Contempt petition; Back wages; Retrospective promotion; Consequential benefits; No work no pay; Madhya Pradesh High Court; CONC-4869-2024; Atul Bajapei; Dwarka Dhish Bansal
 27 Feb, 2026
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Atul Bajapei Versus Mr. V. N. Ambade

  Madhya Pradesh High Court CONC-4869-2024
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Case Background

As per case facts, the petitioner filed a contempt petition alleging willful disobedience of a previous court order that directed his promotion with "all consequential benefits." While the respondent granted ...

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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP: 17552

CONC-4869-2024

1

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH

AT JABALPUR

BEFORE

HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE DWARKA DHISH BANSAL

ON THE 27

th

OF FEBRUARY, 2026

CONTEMPT PETITION CIVIL No. 4869 of 2024

ATUL BAJAPEI

Versus

MR. V. N. AMBADE

Appearance:

Shri Aditya Ahiwasi - Advocate for the petitioner.

Shri V.S. Choudhary - Advocate for the respondent.

ORDER

This contempt petition has been preferred by the petitioner alleging

wilful disobedience of the order dated 20/08/2024 passed by this Court in

Writ Petition No.11828/2005.

2. Relevant paragraph 6 of the aforesaid order is reproduced as under:-

“6. In view of the above discourse, the petition is

allowed. The impugned order dated 09.05.2005 is

hereby set aside. The respondents are directed to grant

promotion to the petitioner on the post of Assistant

Project Range Officer with effect from the date he

became entitled on securing first position in the

training of forest guard i.e. 15.09.2004 with all

consequential benefits of the said post within a period

of 30 days from the date of receipt of copy of this

order.”

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CONC-4869-2024

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3. Taking this Court to the compliance report dated 19/02/2025 as well

as subsequent compliance report dated 31/01/2026, learned counsel for the

respondent submits that as per the order passed by this Court on

20/08/2024, the petitioner has been promoted w.e.f.15/09/2004, by passing

the order on 27/01/2026. He further submits that since the petitioner was

already promoted w.e.f. 29/10/2015, therefore, he has already been given

the benefit of promotional post w.e.f.29/10/2015. He also submits that

since the petitioner did not work on the promotional post w.e.f.15/09/2004,

therefore, he is not entitled for back-wages in the light of order passed by

this Court regarding entitlement of the petitioner to all the consequential

benefits. As such, he submits that there being no wilful disobedience on

the part of the respondent and since the order passed by this Court, has

already been complied with fully, therefore, the contempt proceedings

deserve to be dropped. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for

the respondent placed reliance on the decisions in the case of Paluru

Ramkrishnaiah and Others vs. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1990 SC 166;

State of Haryana and others vs. O.P. Gupta, AIR 1996 SC 2936; Union of

India and another vs. Tarsem Lal and others, (2006) 10 SCC 145; K.

Anand Rao and others vs. S.S. Rawat, IAS and others, (2019) 13 SCC 24;

and Ratnank Mishra & Others vs. High Court of Judicature at Allahabad

through Registrar General, 2025 INSC 1477.

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP: 17552

CONC-4869-2024

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4. In turn, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that since the

petitioner has been promoted w.e.f.15/09/2004, therefore, in the light of

clear direction issued by this Court regarding payment of all the

consequential benefits of the promotional post, the petitioner is entitled for

the back-wages also, which have not been paid to the petitioner by

disobeying the order passed by this Court. In support of his submissions,

learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the decisions in the

case of Inder Parkash Gupta vs. State of Jammu & Kashmir and Ors.,

(2004) 6 SCC 786; The Commissioner, Karnataka Housing Board vs. C.

Muddaiah, (2007) 7 SCC 689; Union of India and others vs. Col. Ran

Singh Dudee, (2018) 8 SCC 53; Jyotsna Singh vs. State of Jharkhand and

Ors., AIR 2025 SC 4436; and Havaldar Tejbali vs. Major Nachhattar

Singh and Anr., 1997 Supreme (MP) 101. As such, he submits that by not

granting the consequential benefits, the respondent has wilfully disobeyed

the order passed by this Court and he deserves to be punished

appropriately.

5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

6. In view of the aforesaid submissions made by learned counsel for

the parties, questions that arise in the instant case are as to whether upon

granting promotion from back date, the employee is entitled to back wages

automatically, especially when the writ Court has ordered grant of all the

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CONC-4869-2024

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consequential benefits of promotional post; and whether back wages are

included in the expression ‘all consequential benefits’?

7. Several times an identical question came before the Hon’ble

Supreme Court, which was answered as under:

i. A three-judge Bench, in the case of Paluru Ramkrishnaiah and

others v. Union of India and another, AIR 1990 SC 166, held as under :

“19. Since, however, the judgment of this Court dated 2-2-1981

in Civil Appeal No. 441 of 1981 has not been challenged and

has become final, the next question which falls for consideration

is as to what further relief, if any, are the appellants in Civil

Appeal No.441 of 1981 entitled in pursuance of the civil

miscellaneous petitions referred to above filed by them. The

reliefs which they have claimed have already been indicated

above. It is now not disputed that the appellants of this appeal

have in pursuance of the order of this Court dated 2-2-1981

been given a back date promotion to the post of Chargeman II

synchronising with the dates of completion of their two years of

service as Supervisor ‘A’. The grievance of the petitioners,

however, is that this promotion tantamounts to implementation

of the order of this Court dated 2-2-1981 only on paper

inasmuch as they have not been granted the difference of back

wages and promotion to higher posts on the basis of their back

date promotion as Chargeman II. As already noticed earlier

certain writ petitions filed in Madhya Pradesh High Court were

allowed by that court on 4-4-1983 relying on the judgment of

this Court dated 2-2-1981 in Civil Appeal No. 441 of 1981.

Against the aforesaid judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High

Court dated 4-4-1983 Special Leave Petitions (Civil) Nos. 5987-

92 of 1986 were filed in this Court by the Union of India and

were dismissed on 28-7-1986. The findings of the Madhya

Pradesh High Court in its judgment dated 4-4-1983 thus stand

approved by this Court. In this view of the matter to put them at

par it would be appropriate that the appellants in Civil Appeal

No. 441 of 1981 may also be granted the same relief which was

granted to the petitioners in the writ petitions before the Madhya

Pradesh High Court. As regards back wages the Madhya

Pradesh High Court held:-

“It is the settled service rule that there has to be no pay for no

work i.e. a person will not be entitled to any pay and allowance

during the period for which he did not perform the duties of a

higher post although after due consideration he was given a

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP: 17552

CONC-4869-2024

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proper place in the gradation list having deemed to be promoted

to the higher post with effect from the date his junior was

promoted. So the petitioners are not entitled to claim any

financial benefit retrospectively. At the most they would be

entitled to refixation of their present salary on the basis of the

notional seniority granted to them in different grades so that

their present salary is not less than those who are immediately

below them.”

In so far as Supervisors ‘A’ who claimed promotion as

Chargeman II the following direction was accordingly given by

the Madhya Pradesh High Court in its judgment dated 4-4-1983

aforesaid:

“All these petitioners are also entitled to be treated as

Chargeman Grade II on completion of two years' satisfactory

service as Supervisor Grade A. Consequently, notional seniority

of these persons have to be refixed in Supervisor Grade A,

Chargeman Grade II, Grade I and Assistant Foreman in cases of

those who are holding that post.... The petitioners are also

entitled to get their present salary refixed after giving them

notional seniority so that the same is not lower than those who

are immediately below them.”

ii. In the case of State of Haryana and others vs. O.P. Gupta, AIR 1996

SC 2936 (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered the similar

controversy and held as under :

“7. This Court in Paluru Ramkrishnaiah v. Union of

India [(1989) 2 SCC 541 : 1989 SCC (L&S) 375 : (1989) 10

ATC 378 : (1989) 2 SCR 92] (SCR at p. 109 : SCC p. 556, para

19) considered the direction issued by the High Court and

upheld that there has to be “no pay for no work”, i.e., a person

will not be entitled to any pay and allowance during the period

for which he did not perform the duties of higher post, although

after due consideration, he was given a proper place in the

gradation list having been deemed to be promoted to the higher

post with effect from the date his junior was promoted. He will

be entitled only to step up the scale of pay retrospectively from

the deemed date but is not entitled to the payment of arrears of

the salary. The same ratio was reiterated in Virender Kumar,

G.M., N. Rlys. v. Avinash Chandra Chadha [(1990) 3 SCC 472 :

1991 SCC (L&S) 62 : (1990) 14 ATC 732] (SCC p. 482, para

16).

8. It is true, as pointed out by Shri Hooda, that in Union of

India v. K.V. Jankiraman [(1991) 4 SCC 109 : 1993 SCC (L&S)

387 : (1993) 23 ATC 322 : AIR 1991 SC 2010] this Court had

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held that where the incumbent was willing to work but was

denied the opportunity to work for no fault of his, he is entitled

to the payment of arrears of salary. That is a case where the

respondent was kept under suspension during departmental

enquiry and sealed cover procedure was adopted because of the

pendency of the criminal case. When the criminal case ended in

his favour and departmental proceedings were held to be

invalid, this Court held that he was entitled to the arrears of

salary. That ratio has no application to the cases where the

claims for promotion are to be considered in accordance with

the rules and the promotions are to be made pursuant thereto.

9. In these appeals unless the seniority list is prepared and

finalised and promotions are made in accordance with the Rules

on the basis of the above seniority list, the question of

entitlement to work in the promotional posts does not arise.

Consequently, the payment of arrears of salary does not arise

since, admittedly the respondents had not worked during that

period. The High Court was, therefore, wholly illegal in

directing payment of arrears of salary. The order of the High

Court accordingly is quashed.”

iii. In the case of Union of India v. B.M. Jha, (2007) 11 SCC 632, the

Hon’ble Supreme Court, while considering the similar question, followed

the earlier decisions in the case of State of Haryana v. O.P. Gupta (supra)

and A.K. Soumini v. State Bank of Travancore, (2003) 7 SCC 238 (three

judge Bench), and held as under :

“5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. It was argued

by learned counsel for the respondent that when a retrospective

promotion is given to an incumbent, normally he is entitled to

all benefits flowing therefrom. However, this Court in State of

Haryana v. O.P. Gupta [(1996) 7 SCC 533 : 1996 SCC (L&S)

633 : (1996) 33 ATC 324] and followed in A.K. Soumini v. State

Bank of Travancore [(2003) 7 SCC 238 : 2003 SCC (L&S)

1041 : JT (2003) 8 SC 35] has taken the view that even in case

of a notional promotion from retrospective date, it cannot entitle

the employee to arrears of salary as the incumbent has not

worked in the promotional post. These decisions relied on the

principle of “no work no pay”. The learned Division Bench in

the impugned judgment has placed reliance on State of

A.P. v. K.V.L. Narasimha Rao [(1999) 4 SCC 181 : 1999 SCC

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP: 17552

CONC-4869-2024

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(L&S) 841 : JT (1999) 3 SC 205] . In our view, the High Court

did not examine that case in detail. In fact, in the said judgment

the view taken by the High Court of grant of salary was set

aside by this Court. Therefore, we are of the view that in the

light of the consistent view taken by this Court in the

abovementioned cases, arrears of salary cannot be granted to the

respondent in view of the principle of “no work no pay” in case

of retrospective promotion. Consequently, we allow this appeal

and set aside the impugned order of the High Court dated 17-5-

2000 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court as also

the order dated 11-1-2000 passed by the Central Administrative

Tribunal, Principal Bench.”

8. In the following cases also, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has dealt

with the almost similar controversy and held as under :

i. In the case of K. Ananda Rao Etc. vs. Sri S.S. Rawat, IAS And

Others Etc., (2019) 13 SCC 24, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as

under:

“14. Since all these issues were not canvased before this Court

and were not gone into by this Court on 09.08.2017, the

question that arises is whether the expression "consequential

benefits" occurring in the order dated 09.08.2017 must be given

the interpretation that the employees were entitled to all salaries

and emoluments for the period that they had not even worked in

their respective organisations ? The order dated 09.08.2017

does not indicate that any such aspect of the matter was in

contemplation of this Court or the matter was addressed

from this stand point. In the absence of any discussion, it is

very difficult to say that this Court had thought of granting

something which was in excess of what was contemplated in

various policy documents culminating in the GO dated

08.08.2017. Those policy documents were not overridden or in

way found to be inoperative. As a matter of fact, they were not

even referred to.

17. Thus, purely on the principle of parity the employees of the

institution or entities in Schedule IX and X of 2014 Act could

not demand the benefit of enhancement of the age of

superannuation from 58 years to 60 years. That benefit came to

be conferred under policy documents and finally by the GO

dated 08.08.2017. Thus, the source was in those policy

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP: 17552

CONC-4869-2024

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documents and naturally the extent of benefits was also spelt out

in those instruments issued by the Government. The Circular

dated 28.06.2016 which was more or less adopted in

proceedings dated 11.06.2018 must be taken to be the governing

criteria in respect of such employees. Unless and until that

governing criteria was departed from specifically, mere

expression "consequential benefits" would not entitle the

concerned employees anything greater than what was

contemplated in the policy documents issued by the State

Government.”

ii. In the case of Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak

Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and others, (2013) 10 SCC 324 the Hon’ble

Supreme Court has held as under:-

“32. We may now deal with the judgment in J.K. Synthetics

Ltd. v. K.P. Agrawal and another (supra) in detail. The facts of

that case were that the respondent was dismissed from service

on the basis of inquiry conducted by the competent authority.

The Labour Court held that the inquiry was not fair and proper

and permitted the parties to adduce evidence on the charges

levelled against the respondent. After considering the evidence,

the Labour Court gave benefit of doubt to the respondent and

substituted the punishment of dismissal from service with that

of stoppage of increments for two years. On an application filed

by the respondent, the Labour Court held that the respondent

was entitled to reinstatement with full back wages for the period

of unemployment. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ

petition and the Division Bench declined to interfere by

observing that the employer had willfully violated the order of

the Labour Court. On an application made by the respondent

under Section 6(6) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the

Labour Court amended the award. This Court upheld the power

of the Labour Court to amend the award but did not approve the

award of full back wages. After noticing several precedents to

which reference has been made hereinabove, the two Judge

Bench observed:

“There is also a misconception that whenever reinstatement

is directed, “continuity of service” and “consequential

benefits” should follow, as a matter of course. The

disastrous effect of granting several promotions as a

“consequential benefit” to a person who has not worked for

10 to 15 years and who does not have the benefit of

necessary experience for discharging the higher duties and

functions of promotional posts, is seldom visualised while

granting consequential benefits automatically. Whenever

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courts or tribunals direct reinstatement, they should apply their

judicial mind to the facts and circumstances to decide whether

“continuity of service” and/or “consequential benefits” should

also be directed.

Coming back to back wages, even if the court finds it

necessary to award back wages, the question will be whether

back wages should be awarded fully or only partially (and if

so the percentage). That depends upon the facts and

circumstances of each case. Any income received by the

employee during the relevant period on account of alternative

employment or business is a relevant factor to be taken note of

while awarding back wages, in addition to the several factors

mentioned in Rudhan Singh and Uday Narain Pandey.

Therefore, it is necessary for the employee to plead that he was

not gainfully employed from the date of his termination. While

an employee cannot be asked to prove the negative, he has to at

least assert on oath that he was neither employed nor engaged in

any gainful business or venture and that he did not have any

income. Then the burden will shift to the employer. But there is,

however, no obligation on the terminated employee to search

for or secure alternative employment. Be that as it may.”

9. Although in the decisions relied upon by learned counsel for the

petitioner, in the case of Inder Parkash Gupta (supra); The Commissioner,

Karnataka Housing Board (supra); Union of India and others (supra);

Jyotsna Singh (supra); and Havaldar Tejbali (supra), the effect of

expression ‘all consequential benefits’ has been taken into consideration,

but in none of these decisions, question of grant of back wages in lieu of

consequential benefits upon granting promotion from back date, that too in

contempt jurisdiction, is considered. Further, in all these decisions,

previous decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Paluru

Ramkrishnaiah and others (supra) (3 judge Bench); State of Haryana and

others vs. O.P. Gupta (supra); A.K. Soumini v. State Bank of Travancore

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP: 17552

CONC-4869-2024

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(supra) (3 judge Bench); and Union of India v. B.M. Jha (supra) have not

been taken into consideration, so the decisions relied upon by learned

Counsel for the petitioner, do not provide any assistance to the questions

involved in the instant contempt petition.

10. While considering the scope of contempt jurisdiction the Hon’ble

Supreme Court has in the case of Jhareswar Prasad Paul & Anr. vs. Tarak

Nath Ganguly and Ors., (2002) 5 SCC 352, held as under:-

“12. ………At the cost of repetition be it stated here that the

court exercising contempt jurisdiction is primarily concerned

with the question of contumacious conduct of the party, which

alleged to have committed deliberate default in complying with

the directions in the judgment or order. If the judgment or order

does not contain any specific direction regarding a matter or if

there is any ambiguity in the directions issued therein then it

will be better to direct the parties to approach the court which

disposed of the matter for clarification of the order instead of

the court exercising contempt jurisdiction taking upon itself the

power to decide the original proceeding in a manner not dealt

with by the court passing the judgment or order. If this

limitation is borne in mind then criticisms which are sometimes

levelled against the courts exercising contempt of court

jurisdiction "that it has exceeded its powers in granting

substantive relief and issuing a direction regarding the same

without proper adjudication of the dispute" in its entirety can be

avoided. This will also avoid multiplicity of proceedings

because the party which is prejudicially affected by the

judgment or order passed in the contempt proceeding and

granting relief and issuing fresh directions is likely to challenge

that order and that may give rise to another round of litigation

arising from a proceeding which is intended to maintain the

majesty and image of courts.”

11. In the present case, the direction contained in the order dtd.

20/08/2024 passed by Writ Court was to grant promotion with all

consequential benefits; however, there was no specific or express direction

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for payment of back wages. The question whether back wages are payable,

involves an independent consideration and cannot be presumed to be

implicit in every case under the expression ‘all consequential benefits.’ In

contempt jurisdiction, this Court is required to confine itself to the plain

terms of the order and to examine whether there has been wilful and

deliberate non-compliance.

12. A bare perusal of the record shows that in compliance of the order

dated 20/08/2024 passed by this Court, the petitioner has been promoted

w.e.f.15/09/2004 and his seniority has been fixed notionally and the period

w.e.f.01/11/2005 till 28/10/2015 has also been directed to be taken into

consideration for notional fixation of his salary. Further, it appears that the

petitioner was already promoted w.e.f.29/10/2015 and he was receiving the

benefits of the promotional post from the said date. Under such

circumstances, denial of back-wages w.e.f.15/09/2004, does not amount to

wilful disobedience of the order dated 20/08/2024 passed by this Court.

13. In view of the aforesaid legal position settled by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in the above-mentioned cases, it cannot be said that the

petitioner, in the guise of an order passed by the High Court granting

consequential benefits, is entitled to back wages also. And as such, this

Court finds that the back wages are not covered in the expression ‘all

consequential benefits’ and consequently, this Court does not find any case

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of wilful disobedience.

14. Accordingly, this contempt petition is dismissed.

15. However, the petitioner shall be at liberty to file a fresh writ petition

in respect of his remaining grievance regarding back-wages, if law permits.

16. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

(DWARKA DHISH BANSAL)

JUDGE

Arun*

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