1

2026:CGHC:15711-DB

NAFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

ACQA No. 1045 of 2024

The date when

the judgment is

reserved

The date when the

judgment is

pronounced

The date when the judgment

is uploaded on the website

Operative Full

24.02.2026 07.04.2026 -- 07.04.2026

1 - XYZ (Nil)

Appellant (s)

versus

1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Khamtarai, District

Raipur, Chhattisgarh.

2 - Ramkumar Chelak, S/o Devlal Chelak Aged About 24 Years R/o

Ranvabhatha, Satnam Chowk, Ward No.15, Thana Khamtari, Raipur,

District - Raipur, Chhattisgarh.

Respondent(s)

For Appellant (s) :Mr. Mateen Siddiqui and Mr. Waquar Naiyer,

Advocates

For Respondent-State:Mr. Atanu Ghosh, Dy. GA

For Respondent No.2:Mr. Anchal Matre, Advocate

Hon’ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey

Hon’ble Shri Justice Radhakishan Agrawal

CAV Judgment

Per Rajani Dubey. J.

2

1.The present acquittal appeal has been preferred by the

appellant/complainant against the judgment of acquittal dated

02.05.2024 passed by the learned Additional Session Judge,

FTC Special Court ‘POCSO’, Raipur (C.G.) in Special Criminal

Case (POCSO) No.180/2022, whereby the respondent No.2 has

been acquitted of the charges under Section 376 (3) of IPC and

Section 4 (2) of POCSO Act.

2.Brief facts of the case are that appellant/prosecutrix lodged

written report at the police station concerned alleging interalia

that respondent/accused contacted her through mobile phone in

the month of November 2021. The respondent/accused used to

contact her through the mobile phone and say I love you and also

asked her to come at her old house to meet him however she

refused to meet him however on 05.04.2022 around 11 PM,

respondent/accused asked the her to come and meet him near

her old house upon which she came there and the

respondent/accused took her inside old house and committed the

rape with her. Thereafter, the appellant haven't got her periods in

the month April 2022 however she got scared so she didn't tell

about her periods to her parents. Thereafter the appellant belly

started increasing so on 31.08.2022 the her parents took her for

treatment at Parivar Seva Kendra, Pandari where the appellant

parents got to know that she is pregnant and the fetus was

stillbirth (intra uterine death) after 7 months of pregnancy.

Therefore, she was admitted at Dr. Bhemrao Ambedkar Hospital

3

and abortion was carried out. Thereafter a case was registered

against the accused respondent and he was arrested. After

completion of the investigation, the charge-sheet was filed before

the Magistrate concerned. The learned Trial Court after

appreciating the oral and documentary evidence available on

record acquitted the respondent No.2 of the aforesaid charges.

3.Learned counsel for the appellant/complainant submits that the

impugned judgment of acquittal passed by the learned Trial Court

is illegal. The prosecution witnesses categorically stated against

the accused/respondents, but the learned Trial Court only on

minor contradictions and omissions acquitted the respondents.

He further submits that the prosecutrix clearly deposed against

the accused respondent but the same has not been considered

by the learned Trial Court. The learned Trial Court also ought to

have considered that the age of prosecutrix was below 18 years

on the date of incident based on the evidence available on

record, but the learned Trial Court did not appreciate the oral and

documentary evidence properly, as such the impugned judgment

is liable to be set aside and the accused respondent is liable to

be convicted. Reliance has been placed on the judgment

rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of

Prasanta Debnath and another vs State of Tripura, reported

in 2026 SCC Online Tri 93, Vijay vs State of Madhya Pradesh,

passed in CRA No.660/2008, decided on 27.07.2010 and State

4

of Madhya Pradesh vs Anoop Singh, passed in CRA

No.442/2010, decided on 03.07.2015.

4.Learned State counsel supports the contention made by the

learned counsel for the appellant and submits that the

prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt

against the accused/respondent but he has wrongly been

acquitted by the learned Trial Court. Therefore, the impugned

judgment is liable to be set aside.

5.Learned counsel for the respondent No.2 opposes the

submission made by the learned counsel for the

appellant/complainant as well as learned State counsel and

submits that learned Trial Court has minutely appreciated the oral

and documentary evidence available on record and rightly found

that the on the date of incident, the prosecutrix was not below 18

years of age and rightly held that the accused respondent did not

meet the prosecutrix during the period in which she got pregnant

and the prosecutrix herself admitted that she did not meet the

accused during the said period and even her father and

prosecutrix herself denied consent for DNA Test, as such

accused respondent was falsely implicated by the prosecutrix

and the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond

reasonable doubt against the accused respondent and the

learned Trial Court has rightly acquitted the respondent accused

of the aforesaid charges. Therefore, the appeal is liable to be

5

dismissed. Reliance has been placed on the judgment rendered

by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of State (GNCT of

Delhi) vs Vipin @ Lalla, reported in 2025 SCC Online SC 78,

Sham Singh vs State of Haryana, reported in 2018 SCC

Online SC 1042, Dola @ Dolagobinda Pradhan vs State of

Odisha, reported in 2018 SCC Online SC 1224, Mohd Ali @

Guddu vs State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in (2015) 7 SCC

272 and Hem Raj vs State of Haryana, reported in (2014) 2

SCC 395.

6.Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material

available on record.

7.It is clear from record of learned Trial Court that the learned Trial

Court framed charges under Section 376 (3) of IPC and Section

4 (2) of POCSO Act against the respondent accused and after

appreciation of oral and documentary evidence available on

record the learned Trial Court acquitted the respondent accused

of the aforesaid charges.

8.The learned Trial Court found that the prosecutrix was below 16

years of age on the date of incident.

9.PW-3 principal of school filed memo for seizure of dakhil kharij

register of police vide Ex-P/10 and stated that this register was

seized by the Police as per seizure memo (Ex-P/11) and original

dakhil kharij register is Ex-P/12, whereas attested copy of

register is Ex-P/12C and as per this register, name of prosecutrix

6

was entered at Sr. No.1105 in the school and as per this register,

she was admitted in Class 6

th

on 30.06.2017 and her date of birth

mentioned in in the register is 18.04.2006. In the cross-

examination, she admitted that entry was not made by her. In

para 6, she also admitted that as to who had come to get her

admitted in the school she does not know.

10.PW-2 father of the prosecutrix stated that the date of birth of her

daughter is 18.04.2006. In the cross-examination, he admitted

that birth certificate or any document regarding date of birth of

the prosecutrix was not seized by the prosecution and even did

not provide photo copy of the same. He also admitted that report

card of Class 8

th

of prosecutrix is also not with him. He denied

this suggestion that he did not make birth certificate. He stated in

paras 22 & 23 as under:-

“22- “;g dguk xyr gS fd ihfM+rk dk tUe izek.k i= ugh cuok;k gWwA lk{kh us

Lor% dFkd fd;k fd xqe x;k gSA ;g dguk lgh gS fd eSus tUe izek.k i= dh

f}rh; izfr izkIr ugh dh gSA ;g dguk lgh gS fd tUe izek.k i= dh QksVks izfr

Hkh eSaus iqfyl okyksa dks ugh nh gSA ;g dguk lgh gS fd ihfM+rk dk d{kk vkBoh

dk ewy izxfr i=d esjs ikl ugh gSA eSus iqfyl dks fn;k FkkA ;g dguk xyr gS

fd eSus iqfyl dk ihfM+rk dk d{kk vkBoh dh izxfr i=d dh dsoy QksVks izfr nh

FkhA ;g dguk lgh gS fd ihfM+rk ds tUe ds laca/k esa dksVokj iath esjs ikl ugh

gSA

23- ;g dguk lgh gS fd eS vkt ihfM+rk ds tUe ds laca/k esa dksbZ Hkh vly

nLrkost ysdj ugh vk;k gWwA ;g dguk xyr gS fd esjs ikl ihfM+rk ds tUe ds

laca/k esa izek.k i= gSA esjs ikl vk/kkj dkMZ esa ihfM+rk dh tUe frfFk vyx ntZ gS

tks =qfVo’k ntZ gSA**

11.Thus, it is clear from the statement of father of prosecutrix (PW-2)

and statement of principal (PW-3) that the prosecution only filed

discharge register of Class 8

th

of prosecutrix and no document

7

was filed regarding her previous classes or birth certificate was

not filed by the prosecution and principal admitted this suggestion

that entry was not made by her but the learned Trial Court did not

appreciate all these aspects of the matter and gave wrong finding

regarding the age of the prosecutrix on the date of incident.

12.The Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Alamelu and another

Vs. State, represented by Inspector of Police, (2011) 2 SCC

385 observed in paras 40 & 48 of its judgment as under:

"40. Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates

that the girl's date of birth was 15th June, 1977. Therefore,

even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be

above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on

the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The

transfer certificate has been issued by a Government

School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster.

Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under

Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the

admissibility of such a document would be of not much

evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence

of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded.

48. We may further notice that even with reference to

Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document

has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as

well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be

appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court

in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P. held

as follows:-

“The age of a person as recorded in the school register

or otherwise may be used for various purposes,

namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an

appointment; for contesting election; registration of

marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling

laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a

civil forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a

court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on

the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not

appropriately represented therein or any transaction

made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A

court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a

party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of

8

Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the

same standard. No different standard can be applied in

case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape,

or similar offence where the victim or the prosecutrix

although might have consented with the accused, if on

the basis of the entries made in the register maintained

by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the

accused would be deprived of his constitutional right

under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the

accused may unjustly be convicted.”

13.PW-1 prosecutrix stated in para 3 that when she was studying in

Class 10, the accused’s sister was connected with her in an

online class group. The accused took her number from that

online group. He repeatedly used to message her on her number.

She used to refuse and told him not to message her, but he did

not listen. The accused used to message her and also

threatened her to meet him, otherwise he would beat her and

slap her. After that, she went to meet the accused at a house

near her home and forcibly established physical relations with

her. Due to fear, she kept going to the accused and he continued

to have physical relations with her. The accused had physical

relations with her about two times. She further stated that during

the festival of Teeja Pola, her health deteriorated and her father

took her to Mekahara Hospital for treatment. Her menstruation

had stopped. After examination, the doctor informed her and her

father that she got pregnant and the fetus had already been

damaged in the womb. Thereafter, the doctor conducted her

abortion at Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar Hospital, and the fetus of the

deceased child was kept preserved by the police for DNA testing.

9

Police prepared Dehati Nalisi (Exhibit P-01) and she admitted her

signatures on A to A part of the same. The spot map is Exhibit P-

02 was prepared, which also bears her signatures on A to A part.

The police gave notice to her for DNA test consent but she and

her father denied DNA test. The prosecution declared her hostile

and cross-examined her then she admitted this suggestion that

because of accused she got pregnant. She admitted this

suggestion of defence that while giving her statement before

police, she did not tell that the accused committed rape twice

with her. She also admitted in para 20 that when her parents

came to know that she got pregnant because of accused, even

then no report was lodged against the accused. She denied this

suggestion that she denied consent for DNA test as the child

belongs to someone else. She admitted this suggestion that prior

to the date of incident i.e. on 04.05.2022, she never met the

accused. She also admitted that when her period cycle got

stopped, she did not tell her parents.

14.PW-2 father of the prosecutrix stated the accused committed

rape with her daughter. The incident occurred approximately one

year ago. His daughter had gone to visit her maternal uncle's

house during the season of the 'Pora Tija' festival. At that time,

her maternal uncle called to inform him that she was unwell and

was experiencing symptoms such as dizziness. Consequently, he

went to her maternal uncle's house, brought her back to their

home, and subsequently took her to the 'Parivar Seva Kendra'

10

clinic in Pandri for a medical examination. Upon examining the

victim, the doctor informed them that she was 4–5 months

pregnant, but the fetus had already died inside the womb. The

doctor then advised them to take the girl (the victim) to Mekahara

Hospital and thereafter she was admitted in the said hospital. He

admitted that he received notice (Ex-P/8) which was with regard

to consent for DNA Test but they did not give consent for DNA

test. In the cross-examination, he admitted this suggestion that

before going to hospital, they did not lodge any report against the

accused. In para 16, he denied this suggestion that he had prior

knowledge of prosecutrix being pregnant. He stated that he did

not give consent for DNA test, as the prosecutrix was already

taking the name of accused as such there was no need to waste

time. He denied this suggestion that he did not give consent for

DNA test for the reason that name of the real father of the child

would come out.

15.PW-4 Assistant Professor in Dr. Bhimrao Hospital, Raipur stated

that prosecutrix was admitted in hospital on 31.08.2022 and she

was pregnant of 28-30 weeks but heartbeat of fetus was not

present. The prosecutrix was advised for sonography test. In the

sonography report, the prosecutrix was 27 weeks and 3 days

pregnant and heartbeat of child was not present. Thereafter

parents of prosecutrix gave consent for abortion. After abortion,

dead fetus of 1 kg was born and sample of dead fetus for DNA

test was preserved. She admitted this suggestion that looking to

11

the situation of pregnancy of prosecutrix, it appears that

prosecutrix might have got pregnant prior to 7 months i.e. in

February, 2022. In para 19 she admitted that as per fetus, the

prosecutrix can be pregnant if physical relation was made with

her prior to 27 weeks and 3 days.

16.The learned Trial Court minutely appreciated the oral and

documentary evidence available on record and found that

statement and conduct of prosecutrix and her father recorded as

PW/1 & PW/2 are suspicious and they did not give consent for

DNA test and also as per doctor's report date of rape should be

February, 2022 but as per prosecutrix prior to April, 2020 she did

not meet the accused.

17.The Hon'ble Apex Court in Dola @ Dolagobinda Pradhan

(supra) held in paras 7, 8 & 36 as under:-

“7. In this regard it would be useful to quote certain

observations of this Court in Bharwada Bhoginbhai

Hirjibhai vs State of Gujarat wherein it is observed

that:-

"10. By and large thesesfietors are not relevant to

India, and the Indian conditions. Without the fear of

making too wide a a statement, or of overstating the

case, it can be said that rarely will girl or a woman in

India make false allegations of sexual assault on

account of any such factor as has been just enlisted.

The statement is generally true in the context of the

urban asjulso fural society It's also by and large true in

the context of the sophisticated, not so sophisticated,

and unsophisticated society. Only very cardly can one

conceivably.come across an exception or two and that

too possibly from amongst the urban elites. Because:

(1) A girl or a woman in the tradition-bound non-

permissive society of India would be extremely

reluctant even to admit that any incident which is likely

to reflect on her chastity had ever oecüfred. (2) She

12

would be conscious of the danger of being ostracised

by the society or being looked down by the society

including by her own family members, relatives,

friends and neighbours. (3) She would have to brave

the whole world. (4) She would free the risk of losing

the love and respect of her own husband and hear

relatives, and of her matrimonial home and happiness

being shattered. (5) if she is unmarried, she would

apprehend that it would be difficult to secure an

alliance with a suitable match from a respectable or an

acceptable family. (6) It would almost inevitably and

almost invariably result in mental torture and suffering

to herself. (7) The fear of being taunted by others will

always haunt her. (8) She would feel extremely

embarrassed in relating the incident to others being

overpowered by a feeling of shame on account of the

upbringing in a tradition-bound society where by and

large sex is taboo (9) The natural inclination would be

to avoid giving publicity to the incident lest the family

name and family honour is brought into controversy,

(10) The parents of an unmarried girl as also the

husband and members, of the husband's family of a

married woman, would also more often than not, want

to avoid publicity on account of the fear of social

stigma on the family name and family honour. (11) The

fear of the victim herself being considered to be

promiscuous or in some way responsible for

regardless of her innocence. (12) The reluctance to

face interrogation by the investigating agency, to face

the court, to face the cross-examination by counsel for

the culprit, and the risk of being disbelieved acts as a

deterrent.

11. In view of these factors the victims and their

relatives are not too keen to bring the culprit to books.

And when in the face of these factors the crime is

brought to light there is a built-in assurance that the

charge is genuine rather than fabricated On principle,

the evidence of a victim of sexual assault stands on a

par with evidence of an injured witness. Just as a

witness who has sustained an injury (which is not

shown or believed to be self-inflictes, the best witness

in the sense d that he is least likely to exculpate the

real offender, the evident of a victim of a sex offence is

entitled to great weight, absence corroboration

notwithstanding. And while corroboration in the form of

eyewitness account of an independent witness may

often be forthcoming in physical assault cases, such

evidence cannot be expected in sex offences, having

regard to the very nature of the offence. It would

13

therefore be adding insult to injury to insist on

corroboration drawing inspiration from the rules

devised by the counts in the western workd oboisance

to which has perhaps become a habit presumably on

account of the colonial hangover). We are therefore of

the opinion that if the evidence of the victim does not

suffer from any trasie infignity, and the probabilities

factor" does not render it unworthy of credence, as

genetal rule, there is no reason to insist on

corroboration except from the medical evidence,

where, having regard to the circumstances of the case

medical evidence can be expected to be forthcoming,

subject to the following qualification: Corroboration

may he insisted upon when a woman having attained

majority is found in a compromising position and there

is a likelihood of her having levelled such an

accusation on account of the instinct of self-

preservation. Or when the "probabilities factors found

to be out of tune." (emphasis supplied)

8. In Sadashiv Ramrao Radbe v. State of

Maharashtra³, this Court reiterated that the sole

testimong of the prosecutrix could be relied upon if it

Ginspires the confidence of the Court: (SCC p. 95,

para 9)

"9. It is true that in a rape case the accused could be

convicted on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, if it

is capable of inspiring confidence in the mind of the

court. If the version given by the prosecutrix is

unsupported by any medical evidence or the whole

surrounding circumstances are highly improbable and

belie the case set up by the prosecutrix, the court shall

not act on the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix. The

courts shall be extremely careful in accepting the sole

testimony of the prosecutrix when, the entire case is

improbable and unlikely to happen.

36. In our considered opinion, the trial court as well as

the High Court have convicted the appellants without

considering the aforementioned factors in their proper

perspective. The testimony of the Victim is full of

inconsistencies and does not find support from any

other evidence whatsoever. Moreover, the evidence of

the informant/victim is inconsistent and self-destructive

at different places. It is noticeable that the medical

record and the doctor's evidence do not specify

whether there were any signs of forcible sexual

intercourse. It seems that the first information report

was lodged with false allegations to extract revenge

from the appellants, who had uncovered the theft of

14

forest produce by the informant and her husband, The

High Court has, in our considered opinion, brüshed

aside the various inconsistencies pointed out by us

only on the ground That the victim could not have

deposed falsely before the Court. The High Court has

proceeded on the basis of assumptions, conjectures

and surmises, inasmuch as such assumptions are not

corroborated by any reliable evidence. The medical

evidence does not support the case of the prosecution

relating to the offence of rape.”

18.The Hon'ble Apex Court in Vipin @ Lalla (supra) held in paras

10, 11 & 12 as under:-

“10. Although it is absolutely true that in the case of

rape, conviction can be made on the sole testimony of

the prosecutrix as her evidence is in the nature of an

injured witness which is given a very high value by the

Courts. But nevertheless when a person can be

convicted on the testimony of a single witness the

Courts are bound to be very careful in examining such

a witness and thus the testimony of such a witness

must inspire confidence of the Court. The testimony of

the prosecutrix in the present case thus has failed to

inspire absolute confidence of the Trial Court, the High

Court and this Court as well.

11. It is not believable that when the prosecutrix was

caught by the accused who is known to the

prosecutrix, she went with him quite a distance in the

Bazaar and then to a shop, she never raised any

alarm. The only reason she gave is that there was a

knife with accused and he had threatened her that if

she raises an alarm her brother and father would be

killed.

12. In any case as we have already stated above that

the testimony of the prosecutrix does not inspire

confidence, under these circumstances, we are not

inclined to interfere with the well considered order of

the Trial Court and the High Court.”

19.The Hon'ble Apex Court in Sham Singh (supra) held in para 23

as under:-

“23. The evidence of the victim/prosecutrix and the

aunt PW10 are unreliable, untrustworthy inasmuch as

15

they are not credible witnesses. Their evidence

bristles with contradictions and is full of

improbabilities. We cannot resist ourselves to place on

record that the prosecution has tried to tope in the

appellant merely on assumptions, surmises and

conjectures. The story of the prosecution is built on

the materials placed on record, which seems to be

neither the truth, nor wholly the truth. The findings of

the court below, though concurrent, do not desire the

merit of acceptance or approval in our hands with

regard to the glaring infirmities and illegalities vitiating

them, and the patent errors apparent on the face of

record resulting in serious and grave miscarriage of

justice to the appellant.”

20.In light of the above, it is clear that the statement of the

prosecutrix and her father are not reliable and her father also did

not give consent for DNA test and the date of incident is not

matched with the medical report of the prosecutrix, during which

the prosecutrix got pregnant. Thus, the learned Trial Court has

rightly found that the prosecution has failed to prove its case

beyond reasonable doubt against the respondent accused.

21.The Hon’ble Apex Court in its judgment dated 12.02.2024

passed in Criminal Appeal No.1162 of 2011) in case of

Mallappa and Ors. Versus State of Karnataka, has held in para

36 as under:-

“36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based

on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned

as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential

values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any

failure of justice. The principles which come into play

while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be

summarized as:-

“(i) Appreciation of evidence is the core

element of a criminal trial and such

appreciation must be comprehensive

16

inclusive of all evidence, oral and

documentary;

(ii Partial or selective appreciation of

evidence may result in a miscarriage of

justice and is in itself a ground of

challenge;

(iii If the Court, after appreciation of

evidence, finds that two views are possible,

the one in favour of the accused shall

ordinarily be followed;

(iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally

plausible view, mere possibility of a

contrary view shall not justify the reversal

of acquittal;

(v) If the appellate Court is inclined to

reverse the acquittal in appeal on a re-

appreciation of evidence, it must

specifically address all the reasons given

by the Trial Court for acquittal and must

cover all the facts;

(vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to

conviction, the appellate Court must

demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error

of law or fact in the decision of the Trial

Court.”

22.Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the law

laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mallappa (supra) and

the view which has been taken by the learned trial Court appears

to be plausible and possible view and in the absence of any

patent illegality or perversity, as such this Court is not inclined to

interfere with the impugned judgment.

23.Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

Sd/- Sd/-

Rajani Dubey Radhakishan Agrawal

Judge Judge

Nirala