As per case facts, the informant and the deceased went to the accused's house to inform about a death in the family. After taking a meal and drinking wine, the ...
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Cr. Appeal (DB) No.32 of 1998 (R)
[Against the Judgment of conviction dated 17.12.1997 and order of
sentence dated 18.12.1997, passed by the learned 1
st
Additional Judicial
Commissioner, Ranchi, in Sessions Trial No.29 of 1993]
-----
Champa Oraon, son of Nuda Oraon, resident of village Kormbi Sakar
Pada, PS:Mandar, District:Ranchi. ……Appellant
Versus
The State of Bihar (Now Jharkhand) . ... …. Respondent
-----
CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN KUMAR RAI
-------
For the Appellant(s) : Ms. Sumiran Srivastava, Amicus Curiae
For the Respondent : Mr. Pankaj Kumar, P.P.
------
CAV ON:24/02/2026 PRONOUNCED ON:12/03/2026
[Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.]
1. At the very outset, Mr. Pankaj Kumar, the learned Public Prosecutor
has submitted that appellant No.1, namely, Etwa Oraon has died on
07.01.2001.
2. No application to sue the proceeding on behalf of the legal
representative has been filed as yet.
3. Accordingly, the instant appeal against the appellant no.1, namely,
Etwa Oraon stands abated.
4. Now the present appeal exists only against appellant Champa Oraon.
Prayer
5. The present appeal has been filed under section 374(2) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure against the judgment of conviction dated 17.12.1997
and order of sentence dated 18.12.1997, passed by the learned 1
st
Additional Judicial Commissioner, Ranchi, in Sessions Trial No.29 of
1993, whereby and whereunder, the learned court below has convicted
the appellant under sections 302/34, 201 and 379 of the Indian Penal
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Code and sentenced him to undergo RI for life under section 302/34 of
the IPC, RI for one year for the offence punishable u/s 201 of IPC and RI
for three months for the offence punishable under section 379 of IPC. All
the sentences were directed to run concurrently.
Factual Matrix:
6. The prosecution case, in brief, as per fardbeyan dated 29.06.1992, of
the informant, namely, Pannu Oraon (P.W.-3), is that the informant
Pannu Oraon along with his sister Meean Devi, wife of accused Etwa
Oraon and Chumnu Oraon had gone to Biharsharif to work in a brick-
kiln where Meean Devi died due to snake bite. After returning from
Biharsharif, the informant and his brother in-law(bahoni) Chumnu
Oraon(deceased) went to the house of accused Etwa Oraon on 28.6.1992
to inform the date of Shradh of Meena Devi. The informant and Chumnu
Oraon reached in the house of the accused Etwa Oraon at about 10:00
a.m., who started preparing meal for them. At about 01:30 p.m. the
informant and Chumnu Oraon were made to sit in a house facing east
and were offered two bottles of wine. The accused persons produced
three more bottles of wine before them but the informant refused to take
any more.
7. Thereafter, Chumnu Oraon was brought out of the house and accused
started giving knife blows on him and the accused caught the informant’s
neck and wanted to assault him but he managed to escape somehow and
fled to village Kuli and spent night therewith unknown persons. In the
morning, he went to the house of his maternal uncle Mahavir Oraon
(P.W.-2) in village Itki and told everything to his maternal uncle. Then
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the informant and Mahavir Oraon, went to the house of the accused
persons but the accused persons were absconding. Informant further
stated that the dead body of Chumnu Oraon with injuries was found in a
ditch at a distance of one kilometer north-west to village Sakar Pada. The
accused persons had also taken away wrist watches and bicycles of the
informant and Chumnu Oraon.
8. On the basis of the fardbeyan of the informant Mandar P.S. Case
No.80 of 1992dated 29.06.1992 was registered under sections
302/201/379/34 of the Indian Penal Code against the accused persons
Etwa Oraon and Champa Oraon.
9. On completion of investigation, charge-sheet was submitted on
30.9.1992 under sections 302/201/379/34 of the Indian Penal Code
against the accused persons. Thereafter, cognizance of the offences was
taken and case was committed to the court of Sessions.
10. Charges were framed against the accused persons under
sections 302/34, 201 and 379 of the Indian Penal Code to which they
pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried and trial commenced.
11. The prosecution, in order to prove its case, had examined
altogether nine witnesses out of which PW-3 Pannu Oraon is the
informant; P.W.-1Chada Oraon; P.W.-2Mahavir Oraon, is the maternal
uncle of the informant; PW-4 Suga Oraon; P.W.-5 is Dr. Ram Sewak
Sahu, who has conducted autopsy over the dead body of the
deceased;P.W.-6 Jagarnath Ram, is police constable; who has proved the
FIR;P.W.-7 is A.S.I., Bandhu Mahto, who is the first investigating
officer; PW-8, Lattu Oraon, is the father of the Chumnu Oraon
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(deceased) and P.W.-9 Bhola Ram Dabgar, is second investigating
officer of the case..
12. The trial Court, after recording the evidence of witnesses,
examination-in-chief and cross-examination, recorded the statement of
the accused, found the charges levelled against the appellant proved
beyond all reasonable doubts. Accordingly, the appellant had been found
guilty and convicted as aforesaid which is the subject matter of instant
appeal.
Submissions advanced by the learned Amicus Curiae:.
13. The following grounds have been taken by the learned Amicus
Curiae for the appellant in assailing the impugned judgment of
conviction:
I. The learned court below has failed to consider that there is no
other eyewitness except the informant who has given different
version at different stages.
II. Informant had not given the name of appellant Champa Oraon,
in the first information report but he gave his name in his
deposition before the court. Further in the FIR, it is said that
accused Etwa Oraon had took the deceased Chumnu Oraon
from his house and then assaulted him with knife but in court
he has said that both appellants assaulted with knife in the
house.
III. Informant in paragraph-7 of his cross-examination has stated
that whatever he is saying, he is saying for the first time in
court and prior to this, his statement was not taken as such the
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lower court ought to have disbelieved the version of informant
and acquitted the appellant.
IV. It is further submitted that the learned court below ought to
have considered the defence version that the murder was not
committed in the house of the accused persons rather it was
committed where the dead body was found by the informant
and also because nothing incriminating nor any mark of blood
was found in the house of the appellants, benefit of doubts
should have been given to the appellants.
V. Learned court below ought to have considered the defence
version that the doctor PW-5 has said that incised wound can be
caused by sword and tangi, but there is evidence of using of
only knife and no any other sharp cutting weapon, which also
casts doubt upon the prosecution story.
VI. Learned court below ought to have at least acquitted the
appellant as there was no allegation against him of assault in the
FIR.
VII. Learned lower court has ought to have considered that the
prosecution has miserably failed to establish the place of
occurrence because the Investigating Officer had not found any
blood stain soil in the house of the accused persons to prove
that such occurrence.
VIII. Learned court below has erred in convicting the Appellant on
the sole testimony of the informant without any independent
corroboration though there was every possibility of independent
witnesses seeing the informant and deceased, coming to the
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house of the informant, on bicycle and also seeing the
informant (P.W-3) running away when alleged to have been
chased by the accused persons in view of the fact that
occurrence took place in day time at 1.30 P.Μ.
14. The learned counsel for the appellant, based upon the aforesaid
grounds, has submitted that the trial court has not taken into
consideration the aforesaid facts, as such, the impugned judgment is not
sustainable in the eyes of law and requires interference.
Submission advanced by the learned counsel for the State:
15. Per Contra, learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the
respondent-State has taken the following grounds in defending the
impugned judgment of conviction and sentence:
I. Learned counsel appearing for the State has submitted that the
appellant has been charged u/s 302 r/w 34 IPC for causing
murder of Chumnu Oraon. Apart from the aforesaid charge he
has further been charged under section201 and u/s 379 for
snatching wrist watch and bicycle of the informant.
II. Submission has been made that deceased died of stab injuries
which is consistent with the oral evidence of informant. The
ocular evidence of informant got support from the medical
evidence.
III. Further submission has been made that informant is sole eye
witness of the occurrence and prosecution has been able to
prove the charge beyond all reasonable doubt and the instant
case is based upon the cogent testimony of the eyewitness, as
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such, some lacuna in the investigation will not vitiate the
prosecution case.
16. Therefore, learned counsel for the State submitted that learned
trial court on the basis of evidence of the witnesses and documents
available on record has rightly convicted the appellant under section
302/34 and 201, 379 of the IPC and hence, requires no interference by
this court.
Analysis:
17. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the
documents and the testimony of witnesses as also the finding recorded
by learned trial Court in the impugned order.
18. This Court, before appreciating the arguments advanced on
behalf of the parties as also the legality and propriety of the impugned
judgment, deems it fit and proper to refer the testimonies of the
witnesses examined in the present case. For ready reference, the relevant
portion of their testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are quoted as
under:
19. PW-1 Chada Oraon is a hearsay witness who in his cross-
examination has stated that he does not know anything regarding the
alleged occurrence.
20. P.W.-2 Mahavir Oraon, is the maternal uncle of the informant.
P.W-2 has stated in his evidence that his nephew(bhagina) Pannu Oraon
had come to his house and had informed that accused Etwa Oraon gave
knife blows to Chumnu Oraon and Etwa Oraon and his brother had
chased him (Pannu Oraon), but he fled away. P.W.-2 further stated that
he had seen the dead body of Chumnu Oraon to the north of Koram
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Sakra river. He had seen injury on the body of the deceased and neck of
the deceased was severed. In his cross-examination P.W.-2 stated that it
was Monday when Pannu Oraon had told him about the occurrence and
Mandar Police had enquired him about the occurrence.
21. PW-3 Pannu Oraon is informant of the case and brother-in-
law(bahoni)Chumnu Oraon (deceased).Informant has stated in his
examination-in-chief that on the date of occurrence it was Sunday and he
and Chumnu Oraon had gone to the house of the accused persons, on
bicycle, to inform regarding the death of his sister Meena Devi, who died
due to snake bite at Biharsharif. He has further stated that he informed
accused Etwa Oraon about the death of Meena Devi. Etwa Oraon served
them meal and wine. Thereafter the accused persons Etwa Oraon and
Champa Oraon, assaulted Chumnu Oraon with knife on neck and
abdomen. He tried to save Chumnu Oraon upon which the accused
persons caught his neck and snatched his wrist watch. He fled away from
there, but, the accused persons chased him for three miles. He spent the
night in village Kuli Mandra and in the morning he went to Itki to his
maternal uncle Mahabir Oraon (P.W.-2) and told him about the
occurrence. Then they went to Mandar police station where his
fardbeyan was recorded upon which he put his signature. The signature
of the informant on the fardbeyan was marked as Ext.-. Informant has
further identified his signature on the inquest report which was marked
as Ext.-1/1.Informant has further stated that the accused persons
committed theft of his bicycle and bicycle of Chumnu Oraon(deceased).
22. In his cross-examination, informant stated that on the date of
occurrence, all the four drank two bottles of wine. There is about 35
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houses near the house of Etwa Oraon. Informant further stated that in
then fardbeyan, he had told to the police about stabbing in the stomach
and neck of Chumnu Oraon.
23. PW-4 Suga Oraon is tendered witness who stated in his cross-
examination that police had not asked him anything about the
occurrence.
24. PW-5 is Dr. Ram Sewak Sahu, who has conducted postmortem
over the dead body of the deceased and found following injuries: -
1. Incised wounds:
(i) 15x2 c.m. on the front part of the neck situated
transversely cutting the soft tissues, blood vessel,
trachea, esophagus and third cervical vertebrae
partially with infiltration of blood and blood clot at
the sight of cut injury.
(ii) 7x ¼ c.m. x skin deep, 5x¼ c.m. x skin deep on the
front part of the neck situated below the injury no.1
2. Stab wounds:-
(i) 3 ½ x 1 ½ cms x cavity deep on the left abdomen
front situated 2 c.ms. above the umbilicus and 1 c.m. left
to midline. The weapon had passed through the
abdominal wall and perforated the small intestine at two
places. A coil of intestine was protruding out of the
wound. There was presence of blood and blood clot in the
abdominal cavity.
3. Abrasions:-
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(i) 3x2 c.m., 1x1 c.m., 2 ½ x1 c.m. on the left forearm
front.
(ii) 5x2 c.m. on the left lacerated side of the chest.
25. The doctor has stated that the said injuries were ante-mortem,
the stab wounds were caused by sharp cutting cum pointed weapon like
Chhura, the incised wounds by sharp cutting weapon and the abrasions
by hard and blunt substance. The death occurred between 24 to 72 hrs.,
from the time of postmortem examination. He has prepared postmortem
report which is marked as Ext.-2. In his cross-examination he has
deposed that incised wound could be caused by sword and tangi.
26. P.W.-6 Jagarnath Ram, is police constable and he has proved
the formal FIR which was marked as Ext.-3.
27. P.W.-7 A.S.I. Bandhu Mahto, is the first investigating officer of
the case. He has stated in his evidence that on 29.06.1992, he was posted
in Mander Police Station and at that time officer-in-charge was not
present and in absence of the officer-in-charge, he had recorded the
statement of informant Pannu Oraon. He took the investigation of the
case and recorded the re-statement of the informant Pannu Oraon and
proceeded for the place of occurrence. The first place of occurrence is at
village Korambi in the mud and clay tile roofed house of accused
persons Etwa Oraon and Champa Oraon. Then, he proceeded for second
the place of occurrence which is at distance of about one kilometer away
to North-West of village Korambi Sakar Pada in a drain and this place of
occurrence is boundary of village Korambi Sakar Pada. He further stated
that he found the dead body at this place of occurrence and neck of the
body was severed and intestine was protruding out. He had prepared the
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inquest report at this place of occurrence, which is in his handwriting and
signature. Inquest report was marked as Ext.-4. P.W.-7 further stated
that, when Officer-in- Charge Bhola Ram Dabgar, came he handed over
the investigation to him.
28. In his cross-examination P.W.-7 stated that at the first place of
occurrence, he did find object and he did not any make any seizure list.
P.W.-7 further stated that he did not find knife or wine bottle at any
place of occurrence.
29. PW-8 Lattu Oraon, is the father of Chumnu Oraon(deceased).
He has stated that he himself did not see the occurrence rather the
informant told him after two days of the murder of his son that accused
Etwa and Champa had murdered his son.
30. PW-9 Bhola Ram Dabgar is the officer-in-charge and second
investigating officer of the case. He has stated in his evidence that on
29.06.1992, he took over the investigation of the present case. He
recorded the statements of other witnesses, received postmortem report
and submitted charge-sheet after completion of investigation. In his
cross-examination, he stated that he did not seize any object related to
the occurrence.
31. This Court, on the basis of the aforesaid factual aspect vis-a-vis
argument advanced on behalf of parties, has to decide the legality and
propriety of the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence
particularly whether the informant P.W.-3 Pannu Oraon, who is the sole
eye witness of the case, is trustworthy and reliable, to convict the
appellant under Sections 302/34, 201 and 379 of the Indian Penal Code.
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32. This court finds from the impugned judgment that learned trial
court has convicted the appellant relying on the testimony of the
informant P.W.-3Pannu Oraon, who is the sole eyewitness to the assault
on Chumnu Oraon (deceased). Learned trial court had found that
testimony of the informant was substantiated by P.W.-2 Mahavir Oraon,
who is the maternal uncle of the informant and P.W.- 7, who is the
second investigating officer of the case.
33. Before we analyse and appreciate the circumstances that have
weighed with the trial court, this court think it apposite to refer to certain
authorities pertaining to evidentiary value of the sole eyewitness.
34. It is settled proposition of law that the judgment of conviction
can be passed on the basis of the testimony of sole eyewitness but the
testimony of said witness should be trustworthy and inspire confidence
in the mind of the Court.
35. There is no legal impediment in convicting a person on the sole
testimony of a single witness. That is the logic of Section 134 of the
Evidence Act, 1872. But if there are doubts about the testimony the
courts will insist on corroboration. In fact, it is not the number, the
quantity, but the quality that is material. The time-honored principle is
that evidence has to be weighed and not counted. The test is whether the
evidence has a ring of truth, is cogent, credible and trustworthy, or
otherwise.
36. The law is well settled that the judgment of conviction can be
passed also on the basis of the testimony of sole witness but the
testimony of said witness should be trustworthy as per the judgment
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rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Bipin Kumar Mondal v.
State of W.B., (2010) 12 SCC 91, paragraphs 30 to 34 of the said
judgment are being referred hereunder as :-
"30. Shri Bagga has also submitted that there was sole testimony of Sujit
Mondal, PW 1, and the rest i.e. depositions of PW 2 to PW 8, could be
treated merely as hearsay. The same cannot be relied upon for
conviction.
31. In Sunil Kumar v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) this Court repelled a
similar submission observing that:
(SCC p. 371, para 9) "9. ... as a general rule the court can and may act
on the testimony of a single witness provided he is wholly reliable. There
is no legal impediment in convicting a person on the sole testimony of a
single witness. That is the logic of Section 134 of the Evidence Act, 1872.
But, if there are doubts about the testimony the courts will insist on
corroboration."
In fact, it is not the number, the quantity, but the quality that is material.
The time-honoured principle is that evidence has to be weighed and not
counted. The test is whether the evidence has a ring of truth, is cogent,
credible and trustworthy, or otherwise.
32. In Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra this Court reiterated the similar
view observing that it is the quality and not the quantity of evidence
which is necessary for proving or disproving a fact. The legal system has
laid emphasis on value, weight and quality of evidence rather than on
quantity, multiplicity or plurality of witnesses. It is, therefore, open to a
competent court to fully and completely rely on a solitary witness and
record conviction. Conversely, it may acquit the accused in spite of
testimony of several witnesses if it is not satisfied about the quality of
evidence.
33. In Kunju v. State of T.N., a similar view has been reiterated placing
reliance on various earlier judgments of this Court including Jagdish
Prasad v. State of M.P. and Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras.
34. Thus, in view of the above, the bald contention made by Shri Bagga
that no conviction can be recorded in case of a solitary eyewitness has no
force and is negatived accordingly."
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37. Likewise, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Kuriya and
another vs. State of Rajasthan, (2012) 10 SCC 433 has held as under: -
" 33. ---The Court has stated the principle that, as a general rule, the
Court can and may act on the testimony of a single eyewitness provided
he is wholly reliable and base the conviction on the testimony of such sole
eyewitness. There is no legal impediment in convicting a person on the
sole testimony of a single witness."
38. Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Kalu @ Amit vs.
State of Haryana, (2012) 8 SCC 34 held as under:
"11. We find no infirmity in the judgment of the High Court which has
rightly affirmed the trial court's view. It is true that the accused have
managed to win over the complainant PW 4 Karambir Yadav, but the
evidence of PW 5 Ram Chander Yadav bears out the prosecution case. It is
well settled that conviction can be based on the evidence of a sole
eyewitness if his evidence inspires confidence. This witness has meticulously
narrated the incident and supported the prosecution case. We find him to be
a reliable witness."
39. The Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Sheelam Ramesh v. State of
A.P., (1999) 8 SCC 369 in Para -18 held as follows: -
"18. According to learned counsel for the accused appellants, though PW
3 has deposed that 10-15 persons were in the vicinity at the time of
occurrence, no independent witness was examined by the prosecution.
There is nothing on evidence to show that there was any other eyewitness
to the occurrence. Having examined all the eyewitnesses even if other
persons present nearby were not examined, the evidence of the
eyewitnesses cannot be discarded. Courts are concerned with quality and
not with quantity of evidence and in a criminal trial, conviction can be
based on the sole evidence of a witness if it inspires confidence."
40. Thus, on the basis of the aforesaid discussion it is apparent that
the conviction can be based on the evidence of a sole eyewitness if his
evidence inspires confidence reason being that Courts are concerned
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with quality and not with quantity of evidence and in a criminal trial as
per the statute there is no legal impediment on relying upon the
testimony of sole eyewitness.
41. Hence, this court is proceeding to examine the testimony of the
informant P.W.-3 Pannu Oraon, who is the alleged sole eyewitness vis-à-
vis FIR, P.W.-7, who is the first investigating officer of the case and the
post-mortem, in order to appreciate the veracity of the prosecution case.
42. But, before proceeding further, it is pertinent to note that in the
present case, initially FIR was lodged against the two accused persons
namely Etwa Oraon and Champa Oraon and both are brother out of
whom Etwa Oraon died during the pendency of the appeal and his appeal
was abated. Hence, appeal of the surviving appellant for his conviction
under sections 302/34, 201 and 379 of the Indian Penal Code, has to be
decided in the present appeal.
43. In the present case, Etwa Oraon and Chumnu Oraon(deceased),
both are brother-in- law (bahoni) of the informant Pannu Oraon (P.W.-3)
and as per the FIR there is allegation of killing of Chumnu
Oraon(deceased) on Etwa Oraon and Etwa’s brother Champa Oraon
(appellant herein).
44. At this juncture, it would be pertinent to examine the testimony
of the alleged sole eyewitness P.W.-3Pannu Oraon, who is the informant
of the case, in the backdrop of aforesaid legal proposition.
45. Informant PW-3 Pannu Oraon has stated in his evidence that on
the alleged date of occurrence, they took meal and drank wine in the
accused/appellant house and thereafter, the accused persons Etwa Oraon
and Champa Oraon (appellant herein), assaulted Chumnu
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Oraon(deceased) with knife on neck and abdomen. He tried to save
Chumnu Oraon upon which the accused persons caught his neck and
snatched his wrist watch. He fled away from there, but, the accused
persons chased him for three miles.
46. Hence, in his testimony informant has himself admitted that he
drank wine in the house of the accused/ appellant, then question arises
how informant can run in such a drunken condition to save his life,
when he was chased by the two accused person/appellant that too three
miles, as stated by the informant in his deposition and this testimony of
the informant raises doubt in the prosecution case.
47. Further, in the evidence of the informant it has come that when
accused persons Etwa Oraon and Champa Oraon(appellant herein),
assaulted Chumnu Oraon(deceased) with knife on neck and abdomen, he
tried to save Chumnu Oraon upon which the accused persons caught his
neck, but he fled away from there and he spent the night in village Kuli
Bhandra and in the morning he went to Itki to his maternal uncle
Mahabir Oraon (P.W.-2).
48. In his fardbeyan also, the informant had stated that after fleeing
away from the place of occurrence, he had stayed at night at village Kuli
with unknown persons.
49. But, the aforesaid statement of the informant given in his
evidence as well as in his fardbeyan that after fleeing away from the
place of occurrence, informant in the night, hide himself in village Kuli
with unknown persons, was not investigated by both the investigating
officers P.W.-7 and P.W-9.
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50. Hence, failure of the prosecution to examine any witness from
the village Kuli, the veracity of the statement of the informant that after
being chased by the accused person/appellant, informant stayed in the
night at village Kuli with unknown persons, cannot be tested and hence,
raises further doubt in the prosecution case.
51. Now, coming to the place of occurrence, the informant in his
fardbeyan has stated that after taking meal and drinking wine, in accused
/appellant house, Chumnu Oraon(deceased) was brought out of the house
and accused started giving knife blows. But, ongoing through the
fardbeyan, this court finds that informant has not specifically deposed
that where the assault on the deceased took place i.e. whether inside the
house of the accused/appellant or outside the house of the
accused/appellant.
52. But, regarding the place of occurrence, the first investigating
officer P.W.-7 of the case has deposed that there are two places of
occurrence in the case.
53. First investigating officer P.W.-7 has deposed that the first
place of occurrence is at village Korambi in the mud and clay tile roofed
house of accused persons Etwa Oraon and Champa Oraon and the
second the place of occurrence is at distance of about one kilometer
away to North-West of village Korambi Sakar Pada in a drain, from
where dead body of deceased was found and this place of occurrence is
boundary of village Korambi Sakar Pada.
54. Hence, first investigating officer P.W.-7 has deposed that at the
first place of occurrence i.e. in the house of accused/ appellant, incident
of assault on the deceased took place, which is contrary to the statement
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of the informant given in his fardbeyan, wherein informant had deposed
that Chumnu Oraon(deceased) was brought out of the house and accused
started giving knife blows on him. Investigating has also stated in his
evidence that neither he had recovered anything from the first place of
occurrence nor he did prepare any seizure list.
55. Hence, prosecution has failed to prove the place of occurrence
i.e. where the incident of assault on Chumnu Oraon(deceased), leading to
his death took place.
56. Further, informant has stated at paragraph-8 of his cross-
examination that there are about 35 houses nearby the house of
accused/appellant, but, then question arises when the informant himself
has stated in his fardbeyan that incident of assault on the deceased had
taken place outside the house of the accused/appellant, then how nobody
from the village had witnessed the assault though informant has stated in
his fardbeyan that the alleged incident of assault on deceased took
place after they had taken meal and drank wine at 1.30 P.M. in the
afternoon and this, raises doubt in the testimony of the informant.
57. Thus, from the aforesaid discussion this Court is of the
considered view that the testimony of the informant P.W.-3,who had
been claimed as sole eyewitness is not trustworthy and reliable.
58. Further in the case of sole eye witness, the witness has to be
reliable, trustworthy, his testimony worthy of credence and the case has
to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Unnatural conduct and
unexplained circumstances can be a ground for disbelieving the witness.
Reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered in the case of
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Narendrasinh Keshubhai Zala Vs. State of Gujarat [(2023) 18 SCC
783], wherein it has been held as under:
“8. It is a settled principle of law that doubt cannot replace proof.
Suspicion, howsoever great it may be, is no substitute of proof in
criminal jurisprudence (Jagga Singh v. State of Punjab [Jagga
Singh v. State of Punjab, 1994 Supp (3) SCC 463 : 1994 SCC (Cri)
1798] ). Only such evidence is admissible and acceptable as is
permissible in accordance with law. In the case of a sole eyewitness,
the witness has to be reliable, trustworthy, his testimony worthy of
credence and the case proven beyond reasonable doubt. Unnatural
conduct and unexplained circumstances can be a ground for
disbelieving the witness.
9. This Court in Anil Phukan v. State of Assam [Anil Phukan v. State of
Assam, (1993) 3 SCC 282 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 810] has held that : (SCC
p. 285, para 3)
“3. … So long as the single eyewitness is a wholly reliable witness
the courts have no difficulty in basing conviction on his testimony
alone. However, where the single eyewitness is not found to be a
wholly reliable witness, in the sense that there are some
circumstances which may show that he could have an interest in the
prosecution, then the courts generally insist upon some independent
corroboration of his testimony, in material particulars, before
recording conviction. It is only when the courts find that the single
eyewitness is a wholly unreliable witness that his testimony is
discarded in toto and no amount of corroboration can cure that
defect.”
59. The Hon'ble Apex Court in catena of decision has propounded
the proposition that in the criminal trial, there cannot be any conviction if
the charge is not being proved beyond all reasonable doubts, as has been
held in the case of Rang Bahadur Singh & Ors. Vrs. State of U.P.,
reported in (2000) 3 SCC 454, wherein, at paragraph-22, it has been held
as under:-
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"22. The amount of doubt which the Court would entertain regarding the
complicity of the appellants in this case is much more than the level of
reasonable doubt. We are aware that acquitting the accused in a case of this
nature is not a matter of satisfaction for all concerned. At the same time we
remind ourselves of the time-tested rule that acquittal of a guilty person
should be preferred to conviction of an innocent person. Unless the
prosecution establishes the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt a
conviction cannot be passed on the accused. A criminal court cannot afford
to deprive liberty of the appellants, lifelong liberty, without having at least a
reasonable level of certainty that the appellants were the real culprits. We
really entertain doubt about the involvement of the appellants in the crime."
60. Likewise, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Krishnegowda
& Ors. Vrs. State of Karnataka, (supra), has held at paragraph-26 as
under:
"26. Having gone through the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and the
findings recorded by the High Court we feel that the High Court has failed
to understand the fact that the guilt of the accused has to be proved beyond
reasonable doubt and this is a classic case where at each and every stage of
the trial, there were lapses on the part of the investigating agency and the
evidence of the witnesses is not trustworthy which can never be a basis for
conviction. The basic principle of criminal jurisprudence is that the accused
is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is proved beyond reasonable
doubt."
61. Further, it needs to refer herein the principle of 'benefit of
doubt' belongs exclusively to criminal jurisprudence. The pristine
doctrine of 'benefit of doubt' can be invoked when there is reasonable
doubt regarding the guilt of the accused, reference in this regard may be
made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
State of Haryana Vrs. Bhagirath & Ors., reported in (1999) 5 SCC 96,
wherein, it has been held at paragraph-7 as under: -
"7. The High Court had failed to consider the implication of the evidence of
the two eyewitnesses on the complicity of Bhagirath particularly when the
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High Court found their evidence reliable. The benefit of doubt was given to
Bhagirath "as a matter of abundant caution". Unfortunately, the High Court
did not point out the area where there is such a doubt. Any restraint by way
of abundant caution need not be entangled with the concept of the benefit of
doubt. Abundant caution is always desirable in all spheres of human
activity. But the principle of benefit of doubt belongs exclusively to criminal
jurisprudence. The pristine doctrine of benefit of doubt can be invoked when
there is reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused. It is the
reasonable doubt which a conscientious judicial mind entertains on a
conspectus of the entire evidence that the accused might not have committed
the offence, which affords the benefit to the accused at the end of the
criminal trial. Benefit of doubt is not a legal dosage to be administered at
every segment of the evidence, but an advantage to be afforded to the
accused at the final end after consideration of the entire evidence, if the
Judge conscientiously and reasonably entertains doubt regarding the guilt
of the accused."
62. It needs to refer herein that the Hon'ble Apex Court, in the case
of Allarakha K. Mansuri v. State of Gujarat reported in (2002) 3 SCC
57 has laid down the principle that the golden thread which runs through
the web of administration of justice in criminal case is that if two views
are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the
guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is
favourable to the accused should be adopted, for ready reference,
paragraph 6 thereof requires to be referred herein which reads hereunder
as :-
“6. ------The golden thread which runs through the web of
administration of justice in criminal case is that if two views are
possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the
guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view
which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. —"
63. It needs to refer herein before laying down the aforesaid
view, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sharad Birdhichand
Sarda v. State of Maharashtra reported in (1984) 4 SCC 116 has
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22
already laid down the same view at paragraph 163 which is required
to be referred which read hereunder as-
“163. We then pass on to another important point which seems to have
been completely missed by the High Court. It is well settled that where
on the evidence two possibilities are available or open, one which goes
in favour of the prosecution and the other which benefits an accused,
the accused is undoubtedly entitled to the benefit of doubt.---"
64. This Court, after having discussed the factual aspect and legal
position as discussed hereinabove is of the view that the prosecution has
miserably failed to prove the charges against the appellant beyond all
reasonable doubt as such the impugned judgment of conviction and order
of sentence requires interference by this Court.
65. Accordingly, the impugned the judgment of conviction dated
17.12.1997 and order of sentence dated 18.12.1997, passed by the
learned 1
st
Additional Judicial Commissioner, Ranchi, in Sessions Trial
No.29 of 1993,are hereby quashed and set aside.
66. Consequently, the instant appeal stand allowed.
67. The present appellant is hereby discharged from all criminal
liabilities. Since the aforesaid appellant is on bail and, as such, they are
discharged from the liability of the bail bonds.
68. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands
disposed of.
69. Before parting with this order, it requires to refer herein that
this Court vide has appointed Ms. Sumiran Srivastava, the learned
counsel as Amicus to argue this criminal appeal on behalf of appellant.
The assistance of the learned Amicus is highly appreciable.
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70. In view thereof, the Secretary, Jharkhand High Court Legal
Services Committee is directed to ensure payment of admissible fee in
favour of learned Amicus.
71. Let the Trial Court Records be sent back to the Court concerned
forthwith, along with the copy of this Judgment.
I agree (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
(Arun Kumar Rai, J.) (Arun Kumar Rai, J.)
Jharkhand High Court
Dated: 12/03/2026
KNR/AFR
Uploaded On:13/03/2026
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