2026 INSC 705 1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.___ _____OF 2026

[ARISING OUT OF SLP ( CIVIL) NO. 23330 OF 2023]

VENKATESH A AND ANR. … APPELLANTS

VS.

K.M. VENKATAMUNIYAPPA (D) THR. LRS.

& Ors. …RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

DIPANKAR DATTA, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This civil appeal registers a challenge to the judgment and final order

dated 6

th

July, 2023

1

passed by the High Court of Karnataka at

Bengaluru

2

in RSA No. 397 of 2014 , dismissing the appeal of the

appellants under Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

3

. The

1

impugned judgment

2

High Court

3

CPC

2

decree of the first appellate court, which had reversed the decree of

dismissal of a suit by the trial court, thereby stood affirmed.

3. The facts giving rise to the present lis are delineated below:

3.1. Appellants, the defendants 1 and 2 before the trial court, are the

sons of late Thimmadasappa. A property measuring 1 acre and

18¼ guntas in Sy. No.1/4 originally belonged to Thimmadasappa.

He executed a registered sale deed dated 17

th

May, 1971

4

in favour

of Venkatappa, the defendant no.3. Subsequently, the defendant

no.3 conveyed the said property to Govindappa, the defendant

no.4 through a registered sale deed dated 24

th

March, 1972

5

.

Thereafter, the defendant no.4 sold the property to K.M.

Venkatamuniyappa, the plaintiff (since deceased and now

represented by the respondents 1 to 7, being his legal

representatives) by a registered sale deed dated 31

st

May, 1973

6

.

3.2. Some years later, Sy. No. 162, also measuring 1 acre and 18¼

guntas and originally belonging to the Temple of Lord Desha

Narayanaswamy, was re-granted to Thimmadasappa pursuant to

an order dated 5

th

August, 1982.

3.3. Nearly a decade and a half later, on 13

th

March, 1997 to be precise,

a rectification deed was executed between the defendant no. 4

and the plaintiff in respect of Sale Deed III, whereby the survey

4

Sale Deed I

5

Sale Deed II

6

Sale Deed III

3

number mentioned therein was corrected from Sy . No. 1/4 to Sy.

No. 162.

3.4. On 17

th

October 2005, Thimmadasappa executed a registered

partition deed whereby the property bearing Sy . No. 162 was

partitioned between the appellants.

4. Aggrieved thereby, the plaintiff instituted O.S. No. 334 of 2007 out of

which this appeal arises. A declaration was sought that the partition

deed executed between Thimmadasappa and the appellants was not

binding upon the plaintiff. A further declaration was sought that the

plaintiff was the absolute owner in lawful possession of the suit schedule

property

7

. Plaintiff also sought a decree of permanent injunction

restraining the defendants from alienating, encumbering, creating any

charge over, or otherwise interfering with the suit schedule property.

5. Before the trial court, the plaintiff contended that the rectification deed

dated 13

th

March, 1997 had been executed solely to correct an error in

Sale Deed III relating to the survey number of the property, whereby

Sy. No. 1/4 was substituted with Sy. No. 162. It was further contended

that since the revenue authorities had failed to mutate the plaintiff’s

name in the revenue records, Thimmadasappa and the appellants took

7

Schedule

“ALL THAT PIECE AND PARCEL of the property measuring 1 acre 18 % guntas, situated at

Bodhigere Village, Channarayapatna Hobli, Devanahalli

Taluk, Bangalore District, bounded on the;

East by: Anjanappa's Land and now belonging to Venkatapathi

West by: Land earlier belonging to Veknatashamappa, & now belonging to Ganeshappa

North by: Anneyappa's Land now belonging to Sri. Srinivas

South by: Venkatamma's land now belonging to Lakshminarayana ”

4

advantage of such omission and proceeded to partition the property

amongst themselves.

6. Appellants, on the other hand, contended that the suit schedule

property bearing Sy. No. 162 was an Inam land belonging to the Temple

of Lord Desha Narayanaswamy and that their father, Thimmadasappa,

was merely its Barvardar (custodian). Upon abolition of the Inam, the

said land was re-granted to him in the year 1982, following which he

remained in possession thereof. After the partition, the appellants

claimed to have continued in possession and enjoyment of the property.

It was further contended by the appellants that Sale Deeds I to III

pertained exclusively to Sy. No. 1/4 and not to Sy. No. 162 and,

therefore, the suit schedule property was distinct from the property

conveyed by Thimmadasappa by Sale Deed I to the defendant no.3.

7. The trial court dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff on the ground that

the plaintiff had failed to establish either his ownership of or possession

over the suit schedule property, or that Sy. No. 162 and Sy. No. 1/4

were one and the same property. The trial court particularly noted the

admission made by the plaintiff during cross-examination that the two

survey numbers referred to distinct properties. It further held that

Thimmadasappa and his sons were fully entitled to execute a partition

deed in respect of his own property, i.e., Sy. No. 162, and that the

plaintiff could not challenge the same, especially when he had failed to

prove the identity of the two properties.

5

8. Aggrieved thereby, the plaintiff preferred an appeal under Section 96 of

the CPC

8

before the first appellate court. The first appellate court framed

the following issues for determination:

1. Whether appellant/plaintiff proved that he was the absolute owner

of the suit property and there was a mistake in the sale deed

about survey number it was corrected by rectification deed?

2. Whether appellant/plaintiff proved before the trial court that he

was in actual possession and enjoyment of the property and there

was interference in his possession?

3. Whether appellant/plaintiff proved before the trial court that

partition deed entered into between Thimmadasappa and

defendant No. 1 & 2 dated 17.10.2005 is null and void and not

binding on rights of the plaintiff?

4. Whether findings of learned trial judge is perverse, illegal,

arbitrary, and erroneous and interference by this court is

required?

5. What Order?

9. The court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree passed

by the trial court, and decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff by

declaring him to be the absolute owner of the suit schedule property. The

court further declared that the partition deed dated 17

th

October, 2005

was not binding upon the plaintiff and restrained the appellants from

interfering with the plaintiff’s peaceful possession and enjoyment of the

suit schedule property. Liberty was also granted in favour of the plaintiff

to approach the competent revenue authorities for mutation of his name

in the revenue records.

10. While arriving at the aforesaid conclusion, the first appellate court

compared Sale Deed I with the partition deed and observed that the

boundaries mentioned in both documents were identical. On that basis,

8

Regular Appeal No. 41 of 2011

6

the court held that the property originally sold by Thimmadasappa was,

in fact, Sy. No. 162.

11. Dissatisfied with the judgment and decree of the first appellate court

reversing the decree of the trial court, the appellants preferred a second

appeal

9

before the High Court challenging the legality and correctness

thereof. In course of admitting the appeal, the High Court framed the

following substantial question of law for determination:

“When the Trial Court on the basis of the evidence placed on record

dismissed the suit instituted by the respondent by appreciating the

evidence on record, whether the First Appellate Court was justified in

reversing the Judgment and decree of Trial Court and in doing so, did

not assign appropriate and valid reasons to overcome the findings of

the Trial Court and thereby committing illegality in the impugned

Judgment and Decree?”

12. By the impugned judgment, the High Court dismissed the second appeal,

affirmed the decree passed by the first appellate court and held that the

properties in Sy. Nos. 1/4 and 162 are the same property.

13. Having failed to obtain a reversal of the decree of the first appellate court

and crestfallen with dismissal of their second appeal by the impugned

judgment, the appellants have carried the same in appeal before us.

14. Learned counsel for the parties have been heard. We have also perused

the materials on record.

15. The following questions arise for decision:

a. Whether the first appellate court was justified in reversing the

reasoned findings of the trial court despite the admitted position of

9

Regular Second Appeal No. 397 of 2014

7

the subject matter of the sale deeds being Sy. No. 1/4, and not Sy.

No.162?

b. Whether the first appellate court could have decreed the suit in

favour of the plaintiff upon a conjectural comparison of the

boundaries of the properties, in the absence of any pleading to that

effect?

c. Whether the rectification deed dated 13

th

March, 1997, executed

by Govindappa, the defendant no.4 without the participation or

consent of the original vendor, i.e., Thimmadasappa, could alter the

identity of the property earlier conveyed from S urvey No.1/4 to

Survey No. 162?

d. Whether the High Court was justified in declining interference with

the first appellate decree?

16. The questions framed above are intertwined and overlap in material

respects. The principal issue is whether the first appellate court was

justified in reversing the well-reasoned findings of the trial court. The

answer to that question depends upon whether the plaintiff established

the identity of the suit property through proper pleadings and evidence,

whether the rectification deed could legally alter the identity of the

property conveyed under the earlier sale deeds, and whether the first

appellate court reversed the findings of the trial court on legally

sustainable grounds. We shall examine these aspects in that sequence

8

before considering the correctness of the High Court's judgment

affirming the appellate decree.

17. A brief recapitulation of the facts would reveal that the plaintiff sought

declaration of title and injunction in respect of the suit schedule property

situated at Boodigere village on the strength of a rectification deed dated

13

th

March, 1997, which was executed subsequent to three preceding

sale deeds of the seventies of the last century between different

transferors and transferees, i.e., Sale Deeds I, II and III. Significantly,

the property was sought to be identified by boundaries and not by its

number, i.e., Sy. No. 162, a course of action which is permissible under

Order VII Rule 3, CPC. The trial court, upon appreciation of oral and

documentary evidence, dismissed the suit holding, inter alia, that the

plaintiff had failed to establish that Sy.No.1/4 and Sy.No.162 were one

and the same property and he also failed to prove possession. The first

appellate court reversed the decree and the High Court, in second appeal,

affirmed such reversal.

18. At the very outset, having regard to the chain of transactions in the

present case, it is noticed that Sale Deed I executed by Thimmadasappa

in favour of the defendant no.3, Sale Deed II executed by the defendant

no.3 in favour of the defendant no.4 and Sale Deed III executed by the

defendant no.4 in favour of the plaintiff, are consistent qua the

description of the property conveyed as Sy. No.1/4. What was required

to be pleaded by the plaintiff is that Sy. No. 1/4 and Sy. No.162 denoted

9

the same property. Unfortunately, at the heart of the matter lies the lack

of pleading by the plaintiff in the plaint to that effect, that is, Sy. No. 1/4

and Sy. No.162 are the same property. Another equally important aspect

is the lack of any pleading that Thimmadasappa owned no property other

than Sy. No.162 and that the description in the earlier deeds suffered

from a mutual mistake. In the written statement, the appellants

categorically stated that the two survey numbers denote entirely

different properties. Indisputably, no court can grant relief on a case

which is not pleaded. The evidence on record, far from supporting the

plaintiff, also evinces that in his cross examination, the plaintiff himself

as PW-1 admitted that prior to purchase he had verified the mother deeds

of the properties, and followingly admitted that Sy. No.1/4 and Sy.

No.162 were distinct properties. This is evinced from the deposition,

extracted hereinbelow:

4) It is correct to say that the Schedule Property belonged to

Deshanarayanaswamy Temple. It is not correct to say that the said

property has been continuously enjoyed by the descendants of

Deshanarayanaswamy. It is correct to say that the lands in Sy. No.

1/4 & 162 of Budigere Village are totally different from each other. It

is not correct to say that Sy. No. 1/4 was sold by Thimmadasappa in

favour of Venkatappa. It is not correct to say that the said person

thereafter sold the same property in favour of the fourth Defendant.

To the suggestion that the Govindappa sold the same property to us,

the witness states that he has sold Sy. No. 162.

(emphasis ours)

19. The trial court was right in treating this admission as significant ,

militating against the plaintiff’s own case. Read together with the

absence of any pleading or evidence establishing the identity of Sy. No.

1/4 and Sy. No. 162, the plaintiff was not entitled to the reliefs claimed

10

in the suit. However, the said categorical admission was discarded by the

first appellate court without assigning any cogent reasons.

20. The first appellate court’s reasoning was premised upon assumptions not

founded either on pleadings or on evidence. The court had concluded that

the boundaries mentioned in the three sale deeds corresponded to the

suit schedule property and, therefore, the survey number alone was

erroneously mentioned. However, a conjunctive reading of the

boundaries extracted in the record shows material variations. The court

had, in fact, proceeded on the footing that there had been an interchange

of northern and southern boundaries, although no amendment in this

regard was effected in the plaint. A relief, which is premised on a case

not pleaded, cannot be sustained in law.

21. The decision in Trojan & Co. Ltd. v. Nagappa Chettiar

10

lends

credence to the afore-stated position. At the dawn of the Constitution,

this Court had the occasion to declare that the decision of a case cannot

be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties and it is the

case pleaded that has to be found; and, without an amendment of the

plaint, the court is not entitled to grant the relief not asked for. For

obtaining an unclaimed relief, prayer to amend the plaint has to be made

so as to incorporate in it an alternative case.

22. Furthermore, the first appellate court could not have embarked upon an

enquiry into the alleged interchange of the boundaries of the properties

10

(1953) 1 SCC 456

11

without there being a prayer or averment or even a point arising for

determination to that effect. The same has been captured best in the

decision in Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal

11

. We quote the

instructive passage hereinbelow:

13. The object of issues is to identify from the pleadings the

questions or points required to be decided by the courts so as to

enable parties to let in evidence thereon. When the facts necessary

to make out a particular claim, or to seek a particular relief, are not

found in the plaint, the court cannot focus the attention of the parties,

or its own attention on that claim or relief, by framing an appropriate

issue. As a result the defendant does not get an opportunity to place

the facts and contentions necessary to repudiate or challenge such a

claim or relief. Therefore, the court cannot, on finding that the

plaintiff has not made out the case put forth by him, grant some

other relief. The question before a court is not whether there is some

material on the basis of which some relief can be granted. The

question is whether any relief can be granted, when the defendant

had no opportunity to show that the relief proposed by the court

could not be granted. When there is no prayer for a particular relief

and no pleadings to support such a relief, and when the defendant

has no opportunity to resist or oppose such a relief, if the court

considers and grants such a relief, it will lead to miscarriage of

justice. Thus it is said that no amount of evidence, on a plea that is

not put forward in the pleadings, can be looked into to grant any

relief.

23. Pertinently, no attempt was made by the plaintiff to establish through

any survey records, village maps, phodi sketches or any

contemporaneous revenue documents that Sy. No.1/4 and Sy. No.162

represented one and the same parcel of land. Neither was any

Commissioner appointed, nor any expert evidence led to demonstrate

identity of the properties. In the absence of such evidence, the first

appellate court proceeded to decree the suit solely on assumptions drawn

11

(2008) 17 SCC 491

12

from perceived similarities in boundaries. Such an approach is clearly

unsustainable in law.

24. Equally unsustainable is the conjecture drawn by the first appellate court

from the testimony of DW -1, to state that Thimmadasappa had no

property other than Sy. No.162. What DW-1 indeed stated was that the

partition deed of 2005 referred only to Sy. No.162 and not any other

property. The relevant extract of the testimony reads:

It is correct to say that I have not described the devolution of title

over the property in my father’s favour in the partition deed produced

by me. It is correct to say that excepting Sy. No. 162 measuring 1

Acre 18 Guntas, it is not written in the partition deed that my father

owned any other property. It is not correct to say that as per Ex. D2

mutation extract Item No. 5, my father has in his name an extent of

20 Guntas in Sy. No. 162. The person named in Ex. D2 with respect

to the said property is not my father.

25. From such statement, it was impermissible to infer that Thimmadasappa

did not own Sy. No.1/4 in 1971, particularly when the very case of the

appellants was that Sy. No.1/4 had already been conveyed decades

earlier. The inference drawn by the first appellate court is, thus, plainly

conjectural.

26. There is yet another aspect which the first appellate court, and by

extension, the High Court failed to address. On the plaintiff’s own

showing, Sy. No.162 originally belonged to Desha Narayanaswamy

Temple and occupancy rights in favour of Thimmadasappa we re granted

only on 5

th

August, 1982; yet, Sale Deed I purportedly conveyed Sy.

No.1/4. The subsequent rectification deed dated 13

th

March, 1997 was

executed only by the defendant no.4 (the plaintiff’s vendor) and not by

13

Thimmadasappa, the original executant in Sale Deed I. A rectification

deed cannot, in the guise of correcting an error, substitute the very

subject matter of a prior conveyance without participation of the original

transferor. What was sought to be achieved through the rectification deed

was not correction of a clerical mistake simpliciter but substitution of one

property having a specific survey number by another altogether distinct

property. Such unilateral alteration could not divest the appellants of the

rights flowing from the subsequent grant and partition.

27. We may, however, note that neither the trial court nor the first appellate

court invoked Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882

12

. Equally,

no argument founded upon the said provision was advanced by either

side before the High Court. It was the High Court which, on its own accord

and for the first time, proceeded to invoke Section 43 of the ToP Act.

28. Before adverting to the applicability of Section 43 of the ToP Act, it

becomes necessary to examine the legal competence of the rectification

deed dated 13

th

March, 1997. The rights asserted by the plaintiff in

respect of Sy. No.162 are founded entirely upon this document. If the

rectification deed is incapable of conferring title, every subsequent

transaction resting upon it must necessarily be tested in that light.

29. It is found that the High Court relied on the decision of this Court in N.

Venkateshappa v. Munemma

13

regarding the doctrine embodied in

12

ToP Act

13

(2016) 4 SCC 147

14

Section 43 of the ToP Act and for invoking the principle that a re-grant of

an Inam land may enure to the benefit of an earlier alienee. In our view,

the same does not advance the plaintiff’s case any further. The said

decision is clearly distinguishable for it proceeded on the foundational

premise that the property which was the subject matter of the earlier

transfer and the property which was subsequently re -granted are one

and the same. It is only upon such identity being established that the

doctrine of feeding the grant by estoppel or the principle relating to Inam

re-grants can be invoked. In the present case, however, that foundational

fact itself remains unproved. Plaintiff's title deed and the earlier sale

deeds consistently describe the property as Sy.No.1/4, whereas the re-

grant relates to Sy.No.162. Plaintiff neither pleaded nor proved that both

survey numbers represented the same parcel of land; indeed, the

evidence noticed above points otherwise. Once the identity of the suit

schedule property itself is left in doubt, the legal consequences flowing

from Section 43 of the ToP Act or from the law governing Inam re-grants

do not arise for consideration at all. The High Court, by proceeding

directly to apply those principles without first returning a clear finding on

identity, in effect, placed the legal cart before the factual horse.

30. Does Section 26 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963

14

have any application

here? The said provision embodies a limited equitable jurisdiction. The

provision kicks into operation on the assumption that the parties to an

14

SR Act

15

instrument had arrived at a common intention which, by reason of fraud

or mutual mistake, was inaccurately reflected in the document executed

between them. Rectification, therefore, rectifies the expression of a

concluded bargain; it does not substitute one bargain for another. The

provision is intended to remove an error in recording the transaction and

not to alter the essential subject matter of the transaction itself.

31. The said distinction assumes pronounced significance in light of the

uniqueness writ large in the facts of the present case. Sale Deed I

executed by Thimmadasappa conveyed Sy. No.1/4. Sale Deed II

conveyed the very same property. Sale Deed III again described the

property as Sy. No.1/4. The rectification deed executed in 1997, however,

seeks to substitute Sy. No.162 in place of Sy. No.1/4. We repeat, this is

not a case where an erroneous recital is corrected while preserving the

identity of the property conveyed. It is a case where the identity of the

property itself stands altered. Such an exercise traverses beyond the

permissible confines of Section 26 of the SR Act.

32. Equally cardinal is the fact that the original transferor, namely

Thimmadasappa, was not a party to the rectification deed. If the very

fulcrum of rectification is the common intention of the parties to the

original transaction, the participation of the original executant assumes

obvious importance. A transferee deriving title under an instrument

cannot, together with his successor, lawfully alter the subject matter of

a conveyance executed by another person. To hold otherwise would

16

permit derivative holders of title to enlarge the estate conveyed by their

predecessor without the predecessor's concurrence.

33. The matter may also be examined from another perspective. The

principle embodied in the maxim nemo dat quod non habet admits of no

exception in the present case. No person can convey a better title than

he himself possesses. If Thimmadasappa never conveyed Sy. No.162,

the defendant no.3 acquired no title thereto. The defendant no.4 too

could not, therefore, acquire any such title. It necessarily follows that the

defendant no.4 could not convey Sy. No.162 to the plaintiff merely by

executing a rectification deed. A derivative title cannot outvalue the title

from which it is derived.

34. Since Thimmadasappa continued to retain title to Survey No.162,

notwithstanding the rectification deed executed by and between the

plaintiff and the defendant no. 4, the inclusion of the said property in the

partition deed executed between him and his sons cannot be faulted.

35. The first appellate court had proceeded on the footing that once the

boundaries of both the properties had resemblance, the rectification deed

necessarily validated the substitution of survey numbers. In our

considered opinion, this approach runs counter to the correct legal

inquiry. The question was not whether the rectification deed existed, but

whether it was competent in law so as to alter the identity of the property

conveyed under the earlier sale deeds itself. Unless that foundational

question was answered in the affirmative, the rectification deed could not

17

perfect the plaintiff's title to Survey No.162, nor could the partition deed

be declared void at his instance.

36. Even as the very preliminary step, the plaintiff’s title over Sy. No.162 is

nebulous. A plaintiff seeking declaration of title must succeed on the

strength of his own case and not on the perceived weakness of the

defence. It is trite that title cannot rest on surmises or probabilities. The

burden squarely rested on the plaintiff to establish that the property

conveyed under Sale Deeds I, II and III, though described throughout as

Sy. No.1/4, was in reality Sy. No.162. Such burden remained

undischarged.

37. The conduct of the plaintiff is equally relevant. Although the rectification

deed is of the year 1997, admittedly no effort was made to have the

revenue entries changed in his favour. Even until the institution of the

suit in 2007, the revenue entries consistently stood in the name of

Thimmadasappa and, thereafter, in the names of the appellants. While it

is trite that revenue entries themselves do not confer title, they may be

seen as evidence regarding possession. A total absence of any

contemporaneous assertion of right by the plaintiff over Sy. No.162 for

nearly a decade after the alleged rectification deed is a circumstance

which the first appellate court failed to accord due weight.

38. The infirmities canvassed in the preceding discussion are not mere

tenuous errors in the appreciation of evidence. They unravel a more

fundamental jurisdictional error committed by the High Court while

18

exercising powers under Section 100 of the CPC. Upon a threadbare

consideration of the impugned judgment, the findings recorded by the

High Court, in our considered opinion, are rendered perverse for the

reasons ad seriatim assigned hereafter.

39. First, the substantial question of law framed at the threshold required

the High Court to examine whether the judgment of the first appellate

court, reversing the well-reasoned findings of the trial court, did not

suffer from any perversity. However, instead of testing the legality of the

reversal, the High Court too proceeded to re-affirm findings founded

upon assumptions and conjectures. In doing so, the High Court

overlooked that the first appellate court had travelled beyond the

pleadings and had discarded material admissions without assigning

cogent reasons. The enquiry ought to have been whether the first

appellate court had legally dislodged the trial court's findings on the

identity of the property; the validity of the rectification deed; the

plaintiff's admissions and proof of possession. There is not an iota of

discussion in the impugned judgment addressing this enquiry. Rather ,

while upholding the finding that the property conveyed under Sale Deed

I, the High Court embarked upon an independent factual enquiry and

supplied fresh reasons to buttress the findings. In doing so, it brought an

altogether new factual premise into picture that there had been an

interchange of the northern and southern boundaries, although no such

case was ever pleaded or proved by the plaintiff at any point of time.

19

40. Secondly, the High Court also introduced an entirely new legal edifice by

invoking Section 43 of the ToP Act, although the plaintiff never pleaded

the ingredients thereof nor premised any of his reliefs on the said

provision. A fortiori, neither the trial court nor the first appellate court

had anchored their conclusions on the said provision. A conclusion based

on a contention never advanced, in our considered opinion, renders itself

perverse.

41. Thirdly, the High Court failed to deal with the material admissions made

by PW-1, particularly his admission that both Survey No. 1/4 and Survey

No. 162 were distinct survey numbers and that he had inspected the title

documents before purchasing the property. These admissions negated

the very sub-stratum of the plaintiff’s case and could not have been

ignored without recording reasons.

42. The impugned judgment, therefore, is indefensible.

43. For the foregoing reasons, we are of the considered opinion that the

judgment and decree passed by the first appellate court reversing the

decree of the trial court, since affirmed by the High Court, suffer from

manifest errors of law and a complete misappreciation of the evidence

on record. The trial court, we hold, was perfectly justified in dismissing

the suit.

44. Consequently, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and

decree dated 6

th

July, 2023 of the High Court passed in RSA No.397 of

2014 affirming the judgment and decree dated 22

nd

February, 2014

20

passed by the first appellate court in R.A. No.41 of 2011, stand set aside.

The decree dated 15

th

October, 2011 passed by the trial court in O.S.

No.334 of 2007 dismissing the suit is restored.

45. In the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.

..……....…………………J .

(DIPANKAR DATTA)

..…..………………………J.

(VIPUL M. PANCHOLI)

NEW DELHI;

JULY 14, 2026.