CRL.M.C. 4105/2025 Page 1 of 17

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

% Judgment reserved on:29.10.2025

Judgment delivered on:19.01.2026

+ CRL.M.C. 4105/2025 & CRL.M.A. 17787/2025, CRL.M.A.

26097/2025

ANIL KHURANA ..... Petitioner

versus

GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI & ANR. ..... Respondents

Advocates who appeared in this case:

For the Petitioner : Mr. Saurabh Jha and Ms. Ragini Kapoor,

Advocates.

For the Respondents : Mr. Sunil Kumar Gautam, APP for the

State.

Mr. Gautam Khazanchi and Ms. Suruchi

Jaiswal, Advocates for R-2.

CORAM

HON’BLE MR JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN

JUDGMENT

1.The present petition is filed against the order dated 24.05.2024

(hereafter ‘impugned order’) passed by the learned Additional

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Sessions Judge (‘ASJ’), Saket Courts, Delhi in Criminal Revision No.

143/2023.

2.By the impugned order, the learned ASJ set aside the order

dated 25.11.2022 whereby the learned Magistrate while noting that

prima facie there existed sufficient grounds to proceed for the offence

under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’) had

summoned Respondent No. 2.

3.Concisely put, the petitioner and Respondent No. 2 are stated to

be brothers and the petitioner, stated to be a citizen of USA, used to

reside on the ground floor of H. No. 10/21, East Patel Nagar, Delhi

whenever he visited India for holidays. On 05.07.2007, FIR No.

388/2007 was registered at Police Station Patel Nagar for offences

under Sections 341/323 of the IPC against the petitioner on a

complaint given by Respondent No. 2 whereby it was alleged that the

petitioner physically assaulted Respondent No. 2 over a dispute

pertaining to the staircase in the house. It was further alleged that the

petitioner gave multiple blows and kicks to Respondent No. 2 thereby

causing him injuries. Meanwhile a settlement was purportedly

executed between the parties alongwith an affidavit by Respondent

No. 2 and thereafter the petitioner filed a quashing petition before this

Court vide CRL. M.C. 3962/2008. Respondent No. 2 was also

impleaded in the said petition.

4.This Court vide order dated 30.08.2012 declined to quash the

said FIR noting the stand taken by Respondent No. 2 in his reply

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affidavit whereby he stated that the deed of settlement and affidavit

were forged and fabricated and that Respondent No. 2 was made to

sign the same under misrepresentation.

5.Subsequently, the trial concluded and vide judgment dated

28.02.2019, the petitioner was acquitted of the charged offences in

view of the contradictions in the version of the prosecution. The

petitioner thereafter filed the present complaint being CT Cases

5623/2019 under Sections 499/500 of the IPC read with Sections

193/196/199/209 of the IPC. In the complaint, the petitioner alleged

that Respondent No. 2 falsely implicated the petitioner in the FIR No.

388/2007 by making false allegations of hurt and wrongful restraint in

which the petitioner was subsequently acquitted. The petitioner

alleged that due to the said implication, the behaviour of the relatives,

neighbours and his friends have changed. The petitioner further

alleged that during the pendency of the trial in FIR No. 388/2007,

Respondent No. 2 made baseless statements against the petitioner in

relation to forgery and fabrication of documents pertaining to the deed

of settlement to the friends and family members of the petitioner and

that the same are defamatory in nature. The complaint also reflects

three instances where the petitioner was allegedly looked down upon

by his family/friends in relation to forgery and fabrication of

documents in relation to the deed of settlement. It is the case of the

petitioner that the institution of a false case coupled with the baseless

statements made by Respondent No.2 of the alleged forgery and

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fabrication of documents have caused damage to the reputation of the

petitioner.

6.By order dated 25.11.2022, the learned Magistrate issued

summons to Respondent No. 2 while specifically noting that there

existed prima facie sufficient grounds to proceed against Respondent

No. 2.

7.By the impugned order, the learned ASJ set aside the order of

summoning passed by the learned Magistrate dated 25.11.2022. It was

noted that the case of Respondent No. 2 was covered under Exceptions

8 and 9 to Section 499 of the IPC. It was noted that even otherwise,

the allegations levelled by the petitioner against Respondent No. 2 did

not amount to the offence of defamation. It was noted that from the

evidence tendered by the petitioner, it could not be ascertained that

Respondent No. 2 had any intention to defame the petitioner.

Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner has preferred the present

petition.

8.The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the learned

ASJ erred in setting aside the summoning order dated 25.11.2022

passed by the learned Magistrate. He submitted that false allegations

were made in the FIR No. 388/2007 against the petitioner and that the

petitioner was also subsequently acquitted in the said FIR. He further

submitted that Respondent No. 2, during the course of the trial, had

made certain statements to the friends and family of the petitioner in

relation to forgery and fabrication of the documents that had the

CRL.M.C. 4105/2025 Page 5 of 17

impact of lowering the reputation of the petitioner in the eyes of such

friends and family members.

9.He submitted that learned ASJ while considering the revision

petition was only required to assess if there existed any perversity or

impropriety in the order passed by the learned Magistrate. He

submitted that the learned ASJ ought not to have gone into the

defences of Section 499 of the IPC while considering a challenge to

the summoning order while exercising revisional jurisdiction. He

submitted that the role of the learned ASJ was limited to ascertaining

the propriety of the summoning order and the defences qua good faith

is a subject matter of trial and was not required to be looked into.

10.He submitted that even during the course of the trial in FIR No.

388/2007, Respondent No. 2 had made contradictory statements as a

result of which the petitioner was acquitted. He submitted that the

statements made by Respondent No. 2 to the friends and family

members of the petitioner in relation to forgery lowered the reputation

of the petitioner thereby attracting the offence under Section 499 of

the IPC.

11.The learned counsel for Respondent No. 2 submitted that the

impugned order is well reasoned and warrants no interference by this

Court. He submitted that Exceptions 8 and 9 to Section 499 of the IPC

make it amply clear that accusation preferred in good faith to

authorised person and imputation made in good faith by person for

protection of his or other’s interest does not amount to defamation. He

CRL.M.C. 4105/2025 Page 6 of 17

submitted that the stance of Respondent No. 2 even at the time when

the quashing was preferred by the petitioner before this Court being

CRL. M.C. 3962/2008 was that the signatures of Respondent No.2

was obtained under misrepresentation. He submitted that the said

stance taken by Respondent No. 2 before this Court cannot be

considered to be defamatory. He submitted that assuming but not

admitting that the case of the petitioner is true, yet Respondent No. 2

had only narrated those statements which were also recorded in the

order dated 30.08.2012 passed by this Court while dismissing the

quashing petition filed by the petitioner being CRL. M.C. 3962/2008.

He submitted that the same cannot be construed to be defamatory. He

consequently submitted that the present petition is liable to be

dismissed.

Analysis

12.In the present case, the petitioner filed the present complaint

alleging that an FIR No. 388/2007 was registered at the instance of

Respondent No.2 in which the petitioner was ultimately acquitted vide

judgment dated 28.02.2019. During the pendency of the trial, the

record would reveal that a purported settlement was entered into

between the parties as a consequence of which the petitioner preferred

a petition seeking quashing of the FIR No. 388/2007 being CRL. M.C.

3962/2008 before this Court in which Respondent No. 2 was also

impleaded. Respondent No.2, in his reply affidavit, stated that he

never intended to execute any alleged deed of settlement and that he

CRL.M.C. 4105/2025 Page 7 of 17

was made to sign the document on misrepresentation from the brother-

in-law of the parties. Considering the same, this Court declined to

quash the FIR and noted that disputed question of fact arose for

determination. Subsequently, post the conclusion of the trial, the

petitioner was acquitted in the said FIR vide judgment dated

28.02.2019 in view of the contradictions in the case of the prosecution.

13.The petitioner thereafter filed the present complaint raising two-

fold arguments: firstly, false complaint was given byRespondent No.

2 which led to registration of FIR against the petitioner (being FIR No.

388/2007) in which the petitioner was ultimately acquitted which

lowered the reputation of the petitioner; secondly, the petitioner

mentioned three specific instances wherein he alleged that his close

family friends casted aspersions on him in relation to forgery of

documents related to deed of settlement.

14.It is the case of the petitioner that during the pendency of the

trial, Respondent No. 2 made statements to certain close friends and

family members of the parties in relation to forgery of the documents.

It is contended that the same lowered the reputation of the petitioner in

the eyes of the close friends and family members. At the time of pre-

summoning evidence, the petitioner examined two witnesses who

were the petitioner’s family friends. The said witnesses deposed that

they met Respondent No. 2 during the year 2017-2018, and they came

to know about the fact that some forged documents were furnished by

the petitioner before this Court. The said witnesses deposed that upon

CRL.M.C. 4105/2025 Page 8 of 17

learning the same, the image of petitioner was lowered in their eyes. It

is the case of the petitioner that due to the said baseless averments of

Respondent No. 2, he had observed a change in behaviour of his

family friends.

15.The learned counsel for the petitioner emphasised that the

learned ASJ, while exercising revisional jurisdiction, was only

required to ascertain whether there was any illegality in the

summoning order and not venture into the defences as enshrined under

Section 499 of the IPC. It was argued that whether the acts of

Respondent No. 2 fell under the exceptions is an exercise that should

not have been resorted to while considering a challenge to the

summoning order as the same was a subject matter of trial. In

arguendo, it was sought to be impressed upon this Court that the acts

of Respondent No. 2 even otherwise amounted to defamation.

16.The chief ground raised on behalf of the petitioner is that the

learned ASJ erred in venturing to consider the defences to defamation

while considering a challenge to the summoning order. It has

voraciously been contended that the learned ASJ, in exercise of

revisional jurisdiction, could not have looked into the exceptions to

Section 499 of the IPC or ascertained good faith on the part of

Respondent No. 2. This Court does not find itself in agreement with

the said argument raised by the petitioner. The learned ASJ while

exercising revisional jurisdiction was not proscribed from considering

the propriety of the summoning order. In doing so, the learned ASJ

CRL.M.C. 4105/2025 Page 9 of 17

was not precluded from considering whether a complete defence to

Section 499 of the IPC was made out from the material on record.

17.In the case of Jawaharlal Darda v. Manoharrao Ganpatrao

Kapsikar : (1998) 4 SCC 112, the learned Magistrate had issued

process against five accused persons who were editors and proprietors

of the newspaper “Daily Lokmath” in relation to a news article

published in the said newspaper. Upon a challenge to the same, the

learned Sessions Court, in exercise of revisional power, had quashed

the process as the Sessions Court was of the opinion that by publishing

the news item, none of the accused had committed any offence.

Thereafter, the order passed by the learned Sessions Court was

challenged by the complainant before the High Court. Subsequently,

the High Court while setting aside the order passed by the learned

Sessions Court noted that when the Magistrate had found a prima

facie case against the accused and deemed it fit to issue process, the

Sessions Court was not correct in setting aside the order in exercise of

revisional power. The Hon’ble Apex Court while restoring the order

passed by the Sessions Court noted as follows:

“5. It is quite apparent that what the accused had published in its

newspaper was an accurate and true report of the proceedings of

the Assembly. Involvement of the respondent was disclosed by the

preliminary enquiry made by the Government. If the accused bona

fide believing the version of the Minister to be true published the

report in good faith it cannot be said that they intended to harm the

reputation of the complainant. It was a report in respect of public

conduct of public servants who were entrusted with public funds

intended to be used for public good. Thus the facts and

circumstances of the case disclose that the news items were

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published for public good. All these aspects have been overlooked

by the High Court.”

18.As is evident from a reading of paragraph 5 of the decision of

the Hon’ble Apex Court in Jawaharlal Darda v. Manoharrao

Ganpatrao Kapsikar (supra) as reproduced supra, the Hon’ble Apex

Court restored the order of the Sessions Court considering that the

accused published the report in good faith.

19.Subsequently, in the case of Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande v.

Uttam : (1999) 3 SCC 134, a challenge was made by the accused

persons therein to the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Bombay High

Court where the High Court concluded that the order of the Magistrate

issuing process was only an interlocutory order and was not amenable

to the jurisdiction of the Sessions Court under Section 397 of the

CrPC. In the said case, the complainant alleged the accused persons

had made a false representation to the Treasury Officer making false

allegations against the complainant that he had come to the office in a

drunken state and had abused the Treasury Officer thereby committing

the offence under Section 500 of the IPC. The Magistrate therein

postponed the issuance of process and called for a report by the

Treasury Officer under Section 202(1) of the CrPC. Upon the receipt

of the report, the Magistrate noted that sufficient material existed for

issuance of process. The Sessions Court thereafter, on a challenge to

the order passed by the Magistrate issuing process, noted that the

Magistrate having directed an enquiry under Section 202 on receipt of

said enquiry report was not justified in discarding the same. Further,

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the Sessions Court considered the enquiry report from the Treasury

Officer and concluded that the case was covered by Exception 8 to

Section 499 of the IPC. The learned Sessions Court further noted that

the issuance of process was an abuse of process and set aside the

order. Upon a challenge to the same, the High Court set aside the

order passed by the Sessions Court noting that the issuance of process

being an interlocutory order, the Sessions Court ought not to have

interfered with the same under Section 397 of the CrPC. The High

Court, however, observed that it would be open for the Magistrate to

recall the issuance of process if satisfied.

The Hon’ble Apex Court, while finding that the order directing

issuance of process is an intermediate or quasi-final order thereby

permitting exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 of the

CrPC, and confirming the order passed by the Sessions Court taking

into account the fact that Exception 8 to Section 499 of the IPC would

be applicable noted as follows:

“7. ……The question for consideration is whether the allegations

in the complaint read with the report of the Magistrate make out

the offence under Section 500 or not. Section 499 of the Penal

Code, 1860 defines the offence of defamation and Section 500

provides the punishment for such offence. Exception 8 to Section

499 clearly indicates that it is not a defamation to prefer in good

faith an accusation against any person to any of those who have

lawful authority over that person with regard to the subject-matter

of accusation. The report of the Treasury Officer clearly indicates

that pursuant to the report made by the accused persons against

the complainant, a departmental enquiry had been initiated and the

complainant was found to be guilty. Under such circumstances the

fact that the accused persons had made a report to the superior

officer of the complainant alleging that he had abused the Treasury

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Officer in a drunken state which is the gravamen of the present

complaint and nothing more, would be covered by Exception 8 to

Section 499 of the Penal Code, 1860. By perusing the allegations

made in the complaint petition, we are also satisfied that no case of

defamation has been made out. In this view of the matter, requiring

the accused persons to face trial or even to approach the

Magistrate afresh for reconsideration of the question of issuance of

process would not be in the interest of justice. On the other hand,

in our considered opinion, this is a fit case for quashing the order

of issuance of process and the proceedings itself. We, therefore, set

aside the impugned order of the High Court and confirm the order

of the learned Sessions Judge and quash the criminal proceeding

itself. This appeal is allowed.”

20.While the decisions in Jawaharlal Darda v. Manoharrao

Ganpatrao Kapsikar (supra) and Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande v.

Uttam (supra) were rendered as per the facts of the cases, recently, the

Hon’ble Apex Court, in the case of Iveco Magirus

Brandschutztechnik GMBH v. Nirmal Kishore Bhartiya : (2024) 2

SCC 86, discussed the aspects to be satisfied at the stage of

summoning and clarified that the Magistrate is not precluded from

considering, at the pre-trial stage, if at all any exceptions to the

offence of defamation are made out from the material on record. The

relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced hereunder:

“60. What the law imposes on the Magistrate as a requirement is

that he is bound to consider only such of the materials that are

brought before him in terms of Sections 200 and 202 as well as any

applicable provision of a statute, and what is imposed as a

restriction by law on him is that he is precluded from considering

any material not brought on the record in a manner permitted by

the legal process. As a logical corollary to the above proposition,

what follows is that the Magistrate while deciding whether to issue

process is entitled to form a view looking into the materials before

him. If, however, such materials themselves disclose a complete

defence under any of the Exceptions, nothing prevents the

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Magistrate upon application of judicial mind to accord the

benefit of such Exception to prevent a frivolous complaint from

triggering an unnecessary trial.

xxx

62. In the context of a complaint of defamation, at the stage the

Magistrate proceeds to issue process, he has to form his opinion

based on the allegations in the complaint and other material

(obtained through the process referred to in Section 200/Section

202) as to whether “sufficient ground for proceeding” exists as

distinguished from “sufficient ground for conviction”, which has

to be left for determination at the trial and not at the stage when

process is issued. Although there is nothing in the law which in

express terms mandates the Magistrate to consider whether any

of the Exceptions to Section 499IPC is attracted, there is no bar

either. After all, what is “excepted” cannot amount to defamation

on the very terms of the provision. We do realise that more often

than not, it would be difficult to form an opinion that an Exception

is attracted at that juncture because neither a complaint for

defamation (which is not a regular phenomenon in the criminal

courts) is likely to be drafted with contents, nor are statements

likely to be made on oath and evidence adduced, giving an escape

route to the accused at the threshold. However, we hasten to

reiterate that it is not the law that the Magistrate is in any

manner precluded from considering if at all any of the

Exceptions is attracted in a given case; the Magistrate is under

no fetter from so considering, more so because being someone

who is legally trained, it is expected that while issuing process he

would have a clear idea of what constitutes defamation. If, in the

unlikely event, the contents of the complaint and the supporting

statements on oath as well as reports of investigation/inquiry

reveal a complete defence under any of the Exceptions to Section

499IPC, the Magistrate, upon due application of judicial mind,

would be justified to dismiss the complaint on such ground and it

would not amount to an act in excess of jurisdiction if such

dismissal has the support of reasons.

xxx

66. …At the stage, when the trial court made the summoning

order, two aspects were required to be satisfied : (1) whether the

uncontroverted allegations as made in the petition of complaint

read with the examination of the complainant, prima facie, tend

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to suggest an offence having been committed, and (2) whether it

is expedient and in the interest of justice to proceed.”

(emphasis supplied)

21.Upon a consideration of the aforementioned, it is clear that the

learned ASJ while exercising revisional jurisdiction was not precluded

from ascertaining whether the uncontroverted allegations made in the

complaint alongwith the examination of the complainant prima facie

suggested that an offence had been committed and if at all it was

expedient in the interest of justice to proceed. Consequently, while

determining whether sufficient grounds existed for proceeding against

Respondent No. 2, Section 499 of the IPC ought to have been read

along with the exceptions that form an integral part of the provision

and categorically lay down the acts that do not amount to defamation.

Consequently, the learned ASJ, was not in excess of jurisdiction while

ascertaining if at all any exceptions were attracted and whether the

case of the petitioner was excepted and if the contents of the complaint

and supporting statements revealed a complete defence under any of

the Exceptions to Section 499 of the IPC.

22.In that light, this Court turns its gaze to the facts of the present

case. From a perusal of the impugned order, in the opinion of this

Court, the learned ASJ rightly took into account the complaint as well

as the other documents on record to ascertain the propriety of the

summoning order. As rightly appreciated by the learned ASJ, the

intention to cause harm is sine qua non to constitute an offence under

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Section 499 of the IPC and the same has to be gathered from a perusal

of the case in its entirety.

23.The case of the petitioner, as noted above, is that Respondent

No. 2 made false allegations in FIR No. 388/2007 and the petitioner

was ultimately acquitted in the said FIR, however, the false allegations

in the said FIR lowered his reputation thereby attracting the offence

under Section 499 of the IPC. As duly appreciated by the learned ASJ,

merely because the petitioner was acquitted does not indicate that the

intention of Respondent No. 2 was malafide. It is apposite to mention

at this juncture that mere acquittal in a criminal proceeding does not

ipso facto lead to the conclusion that the FIR contained false

allegations. At the cost of iterating the axiomatic, in a criminal

proceeding, the prosecution is tasked to prove the allegation beyond

all reasonable doubts. The said standard is onerous and the

prosecution’s failure to meet the said standard could stem from lack of

concrete evidence or gaps in the case of the prosecution and not

necessarily because the allegations per se are false. An acquittal, even

if honourable, does not tantamount to suggest that a false case was

instituted or the accusations were false.

24.In the present case as well, the petitioner was acquitted in the

FIR 388/2007 noting that the prosecution had failed to prove its case

beyond reasonable doubt and not because the allegations levelled by

Respondent No. 2 were patently false.

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25.The other allegation made by the petitioner is that during the

pendency of the trial, Respondent No. 2 made certain statements to the

friends of the petitioner in relation to forgery of documents pertaining

to the deed of settlement which were false and that the same had the

impact of damaging the petitioner’s reputation. As noted above,

during the pre-summoning evidence, two family friends of the

petitioner were examined who deposed that during the year 2017-2018

they came to know that forged documents were furnished by the

petitioner before the High Court. They further deposed that from

Respondent No. 2, they came to know that certain forged documents

were furnished by the petitioner before the High Court and that upon

learning the same, the image of the petitioner fell in their eyes.

26.It is pertinent to note that as per the eighth exception any

accusation preferred in good faith to an authorised person with respect

to the subject matter of accusation does not amount to defamation. As

is evident from a perusal of the record, Respondent No.2 even at the

stage of quashing petition preferred before this Court stated that the

deed of settlement and other documents were forged and fabricated

and that his signatures were obtained under misrepresentation by his

brother-in-law. The lawful authority in the present case would be the

Court, and as noted above, the case of Respondent No. 2 was

consistent on the aspect that his signatures were obtained under

misrepresentation. Even if the case of the petitioner is taken at the

highest that Respondent No. 2 told the petitioner’s friends that certain

forged documents were furnished by the petitioner or that Respondent

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No. 2’s signatures were obtained under misrepresentation, it is

pertinent to note that the same stance was also maintained by

Respondent No. 2 before the Court at the time when quashing petition

being CRL. M.C. 3962/2008 was filed before this Court. The same

squarely falls within Exception 8 to Section 499 of the IPC and does

not amount to defamation.

27. As rightly noted by the learned ASJ, even otherwise, the

petitioner has not made any allegation that would indicate that

Respondent No. 2 made any imputation against the petitioner with the

intention to defame the petitioner. Upon a holistic consideration of the

material in record, this Court does not find any infirmity in the

impugned order and the same cannot be faulted with.

28.For the foregoing reasons, the present petition has to fail and the

same is accordingly dismissed. Pending applications also stand

disposed of.

AMIT MAHAJAN, J

JANUARY 19, 2026/DU