C-WP3702_05.doc

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION NO.3702 OF 2005

Chirag Shashikant Shah and others … Petitioners

Vs.

State of Maharashtra and others … Respondents

WITH

INTERIM APPLICATION NO.15159 OF 2024

IN

WRIT PETITION NO.3702 OF 2005

---

Mr. Kailas Dewal a/w. Mr. Yash Dewal with Mr. Ashwin Kulkarni i/b. Mr. Kailas

Dewal for Petitioners.

Mr. O. A. Chandurkar, Additional GP with Ms. G. R. Raghuwanshi, AGP for

Respondent Nos.1 to 6-State.

Mr. Niranjan P. Shimpi for Respondent No.7.

CORAM : MANISH PITALE &

SHREERAM V. SHIRSAT, JJ.

Reserved on :AUGUST 07, 2026

Pronounced on:SEPTEMBER 07, 2026

JUDGEMENT : (Per Justice Manish Pitale)

. The petitioners herein seek directions against the respondents to

initiate proceedings for acquisition of 6900 sq.mtrs. land at CTS

No.1917 (Old Survey No.37), in Village Bhayander, Mumbai. It is an

admitted position that the said land is in possession of respondent No.7 -

Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Limited (MTNL) since the year 1989.

MTNL has constructed its building and it has been utilizing the said land

from the year 1989. The chronology of events narrated hereinbelow

would show two sets of proceedings concerning the subject land, one

under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (ULC Act)

and the other under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (LA Act). It is the

case of the petitioners that although the said land admeasuring 6900

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sq.mtrs. has been utilized by respondent No.7 MTNL for all these years,

the petitioners have not been paid compensation and no acquisition

proceedings were undertaken in respect of the said land.

2. The writ petition was initially filed by Mrs. Evelyn Paul Pereira

and others. Due to passage of time, some of the original petitioners were

deleted and upon the demise of Mrs. Evelyn Paul Pereira, her legal

representatives were brought on record. Subsequently, the said

petitioners on record of this writ petition executed a registered deed of

transfer of actionable claims. On the basis of the said document, an

application was moved for substitution of the said original petitioners by

the present petitioners in whose favour the said document was executed.

By an order dated 20.02.2026, the said application was allowed.

Accordingly, the present petitioners came on record. Hence, reference to

petitioners in this judgment and order in the chronology of events at

relevant places is to be taken as reference to the predecessor of the

petitioners. The petitioners were owners of lands in Village Bhayander,

District Thane, including the said land admeasuring 6900 sq.mtrs. The

said lands were notified for acquisition in the year 1982. Notification

under Section 4 of the LA Act was issued on 10.11.1982 and Declaration

under Section 6 thereof was issued on 28.11.1985.

3. While these proceedings were undertaken parallelly, proceedings

under the ULC Act were also undertaken from the year 1976 onwards.

Accordingly, returns under Section 6(1) of the ULC Act were submitted

in respect of lands owned in Village Bhayander. On 26.10.1984, the

Deputy Collector and Competent Authority under the ULC Act passed

an order declaring land to the extent of 29,939 sq.mtrs. as surplus. A

revision proceeding was initiated before the State Government in that

regard.

4. In the meanwhile, suits were filed challenging the Notification

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under Section 4 and Declaration under Section 6 of the LA Act. This

included Regular Civil Suit No.1050 of 1985 filed in respect of the lands

of the petitioners. In the said suit, written statement was filed on behalf

of the State authorities. The acquisition, inter alia, was for the benefit of

MTNL. Hence, in 1987, MTNL deposited an amount of Rs.9,13,996/-

with the Special Land Acquisition Officer (SLAO). In the said suit, an

order of status-quo was operating and therefore, in 1988, MTNL filed an

application for vacating the order of status-quo in respect of the subject

land admeasuring 6900 sq.mtrs. The petitioners placed their say on

record, stating that if acquisition was withdrawn from the remaining

portion, possession of 6900 sq.mtrs. land could be handed over to

MTNL. On 21.12.1988, the concerned Civil Court at Thane, considering

the said suit, vacated the order of status-quo in respect of 6900 sq.mtrs.

of land, which is subject matter of the present writ petition, in view of

undertaking given by the respondents i.e. the State authorities that they

would withdraw acquisition in respect of the remaining land notified for

acquisition.

5. In this backdrop, on 17.04.1989, the petitioners handed over

possession of the subject land admeasuring 6900 sq.mtrs. to MTNL.

There is no dispute about the said fact. In the proceedings under the

ULC Act, the revision proceeding was disposed of by the State

Government, taking note of the subsequent event of possession of 6900

sq.mtrs. of land being handed over to MTNL and thereupon, setting

aside the order dated 26.10.1984 to remand the matter back to the

competent authority under the ULC Act.

6. Upon remand, the competent authority under the provisions of the

ULC Act passed an order on 24.01.1990, declaring surplus land of

18,941 sq. mtrs. excluding 6900 sq.mtrs. i.e. the subject land from the

surplus land. The respondent State Government directed the competent

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authority under Section 35 of the ULC Act to revise the said order dated

24.01.1990. Accordingly, on 20.08.1991, the competent authority passed

an order under Section 45 of the ULC Act reversing its own view taken

in the order dated 24.01.1990, to hold that the subject land admeasuring

6900 sq.mtrs. was part of the surplus land. Aggrieved by the said order,

one of the original owners filed an appeal under Section 33 of the ULC

Act. During this period, on 04.03.1992, the respondent No.5 Collector,

Thane informed respondent No.7 MTNL that the land acquisition

proposal stood cancelled due to declaration of the subject land as surplus

under the ULC Act.

7. On 23.03.1992, the appellate authority dismissed the appeal,

holding that the owners could claim compensation only under the ULC

Act and not under the LA Act. Aggrieved by the said order, the

petitioners filed Writ Petition No.3891 of 1992 before this Court to

challenge the said order passed by the appellate authority. In the said

pending Writ Petition No.3891 of 1992, the respondent No.7 MTNL,

which was also added as a party, moved an application bearing Civil

Application No.5510 of 1993 for a direction that its name should be

recorded in the property card. On 08.02.1994, this Court allowed the

application and accordingly, the name of MTNL was reflected in the

property card.

8. On 10.12.1999, the respondent SLAO informed MTNL that since

it was no longer necessary to acquire the subject land under the

provisions of the LA Act, the aforesaid amount deposited by MTNL was

refunded. Accordingly, Rs.9,08,784/- deposited by MTNL was refunded

to it after deducting amount of Rs.5,212/- towards government

establishment charges, joint measurement charges and newspaper

advertisement bills. The respondents in Writ Petition No.3891 of 1992

filed their affidavits and the writ petition was taken up for consideration.

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9. By an order dated 04.02.2003, this Court allowed the said writ

petition and remanded the matter to the competent authority. It was

directed that order dated 20.08.1991 would be treated as notice. On

21.10.2003, the competent authority passed its order confirming the

order dated 24.01.1990, thereby excluding the subject land from surplus

land under the provisions of the ULC Act. Hence, on 03.04.2004, the

petitioner issued notice to the respondent to initiate land acquisition

proceedings concerning the subject land admeasuring 6900 sq.mtrs. or in

the alternative, to return the said land. In this backdrop, on 06.05.2005,

the present petition was filed. The petitioners prayed for direction to the

respondent Nos.1 to 6 to initiate acquisition proceedings under the LA

Act to acquire the subject land. In the alternative, the petitioners prayed

for a direction to the respondents to handover vacant and peaceful

possession of the subject land after demolishing the structures standing

thereon. The respondents filed their reply affidavits in the writ petition.

On 21.07.2006, this Court directed respondent No.7 MTNL to deposit an

amount of Rs.5 lakhs for the time being towards compensation for

acquisition of the subject land admeasuring 6900 sq.mtrs. The said

amount was indeed deposited by MTNL in this Court and it has been

earning interest. On 29.09.2006, this Court granted Rule in the writ

petition. As noted hereinabove, by order dated 20.02.2026, the present

petitioners substituted the original petitioners and they have pursued the

present writ petition.

10. Mr. Kailas Dewal, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners

submitted that this was a classic case of violation of right to property of

the petitioners guaranteed under Article 300A of the Constitution of

India. It was submitted that the Supreme Court in the cases of Kolkata

Municipal Corporation and another Vs. Bimal Kumar Shah and others,

(2024) 10 SCC 533 and Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz and others Vs.

Government of Karnataka, (2025) 7 SCC 580 recognized right to

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property as a human right and seven valuable sub-rights were also

recognized therein. It was submitted that the approach of the

respondents, in the present case, demonstrates violation of such valuable

rights of the petitioners.

11. It was submitted that although possession of the subject land

admeasuring 6900 sq.mtrs. was taken as far back as on 17.04.1989, till

date, no compensation has been paid and no effort has been made to

acquire the said piece of land. It was submitted that the parallel

proceedings under the LA Act and the ULC Act undertaken by the

respondent authorities in respect of the subject land, had resulted in a

situation where the petitioners stood deprived of valuable land in lieu of

which no compensation has been paid till date. MTNL has utilized the

said land by making constructions and even earning substantial amounts

of money by giving out parts of the structures on rent and lease, while

the petitioners have been continuously deprived of their valuable rights.

12. Since the petitioners were pursuing their remedies under the ULC

Act diligently, which culminated in the said order dated 21.10.2003 and

they ultimately pursued their claim for payment of compensation by

acquisition of the subject land, it cannot be said that their claim is hit by

delay and / or laches. It was highlighted that although the respondents

claimed that an appeal had been filed against the said order dated

21.10.2003 of the competent authority under the ULC Act, no details

were forthcoming and the petitioners were never put to notice thereof. In

any case, upon repeal of the ULC Act in the State of Maharashtra from

29.11.2007, as per Section 3 of the Repealing Act, all pending

proceedings stood abated. On this basis, it was submitted that the order

dated 21.10.2003 passed by the competent authority under the ULC Act

in favour of the petitioners continued to operate, thereby indicating that

the petitioners are entitled to pursue their prayers made in the present

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writ petition. In support of the aforesaid contentions, reliance was placed

on the judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of Vidya Devi Vs.

State of Himachal Pradesh and others, (2020) 2 SCC 569 and

judgement of this Court in the case of Voltas Limited and another Vs.

Additional Collector and Competent Authority, Thane and others, 2008

(5) ALL MR 537.

13. It was further submitted that in the face of such admitted facts, the

respondents are not entitled to challenge the correctness and veracity of

the said order dated 21.10.2003 passed by the competent authority under

the ULC Act as the said order had become final and binding on all

parties. The respondents are not entitled to claim that the said order is

bad on merits or that, it is a nullity. In support of this contention, reliance

was placed on judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of V. S.

Charati Vs. Hussein Nhanu Jamadar (dead) by LRs, (1999) 1 SCC 273.

On this basis, it was submitted that the contentions raised on behalf of

the respondents in that regard do not deserve to be considered.

14. It was submitted that the respondents did not take any steps even

during pendency of the petition to initiate land acquisition proceedings,

while respondent No.7 MTNL continued to enjoy the said property. The

amount deposited by MTNL towards compensation for acquisition of the

subject land was also refunded by the respondent SLAO and therefore,

MTNL has enjoyed the land free of cost at the expense of the petitioners.

On this basis, it was submitted that the respondents ought to to be

directed to initiate acquisition proceedings in respect of the subject land

admeasuring 6900 sq.mtrs. It was submitted that the acquisition ought to

be undertaken under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency

in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act 2013 (Act of

2013). It was further submitted that the petitioners need to be

compensated for being deprived of possession from 17.04.1989 onwards

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in a suitable manner, in the interest of justice. It was also submitted that

alternatively, the subject land ought to be restored to the petitioners with

a direction to the respondents to demolish the structures constructed

thereon.

15. Mr. Chandurkar, learned Additional Government Pleader as also

Ms. Raghuwanshi, learned AGP appearing for respondent Nos.1 to 6-

State relied upon the reply affidavits filed on behalf of the said

respondents in this writ petition. It was submitted that the petitioners and

the respondent No.7 MTNL had mutually agreed as regards possession

of the subject land being handed over to MTNL during the pendency of

the said suit. This resulted in the land acquisition proposal itself being

withdrawn. It was emphasized that the said decision and actions were

not taken by the SLAO and the State authorities. On this basis, it was

submitted that if there is any liability to pay compensation to the

petitioners, it is squarely that of respondent No.7 MTNL. It was further

submitted that if a land acquisition proposal was submitted afresh, the

matter could be considered accordingly.

16. Mr. Shimpi, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.7

MTNL vehemently opposed the present petition. He raised objection of

gross delay and laches on the part of the petitioners. It was submitted

that when possession was handed over, as far back as on 17.04.1989,

filing of the present petition in May 2005 i.e. after 16 years,

demonstrates that the petitioners cannot be allowed to agitate their

grievances after such a long period of time. It was submitted that during

the interregnum, the petitioners never raised any grievance with regard

to compensation for the subject land admeasuring 6900 sq.mtrs. The

respondent No.7 MTNL has been in continued possession of the subject

land since April 1989, several structures have been constructed and a

number of third parties are in possession of such structures. In that light,

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it was submitted that there was no question of returning the vacant

possession of the subject land to the petitioners.

17. It was further submitted that the present petition also raised

disputed questions of facts, which cannot be decided in writ jurisdiction.

According to the respondent No.7 MTNL, the disputed questions of

facts included the nature of out of court settlement between the

petitioners and MTNL with regard to the subject land admeasuring 6900

sq.mtrs. It was submitted that the contents of the application filed by

MTNL in the aforementioned suit wherein status-quo was operating, the

say of the petitioners therein and the order dated 21.12.1988 passed by

the concerned Civil Court, clearly indicate that there are number of

versions with regard to the nature of negotiations between the parties,

which ultimately led to possession of the subject land being handed over

to MTNL. In such a scenario, it was submitted that the petitioners cannot

be permitted to unsettle the status of the claim of the respondent MTNL

in the subject land. The writ petition itself was filed after more than 16

years of handing over of possession and today, after 37 years of the

possession having been handed over, no relief can be granted to the

petitioners. It was further submitted on behalf of the respondent No.7

MTNL that in such a scenario, the petitioners can be said to have waived

their rights, if any, in the subject land.

18. It was submitted that the petitioners cannot be permitted to take

advantage of the fortuitous circumstance of the ULC Act being repealed

during the pendency of the present petition. The petitioners can also not

be permitted to take advantage of the fact that the LA Act also stood

repealed during the pendency of the present writ petition and they cannot

be permitted to now invoke the Act of 2013 for seeking compensation in

respect of the subject land. It was submitted that in such a situation, the

writ petition deserved to be dismissed. If any relief is granted to the

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petitioners, it would amount to dual benefit to them as the subject land

stood excluded from surplus land under the ULC Act and the petitioners

would end up enjoying compensation under the acquisition process. This

was an additional ground invoked on behalf of respondent No.7 to seek

dismissal of the petition.

19. Having considered the rival submissions, this Court finds that the

peculiar circumstances created by the turn of events in the present case,

have resulted in respondent No.7 MTNL retaining possession of the

subject land admeasuring 6900 sq.mtrs. from 17.04.1989 onwards, with

structures being constructed thereon and third parties also being in

possession of parts thereof. In such a situation, the alternative relief

sought by the petitioners of a direction to the respondents, particularly

respondent No.7 MTNL to handover vacant and peaceful possession of

the subject land after demolishing the structures standing thereon is

clearly impractical and hence does not deserve consideration. But, the

question as to whether the petitioners can be compensated and if so, in

what manner, certainly deserves consideration.

20. The parallel proceedings under the ULC Act and the LA Act

initiated in respect of the subject land has led to a situation where the

petitioners stood deprived of enjoyment of the subject land from

17.04.1989 onwards. The admitted facts in the present case indeed

indicate that the exercise of determining quantum of compensation and

payment thereof to the petitioners was not undertaken. Such admitted

facts include initiation of land acquisition for larger pieces of land in

Village Bhayander, District Thane belonging to the petitioners, which

stood challenged before the Civil Court wherein an order of status-quo

had the effect of possession of the lands, including the subject land,

being retained by the petitioners. Respondent No.7 MTNL was

interested in the subject land admeasuring 6900 sq.mtrs. and therefore, it

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had deposited an amount of Rs.9,13,996/- with the respondent SLAO.

As a result of the order dated 21.12.1988 passed by the said Civil Court

in Regular Civil Suit No.1050 of 1985, possession of the subject land

was handed over to the respondent No.7 MTNL while in the backdrop,

the proceedings under the ULC Act continued. Eventually, the

acquisition proceeding itself was withdrawn by the SLAO and

accordingly, on 10.12.1999, the aforesaid amount deposited by MTNL

was refunded to it. Thus, MTNL has continued to remain in possession

of the subject land without payment of any amount towards

compensation to the petitioners.

21. It is also an admitted position on facts that although the order

dated 24.01.1990 passed by the competent authority under the ULC Act,

excluding the subject land admeasuring 6900 sq.mtrs. from the surplus

land, was set aside by the Revising Authority and the appeal there

against was dismissed, such orders were set aside by this Court by order

dated 04.02.2003, allowing Writ Petition No.3891 of 1992 filed by the

petitioners. Upon remand, the competent authority, by its order dated

21.10.2003, confirmed the earlier order dated 24.01.1990, as a

consequence of which, the subject land stood excluded from surplus land

under the ULC Act. This is a crucial fact in the present case. Although

the respondents claim that an appeal against the said order dated

21.10.2003 passed by the competent authority under the ULC Act was

filed, the said appeal remained pending without any orders thereon.

22. We find substance in the petitioners placing reliance on the

judgement of this Court in the case of Voltas Limited and another Vs.

Additional Collector and Competent Authority, Thane and others

(supra), wherein it was held that upon the Repealing Act having its

effect from 29.11.2007 in Maharashtra, whereby the ULC Act stood

repealed, by operation of Section 3 of the Repealing Act, all pending

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proceedings under the ULC Act stood abated. Therefore, the order dated

21.10.2003 passed by the competent authority, confirming the earlier

order dated 24.01.1990 excluding the subject land from surplus land,

stood undisturbed and the benefit thereof must accrue to the petitioners.

23. The respondents, particularly respondent No.7 MTNL, have

raised a serious objection with regard to gross delay and laches on the

part of the petitioners as also the aspect of waiver of rights with efflux of

time. It is claimed that with passage of time and gross delay on the part

of the petitioners to seek relief in an appropriate manner, the possession

of MTNL acquired legitimacy.

24. The admitted position on facts recorded in the form of

chronological sequence of events hereinabove shows that after the

competent authority had passed its order dated 21.10.2003 upon remand

from this Court, the earlier order dated 24.01.1990, excluding the subject

land admeasuring 6900 sq.mtrs. from the surplus land, stood confirmed.

Till such time that the said order was passed, the matter was in a state of

flux for the petitioners. The appeal filed on their behalf had been

dismissed by the appellate authority and the subject land was

categorized as ‘surplus’ under the ULC Act. So long as the aforesaid

status remained, the petitioners could not have agitated their claim for

compensation under the LA Act with regard to the possession of the

subject land being handed over to MTNL on 17.04.1989. The order

dated 21.10.2003 passed by the Competent Authority re-confirmed the

status of the subject land as not being surplus. It is a matter of record

that within reasonable time from the order dated 21.10.2003 i.e. on

03.04.2004, the petitioners sent a legal notice through their advocate to

the respondents calling upon them to compute and pay compensation for

the subject land, failing which, the respondents were called upon to

handover vacant and peaceful possession of the subject land after

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demolishing the structures constructed thereon.

25. Thereafter, on 06.05.2005, the petitioners filed the present writ

petition claiming the aforesaid reliefs in the context of the subject land.

Considering the sequence of events, which is not disputed by the

respondents, it becomes clear that the petitioners pursued the remedies

available to them under the ULC Act and also as regards their claim for

payment of compensation in the light of the possession of the subject

land being handed over to MTNL on 17.04.1989. In the facts of the

present case, it cannot be said that the claim of the petitioners agitated in

the present writ petition suffers from delay and / or laches. It can also

not be said that the petitioners waived their rights because of the fact that

they filed the present writ petition in the year 2005. The fact that the

present writ petition filed as far back as in the year 2005, wherein Rule

was issued as far back as on 29.09.2006, could not be taken up for

consideration and final disposal for 21 years, cannot be a ground to

deprive relief to the petitioners, if they have otherwise made out the case

in their favour. Hence, the arguments of the respondents pertaining to

delay and laches as also waiver are rejected.

26. Although the right to property is no longer a fundamental right

and it is a constitutional right under Article 300A of the Constitution of

India, the Supreme Court in a number of judgements, including in the

cases of Kolkata Municipal Corporation and another Vs. Bimal

Kumar Shah and others (supra) and Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz

and others Vs. Government of Karnataka (supra), has held that the

said right is a human right, which cannot be casually denied to the

owners of the land. In the case of Kolkata Municipal Corporation and

another Vs. Bimal Kumar Shah and others (supra), the Supreme

Court has recognized seven sub-rights in the right to property, which

include the right to notice, the right to be heard, the right to a reasoned

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decision, duty to acquire only for public purpose, the right of restitution

or fair compensation, the right to an efficient and expeditious process

and the right of conclusion.

27. In the present case, these rights have to be construed in the

backdrop of the fact that possession of the subject land admeasuring

6900 sq.mtrs. was taken as far back as on 17.04.1989. The beneficiary of

the said land i.e. respondent No.7 MTNL had deposited amount of

Rs.9,13,996/- towards compensation payable to the claimants with the

SLAO. In the affidavit in reply dated 24.09.2002 filed by the SLAO in

the aforementioned Writ Petition No.3891 of 1992, it was specifically

stated that the said amount was towards 80% of the compensation

amount. In the very same affidavit, the SLAO stated that by a demand

draft dated 10.12.1999, amount of Rs.9,08,784/- was refunded to MTNL

after deducting amount of Rs.5,212/- towards government establishment

charges, joint measurement charges and newspaper advertisement bills.

Thus, payment of compensation in lieu of utilization of the subject land

admeasuring 6900 sq.mtrs. was always recognized and contemplated by

the respondents themselves.

28. The exercise of withdrawing from acquisition was undertaken by

the SLAO by stating that it was no longer necessary to acquire the land

under the LA Act. This was perhaps because the proceedings under the

ULC Act, at the relevant time i.e. in the year 1999, were at the stage of

challenge raised by the petitioners in Writ Petition No.3891 of 1992 to

the order of the appellate authority dismissing the appeal and confirming

the order of the competent authority, including the subject land

admeasuring 6900 sq.mtrs. in surplus land. But, the order passed by this

Court on 04.02.2003 in Writ Petition No.3891 of 1992 changed the

picture as the said order of the competent authority was set aside and the

matter was remanded for consideration afresh. The subsequent order of

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the competent authority dated 21.10.2003 was in favour of the

petitioners as the original order dated 24.01.1990, excluding the subject

land admeasuring 6900 sq.mtrs. from surplus land, stood confirmed.

29. As noted hereinabove, the petitioners moved with alacrity, issued

a legal notice to the respondents and promptly filed the present writ

petition in May 2005 for the aforesaid relief. Thus, there is no

impediment in considering the claim of the petitioners on merits as

regards their entitlement to be compensated for utilization of the subject

land and if the said compensation is denied then their right towards

restoration of the land in their favour. We find substance in reliance

placed on behalf of the petitioners on the judgement of the Supreme

Court in the case of V. S. Charati Vs. Hussein Nhanu Jamadar (dead)

by LRs (supra), wherein it was held that a decision rendered by tribunal

or a court becomes final and binding on the parties when it is not

challenged and even if the decision is wrong, it does not amount to a

nullity.

30. In the present case, though respondent No.7 MTNL, in its

affidavit in reply in the present petition, claimed that the respondents had

challenged the said order dated 21.10.2003 passed by the competent

authority in favour of the petitioners, no further details were

forthcoming. In any case, by operation of Section 3 of the Repealing

Act, which repealed the ULC Act in Maharashtra with effect from

29.11.2007, a proceeding, if any, to challenge the said order of the

competent authority, stood abated. Thus, the order dated 21.10.2003

attained finality and the respondents cannot be permitted to claim that it

was a nullity, even if for the sake of arguments, it could be said to be

wrong. Thus, the petitioners have successfully made out their case for

claiming compensation for the subject land utilized by respondent No.7

MTNL. We find that the alternative prayer made on behalf of the

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petitioners for restoration of possession of the said land with structures

standing thereon being demolished, would lead to grave inconvenience

and it would be impractical. Therefore, the only relief that can be

considered is an appropriate direction for determination and payment of

compensation for the subject land admeasuring 6900 sq.mtrs.

31. We find support in the judgements of the Supreme Court rendered

in similar circumstances, where granting relief of restoration of land to

the claimants, was found to be impractical, as the subject land already

stood utilized for public purpose. In the case of Competent Authority vs.

Barangore Jute Factory and others, (2005) 13 SCC 477, the Supreme

Court found that the impugned notification was liable to be quashed, the

consequence of which would be restoration of land to the claimants. But,

upon finding that the subject land was already utilized for public purpose

of construction of a national highway, the Supreme Court found that no

useful purpose would be served by considering the consequential relief

of restoration of possession of the land to the claimants. In that light, the

Supreme Court proceeded to direct the authorities to determine

compensation from a future date, so that justice was done to the

claimants/land owners.

32. In a recent judgement rendered in the case of Bernard Francis

Joseph Vaz and others vs. Government of Karnataka (supra), the

Supreme Court adopted a similar approach. After referring to the said

judgement in the case of Competent Authority vs. Barangore Jute

Factory and others (supra), the Supreme Court further took note of a

series of judgements, recognizing the right to property under Article

300A of the Constitution as a human right. In the said judgment, the

Supreme Court also referred to the judgements concerning the question

of delay and laches, including judgement of the Supreme Court in the

case of Vidya Devi vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and others (supra).

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33. After referring to a number of judgements on the nature of right

under Article 300A of the Constitution of India, in the case of Bernard

Francis Joseph Vaz and others vs. Government of Karnataka

(supra), the Supreme Court observed as follows:

“43. Right to property ceased to be a fundamental right by

the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act,

1978, however, it continues to be a human right in a

welfare State, and a constitutional right under Article

300-A of the Constitution.

44. Article 300-A of the Constitution provides that no

person shall be deprived of his property save by

authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen

of his property except in accordance with the

procedure established by law.

45. This Court in the aforesaid case of Vidya Devi

[(2020) 2 SCC 569 : (2020) 1 SCC (Civ) 799]

observed that in a democratic polity governed by the

rule of law, the State could not have deprived a

citizen of their property without the sanction of law. It

was further observed that the State being a welfare

State governed by the rule of law cannot arrogate to

itself a status beyond what is provided by the

Constitution.

46. Recently, this Court in the aforesaid case of Ultra-

Tech Cement Ltd. v. Mast Ram, [(2025) 1 SCC 798 :

(2025) 1 SCC (Civ) 379 : (2025) 253 Comp Cas 1]

observed that the Government as a welfare State

ought to have proactively intervened in the matter

with a view to ensure that the requisite amount

towards compensation is paid at the earliest. It was

further observed that the State cannot abdicate its

constitutional and statutory responsibility of payment

of compensation by arguing that its role was limited

to initiating acquisition proceedings. It was, therefore,

observed that the delay in the payment of

compensation, in accordance with law, to the

landowners after taking away ownership of the

subject land from them is in contravention to the

spirit of the constitutional scheme of Article 300-A

and the idea of a welfare State.

47. In the aforesaid case of Ultra-Tech Cement, this Court

further observed that acquisition of land for public

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purpose is undertaken under the power of eminent

domain of the Government much against the wishes

of the owners of the land which gets acquired. It was,

therefore, observed that when such a power is

exercised, it is coupled with a bounden duty and

obligation on the part of the government body to

ensure that the owners whose lands get acquired are

paid compensation/awarded amount as declared by

the statutory award at the earliest.

48. It will also be appropriate for the purpose of the

present discussion to refer to the judgment of this

Court in K. Krishna Reddy v. Collector (LA) [(1988)

4 SCC 163] , specifically in para 12, it was observed

thus: (SCC pp. 166-67)

‘12. We can very well appreciate the anxiety and

need of claimants to get compensation here

and now. No matter what it is. The lands

were acquired as far back in 1977. One

decade has already passed. Now the remand

means another round of litigation. There

would be further delay in getting the

compensation. After all money is what

money buys. What the claimants could have

bought with the compensation in 1977

cannot do in 1988. Perhaps, not even one

half of it. It is a common experience that the

purchasing power of rupee is dwindling.

With rising inflation, the delayed payment

may lose all charms and utility of the

compensation. In some cases, the delay may

be detrimental to the interests of claimants.

The Indian agriculturists generally have no

avocation. They totally depend upon land. If

uprooted, they will find themselves nowhere.

They are left high and dry. They have no

savings to draw. They have nothing to fall

back upon. They know no other work. They

may even face starvation unless

rehabilitated. In all such cases, it is of utmost

importance that the award should be made

without delay. The enhanced compensation

must be determined without loss of time. The

appellate power of remand, at any rate ought

not to be exercised lightly. It shall not be

resorted to unless the award is wholly

unintelligible. It shall not be exercised unless

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there is total lack of evidence. If remand is

imperative, and if the claim for enhanced

compensation is tenable, it would be proper

for the appellate court to do modest best to

mitigate hardships. The appellate court may

direct some interim payment to claimants

subject to adjustment in the eventual award.’

49. It cannot be gainsaid that the appellants herein have

been deprived of their legitimate dues for almost 22

years ago. It can also not be controverted that money

is what money buys. The value of money is based on

the idea that money can be invested to earn a return,

and that the purchasing power of money decreases

over time due to inflation. What the appellants herein

could have bought with the compensation in 2003

cannot do in 2025. It is, therefore, of utmost

importance that the determination of the award and

disbursal of compensation in case of acquisition of

land should be made with promptitude.”

34. In the light of the said position of law clarified and reiterated by

the Supreme Court in a number of judgements, we find that in the facts

of the present case, the petitioners have made out a case for appropriate

directions to the respondents to determine and pay compensation to the

petitioners for utilization of the subject land admeasuring 6900 sq.mtrs.

It is undisputed that the said land has been utilized by respondent No.7

MTNL and that possession of the land was handed over to the said

respondent as far back as on 17.04.1989. The said respondent

constructed buildings on the subject land and utilized the same for its

purpose. Parts of the constructed portions have been let out on rent/lease

by the said respondent, thereby showing that it has utilized and enjoyed

the subject property from the year 1989 onwards.

35. On the other hand, the petitioners have been deprived of

enjoyment of the subject land from the year 1989 and till date, nothing

has been paid towards compensation. Amongst the seven sub-rights

recognized by the Supreme Court in the case of Kolkata Municipal

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Corporation and another vs. Bimal Kumar Shah and others (supra),

the petitioners have been deprived of the right to fair compensation, the

right to an efficient and expeditious process for determination and

payment of compensation and the right to conclusion. Thus, we find that

the right of the petitioners under Article 300A of the Constitution, has

been violated in the facts and circumstances of the present case.

36. The only question which remains to be addressed is the manner in

which the petitioners are to be compensated for violation of the aforesaid

right. The chronology of events noted hereinabove shows that while

respondent No.7 MTNL had deposited an amount of Rs.9,13,996/- with

the SLAO in July 1987, specifically for the purpose of the subject land

admeasuring 6900 sq.mtrs., the said amount was never paid to the

petitioners. Instead, in December 1999, the SLAO refunded an amount

of Rs.9,08,784/- to the said respondent, after deducting a smaller amount

towards expenses, as it was found that acquisition of the subject land

was not necessary. Thus, from the very beginning, the respondent

authorities as well as respondent No.7 MTNL were aware about the fact

that if the petitioners were to be deprived of the subject land, they

deserved to be adequately compensated, in accordance with law.

37. But, till date, the petitioners have not been paid any amount

towards compensation, despite the fact that they stood deprived of

possession of the subject land as far back as on 17.04.1989. We are of

the opinion that in such circumstances, the petitioners deserve fair

compensation by recognizing their right under Article 300A of the

Constitution. While determining the specific date as reference point and

basis for determination of quantum of compensation, the chequered

history and chronology of events of the present case, need to be

considered.

38. On 17.04.1989, when possession of the subject land admeasuring

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6900 sq.mtrs. was taken by MTNL, during pendency of Regular Civil

Suit No.1050 of 1985, as per order of the competent authority, under

ULC Act dated 26.10.1984, the subject land was included in surplus land

of the petitioners. Subsequently, when the State Government remanded

the matter to the competent authority under ULC, by the aforesaid order

dated 24.01.1990, the competent authority excluded the subject land

admeasuring 6900 sq.mtrs. from surplus land of the petitioners. But, by

this time, possession of the same was already taken by the MTNL.

39. Thereafter, the proceedings under the ULC Act continued, as the

order dated 24.01.1990 was revised and on 20.08.1991, the competent

authority reversed its own order and held the subject land again as part

of the surplus land of the petitioners under the ULC Act. The said order

was challenged in appeal, which was dismissed on 23.03.1992 and the

order of the appellate authority was challenged in the said Writ Petition

No.3891 of 1992. Eventually, on 04.02.2003, this Court partly allowed

the writ petition, set aside the orders of the competent authority, revising

its earlier order, as also the order of the appellate authority and remanded

the matter back to the competent authority for consideration afresh.

40. On 21.10.2003, the competent authority passed its order,

confirming its own earlier order dated 24.01.1990, whereby the said land

was excluded from surplus land. As noted hereinabove, even though

MTNL claims that the respondents had challenged the said order, in the

light of the Repeal Act, which repealed the ULC Act in the State of

Maharashtra with effect from 29.11.2007, the challenge, if any, raised to

the order of the competent authority dated 21.10.2003, abated. As noted

hereinabove, the petitioners, in this backdrop, issued a legal notice to the

respondents, claiming reliefs and eventually, on 06.05.2005, they filed

the present writ petition before this Court.

41. This Court is of the opinion that till the proceedings under the

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ULC Act culminated in the order dated 21.10.2003 passed by the

competent authority, confirming its earlier order dated 24.01.1990,

excluding the surplus land of the petitioners, the question as to whether

the petitioners continued to have rights in the subject land, was in a flux.

Till the order dated 21.10.2003 was passed by the competent authority

under the ULC Act, which led to the filing of the present writ petition on

06.05.2005, it could be said that the petitioners would have found it

difficult to assert their right of compensation for deprivation of

enjoyment of the subject land. Therefore, we are of the opinion that if a

specific date is to be ascertained for determination of market value

payable towards compensation to the petitioners in a just and fair

manner, by balancing the interests of all the parties to this litigation, it

would be appropriate that the date of filing of this petition i.e.

06.05.2005, is fixed as the date for determination of market value for

payment of compensation to the petitioners.

42. In the case of Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz and others vs.

Government of Karnataka (supra), the Supreme Court, while referring

to earlier precedents, has recognized power in the High Court under

Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to shift or postpone the date of

preliminary notification for acquisition to a later date. Although in the

present case, the SLAO concluded in the year 1999 that acquisition of

the subject land was not necessary and refunded the amount deposited

by MTNL, we find that the said action was undertaken at a point in time

when challenge to the order of the competent authority under the ULC

Act, holding the subject land as part of surplus land, was still in vogue. It

cannot be ignored that notification under Section 4 of the LA Act for

acquisition of large pieces of land of the petitioners including the said

land, was issued as far back as on 10.11.1982 and that declaration under

Section 6 of the LA Act was issued on 28.11.1985. It appears that the

said notifications did not survive, in the light of the sequence of events,

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including filing of Regular Civil Suit No.1050 of 1985 and the approach

adopted by the parties, leading to possession of the subject land

admeasuring 6900 sq.mtrs. being handed over to MTNL on 17.04.1989.

43. The relevant portion of the judgement of the Supreme Court in the

case of Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz and others vs. Government of

Karnataka (supra), reads as follows:

“15. It can thus be seen that the learned Single Judge of the

High Court, upon appreciation of the material placed on

record, was of the view that insofar as the opinion of the

learned Advocate General with regard to shifting of the

date of the preliminary notification to a later date is

concerned, the said opinion was beyond the scope and

ambit of the query put forth to him and consequently, the

said opinion could not have been made the basis by the

SLAO to pass the award. It is further to be seen that the

learned Single Judge of the High Court after considering

the provisions of the 1894 LA Act, the KIAD Act and

various decisions of this Court, observed that the market

value of the acquired land has to be taken as on the date

of the preliminary notification as contemplated under

Section 11 of the 1894 LA Act. Further, the learned

Single Judge of the High Court observed that only in

exceptional circumstances, where either this Court or the

High Court comes to the conclusion that the acquisition

proceedings themselves were liable to be quashed on

account of certain illegalities or infirmities in the

acquisition process/procedure, it was permissible only for

this Court in exercise of its powers under Article 32/142

or the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution

of India to shift the date to a later/subsequent date. It was

further observed that this power to shift the date is

available only to either this Court or the High Courts and

not definitely/certainly to the SLAOs or the State

Government.

16. We are in agreement with the findings of the learned

Single Judge of the High Court, inasmuch as the SLAO

cannot shift/postpone the date of preliminary notification.

In case, upon appreciation of the material placed on

record if this Court or the High Court, in exceptional

circumstances, came to the conclusion that the

acquisition proceedings themselves were liable to be

quashed only then by exercising inherent powers this

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Court under Article 32/142 or the High Courts under

Article 226 of the Constitution of India, respectively, can

shift/postpone the date of preliminary notification to a

later date. In our considered opinion, therefore, the

learned Single Judge of the High Court rightly came to

the conclusion that the award dated 22-4-2019 be

quashed and set aside and ordered accordingly.”

44. We are of the opinion that following the position of law laid down

by the Supreme Court in the aforementioned judgements, while

exercising power under Section 226 of the Constitution, this Court can

fix a specific date for determination of market value, which would then

be the basis for payment of compensation to the petitioners. In the facts

and circumstances of the present case, we are not inclined to grant the

relief of restoration of possession of the subject land to the petitioners

and therefore, the only exercise that can be carried out is the

determination of quantum of compensation, which would amount to just,

fair and reasonable compensation in recognition of the right of

petitioners under Article 300A of the Constitution. To that extent, we are

inclined to treat this as a case where acquisition was initiated under the

LA Act, but no award was made.

45. In this context, we make a reference to Section 24(1)(a) of the Act

of 2013, to apply the provisions of the said Act insofar as they relate to

determination of quantum of compensation. In that light, the date of

filing of this writ petition i.e. 06.05.2005, is fixed as the date for

determining the market value of the subject land admeasuring 6900

sq.mtrs. Thereupon, the quantum of compensation shall be determined,

by applying the provisions of the Act of 2013 and all statutory benefits

payable under the said Act, shall be paid to the petitioners. Since the

petitioners have been deprived of possession of the subject land for the

period between 17.04.1989 and 05.05.2005, the respondents shall pay

rental compensation to the petitioners as per policy of the State. Since

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MTNL has been enjoying the said property, the financial burden of the

reliefs being granted to the petitioners in this petition, shall be borne by

the MTNL. The amount of Rs.5 lakhs deposited in this Court in terms of

order dated 21.07.2006, shall be disbursed to the petitioners along with

accrued interest and it shall be adjusted in the quantum of compensation

that shall be determined, in terms of directions being issued in the

present writ petition. We find that such directions would meet the ends

of justice, in the facts and circumstances of the present case.

46. In view of the above, the writ petition is allowed in the following

terms:

(a) The respondent No.6 – Special Land Acquisition Officer is

directed to forthwith initiate the exercise of determination

of quantum of compensation payable to the petitioners by

fixing the date 06.05.2005 as the date for determination of

market value of the subject land admeasuring 6900

sq.mtrs.;

(b) the quantum of compensation shall be determined under

the provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation and

Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and

Resettlement Act 2013;

(c) the said compensation shall include all statutory benefits

payable under the provisions of the Right to Fair

Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,

Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act 2013;

(d) the said exercise of determination of quantum of

compensation shall be initiated forthwith by respondent

No.6 – Special Land Acquisition Officer, without waiting

for deposit of any amount by respondent No.7 – MTNL

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and the same shall be completed within a period of six

months from the date of this order;

(e) thereupon, within one week of determination of such

quantum of compensation, the said respondent shall

intimate respondent No.7 – MTNL, who shall deposit such

amount of compensation with SLAO within two weeks of

receipt of intimation. Respondent No.6 – SLAO in turn,

shall disburse the amount to the petitioners within one

week of receiving the same from MTNL;

(f) the amount of Rs.5 lakhs deposited in this Court in terms

of order dated 21.07.2006 along with accrued interest,

shall be disbursed to the petitioners within two weeks of

the date of this order. The Registry to take necessary steps

accordingly;

(g) the aforesaid amount disbursed by the Registry to the

petitioners, shall be adjusted at the time of payment of

compensation to the petitioners, to be determined in terms

of the directions given hereinabove;

(h) the respondent No.5 – Collector is directed to forthwith

initiate the exercise of determination of rental

compensation payable to the petitioners for the period

between 17.04.1989 and 05.05.2005, in terms of the policy

of respondent – State. The said exercise shall be completed

within a period of eight weeks from the date of this order

and the amount so determined, shall be intimated to

respondent No.7 – MTNL within one week. Thereupon,

MTNL shall disburse the said amount to the petitioners

within two weeks.

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47. In the light of the directions given hereinabove, Interim

Application No.15159 of 2024 is disposed of.

48. Rule is made absolute in above terms.

(SHREERAM V. SHIRSAT, J.) (MANISH PITALE, J.)

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Minal / Priya

MINAL

SANDIP

PARAB

Digitally signed by

MINAL SANDIP

PARAB

Date: 2026.09.07

15:21:00 +0530