imparting general secular education and

still not lose its minority character. While the effort of the

Executive was to retain the 'purity' of a minority institution and

thereby to limit it,"the principle which can be discerned in the

various decisions of this Court is that the catholic approach which

led to the drafting of the provisions relating to

minority rights should not be set at naught by narrow judicial

interpretation".

The 'liberal, generous and sympathetic approach' of this

Court towards the rights of the minorities has been somewhat

reversed in the St. Stephens case. Of course, this was the first

decision of this Court which squarely dealt with the inter-

relationship of Article 29(2) and Article 30(1). None of the earlier

cited decisions did.

The decision of this Court in Champakam Dorairajan V.

State of Madras cannot be construed as an authority for the

proposition that Article 29(2) overrides the constitutional right

guaranteed to the minorities under Article 30(1), as Article 30(1)

was not at all mentioned in the entire course of the judgment.

Similarly, the Court in State of Bombay v. Bombay Education

Society was not called upon to consider a situation of conflict

between Article 30(1) and 29(2). The Bombay Education

Society, was in fact directly concerned with Article 337 and an

Anglo-Indian educational institution. In that background, when it

was suggested that Article 29(2) was intended to benefit

minorities only, the Court negatived the submission as it would

amount to a 'double protection', "double" because an Anglo-Indian

citizen would then have not only the protection of Article 337 by

way of a 60% reservation but also the benefit of Article 29(2). It

was not held by the Court that Article 29(2) would override Article

337.

There is thus no question of striking a balance between

Article 29(2) and 30(1) as if they were two competing rights.

Where once the Court has held:

"Equality of opportunity for unequals can

only mean aggravation of inequality.

Equality of opportunity admits

discrimination with reason and prohibits

discrimination without reason.

Discrimination with reasons means rational

classification for differential treatment

having nexus to the constitutional

permissible objects."

and where Article 29(2) is nothing more than a principle of

equality, and when "the whole object of conferring the right on

minorities under Article 30 is to ensure that there will be equality

between the majority and the minority, if the minorities do not have

such special protection they will be denied equality" ,it must follow

that Article 29(2) is subject to the constitutional classification of

minorities under Article 30(1).

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Finally, there appears be an inherent contradiction in the

statement of the Court in St. Stephens that:

"the minority aided educational institutions

are entitled to prefer their community

candidates to maintain the minority

character of the institutions subject of

course to conformity with the University

standard. The State may regulate the

intake in this category with due regard to

the need of the community in the area

which the institution is intended to serve.

But in no case such intake shall exceed 50

per cent of the annual admission. The

minority institutions shall make available at

least 50 per cent of the annual admission

to members of communities other than the

minority community. The admission of

other community candidates shall be done

purely on the basis of merit." (p.614)

I agree with the view as expressed by the Learned Chief

Justice that there is no question of fixing a percentage when the

need may be variable. I would only add that in fixing a

percentage, the Court in St. Stephens in fact "reserved" 50% of

available seats in a minority institution for the general category

ostensibly under Article 29(2). Article 29(2) pertains to the right of

an individual and is not a class right. It would therefore apply

when an individual is denied admission into any educational

institution maintained by the State or receiving aid from the State

funds, solely on the basis of the ground of religion, race, caste,

language or any of them. It does not operate to create a class

interest or right in the sense that any educational institution has to

set apart for non-minorities as a class and without reference to any

individual applicant, a fixed percentage of available seats. Unless

Article 30(1) and 29 (2) are allowed to operate in their separate

fields then what started with the voluntary 'sprinkling' of outsiders,

would become a major inundation and a large chunk of the right of

an aided minority institution to operate for the benefit of the

community it was set up to serve, would be washed away.

Apart from this difference with the views expressed by the

majority view on the interpretation of Article 29(2) and Article

30(1), I am also unable to concur in the mode of determining

the need of a minority community for admission to an

educational institution set up by such community. Whether there

has been a violation of Article 29(2) in refusing admission to a

non minority student in a particular case must be resolved as it

has been in the past by recourse to the Courts. It must be

emphasised that the right under Article 29(2) is an individual

one. If the non-minority student is otherwise eligible for

admission, the decision on the issue of refusal would depend on

whether the minority institution is able to establish that the refusal

was only because it was satisfying the requirements of its own

community under Article 30(1). I cannot therefore subscribe to

the view expressed by the majority that the requirement of the

minority community for admission to a minority educational

institution should be left to the State or any other Governmental

authority to determine. If the Executive is given the power to

determine the requirements of the minority community in the

matter of admission to its educational institutions, we would be

subjecting the minority educational institution in question to an

"intolerable encroachment" on the right under Article 30 (1) and

let in by the back door as it were, what should be denied entry

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altogether.

1971 SCR(Supp) 688,697

1971 SCR (Supp) 677.

1992 (1) SCC 558

Sri Venkataramana Devaru & Ors. v. The State of Mysore & Ors. 1958SCR 895, 918; Pandit M.S

.M. Sharma

v. Shri Sri Krishna Sinha; 1959 Suppl. 1 SCR 806;

Keshvananda Bharati V State of Kerala AIR 1973 SC 1461, para.292,559,682 and 1164.

1992 (1) SCC 558, 607 (para 81)

Kidangazhi Manakkal Narayanan Nambudiripad v. State of Madras AIR 1954 Madras 385 (Vol.41

)

Ramanuja V. State of Tamil Nadu AIR 1972 SC 1586; Quareshi V. State of Bihar 1959 SCR 629

See also in Re. Kerala Education Bill, 1957: 1959 SCR 995, 1037

See Keshavananda Bharati V. State of Kerala: AIR 1973 1461

In re: Kerala Education Bill, 1957 1959 SCR 995,1070

Rev. Sidhajbhai Sabhai V. State of Bombay 1963 (3) SCR 837

Rev. Father W. Proost and Ors. V. State of Bihar 1969 (2) SCR 173,192

State of Kerala V. Very Rev. Mother Pronvincial 1971 (1) SCR 734, 740

St. Xaviers College V. Gujarat 1975 (1) SCR 173, 192

ibid 223

ibid 224

Lily Kurian V. Lewina 1979(2) SCC 124,137

1955 (1) SCR 568

Concise Oxford Dictionary (10th Edition) 864

supra

D.N. Chanchala V. State of Mysore: 1971 SCR (Supp.) 608

Pandit M.S.M. Sharma v. Shri Sri Krishna Sinha; 1959 Suppl. 1 SCR 806;860, 1939 FCR 18

Bhinka V. Charan Singh AIR 1959 SC 960, 966

St. Xaviers College, 1975 (1) SCR 173, paras 7 to 12

Sri Venkataramana Dev Aru V. State of Mysore 1958 SCR 895, 918

Cardozo: Nature of Judicial Process, p.17

K.P.Verghese V.Income Tax Officer 1982 (1) SCR 629, 645; Sanjeev Coke V.Bharat Coking Coal

Ltd. 1983

(1) SCR 1000, 1029 and PV Narasimha Rao AIR 1998 SC 2120, 2158= 1998 (4) SCC 626

1973 (4) SCC 225, para 168, 178

Society of St. Joseph's College V. Union of India 2002 (1) SCC 273,278

p.1052

1975 (1) SCR 173, 234

1951 SCR 525

1955 SCR 568

Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College