2026 INSC 850 SLP (Crl.) No.7030 of 2026 Page 1 of 18

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2026

@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.7030 OF 2026

BALESH KUMAR KURAITI … APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF CHHATTISGARH … RESPONDENT (S)

J U D G M E N T

ARAVIND KUMAR, J.

“It’s not worth the tears of that one tortured child who beat

itself on the breast with its little fist and rayed in its

stinking outhouse, with its unexpiated tears to ‘dear, kind

God’! It’s not worth it, because those tears are unatoned

for. They must be atoned for, or there can be no harmony.

But how?”

1. Heard. Leave Granted.

2. Ivan Karamazov, in Dostoevsky's The Brothers Karamazov,

rejects harmony at the cost of a child’s tears. Indeed, a child

SLP (Crl.) No.7030 of 2026 Page 2 of 18

which is tormented reaches out to the kind God for answers,

for it does not understand the agony or the harrowing

experience it had and simply wants to understand why. Those

innocent painful tears have to be atoned for. We cannot restore

the childhood or the beautiful dreams that the child carried but

we can soothe the child with the powers bestowed on us, to

show the child that there is someone to dry its tears.

3. Before us stands Balesh Kumar Kuraiti, the Appellant who is

accused of committing aggravated penetrative sexual assault

on a victim minor girl aged 3. The case of the prosecution

begins with the lodging of the First Information Report No.

35/2016

1

before the Police Station of Ambagarh Chowki in

Rajnandgaon District by the father of the victim, Dinesh Tope

(PW-2). He accounts that in the evening of 17.02.2016, at

about 7.00 pm, he was at the house of Bansilal Sori (PW-5)

when he heard the sound of a child crying or two cats fighting.

At that time, Tejram (PW-4), victim’s father’s uncle, came and

told Dinesh Tope (PW-2) that when he had gone to urinate in

Ashok’s Badi, he too heard the same sound and when he threw

1

Hereinafter referred to as ‘FIR’

SLP (Crl.) No.7030 of 2026 Page 3 of 18

a stone at the direction of the sound, it stopped. But while

returning back, Tejram (PW-4) heard the sound of a girl crying.

4. When the father of the victim, Dinesh Tope (PW-2), returned

to his house along with Tejram (PW-4), the mother of the

victim, Devki Bai (PW-1), told them that the victim child (PW-

6) has suffered injury marks on both her cheeks, nose, lips and

was bleeding from her private part. She also told PW-2 that the

Appellant-Accused, who was a guest at their aunt Desh Bai’s

house, was carrying the victim on his lap at about 6.30 pm and

then took her away. After some time, the victim returned back

crying and had injuries on her body. PW-1 also told PW-2 that

their child had been raped.

5. The incident was reported before the police and FIR No.

35/2016 was registered on 17.02.2016 against the Appellant-

Accused for offences under sections 376(2)(i) of the Indian

Penal Code, 1860

2

and sections 4 and 8 of the Protection of

Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012.

3

The investigation

was conducted by R. K. Singh Rana (PW-19), who seized the

victim's pajamas and undergarments at Ashok’s Badi. Pending

2

Hereinafter referred to as the ‘IPC’

3

Hereinafter referred to as the ‘POCSO Act’

SLP (Crl.) No.7030 of 2026 Page 4 of 18

investigation, both the victim (PW-6) and the accused were

subjected to medical examinations following the latter's arrest.

6. Following the investigation and the arrest of the Appellant-

Accused on 18.02.2016, the case was tried by the Additional

Sessions Judge, FTC, Rajnandgaon (Chhattisgarh)

4

who had

framed charges under section 376(2)(i) of IPC and sections 6

and 8 of the POCSO Act.

7. The Learned Trial Court weighed in on the corroborative

witness testimonies of the victim (PW-6), the mother (PW-1)

and father of the victim (PW-2) along with documentary

evidence such as the Forensic Science Laboratory Report and

Medical Examination of the victim child (PW-6) and the

Appellant-Accused. The injuries found on the victim child

(PW-6) were supported by the deposition of Dr. Subhadra

Thakur (PW-21) who found abrasions on the left cheek, nose

and upper lip along with lacerated wounds on the genitalia of

the victim. The victim child was further subject to medical

examination before Dr. V.P. Khunte (PW-18) on 18.02.2016

who inferred that the victim child was subjected to forcible

sexual assault due to swollen external genitalia, cuts and

4

Hereinafter referred to as the ‘Trial Court’

SLP (Crl.) No.7030 of 2026 Page 5 of 18

bruises on the vagina which also caused pain to the victim

child.

8. The victim (PW-6), aged three in her testimony before the

Learned Trial Court categorically stated that the Appellant-

Accused had taken her on his lap and threw her on the ground.

She further deposed that the Appellant-Accused bit her cheeks

and took her to Badi where he threw her and removed her

undergarments. The Forensic Laboratory Reports also

confirmed the presence of human sperm on the vaginal slide of

the victim child. On perusal of the deposition of the child and

the medical reports, we have no doubt in observing that the

Appellant-Accused has indulged in such a criminal act, making

it difficult for us to comprehend the unimaginable trauma

endured by a child so young.

9. Upon careful appreciation of the oral and documentary

evidence, as well as the testimonies of the witnesses, the

Learned Trial Court vide Judgment dated 18.04.2017, found

the Appellant-Accused guilty of offences punishable under

Section 376(2)(i) of the IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act,

2012. Crucially, during the hearing on sentence, the Learned

Trial Court observed that despite this being the Appellant-

Accused’s first offence, the gravity and heinous nature of the

SLP (Crl.) No.7030 of 2026 Page 6 of 18

crime warranted no leniency. Consequently, the Court

sentenced the Appellant-Accused to imprisonment for life

along with fine of Rs. 10,000/- (Ten Thousand Rupees) and in

default for payment of fine, additional sentence of simple

imprisonment of 1 year, for both offences, i.e., under Section

376(2)(i) of the IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012.

The said sentences on both the offences were to run

concurrently.

10. Assailing the judgment of conviction awarded by the Learned

Trial Court, Appellant-Accused approached the High Court by

way of Criminal Appeal No. 872/2017. Although the Learned

High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur, vide Judgment dated

14.02.2024 confirmed and affirmed the conviction of the

Appellant-Accused, it modified the sentence awarded from

imprisonment for life to 20 years of rigorous imprisonment for

both offences, i.e., Section 376(2)(i) of IPC and Section 6 of

POCSO Act (Amendment Act, 2019) in view of the application

of Section 42 of the POCSO Act.

11. Dissatisfied with the concurrent conviction and sentence

imposed on the said accounts, the Appellant-Accused has

preferred the present Special Leave Petition. He has raised his

grievance on the imposition of higher minimum punishment as

SLP (Crl.) No.7030 of 2026 Page 7 of 18

per the 2019 Amendment to the POCSO Act and the approval

of his conviction. This Court vide Order dated 13.04.2026

issued notice strictly on the limited question on the quantum of

sentence. Undisputedly, the sole issue for consideration before

us is with respect to whether the sentence imposed by the High

Court is correct under law. Thus, we make no observations on

the conviction of the Appellant on the said offences and the

conviction awarded by the Trial Court as confirmed by the

High Court requires no interference. With that in mind, we

frame the following question of law -

ISSUE

Whether the High Court is justified in reducing

the substantive sentence of the Appellant-

Accused from life imprisonment to 20 years

rigorous imprisonment by taking the 2019

Amendment to the POCSO Act into

consideration?

12. We answer this question in the negative for the following

reasons and inferences drawn from the careful study of the

law on sentencing and judicial precedents -

In Re: Clarification on Section 6 as it stood before and after

the Amendment Act of 2019

SLP (Crl.) No.7030 of 2026 Page 8 of 18

13. Section 6 of the POCSO Act 2012 (before the Amendment)

stipulated –

“Section 6 Punishment for aggravated penetrative sexual

assault Whoever, commits aggravated penetrative sexual

assault, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for

a term which shall not be less than ten years but which may

extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to

fine.”

14. From a bare reading of this provision, it is to be understood that

the minimum punishment for an offence of aggravated

penetrative sexual assault is a minimum of ten years of rigorous

imprisonment which may extend to imprisonment for life and

also fine.

15. Section 6 after enactment of Amendment Act of 2019 stated-

“Section 6 Punishment for aggravated penetrative sexual

assault. --

(1) Whoever commits aggravated penetrative sexual

assault shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a

term which shall not be less than twenty years, but which

may extend to imprisonment for life, which shall mean

imprisonment for the remainder of natural life of that

person and shall also be liable to fine, or with death.

(2) The fine imposed under sub-section (1) shall be just

and reasonable and paid to the victim to meet the medical

expenses and rehabilitation of such victim.]”

SLP (Crl.) No.7030 of 2026 Page 9 of 18

16. Following the Amendment in 2019, which was brought into

force with effect from 16.09.2019, the phrase “which shall

mean imprisonment for the remainder of natural life of that

person” was added after the words “imprisonment for life”. It

also enhanced the minimum sentence from rigorous

imprisonment of 10 years to rigorous imprisonment of 20

years. The backdrop of amendment as explained in the

Statement of Objects and Reasons to the Amendment Act is

primarily to take stringent action against perpetrators of child

sexual abuse, who by their repeated barbaric acts destroy not

only the childhood but also disturb the mental construct of that

child and lead to destructive social disintegration in the

generations to come. With the paramount interest of the life of

the child, the said amendment was effected to and needless to

say, it operated prospectively.

17. The expression "imprisonment for life", as it stood prior to the

amendment, signifies a sentence of imprisonment for life and

although in literal sense it means that the accused shall remain

imprisoned for the remainder of his life, it does not specifically

bar any statutory remedy available. Imprisonment for life

simpliciter entitles the convict to seek the benefit of early

release as per the statutory regime subject to the fulfilment of

SLP (Crl.) No.7030 of 2026 Page 10 of 18

the prescribed conditions therein. Such considerations,

however, have to be mandatorily fulfilled for the accused

person to avail the benefit of early release such as remission.

18. The jurisprudence on retrospective applicability of criminal

laws has been squarely laid down in a catena of rulings of this

Court. The invocation of Article 20(1) of the Constitution also

makes it clear that every person has a fundamental right only

to be convicted of an offence under the law that was in

operation at the time of commission of the criminal act. Thus,

on prima facie construction, we are of the view that the High

Court erred in applying the punishment prescribed under the

Amended Act of 2019, enhancing the minimum punishment

under Section 6 of the POCSO Act.

19. Most recently, this Court in Satauram Mandavi v. State of

Chhattisgarh & Anr.

5

has squarely observed that Court cannot

impose a sentence that was not within the statutory framework

when the criminal offence was committed. Thus, Section 6 of

the POCSO Act as it stood prior to the 2019 Amendment shall

be applicable in the case of the Appellant-Accused herein.

In Re: Punishment as under Section 376(2)(i) of IPC

5

2025 INSC 892

SLP (Crl.) No.7030 of 2026 Page 11 of 18

20. Since the Appellant-Accused is sentenced for two offences, in

order to ascertain the true meaning of the sentences imposed,

we deem it appropriate to look into Section 376(2)(i) as it stood

before its omission.

“376. Punishment for rape. — (1) Whoever, except in the

cases provided for in sub-section (2), commits rape, shall

be punished with rigorous imprisonment of either

description for a term which [shall not be less than ten

years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and

shall also be liable to fine].

(2) Whoever, —

(a)-(h)….

(i) commits rape on a woman when she is under sixteen

years of age; or

shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term

which shall not be less than ten years, but which may

extend to imprisonment for life, which shall mean

imprisonment for the remainder of that person’s natural

life, and shall also be liable to fine.”

21. A bare reading of Section 376(2)(i) of IPC (as it stood before

its omission) indicates that any offence falling under Section

376(2)(i) would attract rigorous imprisonment for a term which

shall not be less than ten years, but which may extend to

imprisonment for life. Significantly, life imprisonment under

the said provision means “imprisonment for the remainder of

that person’s natural life”, meaning thereby that there are

SLP (Crl.) No.7030 of 2026 Page 12 of 18

almost bleak to no chances of an accused being released early

from prison.

In Re: Applicability of Section 42 of the POCSO Act in the

instant matter

We find it imperative to also discuss the position of Section 42 of

the POCSO Act as the High Court has placed reliance on the same

for modifying the sentence imposed. Section 42 for reference is

extracted below -

“42. Alternate punishment.— Where an act or omission

constitutes an offence punishable under this Act and also

under sections 166A, 354A, 354B, 354C, 354D, 370, 370A,

375, 376, [376A, 376AB, 376B, 376C, 376D, 376DA,

376DB], [376E, section 509 of the Indian Penal Code or

section 67B of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (21 of

2000)], then, notwithstanding anything contained in any

law for the time being in force, the offender found guilty of

such offence shall be liable to punishment only under this

Act or under the Indian Penal Code as provides for

punishment which is greater in degree.”

22. In essence, Section 42 entails that if an accused is convicted

under both the IPC and POCSO, the greater of the punishment

imposed amongst the two shall prevail.

23. In the instant matter, the Trial Court imposed a sentence of

imprisonment for life for both the offences under Section

376(2)(i) as well as under Section 6 of POCSO to run

SLP (Crl.) No.7030 of 2026 Page 13 of 18

concurrently. Thus, by application of Section 42, the one that

prescribes higher punishment must prevail. Pertinently, as

discussed above, Section 376(2)(i), in our opinion imposes a

higher punishment with the stipulation that imprisonment for

life shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person’s

natural life. However, the said clarification is absent under

Section 6 of the POCSO Act as it stood prior to the amendment.

Although, on a preliminary look, we reckon that the

punishment under Section 376(2)(i) is greater in degree due to

the express stipulation that imprisonment shall be for the

remainder of the person’s natural life, we are guided by the

principles laid down by this Court in various other instances

recounted below –

24. The case of Swamy Shraddananda v. State of Karnataka

6

which was then affirmed in the case of Union of India v. V

Sriharan alias Murugan and Ors

7

squarely sets out the

dilemma regarding sentencing and stated that the question of

fixing the number of years within the broad spectrum of

imprisonment for life is a question for the Courts to decide. For

in a case where the term imprisonment for life is stipulated to

6

(2008) 13 SCC 767

7

(2016) 7 SCC 1

SLP (Crl.) No.7030 of 2026 Page 14 of 18

mean imprisonment for the remainder for the person’s natural

life, it is for the Court to decide on the whether the accused is

to stay incarcerated for the rest of his life or has a possibility of

early release depending on other facts and circumstances.

25. The latest ruling of this Court in the case of Gyanendra Singh

@ Raja Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh

8

dealing with offences

under Section 376(2)(i) of the IPC and Section 3/4 of the

POCSO Act has also considered the said position of law. At

paras 30 - 31, this Court observed -

“30. Keeping in view the aforesaid exposition of the law, we

thus, direct that the ends of justice would be served by

restoring the judgment of the trial Court and directing that

the sentence of life imprisonment awarded to the accused,

by the trial Court, for the offence under Sections 3/4 of the

POCSO Act shall stand revived.

31. For the offences punishable under Sections 376(2)(f)

and 376(2) (i) of IPC, the accused is sentenced to undergo

imprisonment for life, as awarded by the trial Court,

without the stipulation that the life term will enure till the

natural life of the appellant and a fine of Rs. 5,00,000/- and

in default, to further undergo imprisonment of two years.

Both the sentences shall run concurrently.”

26. Although in the case of Gyanendra, the High Court had

specified that the accused therein shall be imprisoned for life

8

2025 INSC 335

SLP (Crl.) No.7030 of 2026 Page 15 of 18

which shall mean for the remainder of his life, from the

exposition of law laid down by this Court it is clear that the

Courts have the discretion to decide the years of imprisonment

to be undergone incase the sentence is of imprisonment for life.

In Re: Failure of the High Court to record any reasons while

modifying the sentence awarded by the Trial Court.

27. The High Court has grossly erred in modifying the sentence

imposed by the Trial Court. The High Court cryptically records

that although the date of offence is prior to the enforcement of

the Amendment to Section 6 of POCSO in 2019 by which the

minimum sentence was enhanced from 10 years to 20 years

imprisonment, the High Court was of the opinion that 20 years

of rigorous imprisonment for both offences would suffice.

28. We are unable to comprehend the rationale of the sentence

imposed by the Learned High Court. On one hand, the High

Court considers the fact that the victim was a minor girl aged

3 but thereafter finds it appropriate to reduce the sentence to 20

years rigorous imprisonment for both offences, i.e., Section

376(2)(i) of IPC and Section 6 of POCSO Act (Amendment

Act, 2019) in view of the application of Section 42 of the

POCSO Act, which in our considered opinion and reasoning

above is not tenable as per Article 20(1) of the Constitution.

SLP (Crl.) No.7030 of 2026 Page 16 of 18

29. The Trial Court, after duly considering all the evidences inter

alia, documentary and oral evidence had rightly taken the view

that the maximum statutory punishment recognised has to be

imposed on the Appellant-Accused. Thus, we set aside the

judgment of the High Court and restore the judgment of the

Trial Court.

30. The Appellant-Accused is hereby sentenced to undergo

imprisonment for life with a fine of Rs. 10,000/- for offences

under Section 6 of POCSO Act, 2012 (prior to amendment) and

imprisonment for life with a fine of Rs. 10,000/- for offences

punishable under Section 376(2)(i) of IPC without the

stipulation that the imprisonment shall run till the natural life

of the Appellant-Accused. Both the sentences shall run

concurrently and the sentences shall include the term already

undergone by the Appellant.

31. Before we part with this matter, we find it necessary to make

certain observations. This is regrettably not the first case to

come before the courts involving the sexual abuse and brutal

violation of a child. What is particularly disturbing is the

increasing frequency of such offences, which, if left

unchecked, threatens the very moral and social fabric of society

in the years to come.

SLP (Crl.) No.7030 of 2026 Page 17 of 18

32. A child who ought to grow up in an atmosphere of love, trust

and security but instead learns fear, mistrust and vulnerability.

The innocence once stolen can mostly never be returned. The

trauma suffered by a child, if left unaddressed and unhealed

may influence the manner in which that child perceives

relationships, authority and society itself. It can impair

emotional well-being, education, self-worth and the ability to

lead a life of dignity. The damage extends beyond the

individual victim, affecting families, communities and

ultimately the collective conscience of the Society, which leads

to social disintegration.

33. While no sentence can erase the pain inflicted upon a child, we

hold the responsibility of holding offenders accountable,

deterring such crimes and also reaffirming society's

commitment to safeguarding its children. The obligation is also

to ensure that every child survivor receives timely

psychological care, rehabilitation, and a supportive

environment to rebuild a life that has been so cruelly disrupted.

Every act of child sexual abuse is an assault upon humanity

itself which aims at rule of law. It begins with safe homes that

lead to the safer society.

SLP (Crl.) No.7030 of 2026 Page 18 of 18

34. With greatest concern to our children, we deem it appropriate

to direct all the appropriate authorities concerned, right from

the police, to ensure that the legal process is less intimidating

and more reassuring to the children who are unfortunate

sufferers of harsh illegal acts. There has to be timely and

effective enforcement of justice and protection to the child

victims at all times.

35. The Appeal is allowed on the terms discussed above. All other

points of law, fine and victim compensation scheme as

discussed by the High Court are untouched and shall remain

good under law.

36. Pending applications(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

...........................................................J.

[ARAVIND KUMAR ]

............................................................J.

[VIPUL M. PANCHOLI]

NEW DELHI;

AUGUST 12

th

, 2026.