2026 INSC 219 Civil Appeal No. 13581 of 2025 Page 1 of 37

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 13581 OF 2025

ANURAG KRISHNA SINHA …APPELLANT (S)

VERSUS

STATE OF BIHAR & ANR. ...RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

VIKRAM NATH, J.

1. The present appeal challenges the final judgment and

order dated 29

th February 2024 passed by the High

Court of Judicature at Patna in Civil Writ Jurisdiction

Case No.7940 of 2015 whereby the appellant’s writ

petition has been dismissed by the High Court while

upholding the validity of the Srimati Radhika Sinha

Institute and Sachchidanand Sinha Library

(Requisition & Management) Act, 2015

1.

A. Background

2. The case before us concerns the Smt. Radhika Sinha

Institute and Sachchidanand Sinha Library

2, an

institution that has been in existence for nearly a

century. To appreciate the controversy, it is necessary

1

Hereinafter, “The Act”.

2

Hereinafter, “Institute & Library”.

Civil Appeal No. 13581 of 2025 Page 2 of 37

to briefly trace the history of the Institute & Library and

the circumstances in which it was established.

3. The Institute & Library were established in the year

1924 by Shri Sachichidanand Sinha

3, a distinguished

public figure of his time and a prominent son of the

State of Bihar, who served as the first President of the

Constituent Assembly for an interim period. The

Institute & Library was founded in memory of his wife,

Smt. Radhika Sinha. For t his purpose, Shri

Sachichidanand Sinha addressed a letter to the then

Governor of Bihar and Orissa, offering a sum of

₹50,000 from the sale proceeds of ancestral property

belonging to Smt. Radhika Sinha. The offer was

accepted, and the foundation stone was laid on 28

th

March 1922. The construction of the buildings for the

Institute and Library was completed using the said

amount.

4. Shri Sachichidanand Sinha also donated a substantial

collection of books, numbering approximately 10,000

volumes, to the Library. On 9

th February 1924, the

Institute & Library were formally declared open by the

Governor. Dr. Sinha made an oral declaration

constituting a trust, appointed trustees, and assumed

the role of Trustee, Honorary Secretary and Chief

Executive Officer. An additional sum of ₹50,000 was

3

The “Settlor”.

Civil Appeal No. 13581 of 2025 Page 3 of 37

also provided for the maintenance and upkeep of the

institution.

5. A formal Deed of Trust was executed on 10

th March

1926 and signed by all the trustees, including the then

Chief Justice of the Patna High Court as an ex officio

trustee. The Trust Deed provided that the eldest male

member of the family would serve as the Honorary

Secretary and Chief Executive Officer, and further

stipulated that, in the event of failure of the Trust, the

entire trust property would revert to the family

members of the Settlor.

6. The appellant before this Court is the great-grandson

of Shri Sachichidanand Sinha and Smt. Radhika

Sinha, and presently serves as the Trustee, Honorary

Secretary and Chief Executive Officer of the Institute.

7. On 24 November 1955, an agreement was entered into

between the Government of Bihar and the Trust,

whereby the Institute & Library were accorded the

status of a State Central Library. It was expressly

agreed that control and management of the institution

and its property would continue to vest in the trustees,

while the State Government would provide financial

assistance to meet its expenses in accordance with

budgetary allocations.

8. Notably, in 1983, the State Government promulgated

the Smt. Radhika Sinha Institute and Sachichidanand

Sinha Library (Acquisition and Management)

Ordinance, 1983, by which the Trust was sought to be

Civil Appeal No. 13581 of 2025 Page 4 of 37

acquired and vested in the State. This was

communicated to Shri Gopal Krishna Sinha, the then

Honorary Secretary of the Trust and father of the

present appellant, by a letter dated 21 May 1983 issued

by the Education Department. The ordinance was

challenged before the Patna High Court in C.W.J.C.

No.2458 of 1983, wherein an interim stay was granted.

The ordinance was to lapse on 14 August 1983, but a

second ordinance promulgated on 12 August 1983

sought to validate actions taken under the first. The

second ordinance also lapsed thereafter. The High

Court ultimately rejected the writ petition, upholding

the letters and orders vide which the trust stood

acquired by the State and held that despite the

ordinances lapsing, their effect must continue.

However, this Court, in Civil Appeal No.2208 of 1984,

by order dated 20 February 1996, held that the lapsing

of the ordinances rendered all actions thereunder non

est, and allowed the appeal.

9. More than three decades later, the Bihar State

Legislature enacted the impugned Act. The Act was

published in the Bihar Gazette on 6

th May 2015 and

provided for the takeover of the Institute & Library by

the State Government.

10. The appellant challenged the Act by filing C.W.J.C.

No.7940 of 2015 before the Patna High Court. By an

interim order dated 22

nd May 2015, the operation of the

Act was stayed. A special leave petition filed by the

Civil Appeal No. 13581 of 2025 Page 5 of 37

State against the interim order was dismissed by this

Court on 13

th July 2015.

11. The High Court heard the matter and passed the

present impugned order dated 29

th February 2024. The

High Court was of the view that the Trust governing the

Institute & Library was in fact not a private Trust,

observing that the dedication made by the settlor was

in favour of the public of Patna and its neighbourhood

being the general public. Therefore, there is no

application of the Indian Trust Act, 1882

4. The public

interest was found to be clear from the recitals ‘for

better management and development’ in the preamble

of the enactment. It was held that for all purposes, the

Institute & Library was financed by the State

Government and the State Librarian was acting as the

ex-officio Chief Librarian of the Library who was

entrusted with the responsibility of general supervision

of the working and administration of the Institute &

Library subject to the general direction of the Trustees.

12. The High Court ultimately dismissed the writ petition

and upheld the validity of the Act, while observing that

the State Government was obliged to carry on the

objects of the Trust.

13. Aggrieved by the decision of the High Court, the

appellant is before us.

4

Hereinafter, “Trust Act”.

Civil Appeal No. 13581 of 2025 Page 6 of 37

B. Issues

14. The present appeal gives rise to the following issues:

i. Whether the Smt. Radhika Sinha Institute and

Sachchidanand Sinha Library (Requisition &

Management) Act, 2015 is manifestly arbitrary

and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of

India.

ii. Whether the impugned Act effects compulsory

acquisition and extinguishment of rights in a

confiscatory manner, thereby offending Article

300A read with Article 14 of the Constitution of

India.

C. Submissions

I. Appellant’s submissions

15. Learned senior advocate, Mr. Sunil Kumar made the

following submissions:

i. On Legislative Competence: The impugned Act is

an exercise of legislative power by the State

Legislature in respect of a Private Trust which had

the overall control over management and

administration of the said Institute & Library as

defined under Section 2(a) and (b) of the Act.

a) The Deed of Trust, the Deed of Agreement, the

Deed of Lease of Land, the Trust and all its

committees and sub -committees stand

dissolved under Section 4(2) of the Act.

b) The right, title and interest of the Trustees in

the Institute & Library stands transferred to

Civil Appeal No. 13581 of 2025 Page 7 of 37

and vested in the State Government from the

commencement of the said Act under Section 3

thereof.

c) The Trustees including the appellant are put

under a duty to hand over possession of all

assets and furnish complete particulars,

agreements and other instruments of the

Institute & Library to the State Government

under Section 5 and 6 of the said Act.

d) The impugned Act relates to Trust and Trustees

i.e. Entry 10 of List III of the VIIth Schedule to

the Constitution of India, which is a field

occupied by a Federal Legislation, namely, the

Indian Trusts Act,1882. The Preamble of the

Indian Trusts Act makes it abundantly clear

that the object is to codify the law regarding

Trusts and to occupy the entire field of

legislation. Hence, the Trusts Act shall prevail

and the impugned State Act whose subject

matter directly relates to the Trust and its

Trustees would be void under Article 254(1) of

the Constitution of India.

e) The provisions of the impugned Act are in

conflict with the provisions of the Trusts Act.

One cannot be obeyed without disobeying the

other. Therefore, the impugned State Act is

repugnant to the Federal Legislation.

Civil Appeal No. 13581 of 2025 Page 8 of 37

f) In this regard, reliance was placed on Tika

Ramji vs. State of U.P

5

wherein it was

reiterated by this Court in the case of

Innoventive Industries Ltd vs. ICICI Bank

6

that repugnancy may be in three ways – (1)

Where the Federal Legislation expressly or

implicitly evinces its intention to cover the

whole field, (2) even in absence of intention,

where the Federal Legislation and State

Legislation seek to exercise their powers over

the same subject matter, and (c) where there

is a direct conflict between two or more

provisions of the competing Statutes. In any of

these situations, the Federal Legislation

prevails and the State Legislation would be void

to the extent of repugnancy.

ii. On the High Court’s Findings on Legislative

Competency:

a) The High Court decided the question of

repugnancy in paragraph 17 of the impugned

judgment. It acknowledged that the impugned

Act and the Trusts Act, both relate to Entries

in List III of the VIIth Schedule of the

Constitution of India, however, by applying the

doctrine of pith and substance, the High Court

has gone on to hold that the impugned Act

5

AIR 1956 SC 676

6

(2018) 1 SCC 407

Civil Appeal No. 13581 of 2025 Page 9 of 37

“does not even incidentally trench upon the

Indian Trusts Act”.

b) As was held by this Court in Tika Ramji

(supra) and reiterated in the case of

Innoventive Industries (supra), the doctrine

of pith and substance cannot be referred to

while determining questions of repugnancy,

once it is found that both the Federal

Legislation and State Legislation are referable

to the Concurrent list.

c) The impugned Act clearly states in its Preamble

that the aim is for the better management of

the said Institute & Library and one of the

consequences of vesting as contemplated

under Section 4(2) of the Act is that the Trust

would be deemed to be dissolved from the date

of the commencement of the Act. However, the

High Court holds in paragraph 18 of the

impugned order that even if there was

acquisition of the property, as in the present

case, it was for better administration of the

Trust. Further, the High Court holds in

paragraph 36 that the impugned Act was to

vest the Trust and its properties in the State

Government for better functioning and for

furtherance of the objects of the Trust.

d) The impugned Act clearly lays down in Section

3 that what vests is the right, title and interest

Civil Appeal No. 13581 of 2025 Page 10 of 37

of the Institute & Library. The definition of

Trust in Section 3 of the Trusts Act is that it is

an obligation annexed to the ownership of

property, and arising out of a confidence

reposed in and accepted by the owner. The

High Court holds in paragraph 18 of the

impugned judgment that the obligation travels

with the ownership of the property. However,

the High Court omitted to consider that the

obligation has to arise out of a confidence

reposed by the Settlor which cannot be

transferred to anyone. Neither the impugned

Act nor the Trusts Act, even remotely talk

about any obligation dealing with the

acquisition of the property.

e) This Court in In Re: Expeditious Trial of

cases under Section 138 of the N.I.Act,

1881

7 as quoted and followed in Saregama

(India) Ltd vs. Next Radio Ltd.

8 has held that

“…Conferring power on the court by reading

certain words into provisions is impermissible. A

judge must not rewrite a statute, neither to

enlarge nor to contract it. Whatever temptations

the statesmanship of policy-making might

wisely suggest, construction must eschew

interpolation and evisceration. He must not read

7

(2021) 16 SCC 116

8

(2022) 1 SCC 701

Civil Appeal No. 13581 of 2025 Page 11 of 37

in by way of creation. The Judge’s duty is to

interpret and apply the law, not to change it to

meet the Judge’s idea of what justice requires.

The court cannot add words to a statute or read

words into it which are not there.”

iii. On “Public Trust”: the parties before the High

Court were ad idem that the Trust in question was

a Private Trust and arguments were advanced

accordingly.

a) In the impugned judgment, the High Court

records in paragraph 17 that “…The arguments

were addressed on an assumption that the

institution which is a Trust is a private trust

governed by the Indian Trust Act. We have our

own reservations about such assumpt ion,

looking at the deed of Trust authored by the

Settlor…” Thereafter, the High Court went on

to make out a third case that the Trust in

question was a Public Trust.

b) In the present appeal, specific grounds are

raised by the appellant regarding the High

Court dismissing the writ petition on facts and

grounds neither pleaded nor argued before it,

thereby denying the appellant the opportunity

to rebut the same and hence being a nullity in

the eyes of the law as it is impermissible for the

High Court in exercise of its power of judicial

review to make out a case which was not the

Civil Appeal No. 13581 of 2025 Page 12 of 37

stand taken by the State in their Counter

Affidavit, has not been adverted to by the

Respondent-State, much less denied by them.

c) This Court in the case of Bachhaj Nahar vs.

Nilima Mandal

9

has held that when neither

party puts forth a contention, the Court cannot

make out such a case not pleaded, suo moto.

d) In the present case, neither parties pleaded nor

was it argued that the Trust in question was a

Public Trust. In these circumstances, the High

Court could not have made out a third case

that the Trust in question was a Public Trust.

iv. The main point of distinction between a Private

Trust and a Public Trust is; a Private Trust may

fail but a Public Trust does not fail. In the instant

case, the Trust Deed itself visualised that the

Trust may fail and also spelled out the

consequences of such a failing.

v. On the impugned Act being confiscatory and

violative of Article 300A of the Constitution of

India: Section 7 of the impugned Act states that if

any question arises for compensation for the

acquisition, the State Government may pay only

maximin one rupee after examining the claims.

a) Acquisition of property which has devolved

on the appellant by inheritance, without

9

(2008) 17 SCC 491.

Civil Appeal No. 13581 of 2025 Page 13 of 37

payment of just and adequate compensation

renders the impugned Act confiscatory and

violative of Article 300A of the Constitution

of India.

vi. On manifest arbitrariness: for more than a

hundred years, the Trustees, including the

appellant and his ancestors as the Chief

Executive Officer and Secretary, have controlled

and managed the Institute & Library which has

continued to be open, except during the Covid

pandemic, to the public who have been permitted

reasonable use and enjoyment thereof.

a) There was no allegation of any mismanagement

against the Trustees in any correspondence by

the State Government or in the pleadings

before the High Court, or during the course of

arguments before the High Court.

b) The rank arbitrariness of the impugned Act

manifests when one considers the latest Survey

of Libraries in the State of Bihar which shows

that there were 540 public libraries in the State

in the 1960’s, out of which only 51 now survive,

and that too in poor condition.

c) The impugned Act is liable to be invalidated on

the sole ground of violation of Article 14 of the

Constitution of India.

Civil Appeal No. 13581 of 2025 Page 14 of 37

II. Respondent-State of Bihar’s submissions:

16. Learned senior advocate, Mr. Ranjit Kumar made the

following submissions:

i. The impugned Act: The preamble of the Act

expressly notes that its object is to provide for the

acquisition, transfer and better management of

the Act.

ii. As per the petition, the appellant is the legal heir

of the Settlor of the Trust, member-secretary of

the Board of Trustees and its Chief Executive

Officer. The Trust itself has not challenged the

impugned Act. The appellant has no locus or

authority to act on behalf of the Trust.

iii. The Trust is a Public Trust and not a Private

Trust: The appellant has argued before this Court

that the High Court erred by recording a finding

that the Trust is public in nature when the State

did not contest this in its pleadings. However, the

appellant specifically argued before the High

Court that the Trust is a Private Trust governed

by the Trusts Act. In such circumstances, it was

open to the High Court to hold that the appellant’s

contentions were not correct in law and facts. It is

a settled position as held by this Court in Deoki

Nandan vs. Murlidhar

10 and relied upon by the

High Court that whether a Trust is a public or

10

AIR 1957 SC 133

Civil Appeal No. 13581 of 2025 Page 15 of 37

private trust is a mixed question of law and fact.

The factual foundation for the findings of the High

Court were the admitted facts discernible from the

Lease Deed.

iv. The appellant has relied on Clause 12 of the Trust

Deed, i.e, the reversal of property to the Settlor in

the event the Trust fails, to contend that the Trust

is private. However, that contention is without

merit and it is not the appellant’s case that the

Trust has failed. The Trust Deed clearly envisages

the creation of a Public Trust.

v. The appellant’s challenge to legislative

competence is wholly misconceived. Since the

Trust is a Public Trust and Public Trusts are

expressly excluded from the application of the

Trusts Act; consequently, no conflict can arise

between the impugned Act and the Indian Trusts

Act. Even on a contrary assumption, there is no

repugnancy because the Trusts Act governs the

creation, administration, duties, rights and

revocation of trusts but does not regulate or

prohibit the acquisition of trust property by the

State, which is the subject matter of the

impugned Act. A legislation whose pith and

substance is the acquisition of property is

traceable to Entry 42 of List III and the impugned

Act squarely falls within this entry, furnishing an

Civil Appeal No. 13581 of 2025 Page 16 of 37

independent constitutional source of legislative

power.

vi. The proposal for nationalisation of the Institute &

Library arose only due to the persistent and

undeniable failure of the Trust to discharges its

responsibilities, despite substantial aid, support

and oversight extended by the State Government

over several decades. The State Legislature, in the

exercise of its legislative wisdom and in

furtherance of public interest, deemed it

appropriate and necessary to acquire the Institute

& Library and ensure its proper administration,

development and preservation.

vii. The appellant has alleged that the impugned Act

is in contravention of Article 14 of the

Constitution of India. This contention is ex facie

untenable. The Institute & Library constitutes a

class by itself. It is the appellant’s own case that

the Settlor was an instrumental figure in the

State’s history and the Institute & Library embody

his vision and legacy. The State Government is

equally interested in the preservation and

advancement of the legacy of Shri

Sachichidananda Sinha. The impugned Act was

enacted to revitalise the Library, safeguard and

honour the Settlor’s legacy and ensure the

provision of improved facilities to the public. The

Act, therefore, validly singles out the Institute &

Civil Appeal No. 13581 of 2025 Page 17 of 37

Library as a distinct class and the classification

bears a rational nexus to the object sought to be

achieved.

viii. Therefore, the Impugned Act, being

constitutionally sound in its object, scheme and

source of legislative power, warrants no

interference.

D. Analysis

17. Before adverting to the rival submissions, it is

necessary to recall the genesis and founding purpose

of the Institute & Library. The Smt. Radhika Sinha

Institute and Sachchidanand Sinha Library was

conceived not as a commercial or administrative

enterprise, but as a voluntary act of public beneficence

by Shri Sachchidanand Sinha, a distinguished public

figure of his time and a prominent son of the State of

Bihar. Established in the memory of his wife, Smt.

Radhika Sinha, the Institute & Library was founded

through the personal contribution of the Settlor’s

property and his own extensive collection of books, with

the avowed object of promoting learning, scholarship

and public access to knowledge. For nearly a century

thereafter, the Institute & Library has continued to

function in furtherance of this founding vision,

preserving both a cultural legacy and a public

institution of learning. It is this historical context, and

the continuity of purpose with which the Institute &

Civil Appeal No. 13581 of 2025 Page 18 of 37

Library has been managed, that must inform the

constitutional scrutiny of the impugned enactment.

18. Before examining the challenge under Article 14, it is

necessary to briefly address the premise on which the

High Court proceeded, namely the characterisation of

the Trust governing the Institute & Library as a public

trust. The High Court has held that the Trust governing

the Institute & Library is a public trust, relying

primarily on the language used in the Deed of Trust

executed by the Settlor. The Deed records the wish of

Smt. Radhika Sinha to establish an institution for

“providing the public of Patna and its neighbourhood

with a place for intellectual and social intercourse,”

including a library, reading room and facilities for

public meetings. On this basis, the High Court

concluded that the dedication was in favour of the

general public and that the Trust must therefore be

treated as a public trust.

19. In our view, this approach is flawed. The fact that an

institution is intended to serve a public purpose or is

open to public use does not, by itself, conclusively

determine that the trust is a public trust in law. The

legal character of a trust depends on several factors,

including the manner in which the dedication is made,

the structure of the trust, the nature of control and

management, and the rights reserved by the Settlor

and his successors under the trust deed. A public-

facing object, standing alone, is not determinative.

Civil Appeal No. 13581 of 2025 Page 19 of 37

20. Section 3 of the Indian Trusts Act defines a trust as “an

obligation attached to the ownership of property, arising

from a confidence reposed by the Settlor and accepted

by the trustee”. In the present case, Shri

Sachchidanand Sinha clearly reposed such confidence

in identified trustees through a formal Deed of Trust.

The Deed also provided for succession to the office of

Honorary Secretary and Chief Executive Officer, and for

reversion of the trust property in the event of failure of

the Trust. These provisions are material and cannot be

disregarded merely because the Institute & Library was

intended to benefit the public.

21. It is also significant that neither party before the High

Court pleaded or argued that the Trust was a public

trust. The case was argued on the common assumption

that the Trust was a private trust governed by the

Indian Trusts Act. In such circumstances, the High

Court could not have proceeded to decide the case on

an entirely different basis without affording an

opportunity to address that issue.

22. In any event, even if it were assumed that the Trust has

a public character, that fact alone does not legitimise

the State’s action in acquiring the Institute & Library

or dissolving the existing trust arrangements. Whether

the Trust is public or private, any legislative measure

resulting in compulsory acquisition and vesting must

satisfy constitutional requirements, particularly those

flowing from Article 14. The question of public or

Civil Appeal No. 13581 of 2025 Page 20 of 37

private character, therefore, is not determinative of the

validity of the impugned Act.

Issues I & II

23. Article 14 of the Constitution of India mandates that

“the State shall not deny to any person equality before

the law or the equal protection of the laws within the

territory of India.” This guarantee strikes at

arbitrariness in State action and ensures that the

exercise of legislative power is informed by reason,

fairness and non-discrimination. Equality before the

law is not a mere formal concept; it embodies the

principle that State action, whether legislative or

executive, must be based on rational criteria and must

not operate in an arbitrary or capricious manner. From

an early stage, this Court has interpreted this

guarantee not merely as a prohibition against formal

discrimination, but as a constitutional injunction

against arbitrariness in State action. The evolution of

this principle is traceable through a consistent line of

authorities.

24. In S.G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India,

11

a Constitution

Bench of this Court emphasised the centrality of non-

arbitrariness to the rule of law. In paragraph 14 of the

judgment, the Court observed:

“14.In this context it is important to emphasise that the

absence of arbitrary power is the first essential of the rule

of law upon which our whole constitutional system is

11

AIR 1967 SC 1427

Civil Appeal No. 13581 of 2025 Page 21 of 37

based. In a system governed by rule of law, discretion,

when conferred upon executive authorities, must be

confined within clearly defined limits. The rule of law

from this point of view means that decisions should be

made by the application of known principles and rules

and, in general, such decisions should be predictable and

the citizen should know where he is. If a decision is taken

without any principle or without any rule it is

unpredictable and such a decision is the antithesis of a

decision taken in accordance with the rule of law.”

Therefore, this description makes it clear that

arbitrariness is fundamentally incompatible with

constitutional governance, as it replaces reasoned

decision-making with uncertainty and unfettered

discretion. The absence of arbitrary power was thus

recognised as the first essential of the rule of law upon

which the constitutional system rests.

25. In State of Mysore v. S.R. Jayaram,

12 Rule 9(2) of the

Mysore Recruitment of Gazetted Probationers' Rules,

1959 was challenged and struck down by a

Constitution Bench as violative of Article 14 read with

Article 16(1), on the ground that it conferred arbitrary

and uncanalised power on the government without any

guiding principles.

26. A landmark development in this line of jurisprudence

came with E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu ,

13

where arbitrariness was recognised as a distinct and

independent facet of Article 14, alongside unjustness

12

(1968) 1 SCR 349.

13

(1974) 4 SCC 3

Civil Appeal No. 13581 of 2025 Page 22 of 37

and unfairness; establishing three standards against

which State action may be tested when assailed on the

touchstone of Article 14. The Constitution Bench

categorically stated in paragraph 85:

“85 … From a positivistic point of view, equality

is antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact equality and

arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to

the rule of law in a republic while the other, to

the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch.

Where an act is arbitrary, it is implicit in it that

it is unequal both according to political logic and

constitutional law and is therefore violative of

Article 14, and if it effects any matter relating to

public employment, it is also violative of Article 16.

Articles 14 and 16 strike at arbitrariness in State

action and ensure fairness and equality of treatment.

They require that State action must be based on

valid relevant principles applicable alike to all

similarly situate and it must not be guided by any

extraneous or irrelevant considerations because

that would be denial of equality. Where the

operative reason for State action, as

distinguished from motive inducing from the

antechamber of the mind, is not legitimate and

relevant but is extraneous and outside the are a

of permissible considerations, it would amount to

mala fide exercise of power and that is hit by

Articles 14 and 16. Mala fide exercise of power

and arbitrariness are different lethal radiations

emanating from the same vice: in fact the latter

comprehends the former. Both are inhibited by

Articles 14 and 16.”

(emphasis supplied)

27. This ratio was followed by a larger Seven-Judge Bench

in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India ,

14

where the

Court, while testing provisions of the Passports Act,

reaffirmed that equality and arbitrariness are

14

(1978) 1 SCC 248

Civil Appeal No. 13581 of 2025 Page 23 of 37

antithetical, and that Article 14 infuses the

requirement of reasonableness across all State action.

It was observed:

“equality is antithetical to arbitrariness…… Article 14

strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensures

fairness and equality of treatment. The principle of

reasonableness, which legally as well as

philosophically, is an essential element of equality or

non-arbitrariness pervades Article 14 like a brooding

omnipresence and the procedure contemplated by

Article 21 must answer the test of reasonableness in

order to be in conformity with Article 14. It must be

“right and just and fair” and not arbitrary, fanciful or

oppressive; otherwise, it .would be no procedure at all

and the requirement of Article 21 would not be

satisfied.”

28. Thereafter, in Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib

Sehravardi,

15

a Constitution Bench of this Court

affirmed and consolidated the above line of decisions.

In paragraph 16, this Court held:

“16… Wherever therefore there is arbitrariness in State

action whether it be of the legislature or of the executive

or of an ‘authority’ under Article 12, Article 14

immediately springs into action and strikes down such

State action. In fact, the concept of reasonableness and

non-arbitrariness pervades the entire constitutional

scheme and is a golden thread which runs through the

whole of the fabric of the Constitution.”

The significance of Ajay Hasia lies in its explicit clarification

that the doctrine of arbitrariness operates as a check on

legislative action no less than on executive action and that

15

(1981)1 SCC 722.

Civil Appeal No. 13581 of 2025 Page 24 of 37

Article 14 springs into action wherever arbitrariness is

found.

29. In Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Pvt. Ltd. v.

Union of India,

16

the constitutionality of import duty

imposed on newsprint imported from abroad under

sections of the Custom Act, 1962, Customs Tariff Act,

1975 and levy of auxiliary duty under the Finance Act,

1981 as modified by notifications issued under Section

25 of the Customs Act, 1962 was tested. In this

decision, the Court further propounded the test of

manifest arbitrariness. The Court observed:

“75. In India arbitrariness is not a separate ground

since it will come within the embargo of Article 14 of

the Constitution. In India any enquiry into the vires of

delegated legislation must be confined to the grounds

on which plenary legislation may be questioned, to the

ground that it is contrary to the statute under which it

is made, to the ground that it is contrary to other

statutory provisions or that it is so arbitrary that it

could not be said to be in conformity with the

statute or that it offends Article 14 of the

Constitution.”

(emphasis supplied)

30. In K.R. Lakshmanan v. State of Tamil Nadu ,

17

the

Court struck down the Tamil Nadu Act, 1986 on the

ground of arbitrariness, holding that the vice of

arbitrariness was writ large on the face of the statutory

provisions of the said Act.

16

(1985) 1 SCC 641

17

(1996) 2 SCC 226

Civil Appeal No. 13581 of 2025 Page 25 of 37

31. The application of this doctrine to legislative action was

reiterated in A.P. Dairy Development Corporation

Federation v. B. Narasimha Reddy .

18

In paragraph

29, this Court observed:

“29.It is a settled legal proposition that Article 14 of

the Constitution strikes at arbitrariness because an

action that is arbitrary, must necessarily involve

negation of equality. This doctrine of arbitrariness is

not restricted only to executive actions, but also applies

to the legislature. Thus, a party has to satisfy that the

action was reasonable, not done in unreasonable

manner or capriciously or at pleasure without

adequate determining principle, rational, and has been

done according to reason or judgment, and certainly

does not depend on the will alone. However, the action

of the legislature, violative of Article 14 of the

Constitution, should ordinarily be manifestly arbitrary.

There must be a case of substantive unreasonableness

in the statute itself for declaring the act ultra vires

Article 14 of the Constitution.”

32. The doctrine of arbitrariness as a facet of Article 14,

capable of being used to test and strike down

legislation, received its most authoritative affirmation

in Shayara Bano v. Union of India.

19

A Constitution

Bench of this Court held that Triple Talaq was

manifestly arbitrary, and in doing so, brought to rest

any remaining divergence or controversy about

whether manifest arbitrariness is a valid ground to

invalidate legislation. In paragraph 84, the Court

observed:

“84…Arbitrariness in legislation is very much a facet

of unreasonableness in Articles 19(2) to (6), as has

been laid down in several judgements of this

Court…therefore, there is no reason why arbitrariness

18

(2011)9 SCC 286

19

(2017)9 SCC 1

Civil Appeal No. 13581 of 2025 Page 26 of 37

cannot be used in aforesaid sense to strike down

legislation under Article 14 as well”

In paragraph 101, the Court further held:

“101…Manifest arbitrariness, therefore, must be

something done by the legislature capriciously,

irrationally and/or without adequate determining

principle. Also, when something is done which is

excessive and disproportionate, such legislation would

be manifestly arbitrary. We are, therefore, of the view

that arbitrariness in the sense of manifest

arbitrariness as pointed out by us above would apply

to negate legislation as well under Article 14.”

Shayara Bano relied on the Constitution Bench judgments

in Mithu v. State of Punjab

20

and Sunil Batra v. Delhi

Administration

21

, which were both cases where statutes

were struck down on grounds of arbitrariness and

unreasonableness and which drew upon the sustained line

of authority traced above. Significantly, Shayara Bano

(supra) held that State of Andhra Pradesh v. McDowell &

Co.

22

, which had taken the position that arbitrariness is not

a ground on which plenary legislation may be struck down,

to be per incuriam and bad in law, on the ground that it had

failed to consider at least two binding precedents; a

Constitution Bench decision in Ajay Hasia (supra), a three-

Judge decision in K.R. Lakshmanan (supra). Further, it did

not acknowledge another Constitution Bench decision in

Maneka Gandhi (supra).

20

(1983) 2 SCC 277

21

(1978) 4 SCC 494

22

(1996) 3 SCC 709

Civil Appeal No. 13581 of 2025 Page 27 of 37

Hence, it was affirmed that the principle that

arbitrariness is antithetical to equality now operates as a

firm substantive constitutional limitation on legislative

power.

33. Post Shayara Bano (supra), the doctrine was applied

in Joseph Shine v. Union of India ,

23

by a

Constitution Bench of this Court where Section 497 of

the Indian Penal Code, 1860 was challenged and struck

down as being manifestly arbitrary. The relevant

observation reads thus:

“103…What is clear, therefore, is that this archaic law

has long outlived its purpose and does not square with

today's constitutional morality, in that the very object

with which it was made has since become manifestly

arbitrary, having lost its rationale long ago and having

become in today's day and age, utterly irrational. On

this basis alone, the law deserves to be struck down,

for with the passage of time, Article 14 springs into

action and interdicts such law as being

manifestly arbitrary. That legisla tion can be

struck down on the ground of manifest

arbitrariness is no longer open to any doubt, as

had been held by this Court in Shayara Bano v.

Union of India [Shayara Bano v. Union of India,

(2017) 9 SCC 1 : (2017) 4 SCC (Civ) 277].”

(emphasis supplied)

34. Most recently, in Association for Democratic

Reforms v. Union of India ,

24

the validity of the

Electoral Bond Scheme and provisions of the Finance

Act, 2017 were challenged. A Constitution Bench of

this Court held them to be unconstitutional and struck

23

AIR 2018 SC 4898

24

2024 INSC 113

Civil Appeal No. 13581 of 2025 Page 28 of 37

them down, reaffirming that manifest arbitrariness

remains a ground available to Courts to invalidate

legislation under Article 14.

35. It is therefore well settled that manifest arbitrariness is

a ground available to this Court to strike down

legislation under the judicial review of Article 14. It is

acknowledged that this power must be exercised with

care and restraint, so as to maintain the constitutional

balance between the legislature and the judiciary.

However, where clear and substantive

unreasonableness is embedded in a legislative

enactment, the Court is not only empowered but

obliged to intervene.

36. The arc traced through these decisions, from

Jaisinghani (supra) to Shayara Bano (supra) and

beyond, reflects a coherent and settled constitutional

principle being that State action, whether executive or

legislative, must be structured by reason, guided by

discernible and adequate determining principles, and

proportionate in its operation and effect. Arbitrariness,

in whatever form it manifests, whether in the conferral

of uncanalised power, the adoption of excessive means,

the absence of rational nexus, or the imposition of

consequences wholly disproportionate to the stated

object, is antithetical to the constitutional guarantee of

equality and invites the intervention of this Court. A

law which departs from these requirements attracts the

vice of manifest arbitrariness and is liable to be struck

Civil Appeal No. 13581 of 2025 Page 29 of 37

down as violative of Article 14. These are not abstract

propositions; they are the tested and authoritative

foundations on which the present challenge falls to be

adjudicated.

37. Tested against these settled principles, the impugned

Act discloses multiple features of manifest

arbitrariness. While the stated object of the Act is

“better management and development” of the Institute

& Library, the means adopted by the legislature bear

no rational or proportionate nexus to that object.

38. Section 3 of the impugned Act effects a complete

vesting of the Institute & Library, together with all

rights, title and interest therein, in the State

Government. Section 4(2) simultaneously dissolves the

Deed of Trust, the Agreement, the Lease of land, and

all committees and sub -committees constituted

thereunder. The cumulative effect of these provisions is

not regulatory supervision, but total displacement of a

legal and institutional framework that has governed the

Institute & Library for nearly a century.

39. Such a drastic assumption of control represents the

most intrusive form of State intervention. Yet, the

record before this Court discloses no finding of

abandonment, failure of purpose, or established

mismanagement of the Institute & Library. No inquiry

appears to have preceded the enactment. No

contemporaneous material has been placed to

demonstrate that the objectives of the Trust were being

Civil Appeal No. 13581 of 2025 Page 30 of 37

defeated or that lesser measures were inadequate. In

the absence of demonstrated necessity, compulsory

acquisition coupled with dissolution of trust

arrangements is plainly disproportionate.

40. This Court, in the course of hearing the present appeal,

summoned the original records pertaining to the

impugned Act. These records, which included the

correspondence exchanged between the State

Government and the Trust, were produced and

examined by this Court. The examination reveals a

significant and telling gap as there is not a single

communication from the State Government to the

Trust or its Trustees bringing to their notice any

allegation of mismanagement, financial irregularity,

neglect, or failure to discharge the objects of the Trust.

The record contains no correspondence to the effect

that the Institute & Library was non-functional, that its

affairs were being conducted improperly, or that the

funds of the Trust were being misused. Before the

passing of the impugned Act, the State Government

neither intimated the Trust of any such concern, nor

afforded it any opportunity to respond or to take

corrective steps, nor furnished any reasons for the

proposed acquisition. A measure of such sweeping

consequence including complete divestiture of an

institution that has functioned for nearly a century,

cannot rest on assumptions that were never put to the

very persons sought to be displaced. This itself is a

Civil Appeal No. 13581 of 2025 Page 31 of 37

powerful indicator of the arbitrary character of the

legislative action.

41. There is a further circumstance which bears directly on

the State’s claim of mismanagement. Under the

arrangement governing the Institute & Library, the

State Librarian functioned as the ex -officio Chief

Librarian of the Library and was entrusted with the

responsibility of general supervision over its working

and administration, subject to the overall direction of

the Trustees. The day-to-day management of the

Institute & Library thus fell squarely within the domain

of a government-appointed functionary. It necessarily

follows that any mismanagement in the functioning of

the Institute & Library, which the State now invokes as

the justification for a complete legislative takeover,

would, at least in part, have fallen within the

supervisory responsibility of this very official. Yet, the

record does not disclose that any notice was ever issued

to the State Librarian, that any inquiry was ever

initiated against him, or that any action of any kind

was taken in respect of discharge of duties, by the said

official. The State, therefore, is not in a position to rely

on mismanagement as the basis for the acquisition

when it failed to act against its own appointee, who was

charged with the general administration of the very

institution whose management it now seeks to impugn.

This inconsistency further reinforces that the stated

rationale of the Act does not withstand scrutiny.

Civil Appeal No. 13581 of 2025 Page 32 of 37

42. The State has placed on record that, following the

enactment of the impugned Act, a sum of Rs.

72,89,88,640/- (Rupees Seventy-Two Crores Eighty-

Nine Lakhs Eighty-Eight Thousand Six-Hundred and

Forty only) has been sanctioned towards construction,

renovation and infrastructure enhancement of the

Institute & Library, of which an amount of Rs.

16,24,12,840/- (Rupees Sixteen-Crores Twenty-Four

Lakhs Twelve-Thousand Eight-Hundred and Forty

only) has already been released; that dedicated funds

have been sanctioned for the rejuvenation of the

heritage building; that modern technology and digital

tools have been introduced; and that approval has been

granted for the construction of a new multi-storeyed

library building. This Court does not doubt that such

investment reflects a genuine commitment to the

preservation and development of a historically

significant institution. However, the question that this

Court must ask is whether a complete legislative

acquisition of the Institute & Library by dissolving its

Trust, extinguishing long-standing rights, and

displacing a century-old institutional framework, was

a necessary precondition for such investment. The

answer is in the negative. The State is well equipped,

through constitutional and statutory means, to extend

financial assistance to trust institutions and to ensure

that such assistance is applied to its intended purpose,

without resorting to outright acquisition. Grant-in-aid,

Civil Appeal No. 13581 of 2025 Page 33 of 37

conditional funding, statutory audit, and supervisory

oversight are all established mechanisms that serve

this purpose without displacing existing management.

The scale of post-takeover investment does not validate

the takeover; it demonstrates, if anything, that the

State’s objective could have been achieved through far

less drastic means. That the legislature chose the most

extreme measure available, when less invasive

alternatives were plainly at hand, is itself a

manifestation of the arbitrariness that the impugned

Act discloses.

43. As the jurisprudence under Article 14 makes clear,

arbitrariness is not confined to discriminatory

classification. A law which proceeds on unreasoned

assumptions, adopts excessive means, or operates

without adequate determining principle s equally

attracts constitutional censure. The impugned Act, by

extinguishing long-standing rights and arrangements

without cogent justification, departs from the discipline

of reason that Article 14 mandates.

44. The arbitrariness of the statutory scheme is further

aggravated by the compensation provision contained in

Section 7. The provision authorises the State

Government to pay compensation, if any, up to a

maximum of one rupee, after examining claims,

without prescribing any principles, criteria, or

procedural safeguards. Such a scheme vests unguided

Civil Appeal No. 13581 of 2025 Page 34 of 37

discretion in the legislature and reduces compensation

to a nominal and illusory figure.

45. While Article 300A of the Constitution permits

deprivation of property by authority of law, such law

must nevertheless be just, fair and reasonable, and not

arbitrary or confiscatory in effect. A statutory provision

that enables acquisition of property while reducing

compensation to a token amount lacks the basic

attributes of fairness. The confiscatory nature of the

vesting contemplated under the impugned Act

therefore reinforces the conclusion that the enactment

is manifestly arbitrary and fails constitutional scrutiny.

46. The legislative history preceding the impugned

enactment also bears relevance. An earlier attempt by

the State to take over the Institute & Library through

ordinances in 1983 did not pass muster of judicial

scrutiny, and the consequences of those ordinances

were set aside by this Court in 1996 upon their lapse,

restoring the Trust to its prior legal position. The

legislature is, of course, competent to enact a fresh law.

However, the impugned Act, enacted more than three

decades later, seeks to achieve substantially the same

outcome as the failed ordinance of 1983, without any

intervening change in circumstances and without any

fresh material justifying acquisition being placed on

record. The mere passage of time does not supply any

justification. When a legislature re-enacts substantially

the same measure that has previously failed, without

Civil Appeal No. 13581 of 2025 Page 35 of 37

placing any new or cogent material before the Court to

justify the same, the legislative history becomes a

relevant consideration. Viewed in light of this, the

history of this enactment reinforces the findings of

manifest arbitrariness in the impugned Act.

47. It is also material that the impugned Act targets a

single institution for complete takeover, without

disclosing any intelligible basis for such exclusive

treatment. The State’s own material indicates that

several public libraries in the State have ceased to

function or are in a state of disrepair. The selective

application of an extreme legislative measure to a

functioning institution, without objective criteria,

further underscores the absence of a rational and

principled approach.

48. Viewed cumulatively, the scheme of the impugned Act

reveals a pattern of arbitrariness: complete vesting of

property in the State, dissolution of long-standing trust

arrangements, absence of any finding of necessity or

mismanagement, provision for illusory compensation,

and lack of guiding principles or safeguards. Each of

these features, taken individually, raise serious

constitutional concern; taken together, they render the

enactment manifestly arbitrary in its conception and

operation.

49. In light of the settled jurisprudence under Article 14,

as traced in the decisions of this Court referred to

above, the impugned Act cannot be sustained. The

Civil Appeal No. 13581 of 2025 Page 36 of 37

legislation fails the test of reasonableness,

proportionality and non -arbitrariness, and

consequently violates Article 14 of the Constitution of

India. In view of this conclusion, it is unnecessary to

examine the remaining contentions relating to

legislative competence and repugnancy in further

detail.

E. Conclusion

50. The impugned Act authorises the State to take over the

Institute & Library in its entirety, dissolving existing

legal arrangements and divesting long-standing rights,

without any demonstrated necessity, objective criteria,

or prior inquiry. The manner in which this power is

exercised is excessive, unreasoned and

disproportionate to the stated object of “better

management and development”. We are therefore

satisfied that the Srimati Radhika Sinha Institute and

Sachchidanand Sinha Library (Requisition &

Management) Act, 2015 is manifestly arbitrary and

violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

51. Further, the scheme of the Act permits deprivation of

property without adherence to basic requirements of

fairness and due process. The absence of any

principled or meaningful framework for compensation

underscores the arbitrary character of the legislative

measure. While Article 300A permits deprivation of

property by authority of law, such law must be fair,

Civil Appeal No. 13581 of 2025 Page 37 of 37

reasonable and non-confiscatory. The impugned Act

fails to meet this standard.

52. In view of the above, the judgment and order dated

29th February 2024 passed by the High Court of

Judicature at Patna in Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case

No.7940 of 2015 is set aside. The Srimati Radhika

Sinha Institute and Sachchidanand Sinha Library

(Requisition & Management) Act, 2015 is declared

unconstitutional and is accordingly struck down.

53. Accordingly, the Trust governing the Institute &

Library, together with its rights of management and

administration, shall stand restored to its pre-existing

legal position prior to the enactment of the impugned

Act. This shall not preclude the State Government from

providing financial assistance, administrative support

or regulatory oversight in accordance with law.

54. The appeal is accordingly allowed.

55. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

……………………………………….J.

[VIKRAM NATH]

……………………………………….J.

[SANDEEP MEHTA]

NEW DELHI;

MARCH 10, 2026