W.P.(C) No.1005 of 2026 Page 1 of 40

ORISSA HIGH COURT : CUTTACK

W.P.(C) No.1005 of 2026

In the matter of Applications under Articles 226 & 227 of the

Constitution of India, 1950

***

Vedanta Limited

Village: Banjari

P.O./District: Jharsuguda

Odisha – 768 201

Represented through

Authorized Signatory

Shalendra Kumar Thakur

Aged about 41 years

Son of Ram Kumar Thakur

Working as Head Taxation. … Petitioner

-VERSUS-

1. Union of India

Represented through

The Secretary

Department of Revenue

Ministry of Finance, North Block

New Delhi – 110 001.

2. Commissioner of Customs (Preventive)

Central Revenue Building

Rajaswa Vihar

Bhubaneswar, Odisha – 751 007.

3. Assistant Commissioner, Customs Division

Central Revenue Building

Rajaswa Vihar

Bhubaneswar, Odisha – 751 007.

W.P.(C) No.1005 of 2026 Page 2 of 40

4. Commissioner (Appeals)

CGST, Central Excise and Customs

Central Revenue Building

Rajaswa Vihar

Bhubaneswar – 751 007. … Opposite parties.

Counsel appeared for the parties:

For the Petitioner : M/s. Vishal Agarwal

along with

Prasanta Kumar Nayak,

Suman Mitra, Amlan Panda,

Anindita Bisoi, Neelam B. Minz,

Advocates

For the Opposite Party : Mr. Prasanna Kumar Parhi,

No.1. Deputy Solicitor General of India

for High Court of Orissa

And

Mr. Satya Narayan Pattanaik ,

Central Government Counsel

For the Opposite Party : Mr. Sujan Kumar Roy Choudhury ,

Nos.2 to 4 Senior Standing Counsel

P R E S E N T:

HONOURABLE CHIEF JUSTICE

MR. HARISH TANDON

AND

HONOURABLE JUSTICE

MR. MURAHARI SRI RAMAN

Date of Hearing : 22.01.2026 :: Date of Judgement : 24.02.2026

W.P.(C) No.1005 of 2026 Page 3 of 40

JUDGMENT

MURAHARI SRI RAMAN, J.—

Craving to invoke extraordinary jurisdiction under the

provisions of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of

India against Order-in-Appeal No. 220-221/CUS/CCP/

2025, dated 30.09.2025 (issued on 08.10.2025) passed

by the Commissioner (Appeal s), Bhubaneswar

(hereinafter referred to as “impugned order”) setting

aside the Order-in-Original dated 24.01.2024 of the

Assistant Commissioner of Customs Division,

Bhubaneswar, giving effect to Order-in-Appeal No. 100-

101/CUS/CCP/2023 , dated 29.09.2023 (issued on

30.09.2023) of the Principal Commissioner (Appeals) (In-

Situ), Bhubaneswar (“Appellate Order”, for convenience),

the writ petition is filed for grant of following relief(s):

“Under the facts and circumstances, the petitioner,

humbly prays:

a) that this Hon‟ble Court be pleased to issue a Writ of

Certiorari or any other appropriate writ/order/

direction under Article 226 or Article 227 of the

Constitution of India, calling for the records and

proceedings pertaining to the impugned Order dated

08.10.2025 under Annexure-1 and after going into

the validity and legality thereof, to quash and set

aside the same;

b) that this Hon‟ble Court may kindly graciously be

pleased to restore the Appeal No.123/CUS/CCP/

2023 filed on 21.03.2024 by the petitioner;

W.P.(C) No.1005 of 2026 Page 4 of 40

c) for costs of this petition;

d) for such and other reliefs as the nature and

circumstances of the case may require.

And/or any other order/orders as the Court may deem fit

in the interest of justice;

And/or for this act of kindness the petitioner in duty

bound shall ever pray.”

Factual matrix:

2. The petitioner, a public limited company, having units in

the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) as well as the Domestic

Tariff Area (DTA), utilized portion of electricity generated

in the unit located in the DTA for use as input for the

purpose of manufacturing aluminium products.

Therefore, all industry rate of duty drawback for

electricity so used in the unit located in SEZ was

claimed to be NIL with reference to Section 2(m) of the

Special Economic Zones Act, 2005 read with Rule 23

and Rule 24 of the Special Economic Zones Rules, 2006

and relevant provisions of the Customs and Central

Excise Duty Drawback Rules, 1995. Accordingly, an

application was made under Rule 6 of the Customs and

Central Excise Duty Drawback Rules, 1995 before the

Competent Authority on 18.05.2017 seeking fixation of

brand rate of drawback pertaining to the period April,

2017 to March 2018.

W.P.(C) No.1005 of 2026 Page 5 of 40

2.1. The Joint Commissioner of Customs (Preventive),

Bhubaneswar fixed the brand rate of duty drawback at

15.61% of the free on board vide Brand Rate Fixation

Order No. 2 of 2019, dated 18.04.2019 read with

corrigendum dated 07.08.2019 with respect to exports

made during the period 01.04.2017 to 31.03.2018. The

application dated 07.11.2019 filed by the petitioner

before the Assistant Commissioner claiming duty

drawback to the tune of Rs.165,07,76,478/- in respect

of export transactions under nine Bills of Export stood

rejected by Order-in-Original dated 04.06.2020; thereby,

the claim of the petitioner with respect to duty drawback

was disallowed. An appeal preferred under Section 128

of the Customs Act 1962, came to be disposed of vide

Order-in-Appeal No. 100-101/CUS/CCP/2023 , dated

29.09.2023 issued on 30.09.2023 by the Princ ipal

Commissioner (Appeals) (In -Situ), Bhubaneswar

(“Appellate Authority”, for brevity) whereby the claim of

the petitioner was partially allowed. The Appellate

Authority found four Bills of Export dated 01.07.2017,

31.07.2017, 04.09.2017 and 29.09.2017 out of nine

Bills of Export, being assessed prior to 01.07.2017, to be

eligible for duty drawback at brand rate of 15.61%. It

was also held in appeal that in the facts of the case, the

availment of ITC would not disentitle the petitioner from

receiving duty drawback, subject however to the

corresponding ITC reversal. The Authority sanctioned

W.P.(C) No.1005 of 2026 Page 6 of 40

duty drawback amounting to Rs.162,00,11,729/- in

favour of the petitioner subject to reversal of

corresponding ITC pertaining to export covered under

the aforesaid four Bills of Export. Since the remaining

five Bills of Export were assessed after 01.10.2017, the

petitioner was not found eligible for brand rate of

15.61%. Against said Order dated 30.09.2023, the

Customs Department has not preferred further avenue

available to it under the Customs Act; rather upon

review, the Commissioner of Customs (Preventive)

accepted the Order-in-Appeal dated 30.09.2023.

2.2. Addressing the Deputy Commissioner of Customs the

petitioner vide Letter dated 03.10.2023 and 03.01.2024

intimated that it had already reversed/adjusted ITC to

the tune of Rs.40,25,70,556/- in terms of Order-in-

Appeal, and requested for disbursal of duty drawback as

sanctioned by the Appellate Authority. Notwithstanding

the Appellate Authority had observed no interest is

payable in respect of reversal/adjustment of ITC, as the

Department insisted for payment of the same, the

petitioner by Letter 03.01.2024 requested the Deputy

Commissioner, Bhubaneswar to adjust the interest on

such amount of reversal/adjustment of ITC to the tune

of Rs.40,25,78,556/-. The petitioner claimed to have

deposited Rs.1,45,24,423/-, being the refund of Goods

W.P.(C) No.1005 of 2026 Page 7 of 40

and Services Tax on the transactions of zero-rated

supply along with interest of Rs.1,47,19,500/-.

2.3. With such factual background, the Assistant

Commissioner, Bhubaneswar Customs Division in order

to give effect to the Appellate Order passing Order-in-

Original dated 24.01.2024 returned the fact that the

petitioner is found eligible for sanction of drawback to

the tune of Rs.62,00,11,728/- and observed:

“*** taking into account the adjustment/reversal of input

tax credit of Central Goods and Services Tax and

Integrated Goods and Services Tax and applicable

interest thereon total amounting to Rs.86,11,88,387/-

which was adjusted from due drawback on request of the

claimant”.

Accordingly, an amount of Rs.75,88,23,341/- was

sanctioned for payment under Section 75 of the

Customs Act.

2.4. Being aggrieved by said Order-in-Original dated

24.01.2024 to the extent it failed to grant interest on

delayed sanction of drawback and wrongful adjustment

of interest amounting to Rs.45,74,18,640/- and

recovering refund of Rs.1,45,24,423/- against the

sanctioned duty drawback, on 21.03.2024 the petitioner

carried the matter in appeal under Section 128 of the

Customs Act. The Assistant Commissioner of Customs

W.P.(C) No.1005 of 2026 Page 8 of 40

Division also preferred an appeal on 02.04.2024 before

the Commissioner (Appeals) seeking to challenge the

said Order-in-Original, as if it is the original order but

not the consequential order arising out of Order-in-

Appeal, on the ground that no duty drawback ought to

have been sanctioned to the petitioner since it had

availed ITC at the time of claiming such drawback. The

Commissioner (Appeals), Bhubaneswar passed

impugned Order-in-Appeal, dated 30.09.2025 (issued on

08.10.2025) by holding that the petitioner is not eligible

for the duty drawback, as it availed ITC. As a

consequence of such observation, the Order-in-Original,

dated 24.01.2024 stood set aside.

2.5. Challenging the said Order-in-Appeal (Annexure-1) as

perverse, capricious and without jurisdiction, the

petitioner has filed the writ petition.

Hearing and arguments:

3. As short question involving competence, jurisdiction and

authority of the Commissioner (Appeals), Bhubaneswar

in nullifying the Order-in-Original by which duty of

drawback was granted giving effect to Appellate Order of

the Principal Commissioner (Appeals) (In-Situ),

Bhubaneswar has been raised, and no counter

affidavint/affidavit in opposition has been filed even

though copy of writ petition was served on the opposite

W.P.(C) No.1005 of 2026 Page 9 of 40

parties on 09.01.2025, the matter is heard accordingly

on the date of admission.

4. Shri Vishal Agarwal, learned Advocate along with

Prashanta Kumar Nayak submitted that the Order-in-

Appeal dated 30.09.2023 being not carried to the higher

forum, and the Assistant Commissioner vide Order-in-

Original dated 24.01.2024 having given consequential

effect to the issues adjudicated upon in the Appeal, there

is no scope or occasion for the Revenue to question the

veracity of entitlement of duty drawback of the

petitioner.

4.1. He submitted that the Commissioner (Appeals) as if

sitting over the appeal against Order-in-Appeal of the

Principal Commissioner (Appeals) (In-Situ), passed

impugned Order nullifying the consequential grant of

duty drawback by adjusting the amount of ITC with

respect to Central Goods and Services Tax and

Integrated Goods and Services Tax, thereby recovered or

retained such ITC. He, thus, emphatically submitted

that the Commissioner (Appeals) being functus officio

could not have traversed beyond what is adjudicated in

Order-in-Appeal dated 30.09.2023. To buttress his

argument that the appellate orders are to be respected

and to be carried out to its logical end, Sri Vishal

Agarwal, learned Advocate placed reliance on a decision

of this Court rendered in the case of Auroglobal

W.P.(C) No.1005 of 2026 Page 10 of 40

Comtrade Pvt. Ltd. Vrs. Joint Commissioner of Goods and

Services Tax and Central Excise, W.P.(C) No.35050 of

2025, vide Judgment dated 18.12.2025.

4.2. He would further advance argument by canvassing that

the impugned Order is out and out illegal and outcome

of arbitrariness in action inasmuch as the issue which

was settled inter se parties vide Order-in-Appeal dated

30.09.2023, the same could not have been agitated

again when the Revenue had accepted said Appellate

Order. The findings and observations made therein

having attained finality, the Commissioner (Appeals),

Bhubaneswar is estopped from reviewing/revisiting the

Appellate Order dated 30.09.2023. By setting aside the

Order-in-Original dated 24.01.2024 the said Appellate

Authority has overstepped his jurisdiction and the issue

adjudicated by the Principal Commissioner (Appeals) (In-

Situ) would be hit by principles of res judicata.

5. Quod ultra, Sri Prasanna Kumar Parhi, learned Deputy

Soliciter General of India and Sri Satya Narayan

Pattanaik, learned Central Government Counsel

appeared for the opposite party No.1 and Sri Sujan

Kumar Roy Choudhury for the opposite party Nos.2 to 4

conceded that the Order-in-Appeal, dated 30.09.2023

has attained finality, being not challenged by the

Customs Department before the higher fora.

W.P.(C) No.1005 of 2026 Page 11 of 40

5.1. Yet, the counsel appearing for the opposite parties stood

by the reasoning ascribed in the impugned Order-in-

Appeal (Annexure-1) and would submit that the Order-

in-Appeal in Annexure-2 is beyond the ken of statutory

provisions and therefore, the Commissioner (Appeals) is

justified in setting aside the Order-in-Original

(Annexure-3).

Discussions:

6. No provision of the Customs Act could be brought to

notice by the counsel for the opposite parties that the

Commissioner (Appeals) at the stage of giving

consequential relief arising out of Appellate Order is

authorized under law to revisit the Appellate Order and

nullify the effect thereof in the garb of challenging the

consequential Order-in-Original in the appeal,

particularly when the findings and observations

adjudicating entitlement of the petitioner in the

Appellate Order was accepted by the Department.

6.1. The underlying principle of functus officio is highlighted

in the case of Ajay Mohan Vrs. H.N. Rai, (2008) 2 SCC

507, wherein at paragraph 24 the following observation

has been made:

“The order of the City Civil Court dated 13.10.2006

may be bad but then it was required to be set aside

by the Court of Appeal. An appeal had been

W.P.(C) No.1005 of 2026 Page 12 of 40

preferred by the appellants thereagainst but the

same had been withdrawn. The said order dated

13.10.2006, therefore, attained finality. The High

Court, while allowing the appellant to withdraw the

appeal, no doubt, passed an order of status quo for a

period of two weeks in terms of its order dated

23.11.2006 but no reason therefor had been assigned. It

ex facie had no jurisdiction to pass such an interim order.

Once the appeal was permitted to be withdrawn, the

Court became functus officio. It did not hear the parties on

merit. It had not assigned any reason in support thereof.

Ordinarily, a court, while allowing a party to withdraw an

appeal, could not have granted a further relief. [See G.E.

Power Controls India Vrs. S. Lakshmipathy & Ors., (2005)

11 SCC 509].”

6.2. It is apposite in the present context to refer to the

following exposition with regard to application of

doctrine of functus officio in Odisha Administrative

Tribunal Bar Association Vrs. Union of India, (2023) 6

SCR 731:

“90. P. Ramanatha Aiyer’s The Law Lexicon (1997

Edition) defines the term functus officio as:

„A term applied to something which once has had a

life and power, but which has become of no virtue

whatsoever … One who has fulfilled his office or is

out of office; an authority who has performed the act

authorised so that the authority is exhausted’.

91. Black’s Law Dictionary (5th Edition) defines the term

as follows:

W.P.(C) No.1005 of 2026 Page 13 of 40

„Having fulfilled the function, discharged the office,

or accomplished the purpose, and therefore of no

further force or authority … an instrument, power,

agency, etc. which has fulfilled the purpose of its

creation, and is therefore of no further virtue or

effect.’

92. The doctrine of functus officio gives effect to

the principle of finality. Once a judge or a

quasi-judicial authority has rendered a

decision, it is not open to her to revisit the

decision and amend, correct, clarify, or reverse

it (except in the exercise of the power of review,

conferred by law). Once a judicial or quasi-

judicial decision attains finality, it is subject

to change only in proceedings before the

appellate court.

93. For instance, Section 362 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure 1973 provides that a court of law is not to

alter its judgment once it is signed:

„362. Court not to alter judgment.—

Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by

any other law for the time being in force, no

Court, when it has signed its judgment or final

order disposing of a case, shall alter or review

the same except to correct a clerical or

arithmetical error.‟

In Hari Singh Mann Vrs. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa,

(2001) 1 SCC 169, this Court recognized that Section

362 was based on the doctrine of functus officio:

„10. *** The section is based on an acknowledged

principle of law that once a matter is finally

W.P.(C) No.1005 of 2026 Page 14 of 40

disposed of by a court, the said court in the

absence of a specific statutory provision

becomes functus officio and disentitled to

entertain a fresh prayer for the same relief

unless the former order of final disposal is set

aside by a court of competent jurisdiction in a

manner prescribed by law. The court becomes

functus officio the moment the official order

disposing of a case is signed. Such an order

cannot be altered except to the extent of

correcting a clerical or an arithmetical error.‟

94. The doctrine of functus officio exists to provide

a clear point where the adjudicative process

ends and to bring quietus to the dispute.

Without it, decision-making bodies such as

courts could endlessly revisit their decisions .

With a definitive endpoint to a case before a court or

quasi judicial authority, parties are free to seek

judicial review or to prefer an appeal. Alternatively,

their rights are determined with finality.

Similar considerations do not apply to decisions by

the State which are based entirely on policy or

expediency.”

6.3. The doctrinaire concept of functus officio can be

perceived in the judgment rendered by the Hon ’ble

Supreme Court of India in the case of State of Punjab

Vrs. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar, (2011) 15 (Addl.) SCR

540; relevant excerpts of said reported judgment need to

be regarded for clarity in approach:

“26. There is no power of review with the Criminal Court

after judgment has been rendered. The High Court

W.P.(C) No.1005 of 2026 Page 15 of 40

can alter or review its judgment before it is signed.

When an order is passed, it cannot be reviewed.

Section 362 Cr.P.C. is based on an acknowledged

principle of law that once a matter is finally

disposed of by a Court, the said Court in the

absence of a specific statutory provision

becomes functus officio and is disentitled to

entertain a fresh prayer for any relief unless

the former order of final disposal is set aside

by a Court of competent jurisdiction in a

manner prescribed by law. The Court becomes

functus officio the moment the order for disposing of

a case is signed. Such an order cannot be altered

except to the extent of correcting a clerical or

arithmetical error. There is also no provision for

modification of the judgment. (See: Hari Singh Mann

Vrs. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa, AIR 2001 SC 43; and

Chhanni Vrs. State of U.P., AIR 2006 SC 3051).

Moreover, the prohibition contained in Section 362

Cr.P.C. is absolute; after the judgment is signed,

even the High Court in exercise of its inherent power

under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has no authority or

jurisdiction to alter/review the same. (See: Moti Lal

Vrs. State of M.P., AIR 1994 SC 1544; Hari Singh

Mann (supra); and State of Kerala Vrs. M.M.

Manikantan Nair, AIR 2001 SC 2145).

27. If a judgment has been pronounced without

jurisdiction or in violation of principles of natural

justice or where the order has been pronounced

without giving an opportunity of being heard to a

party affected by it or where an order was obtained

by abuse of the process of court which would really

amount to its being without jurisdiction, inherent

powers can be exercised to recall such order for the

W.P.(C) No.1005 of 2026 Page 16 of 40

reason that in such an eventuality the order

becomes a nullity and the provisions of Section 362

Cr.P.C. would not operate. In such eventuality, the

judgment is manifestly contrary to the audi alteram

partem rule of natural justice. The power of recall

is different from the power of altering/

reviewing the judgment. However, the party

seeking recall/alteration has to establish that

it was not at fault. (Vide: Chitawan Vrs. Mahboob

Ilahi, 1970 Crl.L.J. 378; Deepak Thanwardas

Balwani Vrs. State of Maharashtra & Anr., 1985

Crl.L.J. 23; Habu Vrs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1987

Raj. 83 (F.B.); B Swarth Mahto & Anr. Vrs.

Dharmdeo Narain Singh, AIR 1972 SC 1300;

Makkapati Nagaswara Sastri Vrs. S.S.

Satyanarayan, AIR 1981 SC 1156; Asif Kumar Kar

Vrs. State of West Bengal & Ors., (2009) 2 SCC 703;

and Vishnu Agarwal Vrs. State of U.P. & Anr., AIR

2011 SC 1232).

28. This Court by virtue of Article 137 of the Constitution

has been invested with an express power to review

any judgment in Criminal Law and while no such

power has been conferred on the High Court,

inherent power of the court cannot be exercised for

doing that which is specifically prohibited by the

Code itself. (Vide: State Represented by D.S.P.,

S.B.C.I.D., Chennai Vrs. K. V. Rajendran & Ors., AIR

2009 SC 46).

29. In Smt. Sooraj Devi Vrs. Pyare Lal & Anr., AIR 1981

SC 736, this Court held that the prohibition in

Section 362 Cr.P.C. against the Court altering or

reviewing its judgment, is subject to what is

„otherwise provided by this Code or by any other

W.P.(C) No.1005 of 2026 Page 17 of 40

law for the time being in force’. Those words,

however, refer to those provisions only where

the Court has been expressly authorised by the

Code or other law to alter or review its

judgment. The inherent power of the Court is not

contemplated by the saving provision contained in

Section 362 Cr.P.C. and, therefore, the attempt to

invoke that power can be of no avail.

30. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the

effect that the criminal justice delivery system does

not clothe the court to add or delete any words,

except to correct the clerical or arithmetical error as

specifically been provided under the statute itself

after pronouncement of the judgment as the Judge

becomes functus officio. Any mistake or glaring

omission is left to be corrected only by the

appropriate forum in accordance with law .”

6.4. Bearing in mind the aforesaid conceptual conspectus of

doctrine of functus officio, on perusal of Order-in-Appeal

dated 30.09.2023 it is found that the following

observation was made:

“In view of the above, I am of the considered view that

the drawback amounting to Rs.162,00,11,723/-

against the first four Bill of Exports dated

01.07.2017, 31.07.2017, 04.09.2017 and

28.09.2017 is eligible subject to the direction given

supra. The amount of drawback of Rs.3,07,64,749/-

against the Bills of Export dated 31.10.2017, 30.11.2017,

30.12.2017, 31.01.2018 and 28.02.2018 is rejected as

fresh application for fixation of brand rate has not been

W.P.(C) No.1005 of 2026 Page 18 of 40

filed in view of Rule 20 read with Rule 6 or 7 of the

Drawback Rules, 2017.”

6.5. Said Order-in-Appeal was given effect to in the following

manner in Order-in-Original dated 24.01.2024 by the

Assistant Commissioner:

“In view of the above, I am of the view that the

application filed dated 03.01.2023 and 03.01.2024

by M/s. Vedanta Ltd., Village: Banjari, District:

Jharsuguda, Odisha-758201 in pursuance of Order-

in-Appeal dated 30.09.2023 for sanction of

drawback of Rs.162,00,11,728/- is hereby eligible.

However, taking into account the adjustment/reversal of

input tax credit of CGST and IGST and applicable interest

thereon total amounting to Rs.86,11,88,387/- which was

adjusted from duty drawback on request of the claimant.

Thus, balance amount of drawback works out to be

Rs.75,88,23,341/- (Seventy Five Crore Eighty Eight Lakh

Twenty Three Thousand Three Hundred Forty One only)

which is sanctioned for payment to M/s. Vedanta Ltd.,

Village: Banjari, District: Jharsuguda, Odisha-768201

under Section 75 of the Customs Act, 1962 .”

6.6. However, the Commissioner (Appeals), Bhubaneswar in

garb of sitting in appeal against the Order-in-Original

dated 24.01.2024 sought to modify or nullify the effect of

Order-in-Appeal, dated 30.09.2023 passed by the

Commissioner (Appeals) (In-Situ), Bhubaneswar even

while said Appellate Order had not been carried to

higher fora. The Commissioner (Appeals) in the

W.P.(C) No.1005 of 2026 Page 19 of 40

impugned Order nullifying the Order-in-Original giving

consequential effect held as follows:

“Hence, the drawback should have been sanctioned only

if no ITC was availed and if the ITC was availed, then

paid back along with interest before the drawback was

applied.”

6.7. This Court is of the opinion that such an observation by

revisiting/reviewing earlier Order-in-Appeal dated

30.09.2023 is unwholesome and cannot be

countenanced in law. No objection is raised by the

learned Deputy Solicitor General nor the Senior

Standing Counsel as against following contents found

reflected in paragraph 4.21 of the writ petition:

“That the petitioner, thereafter, vide its Letters dated

03.10.2023 and 03.01.2024 addressed to the Deputy

Commissioner of Customs, Bhubaneshwar, sought

disbursal of the duty drawback, sanctioned under the

Order-in-Appeal dated 30.09.2023. The Petitioner also

conveyed its acceptance to reverse/adjust ITC to the

tune of Rs.40,25,78,556/-, as was directed by

Opposite Party No. 4 in the said Order-in-Appeal.”

6.8. Such fact being not controverted by the learned counsel

for the opposite parties, the following observation made

in Commissioner of Central Excise Vrs. Bombay Dyeing &

Mfg. Co. Ltd., (2007) 8 SCC 177, as placed by learned

counsel for the petitioner, may be appropriate for

reference:

W.P.(C) No.1005 of 2026 Page 20 of 40

“16. There is no merit in this civil appeal. Under the

notification, mode of payment has not been

prescribed. Further, exemption is given to the final

product, namely, grey fabric. Under the Central

Excise Act, 1944, levy is on manufacture but

payment is at the time of clearance. Under the Act,

payment of duty on yarn had to be at the spindle

stage. However, when we come to Exemption

Notification No. 14/2002-CE, the requirement was

that exemption on grey fabric was admissible

subject to the assessee paying duty on yarn before

claiming exemption and subject to the assessee not

claiming Cenvat credit before claiming exemption.

The question of exemption from payment of duty on

grey fabric arose on satisfaction of the said two

conditions. In this case, payment of duty on yarn on

deferred basis took place before clearance of grey

fabric on which exemption was claimed. Therefore,

payment was made before the stage of exemption.

Similarly, on payment of duty on the input

(yarn) the assessee got the credit which was

never utilised. That before utilisation, the entry

has been reversed which amounts to not taking

credit. Hence, in this case, both the conditions are

satisfied. Hence Item 1 of the table to Notification

No.14/2002-CE would apply and accordingly the

grey fabric would attract NIL rate of duty.”

6.9. The view expressed by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of

India in the case of CCE & Customs Vrs. Precot Meridian

Ltd., (2021) 17 SCC 381 is also apposite in the present

context, which is reproduced hereunder:

W.P.(C) No.1005 of 2026 Page 21 of 40

“2. As mentioned above, this notification was issued on

28.02.1999. The product of the respondent is

covered by the description of goods at Serial No. 133

of the table annexed with the General Exemption

Notification. The assessee, however, had utilised the

Modvat credit in the previous two years prior to

28.02.1999. As per the assessee, after the issuance

of this notification, no such Modvat credit was ever

taken or utilised. Even the earlier Modvat credit

which was utilised was returned or paid back

on 10.01.2005. In this scenario, question arose

as to whether the assessee fulfils the aforesaid

condition in order to become eligible to get the

benefit of the exemption notification.

3. We note that five-Member Bench of the Tribunal in

Franco Italian Co. (P) Ltd. Vrs. CCE, 2000 SCC

OnLine CEGAT 1026 = (2000) 120 ELT 792 had

taken the view that even if the Modvat credit was

utilised but, thereafter, refunded, it would

amount to not utilising the said Modvat credit.

Same view has been taken by the High Court of

Allahabad in Hello Minerals Water (P) Ltd. Vrs.

Union of India, 2004 SCC OnLine All 2187 = (2004)

174 ELT 422.

4. On a specific query put by the Court, we were

informed that as far as the aforesaid two

judgments are concerned, they were accepted

by the Department and no appeal was filed

thereagainst. In the impugned judgment [Precot

Mills Ltd. Vrs. CCE, 2006 SCC OnLine CESTAT 1256

= (2006) 201 ELT 356], the Tribunal has decided the

issue in favour of the assessee relying upon the

aforesaid two decisions.”

W.P.(C) No.1005 of 2026 Page 22 of 40

6.10. It is put forth by Sri Vishal Agarwal, learned Advocate

that the denial of duty drawback upon restoration of

input tax credit already availed is not justified in view of

Amit Cotton Industries Vrs. Principal Commissioner of

Customs, 2019 (29) GSTL 200 (Guj) = 2019 SCC OnLine

Guj 6909.

1

6.11. Expanding his argument, the learned counsel for the

petitioner would submit that challenge by the Revenue

to the consequential Order-in-Original dated 24.01.2024

before the Commissioner (Appeals), Bhubaneswar could

not be examined by reopening the issue already decided

in the earlier appeal vide Appellate Order dated

30.09.2023 of the Principal Commissioner (Appeals) (In-

Situ), Bhubaneswar inasmuch as the findings and

observations in the said order attained finality. Such

contention finds favour with in the ratio of judgment

rendered by the Hon‟ble Gujarat High Court in the case

of CTM Textile Mills Pvt. Ltd. Vrs. Union of India, (2011) 6

GSTR 552 (Guj) = 2009 (246) ELT 148 (Guj). In the said

case it is observed as follows:

“13. In so far as the merits of the controversy are

concerned, suffice it to state that in so far as the

petitioner is concerned, the petitioner had agitated

the matter right up to the level of the Tribunal and

thereafter when the Tribunal decided against the

1

Vide Judgment dated 27.06.2019 in R/Special Civil Application No.20126 of 2018

of Hon‟ble Gujarat High Court.

W.P.(C) No.1005 of 2026 Page 23 of 40

petitioner on October 11, 2004 the petitioner of its

own volition took a decision to accept the order made

by the Tribunal without challenging the same. In the

present petition filed by the petitioner, there is no

explanation as to why the said order was not

challenged by the petitioner. Therefore, on this

limited count the petition deserves to be rejected.

14. The contention based upon the two orders of this

High Court referred to hereinbefore also cannot carry

the case of the petitioner any further. As noted, the

said orders had been made on August 12, 2002 and

May 6, 2004, i.e., much prior to the point of time the

Tribunal had rendered its decision on October 11,

2004 in the case of the petitioner. Therefore, once

the said orders were available, the petitioner ought

to have carried the matter further challenging the

adverse order made by the Tribunal.

15. The challenge to the consequential order dated

January 4, 2006 made by the adjudicating

authority pursuant to order made by the

Tribunal is not required to be entertained on

the merits considering the fact that the said

order is not an independent order made for the

first time. The said order had already been made

on June 5, 2003. It was only because the

intervening order dated September 19, 2003 of the

Commissioner (Appeals), that the adjudicating

authority was required to pass the consequential

order once again on January 4, 2006 pursuant to

the order made by the Tribunal. In the

circumstances, once the order of the Tribunal

had attained finality, the petitioner cannot

claim any relief.”

W.P.(C) No.1005 of 2026 Page 24 of 40

6.12. This Court is, therefore, one with the submission of

learned counsel for the petitioner that after the Appellate

Order dated 30.09.2023 holding that the petitioner is

entitled to the benefit of drawback, which being not

challenged by the opposite parties attained finality, the

impugned Order seeking to revisit the said issue and

holding to the contrary by unsettling such finding of fact

is erroneous and faulted with.

6.13. Another significant factor which needs to be highlighted

herein is power to re-examine/review/recall by the

Appellate Authority to vary with the issue adjudicated in

the earlier round of co-appellate jurisdiction and the

effect of Orders passed thereunder. Though provisions of

res judicata as envisaged in Section 11 of the Code of

Civil Procedure, 1908 and provisions of estoppel

enshrined in Section 121 of the Bharatiya Sakshya

Adhiniyam, 2023 (corresponding to Section 115 of the

Indian Evidence Act, 1872) do not stricto sensu apply to

the quasi judicial proceedings, the principles thereof can

be adhered to. In Dredging Corporation of India Vrs. State

of Orissa, (1995) 97 STC 10 (Ori) it has been enunciated

that the Evidence Act has no statutory application to the

Tribunals discharging quasi judicial function though for

better adjudication they are to be guided by the

principles of the Evidence Act. Unless contrary intention

appears the procedures and principles of the Evidence

W.P.(C) No.1005 of 2026 Page 25 of 40

Act can be adopted to the proceedings under taxing

statutes.

6.14. In Dadu Dayalu Mahasabha, Jaipur (Trust) Vrs. Mahant

Ram Niwas, (2008) 11 SCC 753 it has been observed as

follows:

“38. Yet again in Hope Plantations Ltd. Vrs. Taluk Land

Board, (1999) 5 SCC 590:

„20. … An adjudication is conclusive and final not

only as to the actual matter determined but as

to every other matter which the parties might

and ought to have litigated and have had it

decided as incidental to or essentially

connected with the subject-matter of the

litigation and every matter coming within the

legitimate purview of the original action both in

respect of the matter of claim or defence. The

principle underlying Explanation IV is that

where the parties have had an opportunity of

controverting a matter that should be taken to

be the same thing as if the matter had been

actually controverted and decided. It is true

that where a matter has been constructively in

issue it cannot be said to have been actually

heard and decided. It could only be deemed to

have been heard and decided. The first reason,

therefore, has absolutely no force.‟ [Ed.:

Quoting from Forward Construction Co. v.

Prabhat Mandal, (1986) 1 SCC 100, p. 112,

para 20.]

It was furthermore opined: (SCC pp. 607-08, para

26)

W.P.(C) No.1005 of 2026 Page 26 of 40

„26. It is settled law that the principles of

estoppel and res judicata are based on

public policy and justice. Doctrine of res

judicata is often treated as a branch of

the law of estoppel though these two

doctrines differ in some essential

particulars. Rule of res judicata prevents the

parties to a judicial determination from

litigating the same question over again even

though the determination may even be

demonstratedly wrong. When the

proceedings have attained finality, parties

are bound by the judgment and are

estopped from questioning it. They cannot

litigate again on the same cause of action nor

can they litigate any issue which was

necessary for decision in the earlier litigation.

These two aspects are „cause of action

estoppel‟ and „issue estoppel‟. These two

terms are of common law origin. Again,

once an issue has been finally determined,

parties cannot subsequently in the same

suit advance arguments or adduce further

evidence directed to showing that the

issue was wrongly determined. Their only

remedy is to approach the higher forum if

available. The determination of the issue

between the parties gives rise to, as noted

above, an issue estoppel. It operates in any

subsequent proceedings in the same suit in

which the issue had been determined. It also

operates in subsequent suits between the same

parties in which the same issue arises.

Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure

contains provisions of res judicata but

W.P.(C) No.1005 of 2026 Page 27 of 40

these are not exhaustive of the general

doctrine of res judicata. Legal principles

of estoppel and res judicata are equally

applicable in proceedings before

administrative authorities as they are

based on public policy and justice.‟

40. Principle of issue estoppel and constructive res

judicata had also been discussed at some length by

this Court in Bhanu Kumar Jain Vrs. Archana

Kumar, (2005) 1 SCC 787 to hold:

„29. There is a distinction between „issue estoppel‟

and „res judicata‟. [See Thoday Vrs. Thoday,

(1962) 2 WLR 371 = (1964) 1 All ER 341 (CA)].

30. Res judicata debars a court from exercising its

jurisdiction to determine the lis if it has

attained finality between the parties whereas

the doctrine issue estoppel is invoked against

the party. If such an issue is decided against

him, he would be estopped from raising the

same in the latter proceeding. The doctrine of

res judicata creates a different kind of estoppel

viz. estoppel by accord.‟ ***”

6.15. Perusal of the record and after hearing the counsel for

respective parties, no reply could be given nor could the

counsel for the opposite parties demonstrate with

plausible reason deducing from the Orders of the

Appellate Authorities and the Original Authorities. It

could not be gainsaid that the entitlement or eligibility of

the petitioner for availing benefit of drawback upon

reversal of already availed input tax credit with regard to

W.P.(C) No.1005 of 2026 Page 28 of 40

Central Goods and Services Tax and Integrated Goods

and Services Tax, which in fact the company had done

in obeisance of Appellate Order dated 30.09.2023, was

subject-matter in earlier appeal and the same was

adjudicated upon by the Principal Commissioner

(Appeals) (In-Situ). Rather indubitably it is admitted that

the Revenue has never challenged said Appellate Order.

Such fact has candidly been placed in the impugned

Order at paragraph 5.3. Nonetheless, the Commissioner

(Appeals) proceeded to refuse to grant such relief allowed

by the Appellate Authority in Order-in-Appeal dated

30.09.2023.

6.16. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Commissioner of Customs

Vrs. Kushalchand and Company, (2016) 16 SCC 457 held

that:

“6. It is pertinent to mention that in spite of particular

conclusion which was arrived at by the Tribunal that

“cocoa powder” was “flour” and covered under the

description of the licence, the Department did not

choose to challenge this finding by filing any

further appeal, therefore, at least inter se

between the parties, the said issue attained

finality and this finding was binding on the

Commissioner and, therefore, it was not open

to the Commissioner to revisit the issue all over

again and come to a contrary finding.

7. The learned Attorney General made an endeavour to

show that “cocoa powder” would not be covered by

W.P.(C) No.1005 of 2026 Page 29 of 40

the term “flour”. In view of the aforesaid facts

emerging from the records, we refrain from

going into the issue at all. Thus, insofar as the

facts of this case are concerned, since the

earlier order of the Tribunal was not

challenged by the Department, the impugned

order warrants no interference. We, thus,

dismiss this appeal.”

6.17. Impugned Order dated 30.09.2025 (issued on

08.10.2025) of the Commissioner (Appeals),

Bhubaneswar (Annexure-1) on a careful reading reveals

the following:

“5.3. I find that the instant drawback claim was

sanctioned after the decision of the Commissioner

(Appeals), Bhubaneswar vide Order-in-Appeal

No.100-101/CUS/CCP/2023 dated 30.09.2023,

wherein the party has been allowed drawback of

Rs.162,00,11,728/- in respect of four numbers of

Bills of Export subject to condition of reversal of ITC

of Rs.40,25,78,556/-. Vide the Order-in-Appeal

dated 30.09.2023 the Commissioner (Appeals) has

also taken view that interest should not be levied on

the reversal of ITC as availment of credit of CGST

and IGST is quite lower than the drawback claims.

The Order of the Commissioner (Appeals) has

been accepted by the Department on

18.12.2023. No appeal has been filed by the

Department against the Order-in-Appeal dated

30.09.2023 issued by the Commissioner

(Appeals). Accordingly, basing on the said

Order-in-Appeal dated 30.09.2023, the instant

drawback has also been sanctioned by the

W.P.(C) No.1005 of 2026 Page 30 of 40

Assistant Commissioner, Bhubaneswar Customs

Division vide Order-in-Appeal, dated

24.01.2024. But while sanctioning the drawback

the original authority adjusted ITC of

Rs.40,25,78,556/- along with interest of

Rs.45,74,18,640 from the drawback.”

6.18. Notwithstanding such fact of adjustment being given by

the Assistant Commissioner in his Order-in-Original

dated 24.01.2024 in view of observation made in

Appellate Order dated 30.09.2023 that “the appellant is

eligible for transitional drawback @ 15.61% subject to

reversal of ITC/adjustment of ITC, the suggestion of

requisition of declaration becomes impossible because of

the peculiar facts of the present case”, the Appellate

Authority in the Appeal vide Order-in-Appeal dated

30.09.2025 held as follows:

“5.5. I find that the Reviewing Authority has relied upon

Circular Nos. 23/2017-CUS, dated 30.6.2017 and

24/2019-CUS, dated 08.08.2019 to drive home the

point that Drawback cannot be allowed wherein the

input duties has been neutralised by way of ITC or

refunded to the claimant. In view of such Circulars, I

find that there is no ambiguity as regards the

intention of the Government. Hence, the Drawback

should have been sanctioned only if no ITC was

availed and if the ITC was availed, then paid back

along with interest before the Drawback was

applied. In this case, I am of the opinion that the

assessee has made concerted efforts to avail of two

alternative benefits at the same time. They are

W.P.(C) No.1005 of 2026 Page 31 of 40

reversing one of the alternative benefits only

when the same is noticed or apprehended by

the Department. Such actions are not expected

from a company of the repute of Vedanta

Limited. In the instant case, as they have

already availed ITC, I hold that they are not

eligible for drawback. As they are not eligible

for drawback, question of interest does not

arise.

6.0. Accordingly,

(i) the appeal filed by M/s. Vedanta Limited is

rejected.

(ii) the appeal filed by the Department is allowed

by setting aside the Order No. 01/CUS/

BBSR/DRAWBACK/ASST. COMMR./2024,

dated 24.01.2014 of the Assistant

Commissioner, Bhubaneswar Customs

Division.”

6.19. Such conclusion arrived at by the Commissioner

(Appeals), Bhubaneswar apparently depicts as if he is

sitting in review against the earlier Appellate Order dated

30.09.2023 of the Principal Commissioner (Appeals) (In-

Situ), Bhubaneswar and threw the earlier observations

made in “peculiar facts” to winds. Nevertheless, he

revised and/or nullified the decision rendered in

appeals, bearing Nos.39/CUS/CCP/2023 and 110/

CUS/CCP/2020, which were allowed vide Order-in-

Appeal dated 30.09.2023 (Annexure-2).

W.P.(C) No.1005 of 2026 Page 32 of 40

6.20. Under the above premise, regard may be had to the

following principle reiterated in Sulthan Said Ibrahim

Vrs. Prakasan, (2025) 5 SCR 2185:

“53. The High Court, in its impugned order, held the

application of the appellant under Order I, Rule 10 to

be barred by res judicata and thus not maintainable

on that ground. We find no infirmity in the said

observation mad by the High Court. This Court in

Bhanu Kumar Jain Vrs. Archana Kumar reported in

(2005) 1 SCC 787 observed that the principles of

res judicata apply not only to two different

proceedings but also to different stages of the

same proceeding as well. The relevant

observations are reproduced hereinbelow:

„18. It is now well settled that principles of res

judicata apply in different stages of the

same proceedings. (See Satyadhyan Ghosal

Vrs. Deorajin Debi, AIR 1960 SC 941 = (1960) 3

SCR 590 and Prahlad Singh Vrs. Col. Sukhdev

Singh, (1987) 1 SCC 727.)

19. In Y.B. Patil, (1976) 4 SCC 66 it was held:

„4. … It is well settled that principles of

res judicata can be invoked not only

in separate subsequent proceedings,

they also get attracted in subsequent

stage of the same proceedings. Once

an order made in the course of a

proceeding becomes final, it would be

binding at the subsequent stage of

that proceeding.‟

W.P.(C) No.1005 of 2026 Page 33 of 40

***

21. Yet again in Hope Plantations Ltd., (1999) 5

SCC 590 this Court laid down the law in the

following terms:

„17. … One important consideration of

public policy is that the decisions

pronounced by courts of competent

jurisdiction should be final, unless

they are modified or reversed by

appellate authorities; and the other

principle is that no one should be

made to face the same kind of

litigation twice over, because such a

process would be contrary to

considerations of fair play and

justice.‟ ***”

6.21. It, thus, needs no further authority to be cited to say

that the Appellate Authority in a subsequent proceeding

could not tinker with the issue decided in the earlier

appeal forming part of the same transaction and doing

so would tantamount to review of his own order. The

counsel appearing for the opposite parties could not

throw light that such power of review or to revisit/relook

has been conferred on the Appellate Authority concerned

by or under the statute. On the admission of the

Appellate Authority in the impugned Order-in-Appeal

dated 30.09.2025 (issued on 08.10.2025) that the Order-

in-Appeal dated 30.09.2023 has attained finality as no

appeal was preferred by the Revenue, it is axiomatic that

W.P.(C) No.1005 of 2026 Page 34 of 40

the findings recorded and the observation made therein

got accepted and the consequential effect of such order

is required to be carried out and the directions contained

therein are to be implemented in true letter and spirit.

6.22. In Union of India Vrs. Kamlakshi Finance Corporation

Ltd., AIR 1992 SC 711 the Supreme Court of India had

directed the Department to adhere to the judicial

discipline and give effect to the orders of higher

Appellate Authorities which are binding on them. The

relevant observations of made therein are required to be

noted, which read thus:

“6. *** The High Court has, in our view, rightly criticised

this conduct of the Assistant Collectors and the

harassment to the assessee caused by the failure of

these officers to give effect to the orders of

authorities higher to them in the appellate hierarchy.

It cannot be too vehemently emphasised that it is of

utmost importance that, in disposing of the quasi-

judicial issues before them, revenue officers are

bound by the decisions of the appellate authorities.

The order of the Appellate Collector is binding on the

Assistant Collectors working within his jurisdiction

and the order of the Tribunal is binding upon the

Assistant Collectors and the Appellate Collectors

who function under the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.

The principles of judicial discipline require that the

orders of the higher appellate authorities should be

followed unreservedly by the subordinate

authorities. The mere fact that the order of the

appellate authority is not “acceptable” to the

W.P.(C) No.1005 of 2026 Page 35 of 40

department— in itself an objectionable

phrase— and is the subject-matter of an appeal

can furnish no ground for not following it

unless its operation has been suspended by a

competent Court. If this healthy rule is not

followed, the result will only be undue harassment

to assessees and chaos in administration of tax

laws.

***

8. *** The observations of the High Court should be

kept in mind in future and utmost regard should be

paid by the adjudicating authorities and the

appellate authorities to the requirements of judicial

discipline and the need for giving effect to the orders

of the higher appellate authorities which are binding

on them.”

6.23. In the case of Tirupati Balaji Developers Private Ltd. Vrs.

State of Bihar, (2004) 5 SCC 1, the Supreme Court held

thus:

“The very conferral of appellate jurisdiction carries with it

certain consequences. Conferral of a principal substantive

jurisdiction carries with it, as a necessary concomitant of

that power, the power to exercise such other incidental

and ancillary powers without which the conferral of the

principal power shall be rendered redundant. As held by

Their Lordships of the Privy Council in Nagendra Nath

Dey Vrs. Suresh Chandra Dey, AIR 1932 PC 165 (Sir

Dinshah Mulla speaking for the Bench of five), an appeal

is an application by a party to an appellate court asking it

to set aside or revise a decision of a subordinate court.

The appeal does not cease to be an appeal though

W.P.(C) No.1005 of 2026 Page 36 of 40

irregular or incompetent. Placing on record his opinion,

Subramania Ayyar, J. as a member of the Full Bench (of

five Judges) in Chappan Vrs. Moidin Kutti (1899) 22 ILR

Mad 68 (at page 80) stated, inter alia, that appeal is „the

removal of a cause or a suit from an inferior to a superior

judge or court for re-examination or review‟. According to

Wharton’s Law Lexicon such removal of a cause or suit is

for the purpose of testing the soundness of the decision of

the inferior court. In consonance with this particular

meaning of appeal, „appellate jurisdiction ‘means‟ the

power of a superior court to review the decision of an

inferior court.’ „Here the two things which are required to

constitute appellate jurisdiction, are the existence of the

relation of superior and inferior court and the power on

the part of the former to review decisions of the latter.

This has been well put by Story:

„The essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction is, that it

revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already

instituted and does not create that cause. In reference to

judicial Tribunals an appellate jurisdiction, therefore,

necessarily implies that the subject-matter has been

already instituted and acted upon by some other court,

whose judgment or proceedings are to be revised, (Section

1761, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United

States). ***”

6.24. In Orissa Forest Corporation Ltd. Vrs. Assistant Collector,

1982 SCC OnLine Ori 209 this Court made the following

observation:

“4. We do not think this should be the attitude of the

Union Government. The demand is under the Statute

and the statutory appellate authority, on the set of

facts which are common both to the period when

W.P.(C) No.1005 of 2026 Page 37 of 40

relief was granted and the period for which the

impugned demand has been made, has already

determined that no levy is exigible. As long as the

appellate order stands, it must be duly

respected and only when the revisional

authority vacates the order and holds that the

decision of the appellate authority is wrong

and the demand was justified, no demand

should be raised. It has been indicated on more

than one occasions by the Supreme Court with

reference to directions of the Appellate

Tribunal under the Income Tax Act that such

directions are binding and decisions rendered

by appellate authorities should be respected by

the subordinate revenue authorities and no

attempt should be made to wriggle out of the

binding decisions of higher authorities as long

as they remain in force. The same principle

should be applied to the present set of facts and we

are, therefore, inclined to take the view that the

demand under Annexure-4 should be set aside but

we would make it clear that in the event of the

appellate orders being vacated, under the Statute

the liability would revive and notwithstanding our

quashing Annexure-4 the statutory authority would

be entitled to raise a demand in terms of the

decision which may be ultimately sustained under

the Statute.”

6.25. The following dicta laid down in BSNL Vrs. Union of

India, (2006) 3 SCC 1 may usefully be kept in mind in

the present context:

W.P.(C) No.1005 of 2026 Page 38 of 40

“20. The decisions cited have uniformly held that res

judicata does not apply in matters pertaining to tax

for different assessment years because res judicata

applies to debar courts from entertaining issues on

the same cause of action whereas the cause of

action for each assessment year is distinct. The

Courts will generally adopt an earlier

pronouncement of the law or a conclusion of

fact unless there is a new ground urged or a

material change in the factual position. The

reason why the Courts have held parties to the

opinion expressed in a decision in one

assessment year to the same opinion in a

subsequent year is not because of any principle

of res judicata but because of the theory of

precedent or the precedential value of the

earlier pronouncement. Where facts and law in

a subsequent assessment year are the same, no

authority whether quasi-judicial or judicial can

generally be permitted to take a different view.

This mandate is subject only to the usual gateways

of distinguishing the earlier decision or where the

earlier decision is per incuriam. However, these are

fetters only on a coordinate Bench which, failing the

possibility of availing of either of these gateways,

may yet differ with the view expressed and refer the

matter to a Bench of superior strength or in some

cases to a Bench of superior jurisdiction.”

6.26. Therefore, this Court is of the considered view that the

Order-in-Appeal (Nos.123/CUS/CCP/2023 and 02/

CUS/CCP/2024), dated 30.09.2025, issued on

08.10.2025 (Annexure-1) is flawed and pernicious and

the Commissioner (Appeals), Bhubaneswar in the said

W.P.(C) No.1005 of 2026 Page 39 of 40

appeals arising out of the subject-Bills of Export could

not take a different view than what had already been

taken by the Principal Commissioner (Appeals) (In-Situ),

Bhubaneswar vide Order-in-Appeal dated 30.09.2023 in

Appeal bearing Nos.39/CUS/CCP/2023 and 110/CUS/

CCP/2020.

Conclusions:

7. Upholding the Order-in-Appeal dated 30.09.2025

(Annexure-1) apropos the present set of facts and

circumstances would not only contradict established

precedents but would also facilitate the Authorities to

revise/review/recall/revisit the findings and

observations made in earlier round of litigation. Giving

quietus to the issue already decided/adjudicated upon is

the policy, or else it would incentivise never-ending/

perpetual litigation on the same issue. The policy

described is central to the stability of the legal system,

ensuring protection of individuals from „double jeopardy‟

that once a competent Court has rendered a decision on

a specific set of facts qua the parties, the matter is laid

to rest permanently. In the wake of above discussions

and analysis of legal perspective, the Order-in-Appeal

dated 30.09.2025, (Appeal Nos. 123/CUS/CCP/ 2023

and 02/CUS/CCP/2024), issued on 08.10.2025

(Annexure-1) passed by the Commissioner (Appeals),

Bhubaneswar cannot withstand judicial scrutiny and

W.P.(C) No.1005 of 2026 Page 40 of 40

hence, it is liable to be set aside. This Court, therefore,

does so.

7.1. Having thus set aside the impugned Order, further order

is felt necessary to be given. The matter is now remitted

to the Commissioner (Appeals), Bhubaneswar to

consider the merit of the grounds of respective

appellants before him in Appeal Nos.123/CUS/CCP/

2023 and 02/CUS/CCP/ 2024 and after affording

opportunity of hearing to them may pass appropriate

orders keeping in view the observations made

hereinabove.

8. Ergo, the writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated

above and pending interlocutory application(s), if any,

shall stand disposed of, but in the circumstances there

shall be no order as to costs.

I agree.

(HARISH TANDON) (MURAHARI SRI RAMAN)

CHIEF JUSTICE JUDGE

High Court of Orissa, Cuttack

The 24

th February, 2026//Aswini/MRS/Laxmikant