CS(COMM) 1161/2024 Page 1 of 30
$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of Decision: 12
th
September, 2025
+ CS(COMM) 1161/2024 & I.A. 48983-48984/2024
WOW MOMO FOODS PRIVATE LIMITED .....Plaintiff
Through: Mr. Chander M. Lall, Sr. Adv. with Mr.
Ankur Sangal and Mr. Ankit Arvind,
Advs.
versus
WOW BURGER & ANR. .....Defendants
Through: None.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MANMEET PRITAM SINGH ARORA
% J U D G M E N T
MANMEET PRITAM SINGH ARORA, J:
I.A. 48983/2024 (Application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC)
1. The present application has been filed under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2
of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [‘CPC’] seeking interim injunction against
the Defendants.
2. The underlying suit has been filed by the Plaintiff inter alia seeking the
relief of permanent injunction against the Defendants from infringing the
Plaintiff’s trademarks by using the mark ‘WOW’/ ‘WOW! BURGER’, passing
off etc.
CS(COMM) 1161/2024 Page 2 of 30
Case Setup by the Plaintiff
3. Mr. Chander M. Lall, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the
Plaintiff has set up the case of the Plaintiff as under:
3.1. The Plaintiff is a private limited company established in Kolkata. The
Plaintiff through its predecessor, coined and adopted the trade mark ‘WOW!’/
‘WOW! MOMO’ in the year 2008. Since the year 2008 the Plaintiff has been
rendering services in food catering, dine-in, delivery, take away format
restaurants in more than 30 cities with over 600 outlets, with valuation of Rs.
1225 Crores (in 2021).
3.2. The Plaintiff is stated to have revolutionized the food market with its
house mark ‘WOW!’. The mark ‘WOW!’ is stated to form the essential and
significant feature of almost all the trademarks of the Plaintiff. It is stated that
the consumer associates the mark ‘WOW!’ and other formative marks with the
Plaintiff alone.
3.3. The Plaintiff has expanded its operation in various food segments and
some of them are reproduced hereinafter: ‘’, ‘ ’, ‘
’, ‘ ’, ‘ ’, ‘ ’, ‘ ’, ‘ ’, ‘
’, ‘ ’, ‘ ’, ‘ ’, ‘ ’.
3.4. Due to continuous use of the mark ‘WOW! BURGER’ along with other
formative marks of the Plaintiff since 2009, the Plaintiff has garnered substantial
CS(COMM) 1161/2024 Page 3 of 30
goodwill and reputation and therefore the mark ‘WOW!’ is exclusively
associated with the Plaintiff.
3.5. In order to statutorily safeguard its rights over its various ‘WOW!’
formative trademarks, the Plaintiff has obtained trademark registrations which
are reproduced herein under:
CS(COMM) 1161/2024 Page 4 of 30
CS(COMM) 1161/2024 Page 5 of 30
3.6. The Plaintiff has a registered domain name/website
www.wowmomo.com, which was registered on 28.07.2013 in its favour.
3.7. The details of the sale turnover of the Plaintiff’s products are given at para
‘18’ of the plaint, and for the year 2023-2024 the same is Rs. 453.932 Crores.
The amount spent by the Plaintiff on promotion of its brand and trademarks is
given at para ‘21’ of the plaint and for the year 2023-2024 the same is Rs. 10.37
Crores.
3.8. The Plaintiff also has substantial social media presence on (i) Facebook
with 657,000+ likes and 656,000+ followers; (ii) Instagram with around 94,700+
followers; and (iii) LinkedIn with 42,000+ followers.
3.9. The Plaintiff has been vigilant about its trademarks and has obtained
various orders from this Court protecting its trademarks, the details of the same
is given at para ‘28’ of the plaint.
CS(COMM) 1161/2024 Page 6 of 30
3.10. In December, 2024 the Plaintiff got to know of the intended launch of the
Defendant No.1’s business activities in India under the impugned mark ‘WOW
BURGER’/ ‘ ’/ ‘ ’, in collaboration with Defendant No.
2, by the LinkedIn post of the Defendant No.2.
3.11. He stated that the Defendants have slavishly copied the dominant/essential
feature ‘WOW!’ for identical goods and services. He stated that ‘WOW!’ is the
essential feature of the trademark of the Plaintiff which has been copied by the
Defendants and therefore on this ground alone the injunction must be granted in
favour of the Plaintiff. In this regard, he relied upon the judgment of this Court
in M/s Amar Singh Chawal Wala v. M/s Shree Vardhman Rice and Genl.
Mills
1
.
3.12. He stated that the trademark of the Plaintiff has to be compared with the
impugned mark of the Defendants as a whole
2
and thereafter the said comparison
would show that both the marks are exactly similar.
3.13. He stated that the mark ‘WOW!’ is arbitrary and is not associated with the
food/restaurant industry. He stated that the said mark is not descriptive or generic
for the food products or services and therefore, the said mark is at best distinctive
and/or suggestive.
3
3.14. He stated that due to continuous and extensive use since 2008, the
Plaintiff’s trademarks including ‘WOW!’ series of marks have acquired
secondary meaning due to immense goodwill and reputation of the Plaintiff.
1
2009 SCC OnLine Del 1690.
2
Amritdhara Pharmacy v. Satya Deo Gupta, AIR 1963 SC 449, at Paragraphs 6 to 8.
3
Bata India Limited v. Chawla Boot House & Anr., 2019 SCC OnLine Del 8147, at Paragraphs 27 to 32.
CS(COMM) 1161/2024 Page 7 of 30
3.15. He stated that it is a settled principle of law
4
that the disclaimer on some
trademarks does not disentitle the Plaintiff from enforcing its right in part, of the
trademark, against the third-party.
3.16. He stated that the stand taken by the Plaintiff in respect of third-party’s
trade mark in response to the objections of the Registrar of Trademarks cannot
be held as an estoppel
5
against the Plaintiff in the present proceedings, because
it relates to a different party/mark.
3.17. He stated that considering that the goods and services of both the parties
in question relate to the food industry grant of injunction becomes necessary.
3.18. He stated that in these facts the Plaintiff has established a prima facie case
in its favour, the balance of convenience also lies in favour of the Plaintiff and
against the Defendants and irreparable injury will be caused in case an order of
injunction is not granted.
3.19. The learned counsel for the Plaintiff has filed written submissions dated
28.07.2025.
Analysis and Findings
4. This Court has heard the learned Senior Counsel for the Plaintiff and
perused the record.
5. The captioned application was listed before this Court on 19.12.2024,
wherein the predecessor Bench of this Court issued notice to the Defendants.
Since none appeared on behalf of the Defendant No.1 after service of summons
and notice, the right of the Defendant No.1 to file written statement was closed
vide order dated 09.07.2025.
4
Sona Mahindra Pvt. Ltd. v. Sona BLW Precision Forgings Ltd. and Ors., 2023 SCC OnLine Del 2184 at
Paragraphs 39, 40, 55 and 56 and Cadbury India Ltd. & Ors. v. Neeraj Food Products, ILR (2007) II Delhi
1065 at Paragraphs 68 and 79.
5
Telecare Network India Pvt. Ltd. v. Asus Technology Pvt. Ltd., 2019 SCC OnLine Del 8739, at Paragraphs 41
and 42.
CS(COMM) 1161/2024 Page 8 of 30
6. The Defendant No.2 has also been served as recorded by this Court in the
order dated 25.07.2025, but none has appeared on behalf of the Defendant No.2
throughout.
7. The captioned application was finally heard on 30.07.2025 and the
judgment was reserved and none appeared on behalf of the Defendants on the
said date as well.
8. The Plaintiff has filed the captioned application seeking the following
relief:
“a. An order of interim injunction restraining the Defendants, their
proprietors, partners or directors, as the case may be, its principal officers,
servants, distributors, licensees, dealers and agents, and all others acting
for and on behalf of the Defendants from selling, offering for sale,
advertising, directly or indirectly dealing in any goods and services under
the impugned trade mark “WOW”/ “WOW BURGER”/ /
or any other mark as may be identical to or deceptively
similar with the Plaintiff’s Trade Marks “WOW! BURGER” / “WOW!
MOMO” and other “WOW” formative trademarks, so as to cause
infringement of the Plaintiff’s registered trademarks as well as passing
off”
No Trademark Registration for ‘WOW’/’WOW BURGER’ in Favour of the Plaintiff
9. The Plaintiff in the fact of the present case claims that in the year 2008 the
predecessor of the Plaintiff coined the mark ‘WOW!’ and ‘WOW! MOMO’ in
Calcutta and subsequently got registrations with user claim of 2008. It is
pertinent to note that all the registration certificates which have been placed on
record by the Plaintiff only shows the registration in the composite marks i.e.,
‘WOW! MOMO’, ‘WOW! DIMSUM’, ‘WOW! THUNDERZZ’, ‘WOW !
CHICKEN’, ‘WOW! ACTIVE’, ‘WOW! CHINA’, ‘WOW! CHINESE’,
‘WOW! MOMO INSTANT’, ‘WOW! EATS’ and ‘WOW! CHIPS’.
CS(COMM) 1161/2024 Page 9 of 30
9.1. At the outset it is pertinent to note that no registration details have been
placed on record which would show that the Plaintiff has trademark registration
for the mark ‘WOW!’ or ‘WOW! BURGER’.
9.2. It is further pertinent to note that some of the registration certificates
which are placed before this Court records that the Plaintiff cannot use any
individual word of the composite marks in a standalone manner and claim
exclusivity thereof.
9.3. The trademark registrations therefore, show that the initial trademark
adopted by the Plaintiff was ‘WOW MOMO’ and subsequently other formative
marks. No registration for the mark ‘WOW’ was ever applied by the Plaintiff as
per the record. Therefore, the assertion of the Plaintiff that the mark ‘WOW’ was
also adopted by the predecessor of the Plaintiff in the year 2008, is not borne out
from the record.
9.4. The record relied upon by the Plaintiff is also wholly deficient on the use
of mark ‘WOW BURGER’ as a trademark/brand and this aspect has been dealt
in detail in subsequent part of the judgment.
Whether ‘WOW’ is the Distinctive/Dominant mark of the Plaintiff
10. The Plaintiff contends that ‘WOW’ constitutes the essential, dominant and
distinctive feature of its trademarks. It is however, important to note that ‘WOW’
is a dictionary word of common use, employed as an exclamatory remark in the
English language. Such expression which are part of ordinary parlance, have
consistently been held by the Courts to fall in the category of non-distinctive and
or descriptive marks, incapable of exclusive use by one single individual/entity.
In this regard it would be pertinent to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court
and certain decisions of this Court as well as Court of other jurisdictions which
have dealt with similar subject matter:
CS(COMM) 1161/2024 Page 10 of 30
(i) Recently, the Supreme Court in Pernod Ricard India (P) Ltd. v.
Karanveer Singh Chhabra
6
while expounding the law on Section 17(2) of the
Act of 1999 reiterated that that generic, descriptive or laudatory terms especially
those commonly used in a given trade cannot be monopolized by any one
proprietor, even where such terms form part of a registered mark. The relevant
paragraphs read as under: -
“34. It is a well-established principle of trademark law that generic,
descriptive, or laudatory terms - particularly those commonly used in
a given trade - cannot be monopolized by any one proprietor. Even
where such terms form part of a registered trademark, protection does not
extend to those elements per se unless it is affirmatively shown that they
have acquired secondary meaning - i.e., that the term has come to be
exclusively and distinctively associated with the plaintiff's goods in the
perception of the consuming public.
…
50. The appellants' attempt to combine elements from two distinct marks
- ‘BLENDERS PRIDE’ and ‘IMPERIAL BLUE’ - to challenge the
respondent's mark ‘LONDON PRIDE’, constitutes a hybrid and
untenable pleading. Each mark must be assessed independently, and
cherry-picking generic or unregistered features from multiple marks
to fabricate a composite case of infringement is not legally
sustainable.
51. It is not in dispute that the word “PRIDE” is not registered as a
standalone mark. Nor can the appellants claim exclusivity over common
elements like bottle shape or color schemes that are generic and widely
used in the industry. While the composite marks ‘BLENDERS PRIDE’
and ‘IMPERIAL BLUE’ are protected, their individual elements -
lacking distinctiveness - are not independently enforceable.
52. The piece-meal approach adopted by the appellants - seeking to
combine unrelated features from their own marks - has undermined their
claim. Apart from the shared use of a common term, there is no
meaningful similarity between the marks. Key elements such as
packaging, typography, bottle design, and label layout are materially
6
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1701
CS(COMM) 1161/2024 Page 11 of 30
distinct. In a market segment, where consumers are more discerning, the
likelihood of confusion is negligible.”
(Emphasis supplied)
(ii) A learned Single Judge of this Court in Institute of Directors v.
Worlddevcorp Technology and Business Solutions Pvt. Ltd.
7
held that
ordinary English words such as ‘Institute’ or ‘Directors’ cannot be monopolized
by one trader, since they remain in the public domain for everyone to use. The
relevant extract of the said judgment reads as under:
“28. It is well settled that words of ordinary English usage cannot be
monopolized. Else, the entire English language would be appropriated
by a few, which can obviously not be permitted. There is, therefore, in
Section 9(1)(a), an absolute proscription to registration of marks which
are inherently lacking in distinctiveness, in that they are incapable of
distinguishing the goods or services of one person from those of another.
Words of common English usage fall within this category. It is only if
the mark has attained secondary significance, by dint of continuous usage
and is entitled, therefore, to the benefit of proviso to Section 9(1), that
such a mark can be registered. Otherwise, words of common English
usage, even when put together to form a phrase of common English
usage, cannot be registered. No monopoly can be claimed by the
registrant of such a mark.”
(Emphasis supplied)
(iii) Recently a Co-ordinate bench of this Court in Yatra Online Limited v.
Mach Conferences and Events Limited
8
was dealing with a similar issue of a
quia timet action, wherein the plaintiff was claiming exclusivity over the word
‘YATRA’ in relation to the travel business. The learned Single Judge while
declining injunction observed as under:
52. It is a settled law that the generic and commonly descriptive
marks, which describe the nature of the business or the services
cannot be exclusive to the proprietor of the registered trade mark.
Section 30 of the Act provides for limits on the effect of the registered
7
CS (COMM) 611/2023 dated 11.12.2023.
8
CS(COMM) 1099/2024 dated 22.08.2025.
CS(COMM) 1161/2024 Page 12 of 30
trade mark when the use of the mark in relation to goods or services
indicates the kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, value,
geographical origin, the time of production of goods or rendering of
services or other characteristics of goods or services.
53. … Although, it can be said that Mark ‘YATRA’ is dominant and
essential part of the registered Device Mark of the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff
cannot claim monopoly on the Mark ‘YATRA’ as the same is generic,
commonly descriptive for the service of travel and tourism. When
the Plaintiff has adopted words in common use for its own Trade
Name/Corporate Name, it runs the risk of the same Mark being used
by others. The generic or commonly descriptive word can never
become trade marks on their own as they never acquire
distinctiveness or a secondary meaning. These words do not indicate
origin or source. It is settled law that words used in everyday
language cannot be allowed to be monopolized.
(Emphasis supplied)
(iv) In the case of Marico Limited v. Agro Tech Food Limited
9
a Division
Bench of this Court went a step ahead from the general norm and held that even
tweaking of a common English descriptive word does not merit trademark
protection, and courts should take a stringent view of such claims. The subject
matter of the said judgment was the trademark ‘LOSORB’, which the Plaintiff
therein had coined from the expression ‘LOW ABSORB’. The relevant
paragraph of the said judgment reads as under:
“On this aspect one immediately feels that it is an aspect of concern
with respect to the claim of the plaintiff that if partly tweaked
descriptive words and expressions of English language are claimed
to be coined words, the same would result in a grave and absurd
situation because a non-tweaked word being a completely
descriptive word will in fact be deceptively similar to the tweaked
descriptive English language word or expression of which
registration is obtained. Meaning thereby that because of success in
getting registered a minor modification of a descriptive word or
expression of the English language, a person who gets registration
can prevent a purely descriptive use of a normal word or expression
9
FAO(OS) No. 352/2010 dated 01.11.2010.
CS(COMM) 1161/2024 Page 13 of 30
as found in English language dictionary on the ground that it would
be identical with or deceptively similar to a registered trademark- a
position which is found in the present case. Such a position, in our
opinion, cannot at all be countenanced and must be struck down
with a heavy hand.”
(Emphasis supplied)
(v) The Privy Council in the case of Standard Ideal Co. v. Standard
Sanitary Manufacturing Company
10
has held that a common English word
that only describes the nature or quality of the goods and nothing else cannot
effectively distinguish one trader’s goods from another’s. In this case, the
trademark in question was ‘STANDARD’ in connection with sanitaryware. The
relevant extract of the said judgment reads as under:
“Now the word “standard” is a common English word. It seme’s to be used
not unfrequently by manufacturers and merchants in connection with the
goods they put upon the market. So used it has no very precise or definite
meaning. But obviously it is intended to convey the notion that the
goods in connection with which it is used are of high class or superior
quality or acknowledged merit. Without attempting to define “the
essentials necessary to constitute a trade mark properly speaking” it seems
to their Lordships perfectly clear that a common English word having
reference to the character and quality of the goods in connection with
which it is used and having no reference to anything else cannot be an
apt or appropriate instrument for distinguishing the goods of one
trader from those of another. Distinctiveness is the very essence of a
trade mark. The plaintiff company was therefore not entitled to register
the word “standard” as a trade mark. The result is, in accordance with the
decision of the Supreme Court in Partlo v. Todd (1), that the word though
registered is not a valid trade mark. The action so far as it is based on
alleged infringement of trade mark must fail.”
(Emphasis supplied)
10.1. It would also be relevant to refer to the dictionary meaning of ‘WOW’ in
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 6
th
edition, at page ‘3672’, which reads as
under:
10
1910 (27) RPC 789.
CS(COMM) 1161/2024 Page 14 of 30
10.2. The dictionary meaning shows that when this word ‘WOW’ is used as an
adjective, it signifies the ‘quality’ of the product or service for which it is used.
Under Section 9(1)(b) of the Act, 1999, a word which merely convey praise or
describe the quality or characteristic of goods or services, are not entitled to
protection as trademarks (monopoly). Moreover, Section 30(2)(a) of the Act of
1999 specifically provides that even if such a word is registered, third parties are
entitled to use it honestly and descriptively to indicate the nature, quality, or other
characteristics of their goods or services. Therefore, in the opinion of this Court,
the Plaintiff cannot assert exclusive rights over the expression “WOW”, as it falls
squarely within statutory exceptions to trademark protection and hence, it cannot
be treated as distinctive/dominant mark of the Plaintiff.
CS(COMM) 1161/2024 Page 15 of 30
10.3. Placing reliance on the aforesaid settled law and the common meaning of
the word ‘WOW’, it is concluded that ‘WOW’ is a laudatory exclamation in the
food/hospitality business, universally used to convey delight over ‘quality’ of the
food. The Plaintiff cannot convert that everyday exclamation into its private
preserve/property.
Admission of the Plaintiff qua non-distinctiveness of WOW
10.4. The other crucial aspect which requires attention of this Court and is worth
noting is that Registrar of Trade Marks while granting registration to Plaintiff’s
device marks
11
i.e., ‘WOW! MOMO’ (Device/Class 30), ‘WOW! MOMO’
(Device/Class 43), ‘WOW! THUNDERZZ’ (Device/Class 32), ‘WOW! CHINA’
(Device/Class 30), ‘WOW! CHINESE’, (Device/Class 32), has given a
disclaimer against the exclusive use of the words forming part of the composite
marks of the Plaintiff. In the opinion of this Court, these disclaimers were
appropriate as the words in question individually are common English words in
the trade of hospitality industry and therefore, cannot be appropriate by a single
trader.
10.5. A perusal of the record and especially the documents qua TM Application
No. 5321648 for ‘WOW CHINA’ and 5412950 for ‘WOW! CHINESE’, shows
that the Registrar of Trade Marks raised certain objections qua these trademark
applications on the basis of objections received from third parties. The word
WOW was also objected to.
In reply(s) to the said objections, the categorical stand taken by the
Plaintiff was that the mark of the Plaintiff is formed by combination of an English
Dictionary words ‘WOW’ and ‘CHINA/CHINESE’. It is further stated in the said
11
TM Application Nos. 2014802, 2014803, 4665746, 5321648, 5412949.
CS(COMM) 1161/2024 Page 16 of 30
replies that the said composite mark when considered as a whole makes it
distinctive of the Plaintiff’s goods and services.
10.6. The relevant part of the replies of the Plaintiff dated 27.03.2022 and
20.07.2022 to the objections of the Registrar of Trade Marks as mentioned above
reads as under:
27.03.2022:
“The objection raised under Section 9(1)(a) is not maintainable as the
applicants submit that their mark is formed by a combination of an
English dictionary word WOW suffixed with CHINA, followed by a
tagline DESI CHINESE.”
20.07.2022:
“The Applicant submits that the objection raised under Section 9(l)(a) is
not maintainable as the applicants submit that their mark is formed by
a combination of an English dictionary word WOW suffixed with
CHINESE.”
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the Plaintiff on its own showing admitted before the Registrar of
Trade Marks that the word ‘WOW’ alone being an English Dictionary word is
not distinctive and it is in a combination with another word that it would as a
composite mark have a distinctive character. In view of this stand, Plaintiff
cannot contend in these proceedings that the word WOW on a standalone basis
is a distinctive mark.
10.7. The binding effect of admissions made before the Registrar of Trademarks,
at this prima facie interim stage was dealt by this Court in Institute of Directors
(supra). The relevant paragraph reads as under:
“18. This Court is presently examining the matter at a prima facie
interlocutory stage, under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC. Any
admission made by either party, which is destructive of the case that
it seeks to canvass has, therefore, to be taken into consideration by the
Court while passing orders under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2. It
would be open to the party, during trial, to seek to escape the said
CS(COMM) 1161/2024 Page 17 of 30
admission. However, at a prima facie stage, the admission would
operate against the party making it.
19. I see no real escape for the plaintiff, from the representation made by
it before the Trademarks Registry in its reply dated 8 December 2014 to
the FER raised by the Registry, extracted in para 9 supra. It is specifically
stated, by the plaintiff, in the said paragraph, that “words used in the mark
are common English language words and are descriptive in nature and
cannot belong to any one proprietor”. In one breath, the plaintiff, thereby,
admits the textual component of its device mark both to be descriptive as
well as to be lacking in distinctive character, by stating that the textual
component of the mark constituted of common English words which could
not belong to any one proprietor.”
(Emphasis supplied)
10.8. So also, in this regard a Co-ordinate bench of this Court, in Yatra (supra)
observed that disclaimers are placed so that the proprietor of the registered mark
does not try to expand the right beyond their legitimate bounds or claim special
advantages in the disclaimed portions. The relevant portion reads as under:
“57. The disclaimers are placed so that the proprietor of the registered
mark does not try to expand the right beyond their legitimate bounds
or claim special advantages in the disclaimed portions.”
(Emphasis supplied)
10.9. In view of the admissions of the Plaintiff before the Registrar of Trademark
to the above effect, the Plaintiff cannot be allowed to approbate and reprobate
and claim ‘WOW’ as its distinctive/dominant mark. Thus, in light of the said
facts as well, the Plaintiff will not be entitled to claim exclusivity over the word
‘WOW’ stating that the same is distinctive feature of its trademark.
Whether ‘WOW’ has acquired Secondary Meaning
11. The next question which arises for consideration is whether the mark
‘WOW’ even though a common English dictionary word can be afforded
protection on the plea that it had acquired secondary meaning due to continuous
use since 2008 by the Plaintiff.
CS(COMM) 1161/2024 Page 18 of 30
11.1. The Plaintiff contends that ‘WOW’ trademarks have acquired substantial
goodwill and reputation taking the net worth of the Plaintiff company to Rs. 2500
Crores. The sales turn over and expenditure on brand promotion for the year
2023-2024 alone was Rs. 453 Crores and Rs. 10 Crores respectively. The Plaintiff
contends that in light of these facts it can be concluded that the ‘WOW’ mark has
acquired a secondary meaning.
11.2. For evaluating the aforesaid contention of the Plaintiff, this Court finds it
apposite to resort to the guiding principles which are enunciated by the Supreme
Court and this Court in various cases, some of which are referred under:
(i) The Supreme Court in its recent pronouncement Pernod Ricard India (P)
Ltd. (supra), while expounding the law on Section 17(2) of the Act of 1999
reiterated that in disputes involving composite marks, the mere presence of a
generic word in both marks would not justify a finding of deceptive similarity. It
held that if the marks, viewed in totality conveyed distinct identities, the use of a
common element which is descriptive or laudatory, will not by itself amount to
infringement has held as under: -
“32. A foundational principle in trademark law is that marks must be
compared as a whole, and not by dissecting them into individual
components. This is known as the anti-dissection rule, which reflects the
real-world manner in which consumers perceive trademarks - based on
their overall impression, encompassing appearance, sound, structure, and
commercial impression. In Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutt Sharma v.
Navratna Pharmaceuticals Laboratories (supra), this Court underscored
that the correct test for trademark infringement is whether, when
considered in its entirety, the defendant's mark is deceptively similar to
the plaintiff's registered mark. The Court expressly cautioned against
isolating individual parts of a composite mark, as such an approach
disregard how consumers actually experience and recall trademarks.
…
32.3. Consequently, in disputes involving composite marks, the mere
presence of a shared or generic word in both marks does not, by itself,
justify a finding of deceptive similarity. Courts must undertake a holistic
CS(COMM) 1161/2024 Page 19 of 30
comparison examining visual, phonetic, structural, and conceptual
elements, to assess whether the overall impression created by the rival
marks is likely to mislead an average consumer of ordinary intelligence
and imperfect memory. If the marks, viewed in totality, convey distinct
identities, the use of a common element - particularly if it is descriptive
or laudatory - will not by itself amount to infringement.
…
43. Section 17(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 grants exclusive rights
only in respect of the mark as registered. Section 17(2) excludes
protection for common or non-distinctive elements unless such elements
have acquired secondary meaning. Sections 27(2) and 29 preserve the
right to institute passing off actions and define the contours of
infringement, respectively. Notably, Section 29(3) presumes confusion
only where identical marks are used for identical goods - a condition not
met in the present case as the marks.
44. Applying the settled legal standards - including the anti-dissection
rule, the overall similarity test, and the perspective of an average
consumer - we prima facie find no deceptive similarity between the
competing marks that would give rise to confusion.
45. In the present case, the marks - ‘BLENDERS PRIDE’ and ‘LONDON
PRIDE’ - are clearly not identical. Though the products are similar, the
branding, packaging, and trade dress of each are materially distinct. The
Commercial Court and High Court have rightly held that the term
‘PRIDE’ is publici juris, and commonly used in the liquor industry.
The dominant components - ‘BLENDERS’, ‘IMPERIAL BLUE’, and
‘LONDON’ - are entirely different both visually and phonetically,
producing distinct overall impressions.”
(Emphasis supplied)
(ii) A Co-ordinate bench of this Court in the case of PhonePe Pvt. Ltd. v.
EZY Services & Anr.
12
while relying on the ratio as held in the case of Marico
(supra) held that the acquisition of secondary meaning by a mark is not to be
readily assumed and the acquisition of secondary meaning would only be
justified where the concerned common mark has been used for considerably long
period. The learned Single judge also observed that decision on distinctiveness
12
IA 8084/2019 in CS(COMM) 292/2019 dated 15.04.2021.
CS(COMM) 1161/2024 Page 20 of 30
could be made only after evidence was led by the parties. The relevant extract of
the said judgment reads as under:
“47. Having expressed this opinion, the Division Bench adverted to the
proviso to Section 9, which relates to the absolute bar against registration
of descriptive marks, where the marks had acquired distinctiveness. In
this context, the Division Bench opined that “it is only when cancellation
proceedings achieve finality of the same being finally dismissed can it be
said that a mark for which ordinarily there is an absolute ground for
refusal of registration that it has acquired a distinctive character i.e. a
secondary meaning or is a well-known trademark”. The Division Bench
went on (in para 14 of the report et seq.) to address the issue of “whether
in spite of the trademark of the appellant ‘LOW ABSORB’ being the
descriptive trademark, … the appellant (had) established its case at this
interlocutory stage of its trademark becoming so distinctive that it can
claim exclusive right and monopoly in the same by virtue of the proviso
to Section 9. This, observed the Division Bench, led to the issue of “the
meaning to be ascribed to the expression ‘distinctive’ as found in the
proviso to Section 9”. The second issue, observed the Division Bench,
was whether the trademark of Marico had, in fact, become “distinctive”.
Paras 15 and 17 of the report went on to classically explain the concept
of “distinctiveness” and acquisition of secondary meaning, as creating an
exception to the concept of non-exclusivity of descriptive marks, thus:
“The word ‘distinctive’ is not directly defined in the Act.
However, meaning of distinctive is indicated in the definitions
of ‘trade mark’ [Section 2(zb)] and ‘well known trade mark’
[Section 2(zg)]. The word has been explained in a plethora of
judgments. Distinctive has been explained to mean such use
of the trade mark with respect to the goods of a person that
the public will immediately and unmistakably co-relate the
mark with the source or a particular manufacturer/owner
thereof. The real issue which however arises is what should
be the meaning of the expression ‘distinctiveness’ in the
situation when the trade mark is a word mark of descriptive
nature. When a trade mark, which is a word mark, is arbitrarily
adapted and is such having no co-relation to the goods in
question, then in such a case distinctiveness is achieved by
normal and ordinary use of the trade mark with respect to the
goods and it has been repeatedly held that such trade mark is
entitled to the highest degree of protection. However this is
not and cannot/should not be so for a trade mark which is
a descriptive word mark. Some colour has to be taken for the
CS(COMM) 1161/2024 Page 21 of 30
word ‘distinctive’ as found in the proviso to Section 9 from the
expression ‘well known trade mark’ which follows the
distinctiveness aspect as found in the said proviso. Courts
should ordinarily lean against holding distinctiveness of a
descriptive trade mark unless the user of such trade mark
is over such a long period of time of many many years that
even a descriptive word mark is unmistakably and only
and only relatable to one and only source i.e. the same has
acquired a secondary meaning. A case in point is the use of
‘Glucon-D’ for 60 years in the recent judgment in the case of
Heinz Italia v. Dabur India Ltd., (2007) 6 SCC 1. A period of
60 years is indeed a long period of time and thus
distinctiveness of the descriptive word mark used as a
trade mark was accepted, albeit in a tweaked form of the
normal descriptive word ‘Glucose’. Therefore, when the
descriptive trade mark is used only by one person
undisturbed for a very long period of time, without anyone
else attempting to use the trade mark during this long
period time, a case can be established of a descriptive word
having achieved distinctiveness and a secondary meaning.
*****
17. Ultimately everything will turn on the facts of each
individual case and in some cases the facts may be wholly
clear even at the interim stage of deciding an interlocutory
application, in other cases (which are bound to be in a
majority) a decision on distinctiveness can only be made after
evidence is led by the parties. This is also so held by the
Supreme Court in the ‘Super Cup’ case Godfrey Philips India
Ltd. v. Girnar Food & Beverages (P) Ltd., (2004) 5 SCC
257 that distinctiveness is an issue to be established or
examined in the facts of each particular case i.e. the evidence
has to be evaluated in the facts of each individual case.”
48. In my respectful opinion, the afore extracted passage posits the exact
legal position, regarding availability of a plea of infringement even in
respect of descriptive marks, where the mark has acquired distinctiveness
and a secondary meaning. It is important to note that acquisition of a
secondary meaning is not to be readily assumed. The Division Bench
clearly held that, ordinarily, Courts should lean against holding that the
descriptive trademark has become distinctive or has acquired a secondary
meaning, and that such a conclusion would be justified only where the
trademark has been used for such a long period of time “of many many
years” that “the mark is unmistakably and only and only relatable to one
CS(COMM) 1161/2024 Page 22 of 30
and only source”. The word “only”, be it noted, has been used not
once, but thrice. The Division Bench went on to make its meaning
further clear by observing that, in the majority of cases, a decision on
distinctiveness could be made only after evidence was led by the
parties. With profound respect, I entirely agree with this enunciation of
the law.”
(Emphasis supplied)
(iii) Another Co-ordinate bench in the case of Yatra (supra) on the similar lines
held as under:
“54. The word ‘YATRA’ cannot be said to have acquired a secondary
meaning. For acquiring a secondary meaning, the primary meaning
of the said expression has to be lost and left behind. The claim of a
secondary meaning has to satisfy that although the primary meaning of
the expression with which it began, no longer means what it used to prior
to the adoption by the Plaintiff. Hence, to hold that ‘YATRA’ has acquired
a secondary meaning, the Plaintiff has to demonstrate uninterrupted use
for considerable length without any competitor attempting to use the
said Mark. For ‘YATRA’ to acquire a secondary meaning and to be
associated exclusively with the Plaintiff, it has to be explained the
primary meaning of the word ‘YATRA’, which has said to have been
lost.”
(Emphasis supplied)
11.3. Applying the aforesaid law to the facts of the present case, in the
considered opinion of this Court prima facie it cannot be said that the common
law English word ‘WOW’ has acquired any secondary meaning so as to relate it
only to the products and services of the Plaintiff, in the mind of the consumer.
The Plaintiff has been in use only since 2008 and the same cannot be treated as
‘long period of time’ as observed in PhonePe (supra) and Marico (supra). The
volume of turnover of Rs. 453 Cr. for the FY 2023-24 is also not a figure which
would persuade the Court to hold this mark acquired a secondary meaning.
11.4. It is also pertinent to note that there are other businesses in the market
which are using the word ‘WOW’ as part of their trade mark for their product
CS(COMM) 1161/2024 Page 23 of 30
and services and couple of such instance
13
has been placed on record by the
Plaintiff itself as part of the compilation dated 30.01.2025. Moreover, a random
google search would reveal that there are various other businesses enlisted which
are using the word ‘WOW’ in the food industry itself. Therefore, in the
considered opinion of this Court at this prima facie interim stage it cannot be said
that the mark ‘WOW’ has acquired any secondary meaning in relation to the
Plaintiff.
‘WOW! BURGER’ is not the trademark of the Plaintiff
12. A perusal of the plaint shows that the Plaintiff has clandestinely mentioned
all over the plaint that it has a trademark i.e., ‘WOW! BURGER’ and that the
Plaintiff has been using the said trademark continuously since 2009
14
. Some of
the relevant paragraphs capturing the said stand of the Plaintiff is reproduced as
under:
“3. That the Plaintiff is filing the present suit against the Defendants as it
has come to know that the Defendants are about to launch identical
business as that of the Plaintiff under the infringing trade mark “WOW
BURGER”. Accordingly, the suit has been filed to restrain the Defendants
from using the trade mark “WOW BURGER” or any other trade mark(s)
which are identical / deceptively similar to the Plaintiff’s trade mark i.e.,
“WOW! BURGER” / “WOW! MOMO”/ “WOW!” and other “WOW!”
formative trade marks (“Plaintiff’s Trade Marks”).
…..
7. That the Plaintiff has created a revolution in the food market, with its
house mark “WOW!”. The trade mark “WOW!” forms the essential and
significant feature of almost all the trademarks of the Plaintiff. The
consumers associate the trade mark “WOW!”/ “WOW! MOMO” /
“WOW! BURGER” and other “WOW!” formative trademarks with the
Plaintiff alone. Due to the widescale reach and positive acceptance of the
brand, the Plaintiff Company has garnered a net worth of approximately
INR 2500 Crores.
…..
13
WOW Skin Care products.
14
Paragraph Nos. 3, 7, 10, 11, 15, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 26, 27, 36, 41 and 47.
CS(COMM) 1161/2024 Page 24 of 30
10. That the Plaintiff while expanding its business and range of products
under the “WOW!” series of trade marks, adopted the trademark
“WOW! BURGER” in the year 2009 for selling burgers in its
restaurants/ outlets and has been continuously using the same ever
since its adoption.
…..
11. That due to its continuous use of the trade mark “WOW!
BURGER” since the year 2009, the Plaintiff has been able to garner
substantial goodwill and reputation for its business under the Plaintiff’s
Trade Marks and other “WOW!” formative trademarks and the said
trademarks are accordingly exclusively associated with the Plaintiff.”
(Emphasis supplied)
13. This Court has perused the documents annexed with the plaint, which goes
on to show that firstly, the Plaintiff has got no registration in any Class
whatsoever, for the mark ‘WOW! BURGER’, secondly as per the documents
placed on record the last use of the mark ‘WOW! BURGER’ by the Plaintiff was
in the year December, 2018 and that too the mark ‘WOW! BURGER’ was last
used as a ‘menu item’ and not as a house mark/trademark/brand. Thirdly, the
invoices which have been placed on record to show use of the mark ‘WOW!
BURGER’ clearly establishes that the Plaintiff was using the mark ‘WOW!
BURGER’ only as an invoiced menu item and after 2018 there is not even a
single invoice which would show that ‘WOW! BURGER’ is even being used by
the Plaintiff as menu item, currently.
13.1. The current Menu
15
of the Plaintiff which was perused by this Court using
the google search and search over online food ordering apps (Zomato and
Swiggy) as mentioned in the plaint and documents annexed therewith, nowhere
shows that ‘WOW! BURGER’ even exists as a menu item as on date. Instead,
this Court found that the Plaintiff has been using the name ‘Moburg’ for its
Burger items. The Menu as perused by this Court is reproduced as under:
15
As on 09.09.2025.
CS(COMM) 1161/2024 Page 25 of 30
CS(COMM) 1161/2024 Page 26 of 30
Therefore, the claim of the Plaintiff in the plaint that ‘WOW! BURGER’
is its trademark and that it has been in continuous and extensive use of the same,
is not bonafide and is instead misleading.
13.2. This Court also perused the website of the Plaintiff
16
, as per the said
website there are only three brands that Plaintiff uses for selling its products i.e.,
‘WOW MOMO’, ‘WOW CHINA’, and ‘WOW CHICKEN’. These are the marks
which are the source identifier of the Plaintiff.
Significantly, food item ‘Burger’ is being sold by the Plaintiff only under
its brand ‘WOW! MOMO’ and ‘WOW! CHICKEN’. And even more
significantly, the food item Burger is not listed as ‘WOW BURGER’ in the menu
but instead as ‘Moburg’ under the brand ‘WOW MOMO’ and simply as ‘Louder
Chicken Burger’ under its brand WOW CHICKEN. This Court failed to find
any mention of ‘WOW! BURGER’ anywhere on the Plaintiff’s website. The
relevant screenshot of the Plaintiff’s website is reproduced as under:
WOW MOMO
WOW CHICKEN
13.3. Presumably ‘Moburg’/MOBURG is a combination of MOMO and
BURGER, which further shows that Plaintiff is attempting to carve out a distinct
name for its BURGER items instead of ‘WOW! BURGER’.
16
At https://wowmomodashboard.com/links/wow-momo-nutrition/.
CS(COMM) 1161/2024 Page 27 of 30
13.4. The sales figure and the advertisement expenditure which has been averred
in the plaint relates to ‘WOW! MOMO’ as a brand/trademark and has no co-
relation with erstwhile menu item i.e., ‘WOW! BURGER’.
13.5. In view of the aforementioned facts the Plaintiff has instead failed to show
that ‘WOW! BURGER’ was even being used as a trademark/brand ever. Further
in view of the last usage in 2018 of the said mark as a mere menu item (which is
even otherwise not registered), this Court is of the opinion that ‘WOW!
BURGER’ is not the trademark/brand of the Plaintiff.
The Plaintiff has tried to mislead the Court by averring that ‘WOW!
BURGER’ is its trademark/brand.
13.6. Learned senior counsel for the Plaintiff has relied upon the judgment of
this Court in Cadbury India (supra) to contend that though there is disclaimer
in some of its registrations, it would not disentitle the Plaintiff from enforcing its
subsequent registered mark vis-à-vis ‘WOW’ in subsequent registered formative
marks. This Court has come to a conclusion that ‘WOW! BURGER’ is not a
trademark/brand of the Plaintiff and that ‘WOW! BURGER’ as a mark is not
even being used by the Plaintiff currently. Therefore, in light of the said findings
of this Court the judgement in Cadbury India (supra) will not apply to the facts
of the present case as the said judgment relates to infringement of a registered
trademark.
Comparison of the marks of Plaintiff and Defendant No.1
13.7. The Plaintiff contends that the competing marks should be assessed in their
entirety, yet a perusal of the plaint shows that the Plaintiff is trying to bring the
spotlight on the mark ‘WOW!’ as the source identifier and claims that its
exclusivity has been infringed. In the considered opinion of this Court the source
CS(COMM) 1161/2024 Page 28 of 30
identifier of the Plaintiff is the composite mark ‘WOW! MOMO’ when taken as
a whole and not the mark ‘WOW!’.
13.8. The Plaintiff has placed on record details about various awards and
investments received by the Plaintiff; this Court has perused the said record and
is of the opinion that none of the said documents relates to either ‘WOW!
BURGER’ and/or standalone ‘WOW!’, instead all of that material/documents
relates to composite mark ‘WOW! MOMO’. Therefore, the assertion of the
Plaintiff that ‘WOW!’ is their source identifier, is false and incorrect, instead the
source identifier of the Plaintiff is the composite mark i.e., ‘WOW! MOMO’.
13.9. In disputes relating to trademark infringement, deceptive or confusing
similarity is the essential requirement. Composite marks are generally evaluated
as a whole, consistent with the anti‑dissection rule and from the perspective of
the average consumer with imperfect recollection. However, where a component
forms the dominant or essential feature of a composite mark (which is not the
case in the present facts), copying that element can suffice for relief sought; still,
this principle does not allow a proprietor to monopolize descriptive, generic, or
laudatory terms.
13.10. Keeping in mind these principles, it would be pertinent to reproduce the
marks of the Plaintiff and the Defendant. This Court consciously declines to
compare the mark ‘WOW! BURGER’, with the mark of the Defendant No.1 as
urged by the Plaintiff, because at this prima facie interim stage, the Court has
already observed that ‘WOW! BURGER’ is not the Plaintiff’s trademark/brand;
therefore, the relevant comparison has to be between the Plaintiff’s registered
mark ‘WOW! MOMO’ and Defendant No. 1’s mark.
Plaintiff’s mark Defendant’s mark
CS(COMM) 1161/2024 Page 29 of 30
,
13.11. The comparison of the above reproduced marks reveals that except for the
use of the words i.e., ‘WOW’ nothing in the said marks relate them to each other.
The colour combination, stylization and the theme of the two marks is completely
different. The usage of like words which are common English Dictionary words
would be of no avail, because the use of these words in absence of registration as
a composite mark and/or in absence of secondary meaning attached to it the same
cannot be afforded protection of infringement.
13.12. It is also relevant to note that the theme of the Plaintiff’s brand is yellow
which has been consistent all across its product range, which on the other hand
is not the case with the mark of the Defendant No.1 which is in only red and
white.
13.13. It would be further relevant to note that from the documents placed on
record, the Defendant No.1 using the mark and in Hong
Kong is selling burger which are of a specific type i.e., protein-rich vegetarian
burger and as per the LinkedIn post, relied upon by the Plaintiff, it is the same
type of burger, which the said post says Defendant No.1 will bring in India, on
the other hand perusal of the current menu of the Plaintiff shows that the Plaintiff
is selling vegetarian and non-vegetarian burger in the name of ‘Moburg’.
13.14. Therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court, there is no
deceptive/confusing similarity between the trademarks of the Plaintiff and the
Defendant No.1.
13.15. Learned senior counsel for the Plaintiff has relied upon the judgment of
this Court in Sona Mahindra (supra) to contend that disclaimer in the trademark
CS(COMM) 1161/2024 Page 30 of 30
registrations does not travel to the market place and for the purpose of
comparison, a disclaimed portion can also be considered along with the mark as
a whole for the purpose of ascertaining whether infringement has happened or
not.
This Court has compared the mark of the Plaintiff ‘WOW MOMO’ and the
Defendant No.1’s mark ‘WOW BURGER’ and as noted above has not found the
same to be similar.
Conclusion
14. Before concluding, it would be pertinent to mention that this Court gets a
distinct impression from the averments in the plaint that the Plaintiff is trying to
appropriate/monopolize the use of the dictionary word ‘WOW’ which this Court
cannot allow, considering the common nature of the word.
15. Therefore, in the overall conspectus, the Plaintiff has not been able to make
out a prima facie case in its favour for grant of injunction. There is no balance of
convenience in its favour and therefore, there is no question of injury.
16. Accordingly, the captioned application stands dismissed.
17. Opinion expressed by this Court herein-above are only limited to deciding
this application at the present interim and prima facie stage and would not have
any bearing on the merit of the matter.
CS(COMM) 1161/2024
18. List on 15.01.2026.
MANMEET PRITAM SINGH ARORA
(JUDGE)
SEPTEMBER 12, 2025/SK
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