As per case facts, the Petitioner applied for a medical fellowship with a two-stage selection process, Stage-II being a 'departmental clinical/practical/lab based assessment' as per the Prospectus. After qualifying Stage-I, ...
W.P.(C) 19812/2025 Page 1 of 31
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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Judgment reserved on:19.02.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 27 .02.2026
+ W.P.(C) 19812/2025, CM APPL. 82718/2025
DR. OISHIKA CHAKRABORTY ………Petitioner
Through: Dr. Rakesh Gosain, Ms. Shrieya
Gosain, Advs.
versus
ALL INDIA INSTITUTE OF MEDICAL SCIENCES - AIIMS -
THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR & ORS. ………Respondents
Through: Mr. Anand Varma, Mr. Ayush
Gupta, Advs. for R-1&2
Mr. Varun Nagrath, Mr. Nishant Das, Mr.
Karandeep Singh, Ms. Aatrayi Das, Ms.
Jyoti Jha, Advs. with Respondent No.3 in
person
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JASMEET SINGH
J U D G M E N T
1. This is a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India seeking the following prayers:-
“A. Issue an Appropriate Writ, Order or Direction in the
Nature of a Writ of Certiorari quashing the result for
W.P.(C) 19812/2025 Page 2 of 31
Fellowship in Maternal Fetal Medicine (Subject Code 70)
for the January 2026 session.
B. Issue an Appropriate Writ, Order or Direction in the
Nature of a Writ of Mandamus for production of Stage-II
assessment records and video recordings.
C. Alternatively, issue an appropriate writ, order, or direct
the Respondents to select the Petitioner based on her
admitted merit in the Stage-I examination, or conduct a
retest of practical skills may be directed in accordance with
the prospectus.
D. Pass such other and further order(s) that this Hon’ble
Court deems just and proper in the facts and circumstances
of the case and in the interest of justice and equity.”
2. The petitioner i.e., Dr. Oishika Chakraborty, is stated to be an
Obstetrician and Gynaecologist, MBBS from Lady Hardinge Medical
College, New Delhi, and MD in Obstetrics and Gynaecology from
Postgraduate Institute of Medical Education and Research,
Chandigarh (“PGIMER, Chandigarh”), with three years of senior
residency experience at PGIMER Chandigarh, Lok Nayak Hospital,
All India Institute of Medical Sciences (“AIIMS”) New Delhi, and
Safdarjung Hospital.
3. The respondent No. 1 is AIIMS and respondent No. 2 is Assistant
Controller (Examinations), AIIMS.
4. The respondent No. 3 i.e., Dr. Maninder Kaur Ghotra, is the candidate
who secured the seat in question.
W.P.(C) 19812/2025 Page 3 of 31
FACTUAL BACKGRO UND
5. The brief facts are that in October 2025, respondent No.1 issued a
Prospectus (“Prospectus”) vide which applications for several
departments were invited for January 2026 Fellowship Programme,
including for Maternal-Fetal Medicine (Subject Code 70) (“MFM
Fellowship”), for which the petitioner and respondent No. 3 applied.
6. The prescribed selection process had two stages: Stage-I was a written
examination carrying 60 marks, and Stage-II was a “departmental
clinical/practical/lab based assessment” carrying 40 marks, for
candidates securing 50% or more in Stage-I. The process as laid down
in the Prospectus reads as under:-
“5. Procedure to be followed for selections for Fellowship
Programme
Selections are made through 2-Stage Performance
Evaluation basis:
Stage I: Written test carrying 60 marks of 60 minutes
duration in the subject wherein the candidate has applied
for. The question paper will consist of 60 Multiple Choice
Questions (MCQs).
Stage II: Out of the candidates who have secured 50% or
more marks [as per the decision of the meeting of the 116th
Academic committee (item No. AC/116/10 dated
06.03.2018) in the written test (Stage-I), candidates 3 times
the number of seats advertised will be called for
W.P.(C) 19812/2025 Page 4 of 31
departmental clinical /practical/ lab based assessment
(carrying 40 marks).
(a) Candidate must secure 50% marks in Stage-I to qualify
for Stage-II (Departmental Assessment).
(b) Candidate must secure Overall more than 50% to
become eligible for admission
(Both Stage-I & Stage-II combined)
(c) In case candidate gets >50% marks in Stage-I &<50%
marks in Stage I & II combined, he will not be eligible for
admission.
Final Selection: Final result will be declared based on total
marks obtained in Stage-I and Stage-II Examination
Note: I) The result of Stage-I will be available on website of
the Examination Section www.aiimsexams.ac.in No
individual intimation will be communicated to candidates.
II) Candidates who fail to attend any of the two stages
mentioned above will not be eligible for admission.
Selected candidates are required to join between 01.01.2026
to 15.01.2026. The competent authority may permit an
extension of joining till 31.01.2026 based on the merit of
each case.
III) Last date for admission the Fellowship Programme will
be 28.02.2026. In any circumstances, last date for admission
will not be extended after 28.02.2026.”
7. The petitioner secured 52.667 out of 60 marks in Stage-I examination
W.P.(C) 19812/2025 Page 5 of 31
and consequently, was selected for Stage-II process. For Stage-II, the
petitioner gave an online interview and secured 26 out of 40 marks (as
per the final result notification, annexed as Annexure P-3 to the
present petition), whereas the selected candidate i.e., respondent No.
3, obtained 36 out of 40 marks in Stage-II and 46.667 out of 60 marks
in Stage-I. Hence, as per the final result, the respondent No. 3 was
selected, as having scored a total of 82.667 out of 100 marks, whereas
the petitioner scored a total of 78.667 out of 100 marks.
8. Being aggrieved by the said allocation of marks in Stage-II
assessment, the petitioner has challenged the selection process. Hence,
the present petition.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF T HE PETITIONER
9. Dr. Gosain, learned counsel for the petitioner, challenges the validity
of the selection process under Stage-II conducted by respondent No. 1
and 2 for admission under MFM Fellowship Programme. The primary
contentions raised is that respondent Nos. 1 and 2 deviated from
Stage-II procedure as provided in the Prospectus issued for MFM
Fellowship Programme and altered the evaluation methodology and
the procedure for Stage-II assessment was highly subjective.
10. It is submitted that the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 deviated from the
Prospectus, which is binding and any deviation from the same was
illegal. As per the Prospectus, under Stage-II “departmental
clinical/practical/lab based assessment” was to be carried out.
However, vide email dated 13.12.2025, the petitioner received a
Google Meet link for the „interview‟ for Stage-II, being a CV-based
W.P.(C) 19812/2025 Page 6 of 31
interview which is not same as “clinical/practical/lab based
assessment”. Substituting clinical/practical/lab based assessment with
an online CV interview constituted arbitrariness and is in violation of
Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Reliance is placed on Punjab
Engineering College, Chandigarh v. Sanjay Gulati, AIR 1983 SC
580; Guru Nanak Dev University v. Parminder Kr. Bansal, (1993) 4
SCC 401 and Varun Kumar Agarwal v. Union of India, 2011 SCC
OnLine Del 1133.
11. It is further submitted that respondent No. 1 and 2 arbitrarily gave
unduly high weightage to interview held in Stage-II i.e., 40%, and the
same is in violation of principles as laid down in Ajay Hasia v. Khalid
Mujib Sehravardi, (1981) 1 SCC 722 and Ashok Kumar Yadav v.
State of Haryana, (1985) 4 SCC 417.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT NO S. 1
AND 2/AIIMS
12. Mr. Varma, learned counsel for respondent Nos. 1 and 2, submits that
the present writ petition is liable to be dismissed and respondent Nos.
1 and 2 are the sole judge of the merit of a candidate and the
respondent No. 3 is the candidate who has succeeded in the selection
process.
13. It is submitted that the process carried out under Stage-II was
consistent with the Prospectus. The email dated 13.12.2025 sent by the
respondent Nos. 1 and 2 to all the 3 shortlisted candidates clearly
stated that the assessment will be based on a PowerPoint Presentation
including qualifications, publications, awards and any other significant
W.P.(C) 19812/2025 Page 7 of 31
achievements and a CV. Hence, all the candidates, including the
petitioner and respondent No. 3, had the same knowledge about Stage-
II assessment, duly participated, appeared for the Google meet of
16.12.2025 and hence, petitioner‟s contentions of subjectivity and
favouritism are misconceived. The Stage-II assessment was carried
out on the basis of the said objective criteria and the same is reflected
in the marksheet of all the three candidates, which reads as under:-
W.P.(C) 19812/2025 Page 8 of 31
14. It is submitted that Stage-II assessment was an objective based
interview, which lasted for about 10 minutes and was based on
petitioner‟s own CV and PowerPoint Presentation. The use of the
word „interview‟ in the email dated 13.12.2025 is a misnomer and
does not determine the assessment‟s nature, instead, the marksheet, as
produced by respondent Nos. 1 and 2, shows the criteria taken into
account while assessing qualifications of all the 3 candidates.
15. Further, it is submitted that the petitioner never objected to the online
Stage-II assessment and participated in the same without any protest,
despite being aware on 08.12.2025 (when the list of candidates who
qualified for Stage-II was published) that Stage-II assessment shall be
conducted online. The petitioner cannot now challenge the admission
process after participating in the same, reliance is placed on Anupal
Singh v. State of U.P., (2020) 2 SCC 173 and Ramesh Chandra Shah
v. Anil Joshi, (2013) 11 SCC 309.
16. It is submitted that that a clinical/practical/lab based assessment was
not legally tenable as the same is prohibited under Pre-Conception &
Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques Act, 1994 (“PCPNDT Act”). Also,
that the NBE curriculum relied upon by the petitioner is part of
curriculum during the MFM fellowship, and the same cannot be used
as an entry level assessment for the fellowship.
17. It is submitted that petitioner‟s reliance upon Ajay Hasia (supra) is
misplaced, as in Ajay Hasia (supra) the admission process was
challenged on the grounds that the “interview” of petitioners was for
hardly 2-3 minutes and the questions asked during interview were
W.P.(C) 19812/2025 Page 9 of 31
relating to parentage and residence and the candidates selected had
lower marks in the written test, but obtained higher marks in the
interview. In the present case, Stage-II assessment was conducted
based on an objective criteria, as stated above, and hence, the
principles of Ajay Hasia (supra) on interview does not apply.
18. It is submitted that the petitioner has made allegations of favouritism
in favour of respondent No. 3 on the basis that respondent No. 3
obtained more marks in the Stage-II assessment. In the present case,
the eligibility criteria for Fellowship lays emphasis on “post PG
teaching experience”. Hence, for the said purpose candidates‟ CVs,
publications, thesis etc. were assessed for a comprehensive analysis.
Reliance is placed on Secy. (Health) Deptt. of Health & F.W. v. Anita
Puri (Dr), (1996) 6 SCC 282 and Lila Dhar v. State of Rajasthan,
(1981) 4 SCC 159. Further, the Stage-I marks of all candidates were
kept confidential, and not disclosed to the Department conducting
Stage-II assessment and were disclosed only when results were
declared. Thus, the allegation of favouritism are false.
19. Lastly, it is submitted that the views of subject expert/academic
decision or the decision making process does not warrant any
interference as the same was not arbitrary and they are experts in their
filed. The Court should not substitute its own views with those of
subject experts. The board comprised of seven distinguished
professors/ HODs who comprehensively conducted and analysed the
selection process. Reliance is placed on Sanchit Bansal v. Joint
Admission Board, (2012) 1 SCC 157, IIT Kharagpur v. Soutrik
W.P.(C) 19812/2025 Page 10 of 31
Sarangi, (2021) 17 SCC 79 and Deepak Suresh Kumar v. AIIMS,
2024 SCC OnLine Del 8946.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT NO. 3
20. Mr. Nagrath, learned counsel for the respondent No. 3, submits that
the respondent No. 3 is a meritorious Obstetrician and Gynaecologist
with 6 years and 10 months of experience. She cleared both Stages for
admission in MFM Fellowship and came first with 82.667 marks.
Hence, denial of the said seat would gravely jeopardise her career and
cause irreparable injury.
21. It is submitted that the Stage-I result was declared vide notification
dated 08.12.2025, wherein it was stated that “the following candidates
who appeared in the Entrance Examination held on Saturday, the 29
th
November, 2025 for fellowship programme and have qualified for
Stage-II are required to appear for Departmental Clinical/Practical/Lab
Based Assessment through video conferencing mode only” and that
“Date of Departmental Assessment (Online Mode)” was 16.12.2025.
Further, respondent No. 1 vide email dated 13.12.2025 provided link
for virtual meeting for the Departmental Assessment and informed the
candidates to prepare a PowerPoint Presentation including their
qualifications, publications, awards, etc. along with a CV, for the
Stage-II assessment. Hence, in view of the instructions in the email
dated 13.12.2025 and the petitioner having participated in the
selection cannot now turn back to challenge the same. Reliance is
placed on Madan Lal v. State of J&K, (1995) 3 SCC 486 and
Dhananjay Malik v. State of Uttaranchal, (2008) 4 SCC 171.
W.P.(C) 19812/2025 Page 11 of 31
22. It is further stated that the petitioner even failed to raise concerns as
per the procedure provided in the Prospectus. Even an identical
methodology is followed by PGIMER, Chandigarh for its fellowship
programme.
REJOINDER ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER
23. In response to the respondents‟ contention, it is submitted that Stage-II
assessment was a subjective evaluation of past achievements. As per
the breakdown of Stage-II assessment marks, respondent No. 3 scored
18/20 in non-clinical heads, while petitioner scored 8/20 and both
candidates secured 18/20 in the “clinical assessment”. This shows that
respondent No. 3 selection was based on “substantial publications and
presentations” and respondent Nos. 1 and 2 turned “Fellowship
Entrance Exam” into “CV Review”. Further, while petitioner scored
52.667/60 marks in Stage-I test, she was given only 26/40 in Stage-II
assessment, while respondent No. 3 who scored 46.667/60 marks in
Stage-I test, was awarded 36/40 in Stage-II assessment and thereby,
overturning merit. Also, 20 marks allotment to “Clinical Assessment”
is without any defined criteria and the same shows subjectivity.
Further, this Court, vide order dated 31.12.2025 recorded that prima
facie, Stage-II assessment conversion into online interview was not in
objective manner.
24. Further, it is submitted that petitioner participated with expectation
that Prospectus will be followed, however, the same was not done, and
thereby, estoppel argument raised by the respondents is misconceived.
25. It is submitted that though PCPNDT Act regulates misuse of
W.P.(C) 19812/2025 Page 12 of 31
ultrasound techniques but such techniques are steadily conducted over
the country for academic and teaching activities in controlled settings.
Also, the NBE curriculum for FNB Maternal and Fetal Medicine lists
Ultrasound as a “Must Know” skill. Hence, respondent Nos. 1 and 2‟s
argument that since ultrasonography skills is illegal under the
PCPNDT Act no academic assessments could be conducted is
misleading and skills could still be tested on simulators, stored video
loops, or “phantom” models without violating the PCPNDT Act.
26. Lastly, it is submitted that the Ministry of Health & Family Welfare
abolished viva voce/practical components in DM/MCh entrances in
2019. Even National Policy (NEET-PG, NEET-SS, FET) stipulates
that only MCQ based examinations shall be held.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
27. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties and perused the
documents placed on record.
Scope Of Interference In Academic Matters
28. The scope of interference or judicial review of decisions in academic
matters is no longer res integra. A Coordinate Bench of this Court in
Deepak Suresh Kumar (supra), while discussing this scope observed
as under:-
“34. The Constitutional Courts, though tasked with the
constitutional mandate to safeguard fundamental rights,
including the right to education and equality, are equally
saddled with a duty to weigh the fundamental rights against
the expertise of academic institutions so as to reach a
W.P.(C) 19812/2025 Page 13 of 31
nuanced approach in striking a balance between judicial
oversight and academic autonomy. As a rule of prudence,
the courts, while exercising writ jurisdiction for upholding
the constitutional principles and fundamental rights, have
endeavoured to carefully navigate the underlying separation
of powers to avoid subrogation in the areas reserved for
domain experts or policymakers. In essence, unless the
educational policy suffers from arbitrariness or exhibits a
violation of rights or statutory provisions, the judicial
intervention has been generally limited to ensuring
procedural fairness and adherence to law in academic
matters. Put otherwise, a greater amount of deference has
been extended towards pure policy decisions and it is not for
the court to substitute its own policy in the place of the
policy adopted by the Department, except in the
circumstances broadly indicated above.
xxxxxxxx
37. The horizon of interference by the courts in academic
matters is well settled and the courts generally restrain
themselves from expressing opinions on academic matters,
especially on technical aspects of the educational courses
which are based on policy decisions, which ought to be best
left to the wisdom of the policymakers or the field experts.
The Supreme Court in Basavaiah v. H.L. Ramesh7, held as
under : (SCC p. 382, para 38)
W.P.(C) 19812/2025 Page 14 of 31
“38. We have dealt with the aforesaid judgments to
reiterate and reaffirm the legal position that in the
academic matters, the courts have a very limited role
particularly when no mala fides have been alleged
against the experts constituting the Selection Committee.
It would normally be prudent, wholesome and safe for the
courts to leave the decisions to the academicians and
experts. As a matter of principle, the courts should never
make an endeavour to sit in appeal over the decisions of
the experts. The courts must realise and appreciate its
constraints and limitations in academic matters.”
38. The Supreme Court in another judgment reported
as University Grants Commission v. Neha Anil Bobde8, has
held that in case of academic matters, unless and until there
is a clear violation of statutory provisions, the regulations
or the notification issued, the courts shall keep their hands
off since those issues fall within the domain of the
experts.…..
xxxxxxxx
41. A bare perusal of the aforenoted judicial precedents
would lead to an inexorable conclusion that courts are not
the domain experts to deal with academic matters, rather
the powers vest in the expert body to ascertain the bona fide
requirements of any course, more importantly, professional
courses. It cannot be gainsaid that the dilution of academic
W.P.(C) 19812/2025 Page 15 of 31
standards, particularly in the case of professional
education, is at all impermissible and there exists a self-
imposed fetter on courts to not interfere in the decisions
concerning the academic matters.”
(Emphasis added)
29. From a conspectus of the aforementioned observations, it is clear that
the Court must be slow and reluctant to interfere in education matters
as a rule of prudence, but at the same time the Court retains its power
of judicial scrutiny when any arbitrary decision is in question. This
Court is vested with the duty to protect fundamental and legal rights of
the individuals but at the same time at some instances the Courts are
required to exercise judicial restraint not as a matter of abdication but
as a rule of prudence such as in cases involving policy matters or those
requiring subject expertise. The scope of interference or judicial
review of decisions in academic matters is well settled.
30. In the present case, the petitioner has alleged arbitrariness in the
Stage-II assessment and hence, in the view of the aforesaid, I find it is
necessary to examine the nature and justifiability of the actions of the
respondent Nos. 1 and 2 in the light of peculiar facts of the case.
Deviation From The Prospectus In Stage-II Assessment
31. In my considered opinion, the first and foremost question that requires
to be answered, with which the entire controversy can be addressed is
whether the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 deviated from the Prospectus of
the MFM Fellowship under Stage-II assessment. To appreciate the
said issue, I have carefully gone through the Prospectus. The most
W.P.(C) 19812/2025 Page 16 of 31
relevant clause in the present matter is Clause No. 5 namely
“Procedure to be followed for selections for Fellowship Programme”
(reproduced above), under Section III namely “Fellowship
Programme”.
32. A perusal of the same shows that only the candidates who secured
50% in Stage-I written test, will go to Stage-II assessment. Since,
there is only 1 seat in MFM Fellowship at respondent No. 1, only 3
candidates qualified for Stage-II assessment those being the petitioner,
the respondent No. 3 and one Dr. Rupaka Gauri Lakshmi and these
three appeared in Stage-II assessment. These facts are undisputed.
33. As per the Clause No. 5 of the Prospectus, as reproduced above, under
“Stage II” it is clearly mentioned “Out of the candidates who have
secured 50% or more marks … in the written test (Stage-I), candidates
3 times the number of seats advertised will be called for departmental
clinical /practical/ lab based assessment (carrying 40 marks).”
34. The petitioner‟s primary contention is that the Prospectus says
“departmental clinical/practical/lab based assessment”, whereas what
was conducted was a CV and PowerPoint Presentation based
interview. At this point it is crucial to refer to precedents which have
dealt with such situations of sanctity of selection process when
Prospectus or brochure have been deviated. A Division Bench of this
Court in Varun Kumar Agarwal (supra), while dealing with a very
similar issue observed numerous judgments in this regards and held as
under:-
W.P.(C) 19812/2025 Page 17 of 31
“14.Presently we shall refer to certain authorities in the
field that have dealt with sanctity of a prospectus or
brochure and the legal impact when it is changed in the
midstream. In Dr. M. Vannila v. Tamil Nadu Public Services
Commission, 2007 (3) CTC 69, a Division Bench of the
High Court of Madras has opined thus:
“19. The principle that the prospectus is binding on all
persons concerned has been laid by the Supreme Court
in Punjab Engineering College, Chandigarh v. Sanjay
Gulati, (AIR 1983 SC 580 = 1983 (96) LW 172 S.N.).…...
It is clear that the prospectus is a piece of information
and it is binding on the candidates as well as on the State
including the machinery appointed by it for identifying
the candidates for selection and admission.”
[Underlining is ours]
15. In Indu Gupta v. Director Sports, Punjab, AIR 1999
P&H 319 (FB), the Full Bench in paragraphs 9, 10 and 11
has expressed thus:
“9. A Full Bench of this Court in the case of Raj
Singh v. Maharshi Dayanand University, (1994) 4 Recent
Services Judgments, 289 disapproved the liberal
construction of the terms and conditions of the brochure
and specified the need for their strict adherence to avoid
unnecessary prejudice to the candidate or the authority
during the course of admission. …..
W.P.(C) 19812/2025 Page 18 of 31
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11. The cumulative effect of the above well enunciated
principles of law, is that the terms and conditions of the
brochure where they used preemptory language cannot be
held to be merely declaratory. They have to be and must
necessarily to be treated as mandatory. Their compliance
would be essential otherwise the basic principle of
fairness in such highly competitive entrance
examinations would stand frustrated. Vesting of
discretion in an individual in such matters, to waive or
dilute the stipulated conditions of the brochure would per
se introduce the element of discrimination, arbitrariness
and unfairness. Such unrestricted discretion in
contravention to the terms of the brochure would
decimate the very intent behind the terms and conditions
of the brochure, more particularly, where the cut off date
itself has been provided in the brochure. The brochure
has the force of law. Submission of applications complete
in all respects is a sine qua non to the valid acceptance
and consideration of an application for allotment of seats
in accordance with the terms prescribed in the brochure.
[Emphasis added]
16. We have referred to the aforesaid decisions only to
highlight that the conditions stipulated in the prospectus are
guidelines for all concerned and everyone is required to
W.P.(C) 19812/2025 Page 19 of 31
follow the same in letter and spirit and not act in
transgression. The hopes and aspirations of the students,
who came within the zone of merit, cannot be scuttled by
changing the prospectus by way of introducing a
corrigendum. A change in the conditions of the prospectus
can be conceived of and allowed if such power is
specifically reserved while making the prospectus public as
in that case, no one can think of having a right. In that
event, the same could be capable of change. In the case at
hand, in the absence of a power reserved in the prospectus,
in our considered opinion, the same could not have been
altered by way of corrigendum. It is interesting to note that
by issuing a corrigendum, the scenario of results changed
because further results were published and more candidates
were called. This, according to us, is nothing but an
accommodation. The AIIMS may have been conferred the
privilege of institutional preference, but that would not
enable AIIMS to change the prospectus in the manner it has
been done. Thus, the action of the AIIMS on this score is
vitiated and despite the laboured attempt by the learned
counsel for the AIIMS, we cannot give the stamp of approval
to the action of the institution.”
(Emphasis added)
35. A perusal of the paragraphs, reproduced above, clearly lays down that
unless specifically advertised while making the Prospectus public, the
W.P.(C) 19812/2025 Page 20 of 31
institution does not have the right or the power to change the
Prospectus guidelines later and everyone, student and authority, are
bound by it alike.
36. Coming to the peculiar situation of the present case, without
commenting on which assessment type among the two i.e.,
departmental clinical /practical/ lab based assessment or Online
interview/viva voce, is a better way to assess the candidates for MFM
Fellowship, the issue before me is whether respondent Nos. 1 and 2
deviated from the Prospectus while conducting Stage-II assessment
which clearly mentioned “departmental clinical /practical/ lab based
assessment”.
37. In my considered opinion, by no stretch of imagination can I say that
an Online interview/viva voce was not a deviation from what was
stated in the Prospectus i.e., “departmental clinical /practical/ lab
based assessment”. Upon reading the words “departmental clinical
/practical/ lab based assessment” any prudent/ normal person would
imagine that the assessment would be a physical assessment at a
laboratory assessing the candidates‟ departmental and clinical skills
and knowledge. By mentioning word “practical” the Prospectus rules
out any possibility of Online Assessment especially an interview based
on CV and PowerPoint Presentation. Additionally, the word
“clinical/practical/lab” based assessment clearly shows the said test
have to be in a laboratory and based upon candidates‟ practical,
departmental, clinical knowledge. Hence, in view of the aforesaid, the
Stage-II Online Interview based assessment is found foul of the
W.P.(C) 19812/2025 Page 21 of 31
Prospectus and despite the attempts of the learned counsel for the
respondents, I do not agree with the actions of the respondent No. 1.
38. The respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were very much within their right to
conduct Stage-II assessment through CV and PowerPoint Presentation
through an online mode. However, the same should have been clearly
so mentioned in the Prospectus. However, having mentioned that the
Stage-II assessment would be a “departmental clinical /practical/ lab
based assessment”, the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 could not have altered
the evaluation criteria and evaluated the candidates on articles, case
reports, books chapter, awards, etc. The same to mind is clearly a
deviation from the terms of the Prospectus. At this juncture, it is
important to note that I have neither opined nor competent to state
which of the evaluation method is more comprehensive/objective.
39. Since I have already held that the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have
deviated from the Prospectus, the issue of giving subjective weightage
to interview of 40% is not relevant for the purpose of adjudicating the
present writ petition and hence, reliance on Ajay Hasia (supra) and
Ashok Kumar Yadav (supra) by the learned counsel for the petitioner
has not been dealt with. The question remains open to be adjudicated
in appropriate case.
40. Further, the learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have
placed reliance on Secy. (Health) Deptt. of Health & F.W (supra) and
Lila Dhar (supra), to contend that CVs are assessed to evaluate
cumulative work done by the candidates over the course of their
careers. However, the said both judgements are distinguishable on
W.P.(C) 19812/2025 Page 22 of 31
facts. In Secy. (Health) Deptt. of Health & F.W (supra), the
controversy was around posts of Dental Officer, wherein the
advertisement stipulated preference for higher dental qualification and
in Lila Dhar (supra), the issue was around mode of selection for
public service. In both the said cases there was no deviation
specifically from Prospectus for selection.
Petitioner’s Participation In The Stage-II Online Interview
41. Moving on to the next question i.e., whether after participating in the
Stage-II assessment even though it was not in terms with the
Prospectus and waiting until the results were out, can the petitioner
after declaration of result challenge the validity of the Stage-II
assessment. Irrespective of the findings on whether or not respondent
Nos. 1 and 2 deviated from the Prospectus for MFM Fellowship under
Stage-II assessment, it cannot be ignored that the petitioner since
13.12.2025 i.e., when she received the email for Stage-II assessment
interview link, knew that Stage-II assessment will be based on her
PowerPoint Presentation and CV. The said email clearly mentioned
that the petitioner was required to submit a PowerPoint Presentation
which shows her “qualifications, publications, awards and any other
significant achievements” and a CV with the same details by next day
i.e., 14.12.2025. The said email is extracted below:-
W.P.(C) 19812/2025 Page 23 of 31
W.P.(C) 19812/2025 Page 24 of 31
42. Further, the result of Stage-I was declared vide notification dated
08.12.2025, wherein it was stated that “the following candidates who
appeared in the Entrance Examination held on Saturday, the 29
th
November, 2025 for fellowship programme and have qualified for
Stage-II are required to appear for Departmental Clinical/Practical/Lab
Based Assessment through video conferencing mode only.” This
shows that since the said notification dated 08.12.2025, the petitioner
knew that Stage-II assessment would be online based and later vide
email dated 13.12.2025, the petitioner knew what was excepted in
Stage-II assessment and hence, prepared the required PowerPoint
Presentation and CV (attached as Annexure P-5 and P-4, respectively,
with the present petition). Hence, irrespective of what was mentioned
in Prospectus for MFM Fellowship, the petitioner had the same
opportunity and time, as the other two candidates, to prepare for the
Stage-II assessment.
43. In this regards, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Dhananjay Malik
(supra), while referring to Madan Lal (supra), held that once an
individual participated in the interview process without any demur,
he/she is later estopped from complaining that the selection process
was not in accordance with the Rules and should challenge the
selection process without participating in it. The relevant paragraphs
from the said judgement reads as under:-
“8. In Madan Lal v. State of J&K [(1995) 3 SCC 486 : 1995
SCC (L&S) 712 : (1995) 29 ATC 603] this Court pointed
out that when the petitioners appeared at the oral interview
W.P.(C) 19812/2025 Page 25 of 31
conducted by the members concerned of the Commission
who interviewed the petitioners as well as the contesting
respondents concerned, the petitioners took a chance to get
themselves selected at the said oral interview. Therefore,
only because they did not find themselves to have emerged
successful as a result of their combined performance both at
written test and oral interview, they have filed writ petitions.
This Court further pointed out that if a candidate takes a
calculated chance and appears at the interview, then, only
because the result of the interview is not palatable to him,
he cannot turn round and subsequently contend that the
process of interview was unfair or the Selection Committee
was not properly constituted.
9. In the present case, as already pointed out, the
respondent-writ petitioners herein participated in the
selection process without any demur; they are estopped from
complaining that the selection process was not in
accordance with the Rules. If they think that the
advertisement and selection process were not in accordance
with the Rules they could have challenged the advertisement
and selection process without participating in the selection
process. This has not been done.”
(Emphasis added)
44. But I am also mindful of the fact that the result of Stage-I was
announced on 08.12.2025, thereafter the petitioner received the email
W.P.(C) 19812/2025 Page 26 of 31
for Stage-II interview on 13.12.2025, which was conducted on
16.12.2025. The petitioner hardly had a week since declaration of
Stage-I result till the Stage-II assessment. Any student/ candidate in
such short span of time would prioritise preparing for whatever
assessment is about to come his/her way instead of coming to Court or
even raising grievances on the institution‟s portal and wait for
response. Hence, I do not agree with the contention raised by the
respondents that if the petitioner thought that the Online Assessment
amounted to deviation from Prospectus, she should have raised issue
the moment notification dated 08.12.2025 was issued or when she
received the email dated 13.12.2025.
45. In Meeta Sahai v. State of Bihar, (2019) 20 SCC 17,while dealing
with a similar issue i.e., whether having partaken in the selection
process can the appellant therein later challenge it due to mere failure
in selection, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court observed as under:-
“16. It is well settled that the principle of estoppel prevents
a candidate from challenging the selection process after
having failed in it as iterated by this Court in a plethora of
judgments including Manish Kumar Shahi v. State of
Bihar ….
The underlying objective of this principle is to prevent
candidates from trying another shot at consideration, and to
avoid an impasse wherein every disgruntled candidate,
having failed the selection, challenges it in the hope of
getting a second chance.
W.P.(C) 19812/2025 Page 27 of 31
17. However, we must differentiate from this principle
insofar as the candidate by agreeing to participate in the
selection process only accepts the prescribed procedure and
not the illegality in it.In a situation where a candidate
alleges misconstruction of statutory rules and
discriminating consequences arising therefrom, the same
cannot be condoned merely because a candidate has
partaken in it. The constitutional scheme is sacrosanct and
its violation in any manner is impermissible. In fact, a
candidate may not have locus to assail the incurable
illegality or derogation of the provisions of the Constitution,
unless he/she participates in the selection process.”
(Emphasis added)
46. From a perusal of the paragraphs, reproduced above, what emerges is
that when the challenge is to the very basis on which the selection
took place, there is no estoppel against challenging it, even after the
petitioner having participated in the process, as it is possible for the
candidates to challenge the selection after having participated in it.
The ratio laid down in Meeta Sahai (supra) squarely applies to the
facts of the present case. The petitioner would not have been in the
position to challenge the deviation from the Prospectus by respondent
Nos. 1 and 2, had she not participated in the Stage-II assessment.
Without participating in the Stage-II assessment she would have never
know what actually took place in the Stage-II online based
assessment. Therefore, in the present case, the technicality of estoppel
W.P.(C) 19812/2025 Page 28 of 31
would not be impediment for granting relief to the petitioner.
47. Additionally, the learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 has
relied on Anupal Singh (supra) and Ramesh Chandra Shah (supra)
in furtherance of his contention that having participated in the Stage-II
online based assessment the petitioner cannot later challenge the same.
However, in Anupal Singh (supra), the revised notification despite
which the respondents therein participated in the interview was
regarding modification/revision in number of vacancies in different
categories and did not change the rules of the game after the selection
process has commenced. Additionally, the revised notification did not
affect the selection process by changing the eligibility criteria. (Refer:
Anupal Singh (supra) paragraph No. 55). In the present case, the
respondent Nos. 1 and 2 changed the nature of the assessment from
what was provided in the Prospectus. Even, in Ramesh Chandra
Shah (supra) the Hon‟ble Supreme Court held that the respondents
participated in the recruitment process with full knowledge that the
recruitment was made under the General rules and had waived their
right to question the advertisement or the methodology adopted by the
Board. In the present case, the deviation is from the Prospectus
detailing the selection process.
Allegations of Favouritism Against Respondent No. 3
48. Additionally, the allegations of favouritism raised by the petitioner are
unfounded as nothing has been shown to conclude that the conduct of
respondent Nos. 1 and 2 was of favouritism towards respondent No. 3.
Respondent No.1 is an institution of great repute and the Stage-II
W.P.(C) 19812/2025 Page 29 of 31
assessment was conducted by a board of highly respected Doctors of
this Country. Further, even assuming that the Stage-II assessment was
flawed, the fact remains that all the three candidates who qualified
Stage-I assessment and went to Stage-II assessment, participated in
the same Stage-II assessment. The breakdown of marks in Stage-II
assessment clearly shows that all the three candidates were marked
against same criteria which includes publications, awards, etc. As per
the result of Stage-II assessment of all three candidates, as reproduced
above, the petitioner secured the lowest marks and the respondent No.
3 the highest and only after combining marks of both stages the
respondent No. 3 emerged as the successful candidate.
PCPNDT Act
49. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that as per the NBE
curriculum for FNB Maternal & Fetal Medicine “ultrasound” is listed
as “MUST KNOWN” skill across modules. For instance under
“Module 2: Antenatal Complications”, Ultrasonography is listed under
“Competencies / Skills” and under “Module 5: Fetal Medicine”,
competence in skills (i) to (viii), requires first-trimester screening,
detailed mid-trimester anomaly scans, and fetal doppler. It is further
submitted that even though PCPNDT Act prohibits misuse of
ultrasound techniques but such techniques are conducted for academic
and teaching activities in controlled settings and also, candidates‟
skills could be tested on simulators, stored video loops, or “phantom”
models without violating the PCPNDT Act.
50. Undisputedly, the PCPNDT Act regulates use of prenatal diagnostic
W.P.(C) 19812/2025 Page 30 of 31
techniques. Even the learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2
fails to bring forward any clause from the PCPNDT Act or case law
wherein ultrasound or alike techniques could not be used in
assessments for entrance. The learned counsel for the respondent Nos.
1 and 2 states the Section 4 of PCPNDT Act prohibits clinical
practical lab based assessment. On going through Section 4 of
PCPNDT Act, to my mind there is no such prohibition. Only
determination of sex under Section 6 of PCPNDT Act is barred and
nothing else. However, I need not delve any further into this issue, as I
have already held that the Stage-II interview-based assessment was
contrary to the Prospectus.
51. Additionally, Mr. Varma, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 1
and 2, states that the laboratory assessment was impractical in view of
the PCPNDT Act. The PCPNDT Act is of the year 1994 (amended
from time to time) and the Prospectus came in the year 2025 for
January 2026 session. The respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are neither
expected nor would be conducting any laboratory assessment barred
under the provisions of PCPNDT Act.
CONCLUSION
52. In view of the aforesaid findings, the petition is allowed only because
I am of the view that there is a disparity in what was stated in the
Prospectus and the way in which Stage-II assessment was done, which
was contrary to the said Prospectus.
53. Consequently, the Stage-II result declared on 22.12.2025 with respect
to “70. Obstetrics & Gynaecology - Maternal Fetal Medicine (MFM)”
W.P.(C) 19812/2025 Page 31 of 31
is hereby cancelled and respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are free to reconduct
the Stage-II assessment as per the Prospectus.
54. Interim stay granted vide order dated 31.12.2025 shall continue till the
respondent Nos. 1 and 2 reconduct the Stage-II assessment.
55. The Written Submissions on behalf of the petitioner and Brief Note on
behalf of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 handed over in the Court are taken
on record.
56. The present petition is allowed and disposed of in aforesaid terms.
Subject to the above, pending applications, if any, are also disposed
of.
JASMEET SINGH, J
FEBRUARY 27, 2026 / (HG)
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