2026 INSC 126 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 2129-2130 OF 2012

DORAIRAJ …APPELLANT

VERSUS

DORAISAMY (DEAD)

THROUGH LRs & ORS.

…RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA, J.

FACTUAL MATRIX

1.The present Civil Appeals arise out of a long-drawn

family dispute concerning partition, and alienation of

agricultural properties situated primarily in and around

Perambalur Taluk, Tiruchirappalli District. The dispute pertain

to 79 items of immovable properties, all of which are set out

with survey numbers, extents, and boundaries in the plaint

schedule consisting mainly of agricultural lands. At each stage

of adjudication, the concerns have primarily pertained to the

nature and character of the suit properties; the extent to which

certain alienations are binding on the coparcenary; and the legal

C.A. Nos. 2129-30 of 2012 Page 1 of 18

effect of an alleged testamentary disposition purported to have

been executed shortly before the demise of the family patriarch.

The litigation has resulted in concurrent findings of fact, subject

to limited and item-specific modifications at the appellate

stages.

2.The genealogy of the parties is admitted and forms the

foundational backdrop of the lis. One Pallikoodathan was the

common ancestor. He had three sons, namely Chidambaram,

Sengan, and Natesan.

Chidambaram predeceased the institution of the suit.

Upon his death, his minor children pursuant to the orders

passed by the competent court were represented through

their natural guardian, Sengan, and subsequently through

other legal representatives as brought on record.

Natesan’s branch is represented through his legal heirs.

Sengan, the central figure in the dispute, was the father of

the Plaintiff Duraisamy and the second Defendant

Dorairaj.

During his lifetime, Sengan resided with his sons and managed

the agricultural affairs of the family. Several suit properties

stood in his name, while others were acquired in the names of

his sons or through transactions involving the heirs of his

C.A. Nos. 2129-30 of 2012 Page 2 of 18

deceased brother Chidambaram. Sengan died during the

pendency of the suit on 27.11.1989.

3.The suit for partition being O.S. No. 99 of 1987 was

instituted by Duraisamy, seeking partition and possession of his

one-fourth share in the suit schedule properties. The case was

founded on the premise that the suit properties constituted joint

Hindu family properties, either by reason of being ancestral in

origin or by reason of having been acquired from the income

derived from ancestral properties during the subsistence of the

joint family. It was pleaded that the family remained joint in

residence, cultivation, enjoyment, and management, and that

there had never been any partition, either oral or written. As per

the plaint, Sengan, being the senior-most male member, acted as

the Karta of the Hindu joint family, and properties purchased in

his name or in the names of other family members were, in

substance, acquisitions made for and on behalf of the family.

4.Primary contention was that the said acquisitions were

made at a time when the family lived and functioned jointly,

pooling its resources, and that Appellant (D2) herein did not

possess independent income at the relevant point of time,

particularly during the late 1960s and early 1970s to justify

exclusive ownership of the properties standing in his name.

However, the Appellant (D2) provided that substantial number

C.A. Nos. 2129-30 of 2012 Page 3 of 18

of suit items were the self-acquisitions of Sengan, purchased

from his own income generated through diverse sources

including agricultural affairs, money-lending, panchayat-related

works, and other sources. Further, it was pleaded that several

properties were purchased by Dorairaj himself from his

independent income earned as a contractor and businessman,

particularly after the mid-1960s.

5.A central factual assertion in the plaint related to Item

No(s). 14 and 15 of the suit schedule properties, described as

ancestral agricultural lands situated in Thoramangalam Village.

These lands were stated to have devolved from Pallikoodathan

and were pleaded to constitute the principal source of income

for the family. Reliance was placed upon revenue records,

including Adangal extracts for Fasli years 1390 to 1395 (1980-

1985), to demonstrate continuous cultivation. It was specifically

pleaded that these lands were supported by wells and oil motor

pumps, and that agricultural operations over several years

yielded income sufficient to sustain the family and facilitate

acquisition of other properties.

6.A substantial portion of the factual controversy also

relates to a series of registered sale deeds executed by Sengan

in favour of Dorairaj, covering multiple suit items. These

alienations were effected under various sale deeds dated

C.A. Nos. 2129-30 of 2012 Page 4 of 18

16.12.1968, 05.07.1985, 01.08.1986, and 08.05.1987 pertaining

to suit items including Item No(s). 1 to 7, 9, 10, 13, 16, 18, 19,

20 to 25, 31, 33 to 41, 52, 54 to 60, and 63. These documents

referred to discharge of debts, medical expenses, and other

family needs. Dorairaj claimed that these alienations were valid

and binding, having been effected for lawful necessity, and

asserted that possession and revenue entries stood mutated in

his favour pursuant thereto. Plaintiff, however, disputed the

necessity and binding nature of these transactions, contending

that the consideration was either illusory or sourced from joint

family funds, and that alienations in favour of one coparcener

could not bind the others in absence of genuine necessity.

7.Another set of transactions involved alienations made by

Sengan in his capacity as guardian of the minor children of his

deceased brother Chidambaram, pursuant to permissions

obtained in guardianship proceedings. Certain suit items,

including Item No(s). 15, 27 to 30, 32, 44, 67, and 69, were

sold in this manner. While Dorairaj/Appellant herein contended

that these alienations were valid and binding, having been

effected in accordance with court orders, the Plaintiff pleaded

that such transactions did not divest the properties of their joint

family character and could not result in exclusive ownership in

favour of the Appellant herein.

C.A. Nos. 2129-30 of 2012 Page 5 of 18

8.During the pendency of the suit, Sengan died on

27.11.1989. Shortly thereafter, reliance was placed by certain

defendants on an unregistered Will dated 24.11.1989, said to

have been executed three days prior to his death, purporting to

bequeath the entirety of his properties in favour of certain

grandchildren. Plaintiff disputed the genuineness and validity of

the Will, alleging suspicious circumstances relating to the age

and health of the testator, the manner of execution, the use of

thumb impression, and the exclusion of natural heirs.

9.The Trial Court framed issues relating to the nature and

character of the suit properties; the existence of joint family

properties; the validity of the alienations; the effect of the

alleged Will; and the entitlement of the parties to partition and

consequential reliefs. Vide, judgement dated 22.04.1992 in O.S.

No. 99 of 1987, the Trial Court declared that the Plaintiff was

entitled to 1/4

th

share in the suit properties excluding Item

No(s). 15, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 44, 67, 69, 26, 31, 1 to 7, 9 to 13,

18, 19, 20, 21 to 25, 33, 36, 39, 40, 41, 52, 55, 57, 60, and 63;

and certain other properties sold under documents not forming

part of the plaint schedule. The suit was decreed accordingly,

without costs.

10.Aggrieved, by the judgement of the Trial Court, the

Plaintiff preferred A.S. No. 160 of 1994, while Defendant(s) 3

C.A. Nos. 2129-30 of 2012 Page 6 of 18

to 7 preferred A.S. No. 161 of 1994, before the 1

st

Additional

District Judge, Tiruchirappalli. Vide judgement dated

26.09.1995, the First Appellate Court modified the preliminary

decree and declared the Plaintiff entitled to a 5/16

th

share in the

suit schedule properties.

11.Second Appeals bearing S.A. No(s). 1561 and 1562 of

1995 were thereafter preferred before the High Court of

Judicature at Madras. Vide judgment dated 12.08.2009, the

High Court partly allowed the appeals and held that the Plaintiff

was entitled to 5/16

th

share, excluding:

Item No. 74, which had been purchased by Dorairaj from

Mookayee, who was not a coparcener;

Item No. 66 and 4 cents out of 12 cents in Item No. 36,

covered by Exhibit B75, as these did not form part of the

coparcenary.

It is against this backdrop of concurrent and modified findings

that the present Civil Appeals have been filed.

SUBMISSIONS BY THE PARTIES

12.Ld. Senior Counsel for the Appellant (D2) at the outset

submits that the Courts below have erred in holding that the suit

properties constitute joint Hindu family properties in entirety. It

C.A. Nos. 2129-30 of 2012 Page 7 of 18

is contended that the Plaintiff failed to provide facts necessary

to establish the existence of any income-yielding joint family

property capable of supporting subsequent acquisitions. As per

the Appellant, the plaint was conspicuously silent on the

manner in which the suit properties are alleged to have been

acquired from any common family source.

13.It is contended that mere proof of ancestral origin of Item

No(s). 14 and 15 does not, by itself, justify the inference that all

subsequent acquisitions are presumed to bear the character of

joint family property. The Appellant maintains that the Plaintiff

failed to demonstrate a clear nexus between the ancestral

properties and the acquisitions standing in the name of

individual family members.

14.It is submitted that the first Defendant, Sengan, had

substantial and continuous independent sources of income over

several decades. Reliance was placed on documentary and oral

evidence to show that Sengan was engaged in government

service, panchayat administration, money-lending, temple

trusteeship, and later as a Sub-Jail contractor.

15.It is contended that the said independent earnings fully

explain the acquisitions made in his name and negate the

presumption that such properties were purchased from any

common family fund. The Appellant submits that the courts

C.A. Nos. 2129-30 of 2012 Page 8 of 18

below failed to properly appreciate this evidence while

mechanically invoking presumptions relating to joint family

property.

16.It is further submitted that appellant himself had

independent sources of income and financial capacity to acquire

properties in his own name from as early as 1963 and

continuously thereafter till 19.04.1991. It is contended that

there was no justification for the courts below to discard or

disbelieve the purchases made by the Appellant during this

period.

17.Learned counsel emphasises that a series of registered

covenants evidencing purchases and subsequent transactions

effected, including Ex(s). B-2, B-10, B-13 to B-19, B-67, B-73,

B-75, B-76 and B-104 are to be considered. These documents,

as per the Appellant, clearly demonstrate a consistent pattern of

independent acquisition, enjoyment, and in certain cases

alienation, wholly inconsistent with the understanding of joint

family ownership.

18.Reliance is placed on Ex(s). B-121 to B-141,

including Ex(s). B-125, B-126, B-127, B-128, B-129, B-131, B-

132, B-133, B-134, B-135, B-137 and B-142, which consist of

contract orders, completion certificates, income records, and

allied documents to establish the income out of which such

C.A. Nos. 2129-30 of 2012 Page 9 of 18

purchases are made. These, establish beyond doubt that the

Appellant was engaged in gainful commercial and contractual

activities and had sufficient independent income to fund the

acquisitions.

19.Primary concern of the Appellant is that the courts below

failed to undertake an objective evaluation of the aforesaid

documents and unjustly discarded the same without assigning

legally sustainable reasons. It is submitted that such an

approach has resulted in serious prejudice to the Appellant.

20.It is further submitted that even assuming the existence of

a joint family, the alienations effected by the first Defendant in

his favour were legally valid and binding. It is contended that

the first Defendant, being the admitted head of the family, was

indebted and medically indisposed and that the sales effected

under including Ex(s). B-17, B-18 and B-19 were necessitated

by compelling circumstances, including medical expenses and

discharge of certain debts. Reliance is placed on promissory

notes, hospital records, and other contemporaneous documents

to substantiate the plea of necessity. It is argued that alienations

effected for lawful necessity cannot be questioned by other

coparceners.

21.With regard to properties originally belonging to

Chidambaram, it is submitted that the first Defendant was

C.A. Nos. 2129-30 of 2012 Page 10 of 18

appointed guardian of Chidambaram’s minor children by order

of the District Court, Tiruchirappalli. Pursuant to the permission

obtained, sale deeds including dated 16.12.1968 (Ex. B-2) was

executed in favour of the Appellant. It is contended that the sale

proceeds were utilised to discharge Chidambaram’s debts and

that the transactions were lawful, binding, and immune from

challenge.

22.The Appellant also assails the rejection of the Will dated

24.11.1989 (Ex. B-200), contending that it was duly executed

and proved through the scribe and attesting witnesses. It is

largely submitted that the courts below erred in treating the Will

as suspicious and in failing to appreciate the evidence in its

proper perspective.

23.Reliance is placed on admissions made by the Plaintiff

during cross-examination, including admissions relating to

independent transactions, payment of consideration under sale

deeds and existence of debts explaining the joint family

character of the suit properties. It is contended that these

admissions disentitle the Plaintiff from asserting joint family

ownership and operate as estoppel against him.

24.On the contrary, Respondent(s) submit that the existence

of a joint Hindu family and the ancestral origin of Item No(s).

14 and 15 are admitted. It is contended that once ancestral

C.A. Nos. 2129-30 of 2012 Page 11 of 18

properties yielding income were shown to exist and acquisitions

were made during the subsistence of the joint family, the burden

shifted to the Appellant to establish self-acquisition, which he

failed to do.

25.It is further submitted that the Trial Court undertook a

meticulous item-wise scrutiny of alienations, upheld those

supported by necessity, and excluded others. The High Court,

far from acting unfairly, granted relief to the Appellant by

excluding Item No. 74, Item No. 66, and part of Item No. 36

from partition.

26.The Respondent(s) also submit that the rejection of the

Will attained finality, having not been challenged at the

appropriate stage. The Appellant cannot now seek to resurrect

the issue in second appeal.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

27.Having given anxious consideration to the record and

contentions made by the parties; impugned judgment of the

High Court reflects a correct appreciation of the pleadings,

exhaustive analysis of the record and settled principles

governing partition of joint Hindu family properties.

28.At the outset, it must be emphasized that the High Court

correctly identified that the relationship between the principal

C.A. Nos. 2129-30 of 2012 Page 12 of 18

parties was admitted, and that the suit was instituted by one

coparcener against the others during the subsistence of the joint

family. The genealogy traced to Pallikoodathan and his three

sons was not in dispute, nor was the fact that Sengan (D1) and

his three sons namely, Duraisamy (Plaintiff), Durairaj (D2), and

the deceased Rajakannu, constituted a coparcenary at the

relevant time. The High Court therefore approached the

controversy on a settled factual foundation, without allowing

any other dispute to cloud the core issues.

29.The principal contention by the Appellant before the

High Court, and reiterated before us, is that the First Appellate

Court erred in holding that the suit properties were joint family

properties, particularly in the absence of what was described as

an “income-bearing joint family nucleus”. The High Court

primarily placing its reliance on MLJ (II) 1976 225 (Pattusami

Padayachi v. Mullaiammal and others); 1954 1 SCC 544

Shrinivas Krishnarao Kango v. Narayan Devji Kango and Ors.

noted that proof of the mere existence of a joint family does not

by itself render all properties as joint family properties, but

equally, once it is established that ancestral properties yielding

income existed and acquisitions were made during the

continuance of the joint family, the burden shifts to the person

asserting self-acquisition.

C.A. Nos. 2129-30 of 2012 Page 13 of 18

30.In this context, the High Court undertook a detailed

examination of Item No(s). 14 and 15, which were admittedly

ancestral properties. The plea of the Appellant that these lands

were perpetually water-logged, and incapable of yielding

income was carefully examined. On the contrary, reliance was

placed on revenue records (Ex(s). B-201 to B-206), which

categorically evidenced cultivation over several fasli years and

disclosed the existence of wells and oil-engine pump sets. The

High Court further examined the Appellant’s reliance on the

alleged independent income of Sengan (D1). It accepted that

Sengan had engaged in various jobs over his lifetime, including

service and contractual work. However, it correctly rejected the

simplistic assumption that the mere existence of some

independent earnings would automatically negate the

contribution of joint family income. The High Court observed

that Hindu law does not require other coparceners to establish

with precision the exact source of funds for each acquisition

made by the Karta. Where acquisitions are made during the

subsistence of the joint family, and where ancestral properties

yielding income are shown to exist, properties acquired in the

name of the Karta are ordinarily regarded as joint family

properties unless the contrary is proved.

31.Significantly, the High Court also examined the factual

position of the Appellant (D2) during the relevant period. On

C.A. Nos. 2129-30 of 2012 Page 14 of 18

the basis of material on record, it noted that he was pursuing his

studies till about 1966 and that his claim of having amassed

substantial savings sufficient to purchase properties while still a

student was subjected to careful scrutiny. The High Court’s

reasoning on this aspect is neither conjectural nor speculative; it

is rooted in a realistic appraisal of the evidence and the

surrounding circumstances.

32.On the plea of prior partition or division in status, the

High Court recognised that separate enjoyment of portions,

installation of irrigation facilities, or even obtaining borrowings

individually, do not by themselves establish partition in law.

What is required is a clear and unequivocal intention to sever

the joint status. The High Court correctly emphasized that all

relevant conveyances described the interests conveyed as

undivided shares, that there was no mutation evidencing

division, and that there was no separate payment towards

borrowings. In the absence of any declaration or conduct

evidencing an intention to divide, the inference of continued

joint family status was inevitable.

33.The High Court then addressed with notable clarity; the

validity of alienations effected by Sengan (D1) in favour of the

Appellant (D2) as per various sale deeds Ex(s). B-17 to B-19. It

correctly distinguished between alienations for proved legal

C.A. Nos. 2129-30 of 2012 Page 15 of 18

necessity and those which were legally impermissible. The

Courts below undertook an item-wise scrutiny of each

transaction and upheld those alienations where legal necessity

was established, while excluding others where such necessity

was not proved. The High Court affirmed this calibrated

approach, reiterating that alienations by a Karta in favour of one

coparcener must be proved to be for legal necessity and that

vague or general recitals are insufficient to bind the interests of

other coparceners. However, it protected D2’s right to establish

actual medical expenses during final decree proceedings.

34.Of particular significance is the High Court’s approach to

Ex. B-2, qua properties sold by Sengan as guardian of the minor

sons of Chidambaram. The High Court in paragraph 82 to 89

meticulously analysed the surrounding circumstances, the court

permission obtained, the recitals in the sale deed, and the

endorsements on the promissory note. It found glaring

inconsistencies and rightly concluded that the Trial Court had

upheld Ex. B-2 without adequate reasoning. The First Appellate

Court’s correction of this error was therefore fully justified.

35.Likewise, on the issue of the Will dated 24.11.1989 (Ex.

B-200), the High Court’s reasoning is both legally and factually

compelling. It noted that the testator was habitually signing

documents but affixed only a thumb impression as far as this

C.A. Nos. 2129-30 of 2012 Page 16 of 18

document is concerned; that the Will was allegedly executed

barely 72 hours prior to death; that it was scribed by a close

relative instead of a professional scribe; and that the scribe’s

presence itself was doubtful due to election duty. These

circumstances clearly warranted a finding of suspicion.

Importantly, the High Court also noted that the rejection of the

Will by the Trial Court had not been challenged by D2 at the

appropriate stage and had therefore attained finality. The

Appellant cannot be permitted to approbate and reprobate at

different stages of litigation.

36.The High Court further dealt with the impleadment

applications filed by alleged heirs of Rajakannu. It correctly

held that there was no evidence of collusion in the suit, that the

share of Rajakannu was already represented, and that permitting

impleadment at such a belated stage would unsettle proceedings

that had otherwise attained finality. This approach reflects a

proper balance between substantive justice and procedural

discipline.

37.Finally, the High Court exercised its powers with

restraint and precision by granting limited relief to the

Appellant. Item No(s). 66 and 74, as well as a portion of Item

No. 36 were clearly shown to have been purchased from third

parties, accordingly, were excluded from partition as they were

C.A. Nos. 2129-30 of 2012 Page 17 of 18

the exclusive properties of D2. Save and except these limited

modifications, the High Court affirmed the judgment and

decree of the First Appellate Court.

CONCLUSION

38.For the reasons recorded hereinabove, we are of the

considered view that the impugned judgement is reasoned and

borne out from the material on record. Except to the limited

extent expressly modified therein, this Court finds no ground to

take a view different from that taken by the High Court.

39.Accordingly, the Civil Appeals are dismissed. No order

as to cost.

……………………………………J.

[SANJAY KAROL]

……………………………………J.

[SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA]

NEW DELHI

February 05, 2026.

C.A. Nos. 2129-30 of 2012 Page 18 of 18