W.P.(C) 2342/2025 Page 1 of 16

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Reserved on: 27.11.2025

Pronounced on: 07.01.2026

+ W.P.(C) 2342/2025 & CM APPL. 11030/2025

UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .....Petitioners

Through: Mr. Premtosh K. Mishra, CGSC,

Mr. Anurag Tiwari, Mr.

Pranabdh Tiwari, Advs.

versus

NARESH ....Respondent

Through: Mr. R.V.Sinha, Mr. A.S.Singh,

Ms. Shriya Sharma, Ms. Jyoti

Garg, Ms. Nidhi Singh, Advs.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAVIN CHAWLA

HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MADHU JAIN

J U D G M E N T

MADHU JAIN, J.

1.This petition has been filed, challenging the Order dated

20.11.2024 passed by the learned Central Administrative Tribunal,

Principal Bench, New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Tribunal’) in

O.A. No. 719/2023, titledNaresh v.Union of India & Ors.(hereinafter

referred to as the ‘Impugned Order’), whereby the O.A. filed by the

respondent herein was allowed.

FACTS OF THE CASE

2.The factual matrix of the case is that the respondent was appointed

to the post of Workshop Foreman at the IndianInstitute of Handloom

Technology (IIHT), Guwahati, on10.08.2020 on a direct recruitment

basis. Subsequently, by aComplaint dated 02.12.2021 submitted by a2

nd

year girl student of the said Institute, the respondent was accusedof

W.P.(C) 2342/2025 Page 2 of 16

serious misdemeanor towards girl students.

3.Inorder to inquire into the said allegations of misdemeanors, the

Director ofthe Institute constituted an InternalComplaints Committee

(ICC) as contemplated underthe Sexual Harassment of Women at

Workplace(Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 and the

respondent was placed under suspension,videOrder dated 09.12.2021 in

terms of sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 ofthe Central Civil Services

(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965. The complaint was

referred to the Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) of IIHT, Guwahati,

constituted by the Director of IIHT, GuwahativideOrder dated

10.12.2021, under the chairmanship of Smt. K. Basumatary, Junior

Lecturer (Textiles), IIHT, Guwahati, to inquire into the allegations

against the respondent. A copy of the Order dated 10.12.2021, whereby

the ICC of IIHT, Guwahati was constituted by the Director, was duly

provided to the respondent.

4.The ICC conducted three meetings dated 13.12.2021, 12.01.2022,

and 07.02.2022 at IIHT, Guwahati, to proceed with the inquiry against

the respondent.

5.An opportunity was granted to the respondent,videNotice No.

IHTG/Estt-(136)/126-17/135 dated 14.12.2021, to submit his

representation in response to the complaint dated 02.12.2021.

6.The respondentsubmitted his reply to the said notice on

21.12.2021. It is the case of the petitioners that in his reply, the

respondent admitted his misconduct and stated that he would not repeat

such conduct in the future.

7.Based on the observations made by the ICC in its 3

rd

meeting

W.P.(C) 2342/2025 Page 3 of 16

dated 07.02.2022, the petitioners issued an Order dated 25.03.2022,

stating that the recommendations of the ICC had been accepted by the

competent authority and that due procedure under Rule 14(2) of the CCS

(CCA) Rules, 1965, governing the conduct of inquiry, had been

followed. It was further stated that the respondent, being a probationer

and under suspension at the relevant time, was terminated from

Government service with immediate effect. The said order further

observed as follows:

“The accused person, Shri Naresh, is a young

Government official and the offence committed

by him for tempting the teenage girl students, his

act of intimidation towards girl students cannot

be ignored and if it is not prevented at this stage,

he would be encouraged for committing more

offences among girl students and therefore, the

ICC has recommended suitable action required

to be taken for removing Shri Naresh from

service from the institute after taking into

consideration of the risk factors for girl

students.”

8.Thereafter, the respondent filed an appeal on 07.05.2022 before

the Appellate Authority against the Termination Order dated 25.03.2022.

9.The respondent also filed O.A. No. 2152/2022 before the learned

Tribunal, New Delhi, challenging the Termination Order dated

25.03.2022 passed by the petitioners. However, the learned Tribunal,

videOrder dated 17.08.2022, disposed of the said O.A. without entering

into the merits of the case and directed the petitioners to consider the

respondent’s pending appeal dated 07.05.2022 and decide the same by

passing an appropriate, reasoned, and speaking order as expeditiously as

possible.

10.Pursuant thereto, the petitioners,videOrder dated 23.01.2023,

W.P.(C) 2342/2025 Page 4 of 16

rejected the appeal filed by the respondent, thereby confirming the

termination of the respondent from government service.

11.Aggrieved by the Order dated 23.01.2023 passed by the

competent authority, the respondent filed O.A. No. 719/2023 before the

learned Tribunal.

12.The learned Tribunal,videOrder dated 20.11.2024, disposed of

the above-mentioned O.A. with the following directions:

“11. While amendments have been made to Rule

14(2) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1967 to provide

that “Provided that where there is a complaint

of sexual harassment within the meaning of Rule

3-C of the Central Civil Services

(Conduct)Rules, 1964, the Complaints

Committee established in each Ministry or

Department or Office for inquiring into such

complaints, shall be deemed to be the Inquiring

Authority appointed by the Disciplinary

Authority for the purpose of these rules and the

Complaints Committee shall hold, if separate

procedure has not been prescribed for the

Complaints Committee for holding the inquiry

into the complaints of sexual harassment, the

inquiry as far as practicable in accordance with

the procedure laid down in these rules.”, what

needs to be seen whether ICC has followed

wherever practicable the procedures

contemplated in the said Rules. We find from the

record available on file that copy of the

complaint given by the 2nd year Girl student has

not been handed over to the applicant and no

opportunity, too, was given to him to present his

defence, including cross-examination of

witnesses and the report of ICC was accepted by

the respondent no.2 without sharing a copy of

the ICC’s report with the applicant and the

services of the applicant was terminated without

following the principles of natural justice.

12. Therefore, we quash the order of termination

of the services of the applicant as probationer

and remit the case back to the respondents with

liberty to start the proceedings under Rule 14(2)

W.P.(C) 2342/2025 Page 5 of 16

of CCS(CCA) Rules, 1965, afresh by following

the due procedures contemplated in the said

Rules. The applicant will be permitted to be

reinstated in service as a probationer without

any consequential benefits of pay and

allowances on the principle ‘No work no pay’.

13. The exercise as ordained above will be

completed within a period of 8 weeks from the

date of receipt of a certified copy of this order.

There shall be no order as to costs. Pending MA,

if any, also stands disposed of. ”

13.Aggrieved thereby, the petitioners have approached this Court by

way of the present writ petition.

SUBMISSIONS OF THE LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE

PETITIONERS

14.The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that Rule 14(2) of

the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 expressly provides that where a complaint

of sexual harassment, within the meaning of Rule 3(C) of the CCS

(Conduct) Rules, 1964, is made, the Complaints Committee constituted

in the concerned Ministry, Department, or Office shall be deemed to be

the Inquiring Authority appointed by the Disciplinary Authority, and

such Committee shall conduct the inquiry, as far as practicable, in

accordance with the procedure prescribed under the said Rules.

15.The learned counsel further submits that in the present case, the

Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) of IIHT, Guwahati was duly

constituted by the Director, IIHT, GuwahativideOrder dated

10.12.2021, under the Chairpersonship of Smt. K. Basumatary, Junior

Lecturer (Textiles), IIHT, Guwahati, for the purpose of inquiring into the

allegations of sexual harassment levelled against the respondent.

16.The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the learned

W.P.(C) 2342/2025 Page 6 of 16

Tribunal failed to appreciate that the facts and circumstances of the

present case are materially different from those in O.A. No. 2470/2015

and O.A. No. 2998/2021, which were relied upon by the learned

Tribunal as well as by the respondent, and therefore the said decisions

are clearly distinguishable and inapplicable to the present case.

17.The learned counsel submits that the learned Tribunal failed to

consider that due procedure, as mandated under Rule 14(2) of the CCS

(CCA) Rules, 1965, was duly followed by the Internal Complaints

Committee of IIHT, Guwahati, and that the Order dated 25.03.2022 was

issued with the approval of the Competent Authority, including proper

communication of the termination of service of the respondent.

18.The learned counsel further submits that the learned Tribunal

failed to appreciate that the respondent, being an Ex-Workshop Foreman

belonging to the General Central Service, Group ‘C’, was governed by

the Schedule under Part III of Rule 24 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, in

terms of which the Deputy Secretary or Director of the concerned

Ministry or Department is the Appointing and Disciplinary Authority,

and the Secretary of the Ministry or Department is the Appellate

Authority.

19.The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that from the

representation dated 22.12.2021, it would be evident that the respondent

was supplied a copy of the complaint made against him by the girl

students. It is submitted that the finding of the learned Tribunal to the

contrary is erroneous.

20.He further submits that the procedure prescribed under Rule 14 of

the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, was followed by the Committee, inasmuch

W.P.(C) 2342/2025 Page 7 of 16

as the response of the respondent to the allegations was duly sought and

considered. The Committee, in its report dated 07.02.2002, also notes

that the respondent virtually confessed to the allegations levelled against

him, including acts of intimidation directed at the girl students to

withdraw their complaints. It is therefore submitted that the procedure

prescribed under Rule 14(2) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, stood

complied with, as far as practicable.

21.The learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on the

judgments of the Supreme Court inB.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India,

(1995) 6 SCC 749;State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh, (1977) 2 SCC

491; andHira Nath Mishra v. Principal, Rajendra Medical College,

(1973) 1 SCC 805.

SUBMISSIONS OF THE LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE

RESPONDENT

22.On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent submits

that no charges were ever framed against the respondent, nor was he

granted any opportunity to cross-examine the complainants or to lead

evidence in his defence. It is submitted that the report is based solely on

an alleged confession of the respondent. Even the Inquiry Report was

not supplied to the respondent prior to the passing of the Impugned

Order of termination. He further submits that, although the respondent

was on probation, the order terminating his services is punitive and

stigmatic in nature, and therefore the procedure prescribed under Rule 14

of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 was required to be strictly followed.

Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court inAureliano

Fernandes v. State of Goa & Ors.,(2024) 1 SCC 632.

W.P.(C) 2342/2025 Page 8 of 16

23.The learned counsel for the respondent further submits that the

provisions of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 are mandatory in nature and

any non-compliance thereof would vitiate the entire disciplinary

proceedings. It is submitted that from a bare perusal of the Impugned

Order itself, it is evident that no charge memorandum was issued to the

respondent, no list of witnesses or documents was supplied, and no

regular inquiry was conducted by the Committee. Instead, the Committee

proceeded on flimsy grounds and recommended termination of the

respondent solely on the premise that he was a probationer, without

adhering to the prescribed procedure.

24.The learned counsel for the respondent submits that the contention

of the petitioners relying upon the expression“as far as practicable”is

wholly misconceived and contrary to the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 as

well as Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. It is trite law that no

employee can be dismissed or removed from service without being

informed of the charges against him and without being afforded a

reasonable opportunity to defend himself.

25.The learned counsel for the respondent further submits that the

protection of hearing is ingrained in service jurisprudence and, in the

present case, is embodied in the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. However, the

said mandatory safeguards were completely disregarded, inasmuch as no

charge memorandum was issued, no list of documents or witnesses was

supplied, and no opportunity was granted to the respondent to defend

himself.

26.The learned counsel for the respondent submits that no

opportunity was afforded to the respondent to cross-examine the

W.P.(C) 2342/2025 Page 9 of 16

witnesses, nor was he permitted to adduce evidence in his defence,

rendering the entire proceedings a nullity in the eyes of law. It is

submitted that the right of cross-examination is a statutory right, and in

the absence thereof, any evidence relied upon cannot be legally

considered. Likewise, unless documents are duly proved and admitted,

the same cannot form the basis of any adverse finding.

27.The learned counsel for the respondent further submits that the

entire proceedings are in clear violation of the law laid down by the

Supreme Court inRoop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank & Ors.,

(2009) 2 SCC 570, andState of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. v. Saroj Kumar

Sinha,(2010) 2 SCC 772.

28.The learned counsel for the respondent submits that merely

because the complaint pertains to allegations of sexual harassment, it

cannot be a ground to deny the principles of natural justice or to dispense

with a disciplinary inquiry in accordance with the rules. It is further

submitted that the respondent’s status as a probationer does not dilute the

requirement of compliance with due process.

29.The learned counsel for the respondent submits that it is well-

settled law that even in the case of a probationer, if the order of

termination is punitive or stigmatic in nature, the same cannot be

sustained unless a proper disciplinary inquiry is conducted strictly in

accordance with the rules.

30.The learned counsel for the respondent submits that the issue

relating to compliance with principles of natural justice in cases of

sexual harassment has been conclusively settled by the Supreme Court in

Dr. Vijayakumaran C.P.V. v. Central University of Kerala & Ors.,

W.P.(C) 2342/2025 Page 10 of 16

(2020) 12 SCC 426;Aureliano Fernandes v. State of Goa & Ors.,

(2024) 1 SCC 632; andUnion of India & Ors. v. Dilip Paul,2023 SCC

OnLine SC 1423.

31.The learned counsel for the respondent submits that the

allegations levelled against the respondent are false, concocted, and

motivated, having been made at the instance of the then authorities who

were biased against him. It is further submitted that the respondent never

admitted the allegations, contrary to what has been asserted by the

petitioners.

32.The learned counsel for the respondent submits that it is a settled

principle of law that where a statute prescribes a particular manner for

doing an act, the same must be done in that manner alone and no other

mode is permissible. Reliance in this regard is placed uponA.R. Antulay

v. Ramdas Srinivas Nayak & Anr., (1984) 2 SCC 500, andUnion of

India v. Mahender Singh, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 909.

33.The learned counsel for the respondent submits that, in view of the

aforesaid facts and settled legal position, the Impugned Order passed by

the learned Tribunal does not suffer from any perversity, either on facts

or in law, and therefore, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed with

costs in favour of the respondent.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

34.We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned

counsels appearing for the respective parties.

35.The issue that arises for consideration in the present case is

whether the proceedings conducted by the Internal Complaints

Committee satisfied the requirements of Rule 14(2) of the CCS (CCA)

W.P.(C) 2342/2025 Page 11 of 16

Rules, 1965, as well as the principles of natural justice.

36.The relevant extract of Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 is

reproduced hereinbelow:

“14. Procedure for imposing major penalties-

(1) No order imposing any of the penalties

specified in clauses (v) to (ix) of Rule 11 shall be

made except after an inquiry held, as far as may

be, in the manner provided in this rule and rule

15, or in the manner provided by the Public

Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850 (37 of 1850),

where such inquiry is held under that Act.

(2) Whenever the disciplinary authority is of the

opinion that there are grounds for inquiring into

the truth of any imputation of misconduct or

misbehaviour against a Government servant, it

may itself inquire into, or appoint under this rule

or under the provisions of the Public Servants

(Inquiries) Act, 1850, as the case may be, an

authority to inquire into the truth thereof.

Provided that where there is a complaint of

sexual harassment within the meaning of rule 3

C of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules,

1964, the Complaints Committee established in

each Ministry or Department or Office for

inquiring into such complaints, shall be deemed

to be the inquiring authority appointed by the

disciplinary authority for the purpose of these

rules and the Complaints Committee shall hold,

if separate procedure has not been prescribed

for the Complaints Committee for holding the

inquiry into the complaints of sexual

harassment, the inquiry as far as practicable in

accordance with the procedure laid down in

these rules.”

37.At the outset, it is pertinent to note that the complaint from the girl

students was received on 02.12.2021, and the respondent was placed

under suspension on 09.12.2021.

38.From a perusal of the Minutes of Meeting of the Complaints

W.P.(C) 2342/2025 Page 12 of 16

Committee placed before us by the petitioners, it would be evident that

although the respondent had submitted his reply to the Notice of Inquiry

issued to him, the same was found to be unsatisfactory by the

Complaints Committee in its meeting held on 12.01.2022. In the said

meeting, eleven girl students were also examined by the Complaints

Committee in the absence of the respondent. The respondent was not

given any notice to appear on the said date.

39.Furthermore, after considering the statements of the said students,

the Complaints Committee recommended that an opportunity be afforded

to the respondent to be heard, either in person or virtually. On

07.02.2022, the respondent appeared before the Committee virtually and

allegedly confessed to the allegations made against him. Notably, this

report was not supplied to the respondent prior to the issuance of the

Memorandum dated 25.03.2022 terminating his services.

40.InAureliano Fernandes(supra), the Supreme Court considered

the proviso to Rule 14(2) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 insofar as

inquiries into complaints of sexual harassment are concerned and

observed as under:

“77.The intent and purpose of the proviso

inserted in Rule 14(2) of the CCS (CCA) Rules

and Rule 3-C of the CCS (Conduct) Rules is that

the procedure required to be adopted for

conducting an inquiry into the complaint of

sexual harassment that can lead to imposition of

a major penalty under the Rules, must be fair,

impartial and in line with the Rules. Pertinently,

the emphasis on adhering to the principles of

natural justice during an inquiry conducted by a

Complaints Committee finds specific mention in

Rule 7(4) of the subsequently enacted Rules of

2013. But the spirit behind the due process could

never be suppressed or ignored even in the

W.P.(C) 2342/2025 Page 13 of 16

absence of the Statute or the Rules inasmuch as

the principles of natural justice are the very

essence of the decision-making process and must

be read into every judicial or even a quasi-

judicial proceeding.

78.This is not to say that the Committee even if

described as an inquiring authority, by virtue of

the ruling in Medha Kotwal case and required to

follow the procedure prescribed under Rule 14,

was expected to conduct the inquiry as if it was a

full-fledged trial. The expression used in the

proviso to Rule 14(2), “as far as practicable”

has to be read and understood in a pragmatic

manner. In any such proceedings initiated by the

disciplinary authority, a calibrated balance

would have to be struck between the rights of a

victim of sexual harassment and those of the

delinquent employee. At the same time, fairness

in the procedure would have to be necessarily

adopted in the interest of both sides. After all,

what is sauce for the goose, is sauce for the

gander.”

41.After examining the aforesaid aspects, the Supreme Court held

that although the appellant therein could not be said to have been kept in

the dark about the allegations made against him, unlike the respondent in

the present case, nevertheless, the procedural lapses that had occurred in

the conduct of the proceedings of the Complaints Committee

necessitated that the matter be remanded to the Complaints Committee.

The relevant extract from the judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:

“81. For the above reasons, the appellant

cannot be faulted for questioning the process

and its outcome. There is no doubt that matters

of this nature are sensitive and have to be

handled with care. The respondents had received

as many as seventeen complaints from students

levelling serious allegations of sexual

harassment against the appellant. But that would

not be a ground to give a complete go-by to the

procedural fairness of the inquiry required to be

conducted, more so when the inquiry could lead

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to imposition of major penalty proceedings.

When the legitimacy of the decision taken is

dependent on the fairness of the process and the

process adopted itself became questionable, then

the decision arrived at cannot withstand judicial

scrutiny and is wide open to interference. It is

not without reason that it is said that a fair

procedure alone can guarantee a fair outcome.

In this case, the anxiety of the Committee of

being fair to the victims of sexual harassment,

has ended up causing them greater harm.

82. This Court is, therefore, of the opinion that

the proceedings conducted by the Committee

with effect from the month of May 2009, fell

short of the “as far as practicable” norm

prescribed in the relevant Rules. The discretion

vested in the Committee for conducting the

inquiry has been exercised improperly, defying

the principles of natural justice. As a

consequence thereof, the impugned judgment

[Aureliano Fernandes v. State of Goa, 2012 SCC

OnLine Bom 1920] upholding the decision taken

by the EC of terminating the services of the

appellant, duly endorsed by the appellate

authority cannot be sustained and is accordingly

quashed and set aside with the following

directions:

82.1. The matter is remanded back to the

Complaints Committee to take up the inquiry

proceeding as they stood on 5-5-2009.

82.2. The Committee shall afford adequate

opportunity to the appellant to defend himself.

82.3. The appellant shall not seek any

adjournment of the proceedings.

82.4. A Report shall be submitted by the

Committee to the disciplinary authority for

appropriate orders.

82.5. Having regard to the long passage of

time, the respondents are directed to complete

the entire process within three months from the

first date of hearing fixed by the Committee.

82.6. The procedure to be followed by the

Committee and the disciplinary authority shall

be guided by the principles of natural justice.

82.7. The Rules applied will be as were

W.P.(C) 2342/2025 Page 15 of 16

applicable at the relevant point of time.

82.8. The decision taken by the Committee and

the disciplinary authority shall be purely on

merits and in accordance with law.

82.9. The appellant will not be entitled to claim

immediate reinstatement or back wages till the

inquiry is completed and a decision is taken by

the disciplinary authority.”

(Emphasis supplied)

42.In the present case as well, from the above narration of facts, it

would be evident that the Complaints Committee did not afford a fair

opportunity to the respondent to defend the allegations made against

him. The Committee examined the girl students in his absence and

submitted its report on the basis of an alleged admission of guilt by the

respondent. The Inquiry Report was also not furnished to the respondent

prior to the issuance of the Termination Order.

43.The reliance placed by the petitioners onB.C. Chaturvedi v.

Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749;State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh,

(1977) 2 SCC 491; andHira Nath Mishra v. Principal, Rajendra

Medical College,(1973) 1 SCC 805, is misplaced and does not advance

the case of the petitioners.

CONCLUSION

44.Keeping in view the observations made inAureliano Fernandes

(supra), this Court is of the considered view that the learned Tribunal

rightly held that the case ought to be remitted back. The Committee is

expected to deal with the matter in accordance with the principles of

natural justice.

45.It is clarified that during the pendency of the fresh proceedings

before the Internal Complaints Committee, the respondent shall not be

reinstated or permitted to resume duties at the Institute, so as to ensure

W.P.(C) 2342/2025 Page 16 of 16

that the inquiry is conducted in a free, fair, and uninfluenced manner and

to obviate any possibility of contact with, or intimidation of the

complainant students. The inquiry must be completed by the Committee

within a period of 6 months of the date of the judgment.

46.The present petition and application are disposed of with the

above directions.

47.There shall be no order as to costs.

MADHU JAIN, J.

NAVIN CHAWLA, J.

JANUARY 07, 2026/rm/as