1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.95 OF 2018

Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay …Petitioner

Versus

Union of India & Anr. ...Respondents

J U D G M E N T

A.M. Khanwilkar, J.

1. By this writ petition filed under Article 32 of the

Constitution of India as a Public Interest Litigation, the

petitioner prays for issue of a writ of mandamus or direction

to debar the legislators from practising as an Advocate

(during the period when they are Members of Parliament or

of State Assembly/Council) in the spirit of Part-VI of the Bar

Council of India Rules (for short, ‗the Rules’) or, in the

alternative, declare that Rule 49 of the Rules is arbitrary and

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ultra-vires the Constitution and to permit all public servants

to practise as an advocate. During the pendency of this writ

petition, multiple interlocutory applications have been filed

by different protagonists supporting the relief claimed in the

present writ petition.

2. According to the petitioner, the elected people‘s

representatives take a constitutional oath to serve the people

and are supposed to work full-time for public causes. They

also draw their salary from the consolidated fund. Being

public servants, they cannot be permitted to practise as an

advocate. For, if they are allowed to practice law they would

charge fees from their private clients and, at the same time,

continue to draw salary from the public exchequer, which

will be nothing short of professional misconduct. It is urged

that many legislators are actively practising as advocates

before different courts. In the process, they end up in

misusing their position as Members of Parliament/Members

of the Legislative Assembly/Members of Legislative Council

(for short, ―MP/MLA/MLC‖), as is perceived by the public.

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Further, they invariably make regular appearances on

television and give interviews to media, which also entails in

advertisement. It is urged that legal profession is a noble

full-time profession. Resultantly, the legislators cannot be

allowed to ride two full-time engagements – as an elected

representative and as an Advocate. If they do so, they would

end up becoming casual towards one of the two

engagements and in a given situation be guilty of conflict of

interest amounting to professional misconduct. The

petitioner has given multiple instances to buttress the point

of conflict of interest.

3. It is thus urged that allowing legislators to practice law

will have the potential of permitting them to indulge in

conflict of interest amounting to professional misconduct

since they may appear in matters, in their capacity as

advocates, challenging the wisdom of Parliament/ State

Legislature. It is possible that they may have participated in

the deliberation when the Bill to pass the stated law was

introduced in the Parliament/State Legislature. They may

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either take the same position before the court or even a

completely opposite stand in their role as an Advocate. In

either case, it would be a serious issue of conflict of interest.

4. Reliance has been placed on Rule 49 of the Rules in

particular to contend that there is an express restriction on

advocates to take up other employment. It is also urged that

being an elected people‘s representative, by the very nature

of his/her duty as a law maker and legislator, it is a full-

time engagement, coupled with the fact that the emoluments

paid to them is under The Salary, Allowances and Pension of

Members of Parliament Act, 1954 (for short, ‗the 1954 Act‘).

Similarly, allowances are paid as per the rules framed for

different heads under the 1954 Act (e.g. Travelling and Daily

Allowances Rules, 1957; Housing and Telephone Facilities

Rules, 1956; Medical Facilities Rules, 1959; Allowances for

Journeys Abroad Rules, 1960; Constituency Allowance

Rules, 1986; Advance for the Purchase of Conveyances

Rules, 1986; and Office Expenses Allowance Rules, 1986).

Considering the obligation towards the constituency

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represented by them, the elected people‘s representatives are

obliged to work full-time for the public cause and for which

reason it would be neither feasible nor practicable for them

to perform to the best of their ability as advocates, who are

required to give wholehearted and full-time attention to their

profession. Resultantly, legislators cannot be allowed to

practise as advocates during the relevant period.

5. To buttress the aforementioned arguments, reliance is

placed on the decisions of this Court in M. Karunanidhi Vs.

Union of India and An r.

1, Dr. Haniraj L. Chulani Vs.

Bar Council of Maharashtra & Goa

2, Sushma Suri Vs.

Govt. of National Capital Territory of Delhi & Anr.

3,

Satish Kumar Sharma V s. Bar Council of H.P.

4 and

Madhav M. Bhokarikar V s. Ganesh M. Bhokarikar

(Dead) through LRs.

5

1

(1979) 3 SCC 431

2

(1996) 3 SCC 342

3

(1999) 1 SCC 330

4

(2001) 2 SCC 365

5

(2004) 3 SCC 607

6

6. The petition is opposed on the argument that the

substantive relief claimed by the petitioner, in effect, is to

call upon this Court to impose restrictions on a distinct

class of persons sans a law made in that behalf to practise

before the court as advocates whilst they represent their

constituency as elected people‘s representatives in the

Parliament/Legislative Assembly. It is urged that there can

be no relationship of an employee and employer between the

MP/MLA/MLC and the Government as such, merely because

they receive salary, allowances and pension in terms of the

provisions of the 1954 Act as applicable to the Members of

Parliament or similar enactment applicable to the Members

of Legislative Assembly/Council. The nomenclature of salary

for the amount received by the legislators from the

consolidated fund per se does not create a relationship of

employer and employee between the Government and the

elected people‘s representative. Further, being an elected

people‘s representative, the person is not engaged in trade,

business or profession much less being a full-time salaried

employee of the Government. So understood, the provision

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regarding restriction on other employment, as articulated in

the present form, has no application.

7. In other words, as of now , there is no express

prohibition either under the provisions of the Advocates Act,

1961 or the Rules framed thereunder, including by the Bar

Council of India such as in Part VI, Chapter II of the said

Rules governing restrictions on advocates, in particular

Section VII thereof titled as ‗Section on other Employments‘.

The Bar Council of India has filed its response to this writ

petition and has placed on record minutes of the meeting of

its General Council held on 31

st March, 2018 bearing item

No.1420 of 2018. The Bar Council had appointed a Sub-

Committee to examine the question raised in the present

writ petition. The Sub-Committee was of the considered

opinion that legislators could not be prohibited from

practising law. The said recommendation was eventually

accepted by the General Council of the Bar Council of India

in its meeting convened on 31

st March, 2018.

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8. We have heard Mr. Shekhar Naphade, learned senior

counsel for the petitioner, Mr. K.K. Venugopal, learned

Attorney General for India, Mr. Arvind Verma, Mr. S.R.

Singh, Mr. V. Shekhar and Mr. Sukumar Pattajoshi,

learned senior counsel, Mr. S.N. Bhatt, Mr. Sanjai Kumar

Pathak, Dr. Dinesh Rattan Bhardwaj, Mr. Om Prakash Ajit

Singh Parihar and Mr. M.A. Chinnasamy learned counsel for

the parties.

9. The core issue is: whether legislators can be debarred

from practising as advocates during the period when they

continue to be the Members of Parliament or the State

Assembly/Council? We are not concerned with any other

issue including the issue as to whether, by virtue of such

practice, the concerned elected people‘s representative may

incur disqualification to continue to be a member of the

concerned House on the ground of office of profit or any

other ground resulting in his/her disqualification provided

by the Constitution or any law made by the

Parliament/State Legislature in that regard.

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10. It is indisputable that the Bar Council of India is

bestowed with the function and duty to regulate enrollments

of advocates and the terms and conditions of professional

conduct of advocates. The conditions to be fulfilled for

continuing as advocates, however, must be reasonable

restrictions. The right to practise any profession in that

sense is not an absolute right. At the same time , the

restriction must be expressly stated either in the Advocates

Act, 1961 or the Rules framed thereunder. Chapter IV of the

said Act deals with the right to practise as an advocate.

Section 49 of the said Act empowers the Bar Council of India

to make Rules for discharging its functions under the Act on

matters specified in sub-section (1) (a) to 1(j) therein. The

Bar Council has already framed Rules regarding restrictions

on other employment, in exercise of powers under Sections

16 (3) and 49(1)(g) of the said Act. Section VII in Part VI of

the said Rules deals with the said subject, which reads thus:

―Section VII- Section on other Employments

47. An advocate shall not personally engage in any

business; but he may be a sleeping partner in a firm

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doing business provided that in the opinion of the

appropriate State Bar Council, the nature of the

business is not inconsistent with the dignity of the

profession.

48. An advocate may be Director or Chairman of the

Board of Directors of a Company with or without

any ordinarily sitting free, provided none of his

duties are of an executive character. An advocate

shall not be a Managing Director or a Secretary of

any Company.

49. An advocate shall not be a full-time salaried

employee of any person, government, firm,

corporation or concern, so long as he continues to

practice, and shall, on taking up any such

employment, intimate the fact to the Bar Council on

whose roll his name appears and shall thereu pon

cease to practice as an advocate so long as he

continues in such employment.

[***]

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50. An advocate who has inherited, or succeeded by

survivorship to a family business may continue it,

but may not personally participate in the

management thereof. He may continue to hold a

share with others in any business which has

descended to him by survivorship or inheritance or

by will, provided he does not personally participate

in the management thereof.

51. An advocate may review Parliamentary Bills for a

remuneration, edit legal text books at a salary, do

press-vetting for newspapers, coach pupils for legal

examination, set and examine question papers; and

subject to the rules against advertising and full-time

employment, engage in broadcasting, journalism,

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Paras 2 and 3 deleted by the Bar Council of India, Resolution No.65/2001, dated

22

nd

June, 2001, which read as:

―Nothing in this rule shall apply to a Law Officer of the Central Government of a

State or of any Public Corporation or body constituted by statute who is entitled to

be enrolled under the rules of his State Bar Council made under Section 28 (2) (d)

read with Section 24 (1) (e) of the Act despite his being a full time salaried employee.

Law Officer for the purpose of these Rules means a person who is so designated by

the terms of his appointment and who, by the said terms, if required to act and/or

plead in Courts on behalf of his employer.‖

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lecturing and teaching subjects, both legal and non-

legal.

52. Nothing in these rules shall prevent an advocate

from accepting after obtaining the consent of the

State Bar Council, part-time employment provided

that in the opinion of the State Bar Council, the

nature of the employment does not conflict with his

professional work and is not inconsistent with the

dignity of the profession. This rule shall be subject

to such directives if any as may be issued by the Bar

Council of India from time to time.‖

11. For considering the issue articulated in paragraph 9

hereinabove, the efficacy of Rule 49 may be of some import

and that rule alone has been pressed into service by the

petitioner and interventionists. For, Rule 47 deals with a

situation where the advocate is engaged in business, Rule 48

is attracted when the advocate is a Director or Chairman of

the company, Rule 50 becomes applica ble when the

advocate inherits family business, Rule 51 becomes

applicable when the advocate is engaged in other specified

activities, Rule 52 is applicable when an advocate accepts

part time employment. None of this is applicable to an

elected people‘s representative. The closest provision is Rule

49, namely, when an advocate becomes a full-time salaried

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employee of any person, government, firm, corporation or

concern.

12. Rule 49 came up for consideration before a three-Judge

Bench of this Court in Satish Kumar Sharma (supra). In

that case, the appellant after obtaining L.L.B. degree came to

be appointed as Assistant (Legal) in H.P. State Electricity

Board, which post was later redesignated as ―Law Officer

Grade II‖. Further, the Board permitted the appellant to act

as an advocate on its behalf. The appellant was also enrolled

by the Bar Council as an advocate and was issued a

certificate in that behalf, in furtherance of which he

represented the Board when necessary. The appellant after

some time was posted as ―Under-Secretary (Legal)-cum-Law

Officer‖ on promotion whereupon the Bar Council moved

into action for cancellation of his enrollment. In Paragraph

10 of the said decision, while considering the challenge,

observed thus:

―10. The profession of law is called a noble

profession. It does not remain noble merely by

calling it as such, unless there is a continued,

corresponding and expected performance of a noble

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profession. Its nobility has to be preserved,

protected and promoted. An institution cannot

survive on its name or on its past glory alone. The

glory and greatness of an institution depends on its

continued and meaningful performance with grace

and dignity. The profession of law being noble and

an honourable one, it has to continue its

meaningful, useful and purposeful performance

inspired by and keeping in view the high and rich

traditions consistent with its grace, dignity, utility

and prestige. Hence the provisions of the Act and

the Rules made thereunder i nter alia aimed to

achieve the same ought to be given effect to in their

true letter and spirit to maintain clean and efficient

Bar in the country to serve the cause of justice

which again is a noble one.‖

In paragraphs 19 to 21, the Court went on to examine the

facts of the case under consideration and concluded thus:

―19. It is an admitted position that no rules were

framed by the respondent entitling a Law Officer

appointed as a full-time salaried employee coming

within the meaning of para 3 of Rule 49 to enrol as

an advocate. Such an enrolment has to come from

the rules made under Section 28(2)(d) read with

Section 24(1)(e) of the Act. Hence it necessarily

follows that if there is no rule in this regard, there is

no entitlement. In the absence of express or positive

rule, the appellant could not fit in the exception and

the bar contained in the first paragraph of Rule 49,

was clearly attracted as rightly held by the High

Court. ......

In short and substance we find that the appellant

was/is a full-time salaried employee and his work

was not mainly or exclusively to act or plead in

court. Further, there may be various challenges in

courts of law assailing or relating to the

decisions/actions taken by the appellant himself

such as challenge to issue of statutory regulation,

notification or order; construction of statutory

regulation, statutory orders and notifications, the

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institution/withdrawal of any prosecution or other

legal/quasi-legal proceedings etc. In a given

situation the appellant may be amenable to

disciplinary jurisdiction of his employer and/or to

the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Bar Council.

There could be conflict of duties and interests. In

such an event, the appellant would be in an

embarrassing position to plead and conduct a case

in a court of law. Moreover, mere occasional

appearances in some courts on behalf of the Board

even if they be, in our opinion, could not bring the

appellant within the meaning of ―Law Officer‖ in

terms of para 3 of Rule 49. The decision in Sushma

Suri v. Govt. of National Capital Territory of Delhi in

our view, does not advance the case of the appellant.

That was a case where meaning of expression ―from

the Bar‖ in relation to appointment as District Judge

requiring not less than seven years‘ standing as an

advocate or a pleader came up for consideration.

The word ―advocate‖ in Article 233(2) was held to

include a Law Officer of the Central or State

Government, public corporation or a body corporate

who is enrolled as an advocate under exception to

Rule 49 of Bar Council of India Rules and is

practising before courts for his employee. Para 10 of

the said judgment reads: (SCC pp. 336-37)

―10. Under Rule 49 of the Bar

Council of India Rules, an

advocate shall not be a full-time

employee of any person,

Government, firm, corporation or

concern and on taking up such

employment, shall intimate such

fact to the Bar Council concerned

and shall cease to practise as long

as he is in such employment.

However, an exception is made in

such cases of Law Officers of the

Government and corporate bodies

despite his being a full -time

salaried employee if such Law

Officer is required to act or plead

in court on behalf of others. It is

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only to those who fall into other

categories of employment that the

bar under Rule 49 would apply. An

advocate employed by the

Government or a body corporate as

its Law Officer even on terms of

payment of salary would not cease to

be an advocate in terms of Rule 49 if

the condition is that such advocate is

required to act or plead in courts on

behalf of the employer. The test,

therefore, is not whether such

person is engaged on terms of

salary or by payment of

remuneration, but whether he is

engaged to act or plead on its

behalf in a court of law as an

advocate. In that event the terms

of engagement will not matter at

all. What is of essence is as to what

such Law Officer engaged by the

Government does — whether he acts

or pleads in court on behalf of his

employer or otherwise? If he is not

acting or pleading on behalf of his

employer, then he ceases to be an

advocate. If the terms of engagement

are such that he does not have to act

or plead, but does other kinds of

work, then he becomes a mere

employee of the Government or the

body corporate. Therefore, the Bar

Council of India has understood the

expression ‘advocate’ as one who is

actually practising before courts

which expression would include even

those who are Law Officers appointed

as such by the Government or body

corporate.‖

20. As stated in the above para the test indicated

is whether a person is engaged to act or plead in a

court of law as an advocate and not whether such

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person is engaged on terms of salary or payment

by remuneration. The essence is as to what such

Law Officer engaged by the Government does.

21. In the present case, on facts narrated above,

relating to his employment as well as in the absence

of rule made by the respondent entitling a Law

Officer to enrol as an advocate despite being a full-

time salaried employee, the appellant was not

entitled to enrolment as an advocate. Hence, the

appellant cannot take benefit of the aforementioned

judgment.‖

(emphasis supplied)

13. This Court had also referred to a previous three-Judge

Bench judgment in Dr. Haniraj L. Chulani (supra), wherein

Rule 1(1) framed by the State Bar Council of Maharashtra

and Goa restricting a person qualified to be enrolled as an

advocate from so being enrolled when he was already

pursuing another full-time profession i.e. medical profession

came up for consideration. The validity of the said provision

was challenged on the ground that it suffered from the vice

of excessive delegation of legislative power and was also

violative of Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India and

not falling under the exemption granted by sub Article (6)

thereof. The validity of the said Rule was assailed also on the

ground of being violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the

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Constitution. While considering the said challenge, the

Court took note of the fact that the State Bar Councils are

competent to lay down, by virtue of the Rules, conditions or

restrictions which would be germane to the high and

exacting standards of advocacy expected of new entrants

into the fold of the profession. Implicit in the conferment of

such rule-making power are the guidelines laid down by the

legislature itself that the conditions must be commensurate

with the fructification of the very purpose of the act of

putting the profession of advocates on a sound footing so

that a new entrant can well justify his/her role in being

admitted to the fold of the noble profession to which he/she

seeks admission. In paragraph 20, the Court considered the

question of whether a person carrying on another profession

can validly be denied enrollment as an advocate by the State

Bar Council. While considering that question, the Court

observed thus:

―20. ….. In our view looking to the nature of the

legal profession to which we have made detailed

reference earlier the State Bar Council would be

justified in framing such a rule prohibiting the entry

of a professional who insists on carrying on other

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profession simultaneously with the legal profession.

As we have seen earlier legal profession requires

full-time attention and would not countenance

an advocate riding two horses or more at a time.

He has to be a full -time advocate or not at

all……..……….

It is obvious that even though medical profession

also may be a dignified profession a person cannot

insist that he will be a practising doctor as well as a

practising advocate simultaneously. Such an

insistence on his part itself would create an

awkward situation not only for him but for his own

clients as well as patients. It is easy to visualise that

a practising surgeon like the appellant may be

required to attend emergency operation even beyond

court hours either in the morning or in the evening.

On the other hand the dictates of his legal

profession may require him to study the cases

for being argued the next day in the court. Under

these circumstances his attention would be

divided. He would naturally be in a dilemma as to

whether to attend to his patient on the operation

table in the evening or to attend to his legal

profession and work for preparing cases for the next

day and to take instructions from his clients for

efficient conduct of the cases next day in the court.

If he is an original side advocate he may be required

to spend his evenings and even late nights for

making witnesses ready for examination in the court

next day. Under these circumstances as a practising

advocate if he gives attention to his clients in his

chamber after court hours and if he is also required

to attend an emergency operation at that very time,

it would be very difficult for him to choose whether

to leave his clients and go to attend his patient in

the operation theatre or to refuse to attend to his

patients. If he selects the first alternative his clients

would clamour, his preparation as advocate would

suffer and naturally it would reflect upon his

performance in the court next day. If on the other

hand he chooses to cater to the needs of his clients

and his legal work, his patients may suffer and may

in given contingency even stand to lose their lives

without the aid of his expert hand as a surgeon.

Thus he would be torn between two conflicting

loyalties, loyalty to his clients on the one hand

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and loyalty to his patients on the other. In a way

he will instead of having the best of both the

worlds, have the worst of both the worlds. Such a

person aspiring to have simultaneous enrolment

both as a lawyer and as a medical practitioner will

thus be like ‗trishanku‘ of yore who will neither be in

heaven nor on earth. It is axiomatic that an

advocate has to burn the midnight oil for

preparing his cases for being argued in the court

next day. Advocates face examination every day

when they appear in courts. It is not as if that

after court hours an advocate has not to put in

hard work on his study table in his chamber with

or without the presence of his clients who may

be available for consultation. To put forward his

best performance as an advocate he is required

to give whole-hearted and full-time attention to

his profession. Any flinching from such

unstinted attention to his legal profession would

certainly have an impact on his professional

ability and expertise. If he is permitted to

simultaneously practise as a doctor then the

requirement of his full-time attention to the legal

profession is bound to be adversely affected.

Consequently however equally dignified may be the

profession of a doctor he cannot simultaneously be

permitted to practise law which is a full -time

occupation. It is for ensuring the full -time

attention of legal practitioners towards their

profession and with a view to bringing out their

best so that they can fulfil their role as an officer

of the court and can give their best in the

administration of justice, that the impugned rule

has been enacted by the State Legislature. It,

therefore, cannot be said that it is in any way

arbitrary or that it imposes an unreasonable

restriction on the new entrant to the profession who

is told not to practise simultaneously any other

profession and if he does so to deny to him entry to

the legal profession. It is true as submitted by the

learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that the

rule of Central Bar Council does not countenance an

advocate simultaneously carrying on any business

and it does not expressly frown upon any

simultaneous profession. But these are general rules

of professional conduct. So far as regulating

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enrolment to the profession is con cerned it is

the task entrusted solely to the State Bar

Councils by the legislature as seen earlier while

considering the scheme of the Act. While

carrying on that task if the entry to the

profession is restricted by the State Bar Council

by enacting the impugned rule for not allowing

any other professional to enter the Bar when he

does not want to give up the other profession but

wants to carry on the same simultaneously with

legal practice, it cannot be said that the Bar

Council has by enacting such a rule imposed any

unreasonable restriction on the fundamental

right of the prospective practitioner who wants

to enter the legal profession.‖

(emphasis supplied)

Having said thus, in paragraph 21 the Court observed as

follows:

―21………In our view the imp ugned rule does not

impose any unreasonable restriction on the right of

the professional carrying on any other avocation and

insisting on continuing to carry on such profession,

while it prohibits entry of such a person to the legal

profession. If the contention of the learned Senior

Counsel for the appellant is countenanced and any

person professing any other profession is permitted

to join the legal profession having obtained the

Degree of Law and having fulfilled the other

requirements of Section 24, then even chartered

accountants, engineers and architects would also

legitimately say that during court hours they will

practise law and they will simultaneously carry on

their other profession beyond court hours. If such

simultaneous practices of professionals who want to

carry on more than one profession at a time are

permitted, the unflinching devotion expected by the

legal profession from its members is bound to be

adversely affected. If the peers being chosen

representatives of the legal profession constituting

21

the State Bar Council, in their wisdom, had thought

it fit not to permit such entries of dual practitioners

to the legal profession it cannot be said that they

have done anything unreasonable or have framed an

arbitrary or unreasonable rule.‖

14. The elucidation by the three-Judge Bench of this Court

referred to above is irrefutable. The question, however, is

whether the restriction imposed by the Bar Council of India

under the Rules as framed, encompasses the elected

people‘s representatives or legislators. As aforesaid, the

closest rule framed by the Bar Council of India is Rule 49.

However, Rule 49 applies where an advocate is a full-time

salaried employee of any person, government, firm,

corporation or concern. Indubitably, legislators cannot be

styled or characterized as full-time salaried employees as

such, much less of the specified entities. For, there is no

relationship of employer and employee . The status of

legislators (MPs/MLAs/MLCs) is of a member of the House

(Parliament/State Assembly). The mere fact that they draw

salary under the 1954 Act or different allowances under the

relevant Rules framed under the said Act does not result in

creation of a relationship of employer and employee between

22

the Government and the legislators, despite the description

of payment received by them in the name of salary. Indeed,

the legislators are deemed to be public servants, but their

status is sui generis and certainly not one of a full-time

salaried employee of any person, government, firm,

corporation or concern as such. Even the expansive

definition of term ―person‖ in the General Clauses Act will be

of no avail. The term ―Employment‖ may be an expansive

expression but considering the Constitutional scheme, the

legislators being elected people‘s representatives occupy a

seat in the Parliament/Legislative Assembly or Council as its

members but are not in the employment of or for that matter

full-time salaried employees as such. They occupy a special

position so long as the House is not dissolved. The fact that

disciplinary or privilege action can be initiated against them

by the Speaker of the House does not mean that they can be

treated as full-time salaried employees. Similarly, the

participation of the legislators in the House for the conduct

of its business, by no standards can be considered as service

rendered to an employer. One ceases to be a legislator, only

23

when the House is dissolved or if he/she resigns or vacates

the seat upon incurring disqualification to continue to be a

legislator. By no standards, therefore, Rule 49 as a whole

can be invoked and applied to the legislators. Resultantly, it

is not necessary to dilate on the question as to whether the

nature of duty of the legislators is such that it entails into a

full-time engagement and that the person concerned will not

be in a position to pay full attention towards the legal

profession. That is a matter for the Bar Council to consider.

15. There is no other express provision in the Act of 1961

or the Rules framed thereunder to even remotely suggest

that any restriction has been imposed on the elected people‘s

representatives, namely, MPs/MLAs/MLCs to continue to

practise as advocates. In absence of an express restriction in

that behalf, it is not open for this Court to debar the elected

people‘s representatives from practising during the period

when they are MPs/MLAs/MLCs. It is also not possible to

strike down Rule 49 on the ground that the stated class of

persons is excluded from its sweep, not being a case of

24

discrimination between equals or unequals being treated

equally. As expounded in the case of Dr. Haniraj L.

Chulani (supra), it is for the Bar Council of India to frame

Rules to impose restrictions as may be found appropriate. As

of today, no rule has been framed to restrict the elected

people‘s representatives from practising as advocates. On

the other hand, an unambiguous stand is taken by the Bar

Council that being legislators per se is not a disqualification

to practice law.

16. Our attention was invited to the judgment of the

Constitution Bench in M. Karunanidhi (supra). In that

case, the Court was called upon to examine the purport of

Section 21(12) of the Indian Penal Code wherein the

expression ―public servant‖ has been defined to denote a

person falling under any of the descriptions specified

therein. Clause (12) of Section 21 postulates that every

person in the service or ―pay of the Government ‖ or

remunerated by fees or commission for the performance of

any public duty by the Government. The question before the

25

Constitution Bench was whether the Chief Minister or a

Minister is deemed to be a public servant in any sense of the

term. The Court noted that even though the Chief Minister

may not stricto sensu be in the service of the Government

which undoubtedly signifies the relationship of master and

servant where the employer employs employee on the basis

of salary or remuneration; but then the Court went on to

observe that so far as the second limb of Section 21(12) of

IPC is concerned it predicates ―in the pay of the

Government‖. That was of much wider amplitude so as to

include within its ambit even public servant who may not be

a regular employee receiving salary from his master. The

Court then proceeded to consider the constitutional scheme

whereunder the Chief Minister is ―appointed‖ by the

Governor and the duties to be performed by him in that

capacity are defined. As the Court arrived at the conclusion

that the Governor ―appoints‖ the Chief Minister and is also

paid a salary according to the statute made by the

Legislature, from the Government funds it went on to

conclude that the Chief Minister becomes a person ―in the

26

pay of the Government‖ so as to fall squarely within clause

(12) of Section 21 of IPC.

17. In the present case, however, we are dealing with the

expression ―a full-time salaried employee‖ of specified

entities as is explicated in Rule 49 and more so with the

issue of debarring an advocate from practicing law whilst

he/she is a legislator during the relevant period. As regards

the legislators (MP/MLA/MLC) they occupy a unique

position. They are not appointed but are elected by the

electors from respective territorial constituencies. The fact

that they have to take oath administere d by the

President/Governor before they take their seat in the House,

does not mean that they are appointed by the

President/Governor as such unlike in the case of the Prime

Minister/Chief Minister and Ministers in the Council of

Ministers. Article 99 postulates that every member of either

House of Parliament, before taking the seat shall make and

subscribe before the President, or some person appointed in

that behalf by him, an oath and affirmation according to the

27

form set out for the purpose in the Third Schedule. The form

of oath does not suggest that the member is appointed by

the President as such. Further, the legislators vacate

his/her seat only in situations specified in Article 101 of the

Constitution. Article 102 of the Constitution provides for

disqualification for being chosen and for being a member of

either House of Parliament. As regards the legislators, Article

105 provides for their powers and privileges. In the case of

Prime Minister and the Ministers, the Constitution of India

expressly provides for their duties as predicated in Article

78. Suffice it to observe that the exposition in the case of M.

Karunanidhi (supra), will be of no avail while considering

the purport of Rule 49, which is attracted when the advocate

is a full-time salaried employee of any person, firm,

government, corporation or concern. The fact that the

legislators draw salary and allowances from the consolidated

fund in terms of Article 106 of the Constitution and the law

made by the Parliament in that regard, it does not follow

that a relationship of a full-time salaried employee(s) of the

Government or otherwise is created. The legislators receive

28

payment in the form of salary, and allowances or pension

from the consolidated fund is not enough to debar the m

from practising as advocates, sans being a full-time salaried

employee of the specified entities. They continue to remain

only as member(s) of the House representing the territorial

constituencies from where they have been elected until the

House is dissolved or if he/she resigns including vacates the

seat for having incurred disqualification as may be

prescribed by law.

18. The argument then proceeds on the principle of

constitutional morality, affirmative equality and institutional

integrity. During arguments, emphasis was placed on the

dictum of this Court in Manoj Narula Vs. Union of India

7,

Government of NCT of Delhi Vs. Union of India and Ors

8

and Krishnamoorthy Vs. Shivakumar & Ors.

9 This

argument, in effect, is to assert that the legislators who are

practising as advocates are per se guilty of professional

7

(2014) 9 SCC 1

8

Judgment delivered on 4

th

July, 2018 in Civil Appeal No.2357 of 2017; (2018) 8

SCALE 72

9

(2015) 3 SCC 467

29

misconduct including conflict of interest. This is a sweeping

comment. For, whether it is a case of conflict of interest or

professional misconduct would depend on the facts of each

case. That fact will have to be pleaded and proved before the

Competent Authority. There can be no presumption in that

regard, merely on account of the status of being a legislator.

The standards of professional conduct and etiquette have

been delineated in the Rules framed by the Bar Council

Chapter II in Part VI dealing with the rules governing

Advocates, framed under Section 49(1)(c) of the Act read

with the proviso thereto. The relevant portion thereof reads

thus:-

―CHAPTER II

STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND

ETIQUETTE

[Rules under Section 49(1)(c) of the Act read with

the Proviso thereto]

Preamble

An Advocate shall, at all times, comport himself in

a manner befitting his status as an officer of the

Court, a privileged member of the community, and

a gentleman, bearing in mind that what may be

lawful and moral for a person who is not a member

of the Bar, or for a member of the Bar in his non-

professional capacity may still be improper for an

Advocate. Without prejudice to the generality of the

30

foregoing obligation, an Advocate shall fearlessly

uphold the interests of his client, and in his

conduct conform to the rules hereinafter mentioned

both in letter and in spirit. The rules hereinafter

mentioned contain canons of conduct and etiquette

adopted as general guides; yet the specific mention

thereof shall not be construed as a denial of the

existence of other equally imperative though not

specifically mentioned.

SECTION I - DUTY TO THE COURT

xxx xxx xxx

SECTION II - DUTY TO THE CLIENT

11. An Advocate is bound to accept any brief in

the Courts or Tribunals or before any other

authority in or before which he professes to practise

at a fee consistent with his standing at the Bar and

the nature of the case. Special circumstances may

justify his refusal to accept a particular brief.

12. An Advocate shall not ordinarily withdraw

from engagements once accepted, without sufficient

cause and unless reasonable and sufficient notice

is given to the client. Upon his withdrawal from a

case, he shall refund such part of the fee as has not

been earned.

13. An Advocate should not accept a brief or

appear in a case in which he has reason to believe

that he will be a witness and if being engaged in a

case, it becomes apparent that he is a witness on a

material question of fact, he should not continue to

appear as an Advocate if he can retire without

jeopardising his client‘s interests.

14. An Advocate shall at the commencement of

his engagement and during the continuance thereof

make all such full and frank disclosures to his

client relating to his connection with the parties

and any interest in or about the controversy as are

likely to affect his client‘s judgment in either

engaging him or continuing the engagement.

31

15. It shall be the duty of an Advocate fearlessly

to uphold the interests of his client by all fair and

honourable means without regard to any

unpleasant consequences to himself or any other.

He shall defend a person accused of a crime

regardless of his personal opinion as to the guilt of

the accused, bearing in mind that his loyalty is to

the law which requires that no man should be

convicted without adequate evidence.

16. An Advocate appearing for the prosecution

in a criminal trial shall so conduct the prosecution

that it does not lead to conviction of the innocent.

The suppression of material capable of establishing

the innocence of the accused shall be scrupulously

avoided.

17. An Advocate shall not directly or indirectly,

commit a breach of the obligations imposed by Sec.

126 of the Indian Evidence Act.

18. An Advocate shall not at any time, be a

party to fomenting of litigation.

19. An Advocate shall not act on the

instructions of any person other than his client or

his authorised agent.

20. An Advocate shall not stipulate for a fee

contingent on the results of litigation or agree to

share the proceed thereof.

21. An Advocate shall not buy or traffic in or

stipulate for or agree to receive any share or

interest in any actionable claim. Nothing in this

Rule shall apply to stock, shares and debentures or

Government securities, or to any instruments,

which are, for the time being, by law or custom

negotiable, or to any mercantile document of title to

goods.

22. An Advocate shall not, directly or indirectly,

bid for or purchase, either in his own name or in

any other name, for his own benefit or for the

benefit of any other person, any property sold in the

execution of a decree or order in any suit, appeal or

other proceeding in which he was in any way

32

professionally engaged. This prohibition, however,

does not prevent an Advocate from bidding for or

purchasing for his client any property, which his

client may, himself legally bid for or purchase,

provided the Advocate is expressly authorised in

writing in this behalf.

22A. An advocate shall not directly or indirectly bid

in court auction or acquire by way of sale, gift,

exchange or any other mode of transfer either in his

own name or in any other name for his own benefit

or for the benefit of any other person any property

which is subject matter of any suit appeal or other

proceedings in which he is in any way

professionally engaged.

23. An Advocate shall not adjust fee payable to

him by his client against his own personal liability

to the client, which liability does not arise in the

course of his employment as an Advocate.

24. An Advocate shall not do anything whereby

he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence

reposed in him by his client.

25. An Advocate should keep accounts of the

client‘s money entrusted to him, and the accounts

should show the amounts received from the client

or on his behalf, the expenses incurred for him and

the debits made on account of fees with respective

dates and all other necessary particulars.

26. Where moneys are received from or on

account of a client, the entries in the accounts

should contain a reference as to whether the

amounts have been received for fees or expenses,

and during the course of the proceedings, no

Advocate shall, except with the consent in writing of

the client concerned, be at liberty to divert any

portion of the expenses towards fees.

27. Where any amount is received or given to

him on behalf of his client the fact of such receipt

must be intimated to the client as early as

possible.

33

28. After the termination of the proceeding the

Advocate shall be at liberty to appropriate towards

the settled fee due to him any sum remaining

unexpended out of the amount paid or sent to him

for expenses, or any amount that has come into his

hands in that proceeding.

29. Where the fee has been left unsettled, the

Advocate shall be entitled to deduct, out of any

moneys of the client remaining in his hands, at the

termination of the proceeding for which he had

been engaged, the fee payable under the rules of

the Court, in force for the time being, of by then

settled and the balance, if any, shall be refunded to

the client.

30. A copy of the client‘s account shall be

furnished to him on demand provide d the

necessary copying charge is paid.

31. An Advocate shall not enter into

arrangements whereby funds in his hands are

converted into loans.

32. An Advocate shall not lend money to his

client for the purpose of any action or legal

proceedings in which he is engaged by such client.

Explanation:- An Advocate shall not be held

guilty for a breach of this rule, if in the course a

pending suit or proceeding, and without any

arrangement with the client in respect of the same,

the Advocate feels compelled by reason of the rule

of the Court to make a payment to the Court on

account of the client for the progress of the suit of

proceeding.

33. An Advocate who has, at any time, advised in

connection with the institution of a suit, appeal or

other matter or has drawn pleadings, or acted for a

party shall not act, appear or plead for the opposite

party.

xxx xxx xxx‖

34

Resultantly, the case of professional misconduct will have to

be pleaded and proved on case to case basis.

19. Thus, merely because the advocate concerned is an

elected people‘s representative, it does not follow that he/she

has indulged in professional misconduct. Similarly, the

conferment of power on the legislators (MPs) to move an

impeachment motion against the judge(s) of the

Constitutional Courts does not per se result in conflict of

interest or a case of impacting constitutional morality or for

that matter institutional integrity. In the context of the relief

claimed in the main petition, we do not wish to dilate on the

other arguments that India needs dedicated and full-time

legislators, who will sincerely attend Parliament on all

working days when called upon to do so. For, the limited

question considered by us is whether legislators are and can

be prohibited from practising as advocates during the

relevant period. That can be answered on the basis of the

extant statutory provisions governing the conduct of

advocates. As observed in Kalpana Mehta Vs. Union of

35

India

10, the Court cannot usurp the functions assigned to

the legislature. In other words, sans any express restriction

imposed by the Bar Council of India regarding the legislators

to appear as an advocate, the relief as claimed by the

petitioner cannot be countenanced.

20. To sum up, we hold that the provisions of the Act of

1961 and the Rules framed thereunder , do not place any

restrictions on the legislators to practise as advocates during

the relevant period. The closest rule framed by the Bar

Council of India is Rule 49 which, however, has no

application to the elected people‘s representatives as they do

not fall in the category of full-time salaried employee of any

person, firm, government, corporation or concern. As there

is no express provision to prohibit or restrict the legislators

from practising as advocates during the relevant period, the

question of granting relief, as prayed, to debar them from

practising as advocates cannot be countenanced. Even the

alternative relief to declare Rule 49 as unconstitutional, does

10

(2018) 7 SCC 1

36

not commend to us. As of now, the Bar Council of India has

made its stand explicitly clear that no such prohibition can

be placed on the legislators. As a result, the reliefs claimed

in this writ petition are devoid of merit.

21. Accordingly, this writ petition is dismissed with no

order as to costs and as a consequence thereof, the

interlocutory applications are also disposed of.

………………………….. CJI.

(Dipak Misra)

…………………………….. J.

(A.M. Khanwilkar)

…………………………….. J.

(Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud)

New Delhi;

September 25, 2018.