2025 INSC 577

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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. _________of 2025

(@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) No. 13119 of 2024)

CHUNNI BAI ...APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF CHHATTISGARH …RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH, J.

Leave granted.

2. The present appeal has been preferred against judgment and order dated

21.11.2023 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Chhattisgarh at

Bilaspur in Criminal Appeal No. 1035 of 2016 whereby, the High Court upheld

the conviction and sentence imposed upon the present appellant under Section

302 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as ‘IPC’).

3. The case of the prosecution in brief is that on 05.06.2015 at about 9 AM in

the village of Bharadkala, District Bemetara, State of Chhattisgarh, the appellant,

namely Chunni Bai, assaulted her two daughters, namely Kumari Yogita Sahu,

aged 5 years and Kumari Nisha Sahu, aged 3 years with an iron crowbar leading

to grievous injuries thereby causing the death of both the daughters. The incident

was witnessed by Sonam Sahu (PW-1), who is the sister-in-law of the appellant

who also lived in the same house.

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4. On the same day of occurrence, a complaint was lodged before the Saja

Police Station by Laxman Prasad Mishra (PW-3), a neighbour of the appellant,

on the basis of which an FIR No. 126/15 was registered under Section 302 IPC.

On completion of the investigation, the appellant was put on trial.

5. According to the star witness, Sonam Sahu (PW-1), in the morning at

around 9 am on the fateful date, while she was doing household chores, she heard

the appellant shouting in her room that she was killing her daughters, on hearing

of which she went inside the room where PW-1 saw both the children on the bed,

soaked in blood, and saw the appellant hitting the younger child Nisha with an

iron crowbar. PW-1 then snatched the crowbar from the appellant and rushed out

to inform her uncle who stayed next door. Thereafter, she informed her brother

and niece of the incident. Other relatives were also informed.

6. The testimony of the eyewitness PW-1 was corroborated by other

witnesses, most of whom were relatives and who lived nearby and came to the

house soon after the incident. They also saw the appellant crying and shouting

that she had killed her children. The injured children were taken to the hospital

but were declared dead.

7. According to the testimony of the doctor present on duty on the day of the

incident, Dr. G.S. Thakur (PW-18), both the girls had died before reaching the

hospital. PW-18 described the injuries found during the autopsy of the elder

daughter, Yogita Sahu, as follows:

“… There was a crushed wound in the right temporal part

of the head, which measured 10 centimeters in length and

was up to the skull bone. A crushed wound is present 0.5 cm

below the said wound. Its length was 2.0 centimeters and

its depth was up to the skull bone. The body's right occipito-

parietal bone of the head was broken and had sunk into the

brain, which measured 16.0 cm in length and 8.0 cm in

width. The entire body of the dead body had turned pale.

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4. All the injuries found on the dead body were caused by

hard and blunt objects and before death. While examining

the skull and spinal cord of the dead body, I found that a

piece of bone was stuck in the occipital part of the brain

and bleeding was present in the occipital part of the brain.

A long hair-line fracture, was present in the skull of the

body. Which was present from the occipital bone to the fatal

bone.

…………………………..”

PW-18 gave his opinion about the cause of death in the following

words:

“In my opinion, the cause of death was bleeding in the

stomach and stoppage of heart and respiratory rhythm due

to injury in the organic part of the brain which is a result of

hitting the head with a hard and blunt object. Nature: In my

opinion the nature of death was homicidal….”

8. Similarly, with respect to the autopsy of younger daughter, Nisha Sahu,

PW-18 noted the following injuries:

“…There was a visible injury with blood all around the left

eye of the dead body. Whose measurement was 40 X 30

centimetres. The left occipital portion of the head contained

a crushed injury measuring 3.0 X 30 cm. The caudal portion

of the said injury contained a crushed injury measuring 30

X 2.0 cm in length with a depth up to the skull. A congested

bruise of blood was present in the left scapular area. It

measured 9.0 X 20 cm in length, extending from the central

part to the outer part. The above mentioned wounds were

inflicted with a hard and blunt object and were inflicted

before death…”

The cause of death of Nisha Sahu was opined to be due to cardiac and

respiratory arrest due to bleeding in the brain and injuries to organs of the brain

and the said injuries were caused by hitting the head with a hard and blunt object

and it was homicidal in nature.

9. Based on the memorandum statement of the appellant vide Ex. P/10, the

crime weapon i.e., the iron pounder was seized vide Ex. P/4 and the FSL report

vide Ex. P/31 which confirmed the presence of human blood on the seized

weapon.

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10. To support the case of the prosecution, as many as 20 witnesses were

examined. The statement of the appellant was recorded under Section 313 of the

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as ‘CrPC’), wherein

the appellant denied guilt and claimed that she had no knowledge of what had

happened and how it happened and that she was under the influence of some

invisible power. However, no defence witness was produced before the court.

11. The Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Bemetara, in Sessions Trial No.

76/2015, upon appreciation of evidence and after hearing of parties concluded that

based on the postmortem reports proved by the doctor (PW-18), the deaths of both

daughters were due to serious injuries on their heads. Further, it was held that the

author of the crime was the appellant, supported by the eye-witness Sonam Sahu

(PW-1) which was corroborated by other prosecution witnesses. The Trial Court,

thereafter, vide judgment dated 29.06.2016, convicted the appellant for the

offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC and sentenced the appellant to

undergo imprisonment for life with fine of Rs. 1000/- and in default of payment

of fine, to undergo additional rigorous imprisonment for 1 month.

12. In the appeal against the above order, the High Court in Criminal Appeal

No. 1035 of 2016 vide order dated 21.11.2023, upheld the conviction of the

appellant under Section 302 of the IPC. The plea taken by the appellant before the

High Court was that the prosecution failed to prove the case beyond reasonable

doubt and that the appellant was not in proper mental condition at the time of

commission of the offence.

13. The High Court relied on the medical opinion of Dr. G.S. Thakur (PW-18)

and the postmortem reports which stated that the cause of death was

cardiorespiratory arrest caused by intracerebral haemorrhage and injury to vital

parts of brain, as a result of the head being hit by a hard and blunt object, thereby

concluding that the nature of death was homicidal. Further, the High Court took

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into consideration the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, seizure of the

crime weapon and its FSL report to observe that the appellant had assaulted her

daughters with an iron pounder causing grievous injuries leading to their death.

Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.

ANALYSIS BY THIS COURT

14. Since the death of the two girls was not denied and was proved on the basis

of the evidence on record, the first issue that is to be addressed is whether the

death was caused by the appellant. For this, we have to revisit the testimonies of

the prosecution witness, more importantly, Sonam Sahu (PW-1) who is the sole

eyewitness of the incident. PW-1 has specifically stated in her testimony that

when she rushed towards the room upon hearing the scream of the appellant, she

saw the appellant hitting her younger daughter Nisha with an iron pounder while

the elder daughter, Yogita was lying in bed unconscious, soaked in blood. It is to

be noted that as per PW-1’s testimony, no other person was present in the house

at that time other than appellant and her two daughters. This testimony of PW-1

finds corroboration from the statements of other prosecution witnesses such as

Sanat Kumar (PW-16), who is the cousin brother of the appellant’s husband. As

per PW-16, he was informed about the incident by Sonam Sahu (PW-1) who came

crying to his house, which is adjacent to the house of the appellant. When PW-16

reached the place of occurrence, he saw that the appellant was crying and saying

that she had killed Nisha and Babli (Yogita) and repeated this statement upon

being asked the reason behind killing them. Then, PW-16 went to the room of the

appellant and saw both daughters lying unconscious on bed, soaked in blood.

15. Similarly, the contemporaneous testimonies of Rekha Sahu (PW-2),

Laxman Prasad Mishra (PW-3), Ram Kumar Verma (PW-6), Manuwa (PW-9),

Namdev (PW-10), Harish Kumar Sahu (PW-11) and Kaushilya Bai (PW-15) also

corroborate the testimony of Sonam Sahu (PW-1) that the daughters were

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bleeding, lying unconscious and that the appellant was crying and saying that she

had killed her children.

16. Further, as per the testimony of the investigating officer K.M. Mishra (PW-

19), the crime weapon i.e., the iron pounder was seized based on the memorandum

statement of the appellant, although the witnesses to the recording of such

memorandum statement i.e., Ram Kumar Verma (PW-6) and Bhuniram Sahu

(PW-8) denied that any such statement had been given by the appellant in their

presence. The FSL report confirmed the presence of human blood on the seized

iron pounder. Therefore, considering the above evidence including the post

mortem report discussed above, we are of the opinion that there is no infirmity in

the finding given by the Trial Court as well as the High Court that the appellant

had assaulted both of her daughters, which caused grievous injuries, thereby

causing their death.

17. Once homicide is proved being committed by the appellant, the next

consideration will be whether such homicide was “culpable homicide” within the

meaning of Section 299 IPC. If it is found to be “culpable homicide”, further

consideration will be whether it is “culpable homicide not amounting to murder”

which is punishable under Section 304 IPC or “murder” as defined under Section

300 IPC, punishable under Section 302 IPC, under which the appellant has been

convicted and punished by the Trial Court which was upheld by the High Court.

18. The difference between “murder” and “culpable homicide not amounting

to murder” has been succinctly explained by this Court in State of A.P. v.

Rayavarapu Punnayya, (1976) 4 SCC 382 in the following words:

“12. In the scheme of the Penal Code, “culpable homicide” is

genus and “murder” its specie. All “murder” is “culpable

homicide” but not vice-versa. Speaking generally,

“culpable homicide” sans “special characteristics of

murder”, is “culpable homicide not amounting to murder”.

For the purpose of fixing punishment, proportionate to the

gravity of this generic offence, the Code practically

recognises three degrees of culpable homicide. The first is,

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what may be called, “culpable homicide of the first

degree”. This is the greatest form of culpable homicide,

which is defined in Section 300 as “murder”.

The second may be termed as “culpable homicide of the

second degree”. This is punishable under the first part of

Section 304. Then, there is “culpable homicide of the third

degree”. This is the lowest type of culpable homicide and

the punishment provided for it is, also, the lowest among

the punishments provided for the three grades. Culpable

homicide of this degree is punishable under the second part

of Section 304.”

19. The difference was further elucidated in Rampal Singh v. State of U.P.,

(2012) 8 SCC 289 in the following words:

“18. This Court in Vineet Kumar Chauhan v. State of

U.P. [(2007) 14 SCC 660 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 915] noticed

that academic distinction between “murder” and “culpable

homicide not amounting to murder” had vividly been

brought out by this Court in State of A.P. v. Rayavarapu

Punnayya [(1976) 4 SCC 382 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 659] where

it was observed as under: (Vineet Kumar case [(2007) 14

SCC 660 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 915], SCC pp. 665-66, para

16)

“16. … that the safest way of approach to the interpretation

and application of Sections 299 and 300 IPC is to keep in

focus the key words used in various clauses of the said

sections. Minutely comparing each of the clauses of

Sections 299 and 300 IPC and drawing support from the

decisions of this Court in Virsa Singh v. State of

Punjab [AIR 1958 SC 465 : 1958 Cri LJ 818] and Rajwant

Singh v. State of Kerala [AIR 1966 SC 1874 : 1966 Cri LJ

1509] , speaking for the Court, R.S. Sarkaria, J. neatly

brought out the points of distinction between the two

offences, which have been time and again reiterated.

Having done so, the Court said that wherever the court is

confronted with the question whether the offence is

‘murder’ or ‘culpable homicide not amounting to murder’,

on the facts of a case, it [would] be convenient for it to

approach the problem in three stages. The question to be

considered at the first stage would be, whether the accused

has done an act by doing which he has caused the death of

another. Proof of such causal connection between the act of

the accused and the death, leads to the second stage for

considering whether that act of the accused amounts to

‘culpable homicide’ as defined in Section 299. … If the

answer to this question is in the negative the offence would

be ‘culpable homicide not amounting to murder’,

punishable under the First or the Second Part of Section

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304, depending, respectively, on whether the second or the

third clause of Section 299 is applicable. If this question is

found in the positive, but the case comes within any of the

Exceptions enumerated in Section 300, the offence would

still be ‘culpable homicide not amounting to murder’,

punishable under the First Part of Section 304 IPC. It was,

however, clarified that these were only broad guidelines to

facilitate the task of the court and not cast-iron imperative.”

20. This Court in the aforesaid case of Rampal Singh (supra) further explained

the difference between these two offences from the perspective of the punitive

provisions of Sections 302 and 304 IPC by grading the offences in three

categories as follows:

“21. Sections 302 and 304 of the Code are primarily the

punitive provisions. They declare what punishment a

person would be liable to be awarded, if he commits either

of the offences. An analysis of these two sections must be

done having regard to what is common to the offences and

what is special to each one of them. The offence of culpable

homicide is thus an offence which may or may not be

murder. If it is murder, then it is culpable homicide

amounting to murder, for which punishment is prescribed

in Section 302 of the Code. Section 304 deals with cases not

covered by Section 302 and it divides the offence into two

distinct classes, that is, (a) those in which the death

is intentionally caused; and (b) those in which the death is

caused unintentionally but knowingly. In the former case

the sentence of imprisonment is compulsory and the

maximum sentence admissible is imprisonment for life. In

the latter case, imprisonment is only optional, and the

maximum sentence only extends to imprisonment for 10

years. The first clause of Section 304 includes only those

cases in which offence is really “murder”, but mitigated by

the presence of circumstances recognised in the Exceptions

to Section 300 of the Code, the second clause deals only

with the cases in which the accused has no intention of

injuring anyone in particular. In this regard, we may also

refer to the judgment of this Court

in Fatta v. Emperor [AIR 1931 Lah 63] , 1151. C. 476

(Refer: Penal Law of India by Dr Hari Singh Gour, Vol. 3,

2009.)”

21. From the above extracts, it can be understood that one of the criteria to

determine, in any given case, as to whether the act amounts to “murder” or

“culpable homicide not amounting to murder” is the presence or absence of

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intention of the offender. If the “intention” to cause death or to cause such bodily

injury as is likely to cause death or the knowledge, which obviously has to be a

conscious one, that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability,

cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death and commits such act

“without any excuse” for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury, comes

out aloud and clear in the case, it would be most appropriate to categorise it as a

case of “murder” under Section 300 IPC in which event, penal provision of

Section 302 IPC would be attracted. On the other hand, if the “intention” in

causing the death or to causing such bodily injury is not so clear, the case will fall

under the less stringent category of “culpable homicide not amounting to murder”

as punishable under Section 304 IPC.

22. In the case at hand, it can be said to have been proved beyond reasonable

doubt that the appellant had caused the death of her two children and thus

committed culpable homicide.

The evidence on record clearly shows that the appellant had caused the

death of her children by hitting them with an iron crowbar on their heads.

The crucial question however is, whether she had the intention to cause

death of her children or had the intention to cause such bodily injury which was

likely to cause death or whether she had the conscious knowledge that it was

imminently dangerous that in all probability, it would cause death, or such bodily

injury as is likely to cause death and committed the act without any excuse for

incurring the risk of causing death or such injury?

23. When a person performs an act, he is attributed with the intention to cause

the natural consequences that follows from the act performed. There may be

situations when the person makes the intention for performing an act known

clearly by oral declaration or otherwise. However, it can be illusive when

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intention is not clearly spelt out or discernible, and the same has to be gathered

from the surrounding facts and circumstances and the acts of the accused.

24. In the present case, once the factum of homicide being committed by the

appellant is proved beyond reasonable doubt and considering the nature of the

injuries received by the minor victims at the hands of the appellants with iron

crowbar on the basis of the medical and other evidence brought on record, it can

be stated that the intention to commit homicide can certainly be inferred as had

been done by the Trial Court and the High Court.

However, we have certain reservations about such a conclusion being drawn

by the courts below in respect of proof of “intention” or the conscious knowledge

of what she was doing in the light of the peculiar facts and circumstances

obtaining in the case. In our opinion, it cannot be conclusively held in the present

case that the intention of the appellant or conscious knowledge of what she was

doing, a component of mens rea, has been established beyond reasonable doubt.

25. It is well settled that in any criminal case, the burden of proof is on the

prosecution to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt in order to secure

conviction of the accused, that is to say that no reasonable doubt can be said to

have arisen in the judicial mind of the court after appreciating the evidence

presented, and the outcome reached by the prosecution is the only possible

outcome in the given facts and circumstances of the case.

This legal position is necessary for both the ingredients of “actus reus” and

“mens rea”, though “mens rea” can sometimes be inferred from the nature of

“actus reus”, and as far as “mens rea” is concerned, intention or guilty knowledge

is certainly the most important facet.

26. The case of the appellant, as evident from the records, is the claim of

innocence and denial of the charges and the appellant made a specific plea while

being examined under Section 313 CrPC that at the time of occurrence, she was

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under the influence of some invisible power. However, the appellant did not

produce any witness in support of her claim and produced only two documents.

27. The appellant by taking the said plea is seeking to bring her case within the

general exceptions as mentioned in IPC.

Some of the general exceptions which are available under the Indian Penal

Code to escape criminal liability are contained in Sections 76 to 106 of IPC as

well as five “Exceptions” mentioned in Section 300 IPC, etc.

The plea taken by the appellant of being under the influence of some

invisible power can be understood to invoke Section 84 of the IPC, which reads

as follows:

“84. Act of a person of unsound mind.—Nothing is an

offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing

it, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of

knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is

either wrong or contrary to law.”

28. Though in a criminal case the burden of proof to establish a case beyond

reasonable doubt is on the prosecution, however, under Section 105 of the Indian

Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred as “Evidence Act”), the burden of proof

to prove the existence of such circumstances which would attract any of the above

pleaded exceptions is on the accused.

Section 105 of the Evidence Act reads as follows:

“105. When a person is accused of any offence, the burden

of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case

within any of the General Exception in the Indian Penal

Code (XLV of 1860), or within any special exception or

proviso contained in any other part of the same Code, or in

any law defining the offence, is upon him, and the Court

shall presume the absence of such circumstances.”

29. At this juncture, it may be pertinent to note that the standard of proof for

the accused required by law in such cases, in invoking any exception clause is

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preponderance of probability, which is also adopted in civil cases. [See: Satyavir

Singh Rathi, Assistant Commissioner of Police v. State, AIR 2011 SC 1748;

Munshi Ram v. Delhi Admn., AIR 1968 SC 702; State of U.P. v. Mohd.

Musheer Khan, AIR 1977 SC 2226].

This would mean that if the accused is able to raise a reasonable doubt in

the mind of the court that there exists a possibility of existence of such

circumstances based on preponderance of probability, that would attract the

exception as mentioned under the IPC, and if the said burden of proof is

discharged by the accused, he would be entitled to such benefit of exception.

30. It is also well settled that in order to discharge this burden of proof on any

of the exceptions pleaded, it is not imperative for the accused to lead defence

evidence. The court can also by taking into consideration the evidence available

on record, which may have been presented by the prosecution, reach a conclusion

that an exception is attracted in a given case, as observed by this Court in the case

of James Martin v. State of Kerala, (2004) 2 SCC 203:

“13…. Under Section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872

(in short “the Evidence Act”), the burden of proof is on the

accused, who sets up the plea of self-defence, and, in the

absence of proof, it is not possible for the court to presume

the truth of the plea of self-defence. The court shall presume

the absence of such circumstances. It is for the accused to

place necessary material on record either by himself

adducing positive evidence or by eliciting necessary facts

from the witnesses examined for the prosecution. An

accused taking the plea of the right of private defence is not

necessarily required to call evidence; he can establish his

plea by reference to circumstances transpiring from the

prosecution evidence itself. The question in such a case

would be a question of assessing the true effect of the

prosecution evidence, and not a question of the accused

discharging any burden.”

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31. To understand what exactly the burden of proof under Section 105 of the

Evidence Act is, we may refer to the landmark case of Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai

Thakkar v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1964 SC 1563, wherein it was observed that:

“7. The doctrine of burden of proof in the context of the plea

of insanity may be stated in the following propositions : (1)

The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that

the accused had committed the offence with the requisite

mens rea, and the burden of proving that always rests on the

prosecution from the beginning to the end of the trial. (2)

There is a rebuttable presumption that the accused was not

insane, when he committed the crime, in the sense laid down

by Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code : the accused may

rebut it by placing before the court all the relevant evidence

oral, documentary or circumstantial, but the burden of proof

upon him is no higher than that rests upon a party to civil

proceedings. (3) Even if the accused was not able to

establish conclusively that he was insane at the time he

committed the offence, the evidence placed before the court

by the accused or by the prosecution may raise a reasonable

doubt in the mind of the court as regards one or more of the

ingredients of the offence, including mens rea of the accused

and in that case the court would be entitled to acquit the

accused on the ground that the general burden of proof

resting on the prosecution was not discharged.”

32. In the light of the above legal position, we may now examine the facts and

circumstances as well as the evidence on record to consider whether the appellant

was in fact suffering from insanity or was not in a proper state of mind during the

commission of crime for the purpose of understanding whether she had the

“intention” or whether she had knowingly and consciously committed the act

without any excuse.

33. The plea taken by the appellant during her examination by the Trial Court

is that she came under the influence of certain invisible power when she

committed the act. However, this plea does not appear to be a legally recognised

exception as is the case of sudden and grave provocation, heat of passion, right

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of self-defence, etc. There is a difference between medical insanity and legal

insanity. What Section 84 IPC provides is legal insanity as distinguished from

medical insanity. A person is said to be of unsound mind on whom criminal

liability cannot be fastened if at the time of commission of the act, he is incapable

of knowing the nature of the act, or that what he was doing was either wrong or

contrary to law. It may also be noted that the expression “unsoundness of mind”

or the word “insanity” has not been defined in the Indian Penal Code, though

these have been used interchangeably. In the absence of a precise definition of

these terms, insanity or unsoundness of mind has been variously understood by

courts in varying degrees of mental disorder and the courts have applied this

attribute to give the benefit of doubt or otherwise, depending on the facts and

circumstances of the cases. However, mere odd behaviour or certain physical or

mental ailments affecting the emotions or capacity to think and act properly have

not been construed to be “unsound mind” within the scope of Section 84 of the

IPC. All kinds of insanity as are understood are not covered under Section 84 of

IPC but only such acts, when committed by a person who was incapable of

knowing the nature of the act or that he was doing which is either wrong or

contrary to law are concerned. As a consequence, only such mental or medical

condition which affects or disturbs the faculty of the person which renders him

unable to know the nature of act committed or that he was doing which he did not

know that it was wrong or contrary to law can be given the benefit of insanity

under Section 84 IPC, and thus escape criminal liability.

34. In the present case, it is noticed that apart from the plea taken by the

appellant during her examination under Section 313 CrPC that she was under the

influence of invisible power, no evidence has been brought on record by the

appellant which would prove that she was of “unsound mind” within the meaning

of Section 84 of IPC.

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35. Nevertheless, merely because the appellant could not convey herself in a

legally understandable expression or idiom of her mental condition to indicate the

existence of legal insanity or prove such a condition and provide evidence, in our

opinion, such a plea could not have been completely ignored by the Trial Court

or by the High Court.

36. In the peculiar facts and circumstances as revealed in the present case, and

also keeping in mind that the incident happened in a rural setting and the appellant

not being highly educated, the possibility of confusing her unstable mental

condition or temporary lapse of judgmental power bordering on temporary

insanity cannot be completely ruled out which the appellant attributed as coming

under the influence of invisible power, for the purpose of giving a benefit of doubt

about the non-existence of “intention”.

It is not common for rustic persons to be aware of various mental

disorders/illnesses such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, that may temporarily

impair the mental condition of an individual. More often than not, these disorders

are unrecognised and remain untreated as it may be difficult to identify the

symptoms and they do not seek proper and timely medical intervention, resulting

in such medical/mental conditions which can be misinterpreted or confused with

spells or influence of invisible forces based on superstitions.

In the present case, we have also noted that no particulars have been

mentioned about the nature of the "invisible influence" and as such it can be

purely in the realm of speculation that this "invisible influence" may be a

symptom of such mental conditions referred to above. However, in the light of

the strange, bizarre and inexplicable behaviour of the appellant, there is no other

plausible explanation that could be attached to her conduct in the given

circumstances, other than to infer that she was under certain impaired mental

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condition which the appellant described as being under the influence of invisible

power.

37. As per the testimony of Sonam Sahu (PW-1), on hearing the shout of the

appellant, PW-1 went to the room to check, and she found the elder daughter of

the appellant soaked in blood and saw the appellant hitting the younger daughter

with the iron pounder. After the incident too, the appellant kept on shouting and

crying that she had killed her daughters. This evidence stands substantially

corroborated by the contemporaneous testimonies of the prosecution witnesses

such as Rekha Sahu (PW- 2), Lakshman Prasad Mishra (PW-3), Ram Kumar

Verma (PW-6), Pradeep Sahu (PW-7), Bhuniram Sahu (PW-8), Manuwa (PW-9),

Namdev (PW-10) and Harish Kumar Sahu (PW-11).

38. Further, when PW-1 left the appellant alone in the house and went to the

adjacent house of her uncle to call for help, the appellant did not try to flee. In

fact, as per the testimony of Sanat Kumar (PW-16), when he also reached the

place of incident upon being informed by PW-1, he saw the appellant standing

inside the room.

39. It is true that in cases where direct evidence is available that links the

accused to the offence, absence of proof of motive or intention does not preclude

conviction of the accused. Perhaps it is for this reason that in the present case, the

prosecution has not adduced any evidence to prove any motive or intention behind

the commission of crime. However, in cases where the plea taken by the accused

is such that it raises a concern about the mental stability of the accused, the

existence or lack of motive assumes great significance. This is especially true in

cases involving grave offences such as murder, where a complete absence of any

kind of motive which ordinarily impels a person to commit such a crime may lend

credence to the plea of insanity, as in the present case, where a mother has taken

the life of her own children of tender age apparently in absence of any motive.

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40. It is to be noted that the prosecution witnesses, including the husband of the

appellant and other close relatives, as well as the residents of the village, have all

acknowledged that the appellant loved her children very dearly. Testimonies and

cross examination of prosecution witnesses such as Sonam Sahu (PW-1),

Lakshman Prasad Mishra (PW-3), Tulsi Sahu (PW-4), Ram Kumar Verma (PW-

6), Pradeep Sahu (PW-7), Kaushilya Bai (PW-15) and Sanat Kumar (PW-16)

testify to this fact.

41. As regards the relationship between the appellant and her husband, it was

admitted by Sonam Sahu (PW-1) in her cross examination, that her brother loved

his wife and children very much.

42. Similarly, Pradeep Sahu (PW-7), husband of the appellant, denied the

suggestion that he did not want to keep his wife. He also denied that he was

unhappy because the appellant had given birth to daughters. It was also stated by

him that the appellant was an Anganwadi worker and a day before the incident,

she had gone for her duty, which suggests that they were leading a normal

domestic life.

43. None of the above witnesses has spoken ill of the appellant nor of any

strained relationship of the appellant with her husband, other family members and

children. In fact, PW-8, the father-in-law of the appellant though was not an

eyewitness and not present at the time of the incident, refused to implicate the

appellant of committing the aforesaid offence, clearly indicating the absence of

any ill feeling towards his daughter in law, the appellant.

In this background, absence of motive assumes great importance, which in

turn would put a question mark on the presence of “intention” to commit the said

act.

44. Thus, the inference one can safely draw on the basis of the evidence on

record is that the appellant had a cordial relationship with all the family members

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including her children which clearly indicates absence of any ill feelings on the

part of the appellant to provide any basis for any motive to commit the crime

which will prove the presence of “intention” to commit the act.

45. There is yet another notable feature of the appellant’s behaviour. What had

been consistently testified by the witnesses is that at the time of committing the

crime and soon thereafter, she was crying and bemoaning the killing of her

children. She thus clearly appears to have been overwhelmed by remorse. This is

indicative of absence of any premeditation to commit the offence, but rather

committing it in a spur of the moment by the appellant as an impulsive act, without

realising the consequences of her act.

46. Reverting to the fundamental principles of criminal law, when a crime takes

place in which there are eye-witnesses and the factum of homicide is proved by

medical evidence, recovery of weapon of crime etc., the mens rea and the

intention may be inferable, which of course is based on presumption.

However, presumption of the existence of intention merely based on the act

and result may not be safe in every case because the act and consequence of the

questioned act may have been brought about by certain circumstances beyond the

contemplation or control of the accused. Thus, when the court is called upon to

ascertain the real intention or motive of the accused in committing the offence as

in the present case when the accused pleaded that she was under the influence of

invisible power indicating absence of intention, the court ought to have looked

into all the surrounding circumstances before coming to the conclusion that the

intention has been also proved beyond reasonable doubt.

47. Motive is usually the basis for causing the “intention” to commit any crime,

but it is highly elusive and difficult to prove as it remains hidden in the deep

recesses of the mind and is not comprehensible to others, unless disclosed by the

perpetrator. Though under the law, it is absolutely not necessary that to prove an

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offence, motive is also required to be established if the intention or the mens rea

can be safely inferred from the surrounding facts. But where the motive which

can provide the basis for the intention appears to be totally missing, the court has

to be very circumspect in drawing the inference of the proof of the presence of

intention.

48. For committing a serious crime like homicide, there could be various

motivating factors. One may commit the crime of homicide propelled by anger

or motivated by insult, humiliation or jealousy. Other motivating factors may be

to exact revenge or by way of retribution or to hide certain crimes already

committed. One may also commit homicide to gain undue pecuniary benefit or

otherwise. One may commit such a crime out of sheer frustration and dejection

with life channelising through violent acts. One may commit such crime because

of superstitious beliefs.

There could be numerous factors, and it may not be possible to contemplate

and mention all such situations that motivates a person to commit violent crime

like homicide. While proof of motive of the crime may strengthen the

prosecution’s case in proving the guilt of the offender, failure to prove motive is

not fatal if the offence is otherwise proved through direct and incontrovertible

evidence. At the same time, absence of any motive may benefit the accused under

certain circumstances, for the ingredient of intention which constitutes the mens

rea has also to be proved.

49. In a case like the present one where the crime is committed by a mother, in

her own house, members of the family could provide some clues to find out the

motive for committing such a crime.

Naturally, some of the questions which would arise in such a case may be

as follows:

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Did she kill her own children as she was fed up with her

marital life?

Was she subjected to any kind of mental or physical

harassment at home which may have led to desperation to

commit such a crime?

Was she unhappy with her husband or the children in

any manner?

Was there any financial or any such consideration that

motivated her to commit such a crime?

Did she commit the crime at the instigation of any other

person?

Was it a case of propitiating some forces based on

superstitious belief?

Was it a gruesome case of human sacrifice as had been

judicially noticed in some rare cases?

Was she suffering from any psychological or mental

disorder that could have prompted her to commit such a crime?

As noticed above, there is nothing in the evidence on record to suggest the

existence of any of the above situations. On the contrary, the evidence on record

portrays her as a loving mother having a cordial relation with her husband and

other family members, thus leading a normal family life. There is nothing in the

evidence that is suggestive of any disturbed personal and domestic life.

There can be no doubt that failure to unravel the true motivating factor for

committing the crime cannot lead to the inference that the appellant is innocent

in the light of the evidence which may be brought on record, yet the court should

also not rush through to hold that the intention to commit the said offence has

been proved in the light of the peculiar facts and circumstances obtaining in the

present case.

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As noted above, the appellant had taken a plea that when she committed

the offence, she was under the influence of some invisible power. However, in

spite of the inability of the appellant to lead any cogent evidence or explain her

aforesaid claim, in our opinion, this plea cannot be totally brushed aside in the

peculiar facts emanating in the present case.

50. In our view, the aforesaid plea ought to have been considered with utmost

seriousness by the Trial Court as well as the High Court in the light of the facts

and circumstances obtaining in the case.

If there were no motivating factors at all which impelled the appellant to

commit such a gruesome crime in a domestic environment which was otherwise

normal in all respects, it is totally inexplicable and incomprehensible how a

mother who loves her children and who had a cordial relation with her husband

could resort to such a violent act and be attributed with the “intention to cause

death” of her beloved children, except for coming under some influence or forces

beyond her control as claimed by her.

It is generally accepted in every society, especially in Indian society that one

of the most sacred relationships amongst all human relationships is that of a

mother and child. A mother is the life giver as well as the nurturer of a child.

Since time immemorial we have not only been hearing but also observing the

essence of the lines “पूत कपूत सुने बहुतेरे, माता सुनी न कु माता” which means

that a son can be a bad son, but a mother can never be a bad mother. Of course, it

cannot be a legal dictum that mothers can never be an offender but that in the

present case, in complete absence of motive, a mother assaulting her children of

tender ages to death, that too when it is admitted that there was no animosity, but

only love for her children, is contrary to lived human experiences.

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51. What we have also noted is that the State did not make any serious

endeavour to try to ascertain the motive or the intention of the appellant during

the investigation, in spite of all the witnesses portraying a very normal domestic

environment in the family and the appellant to be a normal person which indicated

absence of any factor which prompted the appellant to commit the crime. The

investigating officer appears to have been satisfied in view of the evidence of

PW-1 and other witnesses, recovery of the weapon and the medical evidence, that

the appellant had committed the murder and there was no necessity to investigate

the motive behind the said act.

52. The Trial Court in its judgment though took note of the plea taken by the

appellant that she was under the influence of invisible power when she was

examined under Section 313 CrPC, did not give any importance to it and simply

brushed it aside by observing that the evidence of the witnesses and other

surrounding circumstances and her own admission proved that she committed the

crime. The Trial Court unfortunately did not examine the said plea in all

seriousness it deserved. In spite of being vested with enormous powers under the

law to do complete justice, the Trial Court seems to have failed in exercising the

same to reach a logical conclusion.

53. In the present case, apart from the plea taken by the appellant in her

examination under Section 313 CrPC, the fact of the possibility of the appellant

not being in a stable mental condition came up in the statement of Santram Sahu

(PW-5) recorded under Section 161 CrPC, who is the father-in-law of the

appellant. It was recorded therein that 15 days prior to the incident, the appellant

was babbling nonsense, saying that she is Mata, Budi Dai etc. Further, it was also

mentioned that the appellant was taken to the Psychiatrist at Government

Hospital, Durg where she was given medicine and was advised to follow up. This

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statement of PW-5 made under Section 161 CrPC was sought to be produced by

the appellant in her defence before the Trial Court.

54. Even though the statements recorded under Section 161 of CrPC cannot be

used for any purposes in a trial due to the embargo placed under Section 162

CrPC, however, the power of the Trial Court under Section 165 Evidence Act is

wide enough to put questions based on the statement under Section 161 CrPC to

any witness or party at any stage to secure the ends of justice. For this, we may

profitably refer to the judgment of this Court in Raghunandan v. State of U.P.,

(1974) 4 SCC 186, wherein, it was observed as follows:

“14. It is true that the ban, imposed by Section 162,

Criminal Procedure Code, against the use of a statement of

a witness recorded by the police during investigation,

appears sweeping and wide. But, at the same time, we find

that the powers of the Court, under Section 165 of the

Evidence Act, to put any question to a witness, are also

couched in very wide terms authorising the Judge “in order

to discover or to obtain proper proof of relevant facts” to

“ask any question he pleases, in any form, at any time, of

any witness, or of the parties, about any fact relevant or

irrelevant”. The first proviso to Section 165, Evidence Act,

enacting that, despite the powers of the Court to put any

question to a witness, the judgment must be based upon

facts declared by the Act to be relevant, only serves to

emphasize the width of the power of the Court to question a

witness. The second proviso in this section preserves the

privileges of witnesses to refuse to answer certain questions

and prohibits only questions which would be considered

improper under Sections 148 and 149 of the Evidence Act.

Statements of witnesses made to the police during the

investigation do not fall under any prohibited category

mentioned in Section 165, Evidence Act. If Section 162 of

the Criminal Procedure Code, was meant to be so wide in

its sweep as the trial court thought it to be, it would make a

further inroad upon the powers of the Judge to put

questions under Section 165, Evidence Act. If that was the

correct position, at least Section 162, Criminal Procedure

Code, would have said so explicitly. Section 165 of the

Evidence Act was already there when Section 162, Criminal

Procedure Code was enacted.

15. It is certainly quite arguable that Section 162, Criminal

Procedure Code, does amount to a prohibition against the

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use even by the Court of statements mentioned there.

Nevertheless, the purpose of the prohibition of Section 162

of the Criminal Procedure Code, being to prevent unfair

use by the prosecution of statements made by witnesses to

the police during the course of investigation, while the

proviso is intended for the benefit of the defence, it could

also be urged that, in order to secure the ends of justice,

which all procedural law is meant to subserve, the

prohibition, by taking into account its purpose and the

mischief it was designed to prevent as well as its context,

must be confined in its scope to the use by parties only to a

proceeding of statements mentioned there.

16. We are inclined to accept the argument of the appellant

that the language of Section 162, Criminal Procedure

Code, though wide, is not explicit or specific enough to

extend the prohibition to the use of the wide and special

powers of the Court to question a witness, expressly and

explicitly given by Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act

in order to secure the ends of justice. We think that a narrow

and restrictive construction put upon the prohibition in

Section 162, Criminal Procedure Code, so as to confine the

ambit of it to the use of statements by witnesses by parties

only to a proceeding before the Court, would reconcile or

harmonize the two provisions considered by us and also

serve the ends of justice. Therefore, we hold that Section

162, Criminal Procedure Code, does not impair the special

powers of the Court under Section 165, Indian Evidence

Act…..”

55. This power of the Court to invoke Section 165 of the Evidence Act to

examine witnesses to subserve the cause of justice and public interest has been

reiterated in Sidhartha Vashisht v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2010) 6 SCC 1,

wherein it was observed as follows:

188. It is also important to note the active role which is to be

played by a court in a criminal trial. The court must ensure that

the Prosecutor is doing his duties to the utmost level of efficiency

and fair play. This Court, in Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State

of Gujarat [(2004) 4 SCC 158 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 999] , has noted

the daunting task of a court in a criminal trial while noting the

most pertinent provisions of the law. It is useful to reproduce the

passage in full : (SCC pp. 188-91, paras 43-49)

“43. The courts have to take a participatory role in a trial.

They are not expected to be tape recorders to record

whatever is being stated by the witnesses. Section 311 of the

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Code and Section 165 of the Evidence Act confer vast and

wide powers on Presiding Officers of court to elicit all

necessary materials by playing an active role in the

evidence-collecting process. They have to monitor the

proceedings in aid of justice in a manner that something,

which is not relevant, is not unnecessarily brought into

record. Even if the prosecutor is remiss in some ways, it can

control the proceedings effectively so that the ultimate

objective i.e. truth is arrived at. This becomes more

necessary before the court has reasons to believe that the

prosecuting agency or the prosecutor is not acting in the

requisite manner. The court cannot afford to be wishfully

or pretend to be blissfully ignorant or oblivious to such

serious pitfalls or dereliction of duty on the part of the

prosecuting agency. The prosecutor who does not act fairly

and acts more like a counsel for the defence is a liability to

the fair judicial system, and courts could not also play into

the hands of such prosecuting agency showing indifference

or adopting an attitude of total aloofness.

44.The power of the court under Section 165 of the

Evidence Act is in a way complementary to its power under

Section 311 of the Code. The section consists of two parts

i.e. : (i) giving a discretion to the court to examine the

witness at any stage, and (ii) the mandatory portion which

compels the court to examine a witness if his evidence

appears to be essential to the just decision of the court.

Though the discretion given to the court is very wide, the

very width requires a corresponding caution. In Mohanlal

Shamji Soni v. Union of India [1991 Supp (1) SCC 271 :

1991 SCC (Cri) 595] this Court has observed, while

considering the scope and ambit of Section 311, that the

very usage of the words such as, ‘any court’, ‘at any stage’,

or ‘any enquiry or trial or other proceedings’, ‘any person’

and ‘any such person’ clearly spells out that the section has

expressed in the widest possible terms and do not limit the

discretion of the court in any way. However, as noted

above, the very width requires a corresponding caution that

the discretionary powers should be invoked as the

exigencies of justice require and exercised judicially with

circumspection and consistently with the provisions of the

Code. The second part of the section does not allow any

discretion but obligates and binds the court to take

necessary steps if the fresh evidence to be obtained is

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essential to the just decision of the case, ‘essential’ to an

active and alert mind and not to one which is bent to

abandon or abdicate. Object of the section is to enable the

court to arrive at the truth irrespective of the fact that the

prosecution or the defence has failed to produce some

evidence which is necessary for a just and proper disposal

of the case. The power is exercised and the evidence is

examined neither to help the prosecution nor the defence, if

the court feels that there is necessity to act in terms of

Section 311 but only to subserve the cause of justice and

public interest. It is done with an object of getting the

evidence in aid of a just decision and to uphold the truth.

56. In the light of the above legal position, we are of the opinion that the Trial

Court ought to have taken into consideration the peculiar circumstances of the

case and the statement of PW-5 recorded under Section 161 CrPC to put right

questions to the parties and witnesses to ascertain the motive or intention of the

appellant in committing the crime.

The High Court, while exercising appellate jurisdiction also did not even

make any reference to it, though took into consideration the statement made under

Section 313 CrPC.

57. Under the circumstances, in our opinion, in view of the plea taken by the

appellant that she was under the influence of some invisible power during

commission of crime, a reasonable doubt can be said to have arisen as regards

existence of intention, thus of mens rea for causing death in the present case.

In arriving at this conclusion, we have taken into consideration the

following aspects:

(i) During the commission of crime, the appellant was shouting

that she is killing her children;

(ii) Post the incident, the appellant, on being asked the reason

behind her act, kept on crying and repeating that she has killed

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her children. This is corroborated by other prosecution

witnesses as well;

(iii) The appellant did not try to flee the scene of crime even after

being left alone in the house by PW-1;

(iv) Complete absence of motive behind the commission of crime

in background of the fact that the appellant loved her children

very much, as also acknowledged by the prosecution witness;

(v) The nature of relation between the accused and the deceased

i.e., of a mother and child.

(vi) Absence of any strained domestic relationships or any such

motivating factor discussed above in para 49.

58. However, in spite of the above discussed circumstances and other evidence

on record, in the absence of any conclusive medical evidence with regards to the

mental condition of the appellant, we are of the opinion that it may not be enough

to extend the benefit of exception as encapsulated in Section 84 IPC so as to

acquit the appellant in the present case.

Nevertheless, in our view, the circumstances are enough to cast a shadow

of doubt about the existence of the intention of the appellant to commit the crime

in the present case. We are, thus, satisfied that in the present case “intention of

causing death” cannot be said to have proved.

59. Under the circumstances, applying the practical tests elucidated in State of

A.P. v. Rayavarapu Punnayya (supra) and Rampal Singh v. State of U.P. (supra)

it can be said that the present case falls within the third category of “culpable

homicide of the third degree” as the act was committed by the appellant without

the intention of causing death, and the said culpable homicide would be covered

under Part II of Section 304 IPC.

Page 28 of 29

60. Accordingly, we convert the conviction of the appellant under Part II of

Section 304 IPC from that of Section 302 IPC under which she was initially

convicted and sentenced by the Trial Court which was upheld by the High Court.

61. It has been brought to our notice that the appellant has already undergone

9 (nine) years 10 (ten) months of custody. Part II of Section 304 IPC provides

for punishment with imprisonment of either description for a term which may

extend to 10 (ten) years or with fine or with both.

Upon her conviction under Part II of Section 304 IPC as above, as she has

already undergone more than 9 (nine) years and 10 (ten) months of sentence, we

sentence the appellant to the period already undertaken by her without any fine.

Accordingly, she shall be entitled to be released forthwith, which we direct

so.

[

62. The appeal is, accordingly, partly allowed as above.

63. Before we part with this appeal, we would like to make certain observations

which in our opinion the trial courts should keep in mind while dealing with such

plea taken by an accused, especially when it relates to homicide, that the accused

was under the influence of certain invisible force or where the prosecution is also

totally unable to explain circumstances which motivated him or her to commit

the act of homicide or where the evidence on record unambiguously show totally

inexplicable but highly intriguing, strange and unusual circumstances under

which the crime was committed as happened in the present case.

64. If such circumstances emerge in course of the trial which remain

inexplicable and bizarre as in the present case, the court, in our opinion, even if

the accused opts to remain silent, should ask such questions to the witnesses, as

may be necessary to elicit the truth by invoking Section 165 of the Evidence Act,

since the court has to be satisfied that the offence alleged has been proved beyond

Page 29 of 29

reasonable doubt not only in respect of actus reas but also mens rea. This assumes

great importance when the accused pleads existence of certain circumstances

which are beyond his/her control and which may indicate unsoundness of mind

even temporarily, incapacitating the accused to take a conscious and informed

decision.

It is for the salutary reason that if the accused at the time of commission of

crime was incapable of making conscious and informed decision or was suffering

from certain mental incapacity or unsoundness of mind even if temporarily, it

may put a question mark on the “intention” of the accused in committing such a

crime, in which event, the benefit of doubt may be extended to the accused as

regards proof of intention and mens rea, as it would determine the nature of

conviction and sentence which may be imposed.

……………………………J.

(B.V. NAGARATHNA)

……………….…………………………J.

(NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH)

NEW DELHI;

APRIL 28, 2025.