RC.REV.248/2020 Page 1 of 41

$~

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Reserved on: 19

th

January, 2026

Pronounced on: 8

th

April, 2026

+ RC.REV.248/2020 & CM APPL. 30325/2020

VED PRAKASH .....Petitioner

Through: Mr. Rajat Aneja, Mr. Saubhagya C.

and Mr. Rishabh Mishra, Advocates.

versus

M/S GAY DRY CLEANERS & ANR. .....Respondents

Through: Mr. Amit D. and Mr. Sohan Singh

Rawat, Advocates.

Mr. Ashutosh and Mr. Hema Singh,

Advocates for R-2(iii).

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMIT SHARMA

JUDGMENT

AMIT SHARMA, J.

1. The present petition under Section 25B (8) of the Delhi Rent Control

Act, 1958, seeks the following prayers: -

“It is, therefore, most respectfully prayed that this Hon'ble Court

may be pleased to set aside the impugned Judgment dated

31.10.2019 passed by the Court of Shri Sachin Sangwan,

Additional Rent Controller (South), Saket Courts, New Delhi in the

Eviction Petition bearing RC/ARC No. 6399/16 filed by the

Petitioner/Landlord, titled “Ved Prakash Vs M/s Gay Dry Cleaners

and Another”, in respect of the Shop bearing No. 438 comprising of

the Ground Floor, First Floor and Second Floor, Leela Ram Market,

RC.REV.248/2020 Page 2 of 41

Masjid Moth, New Delhi – 110049; and to allow the Eviction

Petition of the Petitioner by passing an Eviction order against the

Respondents in terms of the Prayer made in the Eviction Petition, in

the light of the facts and grounds explained hereinabove.

Any other relief, which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and

proper in the facts and circumstances of the present case, be also

passed in favour of the Petitioner and against the Respondents.”

2. The present petition assails the impugned judgment dated 31.10.2019,

passed by the learned Additional Rent Controller, South District, Saket Courts

(hereinafter referred to as the “learned ARC”) in RC ARC No. 6399/2016

(hereinafter referred to as the “eviction proceeding/eviction petition”),

whereby the eviction petition filed by Sh. Ved Prakash (hereinafter referred to

as the “Petitioner”) against M/s Gay Dry Cleaners and its managing partner,

i.e., Ms. Aruna Malhotra (hereinafter collectively referred to as the

“Respondents”) was dismissed.

3. At the very outset, it is pertinent to note that during the pendency of the

present petition, Respondent No. 2, i.e., Ms. Aruna Malhotra, had passed

away on 01.04.2022 and was survived by three legal heirs (LRs). On an

application, CM No.20934/2022, filed on behalf of the Petitioner, seeking

impleadment of her legal representatives, the said LRs of Respondent No. 2

were impleaded in the present petition vide order dated 13.03.2023 passed by

learned Joint Registrar (Judicial), only for the purposes of representing the

deceased Respondent No. 2 in the present proceedings, and the amended

memo of parties was taken on record.

RC.REV.248/2020 Page 3 of 41

4. Relevant facts, as stated by the Petitioner, necessary for adjudication of

the present petition are as under: -

i. The Petitioner had preferred the eviction petition before the learned

ARC, seeking eviction of the Respondents from Shop No. 438, Ground

Floor, Leela Ram Market, Masjid Moth, New Delhi, 110049,

(hereinafter referred to as the “tenanted premises”). The tenanted

premises forms part of Shop No. 438, Leela Ram Market, Masjid Moth,

New Delhi, 110049, comprising of ground floor, first floor and second

floor (hereinafter referred to as the “subject premises”);

ii. The Petitioner is the owner of the subject premises and he had let out

the ground floor of the subject premises, i.e., the tenanted premises, to

the Respondents vide rent agreement dated 30.01.1987 at a monthly

rent of INR 500/-, excluding water and electricity charges, and a lease

deed dated 18.07.1987 was also executed for a period of 5 years and on

mutual consent of the parties INR 700/- rent was decided excluding

water and electricity charges. It was further agreed that the rent of the

tenanted premises will be increased by 10% and after every 5 years, a

fresh lease deed will be made, but the Respondents had never executed

the same even after the expiry of the said lease deed;

iii. On 01.06.1987, a notice for termination of tenancy of the Respondents

was sent due to breach of agreement by the Respondents, as the

Respondents had constructed three concrete cement tanks and an iron

jal of about 7 feet on the 2

nd

floor, and also placed a tin sheet

RC.REV.248/2020 Page 4 of 41

admeasuring 10 x 8 and had made several other modifications in the

subject premises, without prior permission of the Petitioner and in clear

breach of terms and conditions, as agreed between the parties in lease

deed. It is the case of the Petitioner that the same had caused substantial

damage to the Petitioner’s property and on said account, he terminated

tenancy of the Respondent by the aforesaid notice and gave them time

to handover peaceful vacant possession of the tenanted premises on or

before 31.07.1987 to the Petitioner. However, the Respondents neither

replied to the said notice, nor complied with the same and refused to

vacate the tenanted premises.

iv. It was further stated by the Petitioner that the aforesaid termination

notice was never contested, nor replied by the Respondents and the

House tax of the tenanted premises was being paid by him till the filing

of the eviction petition. Petitioner, again, sent a notice dated

15.10.2007, intimating the Respondents for termination of tenancy and

to hand over the peaceful vacant physical possession of the tenanted

premises to the Petitioner, on or before 01.12.2007 as also to supply

him a copy of partnership deed which was never supplied by the

Respondents, despite repeated requests. It was further the case of the

Petitioner that he also requested Respondent No.2 to supply the name

of the other partners and the same was never replied nor complied with.

v. It was further the case of the Petitioner that the Respondents had failed

to fulfil their contractual obligation and breached the terms of the rent

agreement by raising illegal construction on the tenanted premises.

RC.REV.248/2020 Page 5 of 41

vi. Regarding bona fide requirement, it was averred by the Petitioner that

he has a family consisting of his wife, and three sons namely, Mr.

Jatinder Atri, Mr. Dara Atri, and Mr. Naveen Atri, and the Petitioner

himself. The sons of Petitioner have their respective families. It was

averred that Mr. Jatinder Atri is working from First Floor of the

Property No. 439, measuring 22 metres approximately, and since his

office was at the First Floor, he was not able to generate good income,

and in order to provide his son a suitable place for running office from

the ground floor, Petitioner required the tenanted premises. It was

further averred that the Petitioner had no other suitable place from

where his son can run his office. Therefore, the tenanted premises were

bona fidely required by the Petitioner, to provide office space to his

son, so that the latter can run his office from the tenanted premises. It

was further stated that the Petitioner was not in occupation and

possession of any other reasonable suitable premises, and the tenanted

premises were required for commercial purposes by the Petitioner.

vii. It was the case of the Petitioner that he is the owner of Property

No. 279, Masjid Moth, New Delhi, comprising stilt parking with one

room, ground floor, first floor, second floor and third floor. The

occupancy status of the said property is as under:

a) Ground Floor: The left side was under the tenancy of Mr. Sanjay

Srivastava. The right side was under the tenancy of Mr. Rajat Ranjan;

RC.REV.248/2020 Page 6 of 41

b) First Floor: The right side was under the tenancy of Mr. Shahnawaz

Wani, with Mr. Jatinder Atri (son of the Petitioner) as the landlord. The

left side was under the tenancy of Mr. Ambuj Kumar;

c) Second Floor: The right side is in possession of the Petitioner’s son,

namely Mr. Naveen Atri, being used as his residential accommodation.

The left side was under the tenancy of Mr. Sohan Singh, with Mr. Dara

Atri (son of the Petitioner) as the lessor;

d) Third Floor: The right side was under the tenancy of Mr. Ghirdhar

Gopal, with Mr. Dara Atri as the lessor. The left side was under the

tenancy of Mr. Uma Kant Verma.

viii. The Petitioner is also in possession of Property No. 279-A,

Masjid Moth, New Delhi, which is being used as his residential

accommodation. The Petitioner resides therein along with his two sons,

namely Mr. Dara Atri and Mr. Jatinder Atri.

ix. The Petitioner is also the owner of Property No. 435, Leela Ram

Market, Masjid Moth, New Delhi. The said property is under the

tenancy of Mr. Sureen Dewan by virtue of a duly executed Lease Deed

dated 04.01.2016.

x. The Petitioner is further the owner of Property No. 436, Leela Ram

Market, Masjid Moth, New Delhi. The said property is under the

tenancy of Mr. Naveen Atri, son of the Petitioner, who is paying a rent of

Rs. 500/- per month. It is submitted that the said tenant has further sub-let

the premises with the consent of the Petitioner.

RC.REV.248/2020 Page 7 of 41

xi. The Petitioner is also the owner of Property No. 437, Leela Ram

Market, Masjid Moth, New Delhi. The said property is in occupation of

Mr. Dara Atri, son of the Petitioner, who is running his real estate

business therefrom under the name and style of “V.K. Properties”.

xii. The Petitioner is further the owner of Property No. 439, Leela

Ram Market, Masjid Moth, New Delhi. The occupancy status of the

said property is as under:

a) The Ground Floor of the said property is under the tenancy of M/s Jyoti

Fabricare Services Ltd.;

b) The First Floor is being used and occupied by Mr. Jatinder Atri, son of

the Petitioner, who has been carrying on his real estate business therefrom

since the year 2011–2012.

xiii. The Petitioner was previously the owner of Property No. 440,

Leela Ram Market, Masjid Moth, New Delhi, however, the said

property was sold to Mr. Amit Sethi by virtue of a registered Sale Deed

dated 22.08.2014.

xiv. An application seeking leave to defend was preferred by the

Respondents in the eviction proceedings, wherein several grounds were

taken by the Respondents. The said application was allowed by the

learned ARC, and thereafter, the Respondents had filed their written

statement and evidence was led by both the parties in the eviction

RC.REV.248/2020 Page 8 of 41

proceedings, and consequently, the impugned judgment was passed by the

learned ARC and the eviction petition was dismissed.

CONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

5. Learned counsel for the Petitioner had submitted that the learned ARC

had failed to take into consideration the pleadings of the parties in the correct

perspective. It was further submitted that the learned ARC had ignored the

materials available on record, thereby exhibiting complete non-application of

mind. It was further submitted that the learned ARC, while dismissing the

eviction petition, had held the second and third ingredients of Section 14(1)(e)

of the DRC could not be proved by the Petitioner.

6. It was contended that the Petitioner had put forth and established the

bona fide need in respect of the tenanted premises, as he had categorically

pleaded the same in the eviction petition for bona fide need of his son, Mr.

Jatinder Atri. It was further argued that the Petitioner had put forth all the

relevant material evidence before the learned ARC in order to establish that

no suitable alternate accommodation was available with the Petitioner and

therefore, the said requirement was bona fide in nature. It was submitted that

the learned ARC, while passing the impugned judgment, had wrongly

observed that the cause, on the basis which the bona fide need was pleaded,

appeared doubtful and the reasoning given by the learned ARC was that the

said requirement was not mentioned by the Petitioner in the eviction petition,

as to when the said need for his son arose prior to filing of the eviction

petition and it was submitted that an eviction petition is always filed in

RC.REV.248/2020 Page 9 of 41

praesenti and there was no requirement, per se, for the Petitioner to explain as

to when such need arose for the first time, and the same can be filed at any

time, whenever suitable to the Petitioner.

7. It was submitted that the learned ARC had failed to consider the fact

that the son of the Petitioner was not able to generate sufficient income, while

operating his real estate business from the first floor of Property No. 439,

rather had observed that the son of the Petitioner was operating his real estate

business from the first floor since long period of time, and no change in

circumstances had been mentioned by the Petitioner for need of alternate

accommodation for his son. It was further submitted that the learned ARC had

wrongly casted doubts over the contentions of the Petitioner by relying on the

testimony given by the Petitioner, i.e., PW-1, that he did know about the

income of his son and never asked about the earnings of his son.

8. It was further submitted that the learned ARC had failed to consider the

evidence led on behalf of the Petitioner in the right perspective, inasmuch as,

PW-2, i.e., Mr. Jatinder Atri, in paragraph 9 of his affidavit, had deposed that

he was struggling in his Real Estate business, as the same was being run by

him from the first floor. The said paragraph is reproduced as under: -

“9. That the deponent is struggling in Real Estate business and at

present is working from first floor, as it is not commercially viable,

he is not able to suitably run his business and generate a good

income. As the “suit premises” is more accessible to the public and

also must suitable for the day to day running of business involving

a lot of hustle and bustle. It is an established fact that any business

run from the ground floor increases business prospects.”

RC.REV.248/2020 Page 10 of 41

9. Learned counsel further submitted that the learned ARC, while passing

the impugned judgment, had wrongly observed that Property No. 436, Leela

Ram Market, Masjid Moth, New Delhi, casted serious doubts on the bona fide

requirement of the Petitioner for his son, as the said property stood in the

name of the Petitioner, but the same was under the tenancy of his son, Mr.

Naveen Atri, who had further sub-let the same with the consent of the

Petitioner. It was contended that the Petitioner himself had not let out the said

property, rather it was let out by his son. It was further submitted that the

learned ARC failed to appreciate the testimonies of PW-1 and RW-1 in

respect of the said property, and the same is reproduced as under: -

“Cross Examination dated 05.05.2018

I put it to you that the property bearing No. 436, Leela Ram

Market, Masjid Moth, New Delhi is occupied by MJs. Aakib

Chicken Point?

A. The business of Biryani is being run in the said shop. I have

let out the said shop to my son Navin Atree.

Q. Since when is the business of Biryani is being run from?

A. I do not know.

It is wrong to suggest that the said business was started after the

filing of the present petition.

Q. Do you know any Riaz Chicken Corner?

A. I do not know.

I do not know if at the time of filing of the present petition a

restaurant in the name of Chinese express was being run from

property no. 436 as I have let out this shop to my son.

Q. Does the biryani business belong to your son?

RC.REV.248/2020 Page 11 of 41

A. I do not know. Again said my son Navin Atree took my

consent to give this shop on rent to someone but I do not know who

is the tenant. I do not remember as to when the said consent was

taken from me by my son. Naveen is mv tenant in the said portion

from last many years.

Q. Was any document executed between you and Navin

regarding the tenancy in respect of shop no. 436?

A. No, as he is my son.

Navin is my tenant @ Rs. 500/- per month. I show all the rent

received by me in my income tax return. I have not filed any of my

income tax return on the record of the present petition.

It is wrong to suggest that Navin was never a tenant in shop

no. 436, Leela Ram Market, Masjid Moth, New Delhi. It is wrong

to suggest that I have been letting out the said shop to different

tenants time to time.

The fact that Navin is my tenant has been written in my

eviction petition. It is wrong to suggest that no such fact is

mentioned in the eviction petition.”

10. It was further submitted that the learned ARC had failed to consider the

testimony of RW-1, who had clearly deposed during her cross-examination

dated 14.11.2018 that the possession of the tenanted premises was with M/s

Wardrobe Dry-Cleaner since the year 2014. The relevant portion of the said

cross-examination is reproduced as under: -

“…The owner of the property no. 439 is Sh. Ved Prakash petitioner

herein. The possession of the property is with M/s Wardrobe Dry-

Cleaner since 2014. I am not aware about the rent being paid by the

tenant to the petitioner. Before 2014 the property no. 439 was lying

vacant. I have never visited the property personally. The shop is

adjoining to my shop.”

RC.REV.248/2020 Page 12 of 41

It was submitted that the observations of the learned ARC qua letting

out of the said property few months prior to filing the eviction petition reflects

non-application of mind. It was further submitted that the learned ARC failed

to take into consideration the settled proposition of law that in the event of the

landlord exercising his option to choose a particular premise on the ground of

its suitability, the said decision of the landlord cannot be interfered by a

tenant, as long as the decision appears to be a reasoned one.

11. Learned counsel, in support of the aforesaid, had placed reliance on the

judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Prativa Devi (Smt) v.

T.V. Krishnan

1

, and particularly on the following paragraph(s): -

“1. In this appeal by special leave directed against the judgment of

the Delhi High Court dated 1-5-1986 reversing the order passed by

the Controller of Rents, Delhi dated 24-5-1985 directing the

eviction of the respondent under clause (e) to the proviso to Section

14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, the only contention is

that the High Court was not justified in the facts and circumstances

of the case in interfering with the order of the learned Rent

Controller allowing the application made by the appellant-landlady

under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act. After hearing learned counsel for

the parties, we are satisfied that the contention must prevail.

Although the revisional power conferred on the High Court under

sub-section (8) of Section 25-B of the Act may not be as narrow as

the revisional power under Section 115 of the Code of Civil

Procedure, 1908, there was no ground on which the legality and

propriety of the order of the learned Rent Controller could be

successfully assailed. The learned Rent Controller had kept the

legal principles in view and on an objective determination come to

a definite conclusion that the need of the appellant of the demised

premises at C-192, Sarvodaya Enclave, New Delhi for her

residential use was bona fide and that she did not have any

alternative accommodation available for that purpose within the

1

(1996) 5 SCC 353

RC.REV.248/2020 Page 13 of 41

meaning of Section 14(1)(e) of the Act. The High Court ought not

to have interfered under Section 25-B(8) merely on the ground that

on a reappraisal of the evidence it would have come to a contrary

conclusion.

2. The proven facts are that the appellant who is a widow, since the

demise of her husband late Shiv Nath Mukherjee, has been staying

as a guest with Shri N.C. Chatterjee who was a family friend of her

late husband, at B-4/20, Safdarjang Enclave, New Delhi. There is

nothing to show that she has any kind of right whatever to stay in

the house of Shri Chatterjee. On the other hand, she is there merely

by sufferance. The reason given by the High Court that the

appellant is an old lady aged about 70 years and has no one to look

after her and therefore she should continue to live with Shri

Chatterjee, was hardly a ground sufficient for interference. The

landlord is the best judge of his residential requirement. He has a

complete freedom in the matter. It is no concern of the courts to

dictate to the landlord how, and in what manner, he should live or

to prescribe for him a residential standard of their own. The High

Court is rather solicitous about the age of the appellant and thinks

that because of her age she needs to be looked after. Now, that is a

lookout of the appellant and not of the High Court. We fail to

appreciate the High Court giving such a gratuitous advice which

was uncalled for. There is no law which deprives the landlord of the

beneficial enjoyment of his property. We accordingly reverse the

finding reached by the High Court and restore that of the Rent

Controller that the appellant had established her bona fide

requirement of the demised premises for her personal use and

occupation, which finding was based on a proper appreciation of

the evidence in the light of the surrounding circumstances.

3. The learned counsel for the appellant however relies on the

following observations made by a learned Single Judge (T.P.S.

Chawla, J.) supposed to be based on the decision of this Court

in Phiroze Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant N. Patel [(1974) 1 SCC

661 : (1974) 3 SCR 267] to the effect:

“I think, the true test is whether, on an overall and reasonable

view, it can be said that the landlord has suitable accommodation

‘available for his use’. In deciding this question one should

certainly have regard to the fact that the landlord has no legal right

RC.REV.248/2020 Page 14 of 41

to the other accommodation, but that is only a factor and not the

end of the matter.”

These observations proceed on a misunderstanding of the ratio of

the decision of this Court in Phiroze Bamanji Desai case [(1974) 1

SCC 661 : (1974) 3 SCR 267] . The High Court was in error in

laying down that the test is availability of alternative

accommodation and not the legal right to such occupation in

adjudging the bona fides of the claim of the landlord under Section

14(1)(e) of the Act. The decision of this Court in Phiroze Bamanji

Desai case [(1974) 1 SCC 661 : (1974) 3 SCR 267] does not lay

down any such proposition. On the contrary, this Court reversed the

judgment of the Bombay High Court which proceeded upon that

basis. In that case, the first floor was in occupation of the mother of

the appellant as a tenant and the question was as to the availability

of the Truth Bungalow which was given on leave and licence to one

Dr Bharucha. The High Court came to the conclusion that the

requirement of the appellant for the ground floor of the demised

premises was not reasonable and bona fide since the appellant was

in juridical possession of the Truth Bungalow. This Court in

allowing the appeal observed : (SCC p. 668, para 8)

“Now, it is true that when premises are given on leave and

licence, the licensor continues, from a juridical point of view, to be

in possession of the premises and the licensee is merely given

occupation and therefore, strictly speaking the High Court was right

in observing that the Truth Bungalow, which was given on leave

and licence to Dr Bharucha, was in the possession of the appellant.”

The Court then pointed out : (SCC p. 668, para 8)

“But for the purpose of determining whether the requirement

of the appellant for the ground floor premises was reasonable and

bona fide, what is necessary to be considered is not whether the

appellant was juridically in possession of the Truth Bungalow, but

whether the Truth Bungalow was available to the appellant for

occupation so that he could not be said to need the ground floor

premises. If the Truth Bungalow was in occupation of Dr Bharucha

on leave and licence, it was obviously not available to the appellant

for occupation and it could not be taken into account for negativing

the need of the appellant for the ground floor premises.”

RC.REV.248/2020 Page 15 of 41

We accordingly overrule the decision of the Delhi High Court

in Sat Pal v. Nand Kishore [ILR 1983 Del 73] as not laying down

good law.

4. In the premises, the judgment of the High Court disallowing the

appellant's claim cannot be supported. In considering the

availability of alternative accommodation, the Court has to consider

not merely whether such accommodation is available but also

whether the landlord has a legal right to such accommodation. The

appellant had established her bona fide personal requirement of the

demised premises under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act and her claim

could not be disallowed merely on the ground that she was staying

as a guest with a family friend by force of circumstances.

5. In the result, the appeal must succeed and is allowed with costs.

We set aside the judgment and order of the High Court and restore

that of the Rent Controller directing eviction of the respondent from

the demised premises under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent

Control Act, 1958. The respondent is given four months' time to

vacate the premises subject to filing of the usual undertaking within

four weeks from today.”

12. It was further contended that the learned ARC had wrongly arrived at

the conclusion qua the requirement of the Petitioner being bona fide, solely

on the basis of the preponderance of the probabilities and erroneous

consideration of the facts which were irrelevant for the purposes of

adjudication of the eviction petition. It was further contended that the learned

ARC had wrongly considered that the shop No. 440, Leela Ram Market,

Masjid Moth, New Delhi, was available with the Petitioner at the time of sale,

i.e., on 22.08.2014, but the said property was sold on the ground of necessity

of funds to raise for the purposes of raising construction in Property

No. 279-A, Masjid Moth, New Delhi.

RC.REV.248/2020 Page 16 of 41

13. It was further submitted that the learned ARC had wrongly observed

that since no document was placed on record to demonstrate whether any

construction was raised on the Property No. 279-A, there was a serious doubt

qua bona fide requirement of the Petitioner. It was submitted that Property

No. 440 had already been sold by the Petitioner in the year 2014, and the

same was also not disputed by the Respondents. It was further submitted that

at the time of filing of the eviction petition, Property No. 440 was not

available with the Petitioner. Learned counsel for the Petitioner further relied

on the testimony of RW-1 during her cross-examination dated 14.11.2018,

wherein it was deposed by RW-1 that Property No. 440 was purchased by Mr.

Amit Kumar Sethi, four years back, from the Petitioner. Relevant portion of

the said cross-examination is reproduced as under: -

“…Who is the owner of the property no. 440?

A. Some Mr. Amit Kumar Sethi is the owner of the property no.

440.

Q. Since when he is the owner?

A. The said shop was purchased by Mr. Amit Kumar Sethi four

years back from Sh. Ved Prakash petitioner herein.

Q Have you ever visited the shop no. 440 personally?

A. Yes.

Q. What is the area of the said shop no. 440?

A. The area is about the same as my shop in question property

no.”

RC.REV.248/2020 Page 17 of 41

14. Learned counsel for the Petitioner, had submitted that even if another

property was let out to another tenant, the said fact would not disentitle the

Petitioner from seeking eviction of the Respondents from the tenanted

premises. It was further submitted that the Petitioner had authorised his son,

Mr. Naveen Atri, to let out Property No. 435 and utilise the rental income

therefrom for his sustenance. It was further contended that the Petitioner

cannot be expected to snatch away the source of livelihood from one of his

sons, in order to provide accommodation to another son, and therefore, the

argument of Property No. 435 being available with the Petitioner as an

alternate accommodation is unsustainable.

15. Learned counsel had relied on the judgment passed by the learned

Single Judge of this Court in Anil Kumar Jain v. Subhash Chand Chawla

alias Subhash Chander Chawla

2

, and particularly on the following

paragraphs to submit that that the concept of alternative suitable

accommodation is a relative and objective concept, and the same cannot be

applied subjectively: -

“19. If ownership and existence of such alternative

accommodations are a criterion then many landlord(s) in Delhi/

New Delhi will be precluded from initiating any claim(s) for

seeking eviction(s) of his/her/their premises. Had that been the

intention of the DRC Act, no landlord could/ can seek eviction of a

tenant from the subject premises till he is not an owner of any

alternative accommodation(s). Similarly, owning/ existence/

selling/ buying/ purchasing/ renting/ leasing/ sub-leasing/ re-letting/

licensing/ vacancy/ or like are factors which cannot debar any

landlord from initiating eviction proceedings with respect to

premises against a tenant if such a landlord is able to profess, and

2

2026:DHC:168

RC.REV.248/2020 Page 18 of 41

show, his need is without any malice and/ or mala fide intent.

Likewise, any alternative accommodation(s) lying vacant in itself is

also not a reason under the DRC Act for barring a/ the landlord to

initiate eviction proceedings for vacation of a tenant from the

premises.

20. At the end of the day, since the DRC Act does not, admittedly,

include any of the aforesaid, it does not bar any landlord to initiate

eviction proceedings against a tenant from the premises. Therefore,

owning/ existence/ selling/ buying/ purchasing/ renting/ leasing/

sub-leasing/ reletting/ licensing/ vacancy/ or like of any other

alternative accommodation(s) by a/ the landlord are, per se, not

prima facie itself material. They can, at best, be taken as a/ the

landlord having ‘additional’ premises, which, can per se be no

substitute for the subject premises for which he seeks eviction.

Since, the overall reasonableness, suitability, similarity, fairness,

acceptability, adaptability, requirement, location, logistics and

practicality of the landlord have a big role to play in all these, for

any alternative accommodation to be considered as a replacement

thereof and for it to act as a reasonably suitable accommodation in

place of the subject premises, it is imperative for the tenant to show

the similarity/ likeness/ connection inter se them to bring out that

the need for the same professed by the landlord was/ is sham,

unworthy and/ or for some ulterior motives/ purposes.

21. Needless to say, when a landlord is seeking the subject premises

for a commercial purpose, what has also to be taken into account

always are various external factors such as location, floor, contours,

locality, position, viability, purpose, size, dimension, permissions,

footfall, visibility, access, safety concerns, etc. coupled with other

internal factors in the form of practicality, sustainability,

possibility, capability, finances etc., as well. All these have to be

cumulatively given due regard to and taken into consideration while

dealing a case wherein the landlord is seeking eviction of a tenant

from the subject premises for using it for his commercial gain.

Reliance is placed upon Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand

Gupta15; Viran Wali v. Kuldeep Rai Kochhar16 and Kanhaiya

Lal Arya (supra).

22. Conversely, if owning/ existence/ selling/ buying/ purchasing/

renting/ leasing/ sub-leasing/ re-letting/ licensing/ vacancy/ or like

RC.REV.248/2020 Page 19 of 41

of any such alternative accommodation by the landlord are per se

material considerations and the same precludes any landlord for

initiating eviction proceedings qua a subject premises, then,

irrespective of availability of the provision of Section 14(1)(e) of

the DRC Act with the landlord, the landlord shall/ will not take

recourse thereto and the tenant cannot be evicted from the subject

premises. As such, the tenant in more than one ways, assumes

ownership of the subject premises for eternity. Holding so, will be

in stark contradistinction with the intent and purpose of the DRC

Act, which is a balancing Act taking due note and care of both the

landlord and the tenant. Rendering such a finding will certainly

amount to a Court of Law reading into and/ or supplanting and/ or

substituting its views into the provisions of the DRC Act as they

are, which is impermissible and uncalled for.

23. Moreover, merely because the landlord is of a sound financial

background who may be deriving income from rent from other

premises in his name or has other sources of income, also do not

itself mean that he is estopped from filing proceedings claiming

eviction of the tenant from a/ the subject premises as though, it may

be a factor, but not of so much relevance for it to be taken as the

only/ vital criterion for consideration in an eviction proceedings.

Eventually, the landlord has only to project his bona fide

requirement for the subject premises to be such a need which is

genuine and express, more than his whims and fancies and that

there is a landlord tenant relationship between the parties and that

he has no other reasonably suitable alternative accommodations

available with him.

xxx xxx xxx

34. Further, as held in Balwant Singh Chaudhary vs. Hindustan

Petroleum Corp. Ltd.,18 & Yodh Raj, Satya Prakash & Sons

[Firm] & Anr. vs. Narain Kumar & Sons [HUF]19 there was no

necessity/ requirement for the landlord to disclose the exact nature

of business(es) which the landlord wanted to commence or the

names of his relatives or other particulars while initiating

proceedings for seeking eviction of the tenant from the subject

premises. In any event, since this Court is dealing with a case

wherein the trial has already taken place, after the application

RC.REV.248/2020 Page 20 of 41

seeking leave to defend of the tenant had been allowed, the same is

hardly of any significance.

35. Also, it cannot be disputed that the landlord was/ is well within

his rights to induct new tenants, be it with his own relatives, as

alleged by the tenant and/ or let the other premises lie vacant. The

tenant cannot supplant his case and plead the same to his

convenience by taking benefit thereof. Considering that the

landlord is one having numerous premises in or around the same

vicinity nearby to the subject premises, there is nothing wrong for

the landlord to have taken those steps qua letting out them from

time to time. There is no such bar for a landlord to do so before/

during/ after pendency of an eviction proceedings. As such, the

same cannot be taken/ held against the landlord.

36. Interestingly, the learned RC has, while passing the impugned

judgment, dealt with factors like the family members of the

landlord have not run the business themselves but instead sub-let

the premises; and that the landlord was unable to show as to why

the upper floors were unsuitable for his bona fide requirement; and

that the other alternative accommodation in the same vicinity

cannot be treated as not suitable; and that the landlord had come

with unclean hands; and the landlord was “… …creating an

artificial scarcity for himself and his family members… …”; and

further that the landlord had not amended his Eviction Petition “…

…to assert that the vacant shop no.33/4, Middle Circle, Connaught

Place, Delhi was not sufficient for running his business… …” for

dismissing the Eviction Petition of the landlord. These, in view of

the aforesaid observations and analysis and the findings rendered

thereto, are showcasing that the learned RC has substituted his view

over that of the landlord, which is beyond the purview of the DRC

Act and thus calls for setting aside of the impugned judgment.

37. More so, as held in Baldev Singh Bajwa vs. Monish Saini20 &

Kanahaiya Lal Arya vs. Md. Ehshan & Ors.21, it is not for the

tenant to dictate the landlord much less the Court, for substitute its

views with those of the landlord for choosing the available

premises instead of the subject premises by projecting something,

which, according to the landlord himself, is not reasonably suitable

for him. Seeking eviction of a tenant from his own premises merely

because he had/ has other premises with himself cannot amount to

RC.REV.248/2020 Page 21 of 41

the landlord “… …creating an artificial scarcity for himself and his

family members… ..”, when there were sufficient reasons for him

to seek eviction of the subject premises beyond the requirements

enshrined in the DRC Act. Similarly, dismissing the Eviction

Petition of the landlord merely because no amendment was carried

out by him with respect to another premises available with him,

when the same was in Middle Circle, Connaught Place and not

where the subject premises was situated, was also beyond the

requirements enshrined in the DRC Act. 38. As borne out from the

aforesaid, the landlord was indeed able not only to show but also

substantiate that he had bona fide requirement for the subject

premises, and that he was sincere and honest, as also that the

alternative accommodations available with him were not reasonably

suitable for the purpose for which he was seeking eviction of the

tenant from the subject premises. In view of the aforesaid, this

Court is of the opinion that the findings rendered by the learned RC

are not based on a plausible opinion as they run contrary to the

tenets of the DRC Act.”

16. It was further submitted that in the present case, landlord-tenant

relationship and the bona fide requirement of the Petitioner for his son, who

was operating his real estate business from the First Floor of Property No.

439, was not in dispute, and the only issue was with respect to availability of

alternate suitable accommodation. It was further argued that the Petitioner

cannot be expected to take possession from a tenant in an ongoing tenancy, as

it would cause hardship and great financial loss to his other son.

17. It was further argued by learned counsel for the Petitioner that Property

Nos. 435, 436 and 439 were in occupation of different tenants at the time of

filing of the eviction petition, however, the mere fact that tenancy qua the said

shops kept changing from time to time during the pendency of the eviction

petition does not prohibit the Petitioner from seeking eviction of the

RC.REV.248/2020 Page 22 of 41

Respondents from the tenanted premises and the Petitioner cannot be

expected to disrupt the income being incurred from the said tenancies.

18. Learned counsel had further placed reliance upon the following

judgment(s): -

i. Kanahaiya Lal Arya v. Md. Ehshan

3

, Para(s) 10, 11, 13 and 16;

ii. Kusum Lata Sharma v. Arvind Singh

4

, Para(s) 16 to 18 and 23 to 25;

iii. Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Mahesh Chand Gupta

5

, Para(s) 2 to 8, 20 to 24.

CONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

19. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondents

submitted that the learned ARC, while passing the impugned judgment, had

rightly held that the Petitioner had mentioned only one ground in the eviction

petition, which had necessitated shifting of the real estate business being run

by his son, and that was inadequate income generation. It was further

submitted that the Petitioner in his cross-examination dated 05.05.2018 had

deposed as under: -

“…I do not know about the income of Shri Jatinder Atri and never

asked about the earnings of any of my sons.”

It was submitted that the Petitioner had not even deposed about the

income of his son and had rather evaded the issue, and thus, the plea taken by

3

2025 INSC 271

4

2023 SCC OnLine SC 488

5

(1999) 6 SCC 222

RC.REV.248/2020 Page 23 of 41

the Petitioner, with respect to less income being generated by his son, was

seriously doubtful.

20. It was further contended that the Petitioner had further deposed that his

son, Mr. Jatinder Atri, was running his office from the first floor for the last

many years, and thus, there were no changes in the circumstances, as had

been mentioned by the Petitioner, which compelled the Petitioner to look for

an alternative office/accommodation for his son, and thus, the bona fide need

of the Petitioner appeared to be doubtful.

21. It was further submitted that the Petitioner did not disclose in the

eviction petition the alternate properties available with him, being Property

No. 279, Masjid Moth, New Delhi, admeasuring 160 sq. yd., being a four-

storey building, and Property No. 279-A, as both of these properties were

situated on the main road and the same could have been used for commercial

purposes.

22. It was further submitted that Property No. 435 was earlier let out to

Surbhi Caterers, and upon the said tenant vacating the said shop, the

Petitioner admittedly regained vacant possession of the same. It was further

contended that instead of utilizing the said shop for the alleged bona fide

requirement, the Petitioner had re-let the same to another tenant, Mr. Sureen

Dewan, vide lease deed dated 04.01.2016. It was further submitted that the

eviction petition was filed on 07.05.2016, i.e., four months after the said shop

was re-let to Mr. Sureen Dewan, and thus, the Petitioner had conspicuously

failed to disclose any specific time frame as to when the alleged bona fide

RC.REV.248/2020 Page 24 of 41

requirement for his son arose and had such bona fide need genuinely existed,

the Petitioner would not have let out another commercial property, prior to

filing the present petition.

23. It was further submitted that the lease deed dated 04.01.2016 qua

Property No. 435 expired on 31.07.2016, meaning thereby that the said shop

would have become available to the Petitioner within 3 months of filing the

eviction petition. It was further submitted that despite the aforesaid, the

Petitioner had deliberately chosen to institute the eviction proceedings, and

the same casts a serious doubt on the genuineness and immediacy of the bona

fide requirement.

24. Learned counsel for the Respondents further drew attention of this

Court to the cross-examination dated 05.05.2018 of the Petitioner, which

reads as under: -

“…I do not know the name of the tenant who is occupying the

property No.435, Leela Ram Market, Masjid Moth, New Delhi. I

cannot say as to when it was inducted as a tenant in the said portion

Q. Do you know Surbhi Caterers?

A. I do not remember.

Q. Do you know anything about Hangchuaa's Chinese Food

Corner?

A. I cannot read the name in English. However, there is some

Chinese food shop in property No.435. I do not remember since

when the Chinese food corner is being run.”

RC.REV.248/2020 Page 25 of 41

It was contended that the said testimony of the Petitioner demonstrates

that the Petitioner had given evasive and non-committal answers and had

failed to categorically deny that after filing of the present petition, the said

shop was again let out to a new tenant who is presently running a Chinese

food restaurant from the said shop.

25. It was contended that the Petitioner, in the eviction petition, failed to

disclose the existence of other Property Nos. 435, 436, 437, 439 and 440,

Leela Ram Market, Masjid Moth, New Delhi. The details regarding these

properties surfaced only after the Respondents had filed their leave to defend

application before the learned ARC. It was argued that suppression of

material facts is fatal to a petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act, as

the landlord is required to make full disclosure regarding availability of

alternate accommodations.

26. It was further submitted that the subject premises had ground floor, first

floor and second floor, however, the Petitioner had only stated his

requirement for the ground floor for the alleged bona fide need of his son. The

Petitioner had remained silent as to how the first and second floors of the

subject premises would have been utilized in case eviction was granted.

27. It was further submitted that the Petitioner had also filed an eviction

petition qua Property No. 437, Leela Ram Market, Masjid Moth, New Delhi,

and the said petition was dismissed vide order dated 31.10.2019 by the

learned ARC. It was further contended that thereafter the Petitioner allegedly

RC.REV.248/2020 Page 26 of 41

secured possession of the said property from the tenants, by paying them a

substantial amount.

28. Attention of this Court was drawn to the cross-examination of the

Petitioner dated 09.04.2018 wherein it was stated as under: -

“I do not remember as to when the three concrete cement tank, iron

jal and tin shade on the second floor were constructed by the

respondent. I do not remember the name of the advocate to whom I

had got served the notice dated 01.06.1987. The said notice was

sent by Regd. A.D. Post. I do not know from which post office the

said notice was sent. Vol. It was posted by my advocate. It is wrong

to suggest that no notice dated 01.06.1987 was ever sent to the

respondent. It is wrong to suggest that no rent agreement dated

30.01.1987 was ever executed between the parties. It is wrong to

suggest that no lease deed dated 18.07.1987 was entered into

between the parties. It is wrong to suggest that it was never agreed

between the parties that the rent would be increased by 10% and

after every five years a fresh lease deed would be executed. It is

wrong to suggest that the tenancy was orally created. It is wrong to

suggest that the respondents did not carry out any modification in

the premises let out to them.”

29. Attention of this Court was further drawn to the Cross-Examination of

the Petitioner dated 05.05.2018, wherein it was stated as under: -

“I have been issuing rent receipts in respect of shop no. 436 to Sh.

Navin Atree. (Vol- Since, many years, he has not been paying rent

to me). I have not filed any such rent receipt on the record of

present petition. I do not remember that Sh. Jitender Atree has

started his office of real estate since beginning at 439 Leela Ram

Market, Masjid Moth, New Delhi. I do not remember Sh. Jitender

Atree has his office at any other place or not.

The area of no. 435 is approximately 33 sq.mtr., no. 436 &

439 are about 31-31.5 sq.mtr. each, no. 440 I do not know the area.

I do not know the area of shop no. 437 &438. I do not about the

RC.REV.248/2020 Page 27 of 41

area of the first floor of 439. Again said it may be about 20-22

sq.mtr.

It is wrong to suggest that the first floor of property no. 439 is

sufficient and suitable for the purposes of the office of Sh. Jitender

Atree. It is wrong to suggest that the properties bearing no. 279 and

279-A Masjid Moth are also sufficient and suitable for the office of

real estate business. It is wrong to suggest that Sh. Jitender Atree is

earning handsomely from his business. It is wrong to suggest that

for an office of real estate it is not necessary that the office should

be on ground floor only. It is wrong to suggest that no premises are

required for the office of Sh. Jitender Atree.

It is wrong to suggest that I had been calling upon the

respondents to increase the rent about Rs.25,000/- per month. It is

wrong to suggest that property no. 79, masjid moth is lying vacant

in my possession. It is wrong to suggest that no premises are

required by me as mentioned in the petition. It is wrong to suggest

that I had been letting out different properties from time to time as I

did not require any premises for Jitender Atree. It is wrong to

suggest that Sh Jitender Atree has no intention of shifting his office

from the first floor of property no. 439. It is wrong to suggest that

my petition is false and malafide. It is wrong to suggest that shop

no. 436 has always been let out by me from time to time.

It is wrong to suggest that I am deposing falsely.”

30. Reliance was further placed on the judgment passed by the learned

Single Judge of this Court in Sh. Sanket Behari Mittal v. Sh. Subhash

Chand Gupta

6

and particularly on the following paragraph(s): -

“18. Further, no doubt, as held in Shiv Sarup Gupta (supra) the

landlord is the best judge of his needs, it has also been held therein

that the need urged by the landlord must be genuine, sincere,

honest, natural, and the like. In fact, as also held by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in Sarvate T. B. v. Nemichand7 and Dattatraya

Laxman Kamble v. Abdul Rasul Moulali Kotkunde8, should there

6

2026:DHC:156

RC.REV.248/2020 Page 28 of 41

arise any suspicion/ doubt in the mind of the Court as to the

genuineness of the bona fide requirement urged by the landlord, the

burden is upon the landlord to clear all such doubts. Clearly, the

landlord herein has not been able to discharge the said burden.”

31. Learned counsel for the Respondents had further placed reliance upon

the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Kanta

Gupta v. Goverdhan Dass Daga (Deceased) Thr Lrs

7

and particularly on

the following paragraph(s):

“7. The core issue in the present cases being concealment of vital

facts, it needs to be understood that not every failure to disclose

facts amounts to concealment. It is non-disclosure of only the vital

facts, which is tantamount to concealment. The test is as to whether

the court would have allowed the petition or plaint, as the case may

be, on the basis of incomplete facts, had the respondent or

defendant, as the case may be, had not appeared or not contested

the proceedings. In a case where the respondent/defendant on

appearing before the court discloses certain vital facts which would

non-suit the petitioner/plaintiff and which facts were not disclosed

in the originally filed petition/plaint, it would be a case of

concealment. Such concealment, being a fraud attempted on a court

vitiates any order which could be obtained by the

petitioner/plaintiff in such proceedings.

8. The requirement of tenanted premises by the landlord

approaching the court under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act has to be

bona fide requirement and not a mere fanciful desire or evil design

to recover possession of the tenanted premises with an object to

make unjust financial gains. Concealment of vital facts is anathema

to bona fide. In case, the landlord is found to have concealed vital

facts, the requirement of tenanted premises projected by him cannot

be accepted as a bona fide requirement.

9. In the present cases, the petitioner/landlord did not disclose in

her eviction petitions, vital facts on the nature and expanse of

7

2024:DHC:1122

RC.REV.248/2020 Page 29 of 41

business of her son and availability of a number of other premises

from where her son could start or expand his business. Had the

respondents/tenants failed to appear and/or failed to timely file

applications for leave to contest, disclosing those vital facts, the

eviction petitions would have been allowed. Merely because during

trial, those vital facts came up before the court, it cannot be said

that the petitioner/landlord had not concealed those facts in the

eviction petitions.

xxx xxx xxx

11. Paragraph 8 of the eviction petitions to be filed under Section

14(1)(e) of the Act mandates the landlord to truly and completely

disclose details of the accommodation available alongwith the site

plan. In the eviction petition, from which RC Rev 130/2020 arose,

the petitioner disclosed the said accommodation in paragraph 8 as

only one shop and in the eviction petition from, which RC Rev

131/2020 arose, the petitioner disclosed the said accommodation as

only one godown. None of the portions of ground floor or first floor

which were already vacated by other tenants was disclosed. The

petitioner/landlord did not even disclose about availability of four

floors in the said larger premises.”

32. It was further submitted that the learned ARC had rightly dismissed the

eviction petition, mentioning that a landlord is bound to give satisfactory

explanation for not occupying any other premises belonging to him that have

fallen vacant shortly before a petition for recovery of possession is filed. It

was submitted that the Petitioner had failed to give satisfactory explanation

regarding such properties, and hence the present petition is liable to be

dismissed.

FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

33. Heard learned counsels for the parties and perused the records.

RC.REV.248/2020 Page 30 of 41

34. Learned ARC while dismissing the eviction petition filed on behalf of

the Petitioner, observed as under: -

“Bonafide Need Of The Petitioners/Alternative suitable

accommodation

Both of said ingredients are taken up together being

interrelated as filing of petition despite having suitable alternative

accommodation itself creates doubt on the bonafides of the

petitioner.

As per respondent, the petitioner has various other

commercial properties i.e. 279 and 279A, Masjid Moth and the

properties bearing no.435, 436, 439 and 440, Leela Ram Market,

Masjid Moth. Counsel for respondent has submitted that as per

petitioner his son Jatinder Atri is working from the first floor of

property no. 439 and since the office is at first floor, hence he is not

able to generate good income. The Counsel has submitted that

business of property dealing is unlike any retail business which is

effected by the visibility/access from the road. It is submitted that

real estate business is consultancy based and depends upon the

goodwill of the consultant and the efforts made by him. It is

submitted that only a generic ground has been raised regarding low

income due to working from the first floor. It is submitted that

moreover it is not mentioned since when the said need was felt/arose

for shifting the office of Naveen Atri as number of properties were

let out and even sold few months prior to filing the petition and even

during the pendency of the petition. I have considered the

submissions. Indeed property consultancy business is not a retail

business, nonetheless, the said ground itself does not debar the

petitioner to shift his son to a ground floor premises as ground floor

premises are better suited for any business as compared to the first

floor. However, there appears substance in the other submissions of

the Counsel for respondent. Reasons for same are discussed in

succeeding paras.

The petitioner has mentioned only one ground which has

necessitated shifting of business of his son i.e. inadequate income

generation. However, in his cross examination PW1 has deposed that

RC.REV.248/2020 Page 31 of 41

"I do not know about the income of Sh. Jitender Atri. I never asked

about the earnings of any of my sons." Thus, petitioner has not even

deposed about the income of his son/deficiency in the same and has

rather evaded the issue. Thus, the pleading of petitioner regarding

the low income of his son due to running of business from the first

floor is seriously doubtful. Moreover^ petitioner has deposed that his

son Jitender Atri is having his office on the first floor for last many

years. He has even deposed that Jitender Atri is his eldest son and

always been in the business of real estate. PW2 Jatinder Atri has

specifically deposed that "I am doing the real estate business since

2011-12. I am doing the real estate business from 439, first floor,

Masjid Moth, New Delhi 110049 since inception of the business till

now". Therefore, it is clear that Jitender Atri has been running his

business from the first floor since long back but no change of

circumstances have been mentioned that compelled the petitioner to

look for alternative office for his son. As pointed out by the Counsel

for respondent, no time frame have been mentioned during which the

income of Jitender Atri nose dived, nor it is the case of petitioner

that Jitender Atri was not having good income from day one due to

running his office from the first floor. Accordingly, the cause on the

basis of which the bonafide need has been pleaded appears doubtful.

As far as the alternative properties are concerned, the

respondent has claimed property no. 279 and 279A, Masjid Moth as

commercial but on the other hand petitioner has claimed the same as

residential only. However, during her cross examination RWl

deposed that "it is correct that the family of Mr. Ved Prakash is

residing in the properties 279 and 279A, Masjid Moth. It is correct

that both the properties are occupied and. not lying vacant." Thus,

irrespective of status of said properties, respondent has admitted non

-availability of same. Therefore, said properties cannot be

considered as a suitable alternative accommodation u/s 14(1) (e) of

DRC Act.

In regard to the other properties, it is alleged by the

respondent that the property no. 435 was let out to Surbhi Caterers

and the petitioner was put back in the vacant possession thereof and

the petitioner has re-let the property to another tenant. On the other

hand, the petitioner has claimed that the said shop is under tenancy

of Sureen Dewa vide lease deed dated 04.01.2016. I have considered

the submissions and evidence of both parties on said issue. However,

RC.REV.248/2020 Page 32 of 41

even if the statement of petitioner is considered as true same creates

a doubt on the bonafides of petitioner. As per petitioner, his son

requires the suit premises since he is unable to generate sufficient

income from his business as it is being run from first floor. As

pointed out earlier, no time frame has been mentioned when such

bonafide requirement was felt or arose. Same is crucial as the

petition was filed on 07.05.2016 i.e. after about four months of

letting out the aforesaid shop. Thus, if the bonafide need for the suit

premises was there the petitioner would not have let out his other

property on rent. Moreover, the lease deed shows that the lease was

to expire on 31.07.2016. Thus, said shop would have been available

to the petitioner within three months of filing the present petition.

Yet petitioner chose to file the present petition. Even otherwise,

during his cross examination PW l has deposed "7 do not know the

name of the tenant who is occupying the property no.435, Leela Ram

Market, Masjid Moth, New Delhi. I cannot say as to when it was

inducted as a tenant in the said portion.

Q. Do you know Surbhi caterers?

A I do not remember. Q. Do you know anything about

Hangchuaa's Chinese Food Corner?

A I cannot read the name in english. However, there is some

chinese food shop in property no.435. I do not remember since when

the Chinese food corner is being run". Thus, the petitioner has given

evasive answers and has failed to affirmatively depose that petitioner

has not let out the property to a new tenant who is now running a

restaurant of Chinese Food as claimed by the respondent. Thus, it is

doubtful whether the property no.435 did not became available to the

petitioner after filing of the present petition.

In regard to property no.436, the respondent has claimed that

same was let out in 2015 but was vacated in or around October,

November, 2016 and petitioner got the vacant possession of the said

property. As per respondent, the petitioner re-let the property to a

new tenant who was carrying business in the name of Ms Riyaz

Chicken Corner. However, even said tenant vacated the property in

or around April, 2017 and thereafter petitioner re-let said house to a

new tenant who is running a business under the name Ms Akib

Chicken Point. On the other hand, petitioner has not specifically

RC.REV.248/2020 Page 33 of 41

disputed the said letting out and has rather stated that said shop is in

his name but is under the tenancy of his son Naveen Atri who has

sub-letted it further with his consent. I have considered the pleadings

and evidence in regard to said shop. Firstly, the petitioner has not

filed a single document regarding the alleged tenancy to his son

Navin Atri. Secondly, by the conduct of petitioner, said pleading

appear improbable because generally a man treats his son alike.

Thus, if the petitioner is allowing his other sons to use his properties

gratuitously then it is highly doubtful as to why he will let out his

property to one of his sons. More so, petitioner has claimed that his

family consists of his wife and three sons including Navin Atri

thereby implying that all of the sons are part of his family and that

Navin Atri is not separate from his family. Thirdly, during his cross

examination the petitioner has deposed that since many years Navin

Atri has not been paying rent to him. This fact further creates doubt

in the claim of petitioner that he has consented to further sub-letting

by his tenant when the tenant himself was not paying rent to him.

Fourthly, even if the said contention of petitioner is deemed to be

correct still the petitioner has stated that his son Navin Atri sub let

the property further with "his consent". This shows that despite the

existence of bonafide requirement of his other son the petitioner

allowed the further subletting of his ground floor properties. This

fact creates serious doubt in the bonafide requirement of the

petitioner for his son and goes to the root of the matter.

Further, respondent has claimed availability of shop no.439

with the petitioner stating that same was earlier let out in 2013 and

then in beginning of 2014 and even recently it has been let out to a

tenant who is running dry cleaning business from there under name

of "Wardrobe". On the other hand, petitioner has claimed that said

shop is under the possession of Jyoti Fabricare Services Limited vide

lease agreement dt. 03.08.2015. I have considered the submissions

and the evidence in regard to said shop. Firstly the petitioner has

failed to prove the said lease agreement as the original was never

produced. Secondly, even if said agreement is considered, same is of

03.08.2015 i.e. nine months prior to filing the present petition. As

pointed out earlier no time frame has been mentioned by the

petitioner as to when the need for the suit premises arose. Even in

the replication there is no averment that there was no need for the

suit premises when the aforesaid agreement was executed. Thus, -

RC.REV.248/2020 Page 34 of 41

letting out of other properties few months before filing of the

petition cast a shadow of doubt on the bonafides of petitioner.

The respondent has further referred to shop no.440 being sold

by petitioner to Sh.Amit Kumar Sethi about three years ago and

handing over the vacant possession of the complete property at the

time of sale deed. On the other hand, the petitioner has deposed that

vide sale deed dated 22.08.2014 he sold the said shop to Amit Sethi

as he was in need of money for the construction of house no. 279A. I

have considered the submissions and the pleadings regarding said

shop. As pointed out earlier no time frame have been mentioned by

the petitioner when the need for suit premises arose. The copy of

aforesaid sale deed filed by the petitioner himself shows that the

physical vacant possession was delivered by the petitioner to the

vendee. Thus, the said property was available to the petitioner at the

time of the sale. The petitioner has tried to explain the same on the-

ground of necessity for funds to raise construction of 279A.

However, during his evidence petitioner has not even mentioned

about said fact in his affidavit of evidence. No document have been

filed to show that any construction whatsoever was raised on

property no. 279A after execution of the aforesaid sale deed. Thus,

petitioner has failed to lead any documentary or even oral evidence

in support of aforesaid pleading. During his cross examination

petitioner even failed to tell the area of the plot on which property

no.27A, Masjid Moth has been constructed. Thus, it is seriously

doubtful as to whether such construction was raised after the sale of

the aforesaid shop. Thus, bonafides of petitioner gets further

shrouded by more doubts.

A landlord is bound to give satisfactory explanation for not

occupying any other premises belonging to him that have fallen

vacant shortly before a petition for recovery of possession is filed or

while it is pending (P. S. Devgun v. S. P. Walia 1975 RLR (Note 71)

63; Satyapal v. Smt Parsani Devi 1974 RCR 508). However, in the

present case, the petitioner-landlord failed to give satisfactory

explanations regarding such properties.

Therefore, in view of aforesaid discussion, the second and

third ingredients of section 14(1) (e) of DRC Act could not be

proved by the petitioner.

RC.REV.248/2020 Page 35 of 41

In view of aforesaid discussion, the petition of the petitioner

is dismissed.”

(Emphasis Supplied)

35. Although, the Petitioner in his submissions before this Court had given

the status of other properties, which has been mentioned hereinbefore, but at

the time of filing of the eviction petition, no details were given by him,

however, the same were disclosed by him in the reply to the leave to defend

application.

36. It is pertinent to note that an application seeking leave to defend was

preferred by the present Respondents before the learned ARC, and vide order

dated 24.07.2017 leave to defend was granted by the learned ARC, by

observing as under: -

“12. As far as first ingredient is concerned, there is no dispute

between the parties that petitioner is the landlord of the suit

premises. The Bonafide need in the present case is that property is

required by petitioner's son namely Jatinder Atri on ground that the

ground floor in which the respondent is doing their business is more

suitable than first floor of the suit property whereas Jatinder Atri is

already doing business of property dealing from the first floor of

property no 439 in the same market. The business is of property

dealing which may be done even from the first floor. To my mind

this itself is a triable issue, whether the petitioner has any

genuine need of bonafide need of the ground floor or whether it

is mere wish or desire because his son Jitender Atri is already

running his office from the first floor of the suit property and

the petitioner has to prove this fact that in what manner the

prospect of business will increase, if the son of the petitioner

shifts on the ground floor of the suit property. As his son is doing

the business of property dealing which is kind of business which

may not require frequent visitors or customers/clients. Secondly, the

petitioner had admittedly also rented out various properties and

sold out properties in the year 2014, 2015 & 2016 which itself

RC.REV.248/2020 Page 36 of 41

raises triable issue that when these properties were available to

the petitioner, then why he has not given it to his son Jatinder

Atri so that he could have shifted himself to the ground floor.”

(Emphasis Supplied)

37. Thus, it is a matter of record that the sole ground for filing the eviction

petition with regard to the tenanted premises was that the same was required

for the office of the son of Petitioner, Mr. Jatinder Atri, who was working on

the first floor of Property No. 439, admeasuring approximately 22 metres, and

since the same was situated on the first floor, he was not able to generate good

income. Learned counsel for the Petitioner had argued that the learned ARC

erred in observing that the said requirement was not bona fide, as the

Petitioner in his cross-examination or otherwise was not able to demonstrate

as to when the need for the Petitioner’s son had arisen prior to filing of the

petition. It was contended that the eviction petition is always filed in

praesenti, and therefore there was no requirement for the Petitioner to

demonstrate as to when the need for his son’s office to be on the ground floor

had arisen.

38. There is no doubt that the eviction petition is filed in praesenti and the

need for bona fide requirement can arise at any stage before filing of the

eviction petition, however, once a specific stand has been taken by the

Petitioner for the purposes of filing of the eviction petition under Section 14

(1) (e) of the DRC Act, then the burden to prove the same would fall upon the

Petitioner. It had come on record that the Petitioner’s son, Mr. Jatinder Atri,

for whose benefit the tenanted premises was sought, had been engaged in the

profession of property dealing since the year 2011–2012. It is also matter of

RC.REV.248/2020 Page 37 of 41

record that he has been running his office from Property No. 439, First Floor,

Masjid Moth, New Delhi, since the very inception of his business, till the

filing of the present petition. In these circumstances, it was incumbent upon

the Petitioner to show that the ground for which eviction was sought was a

genuine one.

39. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rahabhar Productions (P) Ltd. v.

Rajendra K. Tandon

8

, had observed and held as under: -

“18. The phrase “bona fide need” or “bona fide requirement” occurs

not only in the Delhi Rent Control Act but in the Rent Control

legislation of other States also. What is the meaning of this phrase

has been considered innumerable times by various High Courts as

also by this Court and requires no citations to explain its legal

implications. Even then reference may be made to the decision of

this Court in Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander [(1988) 3 SCC 131 : AIR

1988 SC 1422] , in which it was indicated that “bona fide need”

should be genuine, honest and conceived in good faith. It was also

indicated that landlord's desire for possession, however honest it

might otherwise be, has, inevitably, a subjective element in it. The

“desire” to become “requirement” must have the objective element

of a “need” which can be decided only by taking all relevant

circumstances into consideration so that the protection afforded to a

tenant is not rendered illusory or whittled down. These observations

were made in respect of the provisions contained in E.P. Urban Rent

Restriction Act, 1949.”

40. In the present case, the observations of the learned ARC with respect to

the fact that in his cross-examination the Petitioner had feigned ignorance

with regard to the income of his son, as well as other evasive answers, clearly

points out that the ground taken in the eviction petition was not genuine. The

petitioner could not explain the circumstances which were put to him during

8

(1998) 4 SCC 49

RC.REV.248/2020 Page 38 of 41

cross-examination, and therefore, the bona fide requirement is doubtful.

Coupled with the fact that despite Property No. 435 being available with the

Petitioner, 4 months before filing of the eviction petition, the Petitioner could

not give any satisfactory explanation as to why the said shop was not utilised

by his son Mr. Jatinder Atri for running his office. It has also come on record

that the lease of the said shop was to expire on 31.07.2016, and therefore, the

same would have been available to the Petitioner within 3 months of filing of

the eviction petition, but again, no reasonable explanation could be given by

the Petitioner as to why the same was not suitable for the Petitioner’s son’s

office.

41. Similarly, with respect to Property No. 436, it was stated by the

Petitioner that the same had been let out in the year 2015 and was vacated in

or around October - November, 2016, and subsequently the Petitioner

regained possession of the said property. However, the Respondent

specifically averred that the Petitioner thereafter, had re-let the said property

to successive tenants, i.e., M/s Riyaz Chicken Corner and subsequently to M/s

Akib Chicken Point. The Petitioner, instead of disputing the said position,

took an inconsistent stand that tenancy qua the said property was in the name

of his son, who had further sub-let the same with his consent. In absence of

any documentary proof of such alleged tenancy, coupled with the admission

that no rent had been paid by his son for several years, the said plea was

rightly rejected by the learned ARC. It was correctly concluded that despite

availability of alternate premises, the Petitioner permitted further sub-letting,

which undermined the plea of bona fide requirement.

RC.REV.248/2020 Page 39 of 41

42. With respect to Property No. 439, the Respondent asserted that the said

property had been let out to a tenant running a dry-cleaning business under

the name of “Wardrobe”. The Petitioner, on the other hand, had claimed that

the said property was leased out to “Jyoti Fabricare Services Limited” vide

lease agreement dated 03.08.2015. However, the Petitioner failed to place on

record the original lease agreement before the learned ARC. Even otherwise,

the said property was let out by the Petitioner nine months prior to the filing

of the eviction petition, and there was no averment as to when the alleged

need for the subject premises arose. In these circumstances, the learned ARC

rightly observed that letting out of the said property, shortly before filing of

the eviction petition, casted a serious doubt on the bona fide requirement of

the Petitioner.

43. With respect to Property No. 440, the Respondent had argued that the

same was sold by the Petitioner to Sh. Amit Kumar Sethi and the vacant

possession of the said property was handed over at the time of execution of

the sale deed. It was further contended that despite the said property being

available with the Petitioner, the same was not utilised for his son, Mr.

Jatinder Atri’s requirement. In these circumstances, the time frame for the

alleged need becomes crucial. Per contra, it was argued by the Petitioner that

he was constrained to sell the said property for raising funds for construction

of Property No. 279-A. It is pertinent to note that no evidence, either

documentary or oral, was placed on record before the learned ARC to

demonstrate that any construction was carried out by the Petitioner, after

execution of the said sale deed. In these circumstances, the learned ARC had

rightly concluded that the Petitioner had failed to lead any evidence in support

RC.REV.248/2020 Page 40 of 41

of the said contentions, thereby again casting serious doubts on the bona fide

requirement.

44. The finding of the learned ARC with respect to not specifying the time

period during which the need for a separate office arose, has to be examined

in the aforesaid background, particularly in light of the premises being

available to the Petitioner shortly before the filing of the petition and

thereafter.

45. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance

Co. Ltd.

9

, and Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua

10

, held that the scope of

interference by this Court, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under

Section 25B (8) of the DRC Act, is limited. Such jurisdiction is confined to

examining whether the impugned order suffers from any error apparent on the

face of the record. The Revisional Court cannot reappreciate evidence or

substitute its own view, unless the impugned order is shown to be arbitrary,

perverse, or vitiated by material impropriety. In the absence of such

infirmities, there remains narrow scope for interference with the impugned

order.

46. Having regard to the aforesaid discussion, no interference with the

impugned order dated 31.10.2019 passed by the learned ARC is called for,

and the same is accordingly upheld.

9

(1998) 8 SCC 119

10

(2022) 6 SCC 30

RC.REV.248/2020 Page 41 of 41

47. In view of the aforesaid, the present petition is dismissed and disposed

of accordingly.

48. Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.

49. Judgment be uploaded on the website of this Court, forthwith.

AMIT SHARMA

(JUDGE)

APRIL 08, 2026/sn/db