2024 INSC 687 1 | P a g e

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Criminal Appeal No. 3816 / 2024

(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 11023 / 2024)

Arvind Kejriwal ….Appellant(s)

versus

Central Bureau of Investigation ….Respondent(s)

WITH

Criminal Appeal No. 3817 / 2024

(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 10991 / 2024)

JUDGEMENT

SURYA KANT, J.

Leave granted.

2. These appeals are directed against the judgements and orders dated

05.08.2024 passed by the High Court of Delhi ( hereinafter, ‘High

Court’), dismissing the Appellant’s challenge to his arrest being illegal as

well as his application for the grant of regular bail. Consequently, the

High Court upheld the legality of the Appellant’s arrest and has

summarily declined to exercise its concurrent jurisdiction under Section

439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ( hereinafter, ‘CrPC’),

thereby denying his prayer for regular bail.

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FACTS:

3. At the very outset, it is essential to advert to the brief factual background

to provide context to the manner in which the present proceedings have

arisen.

3.1. The Appellant is a public representative and has been elected thrice the

Chief Minister of the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi

(hereinafter ‘GNCTD’). He also happens to be the National Convenor of

Aam Aadmi Party, a political party in India.

3.2. Central Bureau of Investigation (hereinafter ‘CBI’) – the Respondent

registered an FIR No. RC0032022A0053 (hereinafter ‘FIR’), on

17.08.2022 under Sections 120B read with Section 477A of the Indian

Penal Code, 1806 (hereinafter ‘IPC’) and Section 7 of the Prevention of

Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter ‘PC Act’) against various persons.

The FIR alleged irregularities, falsification, undue advantage, and a

conspiracy among the persons holding positions of responsibility within

the GNCTD, in framing and implementing the Excise Policy for the year

2021-2022 (hereinafter ‘Excise Policy’). However, the Appellant’s name

did not figure in the FIR.

3.3. On 21.03.2024, the Directorate of Enforcement (hereinafter ‘ED’),

arrested the Appellant in the purported exercise of its power under

Section 19 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 .

Subsequently, this Court granted the Appellant interim bail on

10.05.2024, until 01.06.2024. The Appellant surrendered thereafter

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before the jail authorities on 02.06.2024. We may hasten to add here

that the question of law sought to be raised in the ED matter is presently

pending consideration before a larger bench of this Court and is not

relevant to the present controversy, and its particulars are included

solely to ensure lucidity in the factual matrix.

3.4. The Special Judge vide order dated 20.06.2024 granted the Appellant

regular bail while his bail in the ED matter was pending before this Court

and reserved for judgement. However, the ED swiftly sought the

cancellation of that bail order. The High Court on 21.06.2024 stayed the

operation of that order, as a result of which, the Appellant continued to

remain in jail.

3.5. CBI moved an application on 24.06.2024 before the Special Judge (PC

Act) (hereinafter ‘Trial Court’) under Section 41A of the CrPC, seeking

to interrogate the Appellant, which was thereupon allowed. Having

completed interrogation and examination, the CBI filed an application on

25.06.2024 seeking permission to arrest the Appellant and for the

issuance of production warrants. Thereafter, the Trial Court allowed the

CBI’s application noting that the accused was already in judicial custody

in the ED matter. In the meantime, the High Court conclusively stayed

the order granting regular bail to the Appellant in the ED matter on

25.06.2024 itself.

3.6. Shortly thereafter, on 26.06.2024, the Appellant was produced before the

Trial Court, whereupon he was arrested in the instant CBI case and a

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copy of the arrest memo was handed over to the Appellant’s counsel. On

the same day, on an application moved by the CBI, the Trial Court

remanded the Appellant to police custody for five days. Subsequently, on

29.06.2024, the Trial Court remanded the Appellant to judicial custody

till 12.07.2024. It may be noted that the investigation at that time was

ongoing.

3.7. Both the above stated orders dated 26.06.2024 and 29.06.2024 of the

Trial Court, came to be challenged by the Appellant before the High Court

vide a Writ Petition, inter alia seeking a declaration that his arrest was

illegal. On 02.07.2024, when the Petition was heard, the High Court

issued notice to the CBI and scheduled the matter to be heard on

17.07.2024. In the interregnum, the Appellant also approached the High

Court under Section 439 CrPC, seeking regular bail in connection with

the subject FIR. On 05.07.2024, when the Bail Application came up for

hearing, the High Court issued notice and renotified it to be heard on

17.07.2024, along with the Writ Petition challenging the very arrest of

the Appellant.

3.8. The High Court extensively heard the matter on 17.07.2024 and reserved

judgement in the Writ Petition. The Bail Application was renotified for

further hearing on 29.07.2024, which was also reserved. Finally, on

05.08.2024, the High Court vide the impugned judgement and order

upheld the arrest of the Appellant by the CBI and congruously denied

him regular bail, with liberty to approach the Trial Court for such relief.

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3.9. As regard to the legality of the Appellant’s arrest, the High Court upheld

the same on the following broad points: (i) The five circumstances

delineated under Section 41(1)(b) of the CrPC apply only to arrests made

without a warrant and does not pertain to arrests made under the aegis

of Section 41(2) of the CrPC, which is an arrest upon the order of a court;

(ii) The arrest was made in accordance with Section 41(2) of the CrPC;

and (iii) The plea of non-compliance with Section 41A of the CrPC was

totally unsubstantiated.

3.10. As regard to the Appellant’s prayer for regular bail, the High Court has

denied the same for the following reasons: (i) The complexity of the facts

and material on record necessitated a more comprehensive

determination of the Appellant’s role in the alleged conspiracy so as to

assess his entitlement to bail; and (ii) The Bail Application had been filed

prior to the chargesheet being submitted, and since the chargesheet has

now been filed before the Trial Court, the Appellant was directed to first

approach the Court of the Sessions Judge.

3.11. Meanwhile, this Court vide order dated 12.07.2024, passed in Criminal

Appeal No. 2493/2024 directed the Appellant’s release on interim bail in

the ED matter.

1

However, the Appellant continues to face incarceration

on account of the proceedings initiated by the CBI.

1 Arvind Kejriwal v. Directorate of Enforcement, Criminal Appeal No. 2493/2024.

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3.12. The instant appeals are therefore restricted to the Appellant ’s

challenges regarding the legality and propriety of his arrest by the CBI

and his prayer for release on regular bail in connection with the

proceedings initiated by the CBI via the subject FIR.

CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES

4. Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, Learned Senior Counsel representing the

Appellant, argued first and foremost that the Appellant had been arrested

illegally, in violation of the procedure enumerated in Sections 41(1) and

41A of the CrPC. In this vein, he assailed that the Appellant was arrested

without giving any reasons, thus violating the: (i) precondition of just and

valid reasons for the change of a case from ‘non-arrest’ to ‘arrest’ under

Section 41A (3) of the CrPC; and (ii) the mandatory details that have to

be fulfilled under Section 41(1)(b)(ii), to satisfy that the arrest fell within

the purview of any of the clauses (a) to (e). Considering that none of these

stipulations were complied with, the Appellant’s arrest is fraught with

illegality.

5. Dr. Singhvi drew our attention to the High Court having erred in

misapplying the provision of Section 41(2) of the CrPC to justify the non-

compliances of Section 41(1)(b)(ii) of the CrPC and consequential arrest

of the Appellant. He highlighted that Section 41(2) is attracted only to

non-cognizable offences, whereas the arrest of the Appellant was made

in a case of cognizable offence. This was fortified by contending that none

of the applications moved by the CBI seeking remand, sought to invoke

Section 41(2). These violations, Learned Senior Counsel contended, were

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squarely against the dictum of this Court in Arnesh Kumar v. State of

Bihar

2

and a plethora of other subsequent decisions.

6. Dr. Singhvi further argued that the Appellant deserves to be granted bail,

as his continued incarceration is not necessitated, given that the entire

material is in the safe custody of the CBI. He also emphasized that the

Appellant has been granted both interim and regular bail in the ED

matter by this Court, where the conditions are stricter, thus

demonstrating that he would invariably meet the threshold explicated by

the ‘triple test’ in the CBI matter as well: he has no criminal antecedents,

is not a flight risk, and poses no threat of tampering with witnesses or

evidence. He also assailed that the High Court ought not to have

relegated the Appellant to the Trial Court, considering that it exercises

concurrent jurisdiction under Section 439 of the CrPC. This measure, he

underscored, was akin to taking the Appellant back to square one,

leading to a travesty of justice and unwarranted delay in the adjudication

of his bail application.

7. Lastly, Dr. Singhvi drew our attention to the fact that the trial was not

likely to be concluded in the near future, as the FIR was registered on

17.08.2022, with one chargesheet and three supplementary

chargesheets having been filed, 17 accused persons arraigned, as many

as 224 witnesses cited and the physical and digital records running into

lakhs of pages. Further, the fourth supplementary charge sheet was filed

on 29.07.2024, cognizance of which was taken only recently, and which

2 Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2014) 8 SCC 273.

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was yet to be supplied to the Appellant. These reasons, he contended,

irrefutably validated his apprehension of reasonable delay in the

conclusion of trial.

8. Per contra, Mr. S.V. Raju, Learned Additional Solicitor General of India

argued that the arrest of the Appellant had been conducted in due

compliance with the statutory procedure as contemplated in Section

41(1) and 41A of the CrPC. He contended that these provisions do not,

in any manner, mandate a blanket ban on the arrest of an individual,

against whom there is a reasonable suspicion of commission of a

cognizable offence, punishable with imprisonment up to seven years. The

law only stipulates that the investigating authority ought to be satisfied

with the necessity of such an arrest, which has been duly met in the

present case. He strenuously urged that the pre-requisites set out in

Section 41(1)(b)(ii) had been fulfilled as the CBI deemed it imperative to

conduct the custodial interrogation of the Appellant to unearth a larger

conspiracy hatched amongst the accused persons and to establish the

money trail of ill-gotten proceeds.

9. Mr. Raju contended that the requirement of notice under Section 41A of

the CrPC is intended solely to compel the accused to appear before the

investigating authority. Since the accused in the instant case was already

in judicial custody, such notice would have been an empty formality. He

argued that the CBI had obtained permission from the Trial Court, under

whose custody the Appellant was. He supported his contention by

referencing Section 41A (4) of the CrPC, which outlines the procedure for

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situations where an accused fails to comply with a Section 41A notice.

Mr. Raju maintained that, given the Appellant’s incarceration, the

circumstance envisaged under Section 41A (4) becomes inapplicable, and

therefore, the requirement of notice thereunder was not necessary. In

regard to the misgivings on the erroneous application of Section 41(2) of

the CrPC, he explained that the High Court had inadvertently mistyped

the provision and that it ought to be read as Section 41(1)(b)(ii) of the

CrPC instead.

10. While strongly opposing the Appellant’s prayer for bail, Mr. Raju

contended that there was a likelihood of witness intimidation, should the

Appellant be released on bail, resulting in the trial proceedings being

severely derailed. Mr. Raju also alluded to certain instances having

occurred in the context of M/s. Mahadev Liquors of Punjab, thus

pointing to the influence exerted by the Appellant, whose political outfit

is ruling more than one State.

11. Mr. Raju vehemently pressed into aid his preliminary objection to

relegate the Appellant to the Trial Court, who he stressed ought not to

have approached the High Court directly, notwithstanding the

concurrent jurisdiction under Section 439 of the CrPC. He urged that the

Appellant should not be granted any special treatment merely because

of the position of power he holds or his political stature. Mr. Raju

canvassed that the Appellant deserves to be treated like any other

undertrial and, hence, he must firstly approach the Trial Court,

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emphasizing that the High Court's jurisdiction is discretionary and

should be exercised only in rare and exceptional circumstances.

12. According to the Learned ASG, the High Court was correct in refusing to

exercise its jurisdiction because the Appellant had failed to make out an

exceptional case warranting such special scrutiny. Furthermore, Mr.

Raju highlighted a significant anomaly: the Appellant’s failure to annex

the chargesheet while applying for bail. He argued that a crucial aspect

of seeking bail is to demonstrate, based on the material on record, that

no prima facie case exists against the accused. Due to these oversights,

Mr. Raju asserted that the Appellant should first seek relief from the Trial

Court.

13. Lastly, Mr. Raju submitted that since the chargesheet and some

supplementary chargesheets have been filed after the Appellant had

approached the High Court for his enlargement on bail, it is a significant

change in circumstances and therefore, in light of this too the Appellant

should be relegated to the Trial Court. Such relegation would aid in his

bail claim being considered with reference to the nature of evidence

gathered by the CBI and the complicity of the Appellant, if any, as may

be discernible from such evidence.

ISSUES

14. Having considered the material on record and the extensive submissions

made by the parties, the following questions fall for our deliberation:

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i. Whether there was any illegality in the Appellant’s arrest? If so,

whether the Appellant is entitled to be released forthwith, even in

the absence of a formal bail application?

ii. Whether the Appellant, regardless of his lawful arrest, is entitled to

be enlarged on regular bail?

iii. Whether the filing of a chargesheet is a change in circumstances of

such a decisive nature that an accused would be liable to be

relegated to the Trial Court to make out a case for grant of regular

bail?

ANALYSIS

15. We have bestowed our consideration to the rival contentions, along with

the sequence of events that culminated in the Appellant’s arrest. Given

the nature of the issues pending determination, it is essential to address

them each independently and arrive at a definitive conclusion.

A. Whether the procedure undertaken in arresting the Appellant was

illegal?

16. The primary basis for the Appellant's challenge rests on the contention

that the procedure for arrest, as outlined under Sections 41(1)(b)(ii) and

41A of the CrPC, was not complied with. For the purpose of analysing

the legality of the Appellant’s arrest, there are two key aspects which we

propose to examine separately, namely: (i) whether the issuance of a

notice under Section 41A of the CrPC was duly complied with, in the

context of the present factual scenario; and (ii) whether Section

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41(1)(b)(ii) of the CrPC is applicable in the facts and circumstances of

this case.

i. Compliance with Section 41A of the CrPC

17. Section 41A of the CrPC pertains to the issuance of a notice by a police

officer to an individual when their arrest is not warranted under Section

41(1) of the CrPC, but their presence is still required before the

investigating authority. Issuance of a notice under Section 41A(1)

therefore would be imminent, when there is a complaint made, credible

information received or there is a reasonable suspicion of the individual

having committed a cognizable offence. Clause (2) of Section 41A

thereafter, demands that an individual to whom such a notice has been

issued, complies with the same. Section 41A (3) bears out that an

individual who complies and continues to comply with such notice is not

to be arrested in respect of the offence mentioned, unless the police

officer, for reasons to be recorded, deems it necessary to arrest them.

Finally, Section 41A (4) stipulates that if an individual fails to comply

with the notice or refuses to identify themself, the police may arrest such

an individual for the offence recorded in the notice, subject to any orders

passed by a competent court.

18. Given the lucid nature of the language of the provision, it is crucial to

examine the circumstances surrounding the Appellant’s arrest in order

to gauge whether there was due compliance with the procedural

safeguards enshrined within Section 41A. In the present context, since

the Appellant was already in judicial custody at the relevant time in the

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ED case, the CBI filed an application on 24.06.2024 before the Trial

Court under Section 41A of the CrPC, inter alia seeking to interrogate

and examine him. Such examination was allegedly necessitated by new

facts and evidence uncovered by the CBI upon further investigation. The

CBI, vide this application, outlined the reasons prompting such

examination, including the purported irregularities in the framing and

implementation of the Excise Policy, and its manipulation to facilitate the

monopolization and cartelization of wholesale and retail liquor trade in

India.

19. The application also alleged that, upon further investigation, statements

from several witnesses, incriminating documents and messages

exchanged between the accused persons named in the chargesheets,

revealed that the Appellant was a critical component in the criminal

conspiracy related to the Excise Policy. It was claimed that the Appellant,

in connivance with the other accused persons, engaged in tweaking the

policy to enhance the profit margin of wholesalers from 5% to 12%,

resulting in significant windfall gains. These gains were ultimately

alleged to have been utilised by the Appellant’s political party towards

election related expenses, during the 2021-22 Goa Assembly elections.

The application highlighted that the emergence of these new facts,

pointing toward the Appellant’s complicity, required further examination,

as there was reasonable suspicion of his involvement in the commission

of the offence. Upon considering these reasons, the Trial Court, by its

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order dated 24.06.2024, allowed the CBI’s application seeking to

interrogate the Appellant.

20. At this juncture, it is pertinent to first address the Appellant’s allegations

regarding the CBI’s non-compliance with Section 41A of the CrPC,

particularly concerning the issuance of notice or lack thereof. In this

regard, it is crucial to draw reference to the language and intent of the

provision, which aims to ensure an individual’s appearance through the

issuance of a notice. The provision, however, does not outline any

express procedure to be undertaken where the individual in question is

already incarcerated. It is to be remembered that the Court is, in a way,

the guardian of an undertrial, while he is in judicial custody. That being

so, there could possibly be no other way to secure the Appellant’s

physical presence for the purpose of further investigation, except to seek

prior permission of the Trial Court for his interrogation.

21. In fact, given what was contended by the Appellant, it must be explicated

that Section 41A does not envisage or mandate the issuance of a notice

to an individual already in judicial custody. As such a person is already

under the court’s authority, any request to include them in an

investigation in another case must be approved by the competent court.

The CBI has thus followed the procedure which is contemplated in terms

of the intent and purpose of Section 41A CrPC.

22. Contrarily, if the Appellant’s contention is taken to its logical conclusion,

it could lead to detrimental consequences. For instance, serving a notice

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upon an undertrial in jail through the Jail Superintendent, without

informing the court that placed them in judicial custody, would

effectively enable the police to arrest such individuals in a new case

without the court’s knowledge. This could result in a misuse of police

authority and a violation of the Constitutional and procedural rights

afforded to undertrials. Alternatively, when the court’s permission is

sought, it ensures the application of judicial scrutiny to assess whether

custodial interrogation is necessary and, if so, for what duration.

23. In the case in hand, the Trial Court’s approval of the CBI’s application to

interrogate the Appellant should be viewed as satisfying the essential

requirements of Section 41A, as the issuance of a formal notice through

the jail authorities would have had an adverse impact on the rights of

the Appellant. Thus, it is our considered view that the CBI complied with

the procedure encompassed within the framework of Section 41A of the

CrPC.

24. That being said, let us now address the specific contention pertaining to

the alleged violation of Section 41A(3) of the CrPC. The provision

elucidates, at the risk of reiteration, that an individual who complies with

the notice issued under Section 41A should not be arrested, unless the

police officer for reasons recorded, opines that arrest is necessary. The

vital takeaway from this provision is that while compliance with the

notice generally shields an individual from arrest, the police may still

proceed with the arrest if they conclude that it is essential and provide

duly recorded reasons for doing so.

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25. In the present case, following the interrogation, the CBI moved another

application to the Trial Court on 25.06.2024, seeking permission to

arrest the Appellant. The CBI justified the arrest on the grounds that the

Appellant had allegedly given evasive responses during questioning and

that custodial interrogation was necessary to confront him with evidence

and uncover a purported larger conspiracy involving the accused persons

in the implementation of the excise policy. The Trial Court, after

considering these reasons, allowed the CBI's application for the

Appellant's arrest and issued production warrants on the same day.

26. In this respect, our analysis is confined to assessing whether Section

41A(3) was violated, thereby rendering the arrest per se illegal. First, it is

trite law that there is no insurmountable hurdle in the conversion of

judicial custody into police custody by an order of a Magistrate. Thus,

there is no impediment in terms of arresting a person already in custody

for the purposes of investigation, whether for the same offence or for an

altogether different offence.

3

The Appellant’s arrest by the CBI was thus

entirely permissible, in light of the Trial Court’s order dated 25.06.2024.

27. Second, Section 41A(3) allows for arrest, provided the reasons are

recorded, justifying the necessity of such a step, and the police officer is

satisfied that the individual should be arrested. In this context, we have

already noted that the CBI, in their application dated 25.06.2024, clearly

recorded the reasons as to why they deemed the Appellant's arrest

necessary. These reasons were also summarized in the arrest memo

3 Central Bureau of Investigation v. Anupam J. Kulkarni, (1992) 3 SCC 141.

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dated 26.06.2024. It is important to clarify that our current analysis is

limited to verifying whether the CBI followed the correct procedure,

including the recording of sufficient reasons. This issue would not detain

us further, as the reasons as to why the Appellant’s arrest was

necessitated are discernible from the CBI’s application dated

25.06.2024.

28. Third, Section 41A(1), when read with Section 41A(3) CrPC, does not

impose an absolute prohibition on the arrest of an individual against

whom there exists reasonable suspicion of having committed a

cognizable offence punishable with imprisonment up to seven years. This

is evident from the language of the provision itself. Section 41A(3)

explicitly states that an arrest is permissible if the police officer believes

it to be necessary and duly records the reasons for such arrest. This

provision thus essentially carves out an exception to the general rule

under Section 41A, which mandates that an individual whose

appearance is required should not be arrested under Section 41(1) of the

CrPC.

29. Therefore, in view of these considerations, we do not find any merit in

the Appellant's contention that the CBI failed to comply with Section 41A

CrPC, in its true letter and spirit.

ii. Whether Section 41(1)(b)(ii) of the CrPC is applicable?

30. At the outset, it is imperative to clarify that our analysis will be restricted

to the procedure outlined under Section 41(1)(b)(ii) of the CrPC. This is

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because Section 41(1), in its entirety, addresses multiple situations and

complexities regarding the procedure for arrest, which may not be

directly applicable to the intricacies of the present case.

31. In this vein, the language of Section 41(1)(b) postulates as follows:

“41. When police may arrest without warrant. —

(1) Any police officer may without an order from a Magistrate

and without a warrant, arrest any person—

…..

(b) against whom a reasonable complaint has been made, or

credible information has been received, or a reasonable

suspicion exists that he has committed a cognizable offence

punishable with imprisonment for a term which may be less

than seven years or which may extend to seven years whether

with or without fine, if the following conditions are satisfied,

namely:—

(i) the police officer has reason to believe on the basis of such

complaint, information, or suspicion that such person has

committed the said offence;

(ii) the police officer is satisfied that such arrest is necessary—

(a) to prevent such person from committing any further offence;

or

(b) for proper investigation of the offence; or

(c) to prevent such person from causing the evidence of the

offence to disappear or tampering with such evidence in any

manner; or

(d) to prevent such person from making any inducement, threat

or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case

so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court

or to the police officer; or

(e) as unless such person is arrested, his presence in the Court

whenever required cannot be ensured, and the police officer

shall record while making such arrest, his reasons in writing:

Provided that a police officer shall, in all cases where the

arrest of a person is not required under the provisions of this

sub-section, record the reasons in writing for not making the

arrest.

……”

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32. Section 41(1)(b)(ii) of the CrPC clearly stipulates that an arrest under this

provision can be made based on a complaint or credible information that

an individual has committed a cognizable offence punishable with

imprisonment up to seven years, with or without a fine. However, such

an arrest must be conducted subject to the satisfaction of specific

conditions outlined in subsections (a) to (e). The rigors of Section

41(1)(b)(ii) have been extensively examined by this Court in Arnesh

Kumar (supra), where it was observed that:

“7.1. From a plain reading of the aforesaid provision, it is

evident that a person accused of offence punishable with

imprisonment for a term which may be less than seven years

or which may extend to seven years with or without fine,

cannot be arrested by the police officer only on its satisfaction

that such person had committed the offence punishable as

aforesaid. Police officer before arrest, in such cases has to be

further satisfied that such arrest is necessary to prevent such

person from committing any further offence; or for proper

investigation of the case; or to prevent the accused from

causing the evidence of the offence to disappear; or tampering

with such evidence in any manner; or to prevent such person

from making any inducement, threat or promise to a witness

so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court

or the police officer; or unless such accused person is arrested,

his presence in the court whenever required cannot be

ensured. These are the conclusions, which one may reach

based on facts.

7.2. The law mandates the police officer to state the facts and

record the reasons in writing which led him to come to a

conclusion covered by any of the provisions aforesaid, while

making such arrest. Law further requires the police officers to

record the reasons in writing for not making the arrest.

7.3. In pith and core, the police office before arrest must put a

question to himself, why arrest? Is it really required? What

purpose it will serve? What object it will achieve? It is only

after these questions are addressed and one or the other

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conditions as enumerated above is satisfied, the power of

arrest needs to be exercised. In fine, before arrest first the

police officers should have reason to believe on the basis of

information and material that the accused has committed the

offence. Apart from this, the police officer has to be satisfied

further that the arrest is necessary for one or the more

purposes envisaged by sub-clauses (a) to (e) of clause (1) of

Section 41 of Cr.PC.”

33. Given this annotation, while there exists no doubt that the submissions

made by the Appellant in regard to the precepts of Section 41(1)(b) are

sound, the provision is inapplicable to the vicissitudes of the present

factual matrix. Here is a case where the court upon application of judicial

mind accorded its approval to the Appellant’s arrest for which necessary

warrant was issued. There was thus no occasion for the arresting police

officer to form an opinion regarding the existence of valid reasons of

arrest. The competent court having undertaken such a task, the police

officer cannot be expected to sit over the order of the court.

34. Still further, Section 41(1) opens with the expression that ‘any police

officer may arrest without an order from a Magistrate or without a

warrant’. It necessarily means that where a Magistrate has issued an

order, the police officer stands absolved form his statutory obligation of

forming an opinion. Consequently, it becomes apparent that the

variables and conditions ensconced in Section 41(1)(b)(ii) of the CrPC

would cease to apply in the present context, given the order granted by

the Trial Court prior.

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35. Lastly, we are inclined to agree with the explanation given by the Learned

ASG that the reference to Section 41(2) of the CrPC in the High Court's

judgment appears to have been included inadvertently and is a

typographical error. Both parties, during their submissions, have rightly

clarified that Section 41(2) which pertains to the procedure of arrest in

non-cognizable offences, does not apply to the facts and circumstances

here.

36. Having considered the CBI's compliance with Section 41A of the CrPC

and the inapplicability of Section 41(1)(b)(ii) of the CrPC, we are thus of

the view that the Appellant’s arrest does not suffer with any procedural

infirmity. Consequently, the plea regarding non-compliance of these

provisions, merits rejection. Ordered accordingly.

B. Whether the Appellant is entitled to the relief of regular bail?

37. Adverting to the question of granting bail to the Appellant, it may be

noticed that the High Court has viewed that due to the complexity and

web of facts and the material on record, it was crucial to comprehensively

determine the role of the Appellant in the alleged conspiracy and then

only decide his entitlement to bail. The High Court further observed that

considering the charge sheet had been filed before the Trial Court, the

Appellant should first seek relief from that court.

38. The evolution of bail jurisprudence in India underscores that the ‘issue

of bail is one of liberty, justice, public safety and burden of the public

treasury, all of which insist that a developed jurisprudence of bail is

22 | P a g e

integral to a socially sensitised judicial process’.

4

The principle has

further been expanded to establish that the prolonged incarceration of

an accused person, pending trial, amounts to an unjust deprivation of

personal liberty. This Court in Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb has

expanded this principle even in a case under the provisions of the

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (hereinafter ‘UAPA’)

notwithstanding the statutory embargo contained in Section 43-D(5) of

that Act, laying down that the legislative policy against the grant of bail

will melt down where there is no likelihood of trial being completed within

a reasonable time.

5

The courts would invariably bend towards ‘liberty’

with a flexible approach towards an undertrial, save and except when the

release of such person is likely to shatter societal aspirations, derail the

trial or deface the very criminal justice system which is integral to rule

of law.

39. It was submitted during these proceedings that the FIR was registered

on 17.08.2022, and since then, the chargesheet along with four

supplementary chargesheets have been filed. The fourth supplementary

chargesheet was filed as recently as 29.07.2024 and we are informed that

the Trial Court has taken cognizance of the same. Additionally, seventeen

accused persons have been named, 224 individuals have been identified

as witnesses, and extensive documentation, both physical and digital,

4 Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor, (1978) 1 SCC 240.

5 Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, AIR 2021 SC 712.

23 | P a g e

has been submitted. These factors suggest that the completion of the

trial is unlikely to occur in the immediate future.

40. In our considered view, although the procedure for the Appellant’s arrest

meets the requisite criteria for legality and compliance, continued

incarceration for an extended period pending trial would infringe upon

established legal principles and the Appellant’s right to liberty, traceable

to Article 21 of our Constitution. The Appellant has been granted interim

bail by this Court in the ED matter on 10.05.2024 and 12.07.2024,

arising from the same set of facts. Additionally, several co-accused in

both the CBI and ED matters have also been granted bail by the Trial

Court, the High Court, and this Court in separate proceedings.

41. So far as the apprehension of the Appellant influencing the outcome of

the trial is concerned, it seems that all evidence and material relevant to

the CBI’s disposition is already in their possession, negating the

likelihood of tampering by the Appellant. Similarly, given the Appellant’s

position and his roots in the society, there seems to be no valid reason

to entertain the apprehension of his fleeing the country. In any case, in

order to assuage the apprehensions of the CBI, we may impose stricter

bail conditions. As regard to Appellant indulging in influencing

witnesses, it needs no emphasis that in the event of any such instance,

it will amount to misuse of the concession of bail and necessary

consequences will follow.

24 | P a g e

42. Therefore, in the light of these extenuating circumstances and

considering the foregoing analysis, it could be resolved that the Appellant

satisfies the requisite triple conditions for the grant of bail. We order

accordingly.

C. Whether the filing of a chargesheet is a change in circumstances

warranting relegation to the trial court for grant of regular bail?

43. It is true that generally the Trial Court should consider the prayer

seeking bail once the chargesheet is filed, since the material that an

Investigating Authority may have been able to procure w ould

undoubtedly facilitate that court to form a prima facie opinion with

regard to (i) the gravity of offence; (ii) the degree of involvement of the

applicant; (iii) the background and vulnerability of the witnesses; (iv) the

approximate timeline for conclusion of the trial based on the number of

witnesses; and (v) the societal impact of granting or denying bail.

However, there can be no straitjacket formula which enumerates that

every case concerning the consideration of bail should depend upon the

filing of a chargesheet. In fact, each case ought to be assessed on its own

merits, recognizing that no one-size fits all formula exists for determining

bail.

44. An undertrial thus should, ordinarily, first approach the Trial Court for

bail, as this process not only provides the accused an opportunity for

initial relief but also allows the High Court to serve as a secondary

avenue if the Trial Court denies bail for inadequate reasons. This

approach is beneficial for both the accused and the prosecution; if bail

25 | P a g e

is granted without proper consideration, the prosecution too can seek

corrective measures from the High Court.

45. However, superior courts should adhere to this procedural recourse from

the outset. If an accused approaches the High Court directly without first

seeking relief from the Trial Court, it is generally appropriate for the High

Court to redirect them to the Trial Court at the threshold. Nevertheless,

if there are significant delays following notice, it may not be prudent to

relegate the matter to the Trial Court at a later stage. Bail being closely

tied to personal liberty, such claims should be adjudicated promptly on

their merits, rather than oscillating between courts on mere procedural

technicalities.

46. This issue is however, more or less academic in the instant case as the

High Court did not relegate the Appellant to the Trial Court at the

preliminary stage. Since notice was issued and the parties were

apparently heard on merits by the High Court, we do not deem it

necessary at this stage to relegate the Appellant to the Trial Court even

though filing of a chargesheet is a change in the circumstances.

CONCLUSION:

47. We, thus, deem it appropriate to pass the following order:

i. The Criminal Appeal challenging the legality of arrest (arising out of

SLP (Crl.) No. 10991/2024) is, hereby, dismissed.

26 | P a g e

ii. The Criminal Appeal (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 11023/2024) is

allowed and the impugned judgement of the High Court dated

05.08.2024, to that extent is set aside. Consequently,

a. the Appellant is directed to be released on bail in connection

with FIR No. RC0032022A0053/2022 registered by the CBI at

PS CBI, ACB, upon furnishing bail bonds for a sum of Rs.

10,00,000 /- with two sureties of such like amount, to the

satisfaction of the Trial Court;

b. the Appellant shall not make any public comments on the

merits of the CBI case, it being sub judice before the Trial Court.

This condition is necessitated to dissuade a recent tendency of

building a self-serving narrative on public platforms;

c. however, this shall not preclude the Appellant from raising all

his contentions before the Trial Court;

d. the terms and conditions imposed by a coordinate bench of this

Court vide orders dated 10.05.2024 and 12.07.2024 passed in

Criminal Appeal No. 2493/2024, titled Arvind Kejriwal v.

Directorate of Enforcement, are imposed mutatis mutandis

in the present case;

e. the Appellant shall remain present before the Trial Court on

each and every date of hearing, unless granted exemption; and

27 | P a g e

f. the Appellant shall fully cooperate with the Trial Court for

expeditious conclusion of the trial proceedings.

48. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of in the above terms.

49. Ordered accordingly.

………..………………… J.

(SURYA KANT)

NEW DELHI

DATED: 13.09.2024

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.3816 OF 2024

@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 11023 OF 2024

ARVIND KEJRIWAL     APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION          RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.3817 OF 2024

@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) No. 10991 OF 2024

J U D G M E N T

UJJAL BHUYAN, J.

I   have   gone   through   the   draft   judgment   of   my

esteemed senior colleague Justice Surya Kant. I am in complete

agreement with the conclusion and direction of his Lordship that

the   appellant   should   be   released   on   bail.   However,   on   the

necessity and timing of the arrest, I have a definite point of view.

2

Therefore, I deem it appropriate to render a separate opinion on

the point of necessity and timing of the arrest of the appellant

while concurring with the opinion of Justice Surya Kant that the

appellant should be released on bail. 

2. Leave granted. 

3. At the outset, a brief recital of the relevant dates and

the attending facts as borne out from the record may be noted.

3.1. A case was registered by the CBI on 17.08.2022 being

RC No. 0032022A0053 under Section 120B read with Section

477A of IPC and Section 7 of the PC Act. The aforesaid case was

registered on the basis of source information as well as on the

basis of a written complaint received from Shri Praveen Kumar

Rai,  Director,  Ministry   of  Home   Affairs,  Government   of  India

dated   22.07.2022.   This   letter   also   conveyed   complaint   dated

20.07.2022 of Shri Vinay Kumar Saxena, Lieutenant Governor of

the   Government   of   National   Capital   Territory   of   Delhi.   The

complaint   sought   for   enquiry   into   the   irregularities   and

manipulation in the framing and implementation of the excise

policy of the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi

(GNCTD) for the year 2021­22. The precise allegation is that the

3

accused persons had deliberately tweaked and manipulated the

excise policy of 2021­22 which resulted in enhanced profit of the

liquor manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers in lieu of illegal

gratification received by the accused persons from what is called

the “south group” to meet the election related expenses of the

Aam Admi Party at Goa.

3.2. On  14.04.2023,  appellant   received  summons  under

Section   160   Cr.P.C.   from   the   CBI   to   appear   before   it   on

16.04.2023. In compliance thereto, appellant appeared before the

CBI   on   16.04.2023.   According   to   the   appellant,   he   was

questioned by the CBI for about 9 to 10 hours. 

3.3. CBI   filed   a   total   of   four   chargesheets   wherein   17

persons were named as accused. Manish Sisodia and Kavitha

Kalvakuntala were named as accused amongst others. Appellant

Shri Arvind Kejriwal was not named as an accused in the said

chargesheets. The gist of the chargesheets is that the excise

policy in question was a result of criminal conspiracy which was

hatched by a cartel of liquor manufacturers, wholesalers and

retailers   ensuring   undue   gain   to   them   in  lieu  of   pecuniary

4

benefits   to   the   accused   persons.   Such   criminal   conspiracy

resulted in huge loss to the government exchequer.

3.4. Fifth and final chargesheet has been filed by the CBI

on 29.07.2024 wherein appellant has been named as an accused.

4. Directorate of Enforcement or ED recorded ECIR No.

HIU­II/14/2022 on 22.08.2022 under the Prevention of Money

Laundering Act, 2005 (PMLA) on the basis of the offences under

which the CBI case was registered. Thus, the offences under the

CBI case became the predicate offence leading to investigation by

the ED under PMLA. ED filed the first prosecution complaint on

26.11.2022 in respect of which the Special Court took cognizance

on 20.12.2022. ED has since then filed seven supplementary

prosecution complaints. In the last supplementary prosecution

complaint filed on 17.05.2024, appellant has been named as an

accused.

4.1. According to ED, several notices under Section 50 of

PMLA   were   issued   to   the   appellant   for   his   examination   and

recording   of   statement   but   he   failed   to  appear   and   join  the

investigation. However, according to the appellant, the notices

issued under Section 50 were illegal, bad in law and invalid.

5

5. Be that as it may, appellant was arrested by the ED on

21.03.2024.   Appellant   challenged   his   arrest   before   the   High

Court by filing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of

India  read with Section 482  Cr.P.C.  However, the  same  was

dismissed by the High Court on 09.04.2024.

6. It   is   stated   that   the   competent   authority   accorded

permission   under   Section   17A   of   the   PC   Act   on   23.04.2024

whereafter CBI proceeded to investigate the role of the appellant

in the CBI case. However, it is not mentioned as to when such

permission was sought for.

7. In so far arrest of the appellant in the PMLA case is

concerned, appellant carried his challenge from the High Court to

this Court. On 10.05.2024, this Court granted interim bail to the

appellant till 02.06.2024 in Criminal Appeal No. 2493 of 2024 in

view of the ongoing Lok Sabha elections. On completion of the

period of interim bail, appellant surrendered and was taken back

into custody.

8. On 20.06.2024, appellant was granted regular bail by

the learned Special Judge in the ED case. This bail order was

challenged by the ED before the High Court which stayed the bail

6

order on 21.06.2024 on an oral mentioning. A detailed order

staying the bail of the appellant in the ED case was pronounced

by the High Court only on 25.06.2024.

9. CBI   sought   for   custody   of   the   appellant   so   as   to

interrogate him. Application filed by the CBI in this regard under

Section 41A Cr.P.C. was allowed by the learned Special Judge on

24.06.2024.

10. It is stated that CBI interrogated the appellant in Tihar

Jail on 25.06.2024 for 3 hours but according to the CBI, he did

not furnish satisfactory reply to the questions put to him. His

reply was found to be evasive.

11. At around the same time the High Court stayed the

bail of the appellant in the PMLA case, on 25.06.2024 CBI sought

for permission of the learned Special Judge to formally arrest the

appellant in the CBI case. On production of the appellant before

the learned Special Judge on 26.06.2024, appellant was formally

arrested and remanded to CBI custody till 29.06.2024 by the

learned Special Judge. In the arrest memo dated 26.06.2024, CBI

mentioned in column 7 that it had explained the grounds of

7

arrest to the appellant. The grounds of arrest were mentioned as

under:

He is not co­operating with the investigation and

concealing   the   true   facts   even   after   being

confronted with evidences gathered during the

investigation so far and also the facts which are

exclusively in his knowledge and relevant for the

purpose of the investigation to reach to the just

conclusion of the case. He is trying to purposely

derail the investigation. He  may  influence the

witnesses.

11.1. In   the   remand   application,   CBI   mentioned   in

paragraph 17 that appellant was examined/interrogated in Tihar

Jail on 25.06.2024. During his interrogation he remained evasive

and non­cooperative, failing to give satisfactory replies to the

questions put to him regarding his role in the conspiracy. CBI

mentioned as under:

That   Arvind   Kejriwal   was

examined/interrogated   in   Tihar   Jail   on

25.06.2024.   During   his   interrogation,   he

remained evasive and non­cooperative, failing

to   give   satisfactory   replies   to   the   questions

raised to him regarding his role in the matter of

demand of upfront money of Rs. 100 Crores

8

from co­accused persons of South Group, the

acceptance and delivery of the same to Aam

Aadmi Party through his close associate Vijay

Nair   as   well   as   utilization   of   the   ill­gotten

money so received in the Assembly Elections of

Goa   during   the   year   2021­22   to   meet   the

election   related   expenditures   of   Aam   Aadmi

Party. He further gave evasive replies regarding

his role and the role of other co­accused in

respect   of   criminal   conspiracy   hatched.   His

replies   are   contrary   to   the   oral   and

documentary evidence gathered by CBI during

the investigation. He is not disclosing the facts

truthfully,   despite   being   confronted   with   the

incriminating evidence and also concealing the

vital   facts,   which   are   exclusively   in   his

knowledge.   These   facts   are   relevant   for   the

purpose of the investigation to reach to the just

conclusion of the case. 

11.2. On 29.06.2024, learned Special Judge remanded the

appellant to judicial custody till 12.07.2024.

12. Criminal Appeal No. 2493 of 2024 was heard by this

Court in the meanwhile. On 12.07.2024, a detailed judgment was

passed. A bench of two Hon’ble Judges of this Court framed the

9

following three questions of law for consideration by a larger

bench:

(a)Whether   the   “need   and   necessity   to   arrest”   is   a

separate ground to challenge the order of arrest passed

in terms of Section 19(1) of the PML Act?

(b)Whether the “need and necessity to arrest” refers to

the satisfaction of formal parameters to arrest and take

a person into custody, or it relates to other personal

grounds and reasons regarding necessity to arrest a

person   in  the   facts   and   circumstances   of   the   said

case?

(c)If questions (a) and (b) are answered in the affirmative,

what are the parameters and facts that are to be taken

into consideration by the court while examining the

question of “need and necessity to arrest”?

12.1. While   making   the   reference   as   above,   the   bench

observed that right to life and liberty is sacrosanct. Appellant had

suffered   incarceration   of   over   90   days.   The   above   questions

referred to a larger bench would require in depth consideration.

Therefore, appellant was directed to be released on interim bail in

connection with ECIR No. HIU­II/14/2022 dated 22.08.2022 on

the   same   terms   which   were   imposed   earlier   while   granting

temporary bail on 10.05.2024.

10

13. CBI filed its final chargesheet naming the appellant for

the first time as an accused on 29.07.2024.

14. Appellant filed Bail Application No. 2285/2024 before

the High Court under Section 439 of Cr.P.C. seeking regular bail

in the CBI case.  On 05.07.2024, a learned Judge of the High

Court issued notice. Thereafter, arguments were heard on interim

bail on 17.07.2024. However, the case was directed to be listed

again on 29.07.2024 at 03:00 PM. On 29.07.2024, arguments

were heard and the judgment was reserved.

14.1. Seven days thereafter the judgment was delivered on

05.08.2024. Without deciding the bail application on merit, the

High Court disposed of the same giving liberty to the appellant to

approach the Court of Special Judge for regular bail saying that

such a course of action would be more beneficial to the appellant.

15. From the narration of facts as noted above, it is seen

that   CBI   had   registered   its   case   RC   No.   0032022A0053   on

17.08.2022. A total of four chargesheets were filed by CBI in the

case naming 17 persons as accused. Appellant Arvind Kejriwal

was not named as an accused in those chargesheets. 

11

16. In   the   meanwhile,   ED   recorded   ECIR   No.   HIU­

II/14/2022   under   PMLA   on   22.08.2022.   ED   filed   seven

complaints   under   PMLA.   In   none   of   the   above   complaints,

appellant was named as an accused. However, appellant was

arrested by the ED in the PMLA case on 21.03.2024.

17. On 20.06.2024, appellant was granted regular bail by

the learned Special Judge in the ED case. On oral mentioning,

this bail order was stayed by the High Court on 21.06.2024.

18. It was thereafter that CBI sought for custody of the

appellant in the CBI case which was allowed by the learned

Special Judge on 24.06.2024.

19. Finally,   this   Court   granted   interim   bail   to   the

appellant in the PMLA case on 12.07.2024.

20. CBI filed the fifth and final chargesheet in the CBI case

on   29.07.2024   wherein   appellant   has   been   named   as   an

accused.

21. Since appellant’s arrest by the ED, bail granted by the

learned Special Judge and stay of bail by the High Court in the

PMLA   case   are   subject   matter   of   parallel   proceedings   where

appellant has been granted interim bail by this Court, I would

12

refrain from commenting thereon. Therefore, I will confine this

opinion only to two aspects: arrest of the appellant and the

judgment of the High Court. 

Arrest of the appellant by the CBI: necessity and timing

22. In   so   far   arrest   of   the   appellant   by   the   CBI   is

concerned, it raises more questions than it seeks to answer. As

already noted above, CBI case was registered on 17.08.2022. Till

the arrest of the appellant by the ED on 21.03.2024, CBI did not

feel   the   necessity   to   arrest   the   appellant   though   it   had

interrogated him about a year back on 16.04.2023. It appears

that only after the learned Special Judge granted regular bail to

the appellant in the ED case on 20.06.2024 (which was stayed by

the High Court on 21.06.2024 on oral mentioning) that CBI

became active and sought for custody of the appellant which was

granted by the learned Special Judge on 26.06.2024. Even on the

date of his arrest by the CBI on 26.06.2024, appellant was not

named as an accused by the CBI. Only in the last chargesheet

filed by the CBI on 29.07.2024, appellant has been named as an

accused.

13

23. Thus, it is evident that CBI did not feel the need and

necessity to arrest the appellant from 17.08.2022 till 26.06.2024

i.e. for over 22 months. It was only after the learned Special

Judge granted regular bail to the appellant in the ED case that

the  CBI activated its  machinery  and took the appellant  into

custody. Such action on the part of the CBI raises a serious

question mark on the timing of the arrest; rather on the arrest

itself. For 22 months, CBI does not arrest the appellant but after

the learned Special Judge grants regular bail to the appellant in

the ED case, CBI seeks his custody. In the circumstances, a view

may be taken that such an arrest by the CBI was perhaps only to

frustrate the bail granted to the appellant in the ED case.

24. In so far the grounds of arrest are concerned, I am of

the view that those would not satisfy the test of necessity to

justify arrest of the appellant and now that the appellant is

seeking bail post incarceration, those cannot also be the grounds

to deny him bail. The respondent is definitely wrong when it says

that because the appellant was evasive in his reply, because he

was not cooperating with the investigation, therefore, he was

rightly arrested and now should be continued in detention. It

14

cannot be the proposition that only when an accused answers

the questions put to him by the investigation agency in the

manner in which the investigating agency would like the accused

to answer, would mean that the accused is cooperating with the

investigation. Further, the respondent cannot justify arrest and

continued detention citing evasive reply.

25. We   should   not   forget   the   cardinal   principle   under

Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India that no person accused

of an offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

This Court has held that such a protection is available to a

person accused of an offence not merely with respect to the

evidence that may be given in the court in the course of the trial,

but is also available to the accused at a previous stage if an

accusation   has   been   made   against   him   which   might   in   the

normal course result in his prosecution. Thus, the protection is

available to a person against whom a formal accusation has been

made, though the actual trial may not have commenced and if

such  an   accusation   relates   to  the   commission  of  an   offence

which   in   the   normal   course   may   result   in   prosecution.   An

accused has the right to remain silent; he cannot be compelled to

make   inculpatory   statements   against   himself.   No   adverse

15

inference can be drawn from the silence of the accused. If this is

the   position,   then   the   very   grounds   given   for   arrest   of   the

appellant would be wholly untenable. On such grounds, it would

be a travesty of justice to keep the appellant in further detention

in the CBI case, more so, when he has already been granted bail

on   the   same   set   of   allegations   under   the   more   stringent

provisions of PMLA.

26. That apart, the apprehension of tampering with the

evidence or influencing witnesses has already been answered by

this Court in the case of Manish Sisodia in the following manner:

57.    Insofar   as   the   apprehension   given   by   the

learned ASG regarding the possibility of tampering

the evidence is concerned, it is to be noted that the

case   largely   depends   on   documentary   evidence

which   is   already   seized   by   the   prosecution.   As

such, there is no possibility of tampering with the

evidence. Insofar as the concern with regard to

influencing the witnesses is concerned, the said

concern can be addressed by imposing stringent

conditions upon the appellant.  

27. Power to arrest is one thing but the need to arrest is

altogether a different thing. Just because an investigating agency

has the power to arrest, it does not necessarily mean that it

16

should arrest such a person. In Joginder Kumar Vs. State of U.P.

1

,

a three­Judge bench of this Court examined the interplay of

investigation  and   arrest.   Referring  to   the   third   report   of   the

National Police Commission, this Court declared that no arrest

can be made just because it is lawful for police officers to do so.

The existence of the power of arrest is one thing but justification

for the exercise of it is quite another. It was held as under:

20. …….No arrest can be made because it is

lawful   for   the   police   officer   to   do   so.   The

existence of the power to arrest is one thing.

The justification for the exercise of it is quite

another.   The   police   officer   must   be   able   to

justify the arrest apart from his power to do so.

Arrest   and   detention   in   police   lock­up   of   a

person   can   cause   incalculable   harm   to   the

reputation   and   self­esteem   of   a   person.   No

arrest can be made in a routine manner on a

mere   allegation   of   commission   of   an   offence

made against a person. It would be prudent for

a police officer in the interest of protection of

the   constitutional   rights   of   a   citizen   and

perhaps   in   his   own   interest   that   no   arrest

should   be   made   without   a   reasonable

satisfaction reached after some investigation as

1 (1994) 4 SCC 260

17

to   the   genuineness   and   bona   fides   of   a

complaint and a reasonable belief both as to

the person's complicity and even so as to the

need to effect arrest. Denying a person of his

liberty   is   a   serious   matter.   The

recommendations   of   the   Police   Commission

merely reflect the constitutional concomitants

of the fundamental right to personal liberty and

freedom. A person is not liable to arrest merely

on the suspicion of complicity in an offence.

There must be some reasonable justification in

the opinion of the officer effecting the arrest

that   such   arrest   is   necessary   and   justified.

Except in heinous offences, an arrest must be

avoided if a police officer issues notice to person

to attend the Station House and not to leave the

Station without permission would do.

28. In the case of Sidhartha Vashisht alias Manu Sharma

Vs. State (NCT of Delhi)

2

, this Court emphasized that investigation

must be fair and effective. Investigation should be conducted in a

manner so as to draw a just balance between a citizen’s right

under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India and the

expansive power of the police to make investigation. Concept of

fair investigation and fair trial are concomitant to preservation of

2 (2010) 6 SCC 1

18

the fundamental right of the accused under Article 21 of the

Constitution of India.

29. This Court in the case of  Arnesh Kumar Vs. State of

Bihar

3

, while examining the provisions of Sections 41 and 41A

Cr.P.C. observed that arrest brings humiliation, curtails freedom

and cast scars forever. This Court, while emphasizing the need to

sensitize the police against high­handed arrest, deprecated the

attitude to arrest first and then to proceed with the rest. While

emphasizing that police officers should not arrest the accused

unnecessarily   and   that   the   Magistrate   should   not   authorize

detention   casually   and   mechanically,   this   Court   observed   as

follows:

5.         Arrest   brings   humiliation,   curtails

freedom and casts scars forever. Lawmakers

know it so also the police. There is a battle

between the lawmakers and the police and it

seems that the police has not learnt its lesson:

the lesson implicit and embodied in CrPC. It

has not come out of its colonial image despite

six   decades   of   Independence,   it   is   largely

considered as a tool of harassment, oppression

and surely not considered a friend of public.

The need for caution in exercising the drastic

3 (2014) 8 SCC 273

19

power of arrest has been emphasized time and

again by the courts but has not yielded desired

result. Power to arrest greatly contributes to

its   arrogance   so   also   the   failure   of   the

Magistracy to check it. Not only this, the power

of   arrest   is   one   of   the   lucrative   sources   of

police corruption. The attitude to arrest first

and then proceed with the rest is despicable. It

has become a handy tool to the police officers

who lack sensitivity or act with oblique motive.

30. Again in the case of  Mohd. Zubair Vs. State (NCT of

Delhi)

4

, a three­Judge Bench of this Court once again emphasized

that the existence of the power of arrest must be distinguished

from the exercise of the power of arrest. The exercise of the power

of arrest must be pursued sparingly. This Court reiterated the

role of the courts in protecting personal liberty and ensuring that

investigations are not used as a tool of harassment. Referring to

its earlier decision in Arnab Ranjan Goswami Vs. Union of India

5

,

this Court observed that the courts should be alive to both ends

of   the   spectrum:   the   need   to   ensure   proper   enforcement   of

criminal law on the one hand and the need to ensure that the

law does not become a ruse for targeted harassment on the other

4 (2022) SCC Online SC 897

5 (2020) 14 SCC 12

20

hand. Courts must ensure that they continue to remain the first

line of defence against the deprivation of liberty of the citizens.

Deprivation of liberty even for a single day is one day too many.

31. When the CBI did not feel the necessity to arrest the

appellant for 22 long months, I fail to understand the great hurry

and urgency on the part of the CBI to arrest the appellant when

he was on the cusp of release in the ED case. The substantive

charge against the appellant is under Section 477A IPC which

deals with falsification of accounts and if convicted carries a

punishment of imprisonment for a term which may extend to

seven years or with fine or with both. The appellant has also

been charged under Section 7 of the PC Act which deals with

offence   relating   to   a   public   servant   being   bribed.   Here   the

punishment, if convicted, is imprisonment for a term which shall

not be less than three years but which may extend to seven years

and   shall   also   be   liable   to   fine.   Without   entering   into   the

semantics of applicability of Section 41(1)(b)(ii) and Section 41A

Cr.P.C. as explained by this Court in  Arnesh Kumar  (supra),

timing of the arrest of the appellant by the CBI is quite suspect. 

21

32. CBI is a premier investigating agency of the country. It

is in public interest that CBI must not only be above board but

must also be seem to be so. Rule of law, which is a basic feature

of our constitutional republic, mandates that investigation must

be fair, transparent and judicious. This Court has time and again

emphasized that fair investigation is a fundamental right of an

accused person under Articles 20 and 21 of the Constitution of

India. Investigation must not only be fair but must be seem to be

so. Every effort must be made to remove any perception that

investigation was not carried out fairly and that the arrest was

made in a high­handed and biased manner. 

33. In a functional democracy governed by the rule of law,

perception matters. Like Caesar’s wife, an investigating agency

must be above board. Not so long ago, this Court had castigated

the CBI comparing it to a caged parrot. It is imperative that CBI

dispel   the   notion   of   it   being   a   caged   parrot.   Rather,   the

perception should be that of an uncaged parrot.

Impugned order

34. Let me now deal with the impugned judgment and

order of  the  High  Court  whereby the   bail application of  the

22

appellant was disposed of. Appellant had filed Bail Application

No. 2285 of 2024 before the High Court  under Section 439

Cr.P.C. in the CBI case where he was taken into custody on

26.06.2024. On 05.07.2024, a learned Judge of the High Court

issued notice, fixing 17.07.2024 for arguments. On 17.07.2024,

arguments were heard on interim bail; thereafter, the case was

directed to be listed on 29.07.2024 at 03:00 PM. On 29.07.2024,

arguments were heard and the judgment was reserved. Finally,

the   judgment   was   pronounced   on   05.08.2024,   the   relevant

portion of which reads as under: 

5.Though   there   is   no   quarrel   about   the

proposition   that   the   District   Courts   and   this

Court have concurrent jurisdiction, as has been

held in the Judgments relied on behalf of the

appellant, but at the same time it has been held

time and again by the Apex Court that the Party

must first approach the Court of first instance.

6.In the present case, it is more in the benefit

of the appellant, considering the complexity and

the web of the facts and the material on record,

to   comprehensively   determine   the   role   of   the

appellant in this alleged conspiracy to determine

if he is entitled to bail. It may also be noted that

when the Bail Application was filed before this

23

Court,   the   chargesheet   had   not   been   filed.

However, in the changed circumstances, when

the chargesheet has already got filed before the

learned Special Judge, it would be in the benefit

of the appellant, to first approach the Court of

Sessions Judge.

7.In   these   circumstances,   this   Bail

Application is hereby disposed of with the liberty

to the appellant to approach the learned Special

Judge for regular bail.

34.1. After observing that it would be more to the benefit of

the appellant if the appellant approaches the learned Special

Judge first for bail more so when the chargesheet has been filed,

the   High   Court   relegated   the   appellant   to   the   forum   of   the

learned  Special  Judge  though both  the  Court  of  the  Special

Judge and the High Court have concurrent jurisdiction in the

matter.

35. If indeed the High Court thought of remanding the

appellant to the forum of the Court of Special Judge, it could

have done so at the threshold itself. After issuing notice, after

hearing the parties at length and after reserving the judgment for

about a week, the above order was passed by the High Court.

24

Though couched in a language which appears to be in favour of

the   appellant,   in   practical   terms   it   has   only   resulted   in

prolonging the incarceration of the appellant for a far more longer

period impacting his personal liberty. 

36. In   somewhat   similar   circumstances,   this   Court   in

Kanumuri Raghurama Krishnam Raju Vs. State of A.P.

6

,  after

observing that jurisdiction of the trial court as well as of the High

Court under Section 439 Cr.P.C. is concurrent, held that merely

because the High Court was approached by the appellant without

approaching the trial court would not mean that the High Court

could not have considered the bail application of the appellant.

In the facts of that case, this Court opined that the High Court

ought to have considered the bail application of the appellant on

merit and decided the same. However, having regard to the fact

that much time had lapsed since passing of the order of the High

Court   and   there   were   subsequent   medical   reports   of   the

appellant, this Court did not relegate the appellant back to the

High Court but considered the bail application of the appellant

on merit herein itself. This Court held thus:

6 (2021) 13 SCC 822

25

14. The jurisdiction of the trial court as well as

the High Court under Section 439 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973 is concurrent and merely

because the High Court was approached by the

appellant   without   approaching   the   trial   court

would not mean that the High Court could not

have   considered   the   bail   application   of   the

appellant. As such, in our view, the High Court

ought to have considered the bail application of the

appellant   on   merits   and   decided   the   same.

However, since the High Court has not considered

the matter on merits and much water has flown

since the passing of the order of the High Court, as

now there are two medical reports of the appellant,

one by the government hospital on the direction of

the High Court and the other by Army Hospital on

the directions of this Court, we deem it fit and

proper   to   consider   the   bail   application   of   the

appellant on merits.

37. Mr. Raju, learned Additional Solicitor General of India,

while supporting the order of the High Court vehemently argued

that the appellant has to first approach the trial court for bail

though under Section 439 Cr.P.C. both the Special Court and the

High  Court   have   concurrent   jurisdiction.   No  special   privilege

should be shown or granted to the appellant. I am afraid such a

26

submission cannot be accepted. In this regard, I am in respectful

agreement   with   the   view   taken   by   this   Court   in  Kanumuri

Raghurama Krishnam Raju. That apart, when the appellant has

been granted bail under the more stringent provisions of PMLA,

further detention of the appellant by the CBI in respect of the

same predicate offence has become wholly untenable. In such

circumstances, asking the appellant or relegating the appellant

to approach the trial court, then to the High Court and then to

this Court for a fresh round of bail proceedings in the CBI case

after he had already traversed the same route in the PMLA case

would be nothing but a case of procedure triumphing the cause

of justice. In this connection, it would be apt to refer to the

observations of this Court in the case of Manish Sisodia Vs. CBI,

Criminal Appeal No. 3296 of 2024, decided on 09.08.2024:

32. It could thus be seen that this Court had granted

liberty to the appellant to revive his prayer after filing of

the chargesheet. Now, relegating the appellant to again

approach the trial court and thereafter the High Court

and only thereafter this Court, in our view, would be

making him play a game of “Snake and Ladder”. The

trial court and the High Court have already taken a view

and in our view relegating the appellant again to the

trial   court   and   the   High   Court   would   be   an   empty

27

formality. In a matter pertaining to the life and liberty of

a citizen which is one of the most sacrosanct rights

guaranteed  by  the   Constitution,   a  citizen  cannot   be

made to run from pillar to post.

37.1. Manish Sisodia is a co­accused in the same CBI case

and the ED case. His second bail application was rejected by the

trial court on 30.04.2024 after taking about three months’ time

to decide the same. When Sisodia moved the High Court for bail,

the   same   also   came   to   be   rejected   on   21.05.2024.   It   was

thereafter that Manish Sisodia approached this Court in the

second round. In the hearing which took place on 04.06.2024,

the learned Solicitor General for India made a statement before

the   Court   that   investigation   would   be   concluded   and   final

complaint as well as chargesheet would be filed in both the ED

and CBI cases on or before 03.07.2024. On the basis of the above

statement of the learned Solicitor General, this Court disposed of

the two criminal appeals of Shri Manish Sisodia with liberty to

him to revive his prayer afresh after filing of final complaint and

chargesheet. When Shri Sisodia approached this Court for bail

after the complaint and the chargesheet were filed, Mr. Raju

learned Additional Solicitor General of India appearing for the ED

28

as well as the CBI contended that Shri Sisodia should again

approach the trial court for regular bail as in the  interregnum,

the complaint and the chargesheet were filed. Such submission

of Mr. Raju was rejected by this Court. Adverting to the earlier

order  of  this   Court  dated   04.05.2024,   this  Court   in  Manish

Sisodia observed as under:

33.   ……..It   will   be   a   travesty   of   justice   to

construe   that   the   carefully   couched   order

preserving the right of the appellant to revive

his prayer for grant of special leave against the

High Court order, to mean that he should be

relegated all the way down to the trial court.

The memorable adage, that procedure is a hand

maiden   and   not   a   mistress   of   justice   rings

loudly in our ears.

38. This   Court   in  Gudikanti   Narasimhulu   Vs.   Public

Prosecutor

7

, had highlighted that bail is not to be withheld as a

punishment. The requirement as to bail is merely to secure the

attendance of the prisoner at trial. This Court in Manish Sisodia

referred to and relied upon the aforesaid decision and reiterated

the   salutary   principle   that   bail   is   the   rule   and   jail   is   the

exception. This Court has observed that even in straightforward

7 (1978) 1 SCC 240

29

open and shut cases, bail is not being granted by the trial courts

and by the High Courts. It has been held as under:

53. The   Court   further   observed   that,   over   a

period of time, the trial courts and the High Courts

have forgotten a very well­settled principle of law

that bail is not to be withheld as a punishment.

From our experience, we can say that it appears

that the trial courts and the High Courts attempt

to   play   safe   in   matters   of   grant   of   bail.   The

principle   that   bail   is   a   rule   and   refusal   is   an

exception   is,   at   times,   followed   in   breach.   On

account   of   non­grant   of   bail   even   in   straight

forward open and shut cases, this Court is flooded

with huge number of bail petitions thereby adding

to the huge pendency. It is high time that the trial

courts and the High Courts should recognize the

principle that “bail is rule and jail is exception”.

39. Bail jurisprudence is a facet of a civilised criminal

justice system. An accused is innocent until proven guilty by a

competent   court   following   the   due   process.   Hence,   there   is

presumption   of   innocence.   Therefore,   this   Court   has   been

reiterating again and again the salutary principle that bail is the

rule and jail is the exception. As such, the courts at all levels

30

must ensure that the process leading to and including the trial

does not end up becoming the punishment itself. 

40. This Court has emphasized and re­emphasized time

and again that personal liberty is sacrosanct. It is of utmost

importance   that   trial   courts   and   the   High   Courts   remain

adequately alert to the need to protect personal liberty which is a

cherished right under our Constitution.

41. That   being   the   position   and   having   regard   to   the

discussions made above, I am of the unhesitant view that the

belated arrest of the appellant by the CBI is unjustified and the

continued incarceration of the appellant in the CBI case that

followed such arrest has become untenable.

42. In the circumstances, the judgment and order of the

High Court dated 05.08.2024 in W.P.(Crl.) No. 1939 of 2024 is

clarified to the above context while the judgment and order of the

High Court dated 05.08.2024 in Bail Application No. 2285 of

2024 is set aside.

43. Consequently, it is directed that the appellant shall be

released   on   bail   forthwith   in   the   CBI   case   i.e.   RC   No.

0032022A0053 dated 17.08.2022.  In so far bail conditions are

31

concerned, this Court in the ED case i.e. in Criminal Appeal No.

2493 of 2024 has imposed several terms and conditions including

clauses   (b)   and   (c)  vide  the   orders   dated   10.05.2024   and

12.07.2024   which   have   been   incorporated   in   clause   (d)   of

paragraph 47(ii) of the judgment delivered by Justice Surya Kant.

Though I have serious reservations on clauses (b) and (c) which

debars the appellant from entering the office of Chief Minister and

the Delhi Secretariat as well as from signing files, having regard to

judicial   discipline,  I  would  refrain  from   further   expressing  my

views   thereon   at   this   stage   since   those   conditions   have   been

imposed in the separate ED case by a two judge bench of this

Court. 

44. Both the appeals are accordingly disposed of.

  ………………………………J.       

                                                           [UJJAL BHUYAN]

NEW DELHI; 

SEPTEMBER 13, 2024.

1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL No.3816 OF 2024

(Arising out of SLP(Crl.)No.11023/2024)

ARVIND KEJRIWAL … APPELLANT

Versus

CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION … RESPONDENT

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL No.3817 OF 2024

(Arising out of SLP(Crl.)No.10991/2024)

O R D E R

1.Leave granted.

2.In view of the separate order passed by Hon’ble Mr.Justice

Ujjal Bhuyan, however, there being a concurrent opinion that the

appellant is entitled to be released on bail, subject to the terms

and conditions mentioned in para 47 of the order, authored by

Hon’ble Mr.Justice Surya Kant, the Criminal Appeal challenging the

legality of arrest (arising out of SLP(Crl.)No.10991/2024 is

dismissed, the Criminal Appeal arising out of

SLP(Crl.)No.11023/2024 is allowed and while setting aside the

impugned judgment of the High Court dated 05.08.2024, the appellant

is directed to be released on bail, subject to the following terms

and conditions:

a. the Appellant is directed to be released on

bail in connection with FIR No. RC0032022A0053/2022

2

registered by the CBI at PS CBI, ACB, upon furnishing bail

bonds for a sum of Rs. 10,00,000 /- with two sureties of

such like amount, to the satisfaction of the Trial Court;

b. the Appellant shall not make any public

comments on the merits of the CBI case, it being sub judice

before the Trial Court. This condition is necessitated to

dissuade a recent tendency of building a self-serving

narrative on public platforms;

c. however, this shall not preclude the Appellant

from raising all his contentions before the Trial Court;

d. the terms and conditions imposed by a

coordinate bench of this Court vide orders dated

10.05.2024 and 12.07.2024 passed in

Criminal Appeal No. 2493/2024, titled Arvind Kejriwal v.

Directorate of Enforcement , are imposed mutatis mutandis

in the present case;

e. the Appellant shall remain present before the

Trial Court on each and every date of hearing,

unless granted exemption; and

f. the Appellant shall fully cooperate with the

Trial Court for expeditious conclusion of the

trial proceedings.

.........................J.

(SURYA KANT)

.........................J.

(UJJAL BHUYAN)

NEW DELHI

DATED: 13.09.2024