Page 1 Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1331 OF 2014

(Arising out of S.L.P. (Criminal) No. 1565 of 2013)

Bhuwan Mohan Singh … Appellant

Versus

Meena & Ors. …Respondent

J U D G M E N T

Dipak Misra, J.

Leave granted.

2.The two issues that pronouncedly emanate in this

appeal by special leave are whether the Family Court

while deciding an application under Section 7 of the

Family Court Act, 1984 (for brevity, “the Act”) which

includes determination of grant of maintenance to the

persons as entitled under that provision, should allow

Page 2 adjournments in an extremely liberal manner remaining

oblivious of objects and reasons of the Act and also

keeping the windows of wisdom closed and the sense of

judicial responsiveness suspended to the manifest

perceptibility of vagrancy, destitution, impecuniosity,

struggle for survival and the emotional fracture, a wife

likely to face under these circumstances and further

exhibiting absolute insensitivity to her condition, who,

after loosing support of the husband who has failed to

husband the marital status denies the wife to have

maintenance for almost nine years as that much time is

consumed to decide the lis and, in addition, to restrict the

grant of maintenance to the date of order on some kind of

individual notion. Both the approaches, as we perceive,

not only defeat the command of the legislature but also

frustrate the hope of wife and children who are deprived

of adequate livelihood and whose aspirations perish like

mushroom and possibly the brief candle of sustenance

joins the marathon race of extinction. This delay in

adjudication by the Family Court is not only against

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Page 3 human rights but also against the basic embodiment of

dignity of an individual.

3.Be it ingeminated that Section 125 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure (for short “the Code”) was conceived

to ameliorate the agony, anguish, financial suffering of a

woman who left her matrimonial home for the reasons

provided in the provision so that some suitable

arrangements can be made by the Court and she can

sustain herself and also her children if they are with her.

The concept of sustenance does not necessarily mean to

lead the life of an animal, feel like an unperson to be

thrown away from grace and roam for her basic

maintenance somewhere else. She is entitled in law to

lead a life in the similar manner as she would have lived in

the house of her husband. That is where the status and

strata come into play, and that is where the obligations of

the husband, in case of a wife, become a prominent one.

In a proceeding of this nature, the husband cannot take

subterfuges to deprive her of the benefit of living with

dignity. Regard being had to the solemn pledge at the

time of marriage and also in consonance with the

3

Page 4 statutory law that governs the field, it is the obligation of

the husband to see that the wife does not become a

destitute, a beggar. A situation is not to be maladroitly

created whereunder she is compelled to resign to her fate

and think of life “dust unto dust”. It is totally

impermissible. In fact, it is the sacrosanct duty to render

the financial support even if the husband is required to

earn money with physical labour, if he is able bodied.

There is no escape route unless there is an order from the

Court that the wife is not entitled to get maintenance from

the husband on any legally permissible grounds.

4. Presently to the facts which lie in an extremely

small compass. The marriage between the appellant and

the husband was solemnized on 27.11.1997 as per Hindu

rites and ritual, and in the wedlock a son was born on

16.12.1998. The respondent, under certain

circumstances, had to leave the marital home and

thereafter filed an application on 28.8.2002 under Section

125 of the Code in the Family Court, Jaipur, Rajasthan,

claiming Rs.6000/- per month towards maintenance. The

Family Court finally decided the matter on 24.8.2011

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Page 5 awarding monthly maintenance of Rs.2500/- to the

respondent-wife and Rs.1500/- to the second respondent-

son. Be it stated, during the continuance of the Family

Court proceedings, number of adjournments were granted,

some taken by the husband and some by the wife. The

learned Family Judge being dissatisfied with the material

brought on record came to hold that the respondent-wife

was entitled to maintenance and, accordingly, fixed the

quantum and directed that the maintenance to be paid

from the date of the order.

5. Being dissatisfied with the aforesaid order the

respondent-wife preferred S.B. Criminal Revision Petition

No. 1526 of 2011 before the High Court of Judicature at

Rajasthan and the learned single Judge, vide order dated

28.5.2012, noted the contention of the wife that the

maintenance should have been granted from the date of

application, and that she had received nothing during the

proceedings and suffered immensely and, eventually,

directed that the maintenance should be granted from the

date of filing of the application.

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Page 6 6. Criticizing the aforesaid order, it is submitted Mr.

Jay Kishor Singh learned counsel for the appellant that

when number of adjournments were sought by the wife,

grant of maintenance from the date of filing of the

application by the High Court is absolutely illegal and

unjustified. It is his submission that the wife cannot take

advantage of her own wrong.

7. Mr. Mohit Paul, learned counsel for the

respondents would submit that the Family Court adjourned

the matter sometimes on its own and the enormous delay

took place because of non-cooperation of the husband in

the proceedings and, therefore, the wife who was

compelled to sustain herself and her son with immense

difficulty should not be allowed to suffer. It is proponed by

him that the High Court by modifying the order and

directing that the maintenance should be granted from

the date of filing of the application has not committed any

legal infirmity and hence, the order is inexceptionable.

8. At the outset, we are obliged to reiterate the

principle of law how a proceeding under Section 125 of the

Code has to be dealt with by the court, and what is the

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Page 7 duty of a Family Court after establishment of such courts

by the Family Courts Act, 1984. In Smt. Dukhtar Jahan

v. Mohammed Farooq

1

, the Court opined that

proceedings under Section 125 of the Code, it must be

remembered, are of a summary nature and are intended

to enable destitute wives and children, the latter whether

they are legitimate or illegitimate, to get maintenance in a

speedy manner.

9. A three-Judge Bench in Vimla (K.) v.

Veeraswamy (K.)

2

, while discussing about the basic

purpose under Section 125 of the Code, opined that

Section 125 of the Code is meant to achieve a social

purpose. The object is to prevent vagrancy and

destitution. It provides a speedy remedy for the supply of

food, clothing and shelter to the deserted wife.

10. A two-Judge Bench in Kirtikant D. Vadodaria v.

State of Gujarat and another

3

, while adverting to the

dominant purpose behind Section 125 of the Code, ruled

that:

1

(1987) 1 SCC 624

2

(1991) 2 SCC 375

3

(1996) 4 SCC 479

7

Page 8 “While dealing with the ambit and scope of the

provision contained in Section 125 of the Code,

it has to be borne in mind that the dominant

and primary object is to give social justice to

the woman, child and infirm parents etc. and to

prevent destitution and vagrancy by compelling

those who can support those who are unable to

support themselves but have a moral claim for

support. The provisions in Section 125 provide a

speedy remedy to those women, children and

destitute parents who are in distress. The

provisions in Section 125 are intended to

achieve this special purpose. The dominant

purpose behind the benevolent provisions

contained in Section 125 clearly is that the wife,

child and parents should not be left in a helpless

state of distress, destitution and starvation.”

11. In Chaturbhuj v. Sita Bai

4

, reiterating the legal

position the Court held: -

“Section 125 CrPC is a measure of social justice

and is specially enacted to protect women and

children and as noted by this Court in Captain

Ramesh Chander Kaushal v. Veena Kaushal

5

falls within constitutional sweep of Article 15(3)

reinforced by Article 39 of the Constitution of

India. It is meant to achieve a social purpose.

The object is to prevent vagrancy and

destitution. It provides a speedy remedy for the

supply of food, clothing and shelter to the

deserted wife. It gives effect to fundamental

rights and natural duties of a man to maintain

his wife, children and parents when they are

unable to maintain themselves. The aforesaid

position was highlighted in Savitaben Somabhai

Bhatiya v. State of Gujarat

6

.”

4

(2008) 2 SCC 316

5

(1978) 4 SCC 70

6

(2005) 3 SCC 636

8

Page 9 12. Recently in Nagendrappa Natikar v.

Neelamma

7

, it has been stated that it is a piece of social

legislation which provides for a summary and speedy relief

by way of maintenance to a wife who is unable to maintain

herself and her children.

13. The Family Courts have been established for

adopting and facilitating the conciliation procedure and to

deal with family disputes in a speedy and expeditious

manner. A three-Judge Bench in K.A. Abdul Jaleel v.

T.A. Shahida

8

, while highlighting on the purpose of

bringing in the Family Courts Act by the legislature, opined

thus: -

“The Family Courts Act was enacted to provide

for the establishment of Family Courts with a

view to promote conciliation in, and secure

speedy settlement of, disputes relating to

marriage and family affairs and for matters

connected therewith.”

14. The purpose of highlighting this aspect is that in

the case at hand the proceeding before the Family Court

was conducted without being alive to the objects and

reasons of the Act and the spirit of the provisions under

7

2013 (3) SCALE 561

8

(2003) 4 SCC 166

9

Page 10 Section 125 of the Code. It is unfortunate that the case

continued for nine years before the Family Court. It has

come to the notice of the Court that on certain occasions

the Family Courts have been granting adjournments in a

routine manner as a consequence of which both the

parties suffer or, on certain occasions, the wife becomes

the worst victim. When such a situation occurs, the

purpose of the law gets totally atrophied. The Family

Judge is expected to be sensitive to the issues, for he is

dealing with extremely delicate and sensitive issues

pertaining to the marriage and issues ancillary thereto.

When we say this, we do not mean that the Family Courts

should show undue haste or impatience, but there is a

distinction between impatience and to be wisely anxious

and conscious about dealing with a situation. A Family

Court Judge should remember that the procrastination is

the greatest assassin of the lis before it. It not only gives

rise to more family problems but also gradually builds

unthinkable and Everestine bitterness. It leads to the cold

refrigeration of the hidden feelings, if still left. The

delineation of the lis by the Family Judge must reveal the

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Page 11 awareness and balance. Dilatory tactics by any of the

parties has to be sternly dealt with, for the Family Court

Judge has to be alive to the fact that the lis before him

pertains to emotional fragmentation and delay can feed it

to grow. We hope and trust that the Family Court Judges

shall remain alert to this and decide the matters as

expeditiously as possible keeping in view the objects and

reasons of the Act and the scheme of various provisions

pertaining to grant of maintenance, divorce, custody of

child, property disputes, etc.

15. While dealing with the relevant date of grant of

maintenance, in Shail Kumari Devi and another v.

Krishan Bhagwal Pathak alias Kishun B. Pathak

9

, the

Court referred to the Code of Criminal Procedure

(Amendment) Act, 2001 (Act 50 of 2001) and came to hold

that even after the amendment of 2001, an order for

payment of maintenance can be paid by a court either

from the date of order or when express order is made to

pay maintenance from the date of application, then the

amount of maintenance may be paid from that date, i.e.,

9

(2008) 9 SCC 632

11

Page 12 from the date of application. The Court referred to the

decision in Krishna Jain v. Dharam Raj Jain

10

wherein it

has been stated that to hold that, normally maintenance

should be made payable from the date of the order and

not from the date of the application unless such order is

backed by reasons would amount to inserting something

more in the sub-section which the legislature never

intended. The High Court had observed that it was unable

to read in sub-section (2) laying down any rule to award

maintenance from the date of the order or that the grant

from the date of the application is an exception. The High

Court had also opined that whether maintenance is

granted from the date of the order or from the date of

application, the Court is required to record reasons as

required under sub-section (6) of Section 354 of the Code.

After referring to the decision in Krishna Jain (supra), the

Court adverted to the decision of the High Court of Andhra

Pradesh in K. Sivaram v. K. Mangalamba

11

wherein it

has been ruled that the maintenance would be awarded

from the date of the order and such maintenance could be

10

1992 Cri LJ 1028 (MP)

11

1990 Cri LJ 1880 (AP)

12

Page 13 granted from the date of the application only by recording

special reasons. The view of the learned single Judge of

the High Court of Andhra Pradesh stating that it is a

normal rule that the Magistrate should grant maintenance

only from the date of the order and not from the date of

the application for maintenance was not accepted by this

Court. Eventually, the Court ruled thus: -

“43. We, therefore, hold that while deciding an

application under Section 125 of the Code, a

Magistrate is required to record reasons for

granting or refusing to grant maintenance to

wives, children or parents. Such maintenance

can be awarded from the date of the order, or, if

so ordered, from the date of the application for

maintenance, as the case may be. For awarding

maintenance from the date of the application,

express order is necessary. No special reasons,

however, are required to be recorded by the

court. In our judgment, no such requirement can

be read in sub-section (1) of Section 125 of the

Code in absence of express provision to that

effect.”

16. In the present case, as we find, there was

enormous delay in disposal of the proceeding under

Section 125 of the Code and most of the time the husband

had taken adjournments and some times the court dealt

with the matter showing total laxity. The wife sustained

herself as far as she could in that state for a period of nine

13

Page 14 years. The circumstances, in our considered opinion,

required grant of maintenance from the date of

application and by so granting the High Court has not

committed any legal infirmity. Hence, we concur with the

order of the High Court. However, we direct, as prayed by

the learned counsel for the respondent, that he may be

allowed to pay the arrears along with the maintenance

awarded at present in a phased manner. Learned counsel

for the appellant did not object to such an arrangement

being made. In view of the aforesaid, we direct that while

paying the maintenance as fixed by the learned Family

Court Judge per month by 5

th

of each succeeding month,

the arrears shall be paid in a proportionate manner within

a period of three years from today.

17. Consequently, the appeal, being devoid of merits,

stands dismissed.

.............................J.

[Dipak Misra]

.............................J.

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Page 15 [V. Gopala Gowda]

New Delhi;

July 15, 2014.

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