MAT.APP. 6/2012 Page 1 of 19

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Reserved on: 13.01.2026

Pronounced on: 13.04.2026

+ MAT.APP. 6/2012, CM APPL. 3834/2020, CM APPL.

2452/2021, CM APPL. 3722/2021, CM APPL. 23260/2017

URVASHI AGGARWAL .....Appellant

Through: Mr. S.C. Singhal and Mr. Parth

Mahajan, Advs.

Versus

INDER PAUL AGGARWAL .....Respondent

Through: Mr. Archit Mishra, Mr. Ayush

Anand, Mr. Giriraj Singhal,

Advs.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIVEK CHAUDHARY

HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE RENU BH ATNAGAR

J U D G M E N T

1. The present appeal has been filed under Section 28 of the Hindu

Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as “HMA”) against the

judgment and decree dated 28.11.2011 passed by the learned Judge-

01, Family Courts, Rohini Courts, Delhi (hereinafter referred to as

“Family Court”) in HMA No. 147/2010 and HMA No. 390/2010,

whereby, the petition filed by the respondent-husband under Section

13(1)(ia) was allowed and the petition filed by the appellant-wife

under Section 9 of the HMA was dismissed.

2. In the present appeal, the appellant has only sought to set aside

the impugned judgment only qua the grant of divorce decree, claiming

MAT.APP. 6/2012 Page 2 of 19

the following relief:

“In the circumstances it is therefore prayed

that judgment and decree dated 28.11.2011

passed by the Court of Shri Dilbagh Singh

Judge Family Courts, Rohini Courts, Delhi in

H.M.A. No. 147/2010 (Old No. 57/2006) and

H.M.A. No. 390/2010 (old No. 109/2008) be

set aside & the present appeal be allowed and

the petition filed by the respondent for divorce

be dismissed with cost. Any other order which

this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in

the facts and circumstances of the case may

also be passed in favour of the appellant and

against the Respondent.“

3. The brief facts necessary for disposal of the appeal are that the

marriage between the parties was solemnized on 11.11.1997. Out of

the said wedlock, a girl child was born to the parties on 10.11.1998,

however, on the same date, she was declared dead. Thereafter, the

parties were blessed with two children who were born on 14.08.2000

and 14.08.2002, respectively. However, owing to various differences

and acrimonies between the parties, the couple started residing

separately from 11.04.2004. As a result, thereof, the

respondent/husband, while raising certain allegations of cruelty, filed

a petition on 19.01.2006 under Section 13(1)(ia) of the HMA seeking

a divorce. Subsequently on 08.08.2008, the appellant/wife preferred

an application under Section 9 of the HMA seeking restitution of

conjugal rights.

4. After hearing the parties at length, the issues were framed by

the learned Family Court and vide common judgment dated

28.11.2011, the divorce petition filed by the respondent was allowed

while the application seeking restitution of conjugal rights filed by the

MAT.APP. 6/2012 Page 3 of 19

appellant was dismissed.

5. Being aggrieved thereof, the present appeal has been filed by

the appellant, seeking setting aside of the impugned judgment.

6. It is the plea of the appellant before us that the impugned

judgment passed by the learned Family Court suffers from various

conjectures and surmises as the respondent has failed to prove the

instances of cruelty suffered by him and thus, it is submitted that the

impugned judgment is liable to be set aside.

7. To substantiate his arguments, the learned counsel for the

appellant referred to the incident dated 05.07.2005 which, according

to the appellant, has been falsely narrated by the respondent. He

submitted that the learned Family Court has erroneously relied upon

the medical documents being RW1/4 i.e., the MLC and causality slip

of the mother of the respondent to arrive at its finding that the

respondent was beaten up by the family members of the appellant,

however, neither any witnesses from AIIMS were summoned nor any

police report was ever produced on record to corroborate the

allegations of the aforesaid incident.

8. It is argued that the aforesaid MLC does not indicate that there

were any fractures suffered by the respondent. Further, the ECG does

not show that the respondent‟s mother suffered from any bodily

disorder. It is therefore submitted that the incidents of physical cruelty

committed upon the respondent is nothing but his own twisted

narration of facts as neither the medical documents prove the incidents

nor did he produce his parents in the witness box to state as to how

they reached AIIMS and why.

MAT.APP. 6/2012 Page 4 of 19

9. It is further submitted that the learned Family Court failed to

take into consideration that the X-Ray report of the private clinic

namely Anand X-Ray Clinic, has never been proved on record and no

word has been stated by the respondent as to whether he took

treatment from any other hospital other than AIIMS. It is submitted

that allegedly, the respondent also remained hospitalized for one

week, however, no records of such hospital has been placed on record

to show that he was admitted.

10. It is submitted that due to this manipulation of data and records,

the learned Family Court erred in holding that the respondent was

subjected to cruelty at the hands of the family members of the

appellant whereas, the incidents were not proved in accordance with

the law of evidence and no witnesses were called to prove the

documents relied upon by the respondent.

11. It is also submitted that one of the grounds of cruelty considered

by the learned Family Court is that the appellant remained

uninterested in sexual activities with the respondent and purposely

kept taking anti-pregnancy tablets. To refute this particular allegation,

it is submitted that the respondent, in his cross-examination, was

unable to name the alleged pills, and admittedly, the parties share two

children from the consummation of their marriage which makes this

allegation untenable, impractical and baseless.

12. It is further submitted that the respondent has failed to make out

a case of physical or mental cruelty in the absence of any incidents of

aggressive or dominating behavior of the appellant. Learned counsel

for the appellant submitted that that the learned Family Court has

MAT.APP. 6/2012 Page 5 of 19

erroneously placed reliance on mere narration of the respondent‟s

false stories who has failed to lead any other evidence by bringing on

record relatives of the parties in the witness box to prove his case.

13. It is submitted that no one can be a master of his own case, and

the learned Family Court has committed a grave error in believing the

testimonies of the respondent with regard to the incidents without it

being corroborated by any other substantial evidences like testimonies

of the AIIMS staff, the common relatives, or by bringing on record

any police call recordings of his complaints.

14. It is also submitted that the learned Family Court erroneously

shifted the burden of proof on the appellant and has arrived at an

adverse inference against her on the basis of the fact that the appellant

failed to produce any neighbors or witnesses to disprove the incident

of 05.07.2005, whereas, it is the respondent who bore the burden of

proving his claims of cruelty. Furthermore, it is submitted that the

learned Family Court failed to acknowledge that it was the respondent

who visited the appellant‟s residence on the evening of 05.07.2005,

after separation of almost one year and two months and therefore, the

conclusion arrived at by the learned Family Court with regard to

cruelty committed on 05.07.2005 is misconceived.

15. It is further stated that the allegations of the respondent that the

appellant tried to burn him and the children is also unsubstantiated by

any cogent proof as there is no iota of evidence to prove that incident

including no medical evidence, police call records, investigation

reports, or neighbor‟s testimonies.

16. In view of the foregoing submissions, it is stated that the

MAT.APP. 6/2012 Page 6 of 19

impugned judgment passed by the learned Family Court granting

divorce to the respondent be set aside and the present appeal be

allowed.

17. Per Contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

respondent submitted to the effect that the learned Family Court has

meticulously perused the facts and circumstances as well as the

evidences placed on record before passing the well-reasoned

impugned judgment.

18. It is submitted that the respondent was successful in proving all

the instances of cruelty inflicted upon him by the appellant and it is

the settled position of law that even one instance of cruelty is

sufficient to dissolve a marriage between the parties.

19. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the learned

Family Court has carefully dealt with the evidence placed before it

including the medical records issued by AIIMS which could not have

been manipulated by the respondent. The learned Family Court has

also taken into consideration the incident whereby, the appellant tried

to burn the respondent and his children which duly prove that the

respondent was subjected to mental and physical cruelty.

20. It is contended that the learned Family Court has rightfully

drawn an adverse inference against the appellant for not providing the

medical records of her brother and father who allegedly sustained

injuries. It is submitted that the appellant purposely concealed such

evidence as her version is concocted and the said medical documents

would have gone against her.

21. It is further submitted that another crucial piece of evidence

MAT.APP. 6/2012 Page 7 of 19

showing cruelty which has been taken into consideration by the

learned Family Court is Ex. RW1/1 which is a paper/slip containing

hand written conditions imposed by the appellant upon the respondent.

It is submitted that the learned Family Court, in exercise of its powers

vested under Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, (hereinafter

referred to as “Evidence Act”) asked the appellant to write some lines

for proper comparison of the handwriting in the aforesaid alleged slip

and after categorically perusing both the documents, the learned

Family Court arrived at its findings that the paper/slip containing

illegal demands were written by none other than the appellant herself.

22. It is argued that keeping in view of the appellant‟s hesitant

conduct in handing over her handwriting to be matched with the

handwriting in the alleged slip containing demands, the learned

Family Court also derived at the conclusive proof that the testimony

of the appellant as a witness was not trust-worthy.

23. It is the plea of the respondent that the learned Family Court

carefully dealt with all incidents of cruelty separately while

meticulously examining the evidence before it and thus, found force in

the claims of the respondent who has proved the cruelty inflicted upon

him beyond reasonable doubt.

24. Learned counsel for the respondent further stated that after the

expiry of statutory period of limitation of 30 days in filing an appeal

under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, which gave the

divorce decree in favour of the respondent finality, the respondent re-

married on 22.01.2012, and out of his second wedlock, he has also

been blessed with a child on 13.11.2013. In view of the same, it is

MAT.APP. 6/2012 Page 8 of 19

submitted that the present appeal may be dismissed as being devoid of

merit and for being infructuous.

25. We have heard the learned counsels for the parties and perused

the material placed on record.

26. At the outset, this Court deems it appropriate to refer to the

definition of cruelty. As per the provision of Section 13(1)(ia) of the

HMA, cruelty can be physical or mental. It is further opined that

instances of cruelty, as per settled position of law, is to be considered

in a cumulative effect rather than in isolation. The Supreme Court has

time and again justified as to what attributes as cruelty in a number of

decisions such as in Dr. N. G. Dastane v. Mrs. S. Dastane, (1975) 2

SCC 326; V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat, (1994) 1 SCC 337; Parveen

Mehta v. Inderjit Mehta, (2002) 5 SCC 706 and in A. Jayachandra v.

Aneel Kaur, (2005) 2 SCC 22.

27. In A. Jayachandra v. Aneel Kaur (Supra), the Supreme Court

held as follows:

“12. To constitute cruelty, the conduct

complained of should be “grave and weighty”

so as to come to the conclusion that the

petitioner spouse cannot be reasonably

expected to live with the other spouse. It must

be something more serious than “ordinary

wear and tear of married life”. The conduct,

taking into consideration the circumstances

and background has to be examined to reach

the conclusion whether the conduct

complained of amounts to cruelty in the

matrimonial law. Conduct has to be

considered, as noted above, in the background

of several factors such as social status of

parties, their education, physical and mental

conditions, customs and traditions. It is

difficult to lay down a precise definition or to

MAT.APP. 6/2012 Page 9 of 19

give exhaustive description of the

circumstances, which would constitute cruelty.

It must be of the type as to satisfy the

conscience of the court that the relationship

between the parties had deteriorated to such

an extent due to the conduct of the other

spouse that it would be impossible for them to

live together without mental agony, torture or

distress, to entitle the complaining spouse to

secure divorce. Physical violence is not

absolutely essential to constitute cruelty and a

consistent course of conduct inflicting

immeasurable mental agony and torture may

well constitute cruelty within the meaning of

Section 10 of the Act. Mental cruelty may

consist of verbal abuses and insults by using

filthy and abusive language leading to

constant disturbance of mental peace of the

other party.

13. The court dealing with the petition for

divorce on the ground of cruelty has to bear in

mind that the problems before it are those of

human beings and the psychological changes

in a spouse's conduct have to be borne in mind

before disposing of the petition for divorce.

However insignificant or trifling, such conduct

may cause pain in the mind of another. But

before the conduct can be called cruelty, it

must touch a certain pitch of severity. It is for

the court to weigh the gravity. It has to be seen

whether the conduct was such that no

reasonable person would tolerate it. It has to

be considered whether the complainant should

be called upon to endure as a part of normal

human life. Every matrimonial conduct, which

may cause annoyance to the other, may not

amount to cruelty. Mere trivial irritations,

quarrels between spouses, which happen in

day-to-day married life, may also not amount

to cruelty. Cruelty in matrimonial life may be

of unfounded variety, which can be subtle or

brutal. It may be words, gestures or by mere

silence, violent or non-violent.”

MAT.APP. 6/2012 Page 10 of 19

28. In the case of Gurbax Singh v. Harminder Kaur 2010 SCC

OnLine SC 1162, the Supreme Court clarified that for establishing a

case of cruelty, the married life of a party is required to be assessed as

whole wherein ill conduct of a spouse has persisted for a fairly lengthy

period making the relationship so sour, to an extent that the other

spouse finds it impossible to reside together.

29. The above referred judicial dicta culminate in the fact that

though there is no single definition of cruelty, the limits of cruelty

should be at such an extent that it makes it fairly impossible for the

aggrieved spouse to live with the offending spouse. The ambit of

cruelty covers such ill-conduct which is constant and must be present

for a lengthy amount of period.

30. The facts alleging cruelty hinges upon three incidents mainly.

First incident is dated 11.05.2003, second is dated 11.04.2004 and the

third incident is dated 05.07.2005. A bare perusal of the impugned

judgment indicates that the learned Family Court has taken a note of

the incident dated 11.05.2003 and had given much credence to this

incident on the ground that the same took place when the parties had

not filed any case against each other. On the said date of incident, it

has been alleged that the appellant tried to set the house ablaze by

burning the respondent along with the children with the help of

cooking gas. It is contented in the respondent‟s version that the

appellant was prevented from doing the same by the respondent with

the help of neighbors. It is also noted that the respondent suffered

injuries on his right hand in the aforesaid process of preventing the

mishap.

MAT.APP. 6/2012 Page 11 of 19

31. We find that the respondent failed to examine those neighbors

nor there is any medical records to substantiate his claims of the

incident dated 11.05.2003, nor there is any complaint regarding the

alleged serious allegations. Except his self serving statement, there is

no material to corroborate the statement of the respondent qua that

incident. The respondent withheld the independent best evidence of

neighbors available with him to prove his allegations of cruelty.

Therefore, in the absence of relevant testimonies and medical data on

record, this Court is not influenced by the reasoning extended by the

learned Court below qua this particular incident.

32. Another incident taken into consideration by the learned

Family Court is dated 11.04.2004. It is recorded in the impugned

judgment that the appellant had allegedly thrown a paper/slip in the

matrimonial house which contained a list of whimsical demands that

she had asked from the respondent. The appellant has categorically

denied writing of any such letter.

33. As indicated from the Trial Court Record, the learned Family

Court, in order to compare the handwriting of the appellant on the said

document, directed both the parties to write a few lines on a piece of

paper and then on the basis of his own comparison on the said paper

with the said lines, the learned Family Court inferred that the

handwritten list of conditions was written by the appellant. From the

judgment, it seems that the learned Family Court is swayed against the

appellant in view of her reluctance to give her handwriting which is

revealed from the following observations in the impugned judgment,

the relevant paragraph is reproduced hereinbelow:

MAT.APP. 6/2012 Page 12 of 19

“211. On 19.11.11, I had asked Smt. Urvashi

to write some lines. She gave about 8 lines in

her hand. I have exercised my powers of

comparision u/s 73 of Evidence Act, and have

compared the writing dated 19.11.11 and Ex.

RW1/1 (filed on 27.08.10). I have no hitch to

observe that Ex. RW1/1 and writing dated

19.11.11 have been written by one and the

same person. I deem it pertinent to mention

that when the final arguments were concluded,

I became of the opinion that comparison of Ex

RW1/1 with the admitted handwriting of Smt

Urvashi will give an additional ground about

truthfulness/falseness of respective stands. So

that the parties do not come to know about the

real intention of mine, I asked the parties to

give some lines in writing about children. Sh.

Inder Paul gave in writing without any

hesitation. Smt. Urvashi on the other hand

gave it very hesitatingly. She even demanded

it back on the ground that she had consulted

some senior Advocate of the Supreme Court

and she can not be asked to give anything in

writing. during the course of proceedings

also, Srñt. Urvashi has avoided giving

anything in writing in Hindi.”

(emphasis supplied)

34. At this stage, it is relevant to refer to Section 73 of the Indian

Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred to as, „Evidence Act‟), which

provides for comparison of the signature, writing or seal with others

admitted or proved. The same is reproduced hereinbelow:

“73. Comparison of signature, writing or seal

with others admitted or proved.––In order to

ascertain whether a signature, writing, or seal

is that of the person by whom it purports to

have been written or made, any signature,

writing, or seal admitted or proved to the

satisfaction of the Court to have been written

or made by that person may be compared with

the one which is to be proved, although that

signature, writing, or seal has not been

MAT.APP. 6/2012 Page 13 of 19

produced or proved for any other purpose. The

Court may direct any person present in Court

to write any words or figures for the purpose

of enabling the Court to compare the words or

figures so written with any words or figures

alleged to have been written by such person. 1

[This section applies also, with any necessary

modifications, to finger-impressions.]”

35. On the aforementioned aspect, this Court finds that in the Order,

the learned Family Court had nowhere mentioned to the parties before

taking their handwriting that the order is being passed in exercise of

powers conferred under Section 73 of the Evidence Act nor the

learned Court below disclosed the reason behind asking the parties for

their handwriting. In this scenario, we find that the hesitant behavior

of the appellant in handing over her handwritten note is fairly natural

and nor the said reluctance, in the absence of expert opinion, be

sufficient to conclude that she had written the words in the paper/slip

containing the list of demands.

36. In view of the same, we are of the view that the learned Family

Court‟s approach was critically flawed and against the principles of

natural justice. The exercise of this provision requires awareness of

the parties as a pre-requisite for the reasons of procedural fairness.

The comparison under Section 73 of the Evidence Act is required to

be undertaken sparingly, especially since the document in this regard

is of substantial consequence. Furthermore, the Court is always at

liberty to supplement its finding on comparison with an expert

opinion. In the present case, the learned Family Court overlooked

these essential details which were crucial in proper adjudication of the

claims of cruelty qua this particular incident.

MAT.APP. 6/2012 Page 14 of 19

37. Though we are conscious of the fact that a Family Court is

empowered to devise its own procedure for doing justice between the

parties but the procedure should always meet the principle of natural

justice. Such power is to be exercised by the Court to fairly reach the

truth, rather than to give support to the view taken by the Court.

Moreover, in the present case, the respondent did not take any steps to

prove said document by providing any expert report. Thus, the

conduct of the Court, at the end of hearing, to exercise power under

Section 73 of the Evidence Act, without informing the parties and

giving them an opportunity of assistance of experts is more an attempt

to support the view taken by the Court, instead of a fair procedure

being adopted. Further, raising an adverse inference against a party, on

account of her resistance for giving her handwriting, without

informing her that the same will be used by the Court for comparison

purposes, is against the principles of natural and fair justice and

cannot be sustained.

38. The impugned judgment further indicates that the learned

Family Court has placed significant reliance on the version of the

respondent spouse based on his testimonies and medical records. With

regard to the incident dated 05.07.2005, the learned Family Court,

relying upon the medical documents such as the MLC of respondent

and the ECG of the mother of the respondent, being Ex. RW1/4 and

Ex. RW1/5, respectively, found that the injuries sustained by the

respondent were at the hands of the family members of the appellant

wherein the appellant had played an active role, thereby, finding force

in the claims of cruelty upon him.

MAT.APP. 6/2012 Page 15 of 19

39. This Court has perused the aforementioned medical records

which have been annexed as Annexure A-8 (Colly) in the present

appeal. A perusal of the said medical records indicate that the

respondent was found having chest pain in his left clavicle region and

had a history of assault about one and a half hours before being

examined.

40. In view of the aforesaid, this Court finds that the MLC issued

by the AIIMS, is silent on how he was assaulted and by whom. The

report fails to substantiate the claims of the respondent and there is no

evidence to arrive at the conclusion that the injuries sustained by the

respondent were due to assault inflicted upon him by the appellant or

her family. The learned Family Court overlooked the relevance of any

police call records/police reports of the incident. The alleged

altercation, if any, on 05.07.2005 between the parties, does not prove

the commission of assault by the appellant wife, especially in the

backdrop of the fact that it was the respondent who visited her place of

residence in evening after they had been living separately for almost

more than a year.

41. This Court is of the view that the medical reports alone cannot

act as definitive proof of cruelty being inflicted upon him by the

appellant wife. The medical records at best, show that the respondent

had suffered injuries due to an assault at a preceding period, but they

fail to elaborate on who assaulted him and why. The only thing

supporting his version of narration was his testimony. In the absence

of any police investigation reports or police call records of the incident

dated 05.07.2005, or independent witness, his statement alone cannot

MAT.APP. 6/2012 Page 16 of 19

be the sole reliance and this incident in isolation does not tantamount

to cruelty under HMA.

42. The learned Family Court, in our opinion, failed to adjudicate

upon these relevant factors and found the version of the respondent to

be true and reliable solely on the basis of his testimony and the

medical document placed on record. Therefore, this Court finds that

the reasoning of the learned Family Court qua the aforementioned

incident is improper and inadequate as the allegations are unattributed

and unsupported by any other credible evidence.

43. Further perusal of the impugned judgment denotes that the

learned Family Court has repeatedly derived at the conclusion that the

appellant has failed to examine her family members and her

neighbors. It is also stated that she has failed to produce relevant

evidence on record including the medical records of her father and

brother which indicates that her narration of the incident is tainted.

44. In matrimonial claims of cruelty, the settled position of law is

that the burden of proof lies on the petitioner who has leveled

allegations of cruelty and not on the party against whom the

allegations are made.

45. At this stage, it is pertinent to mention the judgment of the

Supreme Court in Roopa Soni v. Kamalnarayan Soni, (2023) 16 SCC

615 wherein, it was held as follows:

“10. On the question of burden in a petition

for divorce, burden of proof lies on the

petitioner. However, the degree of probability

is not one beyond reasonable doubt, but of

preponderance.”

MAT.APP. 6/2012 Page 17 of 19

46. Furthermore, this Court vide judgment dated 01.07.2025,

delivered in Deepti Khatana v. Rahul Khatana, 2025 SCC OnLine

Del 6336, categorically held that in matrimonial cases, the burden of

proving allegations of cruelty lies upon the petitioner who alleges the

same. Relevant extract of the aforesaid judicial dictum is reproduced

hereinbelow:

“28. In cases of cruelty, the entire case of a

petitioner hinges upon the allegations of

cruelty and proof of the same. The burden of

proof undoubtedly lies on a petitioner who

alleges the same and the standard of proof

required is preponderance of probability. It is

imperative to appreciate the cumulative effect

of the conduct of the parties and the

happenings that occurred over a period of

time in their matrimonial life to ascertain the

ground of cruelty. It is required to be assessed

that the conduct complained of must be serious

and that it would be more tragic for the

petitioner to live with the respondent. It is

always dependent upon the social strata or the

milieu to which the parties belong, their ways

of life, relationship, temperaments and

emotions that have been conditioned by their

social status.”

(Emphasis Supplied)

47. The duty of first proving the incidents undoubtedly was on the

respondent herein which was required to be assessed cautiously. In

the present case however, we find that the learned Family Court has,

without any compelling reasons, placed this burden on the appellant

wife and has drawn adverse inference against her on various accounts.

48. Insofar as the claim of the respondent that the appellant was

disinterested in engaging in sexual activities with him is concerned,

the learned Family Court chose not to delve into it holding that since

MAT.APP. 6/2012 Page 18 of 19

such allegation, even if true, could not have been proved by the

respondent for it being a closed-door matter.

49. In the present case, the marriage between the parties was clearly

consummated and within 11 months of their marriage, a child was

born to them on 11.10.1998, who unfortunately passed away on the

same date. The parties were thereafter, blessed with two children, one

boy who was born on 14.10.2000 and a girl child who was born on

14.10.2002. Keeping in view the above-stated facts, this Court accedes

to the argument made on behalf of the appellant that the allegation of

cruelty alleging that the appellant kept avoiding sexual intercourse and

kept anti-pregnancy pills with her, without naming the pills, is without

any substance.

50. The learned Family Court has disregarded these material facts

and legal principles. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered view

that the impugned judgment fails to address several crucial aspects

and the reasoning adopted by the learned Family Court also lacks

support of other cogent evidence which ought to have been considered

by it during the adjudication of the divorce petition.

51. As per the catena of judgments with regard to cruelty passed in

Dr. N. G. Dastane v. Mrs. S. Dastane, (Supra); V. Bhagat v. D.

Bhagat, (Supra); Parveen Mehta v. Inderjit Mehta, (Supra) and in A.

Jayachandra v. Aneel Kaur (Supra), we are of the opinion that

instances of cruelty in terms of Section 13(1)(ia) of the Act, is

required to be considered as a cumulative effect on the marriage as

there is no straitjacket formula to consider the claims of cruelty. Mere

small trivial irritations and small quarrels in a married life are normal

MAT.APP. 6/2012 Page 19 of 19

wear and tear of married life and the same cannot be considered

adequate for grant of divorce under the HMA. We do not find any

other grave allegations which led the Family Court to come to the

conclusion that the appellant treated the respondent with such a

cruelty that it becomes impossible for him to live with the appellant.

52. The learned counsel for the respondent has informed this Court

during arguments that the respondent has re-married. However, as we

have come to the conclusion that the impugned judgment has been

passed erroneously, without correctly appreciating the evidence on

record, the fact that the respondent has re-married would not deter us

from passing an order in this appeal and setting aside the impugned

judgment passed by the learned Family Court.

53. Accordingly, the present appeal is allowed. The impugned

judgment and Decree of Divorce dated 28.11.2011 passed by the

learned Judge-01, Family Courts, Rohini Courts, Delhi are hereby set

aside.

54. Further, it is noted that no reliefs have been sought for setting

aside of the findings qua the disposal of petition of the appellant filed

under Section 9 of the HMA.

55. Pending applications, if any, also stands disposed of.

VIVEK CHAUDHARY , J.

RENU BHATNAGAR, J.

APRIL 13, 2026/p/sm/kp