IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA

CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION

APPELLATE SIDE

Present:

The Hon’ble Justice Rai Chattopadhyay

WPA 31172 of 2017

(CAN 1/2022, CAN 2/2024)

Dr. Anita Nan Banerjee

Vs.

State of West Bengal & Ors.

For the Petitioner : Mr. Krishnendu Paul Chowdhury

: Mr. Anupam Dasadhikari

For the respondent : Mr. Ratul Biswas

: Mr. S. Kanu

: Mr. Durlav De

Reserved on : 13.05.2026

Judgment on : 10.06.2026

Uploaded on : 10.06.2026

Rai Chattopadhyay, J. :-

1. The writ petitioner having been employed as a “Tutor” at the

respondent/West Bengal Council of Rabindra Open Schooling

[herein after referred to as “WBCROS”] and having served there

as claimed, that is, continuously since her appointment in the

year 2005, seeks regularisation of her service with appropriate

benefit to be allowed to her in terms of Memorandum No. 16

F(P1) dated January 2, 2020, by dint of which, she says, that

recommendations of the 6

th

Pay Commission has been

implemented for the employees of WBCROS.

2. She is also aggrieved with the alleged decision and action of

the respondent authority extending her service for every six

months with intermittent break for one day. She has claimed

that such decision is arbitrary and her pay for the said

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intermittent one day of break of service, cannot be lawfully

withheld by the authority, particularly when she has attended

duty on each day, which are considered as the days of break in

her service.

3. Further the writ petitioner is aggrieved in particular with the

order dated May 29, 2017, which has been issued with

reference to the notification dated January 1, 1999 and she

challenges the same and seeks setting aside of the same. The

impugned order shall be discussed at an appropriate place in

this judgment.

4. Also, the petitioner has claimed further an amount of gratuity

after attaining age of superannuation and retiring from the

service, as per her last drawn salary, with the statutory

interest and also the differential amount of gratuity after

calculation of her pay at the revised rate as claimed.

5. With these grievances and commensurate prayers for redress,

the instant writ petition has been filed along with an

application therewith, being CAN 1 of 2022 and CAN 2 of

2024.

6. Before proceeding further, the factual background of the case

may be narrated in a nut shell as follows.

7. The instant writ petition originates from a notification issued

by the School Education Department of the Government of

West Bengal No. 3-SE (Apptt.) dated January 1, 1999. The

same is for creation of posts with matching pay scales for the

State Open Schools. It is important to note the relevant terms

as mentioned therein.

“The appointment of the marginally noted posts will be

either on deputation or on contract basis. In case of

contract, which will be initially for a period of two years

and will be extended thereafter by one year at a time,

there will not be any restriction on upper age and retired

persons with physical and mental alertness will also be

engaged”.

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8. By dint of the said notification dated January 1, 1999, several

posts have been created including that of “Tutors” [one each

for Science, Humanities, Language and Vocational Studies]. As

per the terms of notification, the contractual appointees

should have been appointed initially for two years, their

contractual service being extendable for one year at a time,

after the initial two years‟ time period was over.

9. Under the said notification the petitioner‟s appointment was

made vide the appointment letter dated March 29, 2005. The

appointment preceded with an interview in which the

petitioner had performed successfully. The appointment letter

was like this:

“Sub: Engagement in the post of Tutor.

He/she is engaged as a tutor of Rabindra Mukta

Vidyalaya on purely temporary and contractual basis for

one year with effect from the date of his/her joining the

post on a contractual pay of Rs.8000/- per month plus DA,

HRA, MA as may be admissible. He/she is requested to

join his/her duties immediately on receipt of the letter.

The engagement shall not entail any claim to being

absorbed on permanent basis”.

10. By accepting the terms of appointment as envisaged in the

appointment letter as quoted above, the writ petitioner had

joined in duties. Later on her tenure of employment has been

extended from time to time, like vide (i) office order dated

March 29, 2006 [date of effect of extension March 31, 2006],

(ii) Memorandum dated March 30, 2007 [date of effect of

extension from March 30, 2007 to June 29, 2007], (iii)

Memorandum dated June 28, 2007 [extension granted for the

period from June 30, 2007 to March 30, 2008], (iv)

Memorandum dated March 31, 2008 [period of extension from

March 31, 2008 to March 30, 2009], (v) Memorandum dated

March 17, 2009 [period of extension from March 31, 2009 to

March 30, 2010], (vi) Memorandum dated April 1, 2010 [period

of extension from March 31, 2010 to March 30, 2011].

11. It is pertinent to note that time and again while extending

period of engagement of the writ petitioner, the respondent has

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not followed the terms of notification dated January 1, 1999 in

strict sense and extension has been provided sometimes for a

period of 3 months, on another occasion for 9 months and on

other occasions for one year period. However, in between the

respondent has never treated any day as break in service of

the writ petitioner.

12. In the meantime the petitioner has stated to have joined and

completed her PHD degree from Netaji Subhash Open

University, with due permission of the President, WBCROS,

her date of registration in PHD being October 22, 2008.

13. Be that as it may, the next relevant incident appears to be

issuance of the letter dated April 10, 2013, by the President,

WBCROS. The same was pursuant to a decision in a meeting

for extension of service of the staff including those of

WBCROS. The same has provided that:

“The incumbents whose extension stands due will be

extended normally for six months with a break of one day”.

14. On such terms, which appear to be not commensurate with

the terms of notification dated January 1, 1999, under which

the writ petitioner has been appointed, her engagement with

the respondent authority was extended from April 1, 2013 to

September 30, 2013. The condition for break of one day in

between the periods of extension of service has been

introduced vide the said letter dated April 10, 2013.

15. The writ petitioner has further alleged that she has received

less salary for the month of March 2013. That she has never

been informed about any reason therefor. Also that for the

month of April 2014 she has received consolidated pay instead

as per the scale divided into Basic, Dearness Allowance and

other allowances. The petitioner‟s representations in protest of

deduction of salary and reimbursement of the portion of salary

deducted have remained unattended by the respondent

authority.

16. On January 28, 2015, the President WBCROS has issued an

office order directing inter alia that from January 15, salary

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shall be deducted on quarterly basis of those employees who

have remained absent in excess of 24 days of leave in a year,

starting from January 2014 to December 2014. The petitioner

has stated that in spite of her not enjoying any extra leave, her

salary for the month of August 2016 has been reduced only to

Rs.16,336/-, without showing any reason therefor.

17. The impugned order dated May 29, 2017, has provided inter

alia that mode of functioning of the respondent authority has

changed with time, the study centres under the Council having

been converted with through computerisation in the process of

imparting teaching and office works. That, this has led some

posts as abandoned and excess which are not desirable any

more to continue with. The posts of “Tutor” were decided to be

non-functioning and declared abandoned as „excess‟ posts.

18. Thus, suitability and requirement of the post of “Tutor” has

been proposed to be discarded, desolated and forsaken, by the

respondent authority, by dint of the said impugned order

dated May 29, 2017.

19. The respondent also accepted the fact that several incumbents

including the writ petitioner have been engaged with the same

purely temporarily and on contractual basis, their services

being extendable from time to time. That, this situation

continued until 2017. A notification of the School Education

Department, Government of West Bengal has been referred to

dated September 18, 2017, which stipulated no further

retention of such temporary and contractua l posts beyond

September 2017. Therefore, according to the respondent, there

has not been sanction any further to any temporary and

contractual posts created as per previous notification dated

January 1, 1999, beyond September 2017.

20. However, so far as the writ petitioner is concerned, she has

been continued to be engaged and also assigned with various

other administrative and allied matters from time to time. Her

engagement has been extended till September 30, 2021, vide

the letter dated March 31, 2021 [at page.80 of CAN 1 of 2022]

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and ultimately she was superannuated from service with effect

from October 31, 2023.

21. In these circumstances the petitioner has stated that the

benefit of pay revision as per recommendation of the 6

th

Pay

Commission, as has been extended to the employees of

WBCROS pursuant to the Memorandum dated January 2,

2020, should be extended to her too, keeping parity with the

other employees of the same. She has further stated that

sudden implementation of the break in service for one day

before further extension thereof, is illegal and arbitrary and so

is deduction of her salary for the days treated as break in

service. Therefore, she seeks appropriate remedy for her

grievances as above, in this writ petition.

22. Another application has been filed by the writ petitioner being

CAN 2 of 2024, praying for the relief that an amount of

Rs.3,63,945/- be directed to be released immediately in her

favour by the respondent authority on account of gratuity

along with the admissible interest of 10%, for the period from

October 31, 2023, that is the date of her superannuation from

the service, till the date of payment [letter of the respondent

dated October 30, 2023, declaring end of her service period on

October 31, 2023 after attaining the age of superannuation,

has been referred to in this regard]. She has further sought for

direction upon the respondent authority for calculation of

gratuity as per the higher pay scale and disbursement of the

differential amount. The petitioner sa ys that she has

completed 18 years and 7 months of continuous service with

the respondent authority, which entitles her for gratuity after

superannuation, as per provisions of the Payment of Gratuity

Act 1972. That, therefore the amount of Rs.3,63,945/- with

the statutory interest, stands due as gratuity as per her last

drawn salary at the rate of Rs.33,202/-.

23. A report of the respondent No.3/President WBCROS affirmed

on affidavit dated May 2, 2018, is available on record. In the

same the said respondent has not denied appointment of the

petitioner as per provisions of notification dated January 1,

1999, at “Rabindra Mukta Vidyalaya”. The said respondent

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has stated in the report that in 2006, a body corporate namely

WBCROS came into place in place of “Rabindra Mukta

Vidyalaya”, in exercise of the provisions of the West Bengal

Council of Rabindra Open Schooling Act, XIII of 2006. That the

Appointment Sub-committee of the Council held in meeting

dated April 10, 2013, that term of engagement of the petitioner

including the other employees would be extended normally for

6 months with break of one day. According to the said

respondent the petitioner has accepted the said order without

any protest and abided by the same.

24. That, as growing trend of unauthorised abs enteeism was

noticed, the Council in its meeting dated January 20, 2015,

decided to deduct salary on quarterly basis of those employees

who remained absent from the office in the year 2014, in

excess of total 24 days of approved leave including casual and

medical leaves. According to the said respondent, the

petitioner absented in duty in 2014 for 50 days, in 2015 for 71

days and for 29 days in 2016. Therefore, according to the said

respondent deduction of salary of the petitioner is in terms of

the office order as well as proper and justified.

25. According to the said respondent, one day service break the

condition stipulated in office order as per decision of the

Council dated November 27, 2017. A mistake in calculation in

this regard has been stated to have resulted into release of

extra pay in favour of the petitioner, which the

respondent/bank was subsequently directed to deduct from

salary of the petitioner. Therefore, according to the said

respondent neither the deduction of pay proportionate to

unauthorised absence of the petitioner nor the decision of

withholding of pay on the day of service break of the petitioner

are illegal or arbitrary as alleged. Instead, the deduction of

copy of the petitioner is based on high-performance report and

the actual day of unauthorised absence of her and withholding

of salary for the day of break in service is as per the decision of

the Council in exercise of its statutory power and capacity.

26. Further it has been reported that the post of “Tutor” has

become non-functional due to thorough computerisation of the

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functioning of the respondent authority and retaining the said

post shall only increase the respondent‟s burden of huge

purposeless and unnecessary expenditure.

27. Mr. Ratul Biswas, learned advocate has submitted for the

respondent/WBCROS that the petitioner reserves no right to

be regularised or absorbed as a permanent employee of the

said respondent. In this regard the appointment letter of the

petitioner has been referred to in which the employer has

incorporated a clause that the petitioner‟s contractual

appointment would not vest her with any right of

regularisation. The petitioner is unconditional acceptance of

the terms of appointment as well as extension of service from

time to time has been referred to fairly in details in support of

the submission that the petitioner has always accepted the

terms of the employer without any dispute or protest and

hence once having accepted, she cannot raise any dispute as

regards the same at this later stage, in this writ petition.

According to the said respondent the petitioner would also not

have any right of regularisation in view of the fact that the

authority in exercise of its discretion has decided to abandon

the post of “Tutors”, that having turned to be non-functional

and not necessary any further. It has been submitted that no

provisions of any statute, rules or regulations of the

respondent authority permit treating a contractual employee

as a permanent employee of the respondent. The post being

abolished, the writ petitioner being a contractual employee

whose service is automatically terminable on expiry of the

period of contract and the writ petitioner not being a computer

known person, would not be further required for any purpose

in the respondent institution and such manpower is required

to be reduced as an effective cost curtailing measure for the

sake of economic health of the institution.

28. So far as the writ petitioner‟s claim for gratuity is concerned,

as per the respondent authority, provisions under the Payment

of Gratuity Act, 1972 is not applicable in case of the said

respondent as it has never exceeded the statutory limit of 10

or more employees, in order to make the said Act applicable for

those employees. That, the respondent Council is not covered

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under the said Act of 1972. It has further been stated that no

gratuity is payable to any temporary and contractual employee

and that the respondent has never paid gratuity to any

employee on attaining age of superannuation.

29. The respondent State though desired to answer the issues

agitated in the writ petition, but could not be represented

excepting on one or two occasions, when the then Learned

Advocate General has represented the State. He has stated

inter alia that the petitioner having admittedly been appointed

temporarily on contractual basis, could not have any right of

regularisation. On the contrary her service should be

considered as terminable after expiry of the contract period,

unless extended. That the petitioner would not have any right

of regularisation, is apparent from the appointment letter of

her. The mode of recruitment has also been challenged for the

reason that no due process was ever followed in the same.

Further that the institution does not need a “Tutor” there any

more due to modernisation and computerisation and that the

said post has been abandoned and forsaken.

30. Mr. Krishnendu Paul Chowdhury, learned advocate has

represented the writ petitioner. At the outset, he has

emphasised that having rendered uninterrupted and

continuous service for approximately eighteen years under the

respondent authority, the petitioner became entitled to

gratuity upon superannuation in terms of the provisions of the

Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. According to the petitioner, the

artificial one day breaks introduced by the respondent

authority cannot defeat the concept of continuous service,

particularly when she allegedly attended duties even on such

intervening days and the engagement in substance continued

uninterruptedly. It is argued further that the respondent

institution performs public functions under the control of the

State and therefore cannot evade its statutory obligations

towards employees by merely describing the engagement as

contractual in nature. That gratuity being a beneficial and

welfare-oriented statutory right, the same ought to receive

liberal interpretation in favour of an employee who served the

institution for nearly two decades. According to the petitioner

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despite the initial contractual nature of appointment, the long

continuance in service, repeated extensions over the years and

entrustment of regular administrative and institutional

responsibilities have rendered it as perennial in nature and the

employer cannot under the law , continue to appoint on

temporary and contractual basis for continuous and perennial

nature of post. It has be contended that the decision to impose

one day service breaks and deduct salary allegedly without

proper justification was arbitrary and intended to deprive the

petitioner of continuity-related benefits. The petitioner also

questions the respondent‟s decision declaring the post of

“Tutor” as non-functional by contending that she continued to

discharge institutional duties till her superannuation and

therefore the work requirement substantially persisted. On

such grounds, the petitioner may seek regularisation and

extension of revised pay benefits and consequential retiral

dues including gratuity.

31. Having heard the learned advocates for the parties and upon

consideration of the materials on record, this Court finds that

the foundational facts relevant for adjudication are

substantially undisputed. It is admitted by the writ petitioner

herself that her engagement was made purely on temporary

and contractual basis under the notification dated January 1,

1999 and the appointment letter dated March 29, 2005. The

appointment letter in unequivocal terms provided that the

engagement was purely temporary and contractual for a

specified tenure and that such engagement “shall not entail

any claim to being absorbed on pe rmanent basis”. The

petitioner accepted such terms without any demur and joined

the service thereunder. Therefore, the relationship between the

parties remained governed by the contractual conditions

accepted by the petitioner herself.

32. It is now a settled principle of service jurisprudence that a

contractual employee, having entered service with open eyes

and upon acceptance of the terms and conditions of

engagement, cannot subsequently turn around and seek

regularisation contrary to the very stipulations governing the

appointment. The doctrine of approbation and reprobation

squarely applies in the present case. A person who consciously

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accepts the benefits flowing from a contractual arrangement is

estopped from challenging the binding terms thereof after

having enjoyed the engagement for years together. The

petitioner having accepted the condition disentitling her from

claiming permanency or absorption, cannot now seek to

rewrite the contract through invocation of writ jurisdiction.

33. The law is equally well settled that regularisation is not a mode

of recruitment. The writ petitioner has been appointed in a

sanctioned post of temporary and contractual nature. In

absence of any statutory rules conferring such right or any

sanctioned permanent post available for absorption, no writ

can ordinarily be issued directing regularisation of service of a

contractual employee. The petitioner has failed to demonstrate

existence of any statutory provision, rule or regulation under

the respondent Council entitling a contractual “Tutor” to

automatic absorption or regularisation upon continuation of

service for certain years. Mere continuation for long duration,

by itself, does not create a vested right in favour of the

employee, particularly where the continuation itself is subject

to periodical extensions granted at the discretion of the

employer authority.

34. In the instant case, the petitioner‟s engagement stood extended

from time to time entirely at the discretion of the respondent

authority. Such extensions cannot be construed to have

transformed the nature of the appointment from contractual to

permanent. On the contrary, each extension reaffirmed the

temporary and contractual character of the engagement. Even

after the decision dated May 29, 2017 declaring the post of

“Tutor” to be non -functional and excess owing to

computerisation and change in administrative structure, the

respondent authority still permitted the petitioner to continue

till attainment of the age of superannuation in October 2023.

Therefore, rather than demonstrating arbitrariness, the

conduct of the respondent authority reflects fairness and

accommodation extended in favour of the petitioner.

35. This Court further finds substance in the contention of the

respondent that the post of “Tutor” no longer remained

perennial or functionally necessary. The materials on record

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demonstrate that the respondent institution underwent

structural and technological transformat ion through

computerisation and digitisation of its educational and office

functioning. Consequently, the post in question lost its

functional utility and was declared non-functional and excess.

It is also admitted from the records that the petitioner herself

had been assigned miscellaneous administrative and allied

works instead of duties strictly relatable to the original post of

“Tutor”. Such circumstance itself demonstrates that the

original nature of work attached to the post had substantially

ceased to exist.

36. It is further well settled that temporary or contractual posts,

particularly those created for specific exigencies and not

forming part of a permanent or perennial cadre structure, do

not confer any indefeasible right of regularisation upon the

incumbents holding the same. Where the very nature of the

post is transitory, contingent upon administrative requirement

and liable to be discontinued upon change of policy or

functional restructuring, continuance of service for a

considerable period cannot convert such post into a

permanent one by implication. In the present case, the post of

“Tutor” itself has admittedly been found by the respondent

authority to have lost its functional necessity owing to

computerisation and modernisation of the institution al

framework and has been declared excess and non -functional.

A writ Court cannot direct regularisation against a post which

itself has ceased to remain perennial in nature or

administratively necessary. Any such direction would amount

to compelling the employer to perpetuate a post which the

competent authority has legitimately decided to abandon in

administrative interest, which is impermissible in law.

37. The question whether a particular post should continue, be

abolished or be treated as excess, squarely falls within the

domain of administrative and policy decision of the employer.

Unless the same is shown to be actuated by mala fide,

manifest arbitrariness or violation of statutory provisions, the

Constitutional Courts exercising power of judicial review ought

not interfere with such administrative determination. Courts

do not sit in appeal over policy decisions relating to manpower

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requirement, financial restructuring or institutional

reorganisation. In the present case, no mala fide, arbitrariness

or perversity could be demonstrated by the petitioner in the

decision of the respondent authority treating the post as non-

functional and unnecessary.

38. So far as the issue relating to one day break in service is

concerned, this Court finds that the same originated from the

decision of the competent authority taken in the meeting dated

April 10, 2013. The petitioner admittedly accepted the

subsequent extensions incorporating such condition and

continued in service thereunder without immediate challenge.

The said decision appears to have been adopted uniformly for

contractual employees whose extensions were due. Such

administrative arrangement, in absence of demonstrable mala

fide or hostile discrimination, cannot be interfered with lightly,

in exercise of writ jurisdiction. Judicial review is concerned

with the decision making process and not with the merits of

every administrative choice. No material has been produced

before this Court to establish that the impugned decision was

actuated by bad faith, colourable exercise of power or patent

unreasonableness.

39. Equally, the deduction of salary for the periods exceeding

approved leave cannot be said to be arbitrary. The respondent

authority has specifically disclosed that the deductions were

made pursuant to the office order dated January 28, 2015 and

on the basis of attendance registers, absence statements and

service records reflecting unauthorised absence beyond the

permissible leave period. The petitioner has not been able to

dislodge the correctness of such records by any cogent

material. No procedural infirmity or violation of principles of

natural justice causing prejudice to the petitioner could be

established in the process adopted by the respondent

authority. In service matters relating to attendance and salary

disbursement, the employer authority is entitled to rely upon

official attendance records maintained in regular course of

business, unless proven otherwise.

40. This Court also finds that the challenge to deduction of salary

for the one day service break cannot succeed independently

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once the underlying administrative decision regarding periodic

contractual extension with one day break is itself found not to

be arbitrary or illegal. Salary being payable for the tenure of

actual contractual engagement, withholding of remuneration

for the day treated as break in service cannot be said to be

wholly without jurisdiction.

41. The petitioner‟s claim for gratuity also does not merit

acceptance by the writ Court in the facts of the present case.

The respondent authority has specifically contended that the

establishment is not covered under the provisions of the

Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, as the statutory threshold

requirement regarding number of employees is not fulfilled. It

has further been stated that gratuity has never been made

applicable to temporary and contractual employees under the

respondent Council. The petitioner has failed to place

sufficient materials to conclusively establish applicability of

the provisions of the said Act to the respondent establishment.

In absence of proof regarding statutory applicability, no

mandamus can be issued directing payment of gratuity.

42. So far as the petitioner‟s claim relating to gratuity is

concerned, although this Court does not find sufficient

materials on record to issue any positive direction in exercise

of writ jurisdiction, it is observed that if the petitioner is

otherwise so advised and chooses to lodge an appropriate

claim before the competent statutory authority under the

provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, the same

shall be at liberty to be considered and decided by such

authority independently in accordance with law and on its own

merits, without being influenced by any observation made in

the present judgment touching the factual entitlement of the

petitioner to gratuity. All questions regarding applicability of

the statute, maintainability of the claim and entitlement of the

petitioner are left open to be decided by the competent

authority in accordance with law.

43. Apart from the above, the petitioner has also approached this

Court seeking substantially equitable relief after having

accepted the contractual arrangement and continued

thereunder for nearly the entirety of her service career without

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substantive challenge to the foundational conditions of

engagement. A writ court exercising equitable jurisdiction

under Article 226 of the Constitution is not expected to grant

relief in derogation of admitted contractual terms or contrary

to settled principles governing public employment. The

petitioner has failed to establish infringement of any

enforceable statutory or constitutional right warranting

interference by this Court.

44. Furthermore, interference with decisions of specialised

educational and administrative authorities concerning staffing

pattern, abolition of posts and institutional restructuring must

remain limited. Unless a palpable illegality, manifest

arbitrariness or procedural impropriety is apparent on the face

of the record, Courts should exercise restraint and defer to the

wisdom of the administrative authority in matters involving

organisational management and financial policy. No such

exceptional circumstance has been demonstrated in the

present case.

45. The aforesaid conclusions also stand fortified by settled

judicial precedents governing temporary a nd contractual

employment. In Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi

(3) at (2006) 4 SCC 1, the Supreme Court authoritatively held

that absorption, regularisation or permanent continuance

cannot ordinarily be directed in respect of temporary,

contractual or casual appointees dehors the regular

recruitment process and in absence of sanctioned permanent

posts. The Court further held that continuation in service for a

long duration does not by itself create any legal right to

regularisation. The ratio laid down therein squarely applies to

the present case where the petitioner was engaged purely on

contractual basis against a temporary post with explicit

stipulation negativing any claim for permanency.

46. In Official Liquidator v. Dayanand at (2008) 10 SCC 1, the

Supreme Court reiterated that courts must exercise restraint

in issuing directions for regularisation of employees appointed

temporarily or contractually and that public employment must

conform to constitutional requirements under Articles 14 and

16. It was further observed that courts cannot create or

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continue posts through judicial orders when the employer

itself has taken a conscious policy decision regarding abolition

or non-requirement of such posts.

47. The limited scope of judicial review in matters inv olving

administrative policy, staffing pattern and abolition of posts

has also been consistently recognised. In State of Punjab v.

Joginder Singh Dhatt at 1993 SCC OnLine SC 1 , the

Supreme Court observed that abolition of posts is a matter of

governmental policy and administrative discretion and courts

ought not interfere unless the decision is shown to be mala

fide or colourable exercise of power.

48. So far as the challenge to administrative deductions from

salary and conditions governing contractual extension are

concerned, the principles governing judicial review laid down

in Tata Cellular v. Union of India at (1994) 6 SCC 651 are

also relevant, namely that the Court does not sit as an

appellate authority over administrative decisions and

interference is warranted only where the decision is arbitrary,

irrational, mala fide or procedurally improper. In the present

case, the respondent authority having acted on the basis of

attendance records, absence statements and uniformly

applicable administrative resolutions, no such perversity or

arbitrariness can be said to have been established.

49. Therefore, considering the totality of the circumstances, this

Court finds no merit in the petitioner‟s claim for regularisation,

challenge to the policy of one day break in service, claim

relating to deduction of salary, prayer for parity of service

benefits with regular employees or the claim for gratuity. The

respondent authority has acted within the framework of the

contractual terms governing the engagement and within the

permissible bounds of administrative discretion.

50. Consequently, the writ petition being No. WPA 31172 of 2017

along with the connected applications being CAN 1 of 2022

and CAN 2 of 2024 stand dismissed. There shall however be no

order as to costs.

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51. Urgent certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be

supplied to the parties upon compliance with all requisite

formalities.

(Rai Chattopadhyay, J.)