2026 INSC 926 Page 1 of 21

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 4083 OF 2026

[ARISING OUT OF SLP (C RL.) NO. 12330 OF 2026]

VIJAY KUMAR RAJPOOT

ALIAS VIJJU … APPELLANT

VS.

STATE OF CHHATTISGARH & ORS. … RESPONDENT S

J U D G M E N T

DIPANKAR DATTA, J.

1. The High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur

1

, by the impugned

judgment and order dated 22

nd

January, 2026

2

, has spurned the

appellant’s challenge in a writ petition

3

to an order of externment and,

while dismissing such petition, relegated him to the alternative

statutory remedy of appeal under Section 9 of the Chhattisgarh Rajya

Suraksha Adhiniyam, 1990

4

.

2. Appellant had approached the High Court assailing an ex parte order

of externment dated 04

th

November, 2025

5

, passed by the District

1

High Court

2

impugned order

3

WPCR No. 16 of 2026

4

Adhiniyam

5

impugned externment order or said order, as per contextual requirement

Page 2 of 21

Magistrate, Raigarh

6

, whereby the appellant was directed to remove

himself from the territorial limits of Raigarh district and contiguous

districts for a period of one year.

3. The genesis of the impugned externment order lies in a memorandum

7

dated 03

rd

April, 2019, submitted by the Superintendent of Police,

Raigarh

8

, to the third respondent, recommending initiation of

proceedings against the appellant to extern him under Sections 5(a)

and (b) of the Adhiniyam. This was premised on the appellant’s alleged

involvement in ten criminal cases registered between the years 2009

and 2019. Acting on it, the third respondent by an order dated 3

rd

May,

2019 registered a case

9

for externment of the appellant.

4. An order dated 06

th

October, 2025

10

followed, whereby the case came

to be closed by the third respondent. Recording that the appellant had

been acquitted in the criminal cases re ferred to by the fourth

respondent in the memorandum; that, no fresh police report had been

submitted against him after the year 2019 ; and that, in the

circumstances, initiation of externment based on the criminal cases

registered between 2009 and 2019 was not justified , the third

respondent closed the case by letting off the appellant with a warning

to refrain from indulging in criminal activities in future.

6

third respondent

7

No. Pu.A./Raig./Reader-1/Jila Badar/04/19

8

fourth respondent

9

Criminal Case No. 03/2019

10

closure order

Page 3 of 21

5. Pertinently, two subsequent developments intervened, reigniting the

controversy. First, an FIR bearing Crime No. 117/2023 was registered

against the appellant and others under Sections 292 and 292-C(2) and

(3) of the Chhattisgarh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956, in connection

with the alleged unauthorised development of a colony on land

admeasuring 2.13 acres at Boirdadar, Raigarh. Secondly, on 30

th

October, 2025, an FIR bearing Crime No. 483/2025 came to be

registered against the appellant at Police Station Chakradhar Nagar

under Sections 296, 299, 302, 352 and 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya

Sanhita, 2023

11

[corresponding to Sections 294, 295A, 298, 504 and

34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), respectively] and Section

3(1)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of

Atrocities) Act, 1989

12

, on the allegation that he had recorded and

circulated on social media a video containing abusive remarks against

Baba Guru Ghasidas, a revered figure of the Satnami community.

Appellant was arrested the same day and lodged in the District Jail,

Raigarh.

6. Consequently, the fourth respondent submitted a fresh report dated

03

rd

November, 2025

13

to the third respondent, bringing to his notice

the aforesaid developments and seeking reconsideration of the closure

order. Acting upon the fresh report, the third respondent recalled the

11

BNS

12

SC/ST Act

13

No. Pu.A./Raig./Reader-1/Jila Badar/04/2025

Page 4 of 21

order dated 06

th

October, 2025, and vide the impugned externment

order recorded as follows:

“On the basis of the aforesaid report dated 03 -11-2025 of the

Superintendent of Police, Raigarh, upon reconsideration of the case,

it is found that the non-applicant has clearly violated the order dated

06-10-2025 of this Court by committing the aforesaid criminal acts.

Due to the said criminal acts of the non -applicant, there is

resentment among the Satnami community, and there is public

outrage among members of the Sindhi community, Agrawal

community, and other communities as well. From the said conduct,

it is clearly reflected that the non-applicant is a habitual offender.

Even after the aforesaid action, there is no improvement in the

conduct of the non-applicant, and if he continues to reside in the

district while remaining involved in criminal activities, there remains

an apprehension of occurrence of untoward incidents. The non -

applicant is hazardous to society, and if left free, there is every

likelihood of adverse impact on society and commission of further

offences. The criminal activities of the non-applicant have resulted in

infringement of the fundamental rights of the general public and have

adversely affected law and order as well as public order. For

maintaining the security of the State and law and order, it has

become necessary to extern the non-applicant from this district and

adjoining districts.

Therefore, a separate order has been passed for externment (district

banishment) of the non-applicant Vijay Kumar alias Vijju, son of late

Mohanlal Rajput. A copy of the order be sent to all concerned for

necessary action.

Let the case be consigned to the record room.”

(emphasis ours)

7. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant knocked the doors of the High Court

albeit unsuccessfully as noted above.

8. Mr. Pallav Mongia, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

appellant, while assailing the impugned order has specifically drawn

our attention to the manner in which the impugned externment order

was passed ex parte, contending that it constitutes a flagrant violation

of the principles of natural justice. He submits that the said order was

passed by the third respondent behind the appellant’s back while he

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was in custody in connection with Crime No. 483/2025. According to

him, the appellant was unaware of revival of the externment

proceedings and only learned of the said order upon his transfer from

District Jail, Raigarh, to District Jail, Bilaspur. The impugned

externment order, according to him, stands vitiated owing to clear

breach of the statutory safeguard, ingrained in Section 8, of being

provided with a notice and/or an opportunity of hearing. He further

contends that the factual foundation underlying the apprehension

against the appellant has substantially eroded, inasmuch as the High

Court has quashed Crime No. 117/2023 vide order dated 04

th

September, 2024

14

, and the appellant has since been enlarged on bail

in the only surviving matter, namely, Crime No. 483/2025, vide order

dated 22

nd

April, 2026

15

. He additionally submits that the third

respondent lacked any statutory power, express or implied, to suo

motu review, recall, or reopen his own closure order, by which the

externment proceedings had been expressly closed. He, accordingly,

submits that since the impugned externment order was ex facie

vitiated by breach of the principles of natural justice as well as by want

of jurisdiction, the self-imposed restriction of asking a party to exhaust

the alternative remedy could not have operated as a bar to the

exercise of writ jurisdiction by the High Court. The High Court, he

finally contends, erred in relegating the appellant to the remedy under

14

CRMP No. 2398 of 2024

15

CRA No. 841 of 2026

Page 6 of 21

Section 9 of the Adhiniyam without examining these fundamental

infirmities.

9. Per contra, Ms. Ankita Sharma, learned counsel appearing on behalf of

the respondents, defends the impugned order by pointing out to

Section 9 of the Adhiniyam. Placing reliance on the decision of this

Court in Jittu Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh & Ors.

16

, Ms. Sharma

argues that the appellate remedy itself constitutes an integral

procedural safeguard and a substantive right that should not ordinarily

be bypassed. She strongly contends that the impugned externment

order was not a de novo action or an impermissible review, but rather

a continuation of the already initiated proceedings based on

supervening events – specifically the appellant’s blatant disregard of

the prior warning and his subsequent involvement in fresh criminal

acts. She further contends since the appellant had already been

afforded an opportunity of hearing in the proceedings culminating in

the closure order, there was no requirement in law to extend a fresh

opportunity before passing the said order which, according to her, was

merely in the nature of an order of reconsideration. Emphasizing the

preventive, rather than punitive, nature of the externment jurisdiction,

Ms. Sharma additionally submits that the registration of Crime No.

483/2025 (involving derogatory and abusive remarks against a

revered saint of the Satnami community) sparked public outrage and

created a severe, immediate threat to public order and social peace,

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2026 INSC 657

Page 7 of 21

thereby justifying the third respondent’s preventive action irrespective

of the subsequent grant of bail or the quashing of a separate FIR.

Finally, she submits, in the alternative, that if this Court were satisfied

that the High Court should not have relegated the appellant to the

available statutory remedy of appeal provided by Section 9 of the

Adhiniyam, an order of remand to the High Court would be most

appropriate meeting the ends of justice.

10. Learned counsel for the parties have been patiently heard and the

materials on record duly perused.

11. At the outset, we may note that undisputedly Crime No. 117/2023

(which formed one of the foundational grounds for extern ing the

appellant) stands quashed by the High Court and that the appellant,

though figuring as an accused in Crime No. 483/2025, is not accused

of murder but of a less heinous crime resulting in his enlargement on

bail. It is equally not in dispute that the impugned externment order

was passed upon revival of the closed case without prior notice to the

appellant and without affording him an opportunity of hearing, at a

time when he was in judicial custody in connection with Crime No.

483/2025.

12. Before we proceed further, it is indeed important to note the statutory

scheme of the Adhiniyam. The Adhiniyam contemplates the making of

externment orders under Sections 3 to 6 in specified circumstances.

In the present case, the impugned externment order has been passed

Page 8 of 21

in exercise of powers conferred by Section 5 of the Adhiniyam. Section

5 is extracted below for ease of understanding:

5. Removal of persons about to commit offence .

- Whenever it appears to the District Magistrate-

(a) that the movements or acts of any person are causing or

calculated to cause alarm, danger or harm to person or property; or

(b) that there are reasonably grounds for believing that such person

is engaged or is about to be engaged in the commission of an offence

involving force or violence or an offence punishable under Chapter

XII, XVI or XVII or under Section 506 or 509 of the Indian Penal

Code, 1860 (45 of 1860) or in the abatement of any such offence,

and when in the opinion of the District Magistrate witnesses are not

willing to come forward to give evidence in public against such person

by reason of apprehension on their part as regards the safety of their

person or property; or

(c) that an outbreak of epidemic disease is likely to result from the

continued residence of an immigrant;

the District Magistrate may, by an order in writing duty served on

him or by beat of drum or otherwise as the District Magistrate thinks

fit, direct such person or immigrant-

(a) so as to conduct himself as shall seem necessary in order to

prevent violence and alarm or the outbreak or spread of such

disease; or

(b) to remove himself outside the district or my part thereof or such

area and any district or districts or any part thereof, contiguous

thereto by such route within such time as the District Magistrate may

specify and not to enter or return to the said district or part thereof

or such area and such contiguous districts, or part thereof, as the

case may be, from which he was directed to remove himself.

13. However, once the District Magistrate is prima facie satisfied that

circumstances do exist for ordering externment of an individual on any

of the grounds mentioned in Section 5, such magistrate is required to

follow Section 8. Again, for ease of understanding, we quote Section 8

below:

8.Hearing to be given before order under Section 3, 4, 5 or 6

is passed.

(1) Before an order under Section 3, 4, 5 or 6 is passed against any

person, the District Magistrate shall inform the person in writing of

the general nature of the material allegations against him and give

him a reasonable opportunity of tendering an explanation regarding

them.

Page 9 of 21

(2) If such person makes an application for the examination of any

witness produced by him, the District Magistrate shall grant such

application and examine such witnesses unless for reason to be

recorded in writing, the District Magistrate is of opinion that such

application is made for the purpose of vexation or delay.

(3) Any written statement put in by such person shall be filed with

the record of the case and such person shall be entitled to appear

before the District Magistrate by any legal practitioner for the

purpose of tendering his explanation and examining the w itnesses

produced by him.

(4) The District Magistrate proceeding under sub-section (1) may. for

the purpose of securing the attendance of any person against whom

any order is proposed to be made under Section 3, 4, 5 or 6 require

such person to appear before him and to execute a se curity bond

with or without sureties for such attendance during the inquiry.

(5) If the person fails to execute the security bond as required or fails

to appeal before the District Magistrate during the inquiry, it shall be

lawful for the District Magistrate to proceed with the enquiry ex parte

and thereupon such order, as was prop osed to be passed against

him, may be passed.

14. The statutory ordainment is, thus, clear: before any externment order

is passed, inter alia, under Section 5, an opportunity of hearing has to

be given under Section 8 to the person proposed to be externed.

15. The procedures for presenting an appeal against any order passed

under Sections 3 to 6 and for its disposal are provided in Section 9.

For facility of reference, the same reproduced below:

9. Appeal.

(1) Any person aggrieved by an order under Section 3, 4, 5 or 6 made

by the District Magistrate or any other officer specially empowered

under Section 13 may appeal to the State Government within thirty

days from the date of such order. Such appeal shall be decided as far

as possible within a period of four months of the date of filing of the

appeal.

(2) An appeal under this section shall be preferred in the form of a

memorandum setting forth concisely the grounds of objection to the

order appealed against, and shall be accompanied by a certified copy

thereof.

(3) On receipt of such appeal, the State Government may after giving

a reasonable opportunity to the appellant to be heard either

personally or by a legal practitioner and after such further inquiry, if

any, as it may deem necessary confirm, vary or rescin d the order

appealed against:

Page 10 of 21

Provided that the order appealed against shall remain in operation

pending the disposal of the appeal, unless the State Government

otherwise directs.

(4) In calculating the period of thirty days provided for an appeal

under this Section, the time taken for granting a certified copy of the

order appealed against shall be excluded.

16. The High Court declined to invoke its writ jurisdiction under Article 226

of the Constitution and dismissed the writ petition of the appellant on

the specious ground that he has not pursued the efficacious statutory

remedy of appeal provided by Section 9 of the Adhiniyam. In so

holding, the High Court refrained from examining the appellant’s plea

on merits that the impugned externment order was rendered in breach

of the principles of natural justice as well as without jurisdiction and,

therefore, was liable to be invalidated on such grounds alone.

17. The sole substantial question of law involved in this appeal is whether

impugned externment order passed by the third respondent is legal

and valid, and also as to whether the High Court was justified in

refusing to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction.

18. On consideration of the facts and materials on record vis-à-vis the law

applicable to the grievance expressed by the appellant, we have

absolutely no hesitation in rejecting the contention of the respondents

that while passing an order under Section 5 upon reopening of a closed

case, requirement of putting on notice the person proposed to be

externed or afforing him a hearing may not be insisted upon and can

be dispensed with. Neither material nor authority has been placed on

record in support of this contention. Even otherwise, after perusing the

Page 11 of 21

scheme of the Adhiniyam in its entirety, we find nothing therein which

lends credence to this contention.

19. We may now advert to the scheme of Section 8 of the Adhiniyam. Sub-

section (1) thereof, as noted earlier, makes it abundantly clear that

issuance of notice by the competent authority, namely, the District

Magistrate, and affording the proposed externee a reasonable

opportunity of hearing constitute conditions precedent for the exercise

of power under Sections 3 to 6. The object of the provision is to ensure

that a person, against whom an externment order is proposed, is made

aware of the material allegations against him and afforded an effective

opportunity to tender his explanation thereto. It necessarily follows

that an order passed in derogation of these mandatory requirements

would stand vitiated and liable to be declared void ab initio.

20. Sub-section (2) further confers upon such person the right to seek

examination of witnesses in support of his explanation and casts a

corresponding obligation on the District Magistrate to allow such

request, unless he forms an opinion that the application has been

made only for the purpose of vexation or delay. Sub -section (3)

recognises the right of the person concerned to be represented by a

legal practitioner in the proceedings. These sub -sections further

underscore the importance of natural justice emb edded within the

legislative scheme.

21. Equally significant are sub-sections (4) and (5), which must be read

conjointly. While sub-section (4) empowers the District Magistrate to

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require the execution of a bond, with or without sureties, to secure the

attendance of the person concerned during the enquiry, sub -section

(5) provides that where such person either fails to execute the bond

or, having executed the same, fails to appear b efore the District

Magistrate, it shall be lawful for the latter to proceed ex parte. The

legislative scheme, thus, contemplates only these specified

contingencies as exceptions to the general requirement of participation

by the affected person in the proceedings. Save and except such

situations, the statute does not authorise the District Magistrate to

dispense with notice or hearing and proceed ex parte.

22. In the facts of the present case, the circumstances contemplated by

sub-section (5) are admittedly absent. Consequently, there was no

statutory basis for dispensing with compliance of the mandatory

requirements of notice and opportunity of hearing before t he

impugned externment order came to be passed.

23. It would also be apposite to consider the decision of this Court against

a similar factual backdrop in Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of

Gujarat

17

, which dealt with the legality of an externment order passed

under the Bombay Police Act, 1951 vis-à-vis Section 59 thereof which

mandated reasonable opportunity of hearing before such an order

could be passed. Hon’ble Krishna Iyer, J. in his ever so inimitable style

held as under:

14. Where hearing is obligated by a statute which affects the

fundamental right of a citizen, the duty to give the hearing sounds in

17

(1974) 2 SCC 121

Page 13 of 21

constitutional requirement and failure to comply with such a duty is

fatal. Maybe that in ordinary legislation or at common law a tribunal,

having jurisdiction and failing to hear the parties, may commit an

illegality which may render the proceedings voidable when a direct

attack is made thereon by way of appeal, revision or review, but

nullity is the consequence of unconstitutionality and so without going

into the larger issue and its plural divisions, we may roundly conclude

that the order of an administrative authority charged with the duty

of complying with natural justice in the exercise of power before

restricting the fundamental right of a citizen is void and ab initio of

no legal efficacy. The duty to hear manacles his jurisdictional exercise

and any act is, in its inception, void except when performed in

accordance with the conditions laid down in regard to hearing.

Maybe, this is a radical approach, but the alternative is a traversty of

constitutional guarantees, which leads to the conclusion of post-

legitimated disobedience of initially unconstitutional orders. On the

other hand law and order will be in jeopardy if the doctrine of

discretion to disobey invalid orders were to prevail. As Learned Hand

observed:

“The idea that you may resist peaceful arrest ... because you

are in debate about whether it is lawful or not, instead of going

to the authorities which can determine (the question is) not a

blow for liberty but, on the contrary, a blow for attempted

anarchy.”

The opposite view is expressed by the California Supreme Court in a

case where one Yick came into the country unlawfully but was held

by the deputy sheriff without authority. He escaped and his abettor

in the escape was convicted but in appeal the Court held:

“An escape is classed as a crime against public justice, and the

law, in declaring it to be an offense, proceeds upon the theory

that the citizen should yield obedience to the law; that when

one has been, by its authority or command, confined in a

prison, that it is his duty to submit to such confinement until

delivered by due course of law. But when the imprisonment is

unlawful, and is itself a crime, the reason which makes flight

from prison an offence does not exist. In such a case the right

to liberty is absolute, and he who regains it is not guilty of the

technical offence of escape.”

American case-law is conflicting and doubtful expressions like “void

on its face” “transparently invalid” have been used. We must

remember the words of Justice Frankfurter: “If one man can be

allowed to determine for himself what is law, every man can. That

means first chaos, then tyranny”. We dwell on these possible views

to underscore the difficulties of solution.

(emphasis ours)

Page 14 of 21

24. Ergo, in our considered opinion, the impugned externment order is

liable to be set aside premised on breach of the statutory mandate in

Section 8 of the Adhiniyam alone, apart from breach of the audi

alteram partem rule.

25. Turning to the point of jurisdiction, it is revealed from the aforesaid

narrative of facts that the third respondent found no justification in

initiation of the case based on the memorandum of the fourth

respondent and, consequently, closed it with a warning. It is settled

law that an administrative authority enjoys no power to review his

earlier order, unless the statute empowers him to do so. We have not

been shown any such empowering provision and, therefore, it has to

be held that the third respondent exercised a jurisdiction not vested in

him by law. We also hold that breach of the warning, if any, without

anything more could not have clothed the third respondent with the

power to reopen the closed case. Since a fresh report from the fourth

respondent was received, the third respondent was statutorily obliged

to repeat the procedure envisioned in Section 8 of the Adhiniyam.

There being failure/omission/neglect in this behalf on the part of the

third respondent, the impugned externment order cannot sustain law.

26. Having held that the impugned externment order fails on both counts

of non-adherence to the rule of a meaningful and effective hearing

guaranteed by Section 8 of the Adhiniyam and the lack of jurisdiction

of the District Magistrate to open a closed case, as if it were having

the power of review and exercising it, we are surprised that in a case

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of such egregious violation of law the High Court chose to maintain a

hands-off approach and relegated the appellant to the alternative

statutory remedy under Section 9 thereof. This Court, on a review of

all precedents, in its decision in Godrej Sarah Lee Ltd. v. The Excise

and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority

18

has delineated

the difference between “entertainability” and “maintainability” of a writ

petition under Article 226 and reiterated the four situations when a

writ court could justifiably entertain a petition under Article 226 of the

Constitution despite the party aggrieved not having exhausted the

available statutory remedy.

27. This happens to be one such case where the High Court grossly erred

in not entertaining the writ petition of the appellant. Relegation of the

appellant to the statutory remedy under Section 9 of the Adhiniyam is

plainly demonstrative of an abject failure to exercise a jurisdiction

vested in the High Court.

28. Since it has been submitted that an order of remand would be

appropriate owing to the merits of the challenge not having been

examined by the High Court, we do not wish to rest our judgment here.

We are satisfied, for the reasons following, that the impugned

externment order cannot be sustained even on its own merits.

29. The impugned externment order, purportedly, was passed in exercise

of powers under clauses (a) and (b) of Section 5 of the Adhiniyam.

However, upon a plain reading of the said order and the statutory

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2023 SCC OnLine SC 95

Page 16 of 21

provision, we are of the considered view that invocation of Section 5(b)

was wholly misconceived. First, the said order records that a criminal

case had been registered against the appellant for offences punishable

under Sections 292 and 292-C(2) and (3) of the Chhattisgarh Municipal

Corporation Act, 1956. More significantly, the said order places

substantial reliance on another criminal case registered against the

appellant for offences punishable under Sections 296, 299, 302, 352

and 3(5), BNS and Section 3(1)(v) of the SC/ST Act. According to the

District Magistrate, the registration of the said case, arising out of

allegations of insulting a saint revered by a particular community, had

generated resentment and public outrage amongst members of

various communities and, consequently, constituted a violation of the

closure order whereby the appellant was warned not to repeat his

criminal activities.

30. In this context, it becomes necessary to notice the requirements of

Section 5(b). The provision can be invoked only where there exist s

reasonable grounds for believing that the person concerned is

engaged, or is about to be engaged, in the commission of an offence

involving force or violence, or in the commission of specified categories

of offences enumerated therein. Admittedly, none of the offences of

which the appellant is accused and which have been relied on by the

third respondent in the impugned externment order are offences

involving force or violence. Equally, the offences alleged against the

appellant do not fall within the categories contemplated by Section

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5(b), namely, offences under Chapters XII, XVI or XVII of the IPC or

offences punishable under Sections 506 or 509 thereof. On the

contrary, the allegations against the appellant pertain to offences

which correspond to the provisions contained in Chapter XV of the IPC

relating to offences affecting religion. In the absence of commission of

offences, as required for an order to be passed under Section 5(b), the

conditions precedent for exercise of power were clearly not satisfied.

The impugned externment order, therefore, cannot be sustained on

the face of what Section 5(b) of the Adhiniyam provides.

31. Be that as it may, we now proceed on the assumption that the

impugned externment order was intended to be founded solely on

Section 5(a) of the Adhiniyam. The said provision empowers the

District Magistrate to direct externment where the acts of a person are

causing, or are calculated to cause, alarm, danger or harm to persons

or property. The language employed in the provision is of wide

amplitude and is capable of encompassing a variety of situations

including, conceivably, the allegations levelled against the appellant in

the present case. However, the breadth of the power is matched by

the seriousness of its consequences. An order of externment directly

impinges upon valuable fundamental freedoms guaranteed to a citizen

and, therefore, cannot be made as a matter of routine or on mere ipse

dixit. Further, merely because multiple criminal cases have been

registered against a person would not, ipso facto, be a ground for

ordering externment. Before exercising such power, the District

Page 18 of 21

Magistrate is required to arrive at a bona fide and informed subjective

satisfaction that the circumstances of the case warrant such an

extreme measure and that externment is necessary to prevent the

apprehended mischief. Although the authority is not expected to

render a judgment in the manner expected of a court of law, the order

must nonetheless disclose, at least in broad terms, the reasons which

persuaded it to arrive at such satisfaction. The existence of objective

material and a discernible nexus between such material and the

conclusion reached are indispensable safeguards against arbitrary

exercise of power.

32. Tested on the aforesaid touchstone, the impugned externment order

falls short of the statutory requirement. Apart from recording that the

conduct attributed to the appellant had generated resentment and

public outrage amongst members of certain communities, the said

order does not indicate the material on the basis of which such

conclusion was reached. No reasons are forthcoming to demonstrate

why the third respondent considered the situation to be so grave as to

necessitate the appellant’s externment. Furthermore, no material has

been placed on record to show why the offences alleged require the

appellant to be externed. More importantly, as noticed earlier, the

appellant was neither served with notice nor afforded an opportunity

to tender his explanation before the order came to be passed.

Page 19 of 21

33. At this juncture, it would be apposite to note a recent decision of this

Court in Deepak v. State of Maharashtra

19

, where again an

externment order under the Bombay Police Act was under challenge.

The relevant paragraphs from such decision are reproduced below:

8. As observed earlier, Section 56 makes serious inroads on the

personal liberty of a citizen guaranteed under Article 19(1)(d) of the

Constitutionof India. In Pandharinath Shridhar Rangnekar v Commr.

of Police [Pandharinath Shridhar Rangnekar v. Commr. of Police,

(1973) 1 SCC 372 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 341] in para 9, this Court has

held that the reasons which necessitate or justify the passing of an

extraordinary order of externment arise out of extraordinary

circumstances. In the same decision, this Court held that care must

be taken to ensure that the requirement of giving a hearing under

Section 59 of the 1951 Act is strictly complied with. This Court also

held that the requirements of Section 56 must be strictly complied

with.

9. There cannot be any manner of doubt that an order of externment

is an extraordinary measure. The effect of the order of externment

is of depriving a citizen of his fundamental right of free movement

throughout the territory of India. In practical terms, such an order

prevents the person even from staying in his own house along with

his family members during the period for which this order is in

subsistence. In a given case, such order may deprive the person of

his livelihood. It thus follows that recourse should be taken to Section

56 very sparingly keeping in mind that it is an extraordinary

measure. For invoking clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 56,

there must be objective material on record on the basis of which the

competent authority must record its subjective satisfaction that the

movements or acts of any person are causing or calculated to cause

alarm, danger or harm to persons or property. For passing an order

under clause (b), there must be objective material on the basis of

which the competent authority must record subjective satisfaction

that there are reasonable grounds for believing that such person is

engaged or is about to be engaged in the commission of an offence

involving force or violence or offences punishable under Chapters XII,

XVI or XVII IPC. Offences under Chapter XII are relating to coin and

government stamps. Offences under Chapter XVI are offences

affecting the human body and offences under Chapter XVII are

offences relating to the property. In a given case, even if multiple

offences have been registered which are referred in clause (b) of sub-

section (1) of Section 56 against an individual, that by itself is not

sufficient to pass an order of externment under clause (b) of sub-

section (1) of Section 56. Moreover, when clause (b) is sought to be

invoked, on the basis of material on record, the competent authority

must be satisfied that witnesses are not willing to come forward to

19

(2023) 14 SCC 707

Page 20 of 21

give evidence against the person proposed to be externed by reason

of apprehension on their part as regards their safety or their

property. The recording of such subjective satisfaction by the

competent authority is sine qua non for passing a valid order o f

externment under clause (b).

***

12. Considering the nature of the power under Section 56, the

competent authority is not expected to write a judgment containing

elaborate reasons. However, the competent authority must record its

subjective satisfaction of the existence of one of the grounds in sub-

section (1) of Section 56 on the basis of objective material placed

before it. Though the competent authority is not required to record

reasons on a par with a judicial order, when challenged, the

competent authority must be in a position to show the application of

mind. The court while testing the order of externment cannot go into

the question of sufficiency of material based on which the subjective

satisfaction has been recorded. However, the court can always

consider whether there existed any material on the basis of which a

subjective satisfaction could have been recorded. The court can

interfere when either there is no material or the relevant material

has not been considered. The court cannot interfere because there is

a possibility of another view being taken. As in the case of any other

administrative order, the judicial review is permissible on the

grounds of mala fides, unreasonableness or arbitrariness.

***

14. As the order impugned takes away fundamental right under

Article 19(1)(d) of the Constitution of India, it must stand the test of

reasonableness contemplated by clause (5) of Article 19. Considering

the bare facts on record, the said order shows non -application of

mind and smacks of arbitrariness. Therefore, it becomes vulnerable.

The order cannot be sustained in law.

(emphasis ours)

34. In light of the aforementioned discussion, and whichever way one

looks at it, the impugned externment order is infirm and indefensible

and cannot be sustained for want of any cogent reasons in support

thereof.

35. Respondents have relied on Jittu Yadav (supra). The question of law

before this Court was whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963

stood excluded (either expressly or by necessary inclusion) in its

application to a belated appeal presented under Section 9 of the

Page 21 of 21

Adhiniyam. This Court answered the question in the negative. We need

not express any opinion since this decision does not have any bearing

on the issues that we are seized of.

36. Therefore, in our considered opinion, the impugned order of the High

Court as well as the externment order is liable to be quashed for the

foregoing reasons. It is ordered accordingly.

37. Appellant is free to enter the districts from where his externment was

ordered.

38. We, however, make it clear that none of our observations here shall

be treated as findings on the merits of the pending case(s) in which

the appellant figures as an accused.

39. The appeal stands allowed on the above terms. Pending application(s),

if any, shall also stand disposed of.

…………………………….J.

(DIPANKAR DATTA )

…………………………….J.

(SHEEL NAGU)

NEW DELHI;

AUGUST 31, 2026.