As per case facts, an advocate was removed from a bank's panel and placed on the Indian Banks' Association (IBA) "Caution List" due to alleged negligence in a legal opinion ...
2026 INSC 670 Page 1 of 41
REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2026
ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. OF 2026
@ DIARY NO. 10787/2024
AJAY VIJH ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
INDIAN BANKS ASSOCIATION & ORS . …RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
Table of Contents
I. The Dispute and Its Consideration. ............................................................. 2
II. Factual Background ...................................................................................... 5
III. Issues for Consideration .............................................................................. 7
IV. Maintainability of Writ Petition under Article 226. ……………………………8
V. Scope and object of Caution List as per RBI Guidelines ......................... 13
VI. Professional Independence, Self-Regulation and BCI being the
Disciplinary Body. .............................................................................................. 21
VII. Duty of BCI to undertake performance audit of its disciplinary jurisdiction
to ensure accountability. ................................................................................... 29
VIII. Continuing Legal Education (CLE) for Lawyers: A Necessity for
Strengthening Justice Delivery. ........................................................................ 35
IX. Conclusions. ................................................................................................. 40
Page 2 of 41
1. Delay condoned. Leave granted.
1
I. The Dispute and Its Consideration.
2. The appellant, an advocate by profession, served as panel counsel
for Canara Bank at the relevant time. Pursuant to a legal opinion rendered
by him in the year 2015, the Bank considered it necessary, not only to
remove his name from its panel of advocates but also to include his name
in what is called the “Caution List”, maintained by the Indian Banks’
Association (IBA) as per guidelines in circulars issued by RBI. The writ
petition instituted by the appellant challenging the aforesaid action of the
Bank and the IBA came to be dismissed on the ground that the IBA is not
a State under Article 12 of the Constitution.
2.1 Having regard to the significance of the issues involving autonomy,
self-regulation and accountability of the legal profession, we permitted the
learned counsels appearing for respective parties, as well as Mr. Maninder
Singh, Amicus Curiae to address us on the maintainability of the writ
petition, as also the merits of the case. For the reasons to follow, we have
held that a writ petition under Article 226 is maintainable.
1
The present Civil Appeal arises from the judgment and order dated 20.11.2023 passed by the High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 12074 of 2023.
Page 3 of 41
2.2 On merits, we have declared that the C aution List maintained by the
IBA is intended to operate only in cases involving fraud, dishonesty,
criminality, or other serious misconduct affecting the banking system. It
was never designed to address cases resting merely on alleged
negligence or errors of professional judgment. Consequently, we have
held that inclusion of appellant’s name in the Caution List solely on
account of negligence is unsustainable in law.
2.3 The issues that have arisen for consideration compelled us to
examine certain foundational principles, namely, independence of legal
profession and the concomitant freedom of self-regulation. These
principles are well recognised and have, in fact, secured statutory
recognition under the Advocates Act, 1961 (‘Act’). Matters relating to
professional conduct or misconduct of advocates fall within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the regulatory bodies constituted under the Act, namely the
Bar Council of India and the respective State Bar Councils. Banks have
the choice of disengaging a legal professional and also to remove his/her
name from the panel if the services are not up to the mark, but an action
in the nature of public declaration to all other banks about the conduct,
competency or incompetency of an advocate is clearly beyond their power
and jurisdiction and clearly illegal.
Page 4 of 41
2.4 At the same time, this Court is of the considered view that the right
and privilege of s elf-regulation of the Bar, through peer review, must
withstand scrutiny on the touchstones of transparency, accountability, and
institutional effectiveness. Public confidence in the legal profession, which
is indispensable to the administration of justice, can be sustained only
when disciplinary mechanisms inspire trust and credibility. We have
therefore considered it appropriate to direct the Bar Council of India to
undertake a performance audit of the efficacy and credibility of its
disciplinary powers and to adopt such corrective and remedial measures
as may be found necessary.
2.5 Further, in order to maintain the highest standards of professional
competence, legal knowledge, advocacy skills, and ethical conduct
expected from members of this noble profession, we have directed the
Bar Council of India to initiate and institutionalise the discipline and culture
of Continuing Legal Education (CLE). We have also suggested that the
Bar Council of India may consider establishing a National Legal Academy
(NLA) for members, like how the National Judicial Academy (NJA) was
established for Judges. There is both a need and a promise in a
successful collaboration among these Academies.
Page 5 of 41
II. Factual Background.
3. The appellant, an advocate by profession, was enrolled in 1998 and
had been on the panel of several banks and financial institutions for
rendering legal advisory services. He claims to have been on the panel of
the respondent Bank from September 2010, and to have continued to
provide professional services. The dispute traces its origin to a
communication dated 27.07.2018 issued by the regional manager of the
Bank, in which it was alleged that a legal opinion furnished by the
appellant on 08.08.2015 regarding certain immovable property offered as
security for a credit facility was erroneous. By the said communication, the
appellant was called upon to furnish his explanation. The allegation
proceeded on the footing that, while the appellant had opined that the
subject land which was given as collateral for a credit facility of Rs. 2.00
Crore was wholly owned by M/s Pushpanjali Buildwell Private Limited, the
guarantor to the loan transaction, a portion thereof had, in fact, been
alienated three years back under sale deeds dated 31.10.2012, and the
opinion failed to examine this. According to the respondent bank, this
omission exposed it to financial risk.
4. Upon receipt of the aforesaid communication, the appellant
submitted a detailed explanation dated 17.08.2018, asserting that the
legal opinion was based on a search certificate issued by the office of the
Sub-Registrar, Hapur, and after inspection of the relevant records for a
Page 6 of 41
substantial period. It was his case that the alleged sale transactions were
not discernible from the records available at the relevant time, and that
the opinion was furnished in accordance with the prevailing professional
standards and the bank’s own guidelines. Having considered the
explanation furnished by the appellant, the respondent bank, by
communication dated 31.01.2019, proceeded to remove him from their
panel on the ground of negligence in verification of title.
5. Matter did not rest there. The bank proceeded to forward appellant’s
name to IBA for inclusion in the Caution List, pursuant to which, with effect
from 05.02.2020, appellant’s name came to be incorporated in the said
Caution List titled “Third Party Entities Involved in Fraud”. Against the
appellant’s name, in the remark column, it was recorded : “Given Wrong
Legal Opinion And Negligence in Conducting Search and Bank Was
Exposed to Loss and Financial Risk”. The appellant asserts that such
inclusion was effected without prior notice, without affording him an
opportunity to be heard, and in derogation of the procedural guidelines
governing such action.
6. The Caution List, as contemplated under the guidelines issued by
the RBI Circular dated 16.03.2009, is a mechanism devised for the
purpose of alerting banks and financial institutions about third- party
entities, including advocates, valuers, chartered accountants and other
Page 7 of 41
professionals, whose acts of omission or commission are perceived to
have exposed banks to fraud or financial risk. The object underlying the
maintenance and dissemination of information through such a list is to
enable banks to exercise due caution while engaging or dealing with such
entities in future transactions.
7. It is the appellant’s case that the adverse consequence of such
inclusion in the Caution List was not merely confined to the respondent
bank, but had a cascading effect on his professional engagements,
resulting in termination of his empanelment with other banking institutions,
seriously denting his honour and reputation. The appellant claims to have
become aware of his inclusion in the C aution List only much later, as there
was no intimation of such inclusion. Immediately upon learning the same,
he filed a writ petition before the High Court challenging the said action.
8. The High Court, however, declined to entertain the writ petition,
holding that a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not
maintainable against the respondents and proceeded to dismiss the same
without entering into the merits of the dispute. It is against this order that
the present appeal is pressed on the following issues:
III. Issues for Consideration.
9. The following are the issues that arise for consideration:
Page 8 of 41
9.1 Whether the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution
challenging the inclusion of the appellant’s name in the IBA Caution List
was maintainable?
9.2 Whether the inclusion of an advocate’s name in the Caution List
maintained by banks and financial institutions is merely an administrative
measure confined to the contractual relationship between the bank and its
panel advocate, or whether such inclusion has a bearing on legal and
constitutional rights of the parties?
9.3 Whether allegations relating to professional misconduct or
negligence of an advocate fall within the disciplinary domain under the
Advocates Act, 1961, and the Bar Councils have exclusive jurisdiction to
deal with them?
IV. Maintainability of Writ Petition under Article 226.
Re: Issue No. 1: Whether the writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution challenging inclusion of the appellant’s name in the IBA
Caution List was maintainable?
10. The High Court dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the
IBA is not “State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and
that, therefore, no writ petition would lie against it. In our view, the High
Court approached the matter from a rather narrow perspective of the
scope and ambit of Article 226.
Page 9 of 41
11. The appellant is not merely aggrieved by his de-empanelment by a
Bank, which may well fall within the realm of a contractual relationship.
His real grievance is against the inclusion of his name in the C aution List
with remarks casting aspersions on his professional competence and
integrity. Such action undoubtedly carries serious consequences as it has
the potential to affect his standing as an advocate and his future
professional engagements, particularly by financial institutions. The
appellant, therefore, asserts infringement of his fundamental right to
practise the profession of law under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.
Once such a grievance is raised, the High Court, exercising jurisdiction
under Article 226, could not have declined examination of the matter solely
on the ground that the body against whom relief was sought may not
strictly fall within the definition of “State” under Article 12.
12. Once upon a time, the maintainability of a petition under Articles 32
and 226 of the Constitution depended primarily upon who the respondent
was. The focus has gradually shifted from the formal character of the body
against whom relief is sought to the nature of the function performed, the
source of power exercised, and the effect of the impugned action on
legally protected rights.
2
Article 226 is not confined merely to statutory
2
Kaushal Kishor v. State of U.P, (2023) 4 SCC 1. Held: “Once upon a time, the maintainability of a
petition under Articles 32/226 depended upon “who the respondent was”. Later, the focus shifted to “the
nature of the duties/functions performed” by the respondent, for finding out his amenability to the
jurisdiction under Article 226.”
Page 10 of 41
authorities or instrumentalities of the State falling within Article 12. The
expression “any person or authority” occurring in Article 226 has
consistently received a wider and more liberal interpretation.
13. In Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna
Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust v. V.R. Rudani
3
, this Court authoritatively
held that the power under Article 226 extends even to bodies discharging
public duties, irrespective of whether such duties arise from statute or
otherwise. What is material is the existence of a public law element and
the effect of the impugned action upon the rights of persons affected
thereby. This Court observed that:
“17. There, however, the prerogative writ of mandamus is
confined only to public authorities to compel performance of
public duty. The “public authority” for them means everybody
which is created by statute — and whose powers and duties are
defined by statute. So government departments, local
authorities, police authorities, and statutory undertakings and
corporations, are all “public authorities”. But there is no such
limitation for our High Courts to issue the writ “in the nature of
mandamus”. Article 226 confers wide powers on the High Courts
to issue writs in the nature of prerogative writs. This is a striking
departure from the English law. Under Article 226, writs can be
issued to “any person or authority”. It can be issued “for the
enforcement of any of the fundamental rights and for any other
purpose”.
20. The term “authority” used in Article 226, in the context, must
receive a liberal meaning unlike the term in Article 12. Article 12
is relevant only for the purpose of enforcement of fundamental
rights under Article 32. Article 226 confers power on the High
Courts to issue writs for enforcement of the fundamental rights
as well as non-fundamental rights. The words “any person or
authority” used in Article 226 are, therefore, not to be confined
3
(1989) 2 SCC 691.
Page 11 of 41
only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State.
They may cover any other person or body performing public duty.
The form of the body concerned is not very much relevant. What
is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on the body. The
duty must be judged in the light of positive obligation owed by
the person or authority to the affected party. No matter by what
means the duty is imposed, if a positive obligation exists
mandamus cannot be denied.”
14. Similar principles were reiterated in Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of
India
4
, wherein this Court recognised that even private bodies exercising
functions of public significance remain amenable to judicial review under
Article 226.
15. More recently, in S. Shobha v. Muthoot Finance Ltd .
5
, this Court
reiterated that where the action complained of possesses a public law
character and materially affects legal rights, the remedy under Article 226
cannot be denied merely because the authority concerned is not “State”
within Article 12. Relevant observations of this Court are as follows;
“9. (7) If a private body is discharging a public function and the
denial of any rights is in connection with the public duty imposed
on such body, the public law remedy can be enforced. The duty
cast on the public body may be either statutory or otherwise and
the source of such power is immaterial but, nevertheless, there
must be the public law element in such action.”
4
(2005) 4 SCC 649. Held: “33. Thus, it is clear that when a private body exercises its public functions
even if it is not a State, the aggrieved person has a remedy not only under the ordinary law but also
under the Constitution, by way of a writ petition under Article 226….”
5
2025 SCC OnLine SC 177. It was also observed: “8. A body, public or private, should not be
categorized as “amenable” or “not amenable” to writ jurisdiction. The most important and vital
consideration should be the “function” test as regards the maintainability of a writ application. If a public
duty or public function is involved, any body, public or private, concerned or connection with that duty
or function, and limited to that, would be subject to judicial scrutiny under the extraordinary writ
jurisdiction of Article 226 of the Constitution of India.”
Page 12 of 41
16. We must now analyse whether a writ would be maintainable against
the first respondent in the facts and circumstances of the present case.
17. First respondent contends that it is neither a statutory body nor
“State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. Accepting the
argument, the High Court, by the order impugned before us, declined to
entertain the appellant’s writ petition by placing reliance on the judgment
of the Bombay High Court in Kishor S. Bhat v. Indian Banks’ Association
6
,
wherein the IBA was held not to satisfy the tests necessary for being
characterised as “State” under Article 12. However, in our opinion, the
reliance placed on Kishor S. Bhat is misplaced. The decision in Kishor S.
Bhat arose out of an inter se service dispute between an employee and
the IBA and was treated as a purely private contractual matter. The
present case stands on an entirely different footing. Here, the challenge
concerns the maintenance and dissemination of a sector -wide Caution
List, issued in accordance with RBI guidelines to maintain confidence and
integrity in financial transactions.
18. The real grievance is that the Caution List operates as an industry-
wide adverse accreditation mechanism having direct bearing upon the
professional reputation, livelihood and future opportunities of the
individual concerned. The impugned action directly impacts the
6
2018 SCC OnLine Bom 2857.
Page 13 of 41
appellant’s right to practise his profession, thereby affecting the guarantee
under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. Further, the Caution List has a
statutory basis; we will elaborate on this aspect in the next section.
19. Similar writ petitions challenging the inclusion of a professional’s
name in the C aution List maintained by IBA have been entertained by
several High Courts
7
across the country. The consistent judicial approach
has been to recognise that the action of IBA in maintaining and operating
such a Caution List possesses sufficient public law character to render it
amenable to judicial review. The contrary view adopted by the High Court
in the present case, solely on the basis that IBA may not strictly answer
the description of “State” under Article 12, cannot therefore be sustained.
This issue is answered by holding the writ petition is maintainable.
V.
Scope and object of Caution List as per RBI Guidelines :
Re: Issue No. 2: Whether the inclusion of an advocate’s name in the
Caution List maintained by banks and financial institutions is merely
an administrative measure confined to the contractual relationship
between the bank and its panel advocate, or whether such inclusion
has a bearing on legal and constitutional rights of the parties?
20. Having held that the writ petition was maintainable, we must now
proceed to examine the true nature and legal effect of the impugned action
7
Including Karnataka High Court in H.T. Vasudev v. State Bank of India & Ors., 2024 SCC OnLine Kar
9402, Madras High Court in NR Raghuram & Co. v. Indian Banks’ Association, W.P. No. 17780 of
2017, Andhra Pradesh High Court in R.K.L. Prasad v. SBI, 2024 SCC OnLine AP 730., and Delhi
High Court in Simi Dua v. Bank of Baroda, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 1049.
Page 14 of 41
which is whether the inclusion of an advocate’s name in the C aution List
maintained by the IBA is merely an internal administrative measure
confined to the banking sector, or whether such inclusion travels beyond
the realm of contractual and institutional regulation and conflicts with the
fundamental right to practise profession and other statutory laws.
21. Before addressing this issue, it would be necessary to notice the
regulatory framework within which the impugned mechanism operates.
RBI, being the statutory regulator of the banking system in the country, is
entrusted with the responsibility of securing and monitoring the stability of
banking operations. In exercise of its regulatory powers under Section 35-
A of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, the RBI is empowered to issue
directions to banking institutions in public interest and for proper
management of banking affairs. Section 35-A is extracted below for ready
reference:
“35A. Power of the Reserve Bank to give directions.--(1)
Where the Reserve Bank is satisfied that--
(a) in the public interest; or
(aa) in the interest of banking policy; or
(b) to prevent the affairs of any banking company being
conducted in a manner detrimental to the interests of the
depositors or in a manner prejudicial to the interests of the
banking company; or
(c) to secure the proper management of any banking company
generally, it is necessary to issue directions to banking
companies generally or to any banking company in particular, it
may, from time to time, issue such directions as it deems fit, and
Page 15 of 41
the banking companies or the banking company, as the case
may be, shall be bound to comply with such directions.
(2) The Reserve Bank may, on representation made to it or on
its own motion, modify or cancel any direction issued under sub-
section (1), and in so modifying or cancelling any direction may
impose such conditions as it thinks fit, subject to which the
modification or cancellation shall have effect.”
22. It is in exercise of the powers under Section 35-A, that the RBI has
been issuing circulars from time to time on issues concerning fraud
prevention, fraud risk management and reporting of irregularities affecting
banking transactions. There can be no quarrel with the proposition that
the RBI, as a sectoral regulator, is entitled to devise such regulatory
measures aimed at maintaining the stability of the banking system.
However, the issue before us is not whether the RBI possesses the
authority to issue regulatory directions in matters concerning banking
discipline and fraud prevention, but whether the measures contemplated
in the circulars, when applied to advocates rendering professional
services, amounts to disciplinary action based on their professional
conduct.
23. The respondents have sought to justify the inclusion of the
appellant’s name in the C aution List by placing reliance upon the
regulatory framework evolved by the RBI concerning the reporting of third-
party entities involved in banking frauds. Reference in this regard has
been made to the Circular dated 16.03.2009. It is necessary to refer to
Page 16 of 41
this Circular to examine whether it is confined to the detection of fraud or
extends to matters concerning negligence or professional incompetence.
Circular dated 16.03.2009 is as follows:
“Circulation of the names of third parties involved in frauds
As you are aware, Reserve Bank of India has been
cautioning/alerting banks about unscrupulous borrowers who
have defrauded banks. RBI has also been advising the banks to
exercise due diligence while appraising the credit, needs of such
borrower companies; partnership concerns, proprietorship
concerns, directors, partners and proprietors, etc. as also their
associates in case th ey approach any bank for fresh
loans/renewal of loans.
2. Recently we had undertaken a review of emerging trends in
fraud cases in the Indian banking system. The analysis has
shown an increasing trend in cases of frauds in borrowal
accounts especially those pertaining to retail loans such as
housing loans, commodity financing against warehouse receipts,
loans for purchase of agricultural implements from dealers,
vehicle loans and credit card liabilities, etc. While examining the
modus operandi in these cases, one common striking feature
was noted in a large number of cases evidencing questionable
role played by third parties affecting the credit sanction and
disbursement process at the banks. From these third parties
such as builders, warehouse/cold storage owners, motor
vehicle/tractor dealers, travel agents etc. the banks call for
valuable inputs/receipts/documents etc. which play a vital role i n
credit sanction/disbursement. Similarly, professional
advices/reports/certificates etc tendered by professional such as
Architects/Valuers/Chartered Accountants/Advocates etc. play a
crucial role in ascertaining the progress in house construction,
validity/marketability of the title of properties proposed to be
mortgaged, value of assets to be financed or to be taken as
mortgage, etc.
3. The review of fraud cases undertaken by us has revealed that
in many cases, the inputs provided by the third parties were
misleading or distorted. Often, the third parties which had
apparently issued documents/statements were found to have
actively colluded with borrowers to facilitate the credit
sanctions…..While banks are cautioned about the borrowers
involved in such cases, the third parties, by virtue of not being
borrowers of the banks, are not held accountable for their
Page 17 of 41
negligence or active involvement in the frauds. Nor are those
parties specifically identified as sources of risk for the banks.
4. Similarly, Valuers, Advocates and Chartered Accountants have also been found to have facilitated perpetration of frauds
by providing/certifying fake documents/certifying incorrect
information/legal opinion on financial statements/statement of
accounts of the borrowers/properties taken as security by the
banks etc. While in certain circumstances the acts of
omission/commission by the third parties could be termed as
bonafide mistakes, on numerous other occasions they were the
result of pure negligence or even malafide actions. In return, the
third parties could draw financial gains by way of
disproportionate fees collected from the borrowers. Even after
being instrumental in perpetration of frauds, these professionals
continue to be on the panel of other banks and continue to
provide or certify incorrect information/take documents and
provide legal opinion on the properties etc. taken as security by
the banks….
5. It is therefore necessary that the banks build up internal
database on such third parties in a systematic manner and resort
to mutual exchange of those data on an ongoing basis. Banks
mat, hereafter, report to Indian Banks Association (IBA) the
details of such third parties, including professionals involved in
frauds….”
(emphasis supplied)
It is evident from the above that the 2009 Circular deals only with fraud
and has no bearing on professional advice of a lawyer.
24. Learned amicus as well as Mr. Rajesh Kumar Gautam, learned
counsel for the Bank, have brought to our notice subsequent circulars
issued by RBI being; (1) Reserve Bank of India (Frauds Classification and
Reporting by Commercial Banks and Select FIs) Directions, 2016, and
also (2) Master Directions on Fraud Risk Management in Commercial
Page 18 of 41
Banks and All India Financial Institutions, 2024. Clauses 8.12.4
8
and
8.12.5
9
of the 2016 Directions, as well as Clause 4.2
10
of Master
Directions 2024, clearly indicate that the Caution List is confined to
informing member banks about the fraudulent transactions that they must
be aware of. The subsequent directions consolidate and continue the
regulatory framework originally introduced through the 2009 circular and
reiterate the position that where third-party entities or professionals,
including advocates, are found to have played a role in facilitating
fraudulent banking transactions, the concerned banks may report such
entities to the IBA for preparation and circulation of C aution Lists amongst
member banks.
25. The difficulty, however, arises when a framework intended primarily
for fraud prevention is extended to cases involving alleged professional
negligence or an erroneous legal opinion rendered by an advocate in
8
8.12.4: In addition to above borrower- fraudsters, third parties such as builders, warehouse/cold
storage owners, motor vehicle/tractor dealers, travel agents, etc. and professionals such as architects,
valuers, chartered accountants, advocates, etc. are also to be held accountable if they have played a
vital role in credit sanction/disbursement or facilitated the perpetration of frauds. Banks are advised to
report to Indian Banks Association (IBA) the details of such third parties involved in frauds.
9
8.12.5 Before reporting to IBA, banks have to satisfy themselves of the involvement of third parties
concerned and also provide them with an opportunity of being heard. In this regard the banks should
follow normal procedures and the processes followed should be suitably recorded. On the basis of such
information, IBA would, in turn, prepare caution lists of such third parties for circulation among the
banks………”
10
4.2 Independent confirmation from third-party service providers, including professionals
4.2.1 Banks place reliance on various third- party service providers as part of pre- sanction appraisal and
post-sanction monitoring. Therefore, banks may incorporate necessary terms and conditions in their
agreements with third- party service providers to hold them accountable in situations where wilful
negligence or malpractice by them is found to be a causative factor for fraud.
4.2.2 Banks shall, after complying with the principles of natural justice, report to the Indian Banks’
Association (“IBA”) the details of such third parties or professionals involved in frauds. The IBA would,
in turn, prepare caution lists of such third parties for circulation among banks………”
Page 19 of 41
discharge of professional duties. The present case does not involve any
allegation of fraud, collusion, criminal misconduct, or deliberate facilitation
of fraudulent activity by the appellant. The allegation, as borne out from
the record, pertains only to negligence in conducting title verification and
rendering a legal opinion. There can be no dispute that a bank or financial
institution is entitled to internally assess the quality of services rendered
by professionals engaged by it and, on that basis, take a decision
regarding continuation or discontinuation of empanelment. An advocate
has no right to be empanelled with a bank or to be continued so, as the
relationship between the bank and the advocate is primarily contractual
and also founded upon trust and confidence. Consequently, where a bank
is dissatisfied with the services rendered, it is always open to it to
discontinue such engagement or decline future empanelment.
26. However, the matter stands on an entirely different footing when
banks, followed by the IBA, seek to place the name of an advocate on a
Caution List or in a list circulated under the title "Circulation of Names of
Third Parties Involved in Frauds", accompanied by remarks touching upon
the professional incompetence or negligence of the concerned lawyer.
The Caution List may or may not be a public document, but its circulation
to all the banking institutions operates as a declaration about
(in)competence, as well as the negative character of the advocate, having
Page 20 of 41
serious implications on his right to practice his profession. In the present
case, a careful scrutiny of the record, particularly the communication
dated 27.07.2018 issued by respondent no. 2, reveals that the allegation
against the appellant is not one of fraud, collusion, or deliberate
wrongdoing, but something relatable to negligence in rendering a title
verification opinion.
27. Fraud, by its very nature, imports an element of mens rea and
deliberate intention and design to defraud . An erroneous legal opinion or
an omission in the course of due diligence, absent any allegation of
dishonest intent or deliberate facilitation of illegality, cannot be elevated to
the level of fraud. Had appellant been alleged to have committed fraud
and subjected to criminal prosecution, entirely different considerations
would arise. That, however, is not even the case with the respondents.
Their stated object is to caution member banks regarding the alleged
inefficiency or professional negligence of the appellant.
28. In our considered opinion, the circulars issued by the RBI in exercise
of power under Section 35A to alert member banks against fraudulent
transactions, as also fraudulent professionals, cannot be interpreted to
authorise banks or the IBA to include cases of alleged negligence or
professional (in)competence of an advocate in the said list. While the RBI
may issue directions to ensure integrity in banking transactions, such
Page 21 of 41
power does not include declaring an advocate professionally negligent by
including his name on a Caution List, which is meant to identify fraudulent
entities. In the present case, where the allegation against the appellant
pertains solely to negligence, the inclusion of his name in the C aution List
is unsustainable. In view of the above discussion and analysis, we hold
that the respondent Bank and IBA cannot include the name of the
appellant in the Caution List. Consequently, we direct them to remove the
appellant’s name from the C aution List with immediate effect.
VI. Professional Independence, Self-Regulation and BCI being the
Disciplinary Body. Re : Issue No. 3: Whether allegations relating to
professional misconduct or negligence of an advocate falls within
the disciplinary domain under the Advocates Act, 1961 and the Bar
Councils have exclusive jurisdiction to deal with them?
29. It has been the uniform and consistent submission on behalf of the
appellant, the Bar Council of India, the Ministry of Law and Justice, as well
as the learned Amicus Curiae that the alleged allegations of professional
negligence or misconduct on the part of the appellant-advocate, even if
true, fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the disciplinary authorities
contemplated under the Advocates Act, 1961. It has been contended that
neither the Bank nor IBA possess the authority to adjudicate upon the
professional conduct of an advocate or to impose the consequential action
of virtually blacklisting a lawyer.
Page 22 of 41
30. The legal profession occupies a distinct position in the constitutional
and institutional framework of this country. The position of a lawyer, in
contrast to that of other professionals such as engineers, doctors, or
architects, is markedly different. In Bar of Indian Lawyers v. D.K. Gandhi
PS National Institute of Communicable Diseases,
11
this Court elaborately
considered the distinctive nature of the legal profession and held that the
profession of law is sui generis . Lawyers frequently operate in
environments where control over outcomes is elusive and where
professional obligations are regulated not merely by contractual duties,
but also by ethical obligations towards the Court, the client, the opponent
and the justice delivery system itself. The relevant portion of the judgment
is as follows:
“34. It is thus well recognised in a catena of decisions that the
legal profession cannot be equated with any other traditional
professions. It is not commercial in nature but is essentially a
service oriented, noble profession. It cannot be gainsaid that the
role of advocates is indispensable in the justice delivery system.
An evolution of jurisprudence to keep our Constitution vibrant is
possible only with the positive contribution of the advocates. The
advocates are expected to be fearless and independent for
protecting the rights of citizens, for upholding the Rule of Law
and also for protecting the independence of judiciary. People
repose immense faith in the judiciary, and the Bar being an integral part of the judicial system has been assigned a very
crucial role for preserving the independence of the judiciary, and
in turn the very democratic set-up of the nation. The advocates
are perceived to be the intellectuals amongst the elites and
social activists amongst the downtrodden. That is the reason
they are expected to act according to the principles of uberrima
fides i.e. the utmost good faith, integrity, fairness and loyalty
11
(2024) 8 SCC 430
Page 23 of 41
while handling the legal proceedings of his client. Being a responsible officer of the court and an important adjunct of the
administration of justice, an advocate owes his duty not only to
his client but also to the court as well as to the opposite side.
35. The legal profession is different from the other professions
also for the reason that what the advocates do, affects not only
an individual but the entire administration of justice, which is the
foundation of the civilised society. It must be remembered that
the legal profession is a solemn and serious profession. It has
always been held in very high esteem because of the stellar role
played by the stalwarts in the profession to strengthen the
judicial system in the country. Their services in making the
judicial system efficient, effective and credible, and in creating a
strong and impartial judiciary, which is one of the three pillars of
the Democracy, could not be compared with the services
rendered by other professionals. Therefore, having regard to the
role, status and duties of the advocates as the professionals, we
are of the opinion that the legal profession is sui generis i.e.
unique in nature and cannot be compared with any other
profession.”
31. Independence of legal profession is as important as independence
of judiciary. In fact, their independence from the executive and the
legislature is the foundation of the rule of law and democracy. The
independence of the legal profession is secured by the principle of self-
regulation. This principle has had statutory recognition with the passing of
the Advocates Act, 1961. Questions concerning the professional conduct,
competence, or negligence of an advocate fall within the exclusive domain
of the disciplinary mechanism contemplated under the said enactment
and are to be examined by the statutory bodies constituted thereunder.
Permitting external agencies or institutions to record adverse findings and
opinion about the professional standing of advocates would not only
Page 24 of 41
transgress the legislative framework governing the legal profession, but
also undermine the independence of the Bar.
32. The Advocates Act, 1961, comprehensively deals with enrolment,
right to practise, standards of professional conduct, disciplinary control
and institutional supervision of advocates. The statutory scheme clearly
evidences legislative intention to confer professional autonomy through
self-regulation and also subjects it to structured disciplinary oversight
through professional bodies, namely the State Bar Councils and the Bar
Council of India. The Parliament has thus attempted to strike a balance
between the independence of the profession with accountability. Chapter
II of the Act deals with Bar Councils, namely the State Bar Councils and
the Bar Council of India. Sections 35 and 36 vest disciplinary jurisdiction
in the respective State Bar Councils and the Bar Council of India. The
scheme of the Act contemplates a structured adjudicatory mechanism
involving notice, framing of charges, recording of evidence and appellate
remedies. The provision not only identifies the competent authority
empowered to examine allegations against advocates, but also prescribes
the procedure to be followed, including the issuance of a notice, an
opportunity of hearing, and the participation of the Advocate-General.
Sub-section (3) of Section 35 enumerates the range of punishments that
may be imposed, extending from reprimand to suspension from practice
Page 25 of 41
and ultimately removal of the advocate’s name from the State roll itself.
Sections 37 and 38 provide appellate remedies against disciplinary orders
passed by the State Bar Councils and the Bar Council of India,
respectively. The statute, therefore, contemplates a complete hierarchy of
disciplinary adjudication culminating in appellate scrutiny by this Court
under Section 38. The power to adjudicate upon professional misconduct
has been consciously entrusted to specialised disciplinary committees
constituted within the Bar Council framework, comprising members drawn
from the legal profession itself. The principle that “peers must regulate
peers” lies at the heart of the disciplinary framework governing the legal
profession. Allegations of professional misconduct against an advocate
are not adjudicated by ordinary executive authorities, but by bodies
comprising members of the Bar itself.
33. The principle of self-regulation has historically been regarded as the
defining feature of independence of the legal profession. The idea
underlying such autonomy is that advocates, as officers of the court and
participants in the administration of justice, must remain insulated from
external pressures. It was on the basis of this principle that the All India
Bar Committee Report, 1953 and the 14th Report of the Law Commission,
1958, endorsed the creation of an autonomous Bar governed through
institutions deriving authority from the profession itself. The legislative
Page 26 of 41
framework embodied in the Advocates Act, 1961, was founded upon this
conception. The disciplinary control over advocates, including matters
relating to enrolment, suspension, and professional misconduct, was
entrusted to the Bar Councils as self-regulatory bodies by members of the
profession. The underlying rationale is that independence of the Bar
constitutes an indispensable condition for preservation of the rule of law;
the necessary implication is that parallel adjudicatory mechanisms outside
the statute are excluded. Such exclusivity of jurisdiction has succinctly
been explained in Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India
12
in
the following manner:
“57……... The power to punish an advocate by suspending his
licence or by removal of his name from the roll of the State Bar
Council for proven professional misconduct vests exclusively in
the statutory authorities created under the Advocates Act, 1961,
while the jurisdiction to punish him for committing contempt of
court vests exclusively in the courts.
58. After the coming into force of the Advocates Act, 1961,
exclusive power for punishing an advocate for “professional
misconduct” has been conferred on the State Bar Council
concerned and the Bar Council of India. That Act contains a
detailed and complete mechanism for suspending or revoking
the licence of an advocate for his “professional misconduct”.
Since the suspension or revocation of licence of an advocate has
not only civil consequences but also penal consequences, the
punishment being in the nature of penalty, the provisions have to
be strictly construed. Punishment by way of suspending the
licence of an advocate can only be imposed by the competent
statutory body after the charge is established against the
advocate in a manner prescribed by the Act and the Rules
framed thereunder.
12
(1998) 4 SCC 409
Page 27 of 41
71. Thus, after the coming into force of the Advocates Act, 1961
with effect from 19-5-1961, matters connected with the
enrolment of advocates as also their punishment for professional
misconduct is governed by the provisions of that Act only. Since,
the jurisdiction to grant licence to a law graduate to practise as
an advocate vests exclusively in the Bar Council of the State
concerned, the jurisdiction to suspend his licence for a specified
term or to revoke it also vests in the same body.”
34. Further, this Court in Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M.V. Dabholkar
13
wherein it was held as under:
“24. The scheme and the provisions of the Act indicate that the
constitution of State Bar Councils and Bar Council of India is for
one of the principal purposes to see that the standards of
professional conduct and etiquette laid down by the Bar Council
of India are observed and preserved. The Bar Councils therefore
entertain cases of misconduct against advocates. The Bar
Councils are to safeguard the rights, privilege and interests of
advocates. The Bar Council is a body corporate. The Disciplinary
Committees are constituted by the Bar Council. The Bar Council
is not the same body as its Disciplinary Committee. One of the
principal functions of the Bar Council in regard to standards of
professional conduct and etiquette of advocates is to receive
complaints against advocates and if the Bar Council has reason
to believe that any advocate has been guilty of professional or
other misconduct it shall refer the case for disposal to its
Disciplinary Committee. The Bar Council of a State may also of
its own motion if it has reason to believe that any advocate has
been guilty of professional or other misconduct it shall refer the
case for disposal to its Disciplinary Committee. It is apparent that
a State Bar Council not only receives a complaint but is required
to apply its mind to find out whether there is any reason to believe
that any advocate has been guilty of professional or other
misconduct. The Bar Council of a State acts on that reasoned
belief. The Bar Council has a very important part to play, first, in
the reception of complaints, second, in forming reasonable belief
of guilt of professional or other misconduct and finally in making
reference of the case to its Disciplinary Committee. The initiation
of the proceeding before the Disciplinary Committee is by the
Bar Council of a State. A most significant feature is that no litigant
and no member of the public can straightaway commence
13
(1975) 2 SCC 702.
Page 28 of 41
disciplinary proceedings against an advocate. It is the Bar
Council of a State which initiates the disciplinary proceedings.”
35. Reverting to the facts of present case, the inclusion of the
appellant’s name in the Caution List, coupled with remarks imputing
negligence and wrongful legal opinion, undeniably carried serious
consequences, apart from affecting appellant’s fundamental right to
practice the profession. Such action effectively amounted to professional
blacklisting, adversely affecting the appellant’s standing and future
professional engagements with other banks.
36. If the Bank is of the opinion that the appellant is guilty of professional
negligence or misconduct in discharge of legal duties as an advocate, the
appropriate remedy is to place the relevant material before the competent
State Bar Council to take necessary action under the Advocates Act, 1961.
Matters concerning the professional conduct of an advocate are within the
exclusive province of the disciplinary authorities contemplated under the
Advocates Act. The mechanism envisaged in the Caution List under the
RBI circulars cannot be invoked to determine or punish alleged
professional misconduct by advocates. Permitting banks or banking
associations to bypass the disciplinary process under the Advocates Act
and unilaterally portray an advocate as professionally incompetent by
including his name in a C aution List is illegal, unsustainable and
impermissible. It would amount to circumventing the legal profession's
Page 29 of 41
freedom of self-regulation, which, in turn, is an inextricable feature of the
independence of the judiciary. Consequently, we hold that the action of
including appellant’s name in the C aution List and the consequent
comment on his competency is illegal and is set aside.
VII. Duty of BCI to undertake performance audit of its disciplinary
jurisdiction to ensure accountability.
37. Before parting with the issue, we deem it necessary to clarify that
the present judgment ought not to be understood as undermining the need
for accountability of the legal profession.
38. The concerns expressed by banks and financial institutions
regarding diligence, quality and reliability of legal opinions furnished by
advocates cannot be ignored . Modern banking transactions require well-
considered legal opinions, and they constitute an important part of
institutional decision-making . Such opinions are critical as banking and
financial transactions involve substantial financial exposure. Deficiencies
in professional services will have immediate and substantial financial
consequences. The solution for accountability lie not in creation of parallel
structures, like declarations in Caution List’s, as in the present case, but
in strengthening the existing regulatory mechanisms contemplated under
the Advocates Act, 1961 itself.
Page 30 of 41
39. The legal profession occupies a unique position in the constitutional
framework of India. Advocates are not merely professionals providing
services to clients; they are officers of the court and indispensable
participants in the administration of justice. Public confidence in the justice
delivery system depends, to a considerable extent, upon the integrity,
competence, and professional conduct of advocates. Consequently, the
existence of a robust, credible, transparent and efficient disciplinary
mechanism for dealing with complaints against advocates is essential for
maintaining the rule of law.
40. The Advocates Act, 1961 entrusts the responsibility of regulating the
legal profession primarily to the State Bar Councils and the Bar Council of
India. Among their most important statutory functions is the consideration
and disposal of complaints relating to professional misconduct by
advocates. Sections 35, 36, 36B and related provisions of the Act
contemplate an institutional framework through which allegations of
misconduct are investigated and adjudicated.
41. The statutory scheme recognises that professional discipline is an
indispensable component of self-regulation. The authority conferred upon
Bar Councils is accompanied by a corresponding duty to ensure that
complaints are examined promptly, fairly and effectively. Delay in
disciplinary proceedings undermines both accountability and fairness. It
Page 31 of 41
erodes public confidence in the profession, causes hardship to
complainants, and leaves advocates facing unresolved allegations under
prolonged uncertainty.
42. Over the years, concerns have repeatedly been expressed
regarding pendency, procedural delays, lack of uniformity in practices
across councils, limited availability of information regarding the progress
and outcome of disciplinary proceedings. While the statutory framework
is well-intentioned, there appears to be insufficient publicly available
information regarding whether the existing mechanisms are achieving
their intended objectives in practice.
43. The need for an efficient and expeditious disciplinary system arises
from multiple considerations. First, the legal profession enjoys substantial
privileges, including exclusive rights of audience before courts. Such
privileges must necessarily be accompanied by accountability
mechanisms that inspire public trust. Secondly, disciplinary proceedings
serve a protective rather than merely punitive function. Their purpose is
not only to identify and sanction professional misconduct but also to
preserve confidence in the administration of justice. Thirdly, delay itself
may result in injustice. A complainant who approaches the disciplinary
machinery expects timely consideration of grievances. Equally, an
advocate against whom allegations are made is entitled to a prompt
Page 32 of 41
determination so that his or her professional reputation is not indefinitely
clouded by unresolved accusations. Fourthly, an ineffective disciplinary
system risks encouraging frivolous complaints on one hand and shielding
genuine misconduct on the other. Both outcomes are detrimental to the
legal profession and the justice system.
44. The duties of the State Bar Councils and the Bar Council of India
therefore extend beyond merely processing individual complaints. They
include ensuring that disciplinary complaints are taken up quickly and
disposed of effectively. The regulators must continuously assess whether
their procedures are meeting the objectives of accountability, fairness,
consistency and efficiency. While self-regulation is important, there is also
a duty to ensure its effectiveness.
45. In Yash Developers v. Harihar Krupa Co-operative Housing Society
Ltd.
14
, this Court emphasised the need to assess whether a statutory
framework is achieving its intended purpose or not. The Court observed
that the executive has an obligation to review the implementation of a
legislation by undertaking a performance audit where statutory objectives
appear to be impeded by systemic delays, procedural bottlenecks, or
institutional inefficiencies. It was held as under :
“57…… Reviewing and assessing the implementation of a statute is
an integral part of Rule of Law. It is in recognition of this obligation of
14
(2024) 9 SCC 606.
Page 33 of 41
the executive government that the constitutional courts have directed
Governments to carry performance audit of statutes.
58. Four aspects for achieving justice are well founded and articulated
as : (i) distribution of advantages and disadvantages of society, (ii)
curbing the abuse of power and liberty, (iii) deciding disputes, and (iv)
adapting to change. Adapting to change is important for achieving
justice, as failure to adapt produces injustice and is, in a sense, an
abuse of power. Thus, failure to use power to adapt to change is in its
own way an abuse of power. In fact, the issue is not one of change or
not to change, but of the direction and the speed of change and such
a change may come in various ways, and most effectively through
legislation. Legal reform through legislative correction improves the
legal system and it would require assessment of the working of the
law, its accessibility, utility and abuse as well.
59. The Executive branch has a constitutional duty to ensure that the
purpose and object of a statute is accomplished while implementing it.
It has the additional duty to closely monitor the working of a statute
and must have a continuous and a real time assessment of the impact
that the statute is having. As stated above, reviewing and assessing
the implementation of a statute is an integral part of Rule of Law. The
purpose of such review is to ensure that a law is working out in practice
as it was intended. If not, to understand the reason and address it
quickly….”
46. The principles articulated in Yash Developers (supra) have
relevance beyond the specific statute considered in that case. They
underscore the necessity of periodically evaluating whether regulatory
mechanisms are functioning in practice as intended by law. If performance
audits are necessary for welfare statutes and administrative frameworks,
they are equally necessary for professional regulatory institutions whose
functioning directly affects access to justice and public confidence in the
legal system.
47. An objective assessment of the disciplinary framework governing
advocates should therefore examine, among other matters; i) The number
of complaints instituted annually before each State Bar Council. ii) The
Page 34 of 41
number of complaints disposed of annually. iii) Average and median
disposal times. iv) Age-wise pendency of cases. v) Regional variations in
disposal patterns. vi) Procedural practices adopted by different Bar
Councils. vii) Adequacy of staffing and administrative support. viii) Nature
of outcomes and sanctions imposed. ix) Accessibility and transparency of
disciplinary proceedings. x) Compliance with statutory timelines.
48. A meaningful evaluation of the existing system requires
participation of multiple stakeholders, including representatives of litigants
as well as experts in public administration, data analysis professionals,
and individuals with experience in institutional reform. Such diversity is
necessary to ensure efficiency and objectivity . Plurality in the composition
of the committee will enable the regulators to avoid institutional blind
spots.
49. The purpose of this exercise is not to attribute blame but to identify
systemic strengths and weaknesses. The objective should be evidence-
based reform aimed at improving the effectiveness of the disciplinary
framework while preserving fairness and professional independence.
There is also a compelling public interest in ensuring that the legal
profession’s regulatory mechanisms meet contemporary standards of
accountability. There is no reason why the disciplinary framework
governing advocates should remain exempt from similar scrutiny.
Page 35 of 41
50. In view of the above discussion and having regard to the importance
of maintaining public confidence in the institution of lawyers , it is desirable
that the Bar Council of India undertakes a comprehensive performance
audit of the disciplinary mechanisms administered by it and the State Bar
Councils under the Advocates Act, 1961. We direct the Bar Council of
India to constitute a committee and seek an objective assessment of its
duties of self-regulation of professional conduct and discipline, consider
the report and file an affidavit of the action proposed/taken.
VIII. Continuing Legal Education (CLE) for Lawyers: A Necessity for
Strengthening Justice Delivery.
51. The maintenance of professional competence, ethical standards,
and public confidence requires much more than laying down the rules and
regulations for conduct and also consequences for misconduct of lawyers
by laying down the procedures of enquiry, adjudication and determination
by regulatory authorities.
52. In India, the statutory responsibility for maintaining standards of
professional conduct and legal education rests with the Bar Council of
India and the State Bar Councils under the Advocates Act, 1961. While
considerable attention has been devoted to legal education at the entry
level through law universities and professional examinations, there is a
glaring dearth in institutionalised learning for advocates after enrolment.
Page 36 of 41
53. Laws, as well as renewed knowledge of its subjects are ever
evolving. Equally, the technique of persuasion-advocacy, as well as
adjudicatory methods require simplification and refinement. Societal
expectations of higher standards of inclusiveness, accountability and
transparency require lawyers to equip themselves not only with updated
legal knowledge but also with evolving ethical and social responsibilities.
Statutes are amended, regulatory frameworks evolve, constitutional
doctrine develop and judicial precedents continuously reshape our
understanding of law. Owing to increasing technological infusion in the
profession and the growing complexity of commercial and financial
transactions, it has become all the more necessary for lawyers to remain
updated and professionally equipped.
54. Many advanced jurisdictions have already recognised this
necessity. In the United States, most state bar associations require
advocates to complete Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE)
credits periodically as a condition for maintaining their licence to practise.
Subjects typically include professional ethics, technological competence,
trial advocacy, and emerging areas of law. In the United Kingdom, the
legal profession has progressively moved towards continuing competence
frameworks under the supervision of bodies such as the Solicitors
Regulation Authority, requiring practitioners to undertake regular
Page 37 of 41
professional development and demonstrate maintenance of competence.
Similar systems exist in jurisdictions such as Singapore, Canada, and
Australia, where structured professional development programmes are
considered essential components of professional regulation.
55. The importance of CLE has repeatedly engaged the attention of
expert bodies in this country. The 184
th
Report of the Law Commission of
India proposed substantial reforms to the Advocates Act, 1961 aimed at
institutionalising continuing legal education and improving standards of
professional training. The proposed amendments contemplated, inter alia,
promotion of continuing education in specialised fields of law, practical
training for advocates and institutional mechanisms for raising standards
of legal education and professional competence. The Advocates
(Amendment) Bill, 2003, proposed amendments to Section 7 of the
Advocates Act to specifically promote continuing legal education,
specialised training and awareness regarding developments in law and
legal education. Though the proposed statutory amendments did not
ultimately materialise, the underlying concerns reflected therein continue
to retain considerable significance.
56. Indian Lawyers can and must develop their own model, a pedagogy
that is suitable for the profession and practice of law . Continuing Legal
Education should not be viewed as a mere regulatory requirement, but as
Page 38 of 41
a professional commitment to excellence and service. Such programmes
can also bridge the knowledge gap between urban and rural practitioners,
ensuring that lawyers across the country have access to developments in
law, technology, advocacy skills, and professional ethics.
57. An important objective of continuing education is in transmission of
the profession’s unwritten traditions and values to the younger
generations of lawyers. Professional conduct and competency is shaped
not only by real-time practice, but also through long-established
conventions of fairness, collaboration, courtesy, respect for courts, and
service to clients. These time-tested practices constitute the cultural
capital of the Bar and must consciously be preserved and passed on
through structured mentoring and training programmes.
58. There is a necessity, rather a compelling need, to kindle among
advocates a deeper and a renewed sense of bond and shared
responsibility for timely disposal of cases as reducing pendency is as
much the duty of the Bar as it is of the Bench. There is no dispute that
mounting pendency of cases across District Courts, High Courts, and the
Supreme Court poses one of the greatest challenges to the justice
delivery system in India. The constitutional courts have rightly assumed
responsibility for addressing this problem, and judges at all levels remain
deeply concerned about delays and arrears. Yet, pendency continues to
Page 39 of 41
be viewed almost exclusively as a judicial responsibility. This approach
overlooks a fundamental reality that the Bar is not merely a stakeholder
but an equal institutional partner in the administration of justice. Despite
frequent references to the Bar and Bench as the “two wheels of the chariot
of justice,” the Bar is seldom called upon to share responsibility for
reducing delays and improving efficiency. A paradigm shift is necessary.
Tackling pendency must become a collaborative mission of the Bench and
the Bar. Through coordinated planning, institutional commitment, and
shared accountability, meaningful access to justice can be achieved. The
first step is to equip and train lawyers to work as a team and then to work
with courts and judges for effective and efficient delivery of justice.
59. To achieve these objectives, serious consideration should be given
to institutionalising “future continuous” learning for lawyers. Episodic and
bouquet presenting seminars and conferences must give way to more
serious and committed learning. It is necessary to establish a full-time
academy, which may be called the National Legal Academy (NLA) for
lawyers, like the National Judicial Academy that has been established for
training and capacity building for Judges. Such an institution would enable
post-enrolment structural learning, enhance professional competence,
ethical awareness, technological adaptability, and long-term planning and
Page 40 of 41
corroboration. Bar Council of India must invest its time and energy in
institutionalising this body.
60. There is no dearth of expertise, experience, vision and wisdom
amongst members of the Bar. All that is required is to bring them together
and enable the idea to take shape. We direct the Bar Council of India to
constitute a team of senior and junior lawyers as well as experts in the
field of establishing academic institutions for considering, discussing and
evolving the idea of establishing National Legal Academy. We hope and
trust the BCI will rise to the occasion and reflect on all these issues and
inform the Court of its decision. List this appeal for further directions on
31.08.2026.
IX. Conclusions.
61. For the reasons stated above, we allow the appeal, set aside the
judgment and order passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad.
We declare that inclusion of appellant’s name in C aution List is
impermissible and without jurisdiction. There shall be a consequential
direction to the respondents to remove the name of the appellant from the
Caution List with immediate effect.
62. List the appeal on 31.08.2026 for considering the issues relating to
institutionalising Continuing Legal Education (CLE) and the proposal for
Page 41 of 41
establishing National Legal Academy (NLA). BCI may file an affidavit
indicating the developments a week before the listing of the case.
………………………………....J.
[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA ]
………………………………....J.
[ALOK ARADHE ]
NEW DELHI;
JULY 07, 2026.
In a landmark judgment, the Supreme Court of India has reaffirmed the foundational principles of legal professional independence, asserting the exclusive jurisdiction of Bar Councils under the Advocates Act 1961 over matters of professional misconduct and negligence. This significant ruling, delivered in Ajay Vijh v. Indian Banks Association & Ors. (2026 INSC 670), meticulously dissects the scope of the RBI Caution List, particularly concerning advocates, and lays down crucial directions for the Bar Council of India to enhance accountability and continuing legal education. This pivotal case is now prominently featured on CaseOn, offering deep insights into the evolving landscape of legal regulation and professional conduct.
\n\nThe case originated when Ajay Vijh, an advocate on Canara Bank\'s panel, provided a legal opinion in 2015 regarding a property offered as security for a credit facility. Later, the bank alleged his opinion was erroneous, claiming a portion of the property had been alienated earlier. Based on this, the bank not only removed him from its panel for \'negligence in verification of title\' but also forwarded his name to the Indian Banks\' Association (IBA) for inclusion in the \'Caution List\' titled "Third Party Entities Involved in Fraud." The appellant argued this inclusion, made without notice or hearing, gravely damaged his reputation and professional opportunities.
\n\nThe High Court dismissed Vijh\'s writ petition, holding that the IBA was not a "State" under Article 12 of the Constitution, thus deeming the writ petition non-maintainable. This decision led to the appeal before the Supreme Court.
\n\nThe Supreme Court clarified that the maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226 does not solely depend on whether the respondent is a \'State\' under Article 12. Citing precedents like Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust v. V.R. Rudani, Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India, and S. Shobha v. Muthoot Finance Ltd., the Court emphasized a shift towards the "function test." If a private body performs public duties or its actions affect legally protected rights, especially fundamental rights like the right to practice a profession under Article 19(1)(g), it can be amenable to writ jurisdiction.
\n\nThe Court found that the IBA\'s action, while not strictly a \'State\' function, involved maintaining and disseminating a sector-wide \'Caution List\' based on RBI guidelines. This mechanism directly impacted the appellant\'s professional reputation and livelihood across the banking industry, thus carrying a significant \'public law\' character. Many High Courts across the country had also entertained similar writ petitions challenging such inclusions. Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that the High Court\'s narrow interpretation was incorrect, and the writ petition was indeed maintainable.
\n\nTo swiftly grasp the nuances of such rulings and their broader implications, legal professionals often turn to CaseOn.in. Their 2-minute audio briefs are an invaluable tool, allowing busy practitioners to analyze specific judgments like this one from Ajay Vijh v. Indian Banks Association & Ors. (2026 INSC 670) quickly and efficiently, ensuring they stay informed without extensive reading.
\n\nThe RBI, empowered by Section 35-A of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, issues circulars for fraud prevention and risk management. The 2009 RBI Circular and subsequent directions (2016, 2024) specifically concern "Circulation of the names of third parties involved in frauds." These guidelines enable banks to report entities like advocates who facilitate *fraudulent* banking transactions to the IBA for inclusion in the Caution List.
\n\nThe Supreme Court meticulously distinguished between \'fraud\' and \'negligence.\' Fraud, by definition, requires \'mens rea\' or a deliberate intention to deceive. The allegations against Ajay Vijh pertained to \'negligence\' in rendering a legal opinion, not fraud, collusion, or deliberate wrongdoing. The Court unequivocally stated that an erroneous legal opinion, in the absence of dishonest intent, cannot be equated with fraud. While banks have the right to de-panel an advocate if their services are unsatisfactory, a public declaration of an advocate\'s \'negligence\' or \'incompetence\' through an industry-wide Caution List—meant for fraudulent entities—is beyond the scope of RBI\'s directives and unsustainable in law. Such an action affects an advocate\'s fundamental right to practice his profession.
\n\nThe legal profession in India is unique, recognized as \'sui generis.\' The Advocates Act, 1961, establishes a robust framework for self-regulation, vesting exclusive disciplinary jurisdiction over professional misconduct and negligence in the State Bar Councils and the Bar Council of India. The principle of "peers must regulate peers" is central to this framework, ensuring that accountability is maintained within the profession through a structured adjudicatory process, including notice, framing of charges, evidence, and appellate remedies.
\n\nThe Court highlighted that allowing banks or banking associations to bypass this statutory mechanism and unilaterally \'blacklist\' an advocate based on perceived negligence would fundamentally undermine the independence and self-regulatory nature of the legal profession. The legal profession, as an indispensable part of the justice delivery system, requires insulation from external pressures. If a bank has concerns about an advocate\'s professional conduct, the appropriate and legal course of action is to file a complaint with the relevant State Bar Council, which is the competent authority to investigate and adjudicate such matters. The IBA\'s action was therefore illegal, impermissible, and an encroachment on the exclusive domain of the Bar Councils.
\n\nRecognizing the importance of accountability within self-regulation, the Supreme Court issued two significant directives to the Bar Council of India (BCI):
\n\nThe Court directed the BCI to undertake a comprehensive performance audit of its disciplinary mechanisms, including those of the State Bar Councils, as mandated by the Advocates Act, 1961. This audit should assess: annual complaint intake and disposal, average/median disposal times, age-wise pendency, regional variations, procedural practices, staffing adequacy, outcomes/sanctions, accessibility, transparency, and compliance with statutory timelines. The goal is to identify systemic strengths and weaknesses, implement evidence-based reforms, and ensure that the disciplinary framework inspires public trust and maintains fairness and professional independence.
\n\nEmphasizing the ever-evolving nature of law and societal expectations, the Court stressed the necessity of Continuing Legal Education (CLE) for lawyers. It called for the BCI to initiate and institutionalize a culture of CLE to maintain high standards of professional competence, legal knowledge, advocacy skills, and ethical conduct. The Court further suggested the establishment of a National Legal Academy (NLA) for lawyers, akin to the National Judicial Academy (NJA) for judges. This NLA would provide post-enrolment structural learning, enhance professional competence, ethical awareness, technological adaptability, and long-term planning, fostering collaboration between the Bar and Bench to address issues like judicial pendency.
\n\nThis Supreme Court judgment is a critical read for all legal professionals and students for several reasons:
\nThe Supreme Court has decisively intervened to protect the independence and self-regulatory framework of the legal profession. By setting aside the High Court\'s order and directing the immediate removal of Ajay Vijh\'s name from the Caution List, the Court has drawn a clear line between negligence and fraud, emphasizing that allegations of professional misconduct fall exclusively under the purview of Bar Councils. Furthermore, the Court\'s forward-looking directives to the Bar Council of India concerning a performance audit of disciplinary mechanisms and the institutionalization of Continuing Legal Education, including the potential establishment of a National Legal Academy, reflect a proactive approach to strengthening the legal profession\'s accountability, competence, and role in justice delivery.
\n\nAll information provided in this article is for informational purposes only and not legal advice. Readers should consult a qualified legal professional for advice on specific legal issues.
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