O.M.P. (COMM) 452/2024 & connected matter Page 1 of 27

$~

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

% Judgment reserved on: 13.01.2026

Judgment pronounced on: 26.02.2026

+ O.M.P. (COMM) 452/2024, I.A. 43176/2024 (Stay), I.A.

43177/2024 (Delay of 25 days in filing the petition) & I.A.

45918/2024 (Dismissing the Petition challenging the impugned

award as the same is barred by limitation)

UNION OF INDIA .....Petitioner

Through: Dr. Monika Arora, Mr.

Subhrdeep Saha, Mr. Prabhat

Kumar, Ms. Anamika Thakur

and Mr. Abhinav Verma,

Advocates.

versus

M/S VARINDERA CONSTRUCTIONS LIMITED

.....Respondent

Through: Mr. Pradeep Chhindra, Mr.

Parth Dhawan, Mr. Devarshi

Mishra and Ms. Pratibha Rathi,

Advocates.

+ OMP (ENF.) (COMM.) 208/2025

VARINDERA CONSTRUCTIONS LIMITED ...Decree Holder

Through: Mr. Pradeep Chhindra, Mr.

Parth Dhawan, Mr. Devarshi

Mishra and Ms. Pratibha Rathi,

Advocates.

versus

UNION OF INDIA .....Judgement Debtor

Through: Dr. Monika Arora, Mr.

Subhrdeep Saha, Mr. Prabhat

Kumar, Ms. Anamika Thakur

and Mr. Abhinav Verma,

Advocates.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN

SHANKAR

O.M.P. (COMM) 452/2024 & connected matter Page 2 of 27

J U D G M E N T

HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR , J.

1. The Objection Petition, being O.M.P. (COMM) 452/2024, has

been instituted under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation

Act, 1996

1

, seeking setting aside of the Arbitral Award dated

02.05.2024, as subsequently amended/corrected vide Order dated

12.06.2024

2

, rendered by the learned Sole Arbitrator in the disputes

arising between M/s Varindera Constructions Limited and Union of

India.

2. The Enforcement Petition, being O.M.P.(ENF.)(COMM.)

208/2025, has been filed by the Award Holder (who is the Respondent

in the Objection Petition) under Section 36 of the A&C Act, read with

Order XXI and Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

3

,

seeking enforcement of the aforesaid Impugned Arbitral Award

against the Award Debtor (who is the Petitioner in the Objection

Petition).

3. For the sake of convenience and consistency, the ranks and

references of the parties hereinafter shall be described as in the

Objection Petition, unless the context otherwise requires.

I.A.-43177/2024 (delay 25 days in filing the present petition) in

O.M.P. (COMM) 452/2024

I.A.-45918/2024 (dismissal of Petition U/S 34 of A&C Act) in

O.M.P. (COMM) 452/2024

4. In the Objection Petition, a preliminary issue has arisen

regarding delay in filing the said petition. The Petitioner, along with

1

A&C Act

2

Impugned Arbitral Award

3

CPC

O.M.P. (COMM) 452/2024 & connected matter Page 3 of 27

the Petition, has filed I.A. No. 43177/2024 seeking condonation of a

delay of 25 days in filing of the Objection Petition.

5. The Respondent, on the other hand, has filed I.A. No.

45918/2024 seeking dismissal of the Objection Petition on the ground

of limitation.

6. In view of these competing applications, it has become

necessary and expedient to determine the said applications at the

threshold. Accordingly, prior to examining the challenge to the

Impugned Arbitral Award on merits under Section 34 of the A&C

Act, this Court considers it appropriate to first adjudicate upon the

issue of condonation of delay and the objection regarding non est

filing raised by the Respondent in the present Petition.

7. The determination of these preliminary objections goes to the

very root of maintainability and shall decide whether the Objection

Petition can be entertained on merits. The fate of the Objection

Petition is therefore contingent upon the outcome of these

applications, and consequently, the fate of the Enforcement Petition

shall also abide by the determination thereof.

8. Before adverting to the aspect of limitation, it is necessary to

briefly set out the factual background relevant to the present

proceedings:

(a) The Respondent is a public limited company engaged for over

three decades in the business of execution of construction

contracts and projects and has had a longstanding association

with the Military Engineer Services

4

, whereas the Petitioner is

4

MES

O.M.P. (COMM) 452/2024 & connected matter Page 4 of 27

an organisation under the Ministry of Defence

5

, Government

of India, entrusted with the award of contracts for construction

of married accommodation and allied infrastructure for

personnel of the Defence Force.

(b) A contract was entered into between the Parties under the aegis

of the Married Accommodation Project

6

for the execution of

construction works as well as completion of incomplete

dwelling units at a defence establishment at Meerut (East).

(c) Upon disputes having arisen with regard to measurements,

payments and alleged breaches, the Engineer-in-Chief’s

Branch, i.e. the departmental authority of the Respondent

herein, vide letter dated 30.12.2022, appointed a Sole Arbitrator

to adjudicate the claims.

(d) Upon conclusion of the arbitral proceedings, the learned Sole

Arbitrator rendered the Impugned Arbitral Award directing

payment of a principal sum of ₹32.76 crores in favour of the

Respondent, along with interest for the pre-reference period,

pendente lite interest for the duration of the arbitral

proceedings, and further future interest in terms of the Award.

(e) The record reflects that the Petitioner initially instituted the

Objection Petition under Section 34 of the A&C Act,

challenging the Arbitral Award on 24.09.2024. Thereafter, on

18.10.2024, the Petitioner undertook a re-filing of the petition

upon removal of objections. The matter was ultimately listed

before this Court on 24.10.2024.

5

MoD

6

MAP

O.M.P. (COMM) 452/2024 & connected matter Page 5 of 27

(f) The Respondent has, in this backdrop, raised a preliminary

objection regarding the maintainability of the Section 34

Petition. It is contended that the initial filing was non est in the

eyes of the law, as it did not comply with the minimum

statutory requirements and procedural standards mandated for a

valid filing. On this premise, it is argued that the Petition must

be treated as having been instituted only upon the subsequent

filing, which, according to the Respondent, falls beyond the

period prescribed under Section 34(3) of the A&C Act, namely,

three months from the date of receipt of the Award, extendable

by a further condonable period of thirty days and no more.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:

9. Learned counsel for the Petitioner would submit that the delay

occasioned in filing the Objection Petition deserves to be condoned as

the initial filing dated 24.09.2024 before this Court was rendered non-

est owing to circumstances beyond the control of the Petitioner. It

would be pointed out that the Impugned Arbitral Award dated

02.05.2024 itself recorded that the Award was drawn on stamp paper

of ₹500 and that any additional stamp duty would be borne by the

party filing the Impugned Arbitral Award before the Court. This

recital, according to counsel, created genuine uncertainty within the

department as to the stage and manner in which the original Award

was to be filed.

10. Learned counsel would further contend that the Petitioner,

being a governmental authority, was required to process the matter

through several administrative channels, including the MES Legal

Cell, the Finance Branch for sanction and procurement of requisite

O.M.P. (COMM) 452/2024 & connected matter Page 6 of 27

stamp duty, and the office of the Director General, Married

Accommodation Project. It would be urged that the time consumed in

undertaking such procedural formalities constitutes sufficient cause

within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963

7

,

particularly when no mala fides are attributable to the Petitioner.

11. Learned counsel for the Petitioner would further contend that

the Petitioner was under a bona fide belief that the filing of a signed

copy of the said Arbitral Award would satisfy the requirement of law

and that the original could be produced as and when directed by the

Court, a practice which, according to the Petitioner, had been followed

in several earlier matters before this Court.

12. It would be submitted that the defect, even if construed as

rendering the filing non-est, is curable and ought not to defeat

adjudication on merits, particularly when the Objection Petition raises

jurisdictional issues going to the root of the Award, and it would be

reiterated to emphasise on a justice-oriented approach where the delay

stands duly explained.

13. Learned counsel for the Petitioner would also submit that the

limitation for filing objections should be reckoned from the date when

the Award became properly stamped and capable of being filed, and

not from the date of mere receipt of the Arbitral Award. Until the

Petitionercould comply with the stamping requirement indicated by

the learned Arbitrator, the Award could also not be a document

capable of valid presentation.

14. Learned counsel for the Petitioner would further contend that

the plea of the Respondent that the filing of objections is “non-est” is

7

Limitation Act

O.M.P. (COMM) 452/2024 & connected matter Page 7 of 27

misconceived. Reliance would be placed upon the Order dated

16.08.2024 passed by this Court in O.M.P. (COMM.) 490/2019 titled

“Union of India v. IDEB Projects Pvt. Ltd.”, to submit that there

exists no rigid or definitive yardstick under the High Court Rules to

determine which defects would render an initial filing non-est, and

that curable procedural deficiencies ought not to defeat substantive

adjudication, particularly when a petition under Section 34 of the

A&C Act embodies a valuable statutory right to assail the legality and

validity of an arbitral award. The relevant portions of the said Order

read as follows:

“14. Another principle that can be culled out from the

aforementionedjudgments are that the defects which are of a

curable nature should be viewed less strictly vis-a-vis the defects

which are incurable in nature.

15. To my mind, the endeavor of this Court should be that this

valuable right available to a party is not curtailed by any hyper-

technicalities and the effort should be to hear and decide the

dispute on merits. The courts have powers to condone the delay

beyond a period of three months by another period of 30 days

under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996.

16. Admittedly, vakalatnama and the affidavit in the present case

were not filed, however, whether the impugned Award was filed or

not is not clear from the filing log, when the original filing was

done.

17. Since, initially, the paper book comprised of 99 pages and the

Arbitral Award dated 20.05.2019 was of 72 pages, it is possible

that the objections when filed contained the Impugned Award of

72 pages and the objections could be of the balance 27 pages

which subsequently, in re-filing may have increased.

18. Hence, I am of the view that the original filing was not non est

filing and the delay is only on account of re-filing. I am inclined to

give that benefit of doubt to the petitioner.”

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT:

15. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the Respondent

would contend that the statutory scheme embodied under Section

O.M.P. (COMM) 452/2024 & connected matter Page 8 of 27

34(3) of the A&C Act is mandatory in nature and circumscribes the

period for filing objections to three months, extendable by a further

period of thirty days and not thereafter. It would be contended that a

petition presented without the Arbitral Award fails to satisfy the basic

legal requirements and is, therefore, a nullity in the eyes of law; such a

defective filing, according to the learned counsel, cannot be regarded

as due institution of proceedings so as to arrest or save limitation.

16. Learned counsel for the Respondent would further contend that

the Petitioner admittedly received the Arbitral Award on 02.05.2024

and the corrigendum thereto on 12.06.2024, whereas the Petition,

accompanied by the original Award, effectively came to be filed only

after expiry of the outer limit prescribed under Section 34(3).

17. It would also be urged that the plea of administrative processing

or internal departmental approvals cannot override the clear legislative

mandate governing limitation.

18. It would be contended that the recital in the Impugned Arbitral

Award concerning payment of additional stamp duty does not

postpone or defer commencement of limitation. According to learned

counsel, the obligation to ensure proper stamping lies solely upon the

party seeking to assail the Award, and any delay occasioned on that

account is self-induced and cannot be pressed into service to seek

condonation.

19. Learned counsel would further contend that the doctrine of non-

est filing, as recognised in settled jurisprudence, squarely operates

against the Petitioner in the present case. It would be submitted that

once the initial filing is treated as non-est for want of compliance with

mandatory requirements, there would, in effect, be no valid petition on

O.M.P. (COMM) 452/2024 & connected matter Page 9 of 27

record within the prescribed period of limitation, and consequently,

this Court would be rendered functus officio and lack jurisdiction to

entertain the objections at a belated stage.

20. Learned counsel for the Respondent would submit that the

considerations of equity or the plea of protection of public funds

cannot confer jurisdiction upon the Court where the statute expressly

prohibits extension of time beyond the limits prescribed. It would be

contended that the mandate of Section 34(3) of the A&C Act admits

of no relaxation on sympathetic grounds, and that the remedy of the

Petitioner, if any, lies in appropriate proceedings elsewhere and not in

seeking condonation in a manner contrary to the express provisions of

law.

21. Learned counsel for the Respondent would place reliance upon

the Order dated 11.03.2025 passed in FAO(OS)(COMM.) 54/2023

titled “Ircon International Ltd. v. M/s PNC-Jain Construction Co.

(JV)”, to contend that non-filing of the Impugned Arbitral Award

along with a petition under Section 34 of the A&C Act is not a mere

technical defect but a mandatory pre-condition for maintainability. It

would be urged that the Division Bench held that in the absence of the

Award, the Court would be left without the necessary foundation to

examine the grounds raised, and such filing must be treated as non-est

in law, incapable of stopping the running of limitation under Section

34(3) of the Act.

22. Learned counsel would also rely upon the decision of the Full

Bench of this Court in Pragati Construction Consultants v. Union of

India

8

, to submit that filing a copy of the Arbitral Award along with a

8

2025 SCC Online Del 636

O.M.P. (COMM) 452/2024 & connected matter Page 10 of 27

Section 34 petition is a substantive precondition for invoking the

jurisdiction of the Court. It would be contended that the principles laid

down therein squarely apply to the present case and demonstrate that

the Objection Petition is not maintainable for want of valid and timely

institution within the statutory period prescribed under Section 34(3)

of the A&C Act.

ANALYSIS:

23. This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties at length

and, with their able assistance, perused the pleadings, documents

placed on record, and the applicable statutory provisions.

24. At the outset, this Court is required to examine whether the

Petitioner has made out any “sufficient cause” for condonation of

delay in filing the petition under Section 34 of the A&C Act, and

whether the initial filing made by the Petitioner can be treated as a

valid filing in the eyes of law or is liable to be regarded as non-est.

These issues are foundational and would determine the very

maintainability of the Objection Petition.

25. For the sake of convenience and clarity, the relevant chronology

commencing from the date of passing of the Impugned Arbitral

Award up to the date of listing of the present Petition before this Court

is delineated hereunder:

Date Fact Remarks

02.05.2024 Arbitral Award

passed.

The award was made in terms of the A&C

Act.

31.05.2024 Application

under Section

33(1) of the

A&C Act

Sought correction of computation and

typographical errors in the Arbitral Award

dated 02.05.2024.

O.M.P. (COMM) 452/2024 & connected matter Page 11 of 27

preferred by

the

Respondent.

12.06.2024 Arbitral Award

stood

corrected.

Date of commencement of the limitation

period.

[Limitation period commences from

13.06.2024 (after excluding the date of

decision in terms of Section 12 of the

Limitation Act) and ends on 13.09.2024]

13.09.2024 Completion of

3 (three)

months period.

Limitation under Section 34(3) expires as

on this date.

24.09.2024 Initial Filing of

objections.

Filed beyond the statutory period of 3

months.

On the said date, the filing was non-est in

the eyes of law, inasmuch as, admittedly,

the Vakalatnama, requisite court fee,

proper pagination, attestation, and

bookmarking had not been furnished

along with the petition as filed.

Pertinent to note - Total of 263 pages

filed while, Award itself is of 256 pages.

It is further to note that, inter alia, only 19

Pages of total 256 pages of the Award was

filed.

14.10.2024 Completion of

the 3 months

and 30-days

period

The outer limit under the proviso to

Section 34(3) expires.

Note:- The outer limit prescribed under

the proviso to Section 34(3) of the A&C

Act, stood exhausted. Although the thirty-

day condonable period, calculated from

13.09.2024, would ordinarily expire on

13.10.2024, the said date being a day

when the Court was closed, the limitation

period stood extended by operation of

Section 4 of the Limitation Act, to the

next working day, i.e., 14.10.2024.

18.10.2024 First re-filing Since substantial defects were cured on

O.M.P. (COMM) 452/2024 & connected matter Page 12 of 27

by the

Petitioner.

Substantial

defects were

cured with

respect to

filing of

foundational

documents

this date thereby the clock concerning the

limitation stopped running from this date

in terms of the judgment of Pragati

Constructions v. UOI, 2025 SCC OnLine

Del 636.

By this date there has been total Delay of

04 Days - beyond 3 months 30 days.

[Computed from 14.10.2024 to

18.10.2024]

22.10.2024 Curing all

defects, finally,

re-filing was

done on this

date and

thereafter the

matter was

listed before

this Court on

24.10.2024.

Since the filing came to be treated as

having been effectively instituted on

18.10.2024, the Petitioner was entitled, in

terms of Chapter IV Rule 3 of the Delhi

High Court (Original Side) Rules,

2018

9

, to a period of thirty (30) days to

cure the remaining defects so as to remain

within the permissible period for re-filing.

It is noted that the defects were eventually

cured within the said period. It is,

however, clarified that the issue of delay

in re-filing does not fall for consideration

in the present adjudication.

26. At this juncture, this Court finds it apposite to reproduce

Section 34(3) of the A&C Act, as the same is necessary for the proper

adjudication of the present case:

“34. Application for setting aside arbitral award. -

*****

(3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three

months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that

application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been

made under section 33, from the date on which that request had

been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal:

Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was

prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within

9

DHC (Original Side) Rules

O.M.P. (COMM) 452/2024 & connected matter Page 13 of 27

the said period of three months it may entertain the application

within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter.”

27. A bare perusal of Section 34(3) of the A&C Act leaves no

manner of doubt that the limitation prescribed therein is strict in

nature and admits of no elasticity. A challenge under Section 34 of

A&C Act is required to be instituted within three months from the

date of receipt of the Arbitral Award, with a limited discretion vested

in the Court to extend the period by a further thirty days upon

sufficient cause being shown, but in no circumstances beyond that

statutory outer limit. The law in this regard has been succinctly laid

down by this Court in Employees State Insurance Corporation v.

M/S Mukesh Associates

10

, which reads as under:

“24. A plain reading of Section 34(3) of the A&C Act makes it

abundantly clear that the period prescribed therein is mandatory

and inflexible. An application for setting aside an arbitral award

must be filed within three months from the date of receipt of the

award, extendable by a further period of thirty days, but not

thereafter. The law in this regard has been succinctly laid down by

the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chintels India Ltd. v. Bhayana

Builders Pvt. Ltd.

11

, which reads as follows:

“10. Sections 34(2) and (2-A) then sets out the grounds on

which an arbitral award may be set aside. Section 34(3),

which again is material for decision of the question raised

in this appeal, reads as follows:

“34. (3) An application for setting aside may

not be made after three months have elapsed

from the date on which the party making that

application had received the arbitral award or,

if a request had been made under Section 33,

from the date on which that request had been

disposed of by the Arbitral Tribunal:

Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the

applicant was prevented by sufficient cause

from making the application within the said

period of three months it may entertain the

10

2026:DHC:829

11

2021 SCC Online SC 80

O.M.P. (COMM) 452/2024 & connected matter Page 14 of 27

application within a further period of thirty

days, but not thereafter.”

11. A reading of Section 34(1) would make it clear that an

application made to set aside an award has to be in

accordance with both sub-sections (2) and (3). This would

mean that such application would not only have to be

within the limitation period prescribed by sub-section (3),

but would then have to set out grounds under sub-sections

(2) and/or (2-A) for setting aside such award. What

follows from this is that the application itself must be

within time, and if not within a period of three months,

must be accompanied with an application for condonation

of delay, provided it is within a further period of 30 days,

this Court having made it clear that Section 5 of the

Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply and that any delay

beyond 120 days cannot be condoned — see State of

H.P. v. Himachal Techno Engineers

at para 5.”

(emphasis added)

25. The statutory timeline prescribed under Section 34 of the A&C

Act has also been succinctly elucidated by the Gujarat High Court

in Manbhupinder Singh Atwal v. Neeraj Kumarpal Shah

12

,

wherein it has been held as under:

“30. Reliance is placed on the decisions of the High Court

of Delhi in Delhi Development Authority v. Durga

Construction Co. and Union of India v. Bharat Biotech

International Ltd. to argue that in both the matters, the

Delhi High Court has taken note of the decisions rendered

by the Apex Court in dealing with the question as to

whether the High Court have jurisdiction to condone the

delay under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act,

1996 after a period of 3 months plus 30 days. It was

placed before us that the purpose of specifying an inelastic

period of limitation under Section 34(3) of the Act would

have to be borne in mind, which means that no application

under Section 34 can be permitted to be instituted beyond

3 months plus a further period of 30 days, which extension

is permissible subject to showing sufficient cause.

31. It was further submitted that the question before the

Delhi High Court in Durga Construction

was for

condonation of delay of 166 days in re-filing the

application under Section 34 of the Act' 1996. In the said

case, on the application filed under Section 34 on

24.07.2009, initially with the delay of 17 days, the registry

12

2025 SCC OnLine Guj 2200

O.M.P. (COMM) 452/2024 & connected matter Page 15 of 27

of the Court raised certain objections and papers were

returned under objections on the same date. The said

application under Section 34 was then refiled on

24.08.2009 when it was again returned due to certain

objections. Upon re-filing, on 22.12.2009 again, the

registry raised certain office objections and returned the

same. Ultimately, the application under Section 34 was

finally re-filed on 06.01.2010 after removing all office

objections. Thus, the question of condonation of the

period of 166 days in re-filing of the application under

Section 34 was the subject matter of consideration before

the Delhi High Court, which was beyond the inelastic

limitation period prescribed in Section 34(3) of the Act'

1996.

32. The Delhi High Court upon reading of the Delhi High

Court Rules has opined that in absence of any specific

statute, although the courts would have the jurisdiction to

condone the delay, but the approach in exercising such

jurisdiction cannot be liberal and the conduct of the

applicant will have to be tested on the anvil of whether the

applicant acted with due diligence and dispatch. The

applicant would have to show that the delay was on

account of the reasons beyond the control of the applicant

and could not be avoided despite all possible efforts by the

applicant. It was opined that though the Court would have

jurisdiction to condone the delay in refiling, even if the

period extends beyond the time specified in sub-section

(3) of Section 34 of the Act, however, this jurisdiction is

not to be exercised liberally considering the object of the

Arbitration and Conciliation Act’ 1996 to ensure that the

arbitration proceedings are concluded expeditiously. The

delay caused in re-filing cannot be permitted to frustrate

the object of the Arbitration Act, 1996. In any case, the

applicant/petitioner would have to satisfy the Court that it

had persuaded the matter diligently and the delays were

beyond his control and were unavoidable.

33. In another decision in Bharat Biotech International

Ltd., the question before the Delhi High Court was of

condonation of delay in re-filing the applications under

Sections 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

In the preliminary objections raised by the respondents

therein, it was contended that the application when

originally filed within the statutory period of limitation

was merely a bunch of papers and could not be treated as

being valid institution in the eyes of law. A complete and

valid application under Section 34 was filed only beyond

the date when the limitation period of 3 months and 30

days as prescribed under Section 34(3) of the Act had

O.M.P. (COMM) 452/2024 & connected matter Page 16 of 27

already expired. The Delhi High Court while considering

the rigours of the proviso to Section 34(3) and the decision

of the Apex Court in Union of India v. Popular

Construction Co., wherein it has been held that the Court

cannot entertain an application to set aside an arbitral

award beyond the extended period under the proviso to

Section 34(3) of the Act, has concluded that the

application for condonation of delay in re-filing the

application under Section 34 beyond the time prescribed

under Section 34(3) of the Act has to be considered in

light of the object and purpose of the limitation prescribed

under Section 34(3).

34. Considering its previous decision in Durga

Construction

of the Division Bench of the High Court of

Delhi, it was noted therein that though the Court is

empowered to condone the delay beyond the extended

period of limitation of 3 months and 30 days, while

considering the delay condonation application in re-filing

an application under Section 34, but it is required for the

party seeking the condonation to show that despite his

diligence, the rectification of defects and re-filing could

not be carried out within the limitation period, for

the bonafide reasons beyond his control. It was noted that

it is important for the Court to bear in mind the legislative

intent for prescribing the statutory period of limitation

under Section 34(3) of the Act ensuring expeditious

disposal of the arbitration proceedings and preventing

delay in implementation of the arbitral award by parties

who would malafidely challenge the same. It was

observed that a liberal approach while dealing with an

application for condonation of delay in challenging the

arbitral award would only endanger and frustrate the

purpose for which the Arbitration Act was enacted. It was

noted by the Delhi High Court that since the applicant

therein had demonstrated alarmingly lackadaisical

approach in complying with general filing practice and the

statutory requirements under Section 34 of the Act' 1996,

the delay in re-filing the petition under Section 34 could

not be condoned being vague, unsubstantiated, insufficient

and contrary to the records.”

28. At the outset, it is imperative to ascertain the point from which

the period of limitation for preferring the present Petition against the

Impugned Arbitral Award commenced.

29. As the Respondent had moved an application under Section

O.M.P. (COMM) 452/2024 & connected matter Page 17 of 27

33(1) of the A&C Act seeking corrections of errors pertaining to

computation and other typographical mistakes, the corrected Arbitral

Award came to be passed by the Arbitrator on 12.06.2024. It is from

this day that the limitation period of 3 months and 30 days started

running.

30. It is pertinent to note that not every improper or defective filing

is liable to be treated as non-est. The issue that, therefore, arises for

consideration is whether an initial filing, though defective, is

sufficient to arrest the running of limitation, or whether such filing

ought to be regarded as non-est. While certain defects are curable and

do not strike at the root of the filing, others may be of such a nature as

to constitute fatal defects, thereby rendering the original filing

incapable of being recognised in law. While Section 34 of the A&C

Act itself does not specify a distinct procedure for filing an application

to set aside an Arbitral Award, it clearly lays down the grounds on

which such an application can be set out, which is extracted

hereunder: -

“34. Application for setting aside arbitral award.—

*****

(2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the Court only if—

(a) the party making the application furnishes proof that—

(i) a party was under some incapacity, or

(ii) the arbitration agreement is not valid under the law

to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any

indication thereon, under the law for the time being in

force; or

(iii) the party making the application was not given

proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of

the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to

present his case; or

(iv) the arbitral award deals with a dispute not

contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the

submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on

matters beyond the scope of the submission to

arbitration: Provided that, if the decisions on matters

O.M.P. (COMM) 452/2024 & connected matter Page 18 of 27

submitted to arbitration can be separated from those

not so submitted, only that part of the arbitral award

which contains decisions on matters not submitted to

arbitration may be set aside; or

(v) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the

arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the

agreement of the parties, unless such agreement was in

conflict with a provision of this Part from which the

parties cannot derogate, or, failing such agreement, was

not in accordance with this Part; or

(b) the Court finds that—

(i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of

settlement by arbitration under the law for the time

being in force, or

(ii) the arbitral award is in conflict with the public

policy of India.

[Explanation 1.—For the avoidance of any doubt, it is clarified

that an award is in conflict with the public policy of India, only

if,—

(i) the making of the award was induced or

affected by fraud or corruption or was in violation of

section 75 or section 81; or

(ii) it is in contravention with the fundamental

policy of Indian law; or

(iii) it is in conflict with the most basic notions of

morality or justice.

Explanation 2.—For the avoidance of doubt, the test as to whether

there is a contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law

shall not entail a review on the merits of the dispute.]”

31. A Full Bench of this Court, in Pragati Constructions

Consultants (supra) has laid down the minimum threshold

requirement for an application to be valid as under Section 34 of the

A&C Act to set aside an Arbitral Award. The said judgment also

addresses the issue as to whether an initial filing, though defective, is

sufficient to arrest the running of limitation, or whether such filing is

liable to be treated as non-est. The relevant portions of the said

judgment are reproduced hereinunder:

“77. In Planetcast Technologies Ltd. case

3

, the court was

considering an appeal against an order where a learned Single

Judge had inter alia held that an application under Section 34 of the

O.M.P. (COMM) 452/2024 & connected matter Page 19 of 27

A&C Act must be accompanied with at least a statement of truth,

vakalatnama and the Award impugned, and in absence of all these

vital documents, cumulatively, it can only be said that a “bunch of

papers” has been filed. As far as the issue of non-filing of the

statement of truth is concerned, the learned Single Judge discussed

the same only to point out that even at the time of refiling of the

application under Section 34 of the A&C Act, the statement of

truth and other objections pointed out earlier had not been

removed. The court, therefore, found that the delay in refiling was

also unreasonable.

78. In appeal, the Division Bench placing reliance on the earlier

judgment of this Court in Jay Polychem (India) Ltd. case

6

and

in Sarvesh Security Services (P) Ltd. case

7

held that the affidavit

of statement of truth is mandatorily required to be filed along with

the petition in order to produce a document worth considering

under the law.

79. As far as Jay Polychem (India) Ltd. case

6

is concerned, the

court was considering a petition under Section 34 of the A&C Act,

which was neither signed on behalf of the petitioners therein, nor

supported by signed and attested affidavits. It was in those facts

that the court held that the application filed therein under Section

34 of the A&C Act was a non est filing. Similarly, in Sarvesh

Security Services (P) Ltd. case

7

, the application filed under

Section 34 of the A&C Act neither bore the signatures of the

petitioner therein, nor was accompanied with an affidavit of the

petitioner; and there was even no vakalatnama from the petitioner

authorising the counsel to sign the same. Therefore, in view of the

cumulative effect of all the defects in the application filed initially,

it was declared as a non est filing.The view of the court

in Planetcast Technologies Ltd. case

3

, that mere non-filing of the

statement of truth would make the application filed under Section

34 of the A&C Act to be declared as a non est filing, therefore, is

not correct.

***

81. Now we will enumerate the various judgments cited before us,

to deal with them, as below.

82. In Steel Strives Wheels Ltd. case, the court was again

considering an application wherein though the statement of truth

was filed along with the application under Section 34 of the A&C

Act, there were blanks, therein also the vakalatnama had not been

properly executed. It was under these circumstances that the court

found that the application under Section 34 of the A&C Act had

been filed in “shoddy manner”. The court had also relied upon the

judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Sai Rama Engg.

Enterprises case

2

, which has been discussed by us hereinabove, as

far as the issue on hand is concerned.

83. Similarly, in SPML Infra Ltd. case

35

also, the court was

confronted with an application under Section 34 of the A&C Act

O.M.P. (COMM) 452/2024 & connected matter Page 20 of 27

which was filed without a vakalatnama, a signed petition and a

statement of truth. It was in those facts that the court held that the

application filed was non est.

84. In Indira Gandhi National Open University v. Sharat Das &

Associates (P) Ltd.

47

also, the court was confronted with an

application filed under Section 34 of the A&C Act which

contained only 29 pp. with blanks, it had no signatures of the

petitioners or its authorised representative, and there was no

vakalatnama filed authorising the advocate to file “the said bunch

of papers”. So much so, the arbitral award was also not annexed.

These led the court to hold that the filing of the application was

“non est”.

85. In Three C Universal Developers (P) Ltd. v. Horizon Crest

India Real Estate

48

, a learned Single Judge of this Court held that

the absence of supporting affidavit/statement of truth/vakalatnama

is a fatal defect which has an effect on the application filed under

Section 34 of the A&C Act to be declared as non est. Similar is the

view of this Court in Air India Ltd. case

29

.

86. In Reacon Engineers (India) (P) Ltd. case

24

, the application

filed under Section 34 of the A&C Act was not accompanied by a

copy of the impugned award and other documents. Further, a

statement of truth was also not filed. It was in those facts that the

court held the application to be a non est filing.

87. Contrarily, in Bajaj Electricals Ltd. case

37

and KNR

Constructions case

38

, the learned Single Judge of this Court held

that for an application filed under Section 34 of the A&C Act to be

termed as “properly” filed, it must fulfil the basic parameters, such

as, each page of the petition as well as the last page should be

signed by the party and the advocate; vakalatnama should be

signed by the parties and the advocates, and the statement of truth

should be signed by the parties and attested by the Oath

Commissioner. However, as we are not in agreement with the view

expressed in either of the aforesaid judgments, we shall be dealing

with the other ingredients, which have been described by the

learned Single Judge as to be compulsory, hereinbelow separately.

94. Though not referred to us, however, as the learned counsels for

the parties assisting us have made submissions on the various other

defects, like the non-filing or defect in filing a vakalatnama,

unsigned application under Section 34 of the A&C Act, substantive

increase in pages for non-filing of the documents, changes made in

the contents or grounds of the application at the time of refiling, or

the application being without or with improper verification, or

there being no court-fee filed or insufficient court-fee being filed at

the time of initial filing of an application under Section 34 of the

A&C Act, or there being blanks in any of the pleadings filed at the

time of the initial filing, we shall briefly discuss these defects as

well.”

O.M.P. (COMM) 452/2024 & connected matter Page 21 of 27

32. From the principles enunciated in Pragati Construction

Consultants (supra), the governing parameters for determining what

constitutes a valid and proper filing may broadly be summarised as

follows:

(a). The petition must disclose specific grounds of challenge falling

within the ambit of Section 34(2) of the A&C Act.

(b). The application must be accompanied by the Impugned Arbitral

Award, the absence of which constitutes a fatal defect,

rendering the filing non-est.

(c). The application must be intelligible and disclose a clear

intention to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court under Section

34 of the A&C Act.

(d). The filing must contain the material particulars, including the

description of the parties, reference to the arbitral proceedings,

and the Arbitral Award sought to be challenged.

(e). The application must be duly signed and properly authorised,

evidencing that it has been validly instituted by or on behalf of

the Petitioner.

33. Hence, from the above, it can be definitely concluded that, in

essence, the filing must not be merely perfunctory or illusory so as to

indicate an attempt only to arrest the running of limitation.

34. This Court, having examined the record in its entirety, is

constrained to observe that the filing dated 24.09.2024 did not

constitute a valid invocation of jurisdiction under Section 34 of the

A&C Act. The said presentation was admittedly bereft of foundational

requirements, as noted above, including the complete Arbitral Award,

duly executed affidavits, Vakalatnama, proper court fee and essential

O.M.P. (COMM) 452/2024 & connected matter Page 22 of 27

procedural compliances, which are not mere technicalities but

conditions precedent for a legally cognisable challenge.

35. In the considered opinion of this Court, it is well settled that a

filing which lacks the minimum jurisdictional substratum cannot be

permitted to assume the character of a valid institution in the eyes of

law. A defective presentation, which fails to meet the foundational

statutory requirements, does not amount to a proper filing so as to

confer legal efficacy upon the proceedings. Consequently, this Court

holds, as a matter of principle, that the initial filing dated 24.09.2024

in the present case was non est in the eyes of law and, therefore,

incapable of arresting or extending the period of limitation prescribed

under Section 34(3) of the A&C Act.

36. The record, however, indicates that on 18.10.2024, the

Petitioner undertook the first substantial re-filing whereby the

foundational defects rendering the petition non-est came to be cured.

It is only at this stage that the complete Impugned Arbitral Award was

placed on record, pleadings and applications were duly signed and

dated, affidavits were filed and attested, and a Vakalatnama was

furnished.

37. In terms of the principles emerging from Pragati Construction

Consultants (supra) and the framework of Chapter IV Rule 3 of the

DHC (Original Side) Rules, such curing of foundational defects may

be treated as the stage where the clock of limitation ceases to run and

the statutory period for re-filing becomes operative. Nevertheless, the

significance of this date lies only in the context of re-filing; it does not

retrospectively validate a filing that was non-est at inception.

38. Thus, the curing of foundational defects on 18.10.2024 occurred

O.M.P. (COMM) 452/2024 & connected matter Page 23 of 27

beyond the jurisdictional window, resulting in a delay of four (04)

days, calculated from 14.10.2024 to 18.10.2024. The subsequent valid

filing on 22.10.2024 only accentuates the lapse, as by that date the

Court had already been divested of jurisdiction to entertain the

challenge.

39. As noted earlier, a careful scrutiny of the record further

discloses that the initial filing of objections dated 24.09.2024

comprised only 263 pages and was returned by the Registry on the

very same day owing to multiple material defects. It is significant to

note that the Impugned Arbitral Award itself runs into 256 pages,

while the corrigendum/order dated 12.06.2024 comprises an

additional 5 pages. Despite this, only 19 pages of the Award were

initially filed, rendering the filing manifestly incomplete and non-

existent in eye of the law.

40. In contrast, the final objections subsequently placed on record

by the Petitioner exceeded 3000 pages. The stark disparity in volume

and content clearly indicates that no substantive or comprehensive

challenge had been instituted within the prescribed period of

limitation and that a substantially expanded and restructured petition

came to be filed only at a later stage. Such an approach, in the

considered opinion of this Court, cannot be permitted to dilute the

discipline of limitation embodied under Section 34(3) of the A&C

Act.

41. The reliance placed by the Petitioner on the decision in IDEB

Projects Pvt. Ltd. (supra) is, in the opinion of this Court,

misconceived. The factual matrix in the present case is materially

distinguishable. The controversy herein concerns the very existence of

O.M.P. (COMM) 452/2024 & connected matter Page 24 of 27

a valid initial filing, which has been held to be non-est, whereas the

aforesaid decision dealt with a delay in re-filing of an otherwise

validly instituted petition. The distinction between an invalid

institution and delayed re-filing is neither cosmetic nor procedural but

goes to the root of jurisdiction under Section 34(3) of the A&C Act.

Consequently, the ratio of the said order does not advance the case of

the Petitioner and is inapplicable to the facts of the present petition.

42. It is a trite law that delay cannot be condoned as a matter of

generosity or benevolence. The quest for substantial justice cannot be

permitted to eclipse the corresponding right of the opposing party to

be free from undue prejudice occasioned by protracted and

unexplained inaction. The law in this regard has been succinctly laid

down in the case of Employees State Insurance Corporation (supra),

which reads as under:

“41. This Court is conscious that refusal to condone delay may, in

a given case, result in the foreclosure of a challenge on merits.

However, in matters governed by Section 34 of the A&C Act, the

Court does not sit as a court of equity, but as a court of limited

statutory jurisdiction. The balance between fairness and finality has

already been struck by the legislature. Once the statutory outer

limit is crossed, considerations of hardship or perceived injustice

cannot confer jurisdiction where none exists. Judicial sympathy

cannot be permitted to supplant legislative mandate.

42. Permitting a petition, which is ex facie barred by limitation and

founded upon a non-est filing, to be entertained would not only run

contrary to the express language of Section 34(3) but would also

undermine the sanctity of arbitral finality and open the floodgates

to speculative and dilatory challenges. Such an approach would

erode discipline in commercial litigation and defeat the very object

of the Commercial Courts regime, which places a premium on

procedural rigour and temporal certainty.”

43. In the present case, the Petitioner has failed to provide any

reasonable or cogent explanation for the delay in pursuing their

remedies. Moreover, a perusal of the Petition and documents on

O.M.P. (COMM) 452/2024 & connected matter Page 25 of 27

record reveal a rather indolent approach by the Petitioner. The initial

filing of only 263 pages as opposed to the final objections reaching

over 3000 pages, leads this Court to conclude that the aforesaid initial

filing was only done with the intent of stopping the limitation clock

from running.

44. In view of the foregoing discussion, it is manifest that while, in

certain cases, an initial filing, though partial, may escape being treated

as a non-est filing, the same cannot be said in the peculiar facts of the

present case. Owing to the fact that the initial filing was limited to

only 263 pages and did not even have the entire Impugned Arbitral

Award as a part of it or certain other vital documents, this Court is of

the view that the initial filing of the Petition under Section 34 of the

A&C Act, was a non-est filing in the eyes of the law, and did not have

the effect of suspending the running of limitation.

45. Insofar as the issue of stamp duty, which is stated to have led to

certain confusion at the administrative level, is concerned, this Court

is of the considered opinion that the same constitutes a wholly

untenable and frivolous explanation. The Petitioner, being a well-

equipped Government authority with adequate legal and

administrative machinery at its disposal, cannot be permitted to rely

upon internal confusion or procedural uncertainty as a justification for

non-compliance with statutory timelines. Such a plea, in any event,

does not avail the Petitioner in the context of the strict limitation

regime prescribed under law, nor can it operate to suspend, extend, or

otherwise enlarge the period of limitation beyond what is expressly

permissible.

46. The inevitable and unavoidable consequence, therefore, is that

O.M.P. (COMM) 452/2024 & connected matter Page 26 of 27

the challenge mounted by the Petitioner under Section 34 of the A&C

Act is ex facie barred by limitation and thereby not maintainable.

DECISION:

47. In view of the foregoing discussion, I.A. No. 43177/2024, filed

by the Petitioner seeking condonation of delay in instituting the

Objection Petition, stands dismissed. Consequently, the Application

preferred by the Respondent, being I.A. No. 45918/2024, seeking

dismissal of the petition under Section 34 of the A&C Act, is allowed.

I. O.M.P. (COMM) 452/2024

48. In consequence thereof, the Objection Petition, being O.M.P.

(COMM) 452/2024, stands dismissed as barred by limitation.

49. The petition, along with pending application(s), if any, stands

disposed of in the above terms.

II. O.M.P.(ENF.)(COMM.) 208/2025

50. Insofar as the Enforcement Petition, being

O.M.P.(ENF.)(COMM.) 208/2025, is concerned, in view of the

dismissal of the Objection Petition as recorded hereinabove, it shall

now be listed for further proceedings in accordance with law.

51. It is noted that vide Order dated 24.11.2025 passed in I.A. No.

43176/2024 in O.M.P.(COMM) 452/2024, this Court had directed the

Award Debtor to deposit the up-to-date awarded amount.

52. In the event such a deposit has not been made till date, the

Award Debtor is directed to deposit the awarded amount in the present

enforcement proceedings within a period of two weeks from today

with the Registry of this Court.

O.M.P. (COMM) 452/2024 & connected matter Page 27 of 27

53. List on 23.03.2026.

HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR , J.

FEBRUARY 26, 2026/kr/sg