Page 1 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 6342-6343 OF 2012

V. Chandrasekaran & Anr. …Appellants

Versus

The Administrative Officer & Ors. …Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Dr. B. S. CHAUHAN, J.

1. These appeals have been preferred against the impugned judgment

and order dated 24.1.2012, passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras

in Writ Appeal Nos. 805-806 of 2011, by which, the Division Bench

reversed the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge, dated

1.11.2010 passed in relation to land acquisition proceedings.

2.Facts and circumstances giving rise to these appeals are as under:

Page 2 A.A Notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894

(hereinafter referred to as `the Act’), was issued on 15.5.1978 with respect to

land measuring 58.59 acres, in the revenue estate of Tambaram Village,

Saidapet Taluk, Chengalpet District, Tamil Nadu, including the suit land

measuring 2.26 acres in Survey Nos. 283/1 (extent of 27 cents), 284/1

(extent of 70 cents), 284/2 (extent of 65 cents) and 284/3 (extent of 64

cents). As the provisions of the Urgency Clause under Section 17 of the Act

were not invoked, the persons interested were at liberty to file objections

under Section 5-A of the Act. A declaration under Section 6 of the Act with

respect to the said land was issued on 6.6.1981. Very few among the persons

interested, challenged the land acquisition proceedings by way of filing 8

writ petitions, including Writ Petition Nos. 8897 and 8899 of 1983 etc.

which were filed by some of the original tenure-holders of the suit land on

several grounds. However, the said petitioners did not challenge the

acquisition proceedings so far as the suit land is concerned, rather they chose

to restrict their cases to the other parts of their lands. The batch of said writ

petitions was allowed by way of a common judgment and order, dated

16.12.1983, quashing the declaration issued under Section 6 of the Act on

the ground that the inquiry was not conducted fairly, and that the objections

raised by the said writ petitioners under Section 5-A, were also not dealt

2

Page 3 with properly. However, the learned Single Judge upheld the Notification

issued under Section 4 of the Act and hence, granted liberty to the

Government of Tamil Nadu to continue with the said acquisition

proceedings, in accordance with law.

B.Being aggrieved by this, the writ petitioners including the

predecessors-in-interest of the appellants, preferred Writ Appeal Nos. 214 to

225 and 435 of 1984, before the Division Bench of the High Court, against

the judgment and order dated 16.12.1983, praying for quashing of the

Notification issued under Section 4 of the Act, as well. The Government did

not challenge the judgment and order dated 16.12.1983. The said writ

appeals were allowed vide judgment and order dated 23.8.1985, and the said

notification under Section 4(1) of the Act, only in respect of the land, which

constituted the subject matter of the aforementioned appeals, was quashed.

Against the judgment and order dated 23.8.1985, the Government of Tamil

Nadu preferred a Special Leave Petition before this Court, which was

dismissed vide order dated 6.5.1992. Thus, those orders attained finality.

C.In the meantime, an Award was passed with respect to the said land,

including the suit land, on 28.6.1983, to the extent of 4.26 acres i.e. Survey

Nos. 283/1, 284/1 and 284/3.

3

Page 4 D.A second batch of writ petitions was filed before the High Court

challenging the acquisition proceedings, as well as the Award. All the said

writ petitions were allowed, following the earlier judgments dated

16.12.1983 and 23.8.1985 vide judgment and order dated 22.12.1986.

E.A second award was made on 14.8.1986, in relation to the remaining

part of said land, including a part of the suit land, i.e. Survey No. 284/2.

F.So far as the suit land is concerned, the persons-interested/tenure-

holders never filed any objection under Section 5-A of the Act, and nor have

they challenged the acquisition proceedings, at any stage. Instead, they

accepted the compensation amount under protest. Possession of the suit land

was taken over by the authority subsequently. There is nothing on record to

show whether the claimants had filed any application for making a reference

under Section 18 of the Act.

G.The tenure-holders/persons-interested in the suit land, after receiving

compensation, and handing over the possession to the respondents

authorities with respect to the suit land, transferred the said land to some

persons, and ultimately, after undergoing multiple sales, the suit land was

purchased by the appellants herein, vide sale-deeds dated 4.3.2004,

10.11.2004, 7.7.2005 and 11.8.2005. As a result thereof, they claim to have

4

Page 5 acquired possession of the said suit land. The appellants planned to

construct flats upon the said land, for the purpose of which, they had also

obtained permission from the Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority

on 16.3.2007. Applications were filed by the original tenure-holders for re-

conveyance of the suit land which stood as rejected vide order dated

7.7.2008.

H.Being aggrieved, the appellants filed Writ Petition No. 6108 of 2009

for the quashing of the Notification dated 15.5.1978, issued under Section 4

of the Act, pertaining to the land that comprised 9 Survey Numbers,

including the suit land contending that the declaration under Section 6 had

been quashed in toto and no fresh declaration was subsequently issued. The

proceedings therefore, automatically lapsed as there could be no Award

without a fresh declaration, and therefore, all subsequent proceedings would

be void ab-initio. Another Writ Petition No. 20896 of 2009, was also filed

seeking totally inconsistent/contrary reliefs i.e. praying for the quashing of

the letter dated 7.7.2005, as also for the issuance of directions to re-convey

the suit land in favour of the appellants.

I.A learned Single Judge, vide judgment and order dated 1.11.2010

allowed both Writ Petitions, observing that as the Section 6 declaration had

been quashed in toto and no fresh declaration was issued thereafter, the land

5

Page 6 acquisition proceedings had lapsed and the suit land was hence, free from

any and all acquisition proceedings.

J.Being aggrieved, the Tamil Nadu Housing Board (hereinafter referred

to as `the Board’) – the respondents, then filed writ appeals which have been

allowed vide impugned judgment and order dated 24.1.2012, reversing the

judgment and order of the learned Single Judge.

Hence, these appeals.

3.Dr. Abhishek M. Singhvi and Mr. Rajiv Dutta, learned senior counsel

appearing for the appellants, have submitted that, since the Section 6

declaration dated 6.6.1981 has been quashed in toto and no fresh declaration

was made thereafter, subsequent proceedings are void ab-initio. The

appellants, before purchasing the suit land made various inquiries and were

informed in writing by various authorities, that the said land was not the

subject matter of any acquisition proceedings at the relevant time. More so,

a high powered committee, constituted by the Board itself, submitted a

report that the suit land was not required by the Board, and that even though

the possession of the land had been taken, the land vested in the State.

There was no approach road to the suit land and thus, the said land could not

be utilised for the purpose for which, it was acquired. The Board was not in

6

Page 7 a position to utilise the suit land and, thus, it could be released in favour of

the appellants, subject to refunding the compensation amount received by

the land owners. More so, the compensation amount received by the persons

aggrieved in 1983 was received under protest, and was refunded to them in

2010, by way of demand draft, though the same was not accepted by the

Board and was therefore, returned to the tenure-holders. The appellants are

still willing to refund the amount of compensation received by the persons-

interested, in pursuance of the illegal and void awards, dated 28.6.1983 and

14.8.1986. Therefore, the impugned judgment and order are liable to be set

aside and the present appeals should be allowed.

4.On the contrary, Shri S. Gomathi Nayagam, learned Additional

Advocate General appearing for the respondents, has vehemently opposed

the appeals, contending that the predecessor-in-interest, of the appellants did

not raise any objection under Section 5-A of the Act, with respect to such

acquisition proceedings at any stage, rather they accepted the compensation

granted under protest. To receive an award under protest is a legal

requirement for the purpose of making a reference under Section 18 of the

Act. The quashing of the declaration under Section 6 of the Act would not

automatically apply to the suit land, as it was not the subject matter of

challenge with respect to the acquisition proceedings before court. The

7

Page 8 appellants did not make any inquiry whatsoever, with respect to the title of

the suit land, though inquiry was sought to be made in relation to the said

land, by different persons in altogether different contexts. The report of the

high powered committee appointed by the Board itself, is self-contradictory,

as they clearly provided that possession had been taken and, in view of the

fact that once possession is taken, the said land vests in the State, free from

all encumbrances under Section 16 of the Act, the same cannot be divested.

Therefore, the question of re-conveying the suit land in favour of the

appellants cannot possibly arise. Land can be released from acquisition

proceedings either under Section 48 of the Act, or in exercise of powers

under the General Clauses Act, 1897, but this can be done only prior to the

vesting of the land in the State, which in itself is prior to taking possession

thereof. The appellants, being purchasers of the said suit land, after more

than 20 years of the Award, cannot challenge the acquisition proceedings at

such a belated stage. More so, the vendors were not competent to make any

transfer, as none of them had good title over the suit land. Therefore, any

and all sale transactions are illegal and void. The sale-deeds executed in

favour of the appellants, do not confer upon them, any title. More so, the

subsequent purchasers cannot challenge the validity of the land acquisition.

The appeals lack merit and are therefore liable to be dismissed.

8

Page 9 5.We have considered the rival submissions made by the learned

counsel for the parties and perused the records.

However, before coming to the merit of the case, it is desirable to

consider the legal issues involved herein.

Whether subsequent purchaser can challenge the acquisition

proceedings:

6.The issue of maintainability of the writ petitions by the person who

purchases the land subsequent to a notification being issued under Section 4

of the Act has been considered by this Court time and again.

In Pandit Leela Ram v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2112, this

Court held that, any one who deals with the land subsequent to a Section 4

notification being issued, does so, at his own peril. In Sneh Prabha v. State

of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1996 SC 540, this Court held that a Section 4

notification gives a notice to the public at large that the land in respect to

which it has been issued, is needed for a public purpose, and it further points

out that there will be "an impediment to any one to encumber the land

acquired thereunder." The alienation thereafter does not bind the State or the

beneficiary under the acquisition. The purchaser is entitled only to receive

compensation. While deciding the said case, reliance was placed on an

9

Page 10 earlier judgment of this Court in Union of india v. Shri Shiv Kumar

Bhargava & Ors., JT (1995) 6 SC 274.

7.Similarly, in U.P. Jal Nigam v. M/s. Kalra Properties Pvt. Ltd.,

AIR 1996 SC 1170, this Court held that, purchase of land after publication

of a Section 4 notification in relation to such land, is void against the State

and at the most, the purchaser may be a person-interested in compensation,

since he steps into the shoes of the erstwhile owner and may therefore,

merely claim compensation. (See also: Star Wire (India) Ltd. v. State of

Haryana & Ors., (1996) 11 SCC 698).

8.In Ajay Kishan Singhal v. Union of India, AIR 1996 SC 2677;

Mahavir & Anr. v. Rural Institute, Amravati & Anr., (1995) 5 SCC 335;

Gian Chand v. Gopala & Ors., (1995) 2 SCC 528; and Meera Sahni v.

Lieutenant Governor of Delhi & Ors., (2008) 9 SCC 177, this Court

categorically held that, a person who purchases land after the publication of

a Section 4 notification with respect to it, is not entitled to challenge the

proceedings for the reason, that his title is void and he can at best claim

compensation on the basis of vendor’s title. In view of this, the sale of land

after issuance of a Section 4 notification is void and the purchaser cannot

challenge the acquisition proceedings. (See also: Tika Ram v. State of U.P.,

(2009) 10 SCC 689).

10

Page 11 9.In view of the above, the law on the issue can be summarized to the

effect that a person who purchases land subsequent to the issuance of a

Section 4 notification with respect to it, is not competent to challenge the

validity of the acquisition proceedings on any ground whatsoever, for the

reason that the sale deed executed in his favour does not confer upon him,

any title and at the most he can claim compensation on the basis of his

vendor’s title.

The acquisition challenged by one – whether others can also take the

benefit of the same.

10.The relief obtained by some persons, by approaching the Court

immediately after the cause of action has arisen, cannot be the basis for other

persons who have belatedly filed their petition, to take the benefit of earlier

relief provided, for the reason that, such persons cannot be permitted to take

impetus of an order passed by the court, at the behest of another more

diligent person. (Vide: Ratan Chandra Sammanta & Ors. v. Union of

India & Ors., AIR 1993 SC 2276; State of Karnataka & Ors. v. S.M.

Kotrayya & Ors., (1996) 6 SCC 267; and Jagdih Lal & Ors. v. State of

Haryana & Ors., AIR 1997 SC 2366).

11

Page 12 11.In Abhey Ram (dead) by L.Rs. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.,

AIR 1997 SC 2564, a three Judge Bench of this Court, dealt with an issue

similar to the one involved herein. The question that arose was whether the

quashing of the notification/declaration under the Act by the court in respect

of other matters, would confer benefit upon non-parties also. The Court held

as under:

“The question then arises is whether the quashing of

the declaration by the Division Bench in respect of

the other matters would enure the benefit to the

appellants also. Though, prima facie, the argument

of the learned counsel is attractive, on deeper

consideration, it is difficult to give acceptance to the

contention….. If it were a case entirely relating to

Section 6 declaration as has been quashed by the

High Court, necessarily that would enure the benefit

to others also, though they did not file any petition,

except to those whose lands were taken possession

of and were vested in the State under Sections 16

and 17(2) of the Act free from all encumbrances.”

(Emphasis

added)

12.In H.M.T. House Building Co-operative Society v. Syed Khader &

Ors., AIR 1995 SC 2244, this Court quashed the land acquisition

proceedings in toto, wherein the land had been acquired by the Government

for the use of the cooperative society which had planned a housing scheme

upon it, in view of the conclusion that it could not be called a “public

purpose”, within the meaning of the Act. The Court further directed the

12

Page 13 respondents therein to restore the possession of the land to the tenure-

holders/persons-interested, and such persons were thereafter, directed to

refund the amount received by them as compensation. (See also: H.M.T.

House Building Cooperative Society v. M. Venkataswamappa & Ors.,

(1995) 3 SCC 128)

13.The said judgment has subsequently been approved and followed by

this Court, in Delhi Admn. v. Gurdip Singh Uban & Ors., AIR 1999 SC

3822, wherein this Court held as follows:

“Quashing the notification in the cases of individual

writ petitions cannot be treated as quashing the

whole of it. That was what was held in Abhey Ram

case (supra). The main points raised before us are

fully covered by the judgment of the three-Judge

Bench in Abhey Ram’s case.”

14.In Om Prakash v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 2010 SC 2430, this

Court considered a similar issue and reiterated the view taken by this Court

in Abhey Ram (supra), wherein it was held that, in case a person interested

has not filed any objection to the notice issued under Section 5-A of the Act,

or challenged the acquisition proceedings, he cannot claim that the order of

quashing the declaration in some other matter, would also cover his case.

The Court held as under:

13

Page 14 “The facts of the aforesaid cases would show that in

the case in hand as many as four declarations under

Section 6 of the Act were issued from time to time.

Finally when declaration is quashed by any Court, it

would only enure to the benefit of those who had

approached the Court. It would certainly not extend

the benefit to those who had not approached the

Court or who might have gone into slumber.”

15.Therefore, the law on the issue can be summarised to state that, in the

event that the person interested has not filed objections in response to a

notice issued under Section 5-A, and has not challenged the acquisition

proceedings, the quashing of the declaration issued under Section 6 in some

other case, would not enure any benefit to such person. More so, where the

possession of land has already been taken, and such land stands vested in the

State, free from all encumbrances as provided under Sections 16 and 17(2)

of the Act, prior to the date of decision of the Court quashing the declaration

in toto, no benefit can be taken by him. Where a party has not filed

objections to the notice issued under Section 5-A, the declaration qua such

persons is generally neither quashed, nor does it stand vitiated qua him, by

any error of law warranting interference. There is also another view with

respect to this matter, which is that, in case the said land has been acquired

for a Scheme, which does not fall within the ambit of “public purpose” then,

14

Page 15 in such a case, it would not be a case of acquisition under the Act, instead, it

would amount to colourable exercise of power.

Land once vested in the Government – whether can be divested:

16.It is a settled legal proposition, that once the land is vested in the

State, free from all encumbrances, it cannot be divested and proceedings

under the Act would not lapse, even if an award is not made within the

statutorily stipulated period. (Vide: Avadh Behari Yadav v. State of Bihar

&. Ors., (1995) 6 SCC 31; U.P. Jal Nigam v. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd.

(Supra); Allahabad Development Authority v. Nasiruzzaman & Ors.,

(1996) 6 SCC 424, M. Ramalinga Thevar v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors.,

(2000) 4 SCC 322; and Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Syed Akbar &

Ors., AIR 2005 SC 492).

17.The said land, once acquired, cannot be restored to the tenure

holders/persons-interested, even if it is not used for the purpose for which it

was so acquired, or for any other purpose either. The proceedings cannot be

withdrawn/abandoned under the provisions of Section 48 of the Act, or

under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, once the possession of the land

has been taken and the land vests in the State, free from all encumbrances.

(Vide: State of Madhya Pradesh v. V.P. Sharma, AIR 1966 SC 1593; Lt.

15

Page 16 Governor of Himachal Pradesh & Anr. v. Shri Avinash Sharma, AIR

1970 SC 1576; Satendra Prasad Jain v. State of U.P. & Ors., AIR 1993

SC 2517; Rajasthan Housing Board & Ors. v. Shri Kishan & Ors.,

(1993) 2 SCC 84 and Dedicated Freight Corridor Corporation of India v.

Subodh Singh & Ors., (2011) 11 SCC 100).

18. The meaning of the word 'vesting', has been considered by this Court

time and again. In Fruit and Vegetable Merchants Union v. The Delhi

Improvement Trust, AIR 1957 SC 344, this Court held that the meaning of

word 'vesting' varies as per the context of the Statute, under which the

property vests. So far as the vesting under Sections 16 and 17 of the Act is

concerned, the Court held as under.-

"In the cases contemplated by Sections 16 and 17,

the property acquired becomes the property of

Government without any condition or ; limitations

either as to title or possession. The legislature has

made it clear that vesting of the property is not for

any limited purpose or limited duration.”

19.In Gulam Mustafa & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., AIR

1977 SC 448, in a similar situation, this Court held as under:-

"Once the original acquisition is valid and title

has vested in the Municipality, how it uses the

excess land is no concern of the original owner

16

Page 17 and cannot be the basis for invalidating the

acquisition. There is no principle of law by which

a valid compulsory acquisition stands voided

because long later the requiring Authority diverts

it to a public purpose other than the one stated in

the ….declaration.”

20. Similarly, in State of Kerala & Anr. v. M. Bhaskaran Pillai &

Anr., (1997) 5 SCC 432, this Court held as under:

“It is settled law that if the land is acquired for a

public purpose, after the public purpose was

achieved, the rest of the land could be used for any

other public purpose. In case there is no other

public purpose for which the land is needed, then

instead of disposal by way of sale to the erstwhile

owner, the land should be put to public auction

and the amount fetched in the public auction can

be better utilised for the public purpose envisaged

in the Directive Principles of the Constitution.

(See also: C. Padma & Ors. v. Deputy Secretary to the Government of

Tamil Nadu & Ors., (1997) 2 SCC 627; Bhagat Singh v. State of U.P. &

Ors., AIR 1999 SC 436; Niladri Narayan Chandradhurja v. State of

West Bengal, AIR 2002 SC 2532; Northern Indian Glass Industries v.

Jaswant Singh & Ors., (2003) 1 SCC 335; and Leelawanti & Ors. v. State

of Haryana & Ors., (2012) 1 SCC 66).

17

Page 18 21.In Government of Andhra Pradesh & Anr. v. Syed Akbar

(Supra), this Court considered this very issue and held that, once the land

has vested in the State, it can neither be divested, by virtue of Section 48 of

the Act, nor can it be reconveyed to the persons-interested/tenure holders,

and that therefore, the question of restitution of possession to the tenure

holder, does not arise. (See also: Pratap v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1996

SC 1296; Chandragaudaj Ramgonda Patil v. State of Maharashtra,

(1996) 6 SCC 405; State of Kerala & Ors. v. M. Bhaskaran Pillai &

Anr., AIR 1997 SC 2703; Printers (Mysore) . Ltd. v. M.A. Rasheed &

Ors. (2004) 4 SCC 460; Bangalore Development Authority v. R.

Hanumaiah, (2005) 12 SCC 508; and Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd. &

Anr. v. State of U.P. & Anr. (2011) 9 SCC 354).

22.In view of the above, the law can be crystallized to mean, that once

the land is acquired and it vests in the State, free from all encumbrances, it is

not the concern of the land owner, whether the land is being used for the

purpose for which it was acquired or for any other purpose. He becomes

persona non-grata once the land vests in the State. He has a right to only

receive compensation for the same, unless the acquisition proceeding is

itself challenged. The State neither has the requisite power to reconvey the

land to the person-interested, nor can such person claim any right of

18

Page 19 restitution on any ground, whatsoever, unless there is some statutory

amendment to this effect.

23.The general rule of law is undoubted, that no one can transfer a better

title than he himself possesses; Nemo dat quod non habet. However, this

Rule has certain exceptions and one of them is, that the transfer must be in

good faith for value, and there must be no misrepresentation or fraud, which

would render the transactions as void and also that the property is purchased

after taking reasonable care to ascertain that the transferee has the requisite

power to transfer the said land, and finally that, the parties have acted in

good faith, as is required under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act,

1882. (Vide: Asa Ram & Anr. v. Mst. Ram Kali & Anr., AIR 1958 SC

183; State Bank of India v. Rajendra Kumar Singh & Ors., AIR 1969 SC

401, Controller of Estate Duty, Lucknow v. Aloke Mitra, AIR 1981 SC

102; Hanumant Kumar Talesara v. Mohal Lal, AIR 1988 SC 299; and

State of Punjab v. Surjit Kaur (Dead) through LRs., JT (2001) 10 SC 42).

24.This Court has earlier taken the view that, in case the award is not

accepted under protest, the persons interested cannot make an application to

make a reference under Section 18, (Vide: Wardington Lyngdoh & Ors. v.

Collector, Mawkyrwat, (1995) 4 SCC 428), wherein this Court held that, a

person who has received the amount of award made under Section 11 of the

19

Page 20 Act, without protest, will not be entitled to make an application under

Section 18 of the Act. Therefore, receipt of the said amount under protest, is

a condition precedent for making an application under Section 18, within the

limitation prescribed under the Act.

25.The aforesaid view however, has not been consistently reiterated, as

is evident from the judgment in Ajit Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab &

Ors., (1994) 4 SCC 67, wherein it was held that, merely an application

under Section 18 of the Act would make it clear that the person-interested

has not accepted the award made by the authority.

26.The instant case requires to be examined in the light of the aforesaid

legal propositions.

From the facts it is evident that, the predecessor-in-interest of the

appellants approached the court by filing Writ Petitions as well as writ

appeals, with respect to some of their lands, but for the reasons best known

to them, they did not challenge the acquisition proceedings so far as the suit

land is concerned. The appellants filed a writ petition for quashing the land

acquisition proceedings and/or seeking a declaration to the effect that the

notification issued under Section 4 of the Act on 15.5.1978, in relation to

Survey Nos. 282/1, 282/2, 283/1, 283/2, 284/1, 284/2, 284/3, 284/4 situated

20

Page 21 in Tambaram Village, Chennai, had lapsed and become inoperative and

consequently, to issue a mandamus, barring the respondents, their men, their

agents, subordinates, servants or anyone acting under them, from interfering

in any manner, with the peaceful enjoyment of the properties belonging to

the appellants, as stipulated in the aforementioned surveys.

27.The appellants also filed another writ petition for quashing the orders

passed in relation to the applications of their predecessors-in-interest with

respect to re-conveyance of the said land. The reliefs claimed therein inter-

alia, are as under:

“Issue a writ of Certiorarified Mandamus or any

other order or direction in the nature of a writ of

Certiorarified Mandamus by calling for the records

comprised in the proceedings of the 4th respondent

bearing Letter No. 2899/LAI(1)/2007-6 dated 7.7.2008

and quash the same as illegal and unconstitutional

and consequently issue a Writ of Mandamus directing

the respondents to reconvey the property situate at

Survey No. 283/1 measuring about 0.27 cents, Survey

No. 284/1 measuring about 0.70 cents, Survey

No.284/2 measuring about 0.65 cents and Survey

No.284/3 measuring about 0.64 cents in 166 of

Tambaram Village, Old State Bank Colony, Saidapet

Taluk, Chengalpat District as per the provisions

contained in Sec.48-B of the Land Acquisition (Tamil

Nadu Amendment) Act 1996 (Tamil Nadu Act of 16 of

1997) and pass such further or other orders as this

Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts

and circumstances of the case and thus render

justice.”

21

Page 22 28.It is evident from the relief clauses of the two writ petitions filed by

the appellants, that the reliefs sought by them are mutually inconsistent and

contradictory. In the event that the appellants wanted a declaration to the

effect that the acquisition proceedings in pursuance of issuance of the

Section 4 notification, dated 15.5.1978 had lapsed or were void, the question

of seeking re-conveyance of the said land could not arise. More so, it is

difficult to understand, how the appellants can claim relief in respect of 9

survey numbers. In the present appeals, relief is restricted only to 4 of the

survey numbers. Dr. A.M. Singhvi has not pressed for the relief of

reconveyance. However, it is apparent that the appellants’ claim cannot co-

exist and can be said to be blowing hot and blowing cold, simultaneously.

29.In Cauvery Coffee Traders, Mangalore v. Hornor Resources

(International) Company Limited, (2011) 10 SCC 420, this Court

considered a large number of judgments on the issue of estoppels and held

as under:

“A party cannot be permitted to “blow hot and

cold”, “fast and loose” or “approbate and

reprobate”. Where one knowingly accepts the

benefits of a contract or conveyance or an order,

is estopped to deny the validity or binding effect

on him of such contract or conveyance or order.

This rule is applied to do equity, however, it must

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Page 23 not be applied in a manner as to violate the

principles of right and good conscience…..

……….The doctrine of estoppel by election is

one of the species of estoppels in pais (or

equitable estoppel), which is a rule in equity. By

that law, a person may be precluded by his actions

or conduct or silence when it is his duty to speak,

from asserting a right which he otherwise would

have had.”

30.In the instant case, the tenure holders/person-interested neither filed

objections under Section 5-A of the Act, nor have they challenged the land

acquisition proceedings, so far as the suit land is concerned, instead they

chose to withdraw the compensation awarded in 1983 and 1986; after the

expiry of about three decades and hence, they cannot be permitted to

challenge the acquisition proceedings on any ground whatsoever. The

appellants cannot claim title/relief better than what the original vendors were

entitled to.

31.In fact, the appellants have claimed reliefs in the writ petitions with

respect to not just the suit land but also in relation to the land which was the

subject matter of an earlier litigation by their predecessors-in-interest. We

fail to understand for what purpose the relief of quashing the acquisition

proceedings has been sought when, in respect of the said land, the

proceedings already stood quashed.

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Page 24 32.The High Court dealt with the proceeding, issued in RC No.

8222/95/F5, which is purported to have been issued by one K.Muthu,

Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition), and observed that the said proceeding

itself stood cancelled and somehow a xerox copy of the said proceeding was

obtained by the appellants and they utilised the same to secure permission

for sanctioning their plan of construction of flats on the said land. Thus, the

appellant have played fraud upon the authorities in order to obtain the said

sanction. Even as per the RC No. 8222/95/F5, it is evident that the

possession of the suit land was taken over ages ago and therefore, the said

suit land was the subject matter of the earlier litigation.

33.The High Court also recorded findings to the effect that the appellants

have “managed”, not only to obtain certain orders from the department, but

have also misused the process of the court to achieve a sinister design. The

court further took note that one of the appellants had filed an additional

affidavit before the High Court in a writ petition by way of which, had

attempted to mislead the court through furnishing of false information.

It has even been admitted at the Bar, that the letter dated 7.7.2005

which was placed on the record by the appellants before the High Court, was

in fact, a forged document.

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Page 25 34.The appellants have not approached the court with clean hands, and

are therefore, not entitled for any relief. Whenever a person approaches a

Court of Equity, in the exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction, it is

expected that he will approach the said court not only with clean hands but

also with a clean mind, a clean heart and clean objectives. Thus, he who

seeks equity must do equity. The legal maxim “Jure Naturae Aequum Est

Neminem cum Alterius Detrimento Et Injuria Fieri Locupletiorem”, means

that it is a law of nature that one should not be enriched by causing loss or

injury to another. (Vide: The Ramjas Foundation & Ors. v. Union of

India & Ors., AIR 1993 SC 852; Nooruddin v. (Dr.) K.L. Anand, (1995)

1 SCC 242; and Ramniklal N. Bhutta & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra &

Ors., AIR 1997 SC 1236).

35.The judicial process cannot become an instrument of oppression or

abuse, or a means in the process of the court to subvert justice, for the

reason that the court exercises its jurisdiction, only in furtherance of justice.

The interests of justice and public interest coalesce, and therefore, they are

very often one and the same. A petition or an affidavit containing a

misleading and/or an inaccurate statement, only to achieve an ulterior

purpose, amounts to an abuse of process of the court.

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Page 26 36.In Dalip Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors., (2010) 2 SCC 114, this Court

noticed an altogether new creed of litigants, that is, dishonest litigants and

went on to strongly deprecate their conduct by observing that, the truth

constitutes an integral part of the justice delivery system. The quest for

personal gain has become so intense that those involved in litigation do not

hesitate to seek shelter of falsehood, misrepresentation and suppression of

facts in the course of court proceedings. A litigant who attempts to pollute

the stream of justice, or who touches the pure fountain of justice with tainted

hands, is not entitled to any relief, interim or final.

37.The truth should be the guiding star in the entire judicial process.

“Every trial is a voyage of discovery in which truth is the quest”. An action

at law is not a game of chess, therefore, a litigant cannot prevaricate and take

inconsistent positions. It is one of those fundamental principles of

jurisprudence that litigants must observe total clarity and candour in their

pleadings. (Vide: Ritesh Tewari & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.,

(2010) 10 SCC 677; and Amar Singh v. Union of India, (2011) 7 SCC 69).

38.In Maria Margarida Sequeria Fernandes & Ors. v. Erasmo Jack

de Sequeria (dead), (2012) 5 SCC 370), this Court taking note of its earlier

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Page 27 judgment in Ramrameshwari Devi v. Nirmala Devi, (2011) 8 SCC 249

held:

“False claims and defences are really serious

problems with real estate litigation, predominantly

because of ever-escalating prices of the real estate.

Litigation pertaining to valuable real estate

properties is dragged on by unscrupulous litigants

in the hope that the other party will tire out and

ultimately would settle with them by paying a huge

amount. This happens because of the enormous

delay in adjudication of cases in our courts. If

pragmatic approach is adopted, then this problem

can be minimised to a large extent.”

The Court further observed that wrongdoers must be denied profit

from their frivolous litigation, and that they should be prevented from

introducing and relying upon, false pleadings and forged or fabricated

documents in the records furnished by them to the court.

39.In view of the above, the appellants have disentitled themselves for

any equitable relief.

40.Section 16-A has been added to the Act by the State Amendment Act,

1996, and the same imposes a complete restriction on the sale of acquired

land by the tenure holder. In case the land is transferred in contravention of

these provisions, the Government may, by way of an order, declare the

transfer to be null and void, and on such declaration, the land shall, as

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Page 28 penalty, be forfeited to, and vest in, the Revenue Department of the

Government, free from all encumbrances.

In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that the sale

deeds in favour of the appellants are void and unenforceable.

41.In such a fact-situation, we fail to understand how the appellants came

to possess the suit land which had been vested in the State ages ago, in the

years 1983 and 1986. Such a course is not possible without the collusion of

the officers of the State/Board.

42.After considering the entire material on record, we reach the

following inescapable conclusions:-

i)The suit land stood notified under Section 4 of the Act as on

15.5.1978. There is nothing on record to show, nor have the appellants

made any pleadings to the effect that, the persons interested at the relevant

time ever filed any objections whatsoever, in response to the notice issued

under Section 5-A of the Act.

ii)Predecessors-in-interest of the appellants have filed two writ petitions

challenging the validity of acquisition of some of their land but they did not

raise the issue of validity of the acquisition in respect of the suit land.

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Page 29 iii)Award no.14/1983 was made on 28.6.1983, in respect of Survey

Nos.283/1, 284/1 and 284/3. The amount of compensation, was withdrawn

by the original tenure holders/persons-interested, though of course, under

protest, and the same was limited to the extent of quantum of compensation,

so that they could approach the Collector for making a reference to the

Court under Section 18 of the Act.

iv)The judgment of the learned Single Judge is subsequent to the

aforesaid award. As the compensation related to the land had been

withdrawn, and the land stood vested in the State, free from all

encumbrances, quashing the declaration under Section 6 in cases filed by

others, would not enure any benefit to the original tenure holders/appellants,

as has been explained by this Court in the case of Abhey Ram (supra), and

furthermore, even if the declaration stood quashed in toto, it could not save

the suit land, as its possession had already been taken over.

v)In the instant case, the High Court did not declare the acquisition

proceedings to be void, or the purpose for which the land had been acquired

not to be a “public purpose” within the meaning of the Act. There has also

been no direction whatsoever, to restore the possession of the said land to

the tenure holders, upon refund of the compensation amount by them.

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Page 30 vi) Another award no.11/1986 in respect of Survey No.284/2 was made on

14.8.1986. Compensation awarded in relation to the said piece of land was

withdrawn. The land thus, vested in the State, free from all encumbrances.

vii)In the instant case, as the original vendors i.e. vendors of the first sale

were not vested with any title over the said land, the transfer by them, was

itself void and all subsequent transfers would also, as a result, remain

ineffective and unenforceable in law. Therefore, sale deeds executed in the

years 2004-05 would not confer any title on the appellants.

viii) The appellants claimed to have made some enquiries in relation to

the acquisition proceedings qua the suit land, to which the competent

authorities replied, that the land was free from acquisition proceedings and

therefore, the appellants proceeded to purchase the said suit land. The letters

written by the Authorities dated 4.3.2004, 7.7.2005 and 12.5.2006 do not

make any reference to the present appellants, nor was any information

sought by any of them in this regard. Some of the said letters had been

addressed to the original tenure holders and other were merely found to be

inter-departmental communications.

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Page 31 ix)Letter dated 7.7.2005, filed by the appellants before the Court is

admittedly a forged document.

x)So far as the matter relating to the proceedings issued in R.C.

No.8222/95/F-5, it is clearly revealed that the appellants have used unfair

means to obtain sanction for their plan of construction of flats.

xi)The appellants filed an affidavit before the High Court only to mislead

the court by furnishing false information.

xii)The appellants also managed to obtain certain orders from the

Department and further have abused the process of the court.

xiii)The appellants did neither approach the statutory authority nor the

court with clean hands.

xiv)Compensation was paid to the original tenure holders in 1983 and

1986. The same was refunded by the present appellants in the name of the

original tenure holders in 2010 i.e. after 27 years, and the same has not been

accepted by the Board and has been duly returned to the appellants.

xv)The recommendations of the High Level Committee contained in

Annexure-P.11 make it clear that the said Committee was constituted, only

upon the request of the appellants to consider their grievances. The

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Page 32 recommendations suggest that although possession of the suit land was

taken, as the land was inaccessible, it remained unutilized for the purpose for

which it was acquired. Therefore, reconveyance of the same was suggested.

xvi)An application for re-conveyance was filed by the original tenure

holders and their legal heirs, and not by the appellants with respect to the

said part of the suit land, as is evident from the orders dated 18.12.2007 and

7.7.2008. The said letters, in fact, were addressed to Tmt. K. Palaniammal,

Tmt. Girija, Tmt. Nagammal, Thiru A.E. Kothandaraman Mudaliar, and

Thiru M. Mahalingam in response to an application made by them.

xvii)It is evident from the record that there was no application for

reconveyance of the land in Survey No.284/2, though the appellants have

sought relief in relation to this land also.

xviii) The appellants filed applications for re-conveyance through the

original tenure holders/legal heirs. This clearly reveals that the appellants

themselves had been of the view that the suit land had already vested in the

State, otherwise there could be no question of re-conveyance.

(xix)The land once vested in the State, free from all encumbrances cannot

be divested.

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Page 33 xx)The appellants had attempted to be succeeded in

illegally/unauthorisedly encroaching upon public land, by connivance with

the officers of the State Govt./Board and raised a huge construction upon the

said land, after getting the Plan sanctioned from the competent statutory

authority.

xxi)The State/Board authorities never made an attempt to stop the

construction. Nor the Board approached the court to restrain the appellants

from encroaching upon its land and construction of the flats. Connivance of

the officers of the Board in the scandal is writ large and does not require any

proof.

Facts of the case reveal a very sorry state of affairs as how the public

property can be looted with the connivance and collusion of the so called

trustees of the public properties. It reflects on the very bad governance of the

State authorities.

43.The aforesaid conclusions do not warrant any relief to the appellants.

The appeals are dismissed with the costs of Rupees Twenty Five lacs, which

the appellants are directed to deposit with the Supreme Court Legal Services

Authority within a period of six weeks.

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Page 34 44.In addition thereto, the Chief Secretary of Tamil Nadu is requested to

examine the issues involved in the case and find out as who were the

officials of the State or Board responsible for this loot of the public

properties and proceed against them in accordance with law. He is further

directed to ensure eviction of the appellants from the public land forthwith.

…………..………………………J.

(Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)

……….….………………………J.

(JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR)

New Delhi,

September 18, 2012

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