2026:JHHC:25969-DB

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI

W.P (S) No.5193 of 2017

-----

Baban Sharma, Son of Shri Nagina Mistri @ Nagina, at present in

Rly. Qtr. No.S-53 B-Type II, S.E. Railway Colony, Ranchi, P.O-

Chutia, P.S-Chutia, Dist-Ranchi (Jharkhand) ....... … Petitioner

Versus

1. Union of India, through the General Manager, South Eastern

Railway, Garden Reach, Kolkata-43.

2. Chief Vigilance Officer, S.E. Railway, Garden Reach, Kolkata-

43.

3. Coaching Depot Hatia and Disciplinary Authority, S.E.

Railway, P.O & P.S-Chutia, Ranchi.

4. Sr. Divisional Accounts Officer, S.E. Railway, Adra Division,

P.O & P.S-Purulia, District-Purulia (W.B).

5. Divisional Railway Manager, Ranchi Division, S.E. Railway,

Ranchi-834001(Jharkhand).

6. Sr. Divisional Mechanical Engineer, S.E. Railway, Ranchi

Division, Ranchi-834001 (Jharkhand)

… … Respondents

-------

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP KUMAR SRIVASTAVA

For the Petitioner : Mrs. M.M. Pal, Sr. Advocate

Ms. Manjusri Patra, Advocate

Mrs. Mahua Palit, Advocate

For the Respondents : Mrs. Bakshi Vibha, CGC

------

C.A.V on 23.07.2026 Pronounced on27/08/2026

Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.

1. The instant writ petition under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India has been preferred seeking quashing the order

dated 17.05.2017 passed by the learned CAT, Circuit Bench at

Ranchi in OA No.051/00205/2015 (Annexure-16) whereby and

whereunder the OA so filed by the petitioner against the

punishment order dated 13.02.2015 and the appellate order dated

28.07.2015 has been dismissed and for a direction on the

2026:JHHC:25969-DB

2

respondents to reinstate the petitioner in his service with full back

wages and with all consequential benefits.

2. The brief facts of the case as per the impugned order and

the pleadings made in the writ petition which require to be

enumerated reads as under:

(i) The petitioner was initially appointed as Ty Shed

Khalasi in S.E. Eastern Railway on 08.12.1980 and

was posted at Carriage shed BKSC, S.E. Railway

and his service was regularized on 17.01.1984.

(ii) The father of the employee, namely, Nagina, Ex.-

B/Smith GR.I W/s, Adra Division made an

application dated 18.08.1980 to the Divisional

Mech. Engineer, Adra for appointment of his son

(the petitioner) and on his application the petitioner

was appointed in the service.

(iii) At the time of appointment, the applicant was

possessing adequate qualification and had furnished

relevant documents before the respondents,

including his school Certificate leaving/transfer

certificate dated 15.10.1979 issued by the

Headmaster of Sri Gautam Uchcha Vidyalaya,

Sonvarsha, Bhojpur on 6.3.2006.

(iv) When the applicant was posted as Blacksmith Grade

II in the office of Senior Section Engineer (C&W),

Hatia, S.E. Railway, a charge-sheet was issued to

him by the Disciplinary Authority alleging therein

2026:JHHC:25969-DB

3

that he had submitted a false certificate in respect of

his date of birth as well as educational qualification,

and had also given changed name of his father with

mala fide intention for securing employment.

(v) After receipt of charge-sheet, the applicant

submitted his reply (show-cause) denying the charge

levelled against him stating therein that the charge is

false and baseless and based on anonymous

complaint made by one Shri Kamla Kant Sharma,

which complaint petition was not supplied to him.

(vi) After receipt of charge-sheet, the applicant

submitted his show-cause dated 17.03.2006 denying

the charge levelled against him, and stating therein

that the charge is false and baseless and based on

anonymous complaint made by one Shri Kamla

Kant Sharma, which complaint petition was not

supplied to him.

(vii) In his reply, the petitioner made a request before the

disciplinary authority to supply the following

documents which was urgently required to defend

his case:

(I) Copy of original report from which the case

has been arisen;

(II) Copy of service book in all pages;

(III) Copy of Medical Certificate,

(IV) Copy of Police Verification which was made

after his employment;

(V) Copy of petitioner’s Transfer Certificate

issued by the concerned School authority, i.e.,

Headmaster/Headmistress;

2026:JHHC:25969-DB

4

(VI) Copy of original declaration of late Nagina,

Ex-B/Smith WRS/Adra.

(viii) It is stated that in charge-sheet also there is no

averment in respect of the anonymous complaint

made by Shri Kamla Kant Sharma. Thereafter, the

applicant through several representations demanded

the relevant documents from the respondents but the

respondents did not supply the same, and the Inquiry

Officer to conduct inquiry in respect of charge

memo was appointed and thereafter the Inquiry

Officer illegally and without supplying copy of the

documents to the applicant brought certain

documents on record as Exhibit-P/1 to P/6.

(ix) During inquiry, neither the complainant-Kamla Kant

Sharma, nor any other witness was examined by the

prosecution, and so the petitioner had no opportunity

to cross-examine the complainant, and other

witnesses which has caused serious prejudice to the

petitioner.

(x) The inquiry was conducted in a haphazard manner

and the inquiry officer submitted his report without

giving proper opportunity to the petitioner to

examine the defence witnesses.

(xi) It is stated that the Inquiry Officer did not properly

examine the defence statement submitted by the

applicant with regard to his educational qualification

as well as the name of his father, and wrongly

2026:JHHC:25969-DB

5

placed reliance upon the statement of the applicant

dated 23

rd

August, 2005 made before the Vigilance

Department, S.E. Railway, which was recorded

under threat and when the applicant was not in a

proper state of mind.

(xii) The inquiry officer held him guilty on the basis of

the School Leaving Certificate (SLC) issued by the

concerned school authority, i.e., headmaster who has

also not been examined and, thus, the charges

cannot be said to be proved and no punishment can

be imposed on the basis of such perfunctory inquiry

report.

(xiii) Further case of the petitioner is that the Disciplinary

Authority, on the basis of inquiry report, passed

illegal order of removal of the applicant from service

on 25.9.2008 and the Appellate Authority also

confirmed the said illegal order of the Disciplinary

Authority vide order dated 18.3.2009.

(xiv) Thereafter, the petitioner moved before the learned

CAT by preferring O.A No.138 of 2009 (R) against

the removal order dated 25.09.2008 as also the

appellate order dated 18.03.2009 which was allowed

by a detailed judgment dated 01.08.2011 where the

removal order dated 25.09.2008 passed by the

Disciplinary Authority and the appellate order dated

18.03.2009 passed by the Appellate Authority were

2026:JHHC:25969-DB

6

quashed and set aside directing the respondent

authority to reinstate the petitioner in service with

immediate effect and to pay all consequential

benefits to him, however, with a liberty to conduct a

de-novo inquiry against the petitioner in accordance

with law with respect of charge memo dated

06.03.2006.

(xv) Being aggrieved, the respondent-authority moved

before this Court by filing a writ petition being

W.P(S) No.715 of 2012 which was also dismissed

vide order dated 09.01.2013 and a direction was

issued to implement the order passed by the learned

CAT without any delay.

(xvi) The petitioner was reinstated in his service with all

consequential benefits vide order dated 30.05.2013

and immediately thereafter a de-novo inquiry was

conducted against him vide order dated 30.05.2013

in connection with the major penalty charge sheet

dated 06.03.2006.

(xvii) The petitioner appeared in the inquiry proceeding

and vide his representation dated 03.01.2014 he

made request before the inquiry officer to produce

the complainant for examination and to supply the

following additional documents as referred above.

(xviii) In reply to his representation dated 03.01.2014 the

inquiry officer informed the petitioner vide its letter

2026:JHHC:25969-DB

7

dated 31.03.2014 that to call upon the complainant

for his examination is not allowed. It was also

informed that the supply of additional/defence

documents cannot be supplied as the same is not

available/traceable except his service book.

(xix) Thereafter, the petitioner approached before the

learned CAT by preferring O.A No.051/ 00116 /

2014(R) to drop the said de-novo inquiry but the

same was dismissed at the admission stage itself

being pre-mature with a liberty to the petitioner to

approach the learned Tribunal afresh with such

grounds.

(xx) The respondent-authority without awaiting the

outcome of the said OA has concluded the

departmental inquiry and submitted a report dated

26.09.2014 against the petitioner without examining

the so-called complainant and the headmaster of the

concerned school.

(xxi) The petitioner has made representation dated

22.11.2014 specifically stating therein that the

inquiry is not fair and proper. It was specifically

stated that the alleged pre-recorded statement dated

23.08.2005 made before the Vigilance Department

was recorded under threat as he was not in a proper

state of mind.

2026:JHHC:25969-DB

8

(xxii) Thereafter, the disciplinary authority has passed the

punishment order dated 13.02.2015 whereby and

whereunder he has been removed from his service

with immediate effect.

(xxiii) The petitioner approached the appellate authority

vide his appeal dated 27.03.2015 raising all his

grievances but the said appeal was also rejected vide

order dated 28.07.2015.

(xxiv) Thereafter the petitioner has challenged the

disciplinary order dated 13.02.2015 and appellate

order dated 28.07.2015 by filing O.A being O.A

No.051/00205/2015 which was also dismissed vide

order dated 17.05.2017.

3. Being aggrieved, the petitioner has approached this Court

by way of filing the instant writ petition.

4. It is evident from the factual aspect that the

petitioner/applicant while in service working as Black Smith, Gr.II

has been proceeded by initiating a departmental proceeding which

finally culminating into the order of removal from service vide

order dated 13.02.2015. The order of removal from service has

been challenged by the applicant by filing an appeal before the

appellate authority which was also dismissed vide order

28.07.2015. Thereafter the petitioner has approached the learned

CAT for quashing and setting aside the order dated 13.02.2015

passed by the disciplinary authority and the order dated 28.07.2015

passed by the appellate authority but was dismissed vide order

2026:JHHC:25969-DB

9

dated 17.05.2017 by the learned Tribunal, which is the subject

matter of the present writ petition.

Submission of the learned counsel for the writ-petitioner:

5. The learned senior counsel appearing for the writ

petitioner-delinquent employee has taken the following grounds:

(i) The complainant has not been examined which caused

serious prejudice;

(ii) The documents have not been exhibited by calling upon the

witnesses in course of inquiry which violates the principle of

natural justice, and

(iii) The very basis of the removal from service was due to the

certificate given by the Principal of Gautam Uchha

Vidyalaya, Bhojpur, the content thereof has not been proved

by the author of the said certificate/letter, i.e, the headmaster

and the same has been taken as a piece of evidence only on

the basis of the averment of one K.K. Ganguly, CVI(A/Cs),

Vigilance Wing of the authority who has been authorized to

investigate the matter is not proper and it may be liable to be

quashed and set aside;

(iv) It is further submitted that the applicant/petitioner in his

defence statement had categorically denied the allegation

and had fully explained that his clarificatory statement was

recorded by the Vigilance Branch under threat and coercion.

The fact is that the applicant/petitioner was compelled to put

his signature on the said clarificatory statement, which

2026:JHHC:25969-DB

10

cannot be used against him unless it is brought on record in

accordance with law;

(v) The Rule 9 of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal)

Rules, 1968 (in short, the Rule of 1968) has not been

followed which provides all procedure to be followed

including the documents which are to be exhibited by the

witnesses to be produced by the Establishment/authority

concerned.

6. In support of her contention, the learned senior counsel

has relied upon the following judgments:

(i) “Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank & Ors.”

(2009) 2 SCC 570; and

(ii) “Commissioner of Police, Delhi & Ors. v. Jai Bhagwan:,

(2011) 6 SCC 376

Submission of the learned counsel for the respondents:

7. While on the other hand, Mrs. Bakshi Vibha, the learned

CGC has taken the following grounds:

(i) There is no need for interference in the impugned orders,

since, all opportunities have been granted to the writ

petitioner in the de- novo inquiry;

(ii) Even though the complainant has not been examined but

the certificate which has been said to be issued by the

concerned school on verification has been found to be

fake and forged as it was not issued by the said school

authority which has been brought to the notice of the

2026:JHHC:25969-DB

11

inquiry officer by K.K. Ganguli, the then CVI(A/Cs) as a

Court witness who has been declined to cross examine by

the petitioner;

(iii) It has been contended that it is incorrect on the part of the

petitioner/applicant that the relevant documents have not

been supplied to him, rather his service book, copy of

medical certificate and copy of the family declaration of

late Nagina, Ex-B/Smith WRS/Adra were supplied to

him;

8. The learned counsel, based upon the aforesaid ground, has

submitted that the order of the disciplinary authority dated

13.02.2015, order of the appellate authority dated 28.07.2015 and

the order dated 17.05.2017 passed by the learned Tribunal need no

interference.

Analysis:

9. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and

gone through the pleadings made in the instant writ petition as also

the findings recorded by the learned Tribunal in the impugned

order.

10. This Court is now proceeding to examine the legality and

propriety of the impugned order in the admitted premises of the

fact that the respondent-applicant has been proceeded

departmentally by initiating a departmental proceeding which

culminating into the order of removal from service as would be

evident from the orders passed by the authority in this regard.

2026:JHHC:25969-DB

12

11. This Court, before appreciating the argument advanced on

behalf of the writ petitioner and respondent as also the legality and

propriety of the impugned order, thinks it proper to first refer about

the jurisdiction which is to be exercised under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India as has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court

in its Constitution Bench judgment rendered in the case of “ L.

Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and Ors.”, (1997) 3 SCC 261,

relevant paragraph-99 thereof is quoted hereunder as:

"99. In view of the reasoning adopted by us, we hold that

clause 2(d) of Article 323-A and clause 3(d) of Article

323-B, to the extent they exclude the jurisdiction of the

High Courts and the Supreme Court under Articles

226/227 and 32 of the Constitution, are unconstitutional.

Section 28 of the Act and the "exclusion of jurisdiction"

clauses in all other legislations enacted under the aegis of

Articles 323- A and 323-B would, to the same extent, be

unconstitutional. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High

Courts under Articles 226/227 and upon the Supreme

Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is a part of the

inviolable basic structure of our Constitution. While this

jurisdiction cannot be ousted, other courts and Tribunals

may perform a supplemental role in discharging the

powers conferred by Articles 226/227 and 32 of the

Constitution. The Tribunals created under Article 323-A

and Article 323- B of the Constitution are possessed of the

competence to test the constitutional validity of statutory

provisions and rules. All decisions of these Tribunals will,

however, be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of

the High Court within whose jurisdiction the Tribunal

concerned falls. The Tribunals will, nevertheless, continue

to act like courts of first instance in respect of the areas of

law for which they have been constituted. It will not,

therefore, be open for litigants to directly approach the

High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of

statutory legislations (except where the legislation which

creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by

2026:JHHC:25969-DB

13

overlooking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned.

Section 5(6) of the Act is valid and constitutional and is to

be interpreted in the manner we have indicated."

12. It is evident from the ratio laid down therein that the

power of judicial review has been deliberated by the Hon'ble Apex

Court, which is to be considered while exercising the said power

only to the extent that if any order is being passed found to be

having error on the face of the order or without jurisdiction or

suffers from perversity. The error apparent on the face of the order

means that if the order appears on its face having with error, then

only the power of judicial review is to be exercised.

13. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of “West Bengal

Central School Service Commission vs. Abdul Halim”, (2019) 18

SCC 39, has held at paragraph-30 that the power of judicial review

must be exercised by the Court after determining that the order

impugned is vitiated by an error apparent on the face of the record

and not the same has been established by a process of reasoning.

Paragraph-30 of the aforesaid judgment is being referred as under:

"30. In exercise of its power of judicial review, the Court

is to see whether the decision impugned is vitiated by an

apparent error of law. The test to determine whether a

decision is vitiated by error apparent on the face of the

record is whether the error is self-evident on the face of

the record or whether the error requires examination or

argument to establish it. If an error has to be established

by a process of reasoning, on points where there may

reasonably be two opinions, it cannot be said to be an

error on the face of the record, as held by this Court in

Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Millikarjun

Bhavanappa Tirumale [Satyanarayan Laxminarayan

Hegde v. Millikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale, AIR 1960 SC

137] . ---."

2026:JHHC:25969-DB

14

14. In the case of T.C. Basappa vs. T. Nagappa and Anr.,

(1955) 1 SCR 250, their Lordships have held that the patent error

in a decision can be corrected by writ of certiorari, when it is

manifested by the error apparent on the face of the proceedings.

The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment is quoted

hereunder:

"11. ... An error in the decision or determination itself may

also be amenable to a writ of certiorari but it must be a

manifest error apparent on the face of the proceedings e.g.

when it is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the

provisions of law. In other words, it is a patent error

which can be corrected by certiorari but not a mere wrong

decision. ...."

15. This Court is now proceeding to examine as to whether

the order passed by the learned Tribunal either suffers from the

element of having error on the face of the order or without

jurisdiction or suffers from perversity.

16. This Court has gone into both the inquiry reports. The

first inquiry report dated 31.12.2007 which has been held to be

perverse and based upon that the order of removal which has been

passed by the disciplinary authority had been quashed by the

learned Tribunal vide its order dated 01.08.2011 passed in O.A

No.138 of 2009 (R) with a direction to reinstate the

applicant/petitioner in service with immediate effect and pay all

consequential benefits to him. However, the liberty is granted to

the authority to conduct a de-novo inquiry and pass a fresh order in

accordance with law.

2026:JHHC:25969-DB

15

17. Being aggrieved, the respondent-authority had moved

before this Court by filing W.P(S) No.715 of 2012 which was also

dismissed vide order dated 09.01.2013.

18. Thereafter, the de-novo inquiry has been conducted as per

the inquiry report available in Annexure-12.

19. This Court has gone through the said inquiry report and

found that the complainant was not examined in the earlier

proceeding and in the de-novo inquiry also the complainant has not

been brought to cross examine by the petitioner.

20. It is also admission on the part of the disciplinary

authority as per the inquiry report that the headmaster who had

issued the certificate/letter with regard to non-issuance of any

certificate in favour of the petitioner has also not been called upon

for cross-examination or even for exhibiting the said document.

21. It is also admitted fact that one K.K. Ganguly, the then

C.V.I. (A/Cs) posted in the Vigilance Wing of the respondent

authority, had verified and got a certificate/letter from the

headmaster stating therein that no such certificate has been issued

in favour of the petitioner showing the proof of studying in the said

school.

22. It needs to refer herein that the respondent has formulated

the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968 wherein

the detail procedure of initiating the proceeding and inflicting

punishment has been provided under Rule 9, for ready reference

the Rule 9 is being referred hereunder as:

“9. Procedure for imposing Major Penalties -It is evident

from the provision of Rule 9 that adequate and sufficient

2026:JHHC:25969-DB

16

opportunity is to be provided to the delinquent employee. It

has also been provided therein that if any document is being

relied upon the disciplinary authority or the inquiry officer

contained thereof is strictly to be proved by the authority at

the time of marking exhibits.

(1) No order imposing any of the penalties specified in

clauses (v) to (ix) of Rule 6 shall be made except after an

inquiry held, as far as may be, in the manner provided in

this rule and Rule 10, or in the manner provided by the

Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850 (37 of 1850) where

such inquiry is held under that Act.

(2) Whenever the disciplinary authority is of the opinion that

there are grounds for inquiring into the truth of any

imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour against a

Railway servant, it may itself inquire into, or appoint under

this rule or under the provisions of the Public Servants

(Inquiries) Act, 1850, as the case may be, a Board of Inquiry

or other authority to inquire into the truth thereof.

Provided that were there is a complaint of

sexual harassment within the meaning of rule 3 C of

the Railway Services (Conduct) Rules, 1966, the

Complaints Committee established for inquiring

into such complaints, shall be deemed to be the

inquiring authority appointed by the disciplinary

authority for the purpose of these rules and the

Complaints Committee shall hold, if separate

procedure has not been prescribed for the

Complaints Committee for holding the inquiry into

the complaints of sexual harassment, the inquiry as

far as practicable in accordance with the procedure

laid down in these rules.

(3) Where a Board of Inquiry is appointed under sub-rule

(2) it shall consist of not less than two members, each of

whom shall be higher in rank than the Railway servant

against whom the inquiry is being held and none of whom

shall be subordinate to the other member or members as the

case may be, of such Board.

(4) Where the Board of Inquiry consists of two or more than

two members, the senior member shall be the Presiding

Officer.

(5) Every decision of the Board of Inquiry shall be passed by

majority of votes, and where there is an equality of votes on

the findings, the finding of each member shall be

incorporated in the report prepared under clause (i) of sub-

rule (25).

Explanation - Where the disciplinary authority

itself holds the inquiry, any reference in sub-rule

(12) and in sub-rules (14) to (25), to the inquiring

authority shall be construed as a reference to the

disciplinary authority.

(6) Where it is proposed to hold an inquiry against a

Railway servant under this rule and Rule 10, the

2026:JHHC:25969-DB

17

disciplinary authority shall draw up or cause to be drawn

up –

(i) the substance of the imputations of misconduct or

misbehaviour into definite and distinct articles of charge;

(ii) a statement of the imputations of misconduct or

misbehaviour in support of each article of charge which

shall contain –

(a) a statement of all relevant facts including

any admission or confession made by the

Railway servant;

(b) a list of documents by which, and a list of

witnesses by whom, the articles of charge are

proposed to be sustained.

(7) The disciplinary authority shall deliver or cause to be

delivered to the Railway servant a copy of the articles of

charge, the statement of the imputations of misconduct or

misbehaviour and a list of documents and witnesses by which

each article of charge is proposed to be sustained and shall

require the Railway servant to submit a written statement of his

defence within ten days or such further time as the disciplinary

authority may allow.

Note: - If copies of documents have not been delivered to the

Railway servant along with the articles of charge and if he desires to

inspect the same for the preparation of his defence, he may do so,

within 10 days from the date of receipt of the articles of charge by

him and complete inspection within ten days thereafter and shall

state whether he desires to be heard in person.

(8) The Railway servant may, for the purpose of his

defence submit with the written statement of his defence, a

list of witnesses to be examined on his behalf.

Note: - If the Railway servant applies in writing for the supply of

copies of the statements of witnesses mentioned in the list referred to

in sub-rule (6), the disciplinary authority shall furnish him with a copy

each of such statement as early as possible and in any case not later

than three days before the commencement of the examination of the

witnesses on behalf of the disciplinary authority.

(9) (a) (i) On receipt of the written statement of defence, the

disciplinary authority shall consider the same and decide whether

the inquiry should be proceeded with under this rule.

(ii) Where the disciplinary authority decides to proceed with the

inquiry it may itself inquire into such of the articles of charge as are

not admitted or appoint under sub-rule (2) a Board of Inquiry or

other authority for the purpose.

2026:JHHC:25969-DB

18

(iii) Where all the articles of charge have been admitted by the

Railway servant in his written statement of defence, the disciplinary

authority shall record its findings on each charge, after taking such

further evidence as it may think fit and shall act in the manner laid

down in Rule 10.

(iv) If the disciplinary authority, after consideration of the written

statement of defence, is of the opinion that the imposition of a major

penalty is not necessary, it may drop the proceedings already

initiated by it for imposition of major penalty, without prejudice to

its right to impose any of the minor penalties, not attracting the

provisions of sub-rule (2) of Rule 11. Where the disciplinary

authority so drops the proceedings but considers it appropriate to

impose any of the minor penalties, not attracting the provisions of

sub-rule (2) of Rule 11, it may make an order imposing such penalty

and it will not be necessary to give the Railway servant any further

opportunity of making representation before the penalty is imposed.

(b) If no written statement of defence is submitted by the Railway

servant, the disciplinary authority may itself inquire into the

articles of charge or may, if it considers it necessary to do so,

appoint, under sub-rule (2) an inquiring authority for the purpose

and also inform the Railway servant of such appointment.

(c) Where the disciplinary authority itself inquires into an article of

charge or appoints a Board of Inquiry or any other inquiring

authority for holding an inquiry into such charge, it may, by an

order in writing, appoint a railway or any other Government

servant to be known as Presenting Officer to present on its behalf

the case in support of the articles of charge.”

23. It is evident from the provision of Rule 9 that adequate

and sufficient opportunity is to be provided to the delinquent

employee. It is also provided therein that if the disciplinary

authority or the inquiry officer relies upon any document, the

contents thereof must be strictly proved by the authority at the time

of marking exhibits.

24. Further, the general law is that if any proceeding has been

initiated on the basis of a complaint, then the complainant is

required to be examined mandatorily, reference in this regard be

2026:JHHC:25969-DB

19

made to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court rendered in the

case of Madhya Pradesh vs. Chintaman Sadashiva

Waishampayan, 1060 SCC OnLine SC 82 wherein at paragraph-

11 it has been observed which reads as under:

“11. … As Venkatarama Aiyar, J. has observed in Union

of India v. T.R. Varma [(1958) SCR 499 at p. 507]

“stating it broadly and without intending it to be

exhaustive it may be observed that rules of natural justice

require that a party should have the opportunity of

adducing all relevant evidence on which he relies, that the

evidence of the opponent should be taken in his presence,

and that he should be given the opportunity of cross-

examining the witnesses examined by that party, and that

no materials should be relied on against him without his

being given an opportunity of explaining them”. It is

hardly necessary to emphasise that the right to cross-

examine the witnesses who give evidence against him is a

very valuable right, and if it appears that effective exercise

of this right has been prevented by the enquiry officer by

not giving to the officer relevant documents to which he is

entitled, that inevitably would be that the enquiry had not

been held in accordance with rules of natural justice. That

is the view taken by the High Court, and in the present

appeal which has been brought to this Court under Article

136 we see no justification for interfering with it. In this

connection it would be relevant to refer to the decision of

this Court in Khem Chand v. Union of India [(1958) SCR

1080 at p. 1096] where this Court has emphasised the

importance of giving an opportunity to the public officer

defend himself by cross-examining the witnesses produced

against him.”

25. Further, on fairness of inquiry, the Hon’ble Apex Court

has propounded the proposition in the judgment rendered in the

case of Union of India and ors. Vs. Gyan Chand Chattar reported

in (2009)12 SCC 78, wherein at para-35 it has been observed

which reads as under:-

2026:JHHC:25969-DB

20

“…Enquiry has to be conducted fairly, objectively and

not subjectively. ”..

26. Further in the case of State of U.P. and ors. vs Saroj

Kumar Sinha, reported in (2010) 2 SCC 772, the Hon’ble Apex

Court has held in paragraph-30, which reads as under: -

“30. When a departmental enquiry is conducted against

the government servant it cannot be treated as a casual

exercise. The enquiry proceedings also cannot be

conducted with a closed mind. The inquiry officer has to

be wholly unbiased. The rules of natural justice are

required to be observed to ensure not only that justice is

done but is manifestly seen to be done. The object of rules

of natural justice is to ensure that a government servant is

treated fairly in proceedings which may culminate in

imposition of punishment including dismissal/removal

from service.”

27. Now adverting to the facts of the present case, it is

admitted fact that the complainant has not been examined on the

basis of which the entire proceeding has been initiated even though

the same has specifically been pleaded but there is no finding to

that effect by the learned Tribunal.

28. The heavy reliance has been placed by the disciplinary

authority on the fakeness of the certificate which was said to be

corroborated by the headmaster of the concerned school but the

veracity of the content of the said letter/certificate has not been

exhibited by the staff/headmaster of the concerned school who was

the author, i.e., the headmaster of the concerned school and thereby

the petitioner has been deprived of the opportunity to cross

examine the headmaster of the concerned school.

29. Further, the aforesaid letter/certificate said to be issued by

the headmaster of the concerned school has been taken in evidence

2026:JHHC:25969-DB

21

for its consideration for forming an opinion in support of proof of

charge against the delinquent employee is only the version of one

K.K. Ganguly, the then CVI, (A/Cs).

30. Further, it is evident from the factual aspect that the basis

of inflicting punishment in the fact-finding inquiry as would be

evident from the report of the Vigilance Wing and the said inquiry

report, since, has been made basis and based upon that said K.K.

Ganguly being the part of the Vigilance Wing of the establishment

cannot be said to be an independent witness, rather it is highly

prejudiced to have with the prejudiced mind to support the

preliminary inquiry.

31. The law is well settled that the findings recorded by an

inquiry officer in a fact-finding report are not for the purpose of

establishing the petitioner’s guilt, but are strictly intended to

determine whether the allegations have a prima facie foundation

for framing a charge, reference in this regard be made to the

judgment of Nirmala J. Jhala v. State of Gujarat reported in

(2013) 4 SCC 301, the relevant paragraph of the aforesaid

judgment are being quoted as under:

42. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Amalendu Ghosh

v. North Eastern Railway [AIR 1960 SC 992] , held that

the purpose of holding a preliminary inquiry in respect of

a particular alleged misconduct is only for the purpose of

finding a particular fact and prima facie, to know as to

whether the alleged misconduct has been committed and

on the basis of the findings recorded in preliminary

inquiry, no order of punishment can be passed. It may be

used only to take a view as to whether a regular

disciplinary proceeding against the delinquent is required

to be held.

2026:JHHC:25969-DB

22

43. Similarly in Champaklal Chimanlal Shah v. Union of

India [AIR 1964 SC 1854] a Constitution Bench of this

Court while taking a similar view held that preliminary

inquiry should not be confused with regular inquiry. The

preliminary inquiry is not governed by the provisions of

Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. Preliminary

inquiry may be held ex parte, for it is merely for the

satisfaction of the Government though usually for the sake

of fairness, an explanation may be sought from the

government servant even at such an inquiry. But at that

stage, he has no right to be heard as the inquiry is merely

for the satisfaction of the Government as to whether a

regular inquiry must be held. The Court further held as

under : (AIR p. 1862, para 12)

“12. … There must therefore be no confusion between the

two enquiries and it is only when the government proceeds

to hold a departmental enquiry for the purpose of

inflicting on the government servant one of the three

major punishments indicated in Article 311 that the

government servant is entitled to the protection of that

article [, nor prior to that].”

(emphasis added)

(See also Govt. of India v. Tarak Nath Ghosh [(1971) 1

SCC 734 : AIR 1971 SC 823. Ed. : See paras 10 to 14

thereof in SCC where the distinction between a

preliminary and regular enquiry has been discussed.

Tarak Nath Ghosh has however been overruled on other

points in P.R. Nayak v. Union of India, (1972) 1 SCC 332

and T.V. Nataraj v. State of Karnataka, (1994) 2 SCC 32.]

.)

44. In Narayan Dattatraya Ramteerthakhar v. State of

Maharashtra [(1997) 1 SCC 299 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 152 :

AIR 1997 SC 2148] this Court dealt with the issue and

held as under:

“… a preliminary inquiry has nothing to do with the

enquiry conducted after issue of charge-sheet. The

preliminary enquiry is only to find out whether

disciplinary enquiry should be initiated against the

delinquent. Once regular enquiry is held under the Rules,

the preliminary enquiry loses its importance and, whether

preliminary enquiry was held strictly in accordance with

2026:JHHC:25969-DB

23

law or by observing principles of natural justice of (sic)

nor, remains of no consequence.”

(emphasis added)

45. In view of the above, it is evident that the evidence

recorded in preliminary inquiry cannot be used in regular

inquiry as the delinquent is not associated with it, and

opportunity to cross examine the persons examined in

such inquiry is not given. Using such evidence would be

violative of the principles of natural justice.

32. This Court is conscious with the fact that in the

disciplinary proceeding if the decision has been taken by the

disciplinary authority, then the least interference is to be required

in exercise of the power conferred under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India.

33. It is equally well-settled law that although departmental

proceedings are governed by the preponderance of probability,

charges must be established through cogent evidence and in

compliance with the principles of natural justice, reference in this

regard may be made to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court

rendered in the case of State of Karnataka and Anr. vs. Umesh,

reported in (2022) 6 SCC 563, wherein, at paragraphs- 18 and 19 it

has been held that mere on probabilities, no punishment can be

imposed in the departmental proceeding. For ready reference, the

same is being referred as under:-

“18. In the course of the submissions, the respondents placed

reliance on the decision in Union of India v. Gyan Chand

Chattar [Union of India v. Gyan Chand Chattar, (2009) 12 SCC

78]. In that case, six charges were framed against the

respondent. One of the charges was that he demanded a

commission of 1% for paying the railway staff. The enquiry

officer found all the six charges proved. The disciplinary

authority agreed with those findings and imposed the

2026:JHHC:25969-DB

24

punishment of reversion to a lower rank. Allowing the petition

under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court observed

that there was no evidence to hold that he was guilty of the

charge of bribery since the witnesses only said that the

motive/reason for not making the payment could be the

expectation of a commission amount. The respondent placed

reliance on the following passages from the decision : (SCC pp.

85 & 87, paras 21 & 31)

“21. Such a serious charge of corruption requires to be

proved to the hilt as it brings both civil and criminal

consequences upon the employee concerned. He would be

liable to be prosecuted and would also be liable to suffer

severest penalty awardable in such cases. Therefore, such a

grave charge of quasicriminal nature was required to be

proved beyond the shadow of doubt and to the hilt. It cannot

be proved on mere probabilities.

31. … wherein it has been held that the punishment should

always be proportionate to the gravity of the misconduct.

However, in a case of corruption, the only punishment is

dismissal from service. Therefore, the charge of corruption

must always be dealt with keeping in mind that it has both

civil and criminal consequences.”

19. The observations in para 21 of Gyan Chand Chattar case

[Union of India v. Gyan Chand Chattar, (2009) 12 SCC 78] are

not the ratio decidendi of the case. These observations were

made while discussing the judgment [Union of India v. Gyan

Chand Chattar, 2002 SCC OnLine Guj 548] of the High Court.

The ratio of the judgment emerges in the subsequent passages of

the judgment, where the test of relevant material and

compliance with natural justice as laid down in Rattan Singh

[State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh, (1977) 2 SCC 491] was

reiterated : (Gyan Chand Chattar case [Union of India v. Gyan

Chand Chattar, (2009) 12 SCC 78] , SCC p. 88, paras 35-36)

“35. … an enquiry is to be conducted against any person

giving strict adherence to the statutory provisions and

principles of natural justice. The charges should be specific,

definite and giving details of the incident which formed the

basis of charges. No enquiry can be sustained on vague

charges. Enquiry has to be conducted fairly, objectively and

not subjectively. Finding should not be perverse or

unreasonable, nor the same should be based on conjectures

2026:JHHC:25969-DB

25

and surmises. There is a distinction in proof and suspicion.

Every act or omission on the part of the delinquent cannot be

a misconduct. The authority must record reasons for arriving

at the finding of fact in the context of the statute defining the

misconduct.

36. In fact, initiation of the enquiry against the respondent

appears to be the outcome of anguish of superior officers as

there had been an agitation by the railway staff demanding

the payment of pay and allowances and they detained the

train illegally and there has been too much hue and cry for

several hours on the railway station. The enquiry officer has

taken into consideration the nonexisting material and failed

to consider the relevant material and finding of all facts

recorded by him cannot be sustained in the eye of the law.”

(emphasis supplied) On the charge of corruption, the Court

observed in the above decision that there was no relevant

material to sustain the conviction of the respondent since

there was only hearsay evidence where the witnesses

assumed that the motive for not paying the railway staff

“could be” corruption. Therefore, the standard that was

applied by the Court for determining the validity of the

departmental proceedings was whether (i) there was relevant

material for arriving at the finding; and (ii) the principles of

natural justice were complied with.”

34. Further, in the case of High Court of Judicature at

Bombay Vs. Uday Singh and others, reported in (1997) 5 SCC

129, the law has been laid down that in the departmental

proceeding the cogent evidence is required to be there for inflicting

punishment. For ready reference, paragraph-10 is being referred as

under:

“-------- the doctrine of proof beyond doubt has no

application. Preponderance of probabilities and some

material on record would be necessary to reach a

conclusion whether or not the delinquent has committed

misconduct-------.”

35. Herein, in the entirety of the facts and circumstances the

fact about non-examination of the complainant, no corroboration

2026:JHHC:25969-DB

26

of the said certificate issued by the headmaster of the school, i.e.,

its author, relying upon the fact-finding inquiry and non-

examination of the complainant is the vital aspect of the matter

which is to be considered for the purpose of fairness and

transparent of the departmental inquiry which is mandatorily

required. On the issue of non-examination of the complainant the

Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Commissioner of Police, Delhi

Ors. Vs. Jai Bhagwan reported in (2011) 6 SCC 376 has observed

which reads as under :

“16. .. Non-examination of the complainant and P.S.

Narang during the departmental proceeding has denied

the respondent of his right of cross- examination and thus

caused violation of Rule 16(iii) of the Delhi Police (F&A)

Rules, 1980.

17. In the absence of such a definite/clear proof

supporting the case of the appellants it is difficult to draw

a finding of taking illegal gratification by the respondent

from the complainant. Therefore, as rightly held by the

High Court the present case is a case of no evidence.”

36. This Court after having discussed the factual aspect as

well as the legal aspect is now adverting to the order passed by the

learned Tribunal and found therefrom the following infirmity:

(i) Non-examination of the complainant has not been

taken into consideration in the inquiry report,

since, there is no finding to that effect;

(ii) Reliance has been placed upon the certificate of the

school said to be issued by the headmaster of the

concerned school, but there is no consideration

with respect to the fact that the content of the said

letter which was to be proved by the headmaster of

2026:JHHC:25969-DB

27

the concerned school has not been called upon for

its examination so as to have an opportunity to the

writ petitioner to cross-examine him so as to follow

the principle of natural justice;

(iii) The certificate/letter said to be issued by the

headmaster of the concerned school has been taken

to be admitted for the purpose of framing the

charge is based upon the evidence of K.K.

Ganguly, the then CVI (A/Cs) in the Vigilance

Wing of the establishment, who cannot be said to

be the competent witness to prove the content of

the letter/certificate said to be issued by the

headmaster of the concerned school.

37. All these facts which are required to be followed

mandatorily as per the judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court, as

referred hereinabove, have not been taken into consideration by the

authority in right perspective.

38. This Court, based upon the finding recorded by the

learned Tribunal as well as the authority concerned, is of the view

that the said finding is perverse and without following the settled

principle of law while passing the capital punishment of removal

from service that too, after rendering 28 years of service by the

petitioner.

39. Accordingly, the order dated 17.05.2017 passed by the

learned Tribunal in O.A No.051/00205/2015 is hereby quashed and

set aside.

2026:JHHC:25969-DB

28

40. Consequently, the order dated 13.02.2015 passed by the

disciplinary authority and the order dated 28.07.2015 passed by the

appellate authority are also quashed and set aside.

41. In the result, the instant writ petition stands allowed.

42. Consequence to follow.

43. Pending I.As, if any, stands disposed of.

(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)

I Agree.

(Pradeep Kumar Srivastava, J.)

( Pradeep Kumar Srivastava, J.)

Sudhir

Dated:27/08/2026

Jharkhand High Court, Ranchi

AFR

Uploaded on 28/08/2026.