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2026 INSC 12 1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Criminal Appeal No. of 2026

(@ S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 15478 of 2025)

Arvind Dham … Appellant

Versus

Directorate of Enforcement … Respondent

JUDGMENT

ALOK ARADHE, J.

1. Leave granted

2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order

dated 19.08.2025, passed by learned Single Judge of the

High Court of Delhi, by which the application preferred by

the appellant under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik

Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (‘BNSS’) read with Section 45 of the

Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (‘PMLA’) seeking

grant of regular bail, came to be rejected.

3. The appellant is a former promoter and non-executive

Chairman of Amtek Auto Ltd. (AAL), and is also non-

executive Director of M/s. ACIL Ltd., a company registered

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under the Companies Act. The group of companies including

subsidiaries and associate concerns is collectively referred

to as the “Amtek Group”. During the period 2017-2018,

Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) was initiated

against entities belonging to Amtek Group.

4. FIRs were registered on 21.12.2022 at the instance of IDBI

Bank and Bank of Maharashtra alleging commission of

offences under Sections 120B, 420, 406, 468 of the Indian

Penal Code and Section 13(2) and 13(1)(d) of the Prevention

of Corruption Act, 1988, wherein the appellant was arrayed

as an accused along with twenty seven other individuals. In

the aforementioned FIRs there is an allegation of fraud to

the extent of INR 385.35 crores and INR 289 crores

respectively. On the basis of the said FIRs on 21.03.2023,

the Directorate of Enforcement registered two ECIRs alleging

laundering of proceeds of crime.

5. A Writ Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India,

being W.P. Criminal No(s). 246 of 2022 (Jaskaran Singh

Chawla vs. Union of India and Ors.) was filed before this

Court alleging failure of CBI and the Serious Fraud

Investigation Office (SFIO) to investigate frauds allegedly

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committed by Amtek Group involving diversion and

siphoning of bank loans amounting to Rs.33,400 crores. A

two-Judge Bench of this Court, by an interim order dated

27.02.2024, directed the CBI and SFIO to conduct an

exhaustive investigation and to cooperate with and

complement the Enforcement Directorate in the collection of

evidence.

6. The gravamen of the allegation against the appellant is that

he is the ultimate beneficiary of the fraud which was a well-

orchestrated scheme, executed at his behest, involving

diversion and siphoning of public funds through layered

entities, resulting in substantial wrongful loss to Public

Sector Banks.

7. The appellant, in response to the summons issued to him

under Section 50 of the PMLA, appeared on 19.06.2024 and

his statement was recorded. The respondent carried out

search and seizure operations on 20.06.2024, at the

residence of the appellant and his statement was again

recorded. The appellant was arrested on 09.07.2024. A

prosecution complaint dated 06.09.2024 was filed against

16 accused persons i.e., six individuals and ten companies,

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wherein, appellant was arrayed as an accused. Thereafter a

supplementary prosecution complaint was filed on

02.08.2025 against 40 accused persons i.e., 22 individuals

and 18 companies. Out of 28 individuals, only the appellant

has been arrested and is in custody. A total number of 208

prosecution witnesses have been cited. The cognizance of

prosecution complaint is yet to be taken.

8. On 16.12.2024, the appellant moved an application under

Section 45 of the PMLA for seeking bail before the Special

Judge. The Special Judge by an order dated 21.01.2025

dismissed the application on the ground that the appellant

is not covered by proviso to Section 45 of the PMLA.

Thereafter, on 04.02.2025, the appellant approached the

High Court by filing an application under Section 483 of the

BNNS and Section 45 of PMLA, along with an application for

interim bail. The appellant was granted interim bail on

medical grounds on 11.03.2025 till 01.04.2025. By the

impugned order dated 19.08.2025, the High Court rejected

application for regular bail.

9. Learned senior counsel for the appellant submitted that

appellant is aged about 64 years and suffers from multiple

5

ailments. It is further submitted that appellant is in custody

for past about 16 months and 20 days and his long

incarceration, is violative of the Right to Liberty and speedy

trial under Article 21 of the Constitution. In support of the

aforesaid submission, reliance is placed on decisions of this

Court

1

. It is pointed out that out of 28 individuals only the

appellant has been arrested and investigation qua the

appellant stands concluded. In this connection, reference

has been made to order dated 20.08.2025 passed by the

Special Court which records the submission of the ED. It is,

therefore, contended that the custody of the appellant is no

longer required. It is urged that no cognizance of the

prosecution complaint has been taken and the matter is at

the stage of scrutiny of documents.

10. It is submitted that there is no likelihood of trial

commencing in foreseeable future. It is pointed out that

delay in trial of approximately eight months is attributable

to the respondent, as it had filed Crl. MC No.7860 of 2024

1

Manish Sisodia v. Enforcement Directorate, (2024) 12 SCC 660, Padam Chand Jain v. Enforcement

Directorate, (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1291, Udhaw Singh v. Directorate Enforcement, 2025 SCC OnLine

SC 357, Prem Prakash v. Union of India, SLP (Crl.) No.691 of 2023 – Order dated 04.10.2024,

Dineshchand Surana v. Asst. Director, ED, SLP (Crl.) No.15274 of 2024 – Order dated 06.08.2025,

Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713, Kapil Wadhawan v. CBI, SLP (Crl.) No.16953 of 2025 –

Judgment/Order dated 11.12.2025.

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before the High Court challenging the order dated

07.09.2024 issuing notice to the proposed accused person.

It is pointed out that in the said proceeding, the High Court

had granted an interim order of deferment of proceeding

before the Special Judge and after eight months,

respondent, on 23.05.2025, withdrew the said proceeding.

11. It is urged that the appellant has cooperated with the

investigation and the allegation with regard to influencing

the witness, Ms. Anuradha Kapur, is incredulous as the

appellant has been in custody since 09.07.2024 and

aforesaid Ms. Anuradha Kap ur has been arrayed as a

witness in supplementary prosecution complaint dated

02.08.2025. Therefore, the question of instructing the said

witness not to join the investigation prior to issue of

summons to her does not arise. It is pointed out that all

close family members of the appellant have fully participated

in the investigation. It is contended that the appellant is in

custody since 09.07.2024 and has no knowledge of

dissipation of properties at Panipat and Alwar. It is

submitted that the appellant is not the Director of M/s.

Marichika Properties and, therefore, has no knowledge

7

about dissipation of properties mentioned in the chart at

page 125 of the counter affidavit.

12. It is submitted that the allegations in the predicate offence

allege a total bank fraud to the tune of INR 673.35 crores,

therefore, the figure of INR 38,000 crores is deliberately

exaggerated to project the instant case as India’s largest

bank fraud to justify the prolonged custody of the appellant.

It is urged that it is settled law that economic offences

cannot be classified as separate class on its own for

determination of grant of bail

2

. It is also stated that the

appellant is neither a flight risk nor can he tamper with the

evidence. Therefore, the appellant is entitled to be enlarged

on bail.

13. On the other hand, learned Additional Solicitor General

submitted that the gravity of the offence disentitles the

appellant from seeking any exemption from the mandatory

twin conditions of bail under Section 45 of the PMLA. It is

further submitted that the appellant is an influential person

and had instructed his cousin, Ms. Anuradha Kapur, who is

a dummy director in his group of companies, not to join the

2

P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2020) 13 SCC 791.

8

investigation. It is also submitted that the appellant has

dissipated the proceeds of crime i.e., immovable properties

at Alwar and Panipat after attachment. It is contended that

mere incarceration for a long period cannot be a sole ground

for bail, ignoring the gravity of an offence especially when

there are allegations of tampering with evidence and

influencing witnesses

3

. It is contended that delay in trial, if

any, is attributable to the appellant, which is evident from

the order sheet of the Trial Court. It is further contended

that the proviso to Section 45(1) of the PMLA has no

application to the facts of the case.

14. It is submitted that out of 210 witnesses to be examined

during the trial, 25 witnesses are common in both the

prosecution complaints. It is pointed out that out of 63,691

pages of relied upon documents, only few pages are relevant

to prove the loss. It is further pointed out that ED has filed

an application on 27.09.2025 for day-to-day hearing. It is

submitted that the appeal is liable to be dismissed.

Alternatively, it is also pointed out that in many serious

cases, this Court has directed the parties to re-apply for bail

3

Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528 and B. Rajesh Ranjan Yadav v. CBI, (2007)

1 SCC 70.

9

after sometime

4

and the appellant, depending upon the

progress of the trial, be directed to renew the prayer for bail

after six months.

15. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the rival

submissions and have carefully perused the record. The

court while dealing with the prayer for grant of bail has to

consider gravity of offence, which has to be ascertained in

the facts and circumstances of each case. One of the

circumstances to consider the gravity of offences is also the

term of sentence i.e., prescribed for the offence, the accused

is alleged to have committed

5

. The court has also to take

into account the object of the special Act, the gravity of

offence and the attending circumstances along with period

of sentence. All economic offences cannot be classified into

one group as it may involve various activities and may differ

from one case to another. Therefore, it is not advisable on

the part of the Court to categorize all the offences into one

group and deny bail on that basis

6

. It is well settled that if

the State or any prosecuting agency including, the court,

4

Bimal Kumar Jain v. Directorate of Enforcement, SLP (Crl.) No. 7942/2021.

5

P. Chidambaram (supra)

6

Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI (2022) 10 SCC 51

10

concerned has no wherewithal to provide or protect the

fundamental right of an accused, to have a speedy trial as

enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution, then the

State or any other prosecuting agency should not oppose the

plea for bail on the ground that the crime committed is

serious. Article 21 of the Constitution applies irrespective of

the nature of the crime

7

. The aforesaid proposition was

quoted with approval by another two-Judge Bench of this

Court and it was held that long period of incarceration for

around 17 months and the trial not even having

commenced, the appellant in that case has been deprived of

his right to speedy trial

8

.

16. A two-Judge Bench of this Court in V. Senthil Balaji’s case

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has held that under the statutes such as PMLA, where

maximum sentence is seven years, prolonged incarceration

pending trial may warrant grant of bail by Constitutional

Courts, if there is no likelihood of the trial concluding within

a reasonable time. Statutory restrictions cannot be

permitted to result in indefinite pretrial detention in

violation of Article 21.

7

Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. (2024) 9 SCC 813.

8

Manish Sisodia (supra)

9

V. Senthil Balaji v. Deputy Director, Enforcement Directorate, 2024 SCC OnLine SC2626

11

17. A three Judge Bench of this Court in Padam Chand Jain

(supra), reiterated that prolonged incarceration cannot be

allowed to convert pretrial detention into punishment and

that documentary evidence already seized by the

prosecution eliminates the possibility of tampering with the

same.

18. The right to speedy trial, enshrined under Article 21 of the

Constitution, is not eclipsed by the nature of the offence.

Prolonged incarceration of an undertrial, without

commencement or reasonable progress of trial, cannot be

countenanced, as it has the effect of converting pretrial

detention into form of punishment. Economic offences, by

their very nature, may differ in degree and fact, and

therefore cannot be treated as homogeneous class

warranting a blanket denial of bail.

19. In the backdrop of aforesaid well settled parameters with

regard to exercise of jurisdiction for grant of bail in

economic offences, we now advert to the facts of the case in

hand. The appellant has joined the investigation even prior

to his arrest i.e., 19.06.2024 and 02.07.2024 as well as on

09.07.2024. Thus, he has cooperated with the investigation.

12

Out of 28 individuals, only the appellant has been arrested.

The order dated 20.08.2025 of the Special Court records the

submission of ED that investigation qua the appellant has

concluded. The maximum sentence which can be imposed

on the appellant is seven years. The appellant is in custody

for past around 16 months and 20 days. It is pertinent to

note that various Benches of this Court, while taking into

account the period of incarceration which ranges from 3

months to 17 months in several cases have granted bail to

the appellants therein

10

. In the instant case, no cognizance

has been taken on the prosecution complaint and the

proceeding is at the stage of scrutiny of documents. No

material has been placed on record to show the fate of the

application filed by the ED on 27.09.2025 seeking day-to-

day hearing even after period of approximately three months

has expired. There are 210 witnesses to be examined in the

proceeding. There is no likelihood of trial commencing in the

near future. The continued incarceration in such

10

P. Chidambaram (supra) (three months), Kalvakuntla Kavitha v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024

SCC OnLine SC 2269 (five months), Sanjay Agarwal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2022 SCC OnLine

SC 1748 (ten months), Sanjay Agarwal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1748

(eleven months), Ramkripal Meena v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2276

(thirteen months), Anil Tuteja v. Directorate of Enforcement, SLP (Crl) No.3148 of 2025 (Order dated

15.04.2025), V. Senthil Balaji (supra) (fifteen months), Neeraj Singal v. Directorate of Enforcement,

2024 SCC OnLine SC 3598 (sixteen months), Abdul Razak Peediyakkal v. UOI, 2023 SCC OnLine SC

2326 (seventeen months) and Manish Sisodia (supra) (seventeen months)

13

circumstances, particularly where the evidence which is

primarily documentary in nature, is already in custody of

the prosecution, violates the right of the appellant to speedy

trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

20. As regards the allegation that the appellant instructed Ms.

Anuradha Kapur not to join the investigation, the same does

not inspire confidence, particularly, in view of the fact that

appellant has been in custody prior to concerned witness

being formally arrayed as a witness. It is noteworthy that

the appellant is in custody since 09.07.2024 and Ms. Kapur

was arrayed as a witness only on 02.08.2025. The

allegation, therefore, is wholly incredulous.

21. The record reveals that the prosecution complaint was filed

on 06.09.2024. The Special Judge issued notice on

07.09.2024 to all proposed accused persons under the

proviso to Section 223 of BNSS. The respondent challenged

the said order before the High Court, resulting in eight

months stay of proceedings, before the Special Judge, which

was lifted on 23.05.2025 only upon withdrawal of the

petition. The delay in the trial is thus attributable only to

the respondent, not the appellant.

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22. The appellant has been in custody since 09.07.2024. The

disposal of immovable properties occurred on 24.12.2024

and 17.02.2025 and pertains to M/s Marichika Properties,

with which no material link to the appellant has been

established. There is no evidence that the appellant was

signatory to any sale document. The allegation of dissipation

of proceeds of crime by him is, therefore, untenable at this

stage.

23. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned judgment and

order dated 19.08.2025 is quashed and set aside.

The appellant-Arvind Dham shall be released on bail during

the pendency of the trial arising out of prosecution

complaint-ECIR Case No s. ECIR/GNZO/13/2024 and

ECIR/GNZO/14/2024, pending before the Special Judge

(PC Act) (CBI)-02(Duty Judge), Rouse Avenue District Court,

under provisions of the PMLA. The terms and conditions for

grant of bail shall be fixed by the Trial Court.

24. In addition, the appellant will provide one telephone/mobile

No. on which he can be contacted by the Officers of

Directorate of Enforcement to ascertain his whereabouts

while he is on bail. The appellant shall surrender his

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passport to the Trial Court and will not leave India without

permission of the Trial Court.

25. In the result, the appeal is allowed.

……………………J.

[SANJAY KUMAR]

..………………….J.

[ALOK ARADHE]

NEW DELHI;

JANUARY 6, 2026.

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