REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2912  OF 2022

[Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.26855 of

2018]

DENTAL COUNCIL OF INDIA  ...APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

BIYANI SHIKSHAN SAMITI & ANR.     ...RESPONDENT(S)

JUDGMENT

B.R. GAVAI, J.

1.Leave granted. 

2.The present appeal challenges the judgment and order of

the   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   of   Judicature   for

Rajasthan, Bench at Jaipur, dated 24

th

 April, 2018, passed in

D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3260 of 2017, thereby allowing the

writ   petition   filed   on   behalf   of   the   respondent   No.1­Biyani

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Shikshan Samiti (hereinafter referred to as “the respondent

No.1”) and striking down the Notification dated 21

st

 May, 2012

(hereinafter referred to as “the impugned Notification”), vide

which   the   appellant­Dental   Council   of   India   (hereinafter

referred to as “the Council”), had substituted Regulation 6(2)(h)

of the Dental Council of India (Establishment of New Dental

Colleges,   Opening   of   New   or   Higher   Course   of   Studies   or

Training and Increase of Admission Capacity in Dental Colleges)

Regulations, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as “the Regulations”),

on   the   ground   of   the   same   being   inconsistent   with   the

provisions of the Dentists Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as

“the said Act”) and also being violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)

(g) of the Constitution of India.  

3.The facts in the present case are not in dispute. 

4.The respondent No. 1 had submitted an application to the

Government of India for grant of permission for establishment

of   dental   college   from   academic   year   2012­2013   on   24

th

2

September, 2011.  This was after the Letter of Intent was issued

by   the   State   Government   on   23

rd

  September,   2011.     The

respondent No. 2 – Union of India, through Secretary, Ministry

of   Health   and   Family   Welfare   (Dental   Education   Section)

[hereinafter   referred   to   as   “the   respondent   No.2”),   noticed

certain deficiencies in the proposal of the respondent No.1 and

vide its letter dated 7

th

 October, 2011, required the respondent

No.1 to cure the said deficiencies.  

5.After exchange of certain communications, on 6

th

 January,

2012, the respondent No.2, returned the application of the

respondent No.1 along with demand draft of Rs.6 lakh, on the

ground that deficiencies pointed out were not cured prior to 31

st

December, 2011, i.e., the last date for curing the deficiencies.  

6.In the meantime, the Government of Rajasthan issued

Essentiality Certificate to the respondent No.1 on 11

th

 January,

2012. However, on 17

th

  February, 2012, the respondent No.2

declined   to   reconsider   the   application/request   of   the

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respondent No.1, on the grounds stated in its earlier letter,

dated   6

th

  January,   2012.       As   such,   the   request   of   the

respondent No.1 for reconsideration of its proposal came to be

rejected by the respondent No.2, vide its communication dated

17

th

 February, 2012.  

7.In the meantime, vide the impugned Notification, existing

Regulation   6(2)(h)   of   the   Regulations   was   substituted   by

amended Regulation 6(2)(h) on 21

st

  May, 2012.   Respondent

No.1 again submitted its fresh application on 28

th

 September,

2012 for academic year 2013­2014.  The same was returned by

the respondent No.2 vide its order dated 31

st

 December, 2012,

on   the   ground   that   the   proposal/application   was   not   in

compliance   with   the   amended   Regulation   6(2)(h)   of   the

Regulations.     On   23

rd

  January,   2013,   the   respondent   No.1

thereafter wrote a letter to the respondent No.2, stating therein

that   since   Essentiality   Certificate   was   issued   to   it   on   11

th

January, 2012, the impugned Notification was not applicable to

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it and requested for reconsideration of its application under the

unamended   Regulation   6(2)(h)   of   the   Regulations.     The

respondent No.2 rejected the application of the respondent No.1

vide its order dated 5

th

 March, 2013.  

8.The respondent No.1 challenged the order passed by the

respondent No.2 rejecting the request for reconsideration of its

application before the learned single judge of the High Court of

Judicature for Rajasthan, Bench at Jaipur, by way of S.B. Civil

Writ Petition No.15090 of 2016.  The respondent No.1 further

sought a direction to reconsider the application submitted by it

on 24

th

  September, 2011 for establishment of a new dental

college for academic session 2017­2018.   The learned single

judge of the High Court, vide judgment and order dated 3

rd

November,   2016,   finding   no   merit   in   the   writ   petition,

dismissed the same. The respondent No.1 thereafter filed a writ

petition before the Division Bench being D.B. Civil Writ Petition

No.   3260   of   2017,   challenging   the   impugned   Notification

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amending   Regulation   6(2)(h)   of   the   Regulations.     The

respondent   No.1   also   sought   a   prayer   for   direction   to   the

respondent No.2, for reconsidering its application, dated 28

th

September, 2012, for establishment of a new Dental College for

academic   session   2018­2019   and   for   subsequent   academic

sessions. By the impugned judgment and order dated 24

th

 April,

2018, the Division Bench of the High Court allowed the said

writ petition by striking down the impugned Notification and

directed the respondent No. 2 to reconsider the case of the

respondent No.1 in the light of the observations made in the

impugned judgment and order.   Being aggrieved thereby, the

present appeal has been preferred by the Council. 

9.We   have   heard   Shri   Gaurav   Sharma,   learned   counsel

appearing   on   behalf   of   the   Council,   Ms.   Aishwarya   Bhati,

learned Additional Solicitor General (“ASG” for short) appearing

on   behalf   of   the   respondent   No.2   and   Ms.   Shobha   Gupta,

learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No.1.

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10.Shri Gaurav Sharma, learned counsel, would submit that

the Division Bench of the High Court has grossly erred in

allowing the writ petition.  He submits that the Council is an

expert statutory body duly constituted under the said Act.  He

submits   that   the   said   Act   empowers   the   Council   to   make

Regulations   for   various   aspects   concerned   with   Dental

Education,   including   prescribing   requirement   of   minimum

standards.     He   submits   that   the   Council,   after   examining

various aspects, had found it necessary to amend Regulation

6(2)(h) of the Regulations.  He submits that this was done for

providing   better   teaching   facilities   to   the   students   and   for

improving the standards of education.   He submits that the

Division Bench has grossly erred in holding that it was beyond

the powers of the Council to make delegated legislation.   He

submits that, in any case, the finding of the High Court that

the impugned Notification was violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)

(g) of the Constitution of India, is totally erroneous.  

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11.Ms.   Aishwarya   Bhati,   learned   ASG   also   supports   the

submission made on behalf of the Council.   Relying on the

judgment of this Court in the case of Dental Council of India

vs.  Subharti  K.K.B.  Charitable  Trust  and   Another

1

, she

submits that the High Court ought not to have interfered with

the impugned Notification, since the Regulations were made by

the expert body in accordance with the provisions of the said

Act.  

12.Ms. Shobha Gupta, learned counsel appearing on behalf

of the respondent No.1, on the contrary, would submit that the

High Court has rightly quashed the impugned Notification. She

submits that the impugned Notification has no nexus with the

object sought to be achieved.  She submits that there is a huge

shortage of Dentists in the country and therefore, the object of

the legislation should be to encourage establishment of more

Dental Colleges rather than providing a requirement which will

1 (2001) 5 SCC 486

8

restrict the number of new Dental Colleges.   On facts, she

submits that there is no medical college within the vicinity of

100 kms. from the place at which the respondent No.1 proposes

to start a new Dental College.  She submits that the impugned

Notification, therefore, violates the fundamental rights of the

students to take dental education as well as the fundamental

right   of   the   respondent   No.1   to   establish   an   educational

institution under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India.  

13.For   considering   the   rival   submissions,   it   will   be

appropriate   to   refer   to   certain   provisions   of   the   said   Act.

Section 3 of the said Act requires the Central Government to

constitute  a Council  consisting  of members  named therein.

Section 10 of the said Act deals with recognition of dental

qualifications.     Section   10A   of   the   said   Act   deals   with

permission for establishment of new dental college, new courses

of study, etc.   Sub­section (1) of Section 10A of the said Act

puts   restriction   on   the   establishment   of   an   authority   or

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institution for a course of study or training which would enable

a student of such course or training to qualify himself for the

grant   of   recognized   dental   qualification;   it   also   imposes   a

restriction on  opening  a   new   or  higher  course  of   study   or

training, or increase the admission capacity in any course of

study or training, including a post­graduate course of study or

training.     It   is   provided   that   no   person   can   establish   an

authority   or   institution   for   dental   education   and   that   no

authority or institution can open a new or higher course of

study or training, including a post­graduate course of study or

training, or increase its admission capacity without the prior

permission of the Central Government.  Sub­sections (2) to (4)

of Section 10A of the said Act deal with the procedure to be

followed for making an application for permission to start a new

or higher course of study or training or increase of intake

capacity in any course of study or training.  Sub­section (5) of

Section 10A of the said Act is a deeming provision, which

10

provides that if the Central Government fails to pass an order

on the scheme/application submitted by the applicant within a

period   of   one   year   from   the   date   of   submitting   the

scheme/application, such scheme/application shall be deemed

to have been approved by the Central Government in the form

in which it was submitted.  It also provides that the permission

of the Central Government required under sub­section (1) shall

also be deemed to have been granted. Sub­section (6) of Section

10A of the said Act provides for extension of the period provided

in sub­section (5) by entitling an applicant for the extension of

the   period   for   furnishing   the   particulars   called   for   by   the

Council or by the Central Government.  

14.It will be apposite to reproduce sub­section (7) of Section

10A of the said Act, since the same fell for consideration before

the Division Bench of the High Court while allowing the writ

petition.  It reads thus: 

11

 “10A. Permission for establishment of

new   dental   college,   new   courses   of

study, etc.—(1) …………………………

(2)………………………………………………

xxx

(7)   The   Council,   while   making   its

recommendations   under   clause   (b)   of

sub­section   (3)   and   the   Central

Government,   while   passing   an   order

either   approving   or   disapproving   the

scheme under sub­section (4), shall have

due   regard   to   the   following   factors,

namely:—

(a) whether the proposed authority

or   institution   for   grant   of

recognised dental qualification or

the   existing   authority   or

institution seeking to open a new

or   higher   course   of   study   or

training, would be in a position to

offer the minimum standards of

dental   education   in   conformity

with the requirements referred to

in   Section   16­A   and   the

regulations   made   under   sub­

section (1) of Section 20;

(b)  whether the  person seeking to

establish   an   authority   or

institution   or   the   existing

authority or institution seeking to

open a new or higher course of

study or training or to increase

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its   admission   capacity   has

adequate resources;

(c)   whether   necessary   facilities   in

respect   of   staff,   equipment,

accommodation,   training   and

other facilities to ensure proper

functioning   of   the   authority   or

institution or conducting the new

course   of   study   or   training   or

accommodating   the   increased

admission   capacity   have   been

provided   or   would   be   provided

within the time­limit specified in

the scheme;

(d)   whether   adequate   hospital

facilities,   having   regard   to   the

number   of   students   likely   to

attend   such   authority   or

institution or course of study or

training   or   as   a   result   of   the

increased   admission   capacity

have been provided or would be

provided   within   the   time­limit

specified in the scheme;

(e)   whether   any   arrangement   has

been made or programme drawn

to   impart   proper   training   to

students   likely   to   attend   such

authority or institution or course

of study or training by persons

having   the   recognised   dental

qualifications;

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(f) the requirement of manpower in

the field of practice of dentistry;

and

(g)   any   other   factors   as   may   be

prescribed.”

15.It could thus be seen that the Council, while making its

recommendations and the Central Government, while passing

an order, are required to take into consideration various factors

as are enumerated in clauses (a) to (g) of sub­section (7) of

Section 10A of the said Act.  

16.Section 20 of the said Act empowers the Council, with the

approval of the Central Government, to make Regulations.  It

will be apposite to refer to the relevant part of Section 20 of the

said Act, which reads thus:

“20.Power to make regulations.­(1) The

Council   may,   with  the   approval   of   the

Central   Government,   by   notification   in

the Official Gazette, make regulations not

inconsistent with the provisions of this

Act   to   carry   out   the   purposes   of   this

Chapter.

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(2)In particular and without prejudice

to the generality of the foregoing power

such regulations may­

(a)……………………………………………

(b)……………………………………………

xxxxxxxxx

(fb)prescribe   any   other   factors   under

clause   (g)   of   sub­section   (7)   of

section 10A”

17.It could thus be seen from the conjoint reading of clause

(g) of sub­section (7) of Section 10A and clause (fb) of sub­

section (2) of Section 20 of the said Act that the Council is also

empowered to take into consideration any other factors as may

be   prescribed   and   also   entitled   to   make   Regulations   for

prescribing any other factor under clause (g) of sub­section (7)

of Section 10A.  

18.It   will   also   be   relevant   to   refer   to   the   provision   of

Regulation   6(2)(h)   as   it   existed   prior   to   the   impugned

Notification  and  the   amended  provision  after   the  impugned

Notification was given effect to.  They read thus:

15

“Regulation 6(2)(h) prior to impugned

Notification dated 21   

st

   May, 2012

6. Eligibility and qualifying criteria.­ 

(1) …………………………………………..

(2)   The   organizations   under   sub­

regulation (1) shall qualify to apply for

permission to establish a dental college if

the following conditions are fulfilled:­ 

(a)…………………………………………..

(b) …………………………………………..

xxx

(h)the applicant owns and manages a

General   Hospital   of   not   less   than   100

beds as per Annexure I with necessary

infrastructure   facilities   including

teaching   pre­clinical,   para­clinical   and

allied medical sciences in the campus of

the proposed dental college, 

or

the proposed dental college is located in

the proximity of a Government Medical

College or a Medical College recognised

by the Medical Council of India and an

undertaking of the said Medical College to

the effect that it would facilitate training

to the students of the proposed dental

college   in   the   subjects   of   Medicine,

16

Surgery and Allied Medical Sciences has

been obtained, 

or

where no Medical College is available in

the   proximity   of   the   proposed   dental

college, the proposed dental college gets

itself tied up at least for 5 years with a

Government   General   Hospital   having   a

provision of at least 100 beds and located

within   a   radius   of   10   K.M.   of   the

proposed dental college and the tie­up is

extendable till it has its own 100 bedded

hospital in the same premises. In such

cases,   the   applicant   shall   produce

evidence   that   necessary   infrastructure

facilities  including  teaching  pre­clinical,

para­clinical and allied medical sciences

are owned by the proposed dental college

itself; 

Regulation 6(2)(h) after the impugned

Notification dated 21   

st

   May, 2012

6. Eligibility and qualifying criteria.­ 

(1) …………………………………………..

(2)   The   organizations   under   sub­

regulation (1) shall qualify to apply for

permission to establish a dental college if

the following conditions are fulfilled:­ 

(a)…………………………………………..

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(b) …………………………………………..

xxx

(h) the applicant shall attach its proposed

dental college with a Government/Private

Medical College approved/recognised by

the   Medical   Council   of   India   which   is

located at the distance of 10 kms. by road

from   the   proposed   dental   college   and

produce   evidence   of   the   said   Medical

College   to   the   effect   that   it   would

facilitate training to the students of the

proposed   dental   college   as   per

syllabus/course curriculum prescribed in

respective   undergraduate   and   post

graduate   dental   course   regulations   as

amended from time to time:­ 

Provided that not more than one dental

college shall be attached with the medical

college.” 

19.It could  thus  be seen that the  change  that  has  been

brought by the impugned Notification is that, though under the

unamended Regulation 6(2)(h), an applicant was entitled to

apply if he/she/it owned and managed a General Hospital of

not less than 100 beds; by the impugned Notification, it has

been made mandatory that  the applicant has  to attach its

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proposed Dental College with the Government/Private Medical

College, approved/recognized by the Medical Council of India,

which is located at a distance of 10 kilometers by road from the

proposed Dental College.   The distance of 10 kilometers has

now been increased to 30 kilometers, vide amendment dated 5

th

July, 2017.  

20. The Division Bench of the High Court vide the impugned

judgment and order dated 24

th

 April, 2018, has allowed the writ

petition   and   quashed   the   impugned   Notification   on   three

grounds, viz., 

(i)that it is violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution

of India; 

(ii)that it is beyond the scope of the powers of the Council

to make delegated legislation as provided under sub­

section (7) of Section 10A of the said Act; and 

(iii)that it is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of

India,   inasmuch   as   the   Dental   Colleges   established

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prior to impugned Notification would be permitted to

run   without   attachment   with   Medical   Colleges,

whereas,   the   Dental   Colleges   established   after   the

impugned Notification will be compelled to have such

an attachment with the Medical Colleges.  

21.We find that the learned judges of the Division Bench have

erred on all counts.  

22.It will be relevant to refer to the following observations of

this   Court   in   the   case   of  Indian   Express   Newspapers

(Bombay) Private Ltd. and others vs. Union of India and

others

2

.

“75. A piece of subordinate legislation does not

carry the same degree of immunity which is

enjoyed by a statute passed by a competent

Legislature.   Subordinate   legislation   may   be

questioned on any of the grounds on which

plenary legislation is questioned. In addition it

may also be questioned on the ground that it

does not conform to the statute under which it

2 (1985) 1 SCC 641

20

is made. It may further be questioned on the

ground   that   it   is   contrary   to   some   other

statute.   That   is   because   subordinate

legislation must yield to plenary legislation. It

may also be questioned on the ground that it

is   unreasonable,   unreasonable   not   in   the

sense of not being reasonable, but in the sense

that it is manifestly arbitrary.” 

23.It could thus be seen that this Court has held that the

subordinate   legislation   may   be   questioned   on   any   of   the

grounds   on   which   plenary   legislation   is   questioned.     In

addition, it may also be questioned on the ground that it does

not conform to the statute under which it is made. It may

further be questioned on the ground that it is contrary to some

other statute.  Though it may also be questioned on the ground

of unreasonableness, such unreasonableness should not be in

the sense of not being reasonable, but should be in the sense

that it is manifestly arbitrary.  

24.It has further been held by this Court in the said case that

for challenging the subordinate legislation on the ground of

21

arbitrariness, it can only be done when it is found that it is not

in conformity with the statute or that it offends Article 14 of the

Constitution.  It has further been held that it cannot be done

merely on the ground that it is not reasonable or that it has not

taken into account relevant circumstances which the Court

considers relevant. 

25.The judgment of this Court in the case of Indian Express

Newspapers (Bombay) Private Ltd.  (supra) has been followed

by a three­judge Bench of this Court in the case of  Khoday

Distilleries Ltd. and others vs. State of Karnataka and

others

3

.     It   will   be   apposite   to   refer   to   the   following

observations of this Court in the said case: 

“13. It is next submitted before us that

the   amended   Rules   are   arbitrary,

unreasonable and cause undue hardship

and, therefore, violate Article 14 of the

Constitution. Although the protection of

Article 19(1)(g) may not be available to

the   appellants,   the   rules   must,

undoubtedly, satisfy the test of Article 14,

3 (1996) 10 SCC 304

22

which   is   a   guarantee   against   arbitrary

action. However, one must bear in mind

that what is being challenged here under

Article   14   is   not   executive   action   but

delegated   legislation.   The   tests   of

arbitrary action which apply to executive

actions   do   not   necessarily   apply   to

delegated   legislation.   In   order   that

delegated legislation can be struck down,

such   legislation   must   be   manifestly

arbitrary;   a   law   which   could   not   be

reasonably expected to emanate from an

authority delegated with the law­making

power.   In   the   case   of Indian   Express

Newspapers (Bombay) (P) Ltd. v. Union of

India [(1985) 1 SCC 641 : 1985 SCC (Tax)

121 : (1985) 2 SCR 287] (SCR at p. 243)

this   Court   said   that   a   piece   of

subordinate legislation does not carry the

same   degree   of   immunity   which   is

enjoyed   by   a   statute   passed   by   a

competent   legislature.   A   subordinate

legislation   may   be   questioned   under

Article   14   on   the   ground   that   it   is

unreasonable; “unreasonable not in the

sense of not being reasonable, but in the

sense   that   it   is   manifestly   arbitrary”.

Drawing a comparison between the law in

England and in India, the Court further

observed   that   in   England   the   Judges

would   say,   “Parliament   never   intended

the authority to make such Rules; they

are   unreasonable   and   ultra   vires”.   In

India,   arbitrariness   is   not   a   separate

23

ground   since   it   will   come   within   the

embargo of Article 14 of the Constitution.

But subordinate legislation must be so

arbitrary that it could not be said to be in

conformity   with   the   statute   or   that   it

offends Article 14 of the Constitution.”

26.In   the   case   of  State   of   T.N.   and   another   vs.   P.

Krishnamurthy and others

4

  after considering the law laid

down by this Court earlier in the cases of  Indian Express

Newspapers (Bombay) Private Ltd.  (supra),  Supreme Court

Employees’ Welfare Association. vs. Union of India and

another

5

,  Shri   Sitaram   Sugar   Company   Limited   and

another vs. Union of India and others

6

, St. Johns Teachers

Training Institute vs. Regional Director, National Council

for   Teacher   Education   and   another

7

,  Rameshchandra

Kachardas Porwal and others vs. State of Maharashtra

4 (2006) 4 SCC 517

5 (1989) 4 SCC 187

6 (1990) 3 SCC 223

7 (2003) 3 SCC 321

24

and others

 8

,  Union of India and another vs. Cynamide

India Ltd. and another

9

  and  State of Haryana vs. Ram

Kishan   and   others

10

,   this   Court   has   laid   down   certain

grounds,   on   which   the   subordinate   legislation   can   be

challenged, which are as under: 

“Whether   the   rule   is   valid   in   its

entirety?

15. There is a presumption in favour of

constitutionality   or   validity   of   a

subordinate legislation and the burden is

upon him who attacks it to show that it is

invalid. It is also well recognised that a

subordinate legislation can be challenged

under any of the following grounds:

(a) Lack of legislative competence to

make the subordinate legislation.

(b) Violation of fundamental rights

guaranteed under the Constitution of

India.

(c) Violation of any provision of the

Constitution of India.

(d) Failure to conform to the statute

under which it is made or exceeding

the limits of authority conferred by the

enabling Act.

8 (1981) 2 SCC 722

9 (1987) 2 SCC 720

10 (1988) 3 SCC 416

25

(e) Repugnancy to the laws of the

land, that is, any enactment.

(f)   Manifest   arbitrariness/

unreasonableness (to an extent where

the   court   might   well   say   that   the

legislature   never   intended   to   give

authority to make such rules).”

27.In the light of these guiding principles, we will have to

examine the correctness of the findings of the learned judges of

the Division Bench in the impugned judgment and order.  

28.One of the grounds on which the impugned Notification

has been struck down is that it is beyond the scope of powers of

the   Council   under   Section   10A(7)(d)   of   the   said   Act.     The

Division Bench of the High Court has relied on clause (d) of

sub­section (7) of Section 10A of the said Act to come to a

conclusion that clause (d) refers to adequate hospital facilities,

having regard to the number of students likely to attend the

institution.   It has held that a requirement of hospital was

already fulfilled in the pre­amended Regulation 6(2)(h) of the

Regulations. It has further held that clause (d) does not refer to

26

Medical   College.     It   was   therefore   held   that   the   impugned

Notification requiring the Dental Colleges to be attached with

the Government/Private Medical College was beyond the scope

of sub­section (7) of Section 10A of the said Act and, therefore,

inconsistent with the said Act.  

29.We find that the Division Bench has failed to take into

consideration clause (g) of sub­section (7) of Section 10A of the

said Act.  It is to be noted that whereas clauses (a) to (f) of sub­

section (7) of Section 10A of the said Act deal with various

factors, clause (g) thereof, which can be said to be a residual

clause, enables the Council to take into consideration also any

other factor as may be prescribed.  

30.We further find that the Division Bench of the High Court

has also failed to take into consideration clause (fb) of sub­

section (2) of Section 20 of the said Act.  A conjoint reading of

these   provisions   would   reveal   that   the   Council   is   also

empowered to take into consideration any other factor as may

27

be prescribed and also to make a Regulation with regard to any

other factor under clause (g) of sub­section (7) of Section 10A of

the   said  Act.    It could   thus  be seen that  it  is  within  the

competence of the Council to make Regulations prescribing any

other conditions, which are otherwise not found in clauses (a)

to   (f)   of   sub­section   (7)   of   Section   10A   of   the   said   Act.

Challenge to the same would be permissible only on the ground

of manifest arbitrariness.   It is also equally settled that the

presumption is always with regard to the validity of a provision.

The burden is on the party who challenges the validity of such

provision.   We find that the respondent No.1 has failed to

discharge the burden to show that the impugned Notification

suffers from manifest arbitrariness.      

31.Secondly, the Division Bench of the High Court found the

impugned Notification dated 21

st

  May, 2012 to be violative of

Article 14 of the Constitution, on the ground that the Dental

Colleges established prior to impugned Notification would not

28

be required to be attached with the Medical Colleges, whereas,

the   Dental   Colleges,   established   after   the   impugned

Notification, will be compelled to be attached to such Medical

Colleges.   We are of  the considered view that  the  Colleges

established prior to the impugned Notification and the Colleges

established/to be established after the impugned Notification

would form two separate classes.  The differential treatment for

different   classes   would   not   be   hit   by   Article   14   of   the

Constitution of India. The only requirement would be, as to

whether   such   a   classification   has   a   nexus   with   the   object

sought   to   be   achieved   by   the   Act.     For   the   reasons   given

hereinafter, we find that the factors taken into consideration by

the   Council,   while   amending   Regulation   6(2)(h)   of   the

Regulations are relevant factors.  The factors have a nexus with

the object sought to be achieved.   It has been submitted on

behalf   of   the   Council   that   the   existing   recognized   Medical

College already has a facility to impart education to about 500­

29

700   students.   Such   Medical   Colleges   have   a   full­fledged

teaching faculty.   Such a faculty would enable providing a

proper education to the students of the Dental colleges on

various   aspects   of   pre­clinical,   para­clinical   and   allied

medicine, etc.  The Council has also taken into consideration

the fact that the General Hospitals having bed­capacity of 100

beds or more do not have experts on full­time basis.   They

usually engage the services of consultant doctors, who visit the

Hospital for a very limited period.  The Council has also taken

into consideration the fact that the private hospitals do not

have adequate clinical facilities and/or clinical material and

therefore,   it   is   unlikely   that   they   will   be   able   to   impart

education and training to students.  It has been submitted on

behalf of the Council that the amended Regulation 6(2)(h) of the

Regulations was brought into effect so that it would facilitate

training to the students of the proposed Dental Colleges as per

the   syllabus/course   curriculum   prescribed.     It,   therefore,

30

cannot be said that the Council has taken into consideration

the factors, which are not relevant or germane for the purpose

to be achieved.  The object to be achieved is to provide adequate

teaching   and   training   facilities   to   the   students.     If   in   the

wisdom of the expert body, this can be done by attaching a

Dental College to the already existing Medical College, it cannot

be faulted with.  

32.The reason given for not permitting more than one Dental

College to be attached to the existing recognized Medical College

is that if one Dental College is permitted to be attached to a

recognized Medical College, which is already having 500­750

students in different semesters of their 5­year MBBS course,

the additional students of the Dental College may very well be

absorbed   in   the   facilities   that   are   already   available   in   the

recognized Medical College.  However, if more than one Dental

College is permitted to be attached, it will lead to overcrowding

of students in the Medical College. 

31

33.We are, therefore, of the considered view that the amended

Regulation   cannot   be   said   to   be   one,   which   is   manifestly

arbitrary, so as to permit the Court to interfere with it.  On the

contrary, we find that the amended Regulation 6(2)(h) has a

direct   nexus   with  the   object  to  be  achieved,  i.e.,   providing

adequate teaching and training facilities to the students.  

34.It will be apposite to refer to the following observations of

the   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   in   the   impugned

judgment: 

“We   fail   to   understand   as   to   how   the

earlier provisions, in any manner, were

not sufficient for the object sought to be

achieved.     A   careful   reading   of   the

unamended   Regulation   6(2)(h)   shows

requirement of attachment with General

Hospital   owned   and   managed   by   the

applicant in the campus of the proposed

Dental College.  It was with infrastructure

facilities  including  teaching  pre­clinical,

para­clinical and allied medical sciences.

If we talk about practical training, it

would be more in the hospital, therefore,

the unamended provision of Regulation

32

6(2)(h) provided both i.e. attachment with

General   Hospital   or   with   a   Medical

College   with   required   facilities   of

teaching.”

35.In this respect, we would gainfully refer to the following

observations of this Court in the case of Maharashtra State

Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education and

another vs. Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth and others

11

:

“14. ….. whether a rule or regulation or

other type of statutory instrument — is in

excess   of   the   power   of   subordinate

legislation conferred on the delegate has

to be determined with reference only to

the specific provisions contained in the

relevant statute conferring the power to

make the rule, regulation, etc. and also

the object and purpose of the Act as can

be gathered from the various provisions

of   the   enactment.   It   would   be   wholly

wrong for the Court to substitute its own

opinion for that of the Legislature or its

delegate  as  to  what  principle  or policy

would   best   serve   the   objects   and

purposes   of   the   Act   and   to   sit   in

judgment   over   the   wisdom   and

effectiveness   or   otherwise   of   the   policy

11 (1984) 4 SCC 27

33

laid down by the regulation­making body

and declare a regulation to be ultra vires

merely on the ground that, in the view of

the Court, the impugned provisions will

not help to serve the object and purpose

of the Act. So long as the body entrusted

with   the   task   of   framing   the   rules   or

regulations acts within the scope of the

authority conferred on it, in the sense

that the rules or regulations made by it

have a rational nexus with the object and

purpose of the statute, the court should

not   concern   itself   with   the   wisdom   or

efficaciousness   of   such   rules   or

regulations.”

36.This Court in unequivocal terms has held that it would be

wholly wrong for the Court to substitute its own opinion for

that of the Legislature or its delegate as to what principle or

policy would best serve the objects and purposes of the Act.  It

has been held that it is not permissible for the Court to sit in

judgment over the wisdom and effectiveness or otherwise of the

policy laid down by the regulation­making body and declare a

regulation to be ultra vires merely on the ground that, in the

34

view of the Court, the impugned provisions will not help to

serve the object and purpose of the Act. 

37.We find that the observations quoted herein above of the

Division Bench of the High Court are totally contrary to the

view expressed by this Court in the  case of  Maharashtra

State   Board   of   Secondary   and   Higher   Secondary

Education and another (supra).  

38.The  Division   Bench   of   the  High   Court   has   erred   in

substituting its wisdom with that of the rule­making body,

which is an expert body.  In this respect, it will also be apposite

to refer to the observations of this Court in the case of  All

India Council for Technical Education vs. Surinder Kumar

Dhawan and others

12

.   After considering various judgments

on the issue, this Court observed thus:

“16. The courts are neither equipped nor

have   the   academic   or   technical

12 (2009) 11 SCC 726

35

background to substitute themselves in

place of statutory professional technical

bodies   and   take   decisions   in  academic

matters involving standards and quality

of technical education. If the courts start

entertaining   petitions   from   individual

institutions or students to permit courses

of   their   choice,   either   for   their

convenience or to alleviate hardship or to

provide better opportunities, or because

they think that one course is equal to

another,   without   realising   the

repercussions   on   the   field   of   technical

education in general, it will lead to chaos

in   education   and   deterioration   in

standards of education.

17. The role of statutory expert bodies on

education and the role of courts are well

defined   by   a   simple   rule.   If   it   is   a

question of educational policy or an issue

involving   academic   matter,   the   courts

keep their hands off.”

39.We are, therefore, of the considered view that it was not

permissible for the Division Bench of the High Court to enter

into an area of experts and hold that the unamended provisions

ought to have been preferred over the amended provisions.  

36

40.That leaves us with the finding of the Division Bench of

the High Court that the amended Regulation is violative of

Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. Reliance in this respect is

placed on the Eleven­Judge Constitution Bench judgment of

this Court in the case of T.M.A. Pai Foundation and others

vs. State of Karnataka and others

13

.  In this respect, it will

be relevant to refer to the following observations of the Eleven­

Judge Constitution Bench of this Court in the said case:

“54. The right to establish an educational

institution   can   be   regulated;   but   such

regulatory measures must, in general, be

to   ensure   the   maintenance   of   proper

academic   standards,   atmosphere   and

infrastructure   (including   qualified   staff)

and the prevention of maladministration

by those in charge of management. The

fixing of a rigid fee structure, dictating

the   formation   and   composition   of   a

governing body, compulsory nomination

of teachers and staff for appointment or

nominating   students   for   admissions

would be unacceptable restrictions.”

13 (2002) 8 SCC 481

37

41.It can thus clearly be seen that the Constitution Bench

itself   has   held   that   the  right   to   establish   an   educational

institution   can   be   regulated.     However,   such   regulatory

measures must, in general, be to ensure the maintenance of

proper academic standards, atmosphere and infrastructure and

the prevention of maladministration. 

42.The impugned Notification, undoubtedly, is made in order

to ensure the maintenance of proper academic standards and

infrastructure and as such, the judgment of the Constitution

Bench of this Court in the case of T.M.A. Pai Foundation and

others  (supra),   rather   than   supporting   the   case   of   the

respondent No.1, would support the case of the Council.  

43.We   further   find   that   the   impugned   judgment   of   the

Division Bench of the High Court is also not sustainable on the

ground of judicial propriety.  The respondent No.1 had already

filed a writ petition being S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 15090 of

2016, challenging the action of the Council and the respondent

38

No.2 in returning the application of the respondent No.1 for

grant of recognition to new Dental College and for a direction to

reconsider its application submitted on 24

th

 September, 2011.

The said writ petition was filed in the year 2016.  The said writ

petition was dismissed by the learned single judge of the High

Court by the judgment and order dated 3

rd

  November, 2016.

After the said writ petition was rejected on 3

rd

 November, 2016,

the respondent No.1 filed the present writ petition being D.B.

Civil Writ Petition No.3260 of 2017 before the Division Bench of

the High Court on 1

st

 March, 2017.  In the said writ petition,

the prayer was for challenging the validity of the impugned

Notification and for a direction to reconsider the proposal of the

respondent No.1.   The impugned Notification could have very

well been challenged in the earlier writ petition, which was filed

in the year 2016 before the learned single judge of the High

Court.  However, having failed in that writ petition before the

learned single judge, the respondent No.1 filed another writ

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petition before the Division Bench of the High Court.  Though

one of the prayers challenges the  validity of the impugned

Notification, another prayer claims for reconsideration of its

proposal.   The said prayer has been granted by the Division

Bench of the High Court by its impugned judgment and order

dated 24

th

 April, 2018.  It could thus be seen that the prayer for

reconsideration of the proposal submitted by the respondent

No.1, which was already rejected by the learned single judge of

the High Court vide order dated 3

rd

  November, 2016 in S.B.

Civil Writ Petition No.15090 of 2016, has been renewed in the

fresh writ petition filed in the year 2017 and granted by the

Division Bench of the High Court.  

44.We, therefore, find that on the ground of judicial propriety

also the Division Bench of the High Court ought not to have

entertained the writ petition for a prayer, which already stood

rejected. In that view of the matter, the impugned judgment

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and order dated 24

th

 April, 2018 passed by the Division Bench

of the High Court is not sustainable. 

45.In   the   result,   the   appeal   is   allowed.     The   impugned

judgment   and   order   dated   24

th

  April,   2018   passed   by   the

Division Bench of the High Court is quashed and set aside.  The

D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.3260 of 2017 filed by the respondent

No.1   before   the   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   stands

dismissed.  No order as to costs.

46.Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of. 

…..….......................J.

[L. NAGESWARA RAO]

…….........................J.       

[B.R. GAVAI]

NEW DELHI;

APRIL 12, 2022

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