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A. Valliammai Vs. K.P. Murali and Others

  Supreme Court Of India Civil Appeal /5342/2023
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Case Background

As per the case facts, a dispute concerning specific performance of an agreement led to appeals before the Supreme Court, following a High Court decision. Additional evidence was allowed to ...

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Civil Appeal No. 5342 of 2023 & Ors. Page 1 of 21

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5342 of 2023

A. VALLIAMMAI ..... APPELLANT

VERSUS

K.P. MURALI AND OTHERS ..... RESPONDENTS

W I T H

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5343 of 2023

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5344 OF 2023

A N D

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5345 OF 2023

J U D G M E N T

SANJIV KHANNA, J.

I.A. Nos. 1 of 2017 and 27407 of 2023.

1. I.A. Nos. 1 of 2017 and 27407 of 2023, for permission to take on

record additional evidence in the nature of documents, are not

opposed. Accordingly, I.A. Nos. 1 of 2017 and 27407 of 2023 are

allowed. The documents are taken on record. S. Nos. 2 – 12 in I.A.

No. 1 of 2017 are marked as Exhibit Nos. S-1– S-11

1

, and S. Nos.

1

Exhibit S-1 – a true copy of the judgment dated 23.12.1992 passed by the district munsif court in

O.S. No. 508 of 1991; Exhibit S-2 – a true copy of the lawyer's notice dated 11.07.1994; Exhibit S-3

Civil Appeal No. 5342 of 2023 & Ors. Page 2 of 21

2 – 4 in I.A. No. 27407 of 2023 are marked as Exhibit Nos. S-12 – S-

14

2

.

C.A. Nos. 5342-5345 of 2023.

1. The impugned judgment by the Division Bench of the Madras High

Court at Madurai, dated 20.12.2016, in Appeal Suit (MD) No. 63 of

2007, affirms the judgment and decree of specific performance

passed by the court of the Additional District and Sessions Judge,

Fast Track Court No.1, Tiruchirapalli, dated 28.12.2006, in O.S. No.

21 of 2004.

2. The appellant in Civil Appeal No. 5342 of 2023 is A. Valliammai,

statedly owner of 11 acres of land situated at the west end of survey

numbers 55/2B1 and 55/2B2 in 58, Agaram village, Tiruverambur

sub-district, Trichi district

3

, having inherited the same being the

second wife of late Ayyamperumal. Civil Appeal Nos. 5343 of 2023,

5344 of 2023 and 5345 of 2023 are preferred by S. Jayaprakash

– a true copy of the rejoinder notice dated 13.07.1994; Exhibit S-4 – a true copy of the judgment dated

12.06.2002 passed by the district munsif court in O.S. No. 1164 of 1994; Exhibit S-5 – a true copy of

the deposition of PW-1 – plaintiff – Duraisamy, in O.S. No. 21 of 2004 dated 05.07.2004; Exhibit S-6

– a true copy of the deposition of the DW-1 – first defendant – K. Sriram in O.S. No. 21 of 2004 dated

07.09.2006; Exhibit S-7 – a true copy of the deposition of DW-2 – second

defendant – Valliammai, in

O.S. No. 21 of 2004 dated 15.09.2006; Exhibit S-8 – a true copy of the deposition of DW-3 – Sivakami

in O.S. No. 21 of 2004 dated 26.10.2006; Exhibit S-9 – a true copy of the deposition of DW-4 –

Singaram in O.S. No. 21 of 2004 dated 10.11.2006; Exhibit S-10 – a true copy of the sale deed dated

08.05.1995 along with the power of attorney deed dated 28.11.1994; Exhibit S-11 – a true copy of the

notice dated 31.08.1991.

2

Exhibit S-12 – a true copy of the judgement/order dated 03.11.1989 passed in O.S. No. 787 of 85

and docket orders in O.S. No. 787 of 85 along with photocopy of the original; Exhibit S-13 – a true

copy of the rejoinder notice sent on behalf of K. Sriram dated 31.08.1991; Exhibit S-14 – a true copy

of the rejoinder reply sent on behalf of A. Valliammai dated 16.09.1991.

3

For short, “Suit Property”.

Civil Appeal No. 5342 of 2023 & Ors. Page 3 of 21

and others, A. Jeyakumar and others, and S. Balasubramanian and

others, who are subsequent purchasers having purchased portions

of the Suit Property.

3. A. Valliammai had entered into an agreement to sell dated

26.05.1988, Exhibit A-1, with respondent no. 3 – K. Sriram, for the

sale of the Suit Property at the rate of Rs. 2,95,000/- per acre. An

amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- was paid by K. Sriram to A. Valliammai as

an advance. The balance sale consideration of Rs. 31,45,000/- was

required to be paid within one year from 26.05.1988, that is, by

26.05.1989. However, vide endorsement dated 26.05.1989, Exhibit

A-3, the timeline for payment of the balance sale consideration and

execution of the sale deed was extended by 6 months, that is, till

26.11.1989.

4. In order to decide these appeals, before we refer to the facts leading

to the filing of the suit for specific performance, we would like to

reproduce two clauses of the agreement to sell (Exhibit A-1). The

clauses read:

“The under mentioned 4.40 acres in survey number

55/2B 1 which is in my name which is located in the sale

property east to west shift to the east end, north to south

in favour of Ayyarmalai trust and after shifting it pass

through survey numbers 55/2B 1 and 2B 2 and then sell

the properties to you so the 11 acres properties which I

sell to you shift to the west end into the above two

survey numbers and ensure that the lone properties

which I sell to you would come within the limit.

Civil Appeal No. 5342 of 2023 & Ors. Page 4 of 21

xx xx xx

I assure that there is encumbrance or dispute over the

under described property except the original suit

number 737/85 in the sub court. If any encumbrance or

dispute is found later on, I assure that I will settle those

encumbrances and disputes at my responsibility.”

5. On 11.07.1991, K. Sriram had issued a legal notice through his

advocate, Exhibit A-6, requiring A. Valliammai to accept the

balance sale consideration and execute the sale deed within one

month. A. Valliammai had agreed to execute the sale deed within

one year from the date of the agreement by executing single or

multiple deeds in favour of K. Sriram or third persons, as suggested

by him. On 14.04.1991, A. Valliammai had demanded Rs.

3,00,000/- as a part of the sale consideration, but on 07.07.1991,

she had refused to accept the Rs. 3,00,000/- offered by K. Sriram.

Further, A. Valliammai had expressed her willingness to sell only

half of the Suit Property and that too at an enhanced consideration

of Rs. 4,17,000/- per acre. A. Valliammai had assured to convert

4.40 acres of land belonging to the Ayyarmalai Trust

4

, to ensure

that the property under sale in terms of the agreement to sell

(Exhibit A-1) lies adjacent to Trichy to Tanjavur road. At his own

expense, K. Sriram had put in great effort to facilitate such

4

For short, “Trust”.

Civil Appeal No. 5342 of 2023 & Ors. Page 5 of 21

conversion. He had prepared the layout plan, submitted it to

Triuverambur Panchayat Union and Madras Town Planning for their

approval and had handed over the common land to Tiruverambur

Panchayat Union. A. Valliammai had also promised to settle the

partition suit in O.S. No. 787 of 1985, pending in Tiruchi sub court,

filed by Rajamani Ammal, first wife of A. Valliammai’s husband, late

Ayyamperumal Konar, that is, the original owner of the Suit

Property.

5

6. A. Valliammai responded vide reply sent by her advocate dated

09.08.1991, Exhibit A-7. She denied having demanded the

payment of Rs. 3,00,000/-. Conversely, she alleged that K. Sriram

had failed to perform and abide by the agreement to sell (Exhibit A-

1) within the stipulated deadline due to his inability to complete the

contract. The allegations made by K. Sriram were invented to

postpone the execution of the sale deed. She had submitted an

application for cancellation of the layout plan due to difficulty in

obtaining approval. She denied that K. Sriram had spent any money

in putting up the layout. Only if the property belonging to the Trust

is allotted on the east, then the property as described could be

conveyed. She denied that the partition suit in O.S. no. 787 of 1985

5

Rajamani Ammal and late Ayyamperumal Konar were childless.

Civil Appeal No. 5342 of 2023 & Ors. Page 6 of 21

was to be disposed of at her cost. K. Sriram was aware of the

pendency. The sale deed was to be executed after disposal of the

partition suit. A. Valliammai did not want to take the risk of

conveying the property since the said partition suit had not been

disposed of.

7. K. Sriram responded vide rejoinder dated 31.08.1991, Exhibit S-13,

stating that the allegations made by A. Valliammai were incorrect.

A. Valliammai wanted to extricate herself from the agreement. He

was ready and willing to perform his obligations under the

agreement to sell (Exhibit A-1). The demand to execute the sale

deed was not pre-mature. K. Sriram had spent a lot of money to

obtain an approval of the layout plan. K. Sriram had instructed his

advocate to file a suit for specific performance. But before that he

wanted to give one last opportunity to A. Valliammai to execute the

sale deed in 2 weeks, when he would offer the balance sale

consideration. Further, the partition suit in O.S. No. 787 of 1985 was

dismissed for default on 04.07.1991. Wrong survey demarcation

viz. the land belonging to the Trust stood corrected such that the

Trust’s property was situated on the east and the Suit Property on

the west.

8. A. Valliammai responded vide rejoinder reply dated 16.09.1991,

Civil Appeal No. 5342 of 2023 & Ors. Page 7 of 21

Exhibit S-14, in which she denied that a sale deed could be

executed and specifically enforced. While accepting that the

partition suit in O.S. No. 787 of 1985 had been dismissed for

default, it was stated that an application for its restoration was filed.

The suit might be restored. A. Valliammai claimed that she was

illiterate. Although she was taken to the Revenue Office, she was

unaware about the contents of the statement said to have been

made by her. In any event, exchange of property requires a

registered document. A partition deed cannot be corrected in the

survey proceedings.

9. On 15.07.1991, K. Sriram filed a suit for permanent injunction in

O.S. No. 1508 of 1991 to restrain A. Valliammai from dealing with

the Suit Property till she executes the sale deeds. A. Valliammai, it

was alleged, was negotiating with third parties to sell the Suit

Property. K. Sriram would be filing a suit for specific performance

in a short time, and was waiting for a reply to his notice.

10. A. Valliammai contested the suit, and in her written statement, she

had alleged that K. Sriram was never ready and willing to perform

the agreement to sell (Exhibit A-1). He had therefore filed a suit of

injunction instead of a suit of specific performance. She had

claimed that time was essence of the contract. She had consented

Civil Appeal No. 5342 of 2023 & Ors. Page 8 of 21

for extension of time till 26.11.1989, but K. Sriram had not paid the

balance sale consideration till that date. Suit Property had been

leased out to one A. Gopalakrishnan, who was in possession and

was cultivating the land.

11. An order of temporary injunction was passed in favour of K. Sriram

and against A. Valliammai by the trial court. However, on

23.12.1992 the suit was dismissed as not pressed. Liberty to file a

fresh suit was neither prayed nor granted.

12. On 23.12.1992 itself, K. Sriram assigned his rights under the

agreement to sell (Exhibit A-1) in favour of respondent no.1 – K.P.

Murali and respondent no.2 - S.P. Duraisamy, vide assignment

agreement dated 23.12.1992, Exhibit A-2.

13. K.P. Murali and S.P. Duraisamy, filed a suit for permanent

injunction in O.S. No. 1651 of 1994 with a prayer to restrain A.

Valliammai from dealing with the Suit Property. Decree for specific

performance of the agreement to sale (Exhibit A-1) was not prayed.

It appears that an interim injunction was not granted.

14. On 02.05.1995, A. Valliammai sold 5 acres, a portion of the Suit

Property, for a sale consideration of Rs.7,50,000/- to B. Namichand

Jain and three others. The purchasers were put in possession and

Civil Appeal No. 5342 of 2023 & Ors. Page 9 of 21

enjoyment of such portions of the Suit Property.

15. On 27.09.1995, during pendency of the suit for permanent

injunction in O.S. No. 1651 of 1994, K.P. Murali and S.P. Duraisamy

filed a suit for specific performance in O.S. No. 1126 of 1995,

subsequently renumbered as O.S. No. 21 of 2004. The present

appeal arises from the judgment and decree of the trial court in the

said suit, affirmed subsequently by the High Court in the impugned

judgment.

16. The suit was defended by A. Valliammai on several grounds,

including, inter alia, constructive res judicata, bar under Order II

Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908,

6

bar of limitation,

failure to show readiness and willingness to perform the agreement

to sell (Exhibit A-1) and invalidity of the assignment agreement

(Exhibit A-2).

17. The trial court framed one issue, that is, whether the plaintiffs were

entitled to the relief of specific performance. Trial court held that the

execution of the agreement to sell (Exhibit A-1) and its extension

by six months vide the endorsement (Exhibit A-3) were admitted.

A. Valliammai had not led evidence regarding allotment of land to

the Trust on the eastward side or her willingness to refund the

6

For short, “Code”.

Civil Appeal No. 5342 of 2023 & Ors. Page 10 of 21

advance amount. Further, K. Sriram was not aware of the status of

partition suit in O.S. No. 787 of 1985. In terms of Order VIII, Rules

4 and 5 of the Code, A. Valliammai had not denied her intention to

complete the agreement to sell (Exhibit A-1). K.P. Murali and S.P.

Duraisamy had awaited the conclusion of the partition suit in O.S.

No. 787 of 1985. Therefore the limitation period had not

commenced till the disposal of the said partition suit on 30.04.1993.

Correspondingly, the plea of res judicata was rejected since the

decision to not file the suit of specific performance was considered

to be bona-fide. K. Sriram was ready and willing to perform the

agreement to sell (Exhibit A-1) since he had taken steps to divide

the Suit Property into housing plots. The contention that the

assignment agreement (Exhibit A-2) would not confer any rights to

K.P. Murali and S.P. Duraisamy was rejected.

18. The High Court in the impugned judgment rejected the pleas of res

judicata or bar under Order II, Rule 2 of the Code in view of the

pendency of the partition suit in O.S. No. 787 of 1985. However, the

allotment of the Trust property eastwards was held to be non-

essential to the agreement to sell (Exhibit A-1). The High Court

agreed with the trial court, that K. Sriram was ready and willing to

purchase the Suit Property and had taken steps to execute the sale

deeds. K. Sriram had also reserved his right to file a suit for specific

Civil Appeal No. 5342 of 2023 & Ors. Page 11 of 21

performance during the suit for injunction in O.S. No. 1508 of 1991,

which suit was subsequently dismissed as not pressed.

19. We must record at the outset that there is considerable force in the

contention raised by the appellants relying upon the principle of

constructive res judicata or Order II, Rule 2 of the Code. However,

we are not giving an affirmative final opinion on these pleas. The

appellants must succeed in this appeal since the suit for specific

performance in O.S. No. 21 of 2004 is clearly and without doubt

barred by limitation. To avoid prolixity, the arguments raised by the

learned counsels for the parties would be referred to in our

discussion and reasoning.

20. Article 54 of Part II of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963

7

stipulates the limitation period for filing a suit for specific

performance as three years from the date fixed for performance,

and in alternative when no date is fixed, three years from the date

when the plaintiff has notice that performance has been refused.

8

7

For short, “Article 54”.

8

The Schedule

xxx

Description of suit Period of

limitation

Time from which period

begins to run

54. For specific performance of a

contract.

Three years The date fixed for the

performance, or, if no such

date is fixed, when the

plaintiff has notice that

performance is refused.

Civil Appeal No. 5342 of 2023 & Ors. Page 12 of 21

Section 9 of the Limitation Act, 1963 stipulates that once the

limitation period has commenced, it continues to run, irrespective

of any subsequent disability or inability to institute a suit or make an

application.

9

21. It is an accepted position that Rs. 1,00,000/- was paid at the time of

execution of the agreement to sell (Exhibit A-1), and the balance

consideration of Rs. 31,45,000 was required to be paid by

26.05.1989. Time for payment of Rs.31,45,000/- and execution of

the sale deed was extended till 26.11.1989 vide the endorsement

(Exhibit A-3). If we take the date 26.11.1989 as the date for

performance, the suit for specific performance filed on 27.09.1995,

is barred by limitation. However, we agree with the submission

raised on behalf of K.P. Murali and S.P. Duraisamy, that the

aforesaid time, as fixed vide the agreement to sell and the

endorsement (Exhibit A-1 and A-3), was not the essence of the

contract and therefore, the first part of Article 54 will not be

applicable.

10

Instead, the second part of Article 54 will apply.

11

On

the interpretation of Article 54, this Court in Pachanan Dhara and

9

9. Continuous running of time: Where once time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or

inability to institute a suit or make an application stops it. Provided that where letters of administration

to the estate of a creditor have been granted to his debtor, the running of the period of limitation for a

suit to recover the debt shall be suspended while the administration continues.

10

Supra Note 8.

11

Supra Note 8.

Civil Appeal No. 5342 of 2023 & Ors. Page 13 of 21

Others v. Monmatha Nath Maity

12

, has held that for determining

applicability of the first or the second part, the court will have to see

whether any time was fixed for performance of the agreement to

sell and if so fixed, whether the suit was filed beyond the prescribed

period, unless a case for extension of time or performance was

pleaded or established. However, when no time is fixed for

performance, the court will have to determine the date on which the

plaintiff had notice of refusal on part of the defendant to perform the

contract. Therefore, we have to examine whether K. Sriram or his

assignees, K.P. Murali or S.P. Duraisamy, had notice that

performance had been refused by A. Valliammai and, if so, from

which date.

22. We have elaborately referred to the correspondence exchanged

between the parties, namely, notice dated 11.07.1991 (Exhibit A-

6), reply dated 09.08.1991 (Exhibit A-7), rejoinder dated 31.08.1991

(Exhibit S-13) and reply to the rejoinder dated 16.09.1991 (Exhibit

S-14). We have also referred to the written statement filed by A.

Valliammai. These are admitted documentary evidence and the

contents thereof are not in debate. In our opinion, K. Sriram, in the

notice dated 11.07.1991 (Exhibit A-6) and rejoinder notice dated

12

(2006) 5 SCC 340.

Civil Appeal No. 5342 of 2023 & Ors. Page 14 of 21

31.08.1991 (Exhibit S-13), had acknowledged having notice that A.

Valliammai had refused to perform her part of the contract. K.

Sriram filed a suit for permanent injunction on 15.07.1991 to

restrain A. Valliammai from selling the Suit Property to third parties.

In the plaint, there is a specific averment and statement that A.

Valliammai was making excuses and going back on the terms

previously agreed. A. Valliammai was negotiating with third parties

for sale of the Suit Property. She was not abiding by the statement

made before the Tiruverumbur Panchayat Union. K. Sriram had

averred that he was going to file a suit for specific performance in a

short time, and he was awaiting reply from A. Valliammai. The reply

dated 09.08.1991 (Exhibit A-7) and rejoinder dated 16.09.1991

(Exhibit S-14) by A. Valliammai did not change the situation. These

are written notices of refusal and not of acceptance of any

obligation and affirmation. K. Sriram did not withdraw the suit for

permanent injunction on the ground that he was satisfied with the

reply and stand of A. Valliammai and hence the cause of action did

not survive. K. Sriram continued with the suit and had enjoyed

benefit of temporary injunction granted in his favour. The suit was

un-conditionally dismissed as withdrawn on 23.12.1992, the day K.

Sriram had transferred/assigned his rights under the agreement to

sell (Exhibit A-1) in favour of K.P. Murali and S.P. Duraisamy

Civil Appeal No. 5342 of 2023 & Ors. Page 15 of 21

(Exhibit A-2). K. Sriram, K.P. Murali and S.P. Duraisamy were

aware of the refusal and thus the cause of action had arisen forcing

them to approach the court with a prayer for injunction against A.

Valliammai.

23. It was submitted before us, that in A. Valliammai’s deposition as

PW-2, in front of the trial court, she had accepted that no notice was

served on K. Sriram to pay the balance sale consideration on the

date prescribed under the agreement to sell (Exhibit A-1) and that

she had remained quiet with the hope that K. Sriram would show

and therefore the limitation period under the second part of Article

54 had not commenced. We do not agree. The question to be

examined and answered is whether K. Sriram had notice of A.

Valliammai’s refusal or unwillingness to perform her part of the

agreement. The relevant portion of deposition of A. Valliammai as

PW-2 does not refer to her refusal or acceptance, but merely refers

to the factual position that she had not issued any notice or at one

point of time she had hope. This deposition cannot be read as

acceptance and willingness of A. Valliammai. At the risk of

repetition, we state that in the reply dated 09.08.1991(Exhibit A-7)

and the rejoinder dated 16.09.1991 (Exhibit S-14), A. Valliammai

had contested the assertions or allegations made against her by K.

Civil Appeal No. 5342 of 2023 & Ors. Page 16 of 21

Sriram, and her denial and refusal to abide and comply by the

agreement to sell (Exhibit A-1) was affirmed.

24. Once we accept A. Valliammai’s refusal and K. Sriram’s notice of

her refusal, the submission on behalf K.P. Murali and S.P.

Duraisamy relying on Section 63 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872,

that a promise may extend time for performance of a contract and

the submission relying on S. Brahmanand and Ors. v. K.R.

Mutugopal

13

, that extension of time need not be in writing and can

be proved by oral evidence, including conduct and forbearance on

the part of the other party, have to be rejected. Refusal and

forbearance are opposites.

25. The High Court in the impugned judgment had rejected the

contention that the allotment of the Trust property eastwards had

any bearing on filing of the suit for specific performance. We agree

with the said finding. In fact, vide rejoinder dated 31.08.1991

(Exhibit S-13), K. Sriram stated that the survey demarcation was

already corrected in the survey map such that the Trust property

was situated on the east and the A. Valliammai’s property on the

west.

13

(2005) 12 SCC 764.

Civil Appeal No. 5342 of 2023 & Ors. Page 17 of 21

26. The submission stating that the agreement to sell (Exhibit A-1) was

to be specifically performed only after disposal of the partition suit

in O.S. No. 787 of 1985 is misconceived and wrong. We have

quoted the relevant clause of the agreement to sell (Exhibit A-1). It

do not state that the sale deed was to be executed only after

disposal of the partition suit. A. Valliammai had only faithfully stated

that there was no encumbrance or dispute over the Suit Property

except the partition suit. The disputed Suit Property could still be

sold and transferred. K. Sriram was clearly aware of the pending

suit while executing the agreement to sell (Exhibit A-1), which was

agreed despite the pending litigation. It was submitted on behalf of

K.P. Murali and Duraisamy that, A. Valliammai, in her reply dated

09.08.1991 (Exhibit A-7) claimed that it was not possible for her to

execute the contract till the disposal of the said partition suit. The

argument is without merit, as this assertion by A. Valliammai shows

her refusal to perform the agreement to sell (Exhibit A-1). A decision

in the said suit was not a condition precedent to the execution of

sale deed under the agreement to sell (Exhibit A-1). Neither had K.

Sriram read the said reply as concurrence or acceptance by A.

Valliammai to execute the sale deed post the decision in the said

partition suit. On the other hand, as recorded previously, K. Sriram

had continued to press the suit for permanent injunction in O.S. No.

Civil Appeal No. 5342 of 2023 & Ors. Page 18 of 21

1508 of 1991. Another fallacy in the argument raised on behalf of

K.P. Murali and K.P. Duraisamy is that A. Valliammai’s reply dated

09.08.1991 (Exhibit A-7) is not being read in its entirety. This is not

a proper manner to construe a notice or reply and the contents and

purport thereof. K. Sriram, and subsequently, K.P. Murali and K.P.

Duraisamy had filed suits for permanent injunction.

27. For the aforesaid reasons, the 3-year limitation period to file a suit

for specific performance commenced as early as when the K.

Sriram had filed suit for injunction on 15.07.1991. A. Valliammai’s

reply dated 09.08.1991 (Exhibit A-7) or reply to rejoinder dated

16.09.1991 (Exhibit S-14) were again sufficient written notice to K.

Sriram of her refusal and unwillingness to perform the agreement

to sell (Exhibit A-1). The limitation period of three years under the

second part of Article 54, which is from the date when the party had

notice of the refusal by the other side, had expired when the suit for

specific performance was filed on 27.09.1995. Suit in O.S. No. 21

of 2004 is barred by limitation.

28. Accordingly, the impugned judgment and decree for specific

performance, as affirmed by the Division Bench, is set aside.

29. K. Sriram had paid an advance of Rs. 1,00,000/- to A. Valliammai.

This position is accepted. In view of our findings, the suit filed by

Civil Appeal No. 5342 of 2023 & Ors. Page 19 of 21

K.P. Murali and S.P. Duraisamy, being barred by limitation, K.P.

Murali and S.P. Duraisamy are not entitled to a decree for refund of

Rs.1,00,000/- with interest. During the course of hearing, the parties

had tried to negotiate a settlement but it had not actualised. A.

Valliammai had agreed to pay Rs. 50,00,000/- (Rupees Fifty Lakhs

Only) to K.P. Murali and S.P. Duraisamy. The reason was that K.

Sriram had spent money in obtaining approval of layout plans. A.

Valliammai has sold most of the Suit Property except for about 1

acre of the land. K.P. Murali and S.P. Duraisamy have deposited

Rs. 31,45,000/- in terms of the decree passed in their favour, which

amount has been converted into interest bearing fixed deposit

receipt(s). Keeping in mind the aforesaid facts and circumstances,

we exercise our power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India,

to do substantial justice with the direction to A. Valliammai to pay

Rs.50,00,000/- (Rupees Fifty Lakhs Only) to K.P. Murali and S.P.

Duraisamy. The figure keeps in mind the advance of Rs.1,00,000/-

paid on 26.05.1988 and the expenses incurred by K. Sriram, and

interest etc. A decree of Rs.50,00,000/- is passed in favour of K.P.

Murai and S.P. Duraisamy against A. Valliammai in the above

terms. It is also directed that in case Rs.50,00,000/- is not paid by

A. Valliammai within 6 (six) months, she shall be liable to pay

Civil Appeal No. 5342 of 2023 & Ors. Page 20 of 21

interest @ 8% per annum on Rs. 50,00,000/- from the date of this

judgment till the date on which the payment is actually made.

30. In view of the aforesaid discussion, Civil Appeal Nos. 5343, 5344

and 5345 of 2023, preferred by S. Jayaprakash and others, A.

Jeyakumar and others, and S. Balasubramanian and others, are

allowed and the decree of specific performance passed in favour of

K.P. Murali and S.P. Duraisamy is set aside. O.S. No. 21 of 2004,

preferred by K.P. Murali and S.P. Duraisamy, decided by Additional

District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 1, Tiruchirapalli

will be treated as dismissed. Civil Appeal No. 5342 of 2023

preferred by A. Valliammai is allowed to the extent that the decree

of specific performance in respect of the suit land is set aside, and

is substituted by a decree of Rs. 50,00,000/- payable with effect

from the date of this judgment along with an interest @ 8% per

annum which A. Valliammai will be liable to pay if she fails to pay

Rs. 50,00,000/- within six months from the date of this judgment.

O.S. No. 21 of 2004, filed by K.P. Murali and S.P. Duraisamy and

decided by the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track

Court No.1, Tiruchirapalli is decreed in the above terms against A.

Valliammai.

31. K.P. Murali and S.P. Duraisamy are entitled to withdraw the

Civil Appeal No. 5342 of 2023 & Ors. Page 21 of 21

amounts previously deposited by them, in terms of the decree of

the trial court along with the interest accrued thereon.

32. In view of the facts and circumstances of this case, we hold that

there will be no order as to costs.

......................................J.

(SANJIV KHANNA)

......................................J.

(BELA M. TRIVEDI)

NEW DELHI;

SEPTEMBER 12, 2023.

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