W.P.(C) 23584/2005 Page 1 of 23

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Reserved on: 05.12.2025

Pronounced on: 26.02.2026

+ W.P.(C) 23584/2005, CM.APPL. 52849/2025 (stay)

UOI .....Petitioner

Through: Mr. Puneet Dhawan, SPC for

UOI with Mr. Meet Nathani,

Exe. Engineer, Ghaziabad,

Division 1, CPWD

versus

BRIJENDRA KUMAR SHARMA & ANR .....Respondents

Through: In person.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE RENU BHATNAGAR

J U D G M E N T

CM.APPL. 50045-46/2025 (For condonation of delay of 365 days

in filing restoration application along with application seeking

restoration)

1. The present application is filed by the petitioner seeking

restoration of W.P.(C) No. 23585/2005 (hereinafter, “the captioned

writ petition”), which was dismissed for non-prosecution vide order

W.P.(C) 23584/2005 Page 2 of 23

dated 27.05.2024. Along with restoration application, the petitioner

has alsofiled an application being CM No. 50046/2005,seeking

condonation of 395 days‟ delay in filing the same.

2. The present Writ Petition was filed by the petitioner assailing

the ex parte Award dated 15.09.2005 passed by the learned Industrial

Tribunal,granting reinstatement tothe respondent-workmanalong with

full back wages and continuity of service.

3. The captioned Writ Petition was initially dismissed for non-

prosecution vide order dated 13.12.2010.Thereafter, the petitioner-

department succeededin having the writ petition restored to its original

number videOrder dated 01.11.2011, subject to payment of costs of

Rs. 25,000/- payable to the respondent-workman.

4. Subsequently,owing to the continued non-appearance on behalf

of the petitioner department, the matter was once again dismissed in

default vide order dated 13.03.2013. The court also took note of the

petitioner-department‟s callous approach in the conduct of the

proceedings. The relevant portion is reproduced herein below-

“There is no appearance on behalf pf the

petitioner despite pass-over.

In the first call as well, none appeared for the

W.P.(C) 23584/2005 Page 3 of 23

petitioner. Even earlier the writ petition had

been dismissed in default on 13.120210. It

appears that the petitioner is not interested in

pursuing the matter with any seriousness.

Dismissed in default.

No application for restoration of the writ

petition shall be entertained unless

accompanied by proof of deposit of Costs of

Rs. 15,000/- with the Juvenile Justice

Account.”

5. Thereafter, subject to the payment of cost of Rs. 15,000/-,the

petitioner secured restoration of thecaptionedwrit petition to its

original numbervide Order dated 29.10.2014.By the same order, the

writ petition was made„Rule‟.

6. The matter accordingly came to belisted before Court on

16.01.2024. On that date, court notice was issued to the

parties,returnable for the date fixed,and the matter was listed in the

category of „Regular Matters‟ for final hearing,considering that it had

been pending since 2005. The relevant portion is reproduced herein

below-

“No one appeared on behalf of the parties.

Issue Court notice to the parties, returnable on

11st March, 2024.

List the matter in the category of “Regular

Matters”.

W.P.(C) 23584/2005 Page 4 of 23

It is made clear that no further adjournment

shall be granted on the next date of hearing as

the matter is pending since 2005.”

7. Thereafter, the matter was listed on 11.03.2024,on which date it

was simply adjourned to a subsequent date, as none appeared on

behalf of the parties and no adverse orders were passed. Pursuant to

that, the matter was again listed before this court on 27.05.2024, when

an order of dismissal in defaultcame to be passed for the third

time,resulting in the dismissal of the petition with the following

observations.

“None appeared on behalf of the petitioner

when the matter was called. None appeared on

11th March, 2024 and 16th January, 2024. It

seems that the petitioner does not wish to

pursue the matter any further.

The petition is thus dismissed for non-

prosecution.”

8. Aggrieved by the dismissal, the petitioner has moved the

present application seeking restoration of the writ petition along with

an application seeking condonation of 395 days delay in filing the

same.

9. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the captioned

writ petition was made „Rule‟ vide Order dated 29.10.2014 and was

W.P.(C) 23584/2005 Page 5 of 23

thereafter listed for the first time on 16.01.2024. In the intervening

period, however, the erstwhile counsel representing the petitioner-

department was discontinued from its panel. Owing to this change in

representation, the petitioner-department was unable to effectively

track the status of the captioned writ petition. Consequently, no

appearance was entered on behalf of the petitioner-department when

the matter was taken up by the Court.

10. It is further submitted that although Court Notice was issued to

the parties vide order dated 16.01.2024, no such court notice was

received by the petitioner-department.

11. It is contended that the petitioner-department became aware of

the position only upon making inquiries with the erstwhile counsel

regarding the status of the writ petition, whereupon it was informed

that the matter was not being pursued following his discontinuation

from the panel. The petitioner-department came to know of the

dismissal order only when the concerned officer approached the

Litigation Section of the Union of India at the Delhi High Court and

engaged new counsel to pursue the matter. Immediately thereafter,the

present application seeking restoration of the captioned writ petition

was filed.

W.P.(C) 23584/2005 Page 6 of 23

12. It is further submitted that the writ petition raises significant

questions of law with far reaching consequences that warrant

adjudication on merits. Learned counsel for the petitioner emphasizes

that procedural laws are intended to advance the cause of justice and

not to defeat substantive rights of litigants.

13. Learned counsel further submits that the learned Industrial

Tribunal committed a grave error in passing the impugned ex parte

award dated 15.09.2005. It is contended the learned industrial tribunal

received the reference on 25.06.2003, on said date, notice was issued

and the respondent-workman was directed to file his statement of

claim. The respondent-workman filed the statement of claim before

the learned Tribunal on 15.09.2003, without supplying a copy thereof

to the petitioner, which was impermissible. In this regard, reliance is

placed upon Rule 10B of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957

and Order V Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which mandate

that a party filing a statement of claim must furnish a copy to the

opposite party. It is further submitted that it was incumbent upon the

learned Tribunal to ensure compliance with Sub-Rules (2) and (3) of

Rule 10B of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957, including

verification that a copy of the statement of claim had been duly served

W.P.(C) 23584/2005 Page 7 of 23

upon the petitioner-department.

14. It is further stated that, despite the petitioner‟s letter dated

01.09.2003 addressed to the learned Tribunal, bringing to its notice

that no copy of the statement of claim had been received and seeking

appropriate directions to the respondent-workman, no such directions

were issued. Instead, the learned Tribunal proceeded ex parte against

the petitioner vide order dated 25.07.2005, which was also the date on

which counsel for the petitioner entered appearance and filed his

authority letter before the Tribunal for the first time.

15. Lastly, it issubmitted that,as a matter of record,the petition

hadpreviouslybeen restored on two occasions subject to payment of

appropriate costs.It is therefore prayed that similar indulgence be

granted to petitioner-department by way of one final,reasonable, and

meaningful opportunity to contest the proceedings on merits.

16. Per contra, the respondent-workman,appearing in person, has

vehemently opposed the present application for restoration.

17. The respondent-workman submits that the petitioner cannot be

permitted to invoke the inherent powers of this Court under Section

151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for restoration of the captioned

W.P.(C) 23584/2005 Page 8 of 23

writ petition, which has been dismissed in default on several

occasions. This, it is contended, reflects a callous and imprudent

approach on the part of the petitioner-department in pursuing the

matter, and the application is, therefore, liable to be dismissed with

exemplary costs. It is further submitted that this Court has already

shown considerable indulgence on earlier two occasions by restoring

the writ petition, albeit subject to payment of costs; however, such

repeated defaults cannot be condoned indefinitely to the prejudice of

the respondent, who has been diligently pursuing the proceedings.

18. It is next submitted that there is substantial delay in filing the

present application also. No cogent or satisfactory explanation has

been offered by the petitioner, except a plea of inadvertenceon part of

its erstwhile counsel in not pursuing the matter diligently.Such a plea,

it is submitted,is insufficient to justify restoration of the petition as

well as the delay in filing the application.

19. It is further submitted that it is a settled principle that the

administrative lapses or lack of coordination between departments and

their counsel cannot constitute "sufficient cause" for restoration

20. The respondent also urges that the writ petition was not

W.P.(C) 23584/2005 Page 9 of 23

dismissed on the first instance of default, but only after the petitioner

had remained absent on several successive dates of hearing.

21. It is further submitted that the petitioner-department had not

been pursuing the matter with due diligence and had continued to

enjoy the benefit of the interim stay of the impugned order. It was

only when the respondent-workman initiated execution proceedings

before the learned Tribunal pursuant to the dismissal of the writ

petition that the petitioner-department awoke from its slumber and

filed the present application seeking restoration.

22. Additionally, it is submitted that the contention of the learned

counsel for the petitioner regarding alleged non-compliance with the

procedural requirements under Rule 10B of the Industrial Disputes

(Central) Rules, 1957 and Order V Rule 2 of the Code of Civil

Procedure pertains to the merits of the case. Such issues, it is argued,

can only be considered at the stage of final hearing of the writ petition

and not in the present restoration proceedings.

23. Lastly, reliance is placed on the settled principle that delay in

seeking restoration, condonation, or other procedural relief cannot be

condoned on sympathetic grounds alone. The applicant must provide a

W.P.(C) 23584/2005 Page 10 of 23

cogent and bona fide explanation supported by credible explanation

for the delay.

24. Heard. I have considered the submissions advanced by learned

counsel for the petitioner as well as those made by the respondent-

workman.

25. In order to consider the prayer for condonation of the delay of

395 days in filing the application for restoration of the petition, it is

necessary to examine the nature of the delay and whether, in the facts

and circumstances of the case, such delay deserves to be condoned on

the grounds urged by the petitioner.

26. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides for extension of

prescribed period for filing an application under any provision except

Order XXI of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 thereby giving powers

to the Court to admit the application by condoning the delay after the

prescribed period of limitation. The said provision is reproduced

herein:

“Section 5. Extension of prescribed period in

certain cases.- Any appeal or any application, other

than an application under any of the provisions of

Order XXI of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (5 of

1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period if

W.P.(C) 23584/2005 Page 11 of 23

the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that

he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal

or making the application within such period.

Explanation.—The fact that the appellant or the

applicant was misled by any order, practice or

judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or

computing the prescribed period may be sufficient

cause within the meaning of this section.”

27. At the outset, it is essential to reiterate the position of law

settled by the Supreme Court in Shivamma (dead) by LRs

v. Karnataka Housing Board & Others, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969.

The Court held that delay cannot be condoned on vague or superficial

grounds; a party must first demonstrate sufficient cause by showing

bona fide conduct and continuous diligence for the entire period. The

Apex Court after considering the entire law/judgements on the point

of condonation of delay, has held as under-

“115. However, as is manifest from the entire

discussion above, for the purpose of

condonation of delay in terms of Section 5 of

the Limitation Act, the delay has to be

explained by establishing the existence of

“sufficient cause” for the entirety of the period

from when the limitation began till the actual

date of filing. In other words, if the period of

limitation is 90-days, and the appeal is filed

belatedly on the 100th day, then explanation

has to be given for the entire 100-days.”

W.P.(C) 23584/2005 Page 12 of 23

28. In the case of Shivamma (Supra), the Supreme Court held that

while procedure is often described as the handmaid of justice, courts,

particularly constitutional courts, cannot relax bars of limitation for a

state agency or it‟s instrumentality that has been negligent or

indifferent, as such agencies are equally bound by the law of

limitation. The relevant portion is reproduced herein under-

“262.The High Courts ought not give a

legitimizing effect to such callous attitude of

State authorities or its instrumentalities, and

should remain extra cautious, if the party

seeking condonation of delay is a State-

authority. They should not become surrogates

for State laxity and lethargy. The

constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of

the apathy and pangs of a private litigant.

Litigants cannot be placed in situations of

perpetual litigations, wherein the fruits of

their decrees or favourable orders are

frustrated at later stages. We are at pains to

reiterate this everlasting trend, and put all the

High Courts to notice, not to reopen matters

with inordinate delay, until sufficient cause

exists, as by doing so the courts only add insult

to the injury, more particularly in appeals

under Section 100 of the CPC, wherein its

jurisdiction is already limited to questions of

law.

263. Limitation periods are prescribed to

maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain

for finality. More than the importance of

W.P.(C) 23584/2005 Page 13 of 23

judicial time, what worries us is the plight of

a litigant with limited means, who is to

contest against an enormous State, and its

elaborate and never - exhausting

paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be

disposed of at the very threshold, because, say

if a party litigating against the State, for

whatever reason, is unable to contest the

condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the

present case, it reopens the lis for another

round of litigation, and leaves such litigant

listless yet again. As courts of conscience, it is

our obligation that we assure that a litigant is

not sent from pillar to post to seek justice.

264. No litigant should be permitted to be so

lethargic and apathetic, much less be

permitted by the courts to misuse the process

of law.”

(Emphasis Supplied)

29. In Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan,

(2012) 5 SCC 157, considering the expression „sufficient cause‟ used

in Section 5 of Limitation Act in the context of Municipal Corporation

of Brihan, Mumbai, Supreme Court, inter alia, observed as under : -

“24. What colour the expression “sufficient

cause” would get in the factual matrix of a

given case would largely depend on bona fide

nature of the explanation. If the Court finds

that there has been no negligence on the part

of the applicant and the cause shown for the

delay does not lack bona fides, then it may

W.P.(C) 23584/2005 Page 14 of 23

condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the

explanation given by the applicant is found to

be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in

prosecuting his cause, then it would be a

legitimate exercise of discretion not to

condone the delay.

25. In cases involving the State and its

agencies/instrumentalities, the Court can

take note of the fact that sufficient time is

taken in the decision making process but no

premium can be given for total lethargy or

utter negligence on the part of the officers of

the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities

and the applications filed by them for

condonation of delay cannot be allowed as a

matter of course by accepting the plea that

dismissal of the matter on the ground of bar

of limitation will cause injury to the public

interest.”

(emphasis supplied)

30. In Office of the Chief Post Master General v. Living Media

India Limited.(2012)3 SCC563, the Supreme Court, inter alia, held as

under :

“27) It is not in dispute that the person(s)

concerned were well aware or conversant with

the issues involved including the prescribed

period of limitation for taking up the matter by

way of filing a special leave petition in this

Court. They cannot claim that they have a

separate period of limitation when the

Department was possessed with competent

W.P.(C) 23584/2005 Page 15 of 23

persons familiar with court proceedings. In the

absence of plausible and acceptable

explanation, we are posing a question why the

delay is to be condoned mechanically merely

because the Government or a wing of the

Government is a party before us.

28.)Though we are conscious of the fact that in

a matter of condonation of delay when there

was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction

or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession has to

be adopted to advance substantial justice, we

are of the view that in the facts and

circumstances, the Department cannot take

advantage of various earlier decisions. The

claim on account of impersonal machinery and

inherited bureaucratic methodology of making

several notes cannot be accepted in view of the

modern technologies being used and available.

The law of limitation undoubtedly binds

everybody including the Government.

29) In our view, it is the right time to inform

all the government bodies, their agencies and

instrumentalities that unless they have

reasonable and acceptable explanation for the

delay and there was bonafide effort, there is

no need to accept the usual explanation that

the file was kept pending for several

months/years due to considerable degree of

procedural red-tape in the process. The

government departments are under a special

obligation to ensure that they perform their

duties with diligence and commitment.

Condonation of delay is an exception and

should not be used as an anticipated benefit

for government departments. The law shelters

W.P.(C) 23584/2005 Page 16 of 23

everyone under the same light and should not

be swirled for the benefit of a few.

30. Considering the fact that there was no

proper explanation offered by the Department

for the delay except mentioning of various

dates, according to us, the Department has

miserably failed to give any acceptable and

cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a

huge delay. Accordingly, the appeals are

liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay.”

(Emphasis Supplied)

31. A Coordinate bench of this court, in case titled as Deptt. of

Health, Govt. of NCT of Delhi v. KamalaMehndiratta&Ors.2023

SCC Online Del 4771 , has held that government departments are

under special obligation to discharge their duties with diligence and

commitment. It has further been observedthat court ought not to

accord differential treatment to government agencies while

considering applications seeking Court‟s indulgence,particularly in

matters relating to condonation, restoration, and similar reliefs. The

relevant portion is reproduced hereunder-

“22. Hence, from the foregoing discussion, it

is clear that the Court must not treat the

Government agencies differently while

deciding the applications for condonation of

delay and the Government is under special

obligation to ensure that the duties enshrined

W.P.(C) 23584/2005 Page 17 of 23

are properly performed.

23. It is common knowledge that many cases

filed before this Court are barred by

limitation, however, the courts adopt liberal

approach while dealing with the cases filed,

despite delay. Even though there is no

threshold of the delay to be condoned, it is

well settled that the courts generally condone

the delay which is reasonable and where the

party concerned show sufficient bona fide

reasons for such delay.”

32. Further, the Hon‟ble Division Bench of this Court, in Rabi

Shankar Senguptav. ITDC, 2007:DHC:5731-DB, while dealing with

a similar situation involving delay coupled with repeated defaults on

the part of the litigant, reflective of a lack of diligence, dismissed the

appeal challenging the order of dismissal in default. The relevant

portion is reproduced herein below-

“4. Courts are liberal in condoning delays and

defaults but in the present case, there have

been repeated defaults not once but twice. Writ

petition was dismissed in default on 24th July,

2002. Five years have since gone by. The first

application for restoration was filed after

delay of 511 days in January, 2004 but the

said applications were also dismissed for non-

prosecution. The second application for

restoration was filed in August, 2007, after a

gap of three and a half years. The learned

Single Judge has specifically mentioned in the

W.P.(C) 23584/2005 Page 18 of 23

order that except for vague submissions and

inchoate averments, no sufficient ground for

the delay and restoration has been made out.

The explanation offered is rather sketchy and

nothing has been stated about the conduct and

efforts made by the appellant during this

period. Though entire blame is put on the

counsel but no action has been taken by the

appellant against him. At least after May

2003, the appellant should have been more

vigilant and should have followed the matter.

It has been specifically recorded in the

impugned order that the appellant is a

Matriculate. He had participated in the

enquiry proceedings and made representations

to the Management against the termination

order.

5. In these circumstances, we are not inclined

to entertain the present appeal, which is

dismissed.”

33. From the foregoing discussion, it is well-settledthat no

preferential or lenient treatment can be accorded to the state or its

instrumentalities, and the rigour of the law applies equally to all. The

only explanation offered by learned counsel for the petitioner-

department in the present case is that, owing to the discontinuation of

the erstwhile counsel from the panel of the petitioner-department, the

matter was not pursued and the status of the case was not

communicated to the petitioner-department. The explanation offered is

rather vague and sketchy. The entire blame is tried to be put upon the

W.P.(C) 23584/2005 Page 19 of 23

erstwhile counsel without stating anything about the conduct and

efforts made by the petitioner-department during the period when the

limitation started to begin till the time the application for restoration

was filed. The petitioner should have been more vigilant at least after

October 2014 when its petition was restored after second dismissal in

default.

34. It is not in dispute, and a bare perusal of the record reveals, that

the present writ petition had earlier been dismissed in default on two

occasions. This is, therefore, the third instance in which the petition

has been dismissed for want of prosecution. Although this Court had

restored the captioned writ petition on the previous two occasions, the

sole ground urged in the present application is that, due to the lapse on

the part of the erstwhile counsel, the petitioner-department was unable

to keep track of the proceedings and came to know of the dismissal

only when inquiries were made by its concerned officers. It is settled

law, as discussed hereinabove that even the government departments

are under special obligation to pursue litigation with due diligence,

like an ordinary citizen.

35. The record reflects a consistent pattern of a callous and casual

approach on the part of the petitioner-department throughout the

W.P.(C) 23584/2005 Page 20 of 23

proceedings of the captioned writ petition. The first dismissal in

default occurred on 13.12.2010, when the petitioner department got

the matter restored vide order dated 01.11.2011, subject to payment of

cost of Rs. 25,000/-. The second dismissal in fault happened on

13.03.2013 and again the petition was restored vide order dated

29.10.2014, subject to payment of cost of Rs. 15,000/-. However, this

is the third time when the matter was again dismissed in default on

27.05.2024, for which the present application is moved. Even after the

petition was restored to its original number on two earlier occasions

upon imposition of costs, the petitioner-department failed to prosecute

the matter diligently and once again defaulted in appearance when the

matter came to be listed before this Court.

36. These defaults from 13.12.2010 to 27.05.2024 leads the

respondent to be in the state of perpetual litigation, who despite an

order of reinstatement with full back wages and consequential

benefits, being passed in his favour on 15.09.2003, was unable to

enjoy the fruits of his decree.

37. Learned counsel for the petitioner has touched upon the merits

of ex parte award alleging that despite a letter sent to the Court for

getting a copy of statement of claim filed by the respondent-workman,

W.P.(C) 23584/2005 Page 21 of 23

no directions were passed nor a copy of claim was supplied and rather

the petitioner was proceeded ex parte resulting in ex parte award being

passed against the petitioner.

38. Although these aspects pertain to the merits of the case and not

required to be looked into while deciding the restoration and

condonation of delay application, yet in view of the submissions from

both sides, they are necessary to be noted to know commitment on the

part of the petitioner-department in prosecuting the matter since the

initiation of the proceedings between the parties in the year 2003. This

Court is unable to appreciate the purpose of addressing such a letter to

the learned Tribunal in lieu of entering appearance and raising the

grievance in accordance with law. Petitioner-department was

proceeded ex parte on 15.04.2005 whereafter the ex parte award dated

15.05.2005 was passed against the petitioner department, which is

impugned in the present writ petition. One thing is clear that even

before the learned Tribunal, the petitioner department has not pursued

the matter diligently, due to which ex parte award was passed against

it.

39. Though, it is well settled that disputes ought, as far as possible,

to be adjudicated on their merits and that the substantive rights of the

W.P.(C) 23584/2005 Page 22 of 23

parties should not be defeated by adopting an unduly hyper-technical

or rigid approach while deciding applications for restoration or for

condonation of delay. However, where there is gross negligence,

deliberate inaction, or absence of bona fides, as is evident in the

present case, a liberal approach cannot be extended, even if when the

party seeking such indulgence is the State or one of its

instrumentalities. The State and its agencies cannot claim preferential

treatment in matters relating to condonation of delay and are required

to furnish a plausible and satisfactory explanation when approaching

the Court for such relief. It is equally well settled that, in cases

involving delay, the material consideration is not the length of the

delay but the sufficiency and quality of the explanation offered. In

absence of any such plausible and cogent reasons, no such relief could

be granted to the applicant.

40. Clearly, the vague and inchoate grounds urged by the learned

counsel for the petitioner do not make out sufficient cause for

condoning the delay of 365 days in filing the restoration as well asfor

restoration of the Writ petition. Law cannot help those who are not

vigilant and diligent in prosecuting their cases.

41. For the reasons stated hereinabove, this court finds no merit in

W.P.(C) 23584/2005 Page 23 of 23

the application seeking condonation of 365 days‟ delay as well as the

application seeking restoration of the captioned writ petition and the

same are hereby dismissed.

42. In view of the order passed hereinabove, all the pending

applications also stand disposed of.

RENU BHATNAGAR, J

FEBRUARY 26, 2026/neha/Kz