REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2023

(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 26491 of 2018)

DHEERAJ SINGH … APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

GREATER NOIDA INDUSTRIAL

DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS. … RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2023

(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.31320/ 2018

JAGDISH SINGH … APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

GREATER NOIDA INDUSTRIAL

DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS. … RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2023

(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.1468/ 2019

RAGHUBEER SINGH … APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

GREATER NOIDA INDUSTRIAL

DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS. … RESPONDENT(S)

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WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2023

(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.31322/ 2018

DHARAM SINGH … APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

GREATER NOIDA INDUSTRIAL

DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS. … RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2023

(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.31321/ 2018

CHARANJEET SINGH … APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

GREATER NOIDA INDUSTRIAL

DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS. … RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2023

(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.32192/ 2018

HAR BHAJAN SINGH … APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

GREATER NOIDA INDUSTRIAL

DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS. … RESPONDENT(S)

2

JUDGMENT

KRISHNA MURARI, J.

Delay condoned.

2.Leave granted.

3.The present Appeals are directed against the impugned order and

judgment dated 05.01.2017 passed by the High Court of Allahabad at

Allahabad (hereinafter referred to as “High Court”), whereby, the appeal

preferred by the appellants herein was dismissed.

FACTS

4.The relevant facts necessary for the adjudication of the present

appeals, for the sake of convenience, the Respondent State Government of

UP had issued a notification under Section 4(1) read with Section 17 of the

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 on 30.04.1993 whereby a large tract of land,

including the land of the appellants herein was acquired for the purpose of

Greater Noida. The declaration of the said lands under Section 6 of the Act

was issued on 25.06.1993, and the possession of the aforesaid lands was

taken on different dates between 13.08.1993 and 31.05.1994.

5.Subsequent to the possession of the said lands being acquired, the

Special Land Acquisition Officer, by order dated 27.08.1994, determined

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the market value of the plots at three different rates i.e., Rs.32.52/-,

Rs.22.44/- and Rs. 16.46/- paisa per square yard.

6.Aggrieved by the aforesaid award, the appellants herein sought

reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act and claimed

compensation at the rate of Rs. 350/- to Rs. 500/- per square yard on

grounds of parity to other lands acquired in the vicinity. The Learned

District Judge, in the aforesaid reference, vide its judgment dated

09.05.2002, determined the market value of the said lands at Rs. 400/-, but

deducted 1/3

rd

amount for development charge, and fixed the market value

at Rs. 267/- per square yard and granted Rs. 80/- as solatium per square

yard with interest at the rate of 9% and 15% per annum, and an additional

compensation at the rate of 12% per annum on the market value with

effect from the date of transfer of possession.

7.As against this, the Respondent Greater Noida filed an appeal in the

High Court, to which the appellants herein filed their cross appeals seeking

a further enhancement.

8.Subsequently, the High Court, vide order and judgment dated

04.01.2017, confirmed the compensation determined by the Learned

District Judge. It is the contention of the appellants herein that the High

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Court, while passing its judgment, did not consider the cross objections

filed by them.

9.The Appellants, aggrieved by the fact that their cross objection for

enhancement was not properly considered, filed a review, however, the

same was dismissed vide impugned order and judgment dated 05.01.2017.

Hence, the present Special Leave Petition.

10.For the sake of clarity, it is necessary to mention that the acquisition

of the land itself is not being challenged by way of the present appeals, and

the limited challenge is only confined to the extent of the quantum of

compensation granted for the acquisition of the said lands.

11.To appreciate the issue at hand and to come to a correct conclusion,

we must analyze the impugned order passed by the High Court, to see

whether there has been any application of mind by the High Court on the

cross objections filed by the appellants herein, and if such consideration

has not been taken into account, then to what extent can this Court grant

relief.

ANALYSIS

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12.Order 41 Rule 22, which is the governing law in the present case,

elaborates on the remedies available to a respondent in the court of first

appeal where an original decree has been challenged. An analysis of the

said provision, in our opinion, is essential to adjudicate upon the present

case.

13.In cases where the decree passed by the court of first instance is in

favor of the respondent in whole, in such circumstance, no remedy exists

in favour of the respondent to appeal such decree, since no right to appeal

can be vested onto a party, which is successful.

14.However, in cases where the decree given by the court of first

instance, is partly in favour of the respondent, but is also partly against the

respondent, two remedies within Order 41 Rule 22 remain with the

respondent, which are (i) To file their cross objections and, (ii) To support

the decree in whole. A third remedy in law also exists, which is the right to

file a cross appeal, which will also be discussed in brief.

15.In cases where the opposing party files a first appeal against part or

whole of the original decree, and the respondent in the said first appeal,

due to part or whole of the decree being in their favour, abstains from

filing an appeal at the first instance, in such cases, to ensure that the

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respondent is also given a fair chance to be heard, he is given the right to

file his cross objections within the appeal already so instituted by the other

party, against not only the contentions raised by the other party, but also

against part or whole of the decree passed by the court of first instance.

16.In a similar circumstance, where the other party in the first instance

has preferred an appeal, apart from the remedy of cross objections, the

respondent can also file a cross appeal within the limitation period so

prescribed, which in essence is a separate appeal in itself, challenging part

or whole of the original decree, independent of the appeal filed by the

other party. The respondent also has the right to fully support the original

decree passed by the lower court in full.

17.In the present case at hand, the appellants herein, in the court of first

appeal filed a cross objection. It is the claim of the appellants herein that

his cross objection was not considered by the High Court while passing the

impugned judgment. At this stage, it must be noted that while cross

objections, unlike a regular appeal, are filed within an already existing

appeal, however, as per Order 41 Rule 22 of the CPC, cross objections

have all the trappings of a regular appeal, and therefore, must be

considered in full by the court adjudicating upon the same.

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18.A bare perusal of the impugned order would show that the issues

raised by the appellants in their cross objections have not been considered

by the High Court. No mention of the cross objections filed by the

appellants herein have been found in the said judgment. While the High

Court has given a detailed analysis of all other issues raised in the appeal

and the both the lower court orders, however, the cross objections in

specific, finds no discussion, much less even a mention.

19.In the case of Santosh Hazari Vs. Purushottam Tiwari (Dead) by

LRs.

1

, this Court held that the court of appeal has a duty to apply its mind

to all issues raised before it, and to discharge such duty, it must also record

its findings against all such issues raised. For the sake of convenience, the

relevant paragraph of the said judgment is being extracted herein:

"The Appellate Court has jurisdiction to reverse or

affirm the findings of the trial court. First appeal is a

valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by

law. the whole case is therein open for rehearing both

on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the

Appellate Court must, therefore, reflect its conscious

application of mind, and record findings supported by

reasons, on all the issues arising along with the

contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for

decision of the Appellate Court.

While reversing a finding of fact the Appellate Court

must come into close quarters with the reasoning

1

(2001) 2 SC 407

8

assigned by the trial court and then assign its own

reasons for arriving at a different finding. This would

satisfy the Court hearing a further appeal that the First

Appellate Court had discharged the duty expected of it."

20.In the case of Madhukar and Ors. Vs. Sangram and Ors.

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, this

Court, while reiterating the principles laid down in the Santosh Hazari

Judgment (Supra), observed that the court of first appeal has a duty to

record its findings qua all the issues raised before it, and in cases where the

High Court fails to do the same, the matter must be remanded to the same

court again for fresh adjudication.

21.Further, in the case of Jitendra Prasad Nayak Vs. Anant kumar

Sah and Anr.

3

, this Court, in an identical circumstance wherein the cross

objections filed by the appellant therein was not considered by the court of

first appeal, held that remanded the case back to the High Court and

observed as under:

"....Admittedly, a cross-objection was filed by the

appellant-landlord against the rejection by the first

appellate court of the existence of one of the two

grounds of eviction. However, while deciding the appeal

of the respondent-tenant in his favour against the

decision of the first appellate court on the other ground,

the existance of the cross objection appears to have been

missed by the High Court with the result that there is no

decision given on the cross objection. The impugned

2

(2001) 4 SCC 756

3

(1998) 9 SCC 383

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judgment cannot, therefore, be sustained inter alia for

this reason. We are also of the opinion that the question

relating to existence of the ground of bona fide need

which has been decided in favour of the tenant requires

a fresh determination by the High Court along with the

other point relating to default in payment of rent which

was the subject mater of cross-objection......."

22.The abovementioned discussions and judgments, when

contextualized to the present case, would show that the High Court was

under an obligation to consider the cross objections filed by the Appellants

herein. Since such an obligation was not discharged while passing the

judgment in appeal, we are of the considered opinion that the matter is fit

for remand to the High Court for fresh adjudication on the grounds raised

in the cross objections during appeal by the appellants herein. Accordingly,

the present appeals are therefore allowed to such an extent.

……...…....………………,J

(KRISHNA MURARI)

……...…....………………,J

(BELA M. TRIVEDI)

NEW DELHI;

04

th

JULY, 2023

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