2026:HHC:98

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

Cr. MP (M) No. 2763 of 2025

Reserved on: 16.12.2025

Date of Decision: 1.1.2026.

Abhishek ...Petitioner

Versus

State of Himachal Pradesh ...Respondent

Coram

Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.

Whether approved for reporting?

1

No.

For the Petitioner : Mr Sanjeev Kumar Suri,

Advocate.

For the Respondent/State : Mr Prashant Sen, Deputy

Advocate General.

Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

The petitioner has filed the present petition for

seeking regular bail in F.I.R. No. 71 of 2025, dated 28.5.2025,

registered in Police Station, Dehra, District Kangra, H.P., for the

commission of an offence punishable under Section 152 of

Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS).

2. It has been asserted that the police party was on

patrolling duty on 28.5.2025 when they received secret

1

Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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2026:HHC:98

information that Abhishek Singh Bhardwaj, the present

petitioner, had uploaded his photo and video on Facebook with

prohibited/illegal weapons, and he was following anti-national

persons. The police associated Mohinder Singh and reached the

petitioner’s house, where his parents were present. The

petitioner came out after some time. The police asked the

petitioner to open his Facebook ID, photographs and video. The

flag of Pakistan and arms were found uploaded. The police

searched the house, but no prohibited arms were recovered. The

police seized the mobile phone. The petitioner had shared the

information about Operation Sindoor with some Pakistani

persons, wherein he declared that Operation Sindoor was wrong

and he supported Khalistan. These allegations are false. The

petitioner is innocent, and he was falsely implicated. The police

have filed the charge sheet, and no fruitful purpose would be

served by detaining the petitioner in custody. Hence, the

petition.

3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report

asserting that the police were on patrolling duty on 28.5.2025.

They received secret information at Dehra Chowk that the

petitioner had uploaded photos and videos with prohibited

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weapons. He had written his name with those weapons. The

police informed SDPO about the information, joined Jagdish

Ram and Mohinder Singh as independent witnesses and went to

the petitioner’s house. The petitioner’s parents were found in

the house. The petitioner also came out after some time. His

Facebook ID was checked, and the photographs of prohibited

weapons, videos, flag of Pakistan were found to be uploaded.

The police searched the house, but no illegal substance was

found. The police seized the mobile phone. The petitioner had

chatted with Niaz Khan, in which he had stated that Operation

Sindoor was wrong; and he had supported Khalistan. The mobile

phone was sent to the FSL, and the result has been obtained. The

police investigated the matter and filed the charge sheet. The

matter is listed for recording the statements of the prosecution’s

witnesses on 14.1.2026.

4. I have heard Mr Sanjeev Kumar Suri, learned counsel

for the petitioner and Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate

General, for the respondent-State.

5. Mr Sanjeev Kumar Suri, learned counsel for the

petitioner, submitted that the allegations made in the FIR do not

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satisfy the requirement of Section 152 of the BNS. The police

have filed the charge sheet, and no fruitful purpose would be

served by detaining the petitioner in custody. Therefore, he

prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be

released on bail.

6. Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General,

for the respondent-State, submitted that the petitioner was

involved in anti-national activities. He was in touch with

Pakistani Nationals. The offence is grave. Hence, he prayed that

the present petition be dismissed.

7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions

made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by

the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC

314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page

380: -

(i) Broad principles for the grant of bail

56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1

SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while elabo-

rating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of

India in the context of personal liberty of a person under

trial, has laid down the key factors that should be consid-

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ered while granting bail, which are extracted as under:

(SCC p. 244, paras 7-9)

“7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is

the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also

pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be

liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also

bears upon the issue.

8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice

would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant ju-

risdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being.

[Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England”

(Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Mod-

ern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]

9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the

Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfer-

ing with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise pol-

luting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but

rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents

of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a

bad record, particularly a record which suggests that he is

likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In regard

to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a

thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit

the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members

of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about

the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an ex-

ercise in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied)

57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4

SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various

aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing

with an application seeking bail. The same may be ex -

tracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)

“8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on

the basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the

circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary man-

ner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind

the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in sup-

port thereof, the severity of the punishment which con-

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viction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and

standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar

to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the

presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable appre-

hension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger

interests of the public or State and similar other consid-

erations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the pur-

poses of granting the bail the legislature has used the

words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the

evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant

of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is

a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecu-

tion will be able to produce prima facie evidence in sup-

port of the charge.” (emphasis supplied)

58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan

Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking

through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising

discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same ju-

diciously. In highlighting that bail should not be granted

as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this

Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3)

“3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order,

but, however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in

a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An or-

der for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sus-

tained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of

bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter

being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary

from case to case. While placement of the accused in the

society, though it may be considered by itself, cannot be

a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail, and the

same should always be coupled with other circumstances

warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is

one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail —

the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance

of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on

the factual matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied)

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59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7

SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that al-

though it is established that a court considering a bail ap-

plication cannot undertake a detailed examination of evi-

dence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the

case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie

reasons justifying the grant of bail.

60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14

SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that

where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the

said order would suffer from the vice of non-application

of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with

regard to the circumstances under which an order grant-

ing bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which

ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail

have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9)

“9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, inter-

fere with an order passed by the High Court granting or

rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally in-

cumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion

judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with

the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions

of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among

other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind

while considering an application for bail are:

(i) whether there is any prima facie or reason-

able ground to believe that the accused had

committed the offence;

(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;

(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of

conviction;

(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing,

if released on bail;

(v) character, behaviour, means, position and

standing of the accused;

(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;

(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses

being influenced; and

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(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted

by grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied)

xxxxxxx

62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of

application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise

of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the

accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC

497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench

of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and ca-

sual order (Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine

Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine

Pat 2857) of the High Court granting bail to the accused,

observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar,

(2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para

35)

“35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an

individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while

considering an application for bail courts cannot lose

sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an

accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case,

particularly, when the accusations may not be false,

frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by

adequate material brought on record so as to enable a

court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While con-

sidering an application for the grant of bail, a prima fa-

cie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must

be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the

case brought on record. Due consideration must be

given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the

criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the na-

ture of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-

à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an accused.” (em-

phasis supplied)

9. The present petition has to be decided as per the

parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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2026:HHC:98

10. The offence punishable under Section 152 of BNS

corresponds to Section 124A of IPC. It was laid down by the

Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vinod Dua v. Union of India, (2023) 14

SCC 286: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 414 that Section 124A applies to

such activities which are intended or tend to create disorder or

disturbance of the public peace. It was observed at page 339:

45. These passages elucidate what was accepted by this

Court in preference to the decisions of the Privy Council in

Gangadhar Tilak v. Queen Empress, 1897 SCC OnLine PC 23:

(1897-98) 25 IA 1] and in King Emperor v. Sadashiv Narayan

Bhalerao, 1947 SCC OnLine PC 9: (1946-47) 74 IA 89]. The

statements of law deducible from the decision in Kedar

Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 6: 1962

Supp (2) SCR 769: AIR 1962 SC 955 are as follows:

45.1. “The expression 'the Government established

by law' has to be distinguished from the persons for

the time being engaged in carrying on the

administration. “Government established by law” is

the visible symbol of the State. The very existence of

the State will be in jeopardy if the Government

established by law is subverted. (Kedar Nath Singh v.

State of Bihar, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 6: 1962 Supp (2) SCR

769: AIR 1962 SC 955], SCC OnLine SC para 24)

45.2. “Any acts within the meaning of Section

124-A which have the effect of subverting the

Government by bringing that Government

into contempt or hatred, or creating

disaffection against it, would be within the

penal statute because the feeling of disloyalty

to the Government established by law or

enmity to it imports the idea of tendency to

public disorder by the use of actual violence

or incitement to violence.” (Kedar Nath Singh

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v. State of Bihar, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 6: 1962

Supp (2) SCR 769: AIR 1962 SC 955 ], SCC

OnLine SC para 24)

45.3. “Comments, however strongly worded,

expressing disapprobation of actions of the

Government, without exciting those feelings

which generate the inclination to cause

public disorder by acts of violence, would not

be penal.” (Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar,

1962 SCC OnLine SC 6: 1962 Supp (2) SCR 769:

AIR 1962 SC 955, SCC OnLine SC para 24)

45.4. “A citizen has a right to say or write

whatever he likes about the Government, or

its measures, by way of criticism or

comment, so long as he does not incite

people to violence against the Government

established by law or with the intention of

creating public disorder.” (Kedar Nath Singh

v. State of Bihar, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 6: 1962

Supp (2) SCR 769: AIR 1962 SC 955, SCC OnLine

SC para 25)

45.5. “The provisions of the sections [ The

reference was to Sections 124-A and 505 IPC.]

read as a whole, along with the Explanations,

make it reasonably clear that the sections aim

at rendering penal only such activities as

would be intended, or have a tendency, to

create disorder or disturbance of public peace

by resort to violence.” (Kedar Nath Singh v.

State of Bihar, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 6: 1962 Supp

(2) SCR 769: AIR 1962 SC 955], SCC OnLine SC

para 26)

45.6. “It is only when the words, written or

spoken, etc., which have the pernicious

tendency or intention of creating public

disorder or disturbance of law and order, that

the law steps in to prevent such activities in

the interest of public order.” (Kedar Nath

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Singh v. State of Bihar, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 6:

1962 Supp (2) SCR 769: AIR 1962 SC 955, SCC

OnLine SC para 26)

45.7. (g) “We propose to limit its operation

only to such activities as come within the

ambit of the observations of the Federal

Court, that is to say, activities involving

incitement to violence or intention or

tendency to create public disorder or cause

disturbance of public peace.” (Kedar Nath

Singh v. State of Bihar, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 6:

1962 Supp (2) SCR 769: AIR 1962 SC 955], SCC

OnLine SC para 27)

As the statement of law at para 45.5 above indicates, it

applies to cases under Sections 124-A and 505IPC.

According to this Court, only such activities which would

be intended or have a tendency to create disorder or

disturbance of public peace by resort to violence are

rendered penal.

11. A similar view was taken in Manzar Sayeed Khan v.

State of Maharashtra, (2007) 5 SCC 1, wherein it was observed: -

16. Section 153-A IPC, as extracted hereinabove, covers a

case where a person by words, either spoken or written, or

by signs or by visible representations or otherwise,

promotes or attempts to promote, disharmony or feelings

of enmity, hatred or ill will between different religious,

racial, language or regional groups or castes or

communities or acts prejudicial to the maintenance of

harmony or is likely to disturb the public tranquillity. The

gist of the offence is the intention to promote feelings of

enmity or hatred between different classes of people. The

intention to cause disorder or incite the people to violence

is the sine qua non of the offence under Section 153-A IPC,

and the prosecution has to prove prima facie the existence

of mens rea on the part of the accused. The intention has

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to be judged primarily by the language of the book and the

circumstances in which the book was written and

published. The matter complained of within the ambit of

Section 153-A must be read as a whole. One cannot rely on

strongly worded and isolated passages for proving the

charge, nor indeed can one take a sentence here and a

sentence there and connect them by a meticulous process

of inferential reasoning.

17. In Ramesh v. Union of India [(1988) 1 SCC 668: 1988 SCC

(Cri) 266: AIR 1988 SC 775], this Court held that TV serial

Tamas did not depict communal tension and violence and

the provisions of Section 153-A IPC would not apply to it.

It was also not prejudicial to national integration, falling

under Section 153-B IPC. Approving the observations of

Vivian Bose, J., in Bhagwati Charan Shukla v. Provincial

Govt. [AIR 1947 Nag 1] The Court observed that

“the effect of the words must be judged from the

standards of reasonable, strong-minded, firm and

courageous men, and not those of weak and

vacillating minds, nor of those who scent danger

in every hostile point of view. … It is the standard

of an ordinary, reasonable man, or as they say in

English law, ‘the man on the top of a Clapham

omnibus’.” (Ramesh case [(1988) 1 SCC 668: 1988

SCC (Cri) 266: AIR 1988 SC 775], SCC p. 676, para 13)

18. Again, in Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of A.P. [(1997) 7 SCC

431: 1997 SCC (Cri) 1094], it is held that the common

feature in both the sections, viz. Sections 153-A and

505(2), being promotion of feeling of enmity, hatred or ill

will “between different” religious or racial or linguistic or

regional groups or castes and communities, it is

necessary that at least two such groups or communities

should be involved. Further, it was observed that merely

inciting the feeling of one community or group without

any reference to any other community or group cannot

attract either of the two sections.

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12. This position was reiterated in Javed Ahmad Hajam v.

State of Maharashtra, (2024) 4 SCC 156: (2024) 2 SCC (Cri) 383:

2024 SCC OnLine SC 249 (supra), wherein it was observed at page

161: -

8. This Court in Manzar Sayeed Khan [Manzar Sayeed Khan

v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 5 SCC 1 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri)

417] referred to the view taken by Vivian Bose, J., as a

Judge of the erstwhile Nagpur High Court in Bhagwati

Charan Shukla v. Provincial Govt., 1946 SCC OnLine MP 5:

AIR 1947 Nag 1 A Division Bench of the High Court dealt

with the offence of sedition under Section 124-AIPC and

Section 4(1) of the Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931.

The issue was whether a particular article in the press

tends, directly or indirectly, to bring hatred or contempt

to the Government established in law. This Court has

approved this view in its decision in Ramesh v. Union of

India, (1988) 1 SCC 668: 1988 SCC (Cri) 266]. In the said

case, this Court dealt with the issue of the applicability of

Section 153-AIPC. In para 13, it was held thus : (Ramesh v.

Union of India, (1988) 1 SCC 668: 1988 SCC (Cri) 266], SCC p.

676)

“13. … the effect of the words must be judged from

the standards of reasonable, strong-minded, firm

and courageous men, and not those of weak and

vacillating minds, nor of those who scent danger in

every hostile point of view. … It is the standard of

an ordinary, reasonable man or as they say in

English law, ‘the man on the top of a Clapham

omnibus’. (Bhagwati Charan Shukla v. Provincial

Govt., 1946 SCC OnLine MP 5: AIR 1947 Nag 1], SCC

OnLine MP para 67)” (emphasis supplied)

Therefore, the yardstick laid down by Vivian Bose,

J., will have to be applied while judging the effect of

the words, spoken or written, in the context of

Section 153-AIPC.

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9. We may also make a useful reference to a decision of

this Court in Patricia Mukhim v. State of Meghalaya, (2021)

15 SCC 35. Paras 8 to 10 of the said decision read thus :

(SCC pp. 41-43)

“8. ‘It is of utmost importance to keep all speech

free in order for the truth to emerge and have a civil

society.’— Thomas Jefferson. Freedom of speech

and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of

the Constitution is a very valuable fundamental

right. However, the right is not absolute.

Reasonable restrictions can be placed on the

right of free speech and expression in the

interest of sovereignty and integrity of India,

security of the State, friendly relations with

foreign States, public order, decency or morality

or in relation to contempt of Court, defamation

or incitement to an offence. Speech crime is

punishable under Section 153-AIPC. Promotion

of enmity between different groups on the

grounds of religion, race, place of birth,

residence, language, etc. and doing acts

prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony is

punishable with imprisonment which may

extend to three years or with a fine or with both

under Section 153-A. As we are called upon to

decide whether a prima facie case is made out

against the appellant for committing offences

under Sections 153-A and 505(1)(c), it is relevant

to reproduce the provisions, which are as

follows:

***

9. Only where the written or spoken words have

the tendency of creating public disorder or

disturbance of law and order or affecting public

tranquillity, the law needs to step in to prevent

such an activity. The intention to cause disorder or

incite people to violence is the sine qua non of the

offence under Section 153-AIPC, and the

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prosecution has to prove the existence of mens rea

in order to succeed. [Balwant Singh v. State of Pun-

jab, (1995) 3 SCC 214: 1995 SCC (Cri) 432]

10. The gist of the offence under Section 153-AIPC is

the intention to promote feelings of enmity or

hatred between different classes of people. The

intention has to be judged primarily by the

language of the piece of writing and the

circumstances in which it was written and

published. The matter complained of within the

ambit of Section 153-A must be read as a whole.

One cannot rely on strongly worded and isolated

passages for proving the charge, nor indeed can

one take a sentence here and a sentence there

and connect them by a meticulous process of

inferential reasoning [Manzar Sayeed Khan v.

State of Maharashtra, (2007) 5 SCC 1: (2007) 2 SCC

(Cri) 41s].”

(emphasis in original and supplied)

13. There is no averment in the FIR that any hatred or

discontent was directed towards the Government established by

law in India. The Pen Drive containing the images and the video

was also perused by me. Prima facie, they show that the

petitioner chatted with someone, and both of them criticised the

hostilities between India and Pakistan. They advocated that all

people, irrespective of their religion, should stay together, and

that the war serves no fruitful purpose. It is difficult to see how a

desire to end the hostilities and a return to peace can amount to

sedition.

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14. It is undisputed that no prohibited weapon was

recovered from the petitioner. Thus, merely posting the

prohibited arms forming the name of a person does not amount

to sedition.

15. It was submitted that the petitioner had raised the

slogan of Khalistan Zindabad. This Court was unable to locate

any such slogan in the data extracted from the mobile phone,

but assuming that it is correct, it was laid down by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in Balwant Singh v. State of H.P. (1995) 3 SCC 124

that raising the slogan of Khalistan Zindabad does not amount

to any offence. It was observed:-

9. Insofar as the offence under Section 153-A IPC is

concerned, it provides for punishment for promoting

enmity between different groups on grounds of religion,

race, place of birth, residence, language, caste or

community or any other ground whatsoever or brings

about disharmony or feeling of hatred or ill-will between

different religious, racial, linguistic or regional groups or

castes or communities. In our opinion, only where the

written or spoken words have the tendency or intention

of creating public disorder or disturbance of law and

order or affect public tranquillity, that the law need to

step in to prevent such an activity. The facts and

circumstances of this case unmistakably show that there

was no disturbance or semblance of disturbance of law

and order, or public order or peace and tranquillity in the

area from where the appellants were apprehended while

raising slogans on account of the activities of the

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appellants. The intention to cause disorder or incite

people to violence is the sine qua non of the offence under

Section 153-A IPC, and the prosecution has to prove the

existence of mens rea in order to succeed. In this case, the

prosecution has not been able to establish any mens rea

on the part of the appellants, as envisaged by the

provisions of Section 153-A IPC, by their casually raising

the three slogans a couple of times. The offence under

Section 153-A IPC is, therefore, not made out.

16. In the present case, the slogans were posted, as per

the prosecution, on Facebook. There is no evidence, whatsoever,

at this stage to show that any person was excited towards

disaffection by posting these slogans. Thus, the mere posting of

the slogans will not prima facie amount to any offence.

17. The police have filed the charge sheet before the

learned Trial Court, and no fruitful purpose would be served by

detaining the petitioner in custody. The provisions of bail cannot

be used to punish a person before the proof of his guilt. Hence,

the petitioner deserves to be released on bail.

18. In view of the above, the present petition is allowed,

and the petitioner is ordered to be released on bail in the sum of

₹50,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction

of the learned Trial Court. While on bail, the petitioner will abide

by the following terms and conditions: -

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(i)The petitioner will not intimidate the witnesses, nor

will he influence any evidence in any manner

whatsoever;

(ii)The petitioner shall attend the trial on each and

every hearing and will not seek unnecessary

adjournments;

(iii)The petitioner will not leave the present address for

a continuous period of seven days without

furnishing the address of the intended visit to the

SHO concerned, the Police Station concerned and the

Trial Court;

(iv)The petitioner will surrender his passport, if any, to

the Court; and

(v)The petitioner will furnish his mobile number and

social media contact to the Police and the Court and

will abide by the summons/notices received from the

Police/Court through SMS/WhatsApp/Social Media

Account. In case of any change in the mobile number

or social media accounts, the same will be intimated

to the Police/Court within five days from the date of

the change.

19. It is expressly made clear that in case of violation of

any of these conditions, the prosecution will have the right to

file a petition for cancellation of the bail.

20. The petition stands accordingly disposed of. A copy

of this order be sent to the Jail Superintendent, Lala Lajpat Rai

District and Air Correctional Home, Dharamshala, HP and the

learned Trial Court by FASTER.

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21. The observations made hereinabove are regarding

the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing whatsoever

on the case's merits.

22. A downloaded copy of this order shall be accepted by

the learned Trial Court while accepting the bail bonds from the

petitioner, and in case said Court intends to ascertain the

veracity of the downloaded copy of the order presented to it, the

same may be ascertained from the official website of this Court.

(Rakesh Kainthla)

Judge

1

st

January, 2026

(Chander)