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CASE NO.:

Appeal (crl.) 1210 of 1999

PETITIONER:

T.N. LAKSHMAIAH

RESPONDENT:

STATE OF KARNATAKA

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 16/10/2001

BENCH:

MB. SHAH & R.P. SETHI

JUDGMENT:

JUDGMENT

2001 Supp(4) SCR 200

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SETHI, J. Claiming insanity at the time of commission of offence of

murdering his own wife Gayathramma and teen aged son Bhaskar, the appel-

lant has prayed for setting aside the judgment of the trial court as well

as the High Court by which he has been convicted under Section 302 of the

Indian Penal Code and sentenced to life imprisonment. Without leading

evidence in support of his claim, the appellant urged that there was

sufficient material on record which probabilised the existence of

circumstances justifying the benefit of the exception as incorporated under

Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code. It is also submitted that the

prosecution had failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

In order to appreciate the submissions of the appellant, it is relevant to

take note of the prosecution case as alleged and proved against him vide

the judgment impunged in this appeal. The appellant was a Government

servant employed in the Department of Agriculture from the year 1991. He

was residing with his wife and son in one of the quarters allotted to him

by the Department. The appellant's deceased son was a student of 7th

standard at the time of occurrence. On 12.1.1991, the appellant applied to

avail casual leave on 14.1.1991, The accused, along with his wife and son,

had left his house on 11.1.1991 and gone to Thadagavadi. On 16.1.1991, he

took his wife and son along with him on the pretext of showing them

Shivanasamudra, a picnic spot where the River Kaveri makes a fall. He

purchased half kilogram of apples from Devegowda (PW11) in a village shop

at Malavalli. At about 9 O'clock in the morning, the appellant with his

wife and son got down from the bus at Satyagola Hand Post where they

purchased and consumed tender coconut. All the three thereafter walked on

foot towards Shivanasamudra. The accused took his wife and son to the

extreme end to show them Gagana Chukki Falls. He led them downwards telling

that he would show the beauty of the falls from a very near point. He is

alleged to have pushed down Bhaskar from that place who fell on a rock

which was 150 feet below. He thereafter caught hold of his wife and

forcibly tied her hands with a red waste thread and dgragged her to a rock,

notwithstanding her pleadings and protests. He tied her saree arount the

neck of his wife and killed her by tightening the knot. Despite being a

picnic spot, he had chosen the spot for commission for the offence where no

tourist normally went. He left the place of occurrence at 4.30 in the

evening, got a bus and went towards Malavalli. He was seen reaching his

horn at about 7.30 p.m. by Sri Kalaiah (PW8). On the next day, the appellat

left his house and went to Kollegal Rural Police Station in the afternoon

where he gave a statement confessing his crime. On the basis of his

statement, a case was registered for offence punishable under Section 302

IPC. As per his disclosure, made in the statement, the dead body of the

wife was recovered from the place pointed out by him. The body of the son

was seen lying on the rock/gorge where the police could not reach on the

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first day. When, on the next day, the body of the child was recorded, he

was alive and brought to the Kollegal Hospital and thereafter sent for

better treatment in NIMHANS at Bangalore, where he breathed his last on

19.1.1999.

On completion of the investigation, the final report was produced, the case

committed to the Sessions and charges framed against the appellant. To

prove their case, the prosecution examined 30 witnesses. It is conceded

that there was no eye-witness to the occurrence. In his statement, recorded

under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the appellant accepted

that he was residing with his wife and son in the quarters belonging to the

Agriculture Department. He also admitted the fact of having applied for

casual leave. He admitted to have left his house on the evening on

11.1.1991 with his wife and son. He denied the charge of having taken his

wife and son to Gagana Chukki Falls and instead stated that he had gone to

Talagawadi with his family. He stated that he only remembered that his wife

had nagged him to eat the meals on 13.1.1991 but does not remember anything

thereafter. He claims to have seen himself in the prison in June, 1991 and

stated that he did not remember as to what had happened in the intervening

period.

To ascertain as to whether the accused had committed the crime or not, the

trial court formulated eight points for its determination and after

appreciating the evidence, hearing the arguments and taking note of the

attending circumstances, concluded that the appellant was guilty for the

commission of the crime of murders of his wife and son. The appeal filed by

him was dismissed by the High Court vide the order impugned in this appeal.

Mr.S. Muralidhar, Amicus curiae who appeared for the appellant submit-ted

that the conduct of the accused at or about the time of occurrence, his

having remained a patient of mental illness and the record produced during

the trial probabilised his being insane within the meaning of Section 84 of

the Indian Penal Code which entitled him acquittal. He has further

contended that as the case of the prosecution rests only on the

circumstantial evidence, the prosecution has failed to connect the accused

with the commission of the crime as, according to the learned counsel, the

chain of circumstances is not so complete to draw the only inference of the

accused being guilty of the offence charged.

To allay all apprehensions, this Court vide order dated 15.11.1999 di-

rected the Superintendent of the Central Jail, New Central Prison,

Bangalore to forward the medical report, if any, concerning him for

facilitating the court to ascertain his mental condition. In response, the

Senior Superintendent of Central Prison, Bangalore has submitted the

medical report dated 6.12.1999 issued by the psychiatrist of the prison

Hospital. In the report it is stated that the appellant was examined and

diagnosed as suffering from "moderate depression". He was put on treatment

and had shown improvement. At the time of submission of the report his

mental condition was stated to be satisfactory.

Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code provides that nothing is an offence

which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, by reason of

unsound-ness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or

that what he is doing is either wrong or contrary to law. The section forms

part of Chapter IV dealing with general exceptions. The importance of the

chapter was highlighted by Lord Macaulay before the House of Commons at the

time of introduction of the Bill as under :

"This chapter has been framed in order to obviate the necessity of

repeating in every penal clause a considerable number of limitations. Some

limitations relate only to a single provision, or to a very small class of

provisions... Every such exception evidently ought to be appended to the

rule which it is intended to modify. But there are other exceptions which

are common to all the penal clauses of the Code, or to a greater variety of

clauses dispersed over many chapters. It would obviously be inconvenient to

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repeat these exceptions several times in every page. We have, therefore,

placed them in a separate chapter and, we have provided that every

definition of an offence, every penal provision, and every illustration of

a definition or penal provision, shall be construed subject to the

provisions contained in that chapter".

The principle embodied in the chapter is based upon the maxim "actus non

facit reum nisi mens sit rea", i.e., an act is not criminal unless there is

criminal intent.

Under the Evidence Act, the onus of proving any of the exception mentioned

in the Chapter lies on the accused though the requisite standard of proof

is not the same as expected from the prosecution. It is sufficient if an

accused is able to bring his case within the ambit of any of the general

exceptions by the standard of preponderance of probabilities, as a result

of which he may succeed not because that he proves his case to the hilt but

because of the version given by him casts a doubt on the prosecution case.

In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ahmadulla, AIR (1961) SC 998 this Court held

that the burden of proof that the mental condition of the accused was, at

the crucial point of time, such as is described by the Section, lies on the

accused who claims the benefit of this exemption vide Section 105 of the

Evidence Act (Illustration a). The settled position of law is that every

man is presumed to be sane and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to

be responsible for his acts unless the contrary is proved. Mere ipsi dixit

of the accused is not enough for availing of the benefit of the exceptions

under chapter IV.

In a case where the exception under Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code is

claimed, the Court has to consider whether, at the time of commission of

the offence, the accused, by reason of unsoundness of mind, was incapable

of knowing the nature of the act or that he is doing what is either wrong

or contrary to law. Entire conduct of the accused, from the time of the

commission of the offence upto the time, the Sessions proceedings

commenced, is relevant for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether plea

raised was genuine, bonafide or after-thought. Dealing with the plea of

insanity, the scope of Section 84 IPC, the attending circumstances and the

burden of proof, this Court in Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakkar v. State of

Gujarat, AIR (1964) SC 1563, held.

"It is fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence of that an ac-cused

is presumed to be innocent and, therefore, the burden lies on the

prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The

prosecution, therefore, in a case of homicide shall prove beyond reasonable

doubt that the accused caused death with the requisite intention described

in S.299 of the Indian Penal Code. This general burden never shifts and it

always rests on the prosecution. But, S.84 of the Indian Penal Code

provides that nothing is an offence if the accused at the time of doing

that act, by reason of unsoundness of mind was incapable of knowing the

nature of his act or what he was doing was either wrong or contrary to law.

This being an exception, under S.105 of the Evidence Act the burden of

proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within the said

exception lies on the accused, and the court shall presume the absence of

such circum-stances. Under S.105 of the Evidence Act, read with the

definition of "shall presume" in S.4 thereof, the court shall regard the

absence of such circumstances as proved unless, after considering the

matters before it, it believes that the said circumstances existed or their

exist-ence was so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circum-

stances of the particular case, to act upon the opposition that they did

exist. To put in other words, the accused will have to rebut the

presumption that such circumstances did not exist, by placing material

before the court sufficient to make it consider the existence of the said

circumstances so probable that a prudent man would act upon them. The

accused has to satisfy the standard of a 'prudent man'. If the material

placed before the court, such as oral and documentary evi-dence,

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presumptions, admissions or even the prosecution evidence, satisfies the

test of 'prudent man' the accused will have discharged his burden. The

evidence so placed may not be sufficient to discharge the burden under

S.105 of the Evidence Act, but it may raise a reasonable doubt in the mind

of a judge as regards one or other of the necessary ingredients of the

offence itself. It may, for instance, raise a reasonable doubt in the mind

of the judge whether the accused had the requisite intention laid down in

S.299 of the Indian Penal Code. If the judge has such reasonable doubt, he

has to acquit the accused, for in that event the prosecution will have

failed to prove conclusively the guilt of the accused. There is no conflict

between the general burden, which is always on the prosecution and which

never shifts, and the special burden that rests on the accused to make out

his defence of insanity."

After referring to various text books and the earlier pronouncements of

this Court, it was further held :

"The doctine of burden of proof in the context of the plea of insanity may

be stated in the following propositions : (1) The prosecution must prove

beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had committed that offence with

the requisite mens rea; and the burden of proving that always rests on the

prosecution from the beginning to the end of the trial. (2) There is a

rebuttable presumption that the accused may not insane, when he committed

the crime, in the sense laid down by S.84 of the Indian Penal Code; the

accused may rebut it by placing before the court all the relevant evidence

- oral, documentary or circumstan-tial, but the burden of proof upon him is

no higher than that rests upon a party to civil proceedings. (3) Even if

the accused was not able to establish conclusively that he was insane at

the time he committed the offence, the evidence placed before the court by

the accused or by the prosecution may raise a reasonable doubt in the mind

of the court as regards one or more of the ingredients of the offence,

including mens rea of the accused and in that case the court would be

entitled to acquit the accused on the ground that the general burden of

proof resting on the prosecution was not discharged."

To the same effect is the judgment in Bhikari v. The State of Uttar

Pradesh, AIR (1966) SC 1.

It is admitted that the appellant in this case, has not led any evidence in

proof of the plea of insanity. There is nothing on the record to infer that

the accused was of unsound mind at or about the time of occurrence. His

behaviour at the time and subsequent to the commission of the crime clearly

indicates that he knew and was capable of knowing the nature of the act

done by him. Being annoyed with the attitude of the deceased, he appears to

have taken a conscious decision of taking them away from the house and

committed the crime at a secluded place. He had all faculties to safely

reach home and sleep for the night. At no point of time his behaviour is

shown to be abnormal. The plea, though not strictly but by implication,

appears to have been taken by the accused for the first time when his

statement was recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

We have found no record allegedly showing the appel-lant to be suffering

from any mental disease when he is stated to have applied for bail. The

plea raised, on the face of it, is after-thought and bereft of any

substance. The opinion of the doctor obtained after about 8 years also does

not indicate any history of medical disorder of the appellant. Even at the

time of examination in the year 1999, he was diagnosed of suffering from

"moderate depression" which is likely to be there in the circumstances

where such person is confined in prison on the charge of the murder of his

wife and son. We are satisfied that the appellant was sane and understood

the implications of the act done by him and in no case was having unsound

mind within the meaning of Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code, at the

relevant time.

We are also not satisfied with the submission of the learned counsel of the

appellant that the prosecution had failed to prove the complete chain of

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circumstances connecting the accused with the commission of the crime. In

its detailed judgment the trial court has referred to proved circumstances

which lead to the only inference of the involvement of the accused in the

commission of the crime. Similarly, the High Court, in its detailed

judgment, has referred to relevant evidence and the incriminating

circumstances. We do not find any ground to draw any other inference in the

present case.

There is no substance in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed.