REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1439 OF 2009

BOBY       ...APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF KERALA    ...RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

B.R. GAVAI, J.

1.This appeal challenges the judgement and order dated 25

th

August 2008, passed by the learned Division Bench of the High

Court of Kerala at Ernakulam (hereinafter referred to as “the

High Court”) in Criminal Appeal Nos. 326, 230 and 847 of 2005

thereby dismissing the appeals filed by Shibu @ Shibu Singh

(accused No. 1) and Boby (accused No. 3/appellant herein),

thereby upholding the judgment of conviction and sentence

dated 18

th

 December 2004, passed by the Additional Sessions

1

Judge,   Fast   Track   Court–II   (Ad­hoc   Court),   Thrissur

(hereinafter referred to as “the trial court”) in Sessions Case No.

208 of 2003 in respect of the said accused persons. Vide the

same impugned judgment, the High Court, however, allowed

the appeal filed by Biju @ Babi (accused No. 2) and acquitted

him from all the offences charged with.

2.Shorn of details, the facts leading to the present appeal

are as under:

2.1On   21

st

  November,   2000,   Leela   w/o   Vishwanathan

(Complainant/PW­1)   made   a   statement   before   the   Police

Station, Anthikkadu, Dist. Thrissur, wherein she alleged that

Shibu @ Shibu Singh (accused No. 1), the younger brother of

her husband, Vishwanathan (deceased), was a convict who was

then undergoing imprisonment as he was involved in many

theft cases wherein stolen articles from the said thefts were

disposed of by her husband. 

2.2It is the case of the complainant that Shibu @ Shibu Singh

(accused   No.   1)   had   escaped   from   the   prison   and   was

absconding.   Due   to   the   fear   that   Vishwanathan   (deceased)

2

would disclose to the police about his escape from jail, Shibu @

Shibu Singh (accused No. 1) along with other accused persons,

namely, accused No. 2 to accused No. 7 came in a jeep to the

house of Vishwanathan (deceased) on 20.11.2000 at 08.00 p.m.

The accused persons then held Vishwanathan (deceased) at

knife   point,   forcefully   poured   liquor   into   his   mouth   and

compelled him to drink till he was left unconscious. When Leela

(Complainant/PW­1) tried to interfere, she sustained injuries

on her palm due to the knife carried by the accused persons

with which they attempted to inflict blows on her. Thereafter,

Leela   (Complainant/PW­1)   along   with   her   husband   were

blindfolded and taken in a jeep. After covering a distance of

about   30   kms.,   the   Complainant/PW­1   was   dropped   at

Poomala, which was her native place. When she managed to

reach her house with the help of a local named Baiju from the

said village, she informed her brother Babu (P.W.6) about the

aforesaid incident, who attempted to search for Vishwanathan

(deceased)   during   the   said   night.   Next   day,   i.e.,   on   21

st

November 2000, Leela (Complainant/PW­1) along with Babu

3

(PW­6) lodged her statement (Ext. P­1) at the Police Station

Anthikkadu,   Dist.   Thrissur.   Based   on   the   contents   of   the

aforesaid complaint, a First Information Report (Ext. P­19) (for

short, “FIR”) came to be registered against the aforementioned

accused   persons   along   with   other   unknown   persons   for

offences punishable under Section 395 and 365 of the Indian

Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as “IPC”). 

2.3 Boby (accused No. 3/appellant herein) was arrested by the

Police   on   25

th

  November   2000.   Based   on   his   disclosure

statement (Ext. P­23), the dead body of Vishwanathan, which

was buried at Pattithara on the banks of river Bharathapuzha,

was recovered. Additionally, stolen goods were also recovered

from the house of accused No. 3 and were marked as Ext. P­14.

Shibu   @   Shibu   Singh   (accused   No.   1)   and   Biju   @   Babu

(accused No. 2) were arrested on 28

th

  November 2000 from a

lodge at Guruvayoor by the Guruvayoor Police. Subsequently,

they   were   handed   over   to   the   Anthikkadu   Police   on   2

nd

December 2000. Based on the disclosure statement of Shibu @

Shibu   Singh   (accused   No.   1),   the   spade   with   which   the

4

deceased’s burial spot was dug was recovered near the site

where the body was exhumed from, concealed in a plastic bag.

2.4 At the conclusion of investigation, a charge­sheet came to

be filed before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court–II,

Thrissur,   who   committed   the   case   to   the   Sessions   Court,

Thrissur for trial. 

2.5  Charges  came   to  be   framed   by   the   trial   court   for   the

offences punishable under Sections 395, 364, 365, 380 and

302 read with Section 34 of the IPC.

2.6 All the accused persons pleaded not guilty and claimed to

be tried. The prosecution examined 33 witnesses to bring home

the guilt of the accused persons. The prosecution also placed

on record 14 Material Objects which were marked as M.O. 1 to

M.O. 14. During the cross­examination from the defence side,

Sekharan (DW­1), father of the deceased was examined. The

accused persons were questioned under Section 313 of the

Criminal   Procedure   Code,   1973   (for   short,   “the   Cr.P.C.”)

wherein they denied the circumstances that appeared against

them in evidence which were put to them. At the conclusion of

5

trial,   the   learned   trial   court   found   Shibu   @   Shibu   Singh

(accused   No.   1),   Biju   @   Babu   (accused   No.   2)   and   Boby

(accused No. 3/appellant herein) guilty of the offences charged

with   and   accordingly   sentenced   them   to   undergo   life

imprisonment for the offence punishable under Section 302

read with Section 34 IPC.  It further directed them to undergo

rigorous  imprisonment  for  different  periods  for  the  offences

punishable under Sections 364, 395, and 201 read with Section

34 of the IPC. The sentences were directed to run concurrently. 

2.7 Being aggrieved thereby, accused Nos. 1 to 3 preferred their

respective appeals before the High Court. The High Court, by

the impugned judgement, dismissed the appeals preferred by

Shibu @ Shibu Singh (accused No. 1) and Boby (accused No.

3/appellant   herein),   but   was   pleased   to   allow   the   appeal

preferred by Biju @ Babu (accused No. 2), thereby setting aside

the   judgment   of   conviction   and   sentence   of   the   trial   court

insofar as Biju @ Babu (accused No. 2) was concerned. 

3.Being aggrieved thereby, the present appeal.

6

4.We have heard Shri R. Basant, learned Senior Counsel

appearing   on   behalf   of   the   appellant–Boby   and   Shri   K.N.

Balgopal, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the

respondent–State of Kerala.

5.Shri Basant, learned Senior Counsel would submit that

both the trial court and the High Court have erred in convicting

and sentencing the appellant–Boby for the offences punishable

under Sections 395, 365, 364, 201, 380, 302 and 302 read with

Section 34 of the IPC. He submitted that the prosecution has

failed   to   prove   its   case   against   the   appellant–Boby   beyond

reasonable doubt and that there are glaring lacunae in the case

of the prosecution. It is submitted that even the High Court

found that there were discrepancies in the statements of the

prosecution witnesses who were examined during the trial. It is

further submitted that the High Court also observed the glaring

discrepancies in the statement of the Complainant/PW­1 with

regard to Biju @ Babu (accused No. 2) on the basis of which,

the   High   Court   acquitted   the   said   accused   Biju   @   Babu

(accused No. 2) of all the charges levelled against him.

7

6.Shri Basant submitted that a Memorandum under Section

27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred to as

“the Evidence Act”) is required in cases of recovery initiated at

the instance of an accused person, based on the statements

made before the Police. It is submitted that, on perusal of

evidence   on   record   in   the   instant   matter,   neither   such

Memorandum   under   Section   27   of   the   Evidence   Act   was

prepared at the time of the recovery of the body of deceased

Vishwanathan, nor were signatures of independent or panch

witnesses   taken   at   the   time   of   said   recovery.   It   is   further

submitted that it was the duty of the Investigating Officer (for

short, ‘IO’) to have prepared the said Memorandum while acting

on the information obtained from Boby (appellant herein) and

that   such   inaction   on   part   of   the   IO   would   vitiate   the

prosecution case, at least insofar as proving the recovery of the

dead body of the deceased is concerned.  

7.Shri Basant submitted that the trial court solely relied on

the last seen theory and held that the prosecution had proved

the same with regard to the chain of circumstances in this

8

case. It is further submitted that conviction of an accused

person cannot be sustained only on the basis of proving the last

seen theory as the same was required to be corroborated with

the statements of the witnesses that are examined during trial

along with other evidence placed on record. While pointing out

the discrepancies in the statements of prosecution witnesses,

which were relied upon by the courts below, it was submitted

that   the   conviction   of   the   appellant   herein   could   not   be

sustained on the said ground alone.

8.Shri Balgopal, on the contrary, submits that the courts

below have concurrently found the accused persons guilty of

the   offences  charged   with.   The  prosecution  has   proved  the

incriminating circumstances beyond reasonable doubt.  It has

also proved the chain of circumstances which leads to no other

conclusion than the guilt  of  the accused. He relies on the

judgment of this Court in the case of Suresh Chandra Bahri

v. State of Bihar

1

.

1 1995 Supp. (1) SCC 80

9

9.Undisputedly,   the   present   case   rests   entirely   on

circumstantial evidence.  A three­Judges Bench of this Court in

the   case   of  Sharad   Birdhichand   Sarda   v.   State   of

Maharashtra

2

, has laid down the golden principles with regard

to conviction in a case which rests entirely on circumstantial

evidence.  We may gainfully refer to the following observations

of this Court in the said case:

“153. A close analysis of this decision would show

that the following conditions must be fulfilled before

a case against an accused can be said to be fully

established:

(1)   the   circumstances   from   which   the

conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should

be fully established.

It may be noted here that this Court indicated that

the circumstances concerned “must or should” and

not   “may   be”   established.   There   is   not   only   a

grammatical but a legal distinction between “may be

proved” and “must be or should be proved” as was

held   by   this   Court   in Shivaji   Sahabrao

Bobade v. State of Maharashtra [(1973) 2 SCC 793 :

1973 SCC (Cri) 1033 : 1973 Crl LJ 1783] where the

observations were made: [SCC para 19, p. 807: SCC

(Cri) p. 1047]

“Certainly, it is a primary principle that

the   accused must be   and   not

merely may be guilty before a court can

convict and the mental distance between

‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is long and divides

2 (1984) 4 SCC 116

10

vague   conjectures   from   sure

conclusions.”

(2)   the   facts   so   established   should   be

consistent only with the hypothesis of the

guilt of the accused, that is to say, they

should not be explainable on any other

hypothesis   except   that   the   accused   is

guilty,

(3)   the   circumstances   should   be   of   a

conclusive nature and tendency,

(4)   they   should   exclude   every   possible

hypothesis except the one to be proved,

and

(5) there must be a chain of evidence so

complete as not to leave any reasonable

ground for the conclusion consistent with

the innocence of the accused and must

show that in all human probability the

act   must   have   been   done   by   the

accused.”

10.It can thus clearly be seen that it is necessary for the

prosecution that the circumstances from which the conclusion

of the guilt is to be drawn should be fully established.   The

Court holds that it is a primary principle that the accused ‘must

be’ and not merely ‘may be’ guilty before a court can convict the

accused.  It has been held that there is not only a grammatical

but a legal distinction between ‘may be proved’ and “must be or

should   be   proved”.     It   has   been   held   that   the   facts   so

11

established  should  be  consistent   only  with the  guilt  of   the

accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any

other hypothesis except  that the  accused is guilty.   It has

further been held that the circumstances should be such that

they exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be

proved.  It has been held that there must be a chain of evidence

so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the

conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and

must show that in all human probabilities the act must have

been done by the accused.

11.In the light of these guiding principles, we have to examine

the present case.  

12.The trial court has relied on the following circumstances:

(i)Last seen together with the deceased;

(ii)Recovery of the stolen material including jewellery from

accused No.3­Boby;

(iii)Recovery of spade from accused No. 1­Shibu @ Shibu

Singh;

(iv)Recovery of the dead body at the instance of accused

No. 3­Boby;

12

13.The trial court had convicted accused Nos. 1 to 3 upon

finding   that   the   prosecution   had   proved   the   aforesaid

circumstances against them.  In appeal, the High Court found

that the prosecution had failed to prove the case against Biju @

Babi (accused No. 2) and accordingly acquitted him.

14.The learned Division Bench of the High Court, though

found that the prosecution had failed to prove the case beyond

reasonable doubt insofar as accused No.2 was concerned, held

that, insofar as accused Nos. 1 and 3 were concerned, the

prosecution had proved the case beyond reasonable doubt. 

15.It could thus be seen that the trial court as well as the

High Court found the circumstance of the accused persons

having been last seen in the company of the deceased on the

basis   of   the   evidence   of   PW­1,   as   the   main   incriminating

circumstance. The High Court further found that, insofar as

Boby (accused No.3/appellant herein) was concerned, there was

an additional evidence with regard to the recovery of the dead

body and ornaments.  Insofar as Shibu @ Shibu Singh (accused

13

No. 1) was concerned, the High Court found that the recovery of

spade which was used to dig the burial site where the dead

body was concealed, was an additional circumstance which

proved the guilt of Shibu @ Shibu Singh (accused No. 1).

16.Insofar as last seen theory is concerned, it will be relevant

to refer to the following observations of this Court in the case of

State of U.P. v. Satish

3

:

“22. The last­seen theory comes into play where the

time­gap   between   the   point   of   time   when   the

accused and the deceased were last seen alive and

when the deceased is found dead is so small that

possibility of any person other than the accused

being the author of the crime becomes impossible. It

would   be   difficult   in   some   cases   to   positively

establish that the deceased was last seen with the

accused when there is a long gap and possibility of

other   persons   coming   in   between   exists.   In   the

absence of any other positive evidence to conclude

that the accused and the deceased were last seen

together,   it   would   be   hazardous   to   come   to   a

conclusion of guilt in those cases. In this case there

is   positive   evidence   that   the   deceased   and   the

accused were seen together by witnesses PWs 3 and

5, in addition to the evidence of PW 2.”

17.It could thus clearly be seen that the last­seen theory

comes into play where the time­gap between the point of time

3 (2005) 3 SCC 114

14

when the accused and the deceased were last seen alive and

when the deceased is found dead is so small that possibility of

any person other than the accused being the author of the

crime becomes impossible. If the gap between the time of last

seen and the deceased found dead is long, then the possibility

of other person coming in between cannot be ruled out.

18.In the present case, according to the complainant/PW­1,

the deceased was taken away by the accused persons on the

night of 20

th

 November 2000 at 08.00 p.m.  Though, it is the

contention   of   the   appellant   that   he   was   taken   into   illegal

custody on 21

st

 November, 2000 and his arrest was shown on

25

th

 November, 2000, we do not find it necessary to go into that

aspect of the matter.  A perusal of the evidence of the IO would

reveal that, on 25

th

  November, 2000, on the basis of secret

information   that   Boby   (accused   No.3/appellant   herein)   was

standing at Manaloor Kadavu, he proceeded to that place and

arrested him at 02.00 p.m.  He stated that, on the basis of his

confession, various articles were seized from his house.   He

further stated that thereafter on the same day, the accused led

15

them towards the place in Bharathapuzha where the deceased

was buried.  He stated that, after seeing the loose soil, the scene

was guarded as it was an odd time.  He further stated that, on

26

th

 November 2000, as led by accused No. 3, they reached the

place   and   the   Tahasildar,   Ottapalam   prepared   the   inquest

report.

19.It can thus clearly be seen that firstly, there is a gap of at

least five days from the date on which, according to PW­1, the

deceased was taken away by the accused persons and the dead

body was recovered.  However, the crucial question would be as

to whether it can be held that the prosecution had established

beyond reasonable doubt that the recovery of dead body was at

the instance of Boby (accused No. 3/appellant herein). Only in

the event the prosecution establishes that the recovery of the

body was at the instance of Boby (accused No. 3/appellant

herein), the relevancy of the gap of five days would come. 

20.As early as 1946, the Privy Council had considered the

provisions of Section 27 of the Evidence Act in the case of

16

Pulukuri Kotayya and Others v. King­Emperor

4

.  It will be

relevant   to   refer   to   the   following   observations   of   the   Privy

Council in the said case:

“The   second   question,   which   involves   the

construction of s. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, will

now   be   considered.   That   section   and   the   two

preceding sections, with which it must be read, are

in these terms. [His Lordship read ss. 25, 26 and 27

of the Evidence Act and continued : ] Section 27,

which   is   not   artistically   worded,   provides   an

exception   to   the   prohibition   imposed   by   the

preceding section, and enables certain statements

made by a person in police custody to be proved.

The condition necessary to bring the section into

operation   is   that   the   discovery   of   a   fact   in

consequence of information received from a person

accused of any offence in the custody of a police

officer must be deposed to, and there upon so much

of the information as relates distinctly to the fact

thereby   discovered   may   be   proved.   The   section

seems to be based on the view that if a fact is

actually discovered in consequence of information

given, some guarantee is afforded thereby that the

information was true, and accordingly can be safely

allowed   to   be   given   in   evidence;   but   clearly   the

extent of the information admissible must depend

on the exact nature of the fact discovered to which

such information is required to relate. Normally the

section is brought into operation when a person in

police   custody   produces   from   some   place   of

concealment some object, such as a dead body, a

weapon or ornaments, said to be connected with the

crime of which the informant is accused. Mr. Megaw

for the Crown, has argued that in such a case the

4 1946 SCC OnLine PC 47

17

“fact discovered” is the physical object produced,

and that any information which relates distinctly to

that object can be proved. On this view information

given by a person that the body produced is that of

a   person   murdered   by   him,   that   the   weapon

produced is the one used by him in the commission

of a murder, or that the ornaments produced were

stolen in a dacoity, would all be admissible. If this

be the effect of s. 27, little substance would remain

in the ban imposed by the two preceding sections

on confessions made to the police, or by persons in

police custody. That ban was presumably inspired

by the fear of the legislature that a person under

police influence might be induced to confess by the

exercise   of   undue   pressure.   But   if   all   that   is

required   to   lift   the   ban   be   the   inclusion   in   the

confession   of   information   relating   to   an   object

subsequently   produced,   it   seems   reasonable   to

suppose that the persuasive powers of the police

will prove equal to the occasion, and that in practice

the ban will lose its effect. On normal principles of

construction   their   Lordships   think   that   the

proviso to s. 26, added by s. 27, should not be

held to nullify the substance of the section. In

their Lordships' view it is fallacious to treat the

“fact   discovered”   within   the   section   as

equivalent   to   the   object   produced;   the   fact

discovered embraces the place from which the

object is produced and the knowledge of the

accused as to this, and the information given

must relate distinctly to this fact. Information

as   to   past   user,   or   the   past   history,   of   the

object produced is not related to its discovery in

the setting in which it is discovered. Information

supplied by a person in custody that “I will produce

a knife concealed in the roof of my house” does not

lead   to   the   discovery   of   a   knife;   knives   were

18

discovered many years ago. It leads to the discovery

of the fact that a knife is concealed in the house of

the informant to his knowledge, and if the knife is

proved to have been used in the commission of the

offence, the fact discovered is very relevant. But if to

the statement the words be added “with which I

stabbed A.”, these words are inadmissible since they

do not relate to the discovery of the knife in the

house of the informant.”

[Emphasis supplied]

21.It could thus be seen that Section 27 of the Evidence Act

requires that the fact discovered embraces the place from which

the object is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to

this, and the information given must relate distinctly to the said

fact. The information as to past user, or the past history, of the

object produced is not related to its discovery.  The said view

has been consistently followed by this Court in a catena of

cases.

22.This Court, in the case of  Chandran v. The State of

Tamil Nadu

5

, had an occasion to consider the evidence of

recovery of incriminating articles in the absence of record of the

statement of accused No. 1. In the said case also, no statement

of accused No. 1 was recorded under Section 27 of the Evidence

5 (1978) 4 SCC 90

19

Act leading to the recovery of jewels.  The Court found that the

Sessions Judge as well as the High Court had erred in holding

that the jewels were recovered at the instance of accused No. 1

therein in pursuance to the confessional statement (Ex. P­27)

recorded before PW­34 therein.  It will be relevant to refer to the

following observations of this Court in the said case:

“36. ……Thus the fact remains that no confessional

statement   of   A­1   causing   the   recovery   of   these

jewels   was   proved   under   Section   27,   Evidence

Act…..”

23.It is thus clear that this Court refused to rely on the

recovery   of   jewels   since   no   confessional   statement   of   the

accused was proved under Section 27 of the Evidence Act.

24.It will also be relevant to refer to the following observations

of this Court in the case of  State of Karnataka v. David

Rozario and Another

6

:

“5.  ……This   information   which   is   otherwise

admissible becomes inadmissible under Section 27

if the information did not come from a person in the

custody of a police officer or did come from a person

not in the custody of a police officer. The statement

which is admissible under Section 27 is the one

which is the information leading to discovery. Thus,

6 (2002) 7 SCC 728

20

what is admissible being the information, the same

has to be proved and not the opinion formed on it

by   the   police   officer.   In   other   words,   the   exact

information given by the accused while in custody

which   led   to   recovery   of   the   articles   has   to   be

proved. It is, therefore, necessary for the benefit

of both the accused and the prosecution that

information   given   should   be   recorded   and

proved   and   if   not   so   recorded,   the   exact

information must be adduced through evidence.

The   basic   idea   embedded   in   Section   27   of   the

Evidence   Act   is   the   doctrine   of   confirmation   by

subsequent events.  The doctrine is founded on

the principle that if any fact is discovered as a

search made on the strength of any information

obtained from a prisoner, such a discovery is a

guarantee that the information supplied by the

prisoner   is   true.   The   information   might   be

confessional or non­inculpatory in nature but if

it results in discovery of a fact, it becomes a

reliable information.  It is now well settled that

recovery   of   an   object   is   not   discovery   of   a   fact

envisaged   in   the   section.   Decision   of   the   Privy

Council   in Pulukuri   Kottaya v. Emperor [AIR   1947

PC 67 : 48 Cri LJ 533 : 74 IA 65] is the most­quoted

authority for supporting the interpretation that the

“fact discovered” envisaged in the section embraces

the place from which the object was produced, the

knowledge   of   the   accused   as   to   it,   but   the

information   given   must   relate   distinctly   to   that

effect. (See State of Maharashtra v. Damu [(2000) 6

SCC  269  :  2000  SCC  (Cri)  1088 :  2000  Cri  LJ

2301] .…..”

[Emphasis supplied]

21

25.A three­Judges Bench of this Court recently in the case of

Subramanya v. State of Karnataka

7

, has observed thus:

“82. Keeping   in   mind   the   aforesaid   evidence,   we

proceed to consider whether the prosecution has

been able to prove and establish the discoveries in

accordance with law. Section 27 of the Evidence Act

reads thus:

“27. How much  of information  received  from

accused may be proved.—

Provided that, when any fact is deposed

to   as   discovered   in   consequence   of

information   received   from   a   person

accused of any offence, in the custody of a

police officer, so much of such information,

whether it amounts to a confession or not,

as relates distinctly to the fact thereby

discovered, may be proved.”

83. The first and the basic infirmity in the evidence

of all the aforesaid prosecution witnesses is that

none of them have deposed the exact statement said

to have been made by the appellant herein which

ultimately led to the discovery of a fact relevant

under Section 27 of the Evidence Act.

84. If, it is say of the investigating officer that the

accused appellant while in custody on his own free

will and volition made a statement that he would

lead to the place where he had hidden the weapon

of   offence,   the   site   of   burial   of   the   dead   body,

clothes   etc.,   then   the   first   thing   that   the

investigating officer should have done was to call for

two   independent   witnesses   at   the   police   station

itself. Once the two independent witnesses would

7 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1400

22

arrive   at   the   police   station   thereafter   in   their

presence the accused should be asked to make an

appropriate statement as he may desire in regard to

pointing out the place where he is said to have

hidden the weapon of offence etc. When the accused

while in custody makes such statement before the

two   independent   witnesses   (panch­witnesses)   the

exact statement or rather the exact words uttered

by the accused should be incorporated in the first

part of the panchnama that the investigating officer

may draw in accordance with law. This first part of

the panchnama for the purpose of Section 27 of the

Evidence Act is always drawn at the police station

in the presence of the independent witnesses so as

to lend credence that a particular statement was

made by the accused expressing his willingness on

his own free will and volition to point out the place

where the weapon of offence or any other article

used in the commission of the offence had been

hidden. Once the first part of the panchnama is

completed thereafter the police party along with the

accused and the two independent witnesses (panch­

witnesses) would proceed to the particular place as

may be led by the accused. If from that particular

place anything like the weapon of offence or blood

stained clothes or any other article is discovered

then that part of the entire process would form the

second part of the panchnama. This is how the law

expects   the   investigating   officer   to   draw   the

discovery   panchnama   as   contemplated   under

Section 27 of the Evidence Act. If we read the entire

oral evidence of the investigating officer then it is

clear that the same is deficient in all the aforesaid

relevant aspects of the matter.”

23

26.This Court has elaborately considered as to how the law

expects   the   IO   to   draw   the   discovery   panchnama   as

contemplated under Section 27 of the Evidence Act.   In the

present   case,  leave aside  the  recovery  panchnama  being  in

accordance   with   the   aforesaid   requirement,   there   is   no

statement of  Boby (accused No. 3/appellant herein)  recorded

under Section 27 of the Evidence Act.  We are, therefore, of the

considered view that the prosecution has failed to prove the

circumstance that the dead body of the deceased was recovered

at the instance of Boby (accused No. 3/appellant herein).  

27.Another circumstance on which the High Court relied was

that the recovery of ornaments was at the instance of  Boby

(accused No. 3/appellant herein).  We find that both the trial

court and the High Court have patently erred in relying on such

recovery.  The trial court found that there was enough material

to   show   that   the   alleged   recovery   memo   was   a   fabricated

document and the alleged recovery as per Ext. P­14 is farce.

However, the trial court still relied on the said recovery to

convict the accused.  In our view, the finding of the trial court

24

in this regard is totally perverse which has been confirmed by

the High Court.

28.Insofar   as   Shibu   @   Shibu   Singh   (accused   No.   1)   is

concerned, the additional circumstance sought to be relied on

by the trial court and the High Court is the alleged recovery of

the spade.  It is to be noted that the spade was also recovered

from the same place from where the dead body of the deceased

was alleged to have been recovered at the instance of  Boby

(accused No. 3/appellant herein).   The trial court again held

that the place from where the spade was recovered was already

known from the disclosure statement of  Boby (accused No.

3/appellant herein);  however, it still held the recovery of the

said spade to be admissible in evidence.  It is thus clear that

the said recovery was from a place which was already known

and not exclusively within the knowledge of  Shibu @ Shibu

Singh (accused No. 1). We find that the trial court has again

committed perversity in arriving at such a finding.

29.It   is   thus   clear   that   the   only   circumstance   that   now

remains is the circumstance of the accused last seen in the

25

company of the deceased on the basis of the evidence of PW­1.

In that view of the matter, we find that, solely on the basis of

last seen theory, the conviction could not have been recorded.

The prosecution has utterly failed to prove that the recovery of

the dead body of the deceased was at the instance of   Boby

(accused No. 3/appellant herein).  The recovery of the articles

from the house of Boby (accused No. 3/appellant herein), even

according   to   the   trial   court,   is   farce   and   fabricated.     The

recovery of the spade at the instance of Shibu @ Shibu Singh

(accused No. 1)  is from a place which, even according to the

trial   court,   was   also   known   on   account   of   the   disclosure

statement made by Boby (accused No. 3/appellant herein).

30.In that view of the matter, we find that the prosecution has

utterly failed to prove the chain of incriminating circumstances

which   leads   to   no   other   conclusion   than   the   guilt   of   the

accused.

31.Insofar as the reliance placed by Shri Balgopal, learned

Senior Counsel on the case of Suresh Chandra Bahri  (supra)

26

is concerned, it is totally misplaced inasmuch as in paragraph

40, this Court has observed thus:

“40. …….Before we discuss the merits or demerits

of the aforesaid submissions we would like to state

that   the   law   relating   to   conviction   based   on

circumstantial evidence is well settled and it hardly

requires   a   detailed   discussion   on   this   aspect.

Suffice to say that in a case of murder in which the

evidence that is available is only circumstantial in

nature   then   in   that   event   the   facts   and

circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is

required to be drawn by the prosecution must be

fully established beyond all reasonable doubt and

the facts and circumstances so established should

not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused

but they also must entirely be incompatible with the

innocence of the accused and must exclude every

reasonable   hypothesis   consistent   with   his

innocence.”

32.It   will   further   be   relevant   to   refer   to   the   following

observations of this Court in the said case:

“71.  ……The   provisions   of   Section   27   of   the

Evidence Act are based on the view that if a fact is

actually discovered in consequence of information

given, some guarantee is afforded thereby that the

information   was   true   and   consequently   the   said

information can safely be allowed to be given in

evidence because if such an information is further

fortified and confirmed by the discovery of articles

or the instrument of crime and which leads to the

27

belief   that   the   information   about   the   confession

made as to the articles of crime cannot be false…..”

33.A perusal of paragraph 71 of the said judgment would

reveal   that   the   Court   has   reiterated   that   the   two   essential

requirements for the application of Section 27 of the Evidence

Act   are   that   (1)   the   person   giving   information   must   be   an

accused   of   any   offence   and   (2)   he   must   also   be   in   police

custody.  The Court held that the provisions of Section 27 of the

Evidence Act are based on the view that if a fact is actually

discovered in consequence of information given, some guarantee

is   afforded   thereby   that   the   information   was   true   and

consequently the said information can safely be allowed to be

given in evidence.

34.In the facts of the said case, the Court found that there

was, in fact, a confessional statement of the disclosure made by

the appellant Gurbachan Singh which was confirmed by the

recovery   of   the   incriminating   articles.     As   such,   the   Court

believed the disclosure statement and the evidence led in that

28

behalf.   As already stated hereinabove, in the present case,

there   is   no   confessional   statement   of  Boby   (accused

No.3/appellant herein) recorded with regard to recovery of the

dead body of the deceased. 

35.In the result, the appeal is allowed.

36.The judgment dated 18

th

  December 2004 passed by the

trial Court, thereby convicting the appellant under Sections

395, 365, 364, 201, 380, 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC

and the impugned judgment dated 25

th

 August 2008, passed by

the High Court affirming the same are set aside. The appellant

is acquitted of all the charges charged with. The bail bonds of

the accused shall stand discharged. 

37.Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

…..….......................J.

[B.R. GAVAI]

      ……....................…..J.       

[M.M. SUNDRESH]

NEW DELHI;

JANUARY 12, 2023.

29

1

ITEM NO.102/1 COURT NO.8 SECTION II-B

S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Criminal Appeal No(s). 1439/2009

BOBY Appellant(s)

VERSUS

STATE OF KERALA Respondent(s)

Date : 12-01-2023 This appeal was called on for hearing today.

CORAM :

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE B.R. GAVAI

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.M. SUNDRESH

For Appellant(s) Mr. R. Basant, Sr. Adv.

Mr. Abdulla Naseeh V.T., Adv.

Meena K. Poulose, Adv.

Mr. Akshay, Adv.

Mr. Ashok Basoya, Adv.

Ms. Shruti Jose, Adv.

Mr. P. S. Sudheer, AOR

For Respondent(s) Mr. K.N. Balgopal, Sr. Adv.

Mr. Harshad V. Hameed, AOR

Mr. Dileep Poolakkot, Adv.

Ms. Ashly Harshad, Adv.

UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following

O R D E R

The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed

reportable judgment. Pending application(s), if any,

shall stand disposed of.

The concluding paragraph of the judgment reads

as under :

“The judgment dated 18

th

December 2004 passed

by the trial Court, thereby convicting the

appellant under Sections 395, 365, 364, 201,

2

380, 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC and

the impugned judgment dated 25

th

August 2008,

passed by the High Court affirming the same

are set aside. The appellant is acquitted of

all the charges charged with. The bail bonds

of the accused shall stand discharged.”

(Geeta Ahuja) (Anju Kapoor)

Assistant Registrar-cum-PS Court Master

(signed reportable judgment containing the reasons is placed

on the file)

# signed order dated 12.1.2023 along with ROP has already been uploaded and

sent to the concerned Branch.

3

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1439 OF 2009

BOBY APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF KERALA RESPONDENT(S)

O R D E R

For the reasons to be recorded separately, t he

appeal is allowed.

The judgment and order dated 18.12.2004 of the trial

Court of conviction and sentence of the appellant

punishable under Sections 395, 365, 364, 201, 380, 302

read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and the

judgment and order dated 25.08.2008 of the High Court

affirming the same are set aside.

The appellant is acquitted of all the charges

charged with. The bail bonds of the accused shall stand

discharged.

Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed

of.

............... J.

( B.R. GAVAI )

............... J.

( M.M. SUNDRESH )

NEW DELHI

12

th

JANUARY, 2023

4

ITEM NO.102 COURT NO.8 SECTION II-B

S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Criminal Appeal No(s). 1439/2009

BOBY Appellant(s)

VERSUS

STATE OF KERALA Respondent(s)

Date : 12-01-2023 This appeal was called on for hearing today.

CORAM :

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE B.R. GAVAI

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.M. SUNDRESH

For Appellant(s) Mr. R. Basant, Sr. Adv.

Mr. Abdulla Naseeh V.T., Adv.

Meena K. Poulose, Adv.

Mr. Akshay, Adv.

Mr. Ashok Basoya, Adv.

Ms. Shruti Jose, Adv.

Mr. P. S. Sudheer, AOR

For Respondent(s) Mr. K.N. Balgopal, Sr. Adv.

Mr. Harshad V. Hameed, AOR

Mr. Dileep Poolakkot, Adv.

Ms. Ashly Harshad, Adv.

UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following

O R D E R

For the reasons to be recorded separately, t he

appeal is allowed.

The judgment and order dated 18.12.2004 of the trial

Court of conviction and sentence of the appellant

punishable under Sections 395, 365, 364, 201, 380, 302

read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and the

judgment and order dated 25.08.2008 of the High Court

affirming the same are set aside.

The appellant is acquitted of all the charges

5

charged with. The bail bonds of the accused shall stand

discharged.

Pending application(s), if any, shall stand

disposed of.

(Geeta Ahuja) (Anju Kapoor)

Assistant Registrar-cum-PS Court Master

(Signed Order is placed on the file)