Supreme Court, Civil Appeal, Ajay Vijh, Indian Banks Association, Caution List, Professional Negligence, Advocates Act 1961, Bar Council of India, Writ Petition, Legal Education
 07 Jul, 2026
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Ajay Vijh Vs. Indian Banks Association & Ors.

  Supreme Court Of India 2026 INSC 670 @ DIARY NO. 10787/2024
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Case Background

As per case facts, an advocate was removed from a bank's panel and placed on the Indian Banks' Association (IBA) "Caution List" due to alleged negligence in a legal opinion ...

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Document Text Version

2026 INSC 670 Page 1 of 41

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2026

ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. OF 2026

@ DIARY NO. 10787/2024

AJAY VIJH ...APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

INDIAN BANKS ASSOCIATION & ORS . …RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

Table of Contents

I. The Dispute and Its Consideration. ............................................................. 2

II. Factual Background ...................................................................................... 5

III. Issues for Consideration .............................................................................. 7

IV. Maintainability of Writ Petition under Article 226. ……………………………8

V. Scope and object of Caution List as per RBI Guidelines ......................... 13

VI. Professional Independence, Self-Regulation and BCI being the

Disciplinary Body. .............................................................................................. 21

VII. Duty of BCI to undertake performance audit of its disciplinary jurisdiction

to ensure accountability. ................................................................................... 29

VIII. Continuing Legal Education (CLE) for Lawyers: A Necessity for

Strengthening Justice Delivery. ........................................................................ 35

IX. Conclusions. ................................................................................................. 40

Page 2 of 41

1. Delay condoned. Leave granted.

1

I. The Dispute and Its Consideration.

2. The appellant, an advocate by profession, served as panel counsel

for Canara Bank at the relevant time. Pursuant to a legal opinion rendered

by him in the year 2015, the Bank considered it necessary, not only to

remove his name from its panel of advocates but also to include his name

in what is called the “Caution List”, maintained by the Indian Banks’

Association (IBA) as per guidelines in circulars issued by RBI. The writ

petition instituted by the appellant challenging the aforesaid action of the

Bank and the IBA came to be dismissed on the ground that the IBA is not

a State under Article 12 of the Constitution.

2.1 Having regard to the significance of the issues involving autonomy,

self-regulation and accountability of the legal profession, we permitted the

learned counsels appearing for respective parties, as well as Mr. Maninder

Singh, Amicus Curiae to address us on the maintainability of the writ

petition, as also the merits of the case. For the reasons to follow, we have

held that a writ petition under Article 226 is maintainable.

1

The present Civil Appeal arises from the judgment and order dated 20.11.2023 passed by the High

Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 12074 of 2023.

Page 3 of 41

2.2 On merits, we have declared that the C aution List maintained by the

IBA is intended to operate only in cases involving fraud, dishonesty,

criminality, or other serious misconduct affecting the banking system. It

was never designed to address cases resting merely on alleged

negligence or errors of professional judgment. Consequently, we have

held that inclusion of appellant’s name in the Caution List solely on

account of negligence is unsustainable in law.

2.3 The issues that have arisen for consideration compelled us to

examine certain foundational principles, namely, independence of legal

profession and the concomitant freedom of self-regulation. These

principles are well recognised and have, in fact, secured statutory

recognition under the Advocates Act, 1961 (‘Act’). Matters relating to

professional conduct or misconduct of advocates fall within the exclusive

jurisdiction of the regulatory bodies constituted under the Act, namely the

Bar Council of India and the respective State Bar Councils. Banks have

the choice of disengaging a legal professional and also to remove his/her

name from the panel if the services are not up to the mark, but an action

in the nature of public declaration to all other banks about the conduct,

competency or incompetency of an advocate is clearly beyond their power

and jurisdiction and clearly illegal.

Page 4 of 41

2.4 At the same time, this Court is of the considered view that the right

and privilege of s elf-regulation of the Bar, through peer review, must

withstand scrutiny on the touchstones of transparency, accountability, and

institutional effectiveness. Public confidence in the legal profession, which

is indispensable to the administration of justice, can be sustained only

when disciplinary mechanisms inspire trust and credibility. We have

therefore considered it appropriate to direct the Bar Council of India to

undertake a performance audit of the efficacy and credibility of its

disciplinary powers and to adopt such corrective and remedial measures

as may be found necessary.

2.5 Further, in order to maintain the highest standards of professional

competence, legal knowledge, advocacy skills, and ethical conduct

expected from members of this noble profession, we have directed the

Bar Council of India to initiate and institutionalise the discipline and culture

of Continuing Legal Education (CLE). We have also suggested that the

Bar Council of India may consider establishing a National Legal Academy

(NLA) for members, like how the National Judicial Academy (NJA) was

established for Judges. There is both a need and a promise in a

successful collaboration among these Academies.

Page 5 of 41

II. Factual Background.

3. The appellant, an advocate by profession, was enrolled in 1998 and

had been on the panel of several banks and financial institutions for

rendering legal advisory services. He claims to have been on the panel of

the respondent Bank from September 2010, and to have continued to

provide professional services. The dispute traces its origin to a

communication dated 27.07.2018 issued by the regional manager of the

Bank, in which it was alleged that a legal opinion furnished by the

appellant on 08.08.2015 regarding certain immovable property offered as

security for a credit facility was erroneous. By the said communication, the

appellant was called upon to furnish his explanation. The allegation

proceeded on the footing that, while the appellant had opined that the

subject land which was given as collateral for a credit facility of Rs. 2.00

Crore was wholly owned by M/s Pushpanjali Buildwell Private Limited, the

guarantor to the loan transaction, a portion thereof had, in fact, been

alienated three years back under sale deeds dated 31.10.2012, and the

opinion failed to examine this. According to the respondent bank, this

omission exposed it to financial risk.

4. Upon receipt of the aforesaid communication, the appellant

submitted a detailed explanation dated 17.08.2018, asserting that the

legal opinion was based on a search certificate issued by the office of the

Sub-Registrar, Hapur, and after inspection of the relevant records for a

Page 6 of 41

substantial period. It was his case that the alleged sale transactions were

not discernible from the records available at the relevant time, and that

the opinion was furnished in accordance with the prevailing professional

standards and the bank’s own guidelines. Having considered the

explanation furnished by the appellant, the respondent bank, by

communication dated 31.01.2019, proceeded to remove him from their

panel on the ground of negligence in verification of title.

5. Matter did not rest there. The bank proceeded to forward appellant’s

name to IBA for inclusion in the Caution List, pursuant to which, with effect

from 05.02.2020, appellant’s name came to be incorporated in the said

Caution List titled “Third Party Entities Involved in Fraud”. Against the

appellant’s name, in the remark column, it was recorded : “Given Wrong

Legal Opinion And Negligence in Conducting Search and Bank Was

Exposed to Loss and Financial Risk”. The appellant asserts that such

inclusion was effected without prior notice, without affording him an

opportunity to be heard, and in derogation of the procedural guidelines

governing such action.

6. The Caution List, as contemplated under the guidelines issued by

the RBI Circular dated 16.03.2009, is a mechanism devised for the

purpose of alerting banks and financial institutions about third- party

entities, including advocates, valuers, chartered accountants and other

Page 7 of 41

professionals, whose acts of omission or commission are perceived to

have exposed banks to fraud or financial risk. The object underlying the

maintenance and dissemination of information through such a list is to

enable banks to exercise due caution while engaging or dealing with such

entities in future transactions.

7. It is the appellant’s case that the adverse consequence of such

inclusion in the Caution List was not merely confined to the respondent

bank, but had a cascading effect on his professional engagements,

resulting in termination of his empanelment with other banking institutions,

seriously denting his honour and reputation. The appellant claims to have

become aware of his inclusion in the C aution List only much later, as there

was no intimation of such inclusion. Immediately upon learning the same,

he filed a writ petition before the High Court challenging the said action.

8. The High Court, however, declined to entertain the writ petition,

holding that a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not

maintainable against the respondents and proceeded to dismiss the same

without entering into the merits of the dispute. It is against this order that

the present appeal is pressed on the following issues:

III. Issues for Consideration.

9. The following are the issues that arise for consideration:

Page 8 of 41

9.1 Whether the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution

challenging the inclusion of the appellant’s name in the IBA Caution List

was maintainable?

9.2 Whether the inclusion of an advocate’s name in the Caution List

maintained by banks and financial institutions is merely an administrative

measure confined to the contractual relationship between the bank and its

panel advocate, or whether such inclusion has a bearing on legal and

constitutional rights of the parties?

9.3 Whether allegations relating to professional misconduct or

negligence of an advocate fall within the disciplinary domain under the

Advocates Act, 1961, and the Bar Councils have exclusive jurisdiction to

deal with them?

IV. Maintainability of Writ Petition under Article 226.

Re: Issue No. 1: Whether the writ petition under Article 226 of the

Constitution challenging inclusion of the appellant’s name in the IBA

Caution List was maintainable?

10. The High Court dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the

IBA is not “State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and

that, therefore, no writ petition would lie against it. In our view, the High

Court approached the matter from a rather narrow perspective of the

scope and ambit of Article 226.

Page 9 of 41

11. The appellant is not merely aggrieved by his de-empanelment by a

Bank, which may well fall within the realm of a contractual relationship.

His real grievance is against the inclusion of his name in the C aution List

with remarks casting aspersions on his professional competence and

integrity. Such action undoubtedly carries serious consequences as it has

the potential to affect his standing as an advocate and his future

professional engagements, particularly by financial institutions. The

appellant, therefore, asserts infringement of his fundamental right to

practise the profession of law under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.

Once such a grievance is raised, the High Court, exercising jurisdiction

under Article 226, could not have declined examination of the matter solely

on the ground that the body against whom relief was sought may not

strictly fall within the definition of “State” under Article 12.

12. Once upon a time, the maintainability of a petition under Articles 32

and 226 of the Constitution depended primarily upon who the respondent

was. The focus has gradually shifted from the formal character of the body

against whom relief is sought to the nature of the function performed, the

source of power exercised, and the effect of the impugned action on

legally protected rights.

2

Article 226 is not confined merely to statutory

2

Kaushal Kishor v. State of U.P, (2023) 4 SCC 1. Held: “Once upon a time, the maintainability of a

petition under Articles 32/226 depended upon “who the respondent was”. Later, the focus shifted to “the

nature of the duties/functions performed” by the respondent, for finding out his amenability to the

jurisdiction under Article 226.”

Page 10 of 41

authorities or instrumentalities of the State falling within Article 12. The

expression “any person or authority” occurring in Article 226 has

consistently received a wider and more liberal interpretation.

13. In Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna

Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust v. V.R. Rudani

3

, this Court authoritatively

held that the power under Article 226 extends even to bodies discharging

public duties, irrespective of whether such duties arise from statute or

otherwise. What is material is the existence of a public law element and

the effect of the impugned action upon the rights of persons affected

thereby. This Court observed that:

“17. There, however, the prerogative writ of mandamus is

confined only to public authorities to compel performance of

public duty. The “public authority” for them means everybody

which is created by statute — and whose powers and duties are

defined by statute. So government departments, local

authorities, police authorities, and statutory undertakings and

corporations, are all “public authorities”. But there is no such

limitation for our High Courts to issue the writ “in the nature of

mandamus”. Article 226 confers wide powers on the High Courts

to issue writs in the nature of prerogative writs. This is a striking

departure from the English law. Under Article 226, writs can be

issued to “any person or authority”. It can be issued “for the

enforcement of any of the fundamental rights and for any other

purpose”.

20. The term “authority” used in Article 226, in the context, must

receive a liberal meaning unlike the term in Article 12. Article 12

is relevant only for the purpose of enforcement of fundamental

rights under Article 32. Article 226 confers power on the High

Courts to issue writs for enforcement of the fundamental rights

as well as non-fundamental rights. The words “any person or

authority” used in Article 226 are, therefore, not to be confined

3

(1989) 2 SCC 691.

Page 11 of 41

only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State.

They may cover any other person or body performing public duty.

The form of the body concerned is not very much relevant. What

is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on the body. The

duty must be judged in the light of positive obligation owed by

the person or authority to the affected party. No matter by what

means the duty is imposed, if a positive obligation exists

mandamus cannot be denied.”

14. Similar principles were reiterated in Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of

India

4

, wherein this Court recognised that even private bodies exercising

functions of public significance remain amenable to judicial review under

Article 226.

15. More recently, in S. Shobha v. Muthoot Finance Ltd .

5

, this Court

reiterated that where the action complained of possesses a public law

character and materially affects legal rights, the remedy under Article 226

cannot be denied merely because the authority concerned is not “State”

within Article 12. Relevant observations of this Court are as follows;

“9. (7) If a private body is discharging a public function and the

denial of any rights is in connection with the public duty imposed

on such body, the public law remedy can be enforced. The duty

cast on the public body may be either statutory or otherwise and

the source of such power is immaterial but, nevertheless, there

must be the public law element in such action.”

4

(2005) 4 SCC 649. Held: “33. Thus, it is clear that when a private body exercises its public functions

even if it is not a State, the aggrieved person has a remedy not only under the ordinary law but also

under the Constitution, by way of a writ petition under Article 226….”

5

2025 SCC OnLine SC 177. It was also observed: “8. A body, public or private, should not be

categorized as “amenable” or “not amenable” to writ jurisdiction. The most important and vital

consideration should be the “function” test as regards the maintainability of a writ application. If a public

duty or public function is involved, any body, public or private, concerned or connection with that duty

or function, and limited to that, would be subject to judicial scrutiny under the extraordinary writ

jurisdiction of Article 226 of the Constitution of India.”

Page 12 of 41

16. We must now analyse whether a writ would be maintainable against

the first respondent in the facts and circumstances of the present case.

17. First respondent contends that it is neither a statutory body nor

“State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. Accepting the

argument, the High Court, by the order impugned before us, declined to

entertain the appellant’s writ petition by placing reliance on the judgment

of the Bombay High Court in Kishor S. Bhat v. Indian Banks’ Association

6

,

wherein the IBA was held not to satisfy the tests necessary for being

characterised as “State” under Article 12. However, in our opinion, the

reliance placed on Kishor S. Bhat is misplaced. The decision in Kishor S.

Bhat arose out of an inter se service dispute between an employee and

the IBA and was treated as a purely private contractual matter. The

present case stands on an entirely different footing. Here, the challenge

concerns the maintenance and dissemination of a sector -wide Caution

List, issued in accordance with RBI guidelines to maintain confidence and

integrity in financial transactions.

18. The real grievance is that the Caution List operates as an industry-

wide adverse accreditation mechanism having direct bearing upon the

professional reputation, livelihood and future opportunities of the

individual concerned. The impugned action directly impacts the

6

2018 SCC OnLine Bom 2857.

Page 13 of 41

appellant’s right to practise his profession, thereby affecting the guarantee

under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. Further, the Caution List has a

statutory basis; we will elaborate on this aspect in the next section.

19. Similar writ petitions challenging the inclusion of a professional’s

name in the C aution List maintained by IBA have been entertained by

several High Courts

7

across the country. The consistent judicial approach

has been to recognise that the action of IBA in maintaining and operating

such a Caution List possesses sufficient public law character to render it

amenable to judicial review. The contrary view adopted by the High Court

in the present case, solely on the basis that IBA may not strictly answer

the description of “State” under Article 12, cannot therefore be sustained.

This issue is answered by holding the writ petition is maintainable.

V.

Scope and object of Caution List as per RBI Guidelines :

Re: Issue No. 2: Whether the inclusion of an advocate’s name in the

Caution List maintained by banks and financial institutions is merely

an administrative measure confined to the contractual relationship

between the bank and its panel advocate, or whether such inclusion

has a bearing on legal and constitutional rights of the parties?

20. Having held that the writ petition was maintainable, we must now

proceed to examine the true nature and legal effect of the impugned action

7

Including Karnataka High Court in H.T. Vasudev v. State Bank of India & Ors., 2024 SCC OnLine Kar

9402, Madras High Court in NR Raghuram & Co. v. Indian Banks’ Association, W.P. No. 17780 of

2017, Andhra Pradesh High Court in R.K.L. Prasad v. SBI, 2024 SCC OnLine AP 730., and Delhi

High Court in Simi Dua v. Bank of Baroda, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 1049.

Page 14 of 41

which is whether the inclusion of an advocate’s name in the C aution List

maintained by the IBA is merely an internal administrative measure

confined to the banking sector, or whether such inclusion travels beyond

the realm of contractual and institutional regulation and conflicts with the

fundamental right to practise profession and other statutory laws.

21. Before addressing this issue, it would be necessary to notice the

regulatory framework within which the impugned mechanism operates.

RBI, being the statutory regulator of the banking system in the country, is

entrusted with the responsibility of securing and monitoring the stability of

banking operations. In exercise of its regulatory powers under Section 35-

A of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, the RBI is empowered to issue

directions to banking institutions in public interest and for proper

management of banking affairs. Section 35-A is extracted below for ready

reference:

“35A. Power of the Reserve Bank to give directions.--(1)

Where the Reserve Bank is satisfied that--

(a) in the public interest; or

(aa) in the interest of banking policy; or

(b) to prevent the affairs of any banking company being

conducted in a manner detrimental to the interests of the

depositors or in a manner prejudicial to the interests of the

banking company; or

(c) to secure the proper management of any banking company

generally, it is necessary to issue directions to banking

companies generally or to any banking company in particular, it

may, from time to time, issue such directions as it deems fit, and

Page 15 of 41

the banking companies or the banking company, as the case

may be, shall be bound to comply with such directions.

(2) The Reserve Bank may, on representation made to it or on

its own motion, modify or cancel any direction issued under sub-

section (1), and in so modifying or cancelling any direction may

impose such conditions as it thinks fit, subject to which the

modification or cancellation shall have effect.”

22. It is in exercise of the powers under Section 35-A, that the RBI has

been issuing circulars from time to time on issues concerning fraud

prevention, fraud risk management and reporting of irregularities affecting

banking transactions. There can be no quarrel with the proposition that

the RBI, as a sectoral regulator, is entitled to devise such regulatory

measures aimed at maintaining the stability of the banking system.

However, the issue before us is not whether the RBI possesses the

authority to issue regulatory directions in matters concerning banking

discipline and fraud prevention, but whether the measures contemplated

in the circulars, when applied to advocates rendering professional

services, amounts to disciplinary action based on their professional

conduct.

23. The respondents have sought to justify the inclusion of the

appellant’s name in the C aution List by placing reliance upon the

regulatory framework evolved by the RBI concerning the reporting of third-

party entities involved in banking frauds. Reference in this regard has

been made to the Circular dated 16.03.2009. It is necessary to refer to

Page 16 of 41

this Circular to examine whether it is confined to the detection of fraud or

extends to matters concerning negligence or professional incompetence.

Circular dated 16.03.2009 is as follows:

“Circulation of the names of third parties involved in frauds

As you are aware, Reserve Bank of India has been

cautioning/alerting banks about unscrupulous borrowers who

have defrauded banks. RBI has also been advising the banks to

exercise due diligence while appraising the credit, needs of such

borrower companies; partnership concerns, proprietorship

concerns, directors, partners and proprietors, etc. as also their

associates in case th ey approach any bank for fresh

loans/renewal of loans.

2. Recently we had undertaken a review of emerging trends in

fraud cases in the Indian banking system. The analysis has

shown an increasing trend in cases of frauds in borrowal

accounts especially those pertaining to retail loans such as

housing loans, commodity financing against warehouse receipts,

loans for purchase of agricultural implements from dealers,

vehicle loans and credit card liabilities, etc. While examining the

modus operandi in these cases, one common striking feature

was noted in a large number of cases evidencing questionable

role played by third parties affecting the credit sanction and

disbursement process at the banks. From these third parties

such as builders, warehouse/cold storage owners, motor

vehicle/tractor dealers, travel agents etc. the banks call for

valuable inputs/receipts/documents etc. which play a vital role i n

credit sanction/disbursement. Similarly, professional

advices/reports/certificates etc tendered by professional such as

Architects/Valuers/Chartered Accountants/Advocates etc. play a

crucial role in ascertaining the progress in house construction,

validity/marketability of the title of properties proposed to be

mortgaged, value of assets to be financed or to be taken as

mortgage, etc.

3. The review of fraud cases undertaken by us has revealed that

in many cases, the inputs provided by the third parties were

misleading or distorted. Often, the third parties which had

apparently issued documents/statements were found to have

actively colluded with borrowers to facilitate the credit

sanctions…..While banks are cautioned about the borrowers

involved in such cases, the third parties, by virtue of not being

borrowers of the banks, are not held accountable for their

Page 17 of 41

negligence or active involvement in the frauds. Nor are those

parties specifically identified as sources of risk for the banks.

4. Similarly, Valuers, Advocates and Chartered Accountants have also been found to have facilitated perpetration of frauds

by providing/certifying fake documents/certifying incorrect

information/legal opinion on financial statements/statement of

accounts of the borrowers/properties taken as security by the

banks etc. While in certain circumstances the acts of

omission/commission by the third parties could be termed as

bonafide mistakes, on numerous other occasions they were the

result of pure negligence or even malafide actions. In return, the

third parties could draw financial gains by way of

disproportionate fees collected from the borrowers. Even after

being instrumental in perpetration of frauds, these professionals

continue to be on the panel of other banks and continue to

provide or certify incorrect information/take documents and

provide legal opinion on the properties etc. taken as security by

the banks….

5. It is therefore necessary that the banks build up internal

database on such third parties in a systematic manner and resort

to mutual exchange of those data on an ongoing basis. Banks

mat, hereafter, report to Indian Banks Association (IBA) the

details of such third parties, including professionals involved in

frauds….”

(emphasis supplied)

It is evident from the above that the 2009 Circular deals only with fraud

and has no bearing on professional advice of a lawyer.

24. Learned amicus as well as Mr. Rajesh Kumar Gautam, learned

counsel for the Bank, have brought to our notice subsequent circulars

issued by RBI being; (1) Reserve Bank of India (Frauds Classification and

Reporting by Commercial Banks and Select FIs) Directions, 2016, and

also (2) Master Directions on Fraud Risk Management in Commercial

Page 18 of 41

Banks and All India Financial Institutions, 2024. Clauses 8.12.4

8

and

8.12.5

9

of the 2016 Directions, as well as Clause 4.2

10

of Master

Directions 2024, clearly indicate that the Caution List is confined to

informing member banks about the fraudulent transactions that they must

be aware of. The subsequent directions consolidate and continue the

regulatory framework originally introduced through the 2009 circular and

reiterate the position that where third-party entities or professionals,

including advocates, are found to have played a role in facilitating

fraudulent banking transactions, the concerned banks may report such

entities to the IBA for preparation and circulation of C aution Lists amongst

member banks.

25. The difficulty, however, arises when a framework intended primarily

for fraud prevention is extended to cases involving alleged professional

negligence or an erroneous legal opinion rendered by an advocate in

8

8.12.4: In addition to above borrower- fraudsters, third parties such as builders, warehouse/cold

storage owners, motor vehicle/tractor dealers, travel agents, etc. and professionals such as architects,

valuers, chartered accountants, advocates, etc. are also to be held accountable if they have played a

vital role in credit sanction/disbursement or facilitated the perpetration of frauds. Banks are advised to

report to Indian Banks Association (IBA) the details of such third parties involved in frauds.

9

8.12.5 Before reporting to IBA, banks have to satisfy themselves of the involvement of third parties

concerned and also provide them with an opportunity of being heard. In this regard the banks should

follow normal procedures and the processes followed should be suitably recorded. On the basis of such

information, IBA would, in turn, prepare caution lists of such third parties for circulation among the

banks………”

10

4.2 Independent confirmation from third-party service providers, including professionals

4.2.1 Banks place reliance on various third- party service providers as part of pre- sanction appraisal and

post-sanction monitoring. Therefore, banks may incorporate necessary terms and conditions in their

agreements with third- party service providers to hold them accountable in situations where wilful

negligence or malpractice by them is found to be a causative factor for fraud.

4.2.2 Banks shall, after complying with the principles of natural justice, report to the Indian Banks’

Association (“IBA”) the details of such third parties or professionals involved in frauds. The IBA would,

in turn, prepare caution lists of such third parties for circulation among banks………”

Page 19 of 41

discharge of professional duties. The present case does not involve any

allegation of fraud, collusion, criminal misconduct, or deliberate facilitation

of fraudulent activity by the appellant. The allegation, as borne out from

the record, pertains only to negligence in conducting title verification and

rendering a legal opinion. There can be no dispute that a bank or financial

institution is entitled to internally assess the quality of services rendered

by professionals engaged by it and, on that basis, take a decision

regarding continuation or discontinuation of empanelment. An advocate

has no right to be empanelled with a bank or to be continued so, as the

relationship between the bank and the advocate is primarily contractual

and also founded upon trust and confidence. Consequently, where a bank

is dissatisfied with the services rendered, it is always open to it to

discontinue such engagement or decline future empanelment.

26. However, the matter stands on an entirely different footing when

banks, followed by the IBA, seek to place the name of an advocate on a

Caution List or in a list circulated under the title "Circulation of Names of

Third Parties Involved in Frauds", accompanied by remarks touching upon

the professional incompetence or negligence of the concerned lawyer.

The Caution List may or may not be a public document, but its circulation

to all the banking institutions operates as a declaration about

(in)competence, as well as the negative character of the advocate, having

Page 20 of 41

serious implications on his right to practice his profession. In the present

case, a careful scrutiny of the record, particularly the communication

dated 27.07.2018 issued by respondent no. 2, reveals that the allegation

against the appellant is not one of fraud, collusion, or deliberate

wrongdoing, but something relatable to negligence in rendering a title

verification opinion.

27. Fraud, by its very nature, imports an element of mens rea and

deliberate intention and design to defraud . An erroneous legal opinion or

an omission in the course of due diligence, absent any allegation of

dishonest intent or deliberate facilitation of illegality, cannot be elevated to

the level of fraud. Had appellant been alleged to have committed fraud

and subjected to criminal prosecution, entirely different considerations

would arise. That, however, is not even the case with the respondents.

Their stated object is to caution member banks regarding the alleged

inefficiency or professional negligence of the appellant.

28. In our considered opinion, the circulars issued by the RBI in exercise

of power under Section 35A to alert member banks against fraudulent

transactions, as also fraudulent professionals, cannot be interpreted to

authorise banks or the IBA to include cases of alleged negligence or

professional (in)competence of an advocate in the said list. While the RBI

may issue directions to ensure integrity in banking transactions, such

Page 21 of 41

power does not include declaring an advocate professionally negligent by

including his name on a Caution List, which is meant to identify fraudulent

entities. In the present case, where the allegation against the appellant

pertains solely to negligence, the inclusion of his name in the C aution List

is unsustainable. In view of the above discussion and analysis, we hold

that the respondent Bank and IBA cannot include the name of the

appellant in the Caution List. Consequently, we direct them to remove the

appellant’s name from the C aution List with immediate effect.

VI. Professional Independence, Self-Regulation and BCI being the

Disciplinary Body. Re : Issue No. 3: Whether allegations relating to

professional misconduct or negligence of an advocate falls within

the disciplinary domain under the Advocates Act, 1961 and the Bar

Councils have exclusive jurisdiction to deal with them?

29. It has been the uniform and consistent submission on behalf of the

appellant, the Bar Council of India, the Ministry of Law and Justice, as well

as the learned Amicus Curiae that the alleged allegations of professional

negligence or misconduct on the part of the appellant-advocate, even if

true, fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the disciplinary authorities

contemplated under the Advocates Act, 1961. It has been contended that

neither the Bank nor IBA possess the authority to adjudicate upon the

professional conduct of an advocate or to impose the consequential action

of virtually blacklisting a lawyer.

Page 22 of 41

30. The legal profession occupies a distinct position in the constitutional

and institutional framework of this country. The position of a lawyer, in

contrast to that of other professionals such as engineers, doctors, or

architects, is markedly different. In Bar of Indian Lawyers v. D.K. Gandhi

PS National Institute of Communicable Diseases,

11

this Court elaborately

considered the distinctive nature of the legal profession and held that the

profession of law is sui generis . Lawyers frequently operate in

environments where control over outcomes is elusive and where

professional obligations are regulated not merely by contractual duties,

but also by ethical obligations towards the Court, the client, the opponent

and the justice delivery system itself. The relevant portion of the judgment

is as follows:

“34. It is thus well recognised in a catena of decisions that the

legal profession cannot be equated with any other traditional

professions. It is not commercial in nature but is essentially a

service oriented, noble profession. It cannot be gainsaid that the

role of advocates is indispensable in the justice delivery system.

An evolution of jurisprudence to keep our Constitution vibrant is

possible only with the positive contribution of the advocates. The

advocates are expected to be fearless and independent for

protecting the rights of citizens, for upholding the Rule of Law

and also for protecting the independence of judiciary. People

repose immense faith in the judiciary, and the Bar being an integral part of the judicial system has been assigned a very

crucial role for preserving the independence of the judiciary, and

in turn the very democratic set-up of the nation. The advocates

are perceived to be the intellectuals amongst the elites and

social activists amongst the downtrodden. That is the reason

they are expected to act according to the principles of uberrima

fides i.e. the utmost good faith, integrity, fairness and loyalty

11

(2024) 8 SCC 430

Page 23 of 41

while handling the legal proceedings of his client. Being a responsible officer of the court and an important adjunct of the

administration of justice, an advocate owes his duty not only to

his client but also to the court as well as to the opposite side.

35. The legal profession is different from the other professions

also for the reason that what the advocates do, affects not only

an individual but the entire administration of justice, which is the

foundation of the civilised society. It must be remembered that

the legal profession is a solemn and serious profession. It has

always been held in very high esteem because of the stellar role

played by the stalwarts in the profession to strengthen the

judicial system in the country. Their services in making the

judicial system efficient, effective and credible, and in creating a

strong and impartial judiciary, which is one of the three pillars of

the Democracy, could not be compared with the services

rendered by other professionals. Therefore, having regard to the

role, status and duties of the advocates as the professionals, we

are of the opinion that the legal profession is sui generis i.e.

unique in nature and cannot be compared with any other

profession.”

31. Independence of legal profession is as important as independence

of judiciary. In fact, their independence from the executive and the

legislature is the foundation of the rule of law and democracy. The

independence of the legal profession is secured by the principle of self-

regulation. This principle has had statutory recognition with the passing of

the Advocates Act, 1961. Questions concerning the professional conduct,

competence, or negligence of an advocate fall within the exclusive domain

of the disciplinary mechanism contemplated under the said enactment

and are to be examined by the statutory bodies constituted thereunder.

Permitting external agencies or institutions to record adverse findings and

opinion about the professional standing of advocates would not only

Page 24 of 41

transgress the legislative framework governing the legal profession, but

also undermine the independence of the Bar.

32. The Advocates Act, 1961, comprehensively deals with enrolment,

right to practise, standards of professional conduct, disciplinary control

and institutional supervision of advocates. The statutory scheme clearly

evidences legislative intention to confer professional autonomy through

self-regulation and also subjects it to structured disciplinary oversight

through professional bodies, namely the State Bar Councils and the Bar

Council of India. The Parliament has thus attempted to strike a balance

between the independence of the profession with accountability. Chapter

II of the Act deals with Bar Councils, namely the State Bar Councils and

the Bar Council of India. Sections 35 and 36 vest disciplinary jurisdiction

in the respective State Bar Councils and the Bar Council of India. The

scheme of the Act contemplates a structured adjudicatory mechanism

involving notice, framing of charges, recording of evidence and appellate

remedies. The provision not only identifies the competent authority

empowered to examine allegations against advocates, but also prescribes

the procedure to be followed, including the issuance of a notice, an

opportunity of hearing, and the participation of the Advocate-General.

Sub-section (3) of Section 35 enumerates the range of punishments that

may be imposed, extending from reprimand to suspension from practice

Page 25 of 41

and ultimately removal of the advocate’s name from the State roll itself.

Sections 37 and 38 provide appellate remedies against disciplinary orders

passed by the State Bar Councils and the Bar Council of India,

respectively. The statute, therefore, contemplates a complete hierarchy of

disciplinary adjudication culminating in appellate scrutiny by this Court

under Section 38. The power to adjudicate upon professional misconduct

has been consciously entrusted to specialised disciplinary committees

constituted within the Bar Council framework, comprising members drawn

from the legal profession itself. The principle that “peers must regulate

peers” lies at the heart of the disciplinary framework governing the legal

profession. Allegations of professional misconduct against an advocate

are not adjudicated by ordinary executive authorities, but by bodies

comprising members of the Bar itself.

33. The principle of self-regulation has historically been regarded as the

defining feature of independence of the legal profession. The idea

underlying such autonomy is that advocates, as officers of the court and

participants in the administration of justice, must remain insulated from

external pressures. It was on the basis of this principle that the All India

Bar Committee Report, 1953 and the 14th Report of the Law Commission,

1958, endorsed the creation of an autonomous Bar governed through

institutions deriving authority from the profession itself. The legislative

Page 26 of 41

framework embodied in the Advocates Act, 1961, was founded upon this

conception. The disciplinary control over advocates, including matters

relating to enrolment, suspension, and professional misconduct, was

entrusted to the Bar Councils as self-regulatory bodies by members of the

profession. The underlying rationale is that independence of the Bar

constitutes an indispensable condition for preservation of the rule of law;

the necessary implication is that parallel adjudicatory mechanisms outside

the statute are excluded. Such exclusivity of jurisdiction has succinctly

been explained in Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India

12

in

the following manner:

“57……... The power to punish an advocate by suspending his

licence or by removal of his name from the roll of the State Bar

Council for proven professional misconduct vests exclusively in

the statutory authorities created under the Advocates Act, 1961,

while the jurisdiction to punish him for committing contempt of

court vests exclusively in the courts.

58. After the coming into force of the Advocates Act, 1961,

exclusive power for punishing an advocate for “professional

misconduct” has been conferred on the State Bar Council

concerned and the Bar Council of India. That Act contains a

detailed and complete mechanism for suspending or revoking

the licence of an advocate for his “professional misconduct”.

Since the suspension or revocation of licence of an advocate has

not only civil consequences but also penal consequences, the

punishment being in the nature of penalty, the provisions have to

be strictly construed. Punishment by way of suspending the

licence of an advocate can only be imposed by the competent

statutory body after the charge is established against the

advocate in a manner prescribed by the Act and the Rules

framed thereunder.

12

(1998) 4 SCC 409

Page 27 of 41

71. Thus, after the coming into force of the Advocates Act, 1961

with effect from 19-5-1961, matters connected with the

enrolment of advocates as also their punishment for professional

misconduct is governed by the provisions of that Act only. Since,

the jurisdiction to grant licence to a law graduate to practise as

an advocate vests exclusively in the Bar Council of the State

concerned, the jurisdiction to suspend his licence for a specified

term or to revoke it also vests in the same body.”

34. Further, this Court in Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M.V. Dabholkar

13

wherein it was held as under:

“24. The scheme and the provisions of the Act indicate that the

constitution of State Bar Councils and Bar Council of India is for

one of the principal purposes to see that the standards of

professional conduct and etiquette laid down by the Bar Council

of India are observed and preserved. The Bar Councils therefore

entertain cases of misconduct against advocates. The Bar

Councils are to safeguard the rights, privilege and interests of

advocates. The Bar Council is a body corporate. The Disciplinary

Committees are constituted by the Bar Council. The Bar Council

is not the same body as its Disciplinary Committee. One of the

principal functions of the Bar Council in regard to standards of

professional conduct and etiquette of advocates is to receive

complaints against advocates and if the Bar Council has reason

to believe that any advocate has been guilty of professional or

other misconduct it shall refer the case for disposal to its

Disciplinary Committee. The Bar Council of a State may also of

its own motion if it has reason to believe that any advocate has

been guilty of professional or other misconduct it shall refer the

case for disposal to its Disciplinary Committee. It is apparent that

a State Bar Council not only receives a complaint but is required

to apply its mind to find out whether there is any reason to believe

that any advocate has been guilty of professional or other

misconduct. The Bar Council of a State acts on that reasoned

belief. The Bar Council has a very important part to play, first, in

the reception of complaints, second, in forming reasonable belief

of guilt of professional or other misconduct and finally in making

reference of the case to its Disciplinary Committee. The initiation

of the proceeding before the Disciplinary Committee is by the

Bar Council of a State. A most significant feature is that no litigant

and no member of the public can straightaway commence

13

(1975) 2 SCC 702.

Page 28 of 41

disciplinary proceedings against an advocate. It is the Bar

Council of a State which initiates the disciplinary proceedings.”

35. Reverting to the facts of present case, the inclusion of the

appellant’s name in the Caution List, coupled with remarks imputing

negligence and wrongful legal opinion, undeniably carried serious

consequences, apart from affecting appellant’s fundamental right to

practice the profession. Such action effectively amounted to professional

blacklisting, adversely affecting the appellant’s standing and future

professional engagements with other banks.

36. If the Bank is of the opinion that the appellant is guilty of professional

negligence or misconduct in discharge of legal duties as an advocate, the

appropriate remedy is to place the relevant material before the competent

State Bar Council to take necessary action under the Advocates Act, 1961.

Matters concerning the professional conduct of an advocate are within the

exclusive province of the disciplinary authorities contemplated under the

Advocates Act. The mechanism envisaged in the Caution List under the

RBI circulars cannot be invoked to determine or punish alleged

professional misconduct by advocates. Permitting banks or banking

associations to bypass the disciplinary process under the Advocates Act

and unilaterally portray an advocate as professionally incompetent by

including his name in a C aution List is illegal, unsustainable and

impermissible. It would amount to circumventing the legal profession's

Page 29 of 41

freedom of self-regulation, which, in turn, is an inextricable feature of the

independence of the judiciary. Consequently, we hold that the action of

including appellant’s name in the C aution List and the consequent

comment on his competency is illegal and is set aside.

VII. Duty of BCI to undertake performance audit of its disciplinary

jurisdiction to ensure accountability.

37. Before parting with the issue, we deem it necessary to clarify that

the present judgment ought not to be understood as undermining the need

for accountability of the legal profession.

38. The concerns expressed by banks and financial institutions

regarding diligence, quality and reliability of legal opinions furnished by

advocates cannot be ignored . Modern banking transactions require well-

considered legal opinions, and they constitute an important part of

institutional decision-making . Such opinions are critical as banking and

financial transactions involve substantial financial exposure. Deficiencies

in professional services will have immediate and substantial financial

consequences. The solution for accountability lie not in creation of parallel

structures, like declarations in Caution List’s, as in the present case, but

in strengthening the existing regulatory mechanisms contemplated under

the Advocates Act, 1961 itself.

Page 30 of 41

39. The legal profession occupies a unique position in the constitutional

framework of India. Advocates are not merely professionals providing

services to clients; they are officers of the court and indispensable

participants in the administration of justice. Public confidence in the justice

delivery system depends, to a considerable extent, upon the integrity,

competence, and professional conduct of advocates. Consequently, the

existence of a robust, credible, transparent and efficient disciplinary

mechanism for dealing with complaints against advocates is essential for

maintaining the rule of law.

40. The Advocates Act, 1961 entrusts the responsibility of regulating the

legal profession primarily to the State Bar Councils and the Bar Council of

India. Among their most important statutory functions is the consideration

and disposal of complaints relating to professional misconduct by

advocates. Sections 35, 36, 36B and related provisions of the Act

contemplate an institutional framework through which allegations of

misconduct are investigated and adjudicated.

41. The statutory scheme recognises that professional discipline is an

indispensable component of self-regulation. The authority conferred upon

Bar Councils is accompanied by a corresponding duty to ensure that

complaints are examined promptly, fairly and effectively. Delay in

disciplinary proceedings undermines both accountability and fairness. It

Page 31 of 41

erodes public confidence in the profession, causes hardship to

complainants, and leaves advocates facing unresolved allegations under

prolonged uncertainty.

42. Over the years, concerns have repeatedly been expressed

regarding pendency, procedural delays, lack of uniformity in practices

across councils, limited availability of information regarding the progress

and outcome of disciplinary proceedings. While the statutory framework

is well-intentioned, there appears to be insufficient publicly available

information regarding whether the existing mechanisms are achieving

their intended objectives in practice.

43. The need for an efficient and expeditious disciplinary system arises

from multiple considerations. First, the legal profession enjoys substantial

privileges, including exclusive rights of audience before courts. Such

privileges must necessarily be accompanied by accountability

mechanisms that inspire public trust. Secondly, disciplinary proceedings

serve a protective rather than merely punitive function. Their purpose is

not only to identify and sanction professional misconduct but also to

preserve confidence in the administration of justice. Thirdly, delay itself

may result in injustice. A complainant who approaches the disciplinary

machinery expects timely consideration of grievances. Equally, an

advocate against whom allegations are made is entitled to a prompt

Page 32 of 41

determination so that his or her professional reputation is not indefinitely

clouded by unresolved accusations. Fourthly, an ineffective disciplinary

system risks encouraging frivolous complaints on one hand and shielding

genuine misconduct on the other. Both outcomes are detrimental to the

legal profession and the justice system.

44. The duties of the State Bar Councils and the Bar Council of India

therefore extend beyond merely processing individual complaints. They

include ensuring that disciplinary complaints are taken up quickly and

disposed of effectively. The regulators must continuously assess whether

their procedures are meeting the objectives of accountability, fairness,

consistency and efficiency. While self-regulation is important, there is also

a duty to ensure its effectiveness.

45. In Yash Developers v. Harihar Krupa Co-operative Housing Society

Ltd.

14

, this Court emphasised the need to assess whether a statutory

framework is achieving its intended purpose or not. The Court observed

that the executive has an obligation to review the implementation of a

legislation by undertaking a performance audit where statutory objectives

appear to be impeded by systemic delays, procedural bottlenecks, or

institutional inefficiencies. It was held as under :

“57…… Reviewing and assessing the implementation of a statute is

an integral part of Rule of Law. It is in recognition of this obligation of

14

(2024) 9 SCC 606.

Page 33 of 41

the executive government that the constitutional courts have directed

Governments to carry performance audit of statutes.

58. Four aspects for achieving justice are well founded and articulated

as : (i) distribution of advantages and disadvantages of society, (ii)

curbing the abuse of power and liberty, (iii) deciding disputes, and (iv)

adapting to change. Adapting to change is important for achieving

justice, as failure to adapt produces injustice and is, in a sense, an

abuse of power. Thus, failure to use power to adapt to change is in its

own way an abuse of power. In fact, the issue is not one of change or

not to change, but of the direction and the speed of change and such

a change may come in various ways, and most effectively through

legislation. Legal reform through legislative correction improves the

legal system and it would require assessment of the working of the

law, its accessibility, utility and abuse as well.

59. The Executive branch has a constitutional duty to ensure that the

purpose and object of a statute is accomplished while implementing it.

It has the additional duty to closely monitor the working of a statute

and must have a continuous and a real time assessment of the impact

that the statute is having. As stated above, reviewing and assessing

the implementation of a statute is an integral part of Rule of Law. The

purpose of such review is to ensure that a law is working out in practice

as it was intended. If not, to understand the reason and address it

quickly….”

46. The principles articulated in Yash Developers (supra) have

relevance beyond the specific statute considered in that case. They

underscore the necessity of periodically evaluating whether regulatory

mechanisms are functioning in practice as intended by law. If performance

audits are necessary for welfare statutes and administrative frameworks,

they are equally necessary for professional regulatory institutions whose

functioning directly affects access to justice and public confidence in the

legal system.

47. An objective assessment of the disciplinary framework governing

advocates should therefore examine, among other matters; i) The number

of complaints instituted annually before each State Bar Council. ii) The

Page 34 of 41

number of complaints disposed of annually. iii) Average and median

disposal times. iv) Age-wise pendency of cases. v) Regional variations in

disposal patterns. vi) Procedural practices adopted by different Bar

Councils. vii) Adequacy of staffing and administrative support. viii) Nature

of outcomes and sanctions imposed. ix) Accessibility and transparency of

disciplinary proceedings. x) Compliance with statutory timelines.

48. A meaningful evaluation of the existing system requires

participation of multiple stakeholders, including representatives of litigants

as well as experts in public administration, data analysis professionals,

and individuals with experience in institutional reform. Such diversity is

necessary to ensure efficiency and objectivity . Plurality in the composition

of the committee will enable the regulators to avoid institutional blind

spots.

49. The purpose of this exercise is not to attribute blame but to identify

systemic strengths and weaknesses. The objective should be evidence-

based reform aimed at improving the effectiveness of the disciplinary

framework while preserving fairness and professional independence.

There is also a compelling public interest in ensuring that the legal

profession’s regulatory mechanisms meet contemporary standards of

accountability. There is no reason why the disciplinary framework

governing advocates should remain exempt from similar scrutiny.

Page 35 of 41

50. In view of the above discussion and having regard to the importance

of maintaining public confidence in the institution of lawyers , it is desirable

that the Bar Council of India undertakes a comprehensive performance

audit of the disciplinary mechanisms administered by it and the State Bar

Councils under the Advocates Act, 1961. We direct the Bar Council of

India to constitute a committee and seek an objective assessment of its

duties of self-regulation of professional conduct and discipline, consider

the report and file an affidavit of the action proposed/taken.

VIII. Continuing Legal Education (CLE) for Lawyers: A Necessity for

Strengthening Justice Delivery.

51. The maintenance of professional competence, ethical standards,

and public confidence requires much more than laying down the rules and

regulations for conduct and also consequences for misconduct of lawyers

by laying down the procedures of enquiry, adjudication and determination

by regulatory authorities.

52. In India, the statutory responsibility for maintaining standards of

professional conduct and legal education rests with the Bar Council of

India and the State Bar Councils under the Advocates Act, 1961. While

considerable attention has been devoted to legal education at the entry

level through law universities and professional examinations, there is a

glaring dearth in institutionalised learning for advocates after enrolment.

Page 36 of 41

53. Laws, as well as renewed knowledge of its subjects are ever

evolving. Equally, the technique of persuasion-advocacy, as well as

adjudicatory methods require simplification and refinement. Societal

expectations of higher standards of inclusiveness, accountability and

transparency require lawyers to equip themselves not only with updated

legal knowledge but also with evolving ethical and social responsibilities.

Statutes are amended, regulatory frameworks evolve, constitutional

doctrine develop and judicial precedents continuously reshape our

understanding of law. Owing to increasing technological infusion in the

profession and the growing complexity of commercial and financial

transactions, it has become all the more necessary for lawyers to remain

updated and professionally equipped.

54. Many advanced jurisdictions have already recognised this

necessity. In the United States, most state bar associations require

advocates to complete Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE)

credits periodically as a condition for maintaining their licence to practise.

Subjects typically include professional ethics, technological competence,

trial advocacy, and emerging areas of law. In the United Kingdom, the

legal profession has progressively moved towards continuing competence

frameworks under the supervision of bodies such as the Solicitors

Regulation Authority, requiring practitioners to undertake regular

Page 37 of 41

professional development and demonstrate maintenance of competence.

Similar systems exist in jurisdictions such as Singapore, Canada, and

Australia, where structured professional development programmes are

considered essential components of professional regulation.

55. The importance of CLE has repeatedly engaged the attention of

expert bodies in this country. The 184

th

Report of the Law Commission of

India proposed substantial reforms to the Advocates Act, 1961 aimed at

institutionalising continuing legal education and improving standards of

professional training. The proposed amendments contemplated, inter alia,

promotion of continuing education in specialised fields of law, practical

training for advocates and institutional mechanisms for raising standards

of legal education and professional competence. The Advocates

(Amendment) Bill, 2003, proposed amendments to Section 7 of the

Advocates Act to specifically promote continuing legal education,

specialised training and awareness regarding developments in law and

legal education. Though the proposed statutory amendments did not

ultimately materialise, the underlying concerns reflected therein continue

to retain considerable significance.

56. Indian Lawyers can and must develop their own model, a pedagogy

that is suitable for the profession and practice of law . Continuing Legal

Education should not be viewed as a mere regulatory requirement, but as

Page 38 of 41

a professional commitment to excellence and service. Such programmes

can also bridge the knowledge gap between urban and rural practitioners,

ensuring that lawyers across the country have access to developments in

law, technology, advocacy skills, and professional ethics.

57. An important objective of continuing education is in transmission of

the profession’s unwritten traditions and values to the younger

generations of lawyers. Professional conduct and competency is shaped

not only by real-time practice, but also through long-established

conventions of fairness, collaboration, courtesy, respect for courts, and

service to clients. These time-tested practices constitute the cultural

capital of the Bar and must consciously be preserved and passed on

through structured mentoring and training programmes.

58. There is a necessity, rather a compelling need, to kindle among

advocates a deeper and a renewed sense of bond and shared

responsibility for timely disposal of cases as reducing pendency is as

much the duty of the Bar as it is of the Bench. There is no dispute that

mounting pendency of cases across District Courts, High Courts, and the

Supreme Court poses one of the greatest challenges to the justice

delivery system in India. The constitutional courts have rightly assumed

responsibility for addressing this problem, and judges at all levels remain

deeply concerned about delays and arrears. Yet, pendency continues to

Page 39 of 41

be viewed almost exclusively as a judicial responsibility. This approach

overlooks a fundamental reality that the Bar is not merely a stakeholder

but an equal institutional partner in the administration of justice. Despite

frequent references to the Bar and Bench as the “two wheels of the chariot

of justice,” the Bar is seldom called upon to share responsibility for

reducing delays and improving efficiency. A paradigm shift is necessary.

Tackling pendency must become a collaborative mission of the Bench and

the Bar. Through coordinated planning, institutional commitment, and

shared accountability, meaningful access to justice can be achieved. The

first step is to equip and train lawyers to work as a team and then to work

with courts and judges for effective and efficient delivery of justice.

59. To achieve these objectives, serious consideration should be given

to institutionalising “future continuous” learning for lawyers. Episodic and

bouquet presenting seminars and conferences must give way to more

serious and committed learning. It is necessary to establish a full-time

academy, which may be called the National Legal Academy (NLA) for

lawyers, like the National Judicial Academy that has been established for

training and capacity building for Judges. Such an institution would enable

post-enrolment structural learning, enhance professional competence,

ethical awareness, technological adaptability, and long-term planning and

Page 40 of 41

corroboration. Bar Council of India must invest its time and energy in

institutionalising this body.

60. There is no dearth of expertise, experience, vision and wisdom

amongst members of the Bar. All that is required is to bring them together

and enable the idea to take shape. We direct the Bar Council of India to

constitute a team of senior and junior lawyers as well as experts in the

field of establishing academic institutions for considering, discussing and

evolving the idea of establishing National Legal Academy. We hope and

trust the BCI will rise to the occasion and reflect on all these issues and

inform the Court of its decision. List this appeal for further directions on

31.08.2026.

IX. Conclusions.

61. For the reasons stated above, we allow the appeal, set aside the

judgment and order passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad.

We declare that inclusion of appellant’s name in C aution List is

impermissible and without jurisdiction. There shall be a consequential

direction to the respondents to remove the name of the appellant from the

Caution List with immediate effect.

62. List the appeal on 31.08.2026 for considering the issues relating to

institutionalising Continuing Legal Education (CLE) and the proposal for

Page 41 of 41

establishing National Legal Academy (NLA). BCI may file an affidavit

indicating the developments a week before the listing of the case.

………………………………....J.

[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA ]

………………………………....J.

[ALOK ARADHE ]

NEW DELHI;

JULY 07, 2026.

Description

['

Supreme Court Redefines Boundaries: Advocates Act 1961 Upholds Professional Autonomy Against RBI Caution List

\n

In a landmark judgment, the Supreme Court of India has reaffirmed the foundational principles of legal professional independence, asserting the exclusive jurisdiction of Bar Councils under the Advocates Act 1961 over matters of professional misconduct and negligence. This significant ruling, delivered in Ajay Vijh v. Indian Banks Association & Ors. (2026 INSC 670), meticulously dissects the scope of the RBI Caution List, particularly concerning advocates, and lays down crucial directions for the Bar Council of India to enhance accountability and continuing legal education. This pivotal case is now prominently featured on CaseOn, offering deep insights into the evolving landscape of legal regulation and professional conduct.

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The Core Issue: Advocate\'s Negligence vs. Bank\'s Caution List

\n\n

Background of the Dispute

\n

The case originated when Ajay Vijh, an advocate on Canara Bank\'s panel, provided a legal opinion in 2015 regarding a property offered as security for a credit facility. Later, the bank alleged his opinion was erroneous, claiming a portion of the property had been alienated earlier. Based on this, the bank not only removed him from its panel for \'negligence in verification of title\' but also forwarded his name to the Indian Banks\' Association (IBA) for inclusion in the \'Caution List\' titled "Third Party Entities Involved in Fraud." The appellant argued this inclusion, made without notice or hearing, gravely damaged his reputation and professional opportunities.

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The High Court\'s Initial Stance

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The High Court dismissed Vijh\'s writ petition, holding that the IBA was not a "State" under Article 12 of the Constitution, thus deeming the writ petition non-maintainable. This decision led to the appeal before the Supreme Court.

\n\n

Issue 1: Is a Writ Petition Maintainable Against the IBA?

\n\n

The Rule: Broadening the Scope of Article 226

\n

The Supreme Court clarified that the maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226 does not solely depend on whether the respondent is a \'State\' under Article 12. Citing precedents like Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust v. V.R. Rudani, Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India, and S. Shobha v. Muthoot Finance Ltd., the Court emphasized a shift towards the "function test." If a private body performs public duties or its actions affect legally protected rights, especially fundamental rights like the right to practice a profession under Article 19(1)(g), it can be amenable to writ jurisdiction.

\n\n

Analysis: Public Duty and Fundamental Rights

\n

The Court found that the IBA\'s action, while not strictly a \'State\' function, involved maintaining and disseminating a sector-wide \'Caution List\' based on RBI guidelines. This mechanism directly impacted the appellant\'s professional reputation and livelihood across the banking industry, thus carrying a significant \'public law\' character. Many High Courts across the country had also entertained similar writ petitions challenging such inclusions. Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that the High Court\'s narrow interpretation was incorrect, and the writ petition was indeed maintainable.

\n\n

To swiftly grasp the nuances of such rulings and their broader implications, legal professionals often turn to CaseOn.in. Their 2-minute audio briefs are an invaluable tool, allowing busy practitioners to analyze specific judgments like this one from Ajay Vijh v. Indian Banks Association & Ors. (2026 INSC 670) quickly and efficiently, ensuring they stay informed without extensive reading.

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Issue 2: Decoding the RBI Caution List – Fraud vs. Negligence

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The Regulatory Framework: Section 35-A and RBI Circulars

\n

The RBI, empowered by Section 35-A of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, issues circulars for fraud prevention and risk management. The 2009 RBI Circular and subsequent directions (2016, 2024) specifically concern "Circulation of the names of third parties involved in frauds." These guidelines enable banks to report entities like advocates who facilitate *fraudulent* banking transactions to the IBA for inclusion in the Caution List.

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Analysis: The Crucial Distinction

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The Supreme Court meticulously distinguished between \'fraud\' and \'negligence.\' Fraud, by definition, requires \'mens rea\' or a deliberate intention to deceive. The allegations against Ajay Vijh pertained to \'negligence\' in rendering a legal opinion, not fraud, collusion, or deliberate wrongdoing. The Court unequivocally stated that an erroneous legal opinion, in the absence of dishonest intent, cannot be equated with fraud. While banks have the right to de-panel an advocate if their services are unsatisfactory, a public declaration of an advocate\'s \'negligence\' or \'incompetence\' through an industry-wide Caution List—meant for fraudulent entities—is beyond the scope of RBI\'s directives and unsustainable in law. Such an action affects an advocate\'s fundamental right to practice his profession.

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Issue 3: Bar Councils\' Exclusive Jurisdiction Over Professional Conduct

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The Rule: Advocates Act, 1961 and Self-Regulation

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The legal profession in India is unique, recognized as \'sui generis.\' The Advocates Act, 1961, establishes a robust framework for self-regulation, vesting exclusive disciplinary jurisdiction over professional misconduct and negligence in the State Bar Councils and the Bar Council of India. The principle of "peers must regulate peers" is central to this framework, ensuring that accountability is maintained within the profession through a structured adjudicatory process, including notice, framing of charges, evidence, and appellate remedies.

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Analysis: Preserving Professional Independence

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The Court highlighted that allowing banks or banking associations to bypass this statutory mechanism and unilaterally \'blacklist\' an advocate based on perceived negligence would fundamentally undermine the independence and self-regulatory nature of the legal profession. The legal profession, as an indispensable part of the justice delivery system, requires insulation from external pressures. If a bank has concerns about an advocate\'s professional conduct, the appropriate and legal course of action is to file a complaint with the relevant State Bar Council, which is the competent authority to investigate and adjudicate such matters. The IBA\'s action was therefore illegal, impermissible, and an encroachment on the exclusive domain of the Bar Councils.

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Supreme Court\'s Groundbreaking Directives to the Bar Council of India

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Recognizing the importance of accountability within self-regulation, the Supreme Court issued two significant directives to the Bar Council of India (BCI):

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Ensuring Accountability: Performance Audit of Disciplinary Mechanisms

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The Court directed the BCI to undertake a comprehensive performance audit of its disciplinary mechanisms, including those of the State Bar Councils, as mandated by the Advocates Act, 1961. This audit should assess: annual complaint intake and disposal, average/median disposal times, age-wise pendency, regional variations, procedural practices, staffing adequacy, outcomes/sanctions, accessibility, transparency, and compliance with statutory timelines. The goal is to identify systemic strengths and weaknesses, implement evidence-based reforms, and ensure that the disciplinary framework inspires public trust and maintains fairness and professional independence.

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Elevating Standards: The Need for Continuing Legal Education (CLE) and a National Legal Academy (NLA)

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Emphasizing the ever-evolving nature of law and societal expectations, the Court stressed the necessity of Continuing Legal Education (CLE) for lawyers. It called for the BCI to initiate and institutionalize a culture of CLE to maintain high standards of professional competence, legal knowledge, advocacy skills, and ethical conduct. The Court further suggested the establishment of a National Legal Academy (NLA) for lawyers, akin to the National Judicial Academy (NJA) for judges. This NLA would provide post-enrolment structural learning, enhance professional competence, ethical awareness, technological adaptability, and long-term planning, fostering collaboration between the Bar and Bench to address issues like judicial pendency.

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Why This Judgment is a Must-Read for Lawyers and Law Students

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This Supreme Court judgment is a critical read for all legal professionals and students for several reasons:

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  • Professional Autonomy: It unequivocally protects the self-regulatory nature of the legal profession, reinforcing that external bodies cannot arbitrarily adjudicate an advocate\'s professional conduct.
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  • Regulatory Boundaries: It clearly delineates the scope of RBI\'s caution list, ensuring it is not misused against advocates for mere negligence, upholding due process.
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  • Accountability and Reform: The directives for a performance audit of Bar Council disciplinary mechanisms underscore the Supreme Court\'s commitment to strengthening accountability within the profession.
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  • Future of Legal Education: The emphasis on Continuing Legal Education (CLE) and the proposal for a National Legal Academy (NLA) signal a major shift towards structured, ongoing professional development, essential for adapting to a dynamic legal landscape.
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  • Right to Practice: It safeguards an advocate\'s fundamental right to practice, preventing arbitrary blacklisting that could cripple a legal career.
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Conclusion

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The Supreme Court has decisively intervened to protect the independence and self-regulatory framework of the legal profession. By setting aside the High Court\'s order and directing the immediate removal of Ajay Vijh\'s name from the Caution List, the Court has drawn a clear line between negligence and fraud, emphasizing that allegations of professional misconduct fall exclusively under the purview of Bar Councils. Furthermore, the Court\'s forward-looking directives to the Bar Council of India concerning a performance audit of disciplinary mechanisms and the institutionalization of Continuing Legal Education, including the potential establishment of a National Legal Academy, reflect a proactive approach to strengthening the legal profession\'s accountability, competence, and role in justice delivery.

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Disclaimer

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All information provided in this article is for informational purposes only and not legal advice. Readers should consult a qualified legal professional for advice on specific legal issues.

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