As per case facts, the petitioner, a Warden-cum-Estate Officer, sought a higher pay scale, claiming his duties were identical to Hostel Superintendents and Estate Officers in other government departments. He ...
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CGHC010424462019 2026:CGHC:38338
AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Order Reserved on : 25.08.2026
Order Pronounced on : 31.08.2026
Order (Full) Uploaded on : 31.08.2026
Writ Petition (Service) No.10434 of 2019
Veerendra Singh Thakur, S/o Shri S.L. Singh Thakur, aged about 40
years, presently posted and working as Warden-Cum-Estate Officer,
In Regional Panchayat and Rural Development Training Centre,
Kurud, Tahsil and District Dhamtari, (Chhattisgarh)
... Petitioner
Versus
1 - State of Chhattisgarh, through The Secretary, Department of
Panchayat and Rural Development, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya,
Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur, (Chhattisgarh)
2 - The Secretary Department of Finance, Mahanadi Bhawan,
Mantralaya, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur, (Chhattisgarh)
3 - The Development Commissioner, Officer of The Development
Commissioner, Indrawati Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur,
(Chhattisgarh)
4 - The Director Thakur Pyarelal State Panchayat And Rural
Development Training Institute, Nimora, Raipur, District Raipur,
(Chhattisgarh)
5 - The Principal Regional Panchayat and Rural Development
Training Centre, Kurud, District Dhamtari, (Chhattisgarh)
... Respondents
Cause-title taken from Case Information System (CIS)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For Petitioner : Ms. Priyanka Rai, Advocate
For Respondents : Mr. Sharad Mishra, Panel Lawyer
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Single Bench: Hon’ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal
CAV Order
1.Invoking extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article
226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner herein has filed this
writ petition seeking quashment of order dated 22.06.2019
(Annexure-P/01), by which, petitioner’s representation for grant of
pay-scale of Rs.15,600-39,100/- with grade pay of Rs.6,600/- at par
with the Hostel Superintendent in SC and ST Development
Department and Estate Officers in Chhattisgarh Housing Board and
Prasad Mukharji International Institution of Information
Technology, on the principle of “equal pay for equal work”, has been
rejected finding no merit.
2.The aforesaid challenge has been made on the following factual
backdrop:-
2.1The Department of Panchayat and Rural Development issued
sanctioned set-up for Regional Panchayat and Rural Development
Training Centre, Kurud, sanctioning the post of “Warden-cum-Estate
Officer” in the pay scale of Rs. 4500-7000/-, for which, competitive
examination was held, in which, the petitioner also participated and
vide order dated 14.06.2013 and eventually he was appointed as
“Warden-cum-Estate Incharge” in the pay scale of Rs. 5200-20200/-
with Grade Pay of Rs. 2800/- and joined the said post accepting the
terms and conditions in the said appointment order. Thereafter, on
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07.12.2016 the petitioner submitted representation to the
respondent No. 3 alleging discrepancy between the sanctioned post
i.e. Warden-cum-Estate Officer and the designation of his appointed
post i.e. Warden-cum-Estate Incharge and sought revision of pay
scale of Rs.15,600-39,100/- with Grade Pay of Rs.6600/-.
2.2The said representation of the petitioner was duly forwarded
by the respondent No.3 and, accordingly, by order dated 31.01.2017,
the State Government corrected the designation of the petitioner
and re-designated the post as Warden-cum-Estate Officer”, however,
the pay-scale was not interfered with. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed
fresh representation claiming additional duties (i.e. Training
Incharge, Faculty) and reiterating his demand for grant of pay scale
of Rs.15,600-39,100/- with Grade Pay Rs.6600/- at par with the
Hostel Superintendent (SC & ST Development Department) and the
Estate Officers, posted at Dr. Shyama Prasad Mukharji
International Institution of Information Technology and
Chhattisgarh Housing Board, which was rejected by the impugned
order dated 22.06.2019, resulting to the filing of this writ petition.
3.It is the case of the petitioner that he performs duties and
functions identical to the Hostel Superintendents posted at SC & ST
Development Department and the Estate Officers posted at Dr.
Shyama Prasad Mukharji International Institution of Information
Technology and Chhattisgarh Housing Board and both posts carries
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pay scale of Rs.15,600-39,100/- with Grade Pay Rs.6,600/-. It is also
the case of the petitioner that he performs duties similar to the
aforesaid posts including additional responsibilities of Training
Incharge and Faculty and continuing him in a lower pay scale is
discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of
India. As such, the order dated 22.06.2019 (Annexure-P/01) rejecting
revision of pay-scale is illegal, arbitrary and violative of Article 14 &
13D of the Constitution of India.
4.The respondents/State has filed their return stating that the
sanctioned set-up dated 03.01.2003, for the Regional Panchayat &
Rural Development Training Centre, Kurud, provides for the post of
Warden-cum-Estate Officer in the pay scale of Rs. 4500-7000/- and
the petitioner was appointed on said post on 14/06/2013 in the pay
scale of Rs.5200-20200/- with Grade Pay Rs. 2800/-, which the
petitioner accepted with open eyes while joining the said post in
terms of the order of appointment, which is in accordance with the
departmental set-up established by the applicable rules. It is also
stated by the respondent-State that the correction of nomenclature
of the post vide order dated 31/01/2017 was purely an administrative
correction to align the designation with the sanctioned set-up and it
did not, and could not, by itself confer any right to a revised or
higher pay scale and the claim of the petitioner of parity with that of
the Hostel Superintendents posted at SC & ST Development
Department and the Estate Officers posted at Dr. Shyama Prasad
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Mukharji International Institution of Information Technology and
Chhattisgarh Housing Board is not at all tenable, as each of the
posts having distinct recruitment rules, qualifications, cadre
structure, employer/management & service conditions and as such,
deserves to be rejected.
5.It is also the stand of the respondent-State that entitlement to
equal/similar pay scale does not depend merely upon nomenclature
or the nature/volume of work performed, indeed, it requires an
evaluation of qualifications, mode of recruitment, duties, degree of
responsibility and the employer/establishment, which the petitioner
has neither pleaded nor established with material particulars.
Further, fixation of pay scale and equation of posts across
departments is a complex exercise falling within the domain of the
executive Government and expert bodies such as the Pay
Commission, having regard to the financial position and capacity of
the State to bear additional liability and this Court, ordinarily,
cannot sit in an appeal over such an exercise. Therefore, the
impugned order dated 22/06/2019 does not suffer from any
arbitrariness, mala fide or non-application of mind and rejection of
petitioner’s representation is just, legal and reasoned administrative
decision, which calls for no interference by this Court. Thus, the
present writ petition deserves to be dismissed.
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6.Ms. Priyanka Rai, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner
submits that the impugned order dated 22.06.2019 (Annexure-P/01)
is illegal, unsustainable and bad in law, therefore, the same is liable
to be set aside. She vehemently argued that the petitioner is entitled
for parity with the Hostel Superintendents posted at SC & ST
Development Department and the Estate Officers posted at Dr.
Shyama Prasad Mukharji International Institution of Information
Technology and Chhattisgarh Housing Board, as enshrined under
Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Learned counsel also submits
that the action of the respondents in rejecting the representation of
the petitioner is not only violative of the principles of equality, but
the same is also discriminatory and liable to be set aside. As such,
the present petition be allowed. And appropriate writ/direction be
issued.
7.Mr. Sharad Mishra, learned State counsel submits that
principle of “equal pay for equal work” is not a fundamental right
vested in any employee, though it is a constitutional goal under
Article 39(d) read with Articles 14 and 16. Fixation of pay and
equation of posts is a complex matter falling within the domain of
the executive and expert bodies such as the Pay Commission and
same is to be assessed having regard to relevant factors including
the financial position and capacity of the State Government and it is
not a matter in which the Court ordinarily re-appreciates. Learned
State counsel further submits that the burden lies on the petitioner
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to plead and establish, with cogent material particulars, that the
posts sought to be compared are identical in qualifications for
recruitment, mode of appointment, nature of duties, degree of
responsibility, quality of work, and common employer/establishment.
Bald assertions of ‘similar duties’, unsupported by comparative
material, cannot found a claim for parity. Even otherwise, the posts
relied upon by the petitioner i.e. Hostel Superintendent in SC and
ST Development Department and Estate Officer in Dr. Shyama
Prasad Mukharji International Institution of Information
Technology and Chhattisgarh Housing Board, both belong to entirely
different establishments with different management, recruitment
rules and service conditions than the Regional Panchayat and Rural
Development Training Centre, Kurud.
8.Learned State counsel further stated that the petitioner
accepted the post and pay scale of Rs. 5200-20200/- with Grade Pay
Rs. 2800/- at the time of his appointment in the year 2013 with full
knowledge of the sanctioned set-up and, now he cannot resile from
those terms. Even, the subsequent correction of designation vide
order dated 31/01/2017 was a limited clerical correction aligning the
appointment order with the sanctioned set-up and it is not an
admission of entitlement to higher pay and creates no vested right
for claiming parity with posts in other departments. Moreover,
differential pay scales across departments/institutions, founded on
differences in qualifications, duties, responsibility and quality of
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work, are inherent in service jurisprudence and are not, without
more, discriminatory or violative of Article 14. ‘Equality’ is a relative
concept to be judged on the entire facts, not on isolated similarity of
designation or function. In any event, the impugned order dated
22/06/2019 does not suffer from illegality, irrationality, mala fide or
procedural impropriety and the only grounds on which judicial
review under Article 226 could lie in a pay-fixation matter and none
of these has been demonstrated by the petitioner. Hence, the writ
petition, being devoid of merit, deserves to be dismissed.
9.I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their
rival submissions made herein-above and went through the record
with utmost circumspection.
10.In the case at hand, the claim of the petitioner is with regard to
grant of pay-scale of Rs.15,600-39,100/- with grade pay of Rs.6,600/-,
which is at par with the Hostel Superintendent posted in the SC and
ST Development Department and the Estate Officers posted in the
Chhattisgarh Housing Board and the Prasad Mukharji International
Institution of Information Technology on the principle of
“equality”/“equal pay for equal work” and one of the directive
principles enumerated in Part IV of the Constitution is that the
State shall direct its policy towards securing that there is equal pay
for equal work for both men and women. However, the directive
principles contained in Part IV of the Constitution are expressly
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declared by Article 37 not to be enforceable by any Court. It is,
however, now settled that that directive principles have to be read
into fundamental rights as a matter of interpretation and it has also
now been held that equal pay for equal work is not a fundamental
right but a constitutional goal (See: State of WB v. WB Minimum
Wages Inspectors Assn.
1
). The Supreme Court has unqualifiedly
declared that the principle of “equal pay for equal work” is not an
abstract doctrine but one of substance (See: Randhir Singh v. UOI
2
).
Equal pay for equal work would depend not only on the nature and
volume of work but also on the qualitative differences as reliability
and responsibility and though the functions may be the same, the
responsibilities do make a real and substantial difference (See: State
of Orissa v. Balaram Sahu
3
). The parameters to be considered are
functional parity, mode of recruitment, qualifications and
responsibilities attached, etc. (See: T. Venkateswarulu v. Tirumala
Tirupathi Devasthanams
4
). Where nature of duties and
qualifications are similar, source of recruitment cannot be a factor
for denying equal pay for equal work.
11.Furthermore, in this regard, the Supreme Court in the matter
of State of M.P. v. Ramesh Chandra Bajpai
5
, has held as under:
1(2010) 5 SCC 225
2AIR 1982 SC 879
32003 (1) SCC 250
4(2009) 1 SCC 546
5(2009) 13 SCC 635
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“15.In our view, the approach adopted by the learned
Single Judge and the Division Bench is clearly
erroneous. It is well settled that the doctrine of equal
pay for equal work can be invoked only when the
employees are similarly situated. Similarity in the
designation or nature or quantum of work is not
determinative of equality in the matter of pay scales.
The court has to consider the factors like the source
and mode of recruitment/appointment, qualifications,
the nature of work, the value thereof, responsibilities,
reliability, experience, confidentiality, functional need,
etc. In other words, the equality clause can be invoked
in the matter of pay scales only when there is
wholesale identity between the holders of two posts.”
12.In the matter of SAIL v. Dibyendu Bhattacharya
6
their
Lordships of the Supreme Court discussed all the relevant factors to
be considered for claiming parity invoking Article14 & 39(d) of the
Constitution of India and held in Para-30 & 31 as under:
“30.In view of the above, the law on the issue can be
summarised to the effect that parity of pay can be
claimed by invoking the provisions of Articles 14 and
39(d) of the Constitution of India by establishing that
the eligibility, mode of selection/recruitment, nature
and quality of work and duties and effort, reliability,
confidentiality, dexterity, functional need and
responsibilities and status of both the posts are
identical. The functions may be the same but the skills
and responsibilities may be really and substantially
different. The other post may not require any higher
qualification, seniority or other like factors. Granting
parity in pay scales depends upon the comparative
evaluation of job and equation of posts. The person
claiming parity, must plead necessary averments and
prove that all things are equal between the posts
concerned. Such a complex issue cannot be adjudicated
by evaluating the affidavits filed by the parties.
6(2011) 11 SCC 122
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31.The onus to establish the discrimination by the
employer lies on the person claiming the parity of pay.
The Expert Committee has to decide such issues, as
the fixation of pay scales, etc. falls within the exclusive
domain of the executive. So long as the value judgment
of those who are responsible for administration i.e.
service conditions, etc. is found to be bona fide,
reasonable, and on intelligible criteria which has a
rational nexus of objective of differentiation, such
differentiation will not amount to discrimination. It is
not prohibited in law to have two grades of posts in the
same cadre. Thus, the nomenclature of a post may not
be the sole determinative factor. The courts in exercise
of their limited power of judicial review can only
examine whether the decision of the State authorities
is rational and just or prejudicial to a particular set of
employees. The court has to keep in mind that a mere
difference in service conditions does not amount to
discrimination. Unless there is complete and
wholesale/wholesome identity between the two posts
they should not be treated as equivalent and the court
should avoid applying the principle of equal pay for
equal work.”
13.Further, in the case of Punjab SEB v. Thana Singh
7
, the
Supreme Court has held that equation of pay scales must be left to
the Government and on the decision of the experts and the Court
should not interfere with it and observed in Para-10, 15 & 19 as
under:
“10.It is fairly well settled that equation of pay scales
must be left to the Government and on the decision of
the experts and the Court should not interfere with it.
Observing that equation of pay scales of posts must be
left to the Government and the experts,
in SAIL v. Dibyendu Bhattacharya [SAIL v. Dibyendu
7(2019) 4 SCC 113
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Bhattacharya, (2011) 11 SCC 122 : (2011) 2 SCC (L&S)
192] , this Court held as under: (SCC p. 133, para 26)
“26. In Union of India v. S.L. Dutta [Union of
India v. S.L. Dutta, (1991) 1 SCC 505 : 1991 SCC
(L&S) 406] , Union of India v. N.Y. Apte [Union of
India v. N.Y. Apte, (1998) 6 SCC 741 : 1998 SCC
(L&S) 1673] , State of U.P. v. J.P. Chaurasia [State
of U.P. v. J.P. Chaurasia, (1989) 1 SCC 121 : 1989
SCC (L&S) 71] and Kshetriya Kisan Gramin
Bank v. D.B. Sharma [Kshetriya Kisan Gramin
Bank v. D.B. Sharma, (2001) 1 SCC 353 : 2001 SCC
(L&S) 1000] , this Court held that the
determination that two posts are equal or not, is a
job of the Expert Committee and the court should
not interfere with it unless the decision of the
Committee is found to be unreasonable or arbitrary
or made on extraneous considerations. More so, it is
an executive function to fix the service conditions,
etc. and lies within the exclusive domain of the
rule-making authority. (See also T.
Venkateswarulu v. TirumalaTirupathiDevasthana
ms [T. Venkateswarulu v. Tirumala
TirupathiDevasthanams, (2009) 1 SCC 546 : (2009)
1 SCC (L&S) 202] .)”
15.For considering the equation of posts, the
following factors had been held to be determinative:
1. The nature and duties of a post;
2. The responsibilities and powers exercised by the
officer holding a post, the extent of territorial or other
charge held or responsibilities discharged;
3. The minimum qualifications, if any, prescribed for
recruitment to the post; and
4. The salary of the post (vide Union of India v. P.K.
Roy [Union of India v. P.K. Roy, AIR 1968 SC 850] ).
19.The person claiming parity must produce material
before the court to prove that the nature of duties and
functions are similar and that they are entitled to
parity of pay scales. After referring to a number of
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judgments and observing that it is the duty of an
employee seeking parity of pay to prove and establish
that he had been discriminated against, this Court,
in SAIL [SAIL v. Dibyendu Bhattacharya, (2011) 11
SCC 122 : (2011) 2 SCC (L&S) 192] , held as under:
(SCC p. 131, para 22)
“22. It is the duty of an employee seeking parity of
pay under Article 39(d) of the Constitution of India
to prove and establish that he had been
discriminated against, as the question of parity has
to be decided on consideration of various facts and
statutory rules, etc. The doctrine of ‘equal pay for
equal work’ as enshrined under Article 39(d) of the
Constitution read with Article 14 thereof, cannot be
applied in a vacuum. The constitutional scheme
postulates equal pay for equal work for those who
are equally placed in all respects. The court must
consider the factors like the source and mode of
recruitment/appointment, the qualifications, the
nature of work, the value thereof, responsibilities,
reliability, experience, confidentiality, functional
need, etc. In other words, the equality clause can be
invoked in the matter of pay scales only when there
is wholesome/wholesale identity between the
holders of two posts. The burden of establishing
right and parity in employment is only on the
person claiming such right. (Vide U.P. State Sugar
Corpn. Ltd. v. Sant Raj Singh [U.P. State Sugar
Corpn. Ltd. v. Sant Raj Singh, (2006) 9 SCC 82 :
2006 SCC (L&S) 1610] , Union of
India v. Mahajabeen Akhtar [Union of
India v. Mahajabeen Akhtar, (2008) 1 SCC 368 :
(2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 183] , Union of
India v. Dineshan K.K. [Union of India v. Dineshan
K.K., (2008) 1 SCC 586 : (2008) 1 SCC (L&S)
248] , Union of India v. Hiranmoy Sen [Union of
India v. Hiranmoy Sen, (2008) 1 SCC 630 : (2008) 1
SCC (L&S) 271] , Official
Liquidator v. Dayanand[Official
Liquidator v. Dayanand, (2008) 10 SCC 1 : (2009) 1
SCC (L&S) 943] , U.P. SEB v. Aziz Ahmad [U.P.
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SEB v. Aziz Ahmad, (2009) 2 SCC 606 : (2009) 1
SCC (L&S) 418] and State of M.P.v. Ramesh
Chandra Bajpai [State of M.P. v. Ramesh Chandra
Bajpai, (2009) 13 SCC 635 : (2010) 1 SCC (L&S)
287] .)”
(emphasis in original)
14.The Supreme Court in the matter of Punjab State Corporation
Limited v. Rajesh Bindaland others
8
held that the burden of proof is
on the person claiming parity of pay scale and observed in Para-20 &
21 as under:
“20.Ordinarily, the scale of pay is fixed keeping in
view the several factors i.e.
(i) method of recruitment;
(ii) level at which recruitment is made;
(iii) the hierarchy of service in a given cadre;
(iv) minimum educational/technical qualifications
required;
(v) avenues of promotion;
(vi) the nature of duties and responsibilities; and
(vii) employer's capacity to pay, etc.
21.It is well settled that for considering the equation
of posts and the issue of equivalence of posts, the
following factors had been held to be determinative:
(i) The nature and duties of a post;
(ii) The responsibilities and powers exercised by the
officer holding a post, the extent of territorial or other
charge held or responsibilities discharged;
(iii) The minimum qualifications, if any, prescribed for
recruitment to the post; and
(iv) The salary of the post (vide Union of India v. P.K.
Roy [Union of India v. P.K. Roy, AIR 1968 SC 850]).”
8(2019) 3 SCC 547
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15.A careful reading of the above judgments (supra) would show
that it has been has consistently held that mere similarity in
designation or duties does not confer a right to equal pay. The
employee claiming parity must establish complete and wholesale
identity between the posts, having regard to the mode of
recruitment, qualifications, nature and extent of duties,
responsibilities, hierarchy, functional requirements and other service
conditions. Further, fixation and equation of pay scales are primarily
matters for the executive and expert bodies, and judicial interference
is warranted only where the differentiation is shown to be arbitrary
or irrational.
16.Applying the aforesaid principles to the present case, it is quite
vivid that the petitioner has merely compared his post of Warden-
cum-Estate Officer with the posts of Hostel Superintendent/Estate
Officer functioning in other departments/institutions and relied
upon similarity of certain duties and the nomenclature of the posts.
However, the petitioner has failed to establish that the posts are
identical in their source and mode of recruitment, prescribed
qualifications, service hierarchy, promotional avenues, duties,
responsibilities and functional requirements, as no material has ben
brought on the record to demostrate the said requirement. The
subsequent correction of his designation by the State to “Warden-
cum-Estate Officer” does not, by itself, establish equivalence with
the posts governed by different departmental set-ups. As such, the
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petitioner has failed to establish the foundational requirement for
invoking the doctrine of “equal pay for equal work” and, in the
absence of cogent material establishing wholesale identity between
the posts, the petitioner cannot claim the higher pay scale as a
matter of constitutional right merely on the ground that a higher
scale is attached to similarly described posts elsewhere.
Consequently, for the reasons mentioned herein-above, the case of
the petitioner claiming “equal pay for equal work” has rightly been
rejeted by the respondents vide impugned order dt. 22.06.2019. I do
not find any merit in this petition. It deserves to and is hereby
dismissed being meritless leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Sanjay K. Agrawal)
Judge
s@if
The recent judgment in Veerendra Singh Thakur v. State of Chhattisgarh, available on CaseOn.in, meticulously examines the complex interplay of the Equal Pay for Equal Work Principle and Pay Scale Disparity in Public Employment. This landmark decision by the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur offers crucial insights into the criteria for claiming salary parity, reinforcing established legal precedents regarding the executive's role in pay fixation.
The petitioner, Veerendra Singh Thakur, serving as a Warden-cum-Estate Officer at the Regional Panchayat and Rural Development Training Centre, Kurud, filed a writ petition seeking a higher pay scale. He argued for parity with Hostel Superintendents in the SC & ST Development Department and Estate Officers in the Chhattisgarh Housing Board and Prasad Mukharji International Institution of Information Technology, invoking the principle of “equal pay for equal work.” His claim was based on performing identical duties and additional responsibilities, asserting that his current lower pay scale was discriminatory and violated Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
The State respondents countered that the petitioner willingly accepted his initial pay scale of Rs. 5200-20200/- with a Grade Pay of Rs. 2800/- upon appointment in 2013. They argued that the subsequent administrative correction of his designation did not automatically entitle him to a revised or higher pay scale. Furthermore, the State emphasized that the posts being compared belonged to entirely different establishments, each with distinct recruitment rules, qualifications, cadre structures, management, and service conditions. They contended that pay scale fixation is a complex exercise falling within the domain of the executive and expert bodies like the Pay Commission, not for judicial re-evaluation, especially without substantial proof of “wholesale identity” between the posts.
The core legal question before the High Court was: Can the petitioner, a Warden-cum-Estate Officer, claim “equal pay for equal work” with Hostel Superintendents and Estate Officers in other departments/institutions based on alleged similar duties, despite differences in recruitment, qualifications, and organizational structures?
The Court, in addressing the petitioner's claim, referred to several established legal principles and Supreme Court judgments concerning the “equal pay for equal work” doctrine:
Legal professionals often find analyzing these specific rulings challenging. CaseOn.in's 2-minute audio briefs provide a concise yet comprehensive analysis, helping legal experts quickly grasp the nuances of such judgments without sifting through extensive documents.
Applying these principles, the High Court carefully reviewed the petitioner’s arguments. The Court noted that the petitioner’s claim for parity was based primarily on a comparison of job titles and a general assertion of similar duties, including additional responsibilities as Training Incharge and Faculty. However, the petitioner failed to provide concrete evidence to demonstrate “complete and wholesale identity” between his post and the comparative posts in other departments/institutions.
Crucially, the petitioner did not furnish material particulars regarding the source and mode of recruitment, prescribed qualifications, service hierarchy, promotional avenues, or the precise nature and extent of responsibilities and functional requirements for all the compared posts. Without such detailed comparative material, bald assertions of “similar duties” could not form the basis for a claim of pay parity.
The Court also considered the fact that the petitioner had accepted his initial appointment terms, including the specified pay scale. The subsequent administrative correction of his designation to “Warden-cum-Estate Officer” was correctly identified as a clerical correction to align with the sanctioned set-up and did not, by itself, create a right to a higher pay scale or establish equivalence with posts in different departmental structures.
The judiciary’s role in pay fixation matters is limited. Courts intervene only when differentiation is shown to be arbitrary, irrational, or mala fide. In this instance, the petitioner could not demonstrate that the respondents’ decision to reject his representation was arbitrary, irrational, or lacked proper reasoning.
The High Court of Chhattisgarh dismissed the writ petition. It concluded that the petitioner failed to meet the foundational requirement of establishing “wholesale identity” between his post and the posts with which he sought parity. Consequently, without cogent material to support his claim of discrimination and identical work, the petitioner could not claim a higher pay scale as a constitutional right. The impugned order of 22.06.2019, which rejected the petitioner’s representation, was upheld as just, legal, and a reasoned administrative decision.
The case of Veerendra Singh Thakur v. State of Chhattisgarh underscores the stringent requirements for invoking the “equal pay for equal work” principle. It reaffirms that mere similarity in designation or superficial duties is insufficient to demand pay parity. Claimants must provide concrete evidence of “wholesale identity” across various critical factors, including recruitment processes, qualifications, and the precise nature and responsibility of duties. The judgment also reiterates that pay fixation is primarily an executive function, with judicial intervention reserved only for instances of arbitrary or irrational decisions, not for re-evaluating complex administrative policies without compelling proof.
This judgment serves as a vital reference for legal professionals and students specializing in service law and constitutional law for several reasons:
All information provided in this analysis is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. While efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, readers should consult with a qualified legal professional for advice pertaining to their specific circumstances.
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