1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4491 OF 2016

EUROTEX INDUSTRIES AND EXPORTS LIMITED &

ANR.

.....APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR. .....RESPONDENT(S)

W I T H

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4492 OF 2016

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4495 OF 2016

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4497 OF 2016

A N D

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4499 OF 2016

J U D G M E N T

A.K. SIKRI, J.

These appeals arise from the judgment of the Bombay High Court dated June

10, 2013 by which the High Court has dismissed a batch of writ petitions wherein

challenge was laid to the constitutional validity of the Maharashtra Value Added Tax

Civil Appeal No. 4491 of 2016 & Ors. Page 1 of 35

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(Levy, Amendment and Validation) Act, 2009 which amended certain provisions in the

Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2002 (for short, the 'MVAT Act') with retrospective

effect from April 01, 2005. The High Court has based its judgment by referring to

various judgments of this Court which held that Legislature has the power to enact

prospectively as well as retrospectively. The appellants do not, and in fact cannot

possibly, have any objection at all with this proposition. However, they argue that the

High Court has failed to appreciate the effects and consequences and the practical

impact of the retrospective amendment on the industrial units which had, in response to

the State Government's Scheme, made huge investments in the most extremely

backward areas of Maharashtra and which were led to believe that they were entitled to

claim exemption from Value Added Tax (for short, 'VAT') on 100% of their production

and accordingly did not recover any VAT from their customers. According to them, the

effect and consequence of this amendment was that, with retrospective effect from April

01, 2005, industrial units which had made capital investments in very backward areas

in the State of Maharashtra and which were earlier entitled to claim VAT exemption

benefit on the entire production of their respective industrial units, had their exemption

benefit substantially curtailed, being limited to, only a portion of the total production of

the unit due to the aforesaid retrospective amendment.

2)It is in this backdrop the issue is as to whether retrospective amendment in the MVAT

Act stands the test of constitutionality and is valid in law. Following factual background

need to be noted in order to understand the exact nature of controversy and the

decisions which are taken by the appellants on the one hand and the respondent on

the other.

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3)In order to encourage and ensure industrialisation in the backward and

underdeveloped areas, Government of Maharashtra had introduced package schemes

of incentives to the industrial units for setting up industries in such areas. First scheme

in this process is known as the 'Package Scheme of Incentives' which was introduced

in the year 1964. Then came few amended Schemes in the subsequent years. On

September 30, 1988, yet another new Package Scheme of Incentives for the period

between October 01, 1988 to September 30, 1993 was promulgated with a view to

rationalise the scope, scale and mode of release of incentives and accelerate the

dispersal of industries from the developed areas of the State to underdeveloped

regions. This was notified with effect from May 07, 1993, with which this case relates

to.

4)The object of the Scheme was to achieve a dispersal of industries outside the Bombay

Thane – Pune belt and to attract them to the underdeveloped and developing areas of

the State, particularly, regions away from Bombay Thane – Pune belt. Paragraph 3.8(I)

(i)(c) of the Scheme provides as follows:

“3.8 Gross Fixed Capital Investment -

(I) Gross Fixed Capital Investment shall mean and include, in the

case of –

(i) New Fixed Assets – The value of new Fixed Assets acquired at

site and paid for:

Explanation –

(a) xx xx xx

(b) xx xx xx

(c) Any acquisition of new Fixed Assets outside the project scheme

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accepted by the Implementing Agency can be considered for the

purposes of proportionate incentives during residual eligible period

provided such acquisition is not less than 25% of the Gross Fixed

Capital Investment at the end of the previous financial year of the

Eligible Unit.”

5)By Government Resolution (GR) dated July 06, 1994, paragraph 3.8(I)(i)(c) was

amended and substituted by deleting the word 'proportionate' from the Scheme of

1993. As a result, it was stipulated that an acquisition of new fixed assets outside the

project scheme accepted by the Implementing Agency could be considered for

incentives other than special capital incentives if the acquisition was not less than 25%

of the gross fixed capital investment. However, for the purposes of sales tax benefits,

the quantum of entitlement would be limited to 75% of that admissible to a new unit.

Existing units were also entitled to benefits of the clause.

6)Notwithstanding the deletion of the word 'proportionate' in the 1993 Scheme, on

January 17,1998, Trade Circular was issued by the Commissioner of Sales Tax, which

stipulated that under the 1993 Scheme incentives would be given in proportion to the

expansion capacity to the total capacity or the investment ratio of new fixed capital

investment to the total gross fixed capital investment after the expansion/investment

and not on the entire production of an eligible unit covered under such category. Vires

of this Circular were challenged by filing writ petitions in the High Court. While these

writ petitions were pending, the Maharashtra Sales Tax Tribunal, in its judgment dated

March 17, 2001, held that the aforesaid Circular was not validly issued as such an

administrative circular could not be issued, which was contrary to the 1993 Scheme, as

amended, since such a Scheme was statutory in nature. It may be mentioned that the

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aforesaid order of the Tribunal was subsequently upheld by the High Court and it

attained finality. To overcome this difficulty, the Legislature brought amendment to the

Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959 with the insertion of Section 41BB. This provision reads

as under:

“41BB.- Proportionate incentives to an Eligible Unit in certain

contingencies. –

(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any

Package Scheme of Incentives, any Eligible Unit, to whom the

Eligibility Certificate has been granted, shall be eligible to draw the

benefits in the current year or in any year, whether preceding or

succeeding the date of commencement of Section 12 of the

Maharashtra Act 22 of 2001, only on that part of its turnover of sales

or purchases as may be arrived at by applying the ratio as may be

prescribed by the State Government to the total turnover of sales and

purchases of the said unit in that year and different ratios may be

prescribed for different classes of dealers and different schemes.

(2) The benefits availed of by an Eligible Unit in contravention of

sub-section (1), if any, shall be and shall be deemed to have been

withdrawn and such unit shall be liable to pay tax in respect of the

turnover of sales and purchases in excess of the turnover arrived at

under sub-section (1) and accordingly any benefit which is withdrawn

shall be recovered as arrears of tax as provided in sub-section (3).

(3) For recovery of arrears of tax as provided in sub-section (2), the

Commissioner shall require the unit, by order in writing, to pay the

tax, interest and penalty on such turnover on which the benefits are

not available and serve on the dealer notice of demand accordingly:

Provided that, no order under this section shall be passed

without giving the dealer a reasonable opportunity of being heard.

Explanation. – For the purposes of the provisions contained in

section 41BA and 41BB the terms “Existing Unit, Eligible Unit,

Implementing Agency, Eligibility Certificate and Certificate of

Entitlement' shall have the same meaning as provided in the relevant

Package Scheme of Incentives.”

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It would, however, be pertinent to mention that though Section 41BB provided

for grant of proportionate incentives, it could be as prescribed by the State Government

by framing rules in this behalf. However, no rules were ever framed.

7)This provision clearly introduced the concept of proportionality, which is also clear from

the Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying the Introduction of that Bill,

categorically stipulating that the Act was being amended 'to restrict grant of incentives

in proportion to the goods manufactured in the expansion units located in the backward

areas of the State'.

8)In the year 2002, VAT regime was introduced and the State of Maharashtra also

enacted the MVAT Act thereby replacing the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959. It came into

force on April 01, 2005. Section 8(4) of the MVAT Act empowers the State Government

to provide for an exemption from payment of the whole of the tax in respect of any

class or classes of sales of goods effected by a unit holding a Certificate of Entitlement,

as defined in Section 88, to whom incentives are granted under any Package Scheme

of Incentives, by way of exemption from payment of tax. Section 93 of the MVAT Act

deals with proportionate incentives to an Eligible Unit in certain contingencies.

Sub-section (1) thereof, as it originally stood, reads as under:

“93. Proportionate incentives to an Eligible Unit in certain

contingencies. –

(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any

Package Scheme of Incentives, any Eligible Unit to whom the

Eligibility Certificate has been granted, shall be eligible to draw the

benefits in any year, after the appointed day, only on that part of its

turnover of sales or purchases as may be arrived at by applying the

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ratio as may be prescribed by the State Government to the total

turnover of sales and purchases of the said unit in that year and

different ratios may be prescribed for different classes of units and

different schemes.

xx xx xx”

9)It is this provision which has been amended retrospectively by the Amendment Act of

2009 and is the bone of contention. The amended provision now reads as under:

“(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any

Package Scheme of Incentives, any Eligible Unit, to whom the

Eligibility Certificate and Certificate of Eligibility have been granted at

any time before or after the appointed day, on account of increase in

the production capacity or, as the case may be, acquisition of new

fixed capital assets, shall be entitled to draw the benefits in any year,

only on that part of its turnover of sales or purchases as may be

arrived at by applying the provisions of sub-section (1A) to the total

turnover of sales and purchases of the said unit in that year.

(1A) In case where the Eligible Unit has, -

(a) maintained separate accounts of sales and purchases and is able

to identify the sales and purchases pertaining to the increase in the

production capacity or, as the case may be, the said eligible

investment, then the portion of the turnover eligible for benefits will be

decided solely on the basis of such identification;

(b) not maintained separate accounts of sales and purchases and is

not able to identify the sales and purchases in relation to increase in

the production capacity or, as the case may be, the said eligible

investment, then such benefits shall be calculated after applying the

formulae in sub-clause (i) or, as the case may be, sub-clause (ii)

given as under:

(i) in case where there is increase in production capacity, then for the

Package Scheme of Incentives for 1988 or, as the case may be,

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Package Scheme of Incentives for 1993, the formulae shall be as

below:

Eligible Turnover =

Turnover x Increase in

production capacity

Total production capacity

after such increase

(ii) in case where there is no increase in production capacity, then

for the Package Scheme of Incentives for 1993, the formulae shall be

as below:

Eligible Turnover =

Turnover x New fixed capital

investment

Total gross fixed capital

investments

(1B) When the eligible turnover comprises of multiple finished

products, then, -

(a) the production capacity of each of the finished products shall be

separately considered in determining the corresponding eligible

turnover, and

(b) eligible turnover shall relate to those products on which the

eligible investment has made impact and when eligible investment

does not add to production capacity, then it shall apply to all the

finished products.”

Simultaneously, Section 93A has been inserted to provide that Section 93 shall

apply to all the Eligible Units, to whom Eligibility Certificates and Certificates of

Entitlement have been issued under any of the Package Schemes of Incentives; if such

certificates have been issued on or before the appointed day (1 April 2005), then from

the appointed day and in any other case, from the date of effect mentioned in such

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certificates.

10)Section 5 of Amending Act 22 of 2009 contains a validation and savings provision

which is as follows:

“5(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment, decree or

order of any Court or Tribunal to the contrary, any assessment,

review, levy or collection of tax in respect of sales or purchases

effected by any dealer or person, or any action taken or thing done in

relation to such assessment, review, levy or collection under the

provisions of the Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2002 (hereinafter

in this section referred to as “the Value Added Tax Act”), before the

date of the commencement to the Maharashtra Value Added Tax

(Levy, Amendment and Validation) Act, 2009 (hereinafter referred to

as “the said Act”), shall be deemed to be valid and effective as if such

assessment, review, levy or collection or action or thing had been

duly made, taken or done under the Value Added Tax Act, as

amended by the said Act, and accordingly,-

(a) all acts, proceedings or things done or taken by the State

Government or by any officer of the State Government or by any

other authority in connection with the assessment, review, levy or

collection of any such tax, shall, for all purposes, be deemed to be,

and to have always been done or taken in accordance with law;

(b) no suit, appeal, application or other proceedings shall lie or be

maintained or continued in any Court or before any Tribunal, officer or

other authority, for the refund of any tax so paid, and

(c) no Court, Tribunal, officer or other authority shall enforce any

decree or order directing the refund of any such tax.

(2) For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that nothing in

sub-section (1) shall be construed as preventing a person,-

(a) from questioning in accordance with the provisions of the Value

Added Tax Act, as amended by the said Act, any assessment, review,

levy or collection of tax referred to in sub-section (1), or

(b) from claiming refund of any tax paid by him in excess of the

amount due from him by way of tax under the Value Added Tax Act,

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as amended by the said Act.

(3) Nothing in the Value Added Tax Act, as amended by the said Act

shall render any person liable to be convicted of any offence in

respect of anything done or omitted to be done by him, before the

commencement of the said Act, if such act or omission was not an

offence under the Value Added Tax Act but for the amendments made

by the said Act; nor shall any person in respect of such act or

omission be subject to a penalty greater than that which could have

been imposed on him under the law in force immediately before the

commencement of the said Act.”

11)As pointed out in the beginning itself, it is only the retrospective operation of

sub-sections (1), (1A) and (1B) of Section 93 of the MVAT Act which is the subject

matter of challenge.

12)The High Court has brushed aside the challenge holding the retrospective operation of

the said amendment to be permissible on the ground that it was in the nature of a valid

legislation and such a legislation can be passed by the Legislature with retrospective

effect, more so when the Legislature is empowered to enact the laws retrospectively.

13)Mr. S. Ganesh, learned senior counsel, submitted that chronology of events stated

above clearly establishes that the State Government and the tax authorities led all

industrial units to a bona fide belief, during the relevant period from 2005 to 2009, that

the benefit of VAT exemption would be available in respect of the entire production of

the industrial unit and not merely a proportionate part thereof. These industrial units

were, therefore, disabled and prevented from recovering any VAT on any part of their

production, as that would have been illegal and would in fact have constituted a

criminal offence. If the same amendment had been made in the year 2005 itself, the

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industrial units would have availed of the VAT exemption benefit over a longer period of

time and from 2005 onwards would have recovered from their customers VAT on an

appropriate proportion of their total production. He argued that the only reason or

justification given by the respondents for the retrospective amendment is that the State

Government was losing a considerable amount of revenue. This is only because a

huge amount of capital investment was made in the extremely backward areas of

Maharashtra in response to the State Government's Incentive Scheme. The State

Government, thus, fully realised all its objectives and goals under the Incentive

Scheme. To then do a somersault and make a significant reduction of the Scheme

benefits is entirely unfair, arbitrary and unreasonable. Further, the twin effects of the

retrospective amendment are that, first, the industrial units are permanently denied a

portion of the exemption benefit to which they are entitled by reason of the capital

investment made by them, though the exemption period has years to go before it

lapses. Secondly, the industrial units are permanently denied of any opportunity to

recover the amount of VAT from their customers only because they were disabled and

effectively prevented from recovering it in the relevant period. It is, therefore, submitted

that the retrospective amendment is arbitrary, unreasonable and oppressive and,

therefore, violates the appellant's fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of

the Constitution.

14)He argued that where the Government has created the situation which makes it illegal

or impossible for a manufacturer/dealer to recover sales tax/VAT from its customers,

then no demand for amount of tax can be raised, as held in West Bengal Hosiery

Association & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Anr., (1988) 4 SCC 134 and British Physical

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Lab India Ltd. v. State of Karnataka & Anr., (1999) 1 SCC 170. In this behalf, he

pointed out that throughout the period 2005 to 2009, the appellant and other industries

covered by the said exemption, were entitled to claim sales tax exemption benefit on

the entire turnover of their respective expanded undertakings, only because no Rule

was framed by the State Government, firstly under Section 41BB of the Sales Tax Act

and thereafter under Section 85 of the VAT Act. Consequently, the appellant and other

industries were effectively disabled and prohibited from recovering sales tax or VAT on

any part of their turnover. In fact, if the appellant recovered sales tax on any part of its

turnover from its customers, the appellant would have been guilty of a criminal offence

under the VAT Act. It is the respondents who are completely responsible for this state

of affairs, which could have been put an end to forthwith by merely framing a Rule

under Section 41 BB or Section 93. Accordingly, the appellant availed tax exemption

on 100% of the turnover of its expanded undertaking and passed on the benefit of

exemption to the appellant’s customers. In the process, the appellant exhausted its

entire tax exemption benefit calculated at 130% of its total fixed capital investment,

long before the expiry of the appellant’s 15 year exemption period which ended only in

2015. Immediately after exhausting its sales tax exemption benefit limit, the appellant

started recovering VAT from its customers and paying over the same to the tax

authorities.

15)The learned senior counsel also argued that the exact effect and impact of the

impugned retrospective amendment made in 2009 with effect from April 01, 2005

needs to be clearly understood, as under:

(a)The total exemption benefit to which a manufacturer was entitled was, in any event,

Civil Appeal No. 4491 of 2016 & Ors. Page 12 of 35

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limited to 130% of the total eligible Fixed Capital Investment in the expansion, which

could be availed of over a long period of 15 years. The effect of the retrospective

amendment is that an undertaking which had already availed of the exemption

benefit on 100% of its turnover will, as a result of the retrospective amendment,

forfeit absolutely a slice of its exemption benefit entitlement, for no fault committed

by it at all.

(b)If the said amendment had been made on April 01, 2005 itself (by the simple

method of issuing a Rule under Section 93), then the appellant would have availed

of tax exemption only on the proportionate portion of its turnover and would have

recovered VAT on the balance (taxable) portion of its turnover. As a consequence of

the impugned retrospective amendment, the appellant is permanently denied not

only a slice of its exemption entitlement (based on its capital investment) but also

denied permanently the opportunity to recover VAT from its customers on that

proportion of its turnover which is taxable.

(c)There is no warrant or justification at all for the said double adverse impact on all

the industries in question. All of them, including the appellant, have duly carried out

everything that was expected of them under the prevailing law. They made huge

capital investments in the most backward districts of the State of Maharashtra and

added significantly to the production and turnover of their undertakings and,

thereby, greatly expanded the tax base of the State of Maharashtra.

(d)Counsel for the State of Maharashtra gave no explanation or justification at all for

the retrospective amendment except to say that it was for correction of an error or

anomaly, which, as already pointed out, was an unstateable argument.

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16)Mr. Anil Shrivastav, learned counsel who appeared in Civil Appeal No. 4499 of 2016

additionally argued that the retrospective amendment vide Amendment Act 2009 does

not seek to remove an ambiguity or to correct a cause of invalidity but, in essence,

seeks to impose a fresh levy of tax on the appellant for the first time, which is

unreasonable and arbitrary and is, therefore, liable to be struck down as being ultra

vires the Constitution of India. His submission in this behalf was that the High Court

failed to consider that the sole purpose of the amendment made from retrospective

effect was to neutralize the effect of the judgment dated July 27, 2009 and the orders

dated October 13, 2008 and June 19, 2009 of the Bombay High Court, which was not

permissible. He also submitted that Legislature cannot legislate with the sole object of

neutralising or over-ruling the decision of the Court. Another submission of Mr.

Shrivastav was that vested rights were created in favour of the appellant and also

Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel was applicable in the present case and these aspects

precluded the Legislature to make the amendment retrospectively. He referred to

number of judgments on the aforesaid propositions.

17)Other counsel, appearing in remaining appeals adopted the above arguments.

18)Learned counsel for the State refuted the aforesaid submissions of the counsel for the

appellants and pleaded that well reasoned judgment of the High Court does not require

to be interfered with. He argued that from the very beginning, the legislative intent was

to allow benefit under Package Scheme of Incentives only on proportionate basis which

was reflected in Section 41BB of the Sales Tax Act as well as Section 93 of the MVAT

Act. Under these Sections, the State Government was required to formulate the

modality for proportionately restricting the grant of benefits under a Package Scheme

Civil Appeal No. 4491 of 2016 & Ors. Page 14 of 35

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of Incentives by prescribing the ratio for computing the part of the turnover of sales and

purchase of a unit eligible for such benefits. He pointed out that though no Rules

prescribing this ratio were framed by the State Government, instead the Commissioner

of Sales Tax issued administrative circular dated January 17, 1998 in this behalf which

was quashed by the Courts as impermissible on the ground that ‘in the absence of any

provision under the 1993 scheme and alternatively, in the absence of any ratio

prescribed by the State Government by framing Rules, it was not open to the Deputy

Commissioner of Sales Tax to direct the assessee to avail the incentives under the

1993 scheme in proportion to the production attributable to the newly acquired fixed

assets.’ Referring to the aforesaid quoted portion, learned counsel submitted that the

High Court recognized the existence of the legislative intent to restrict the benefits but

concluded that there was a lacuna/anomaly in effectuating that intent by not framing

any Rules. It is for this reason VAT Act was amended in the year 2009 with

retrospective effect to cure the aforesaid deficiency. According to the learned counsel,

such a move was within the competence of State Legislature and very much

permissible in law. He also referred to various judgments showing that not only

Legislature is empowered to enact a law, including a fiscal statute, either prospectively

or retrospectively, but Legislature is also empowered to nullify the effect of a judicial

decision by changing the law retrospectively by removing the basis on which the

decision was founded. The learned counsel emphasised that it is in the public interest

to restrict the benefits given under a Package Scheme of Incentives in any year to the

proportion of additional capital investment as this balances the burden of tax amongst

various sectors and prevents an unsustainable drain of financial resources of the State.

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The Legislature in enacting the Validating Act has, in its wisdom, decided that the grant

of benefits on a pro rata or proportionate basis is in public interest and subserves the

objective of the Package Scheme of Incentives. The Validating Act not only carries out

the intent and purpose of Section 93, as originally framed, but also subserves the

underlying objectives of the Package Scheme of Incentives as a means of benefiting

public interest as well as the State and safeguards against these objectives being

nullified by the imposition of a huge financial loss on the State. Another submission of

the counsel for the State was that a retrospective enactment cannot be impugned on

the ground that the retrospective levy did not afford any opportunity to the dealers to

pass on the tax to consumers, as held in Hiralal Ratanlal v. State of Uttar Pradesh,

(1973) 1 SCC 216.

19) Before dealing with the aforesaid contentions of the parties on either side, it would be

apposite to traverse through the impugned judgment of the High Court in order to

ascertain the reasons which have prevailed with the High Court in rejecting the

arguments of the appellants herein.

20)A perusal of the judgment of the High Court would show that after capturing the

essence of the Scheme of 1988, 1993 and statutory provisions in the form of Section

41BB of the Act and amendments thereto from time to time (which have already been

stated by us above) and recording the submissions of the counsel for the parties on

either side, the High Court dealt with the main issue, viz., ‘validating legislation and

retrospectivity’. After pointing out that the power to legislate on a subject which falls

within the competence of legislature comprehends within its ambit, the enactment of

laws with prospective as well as retrospective effect, the High Court also spelled out

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another legal principle, namely, where a law suffers from an infirmity which has been

noted in the judgment of the High Court, it is permissible for the legislature to remedy

the defect by curing the defect which has been found by the Court. This is known as

legislation of validating nature, which is constitutionally permissible inasmuch as such

validating law is in the nature of removing the defect or vice in the earlier legislation.

The High Court thereafter referred to and quoted from various judgments on the

aforesaid twin principles, namely, power of the legislature to enact a law prospectively

as well as retrospectively AND also to pass a validating enactment. Thereafter, the

High Court proceeded to discuss the contention of the appellants that the Amending

Act of 2009, in substance, amounted to imposition of a new levy and the imposition of a

fresh levy with retrospective effect was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and

repelled that contention after finding that legislative intent was given benefits only on

that part of turnover of sales or purchases as may be arrived at by applying the ratio

that may be prescribed by the Government. The Government did prescribe this ratio

but chose wrong method by issuing administrative circular rather than issuing statutory

notification in the form of rules. It is that which is achieved by the validating Act and

therefore it was not a new levy.

21)The High Court has also discussed that the aforesaid kind of legislation would be in the

nature of validating legislation inasmuch as the very basis of foundation of the earlier

decision was sought to be undone.

22)With this we advert to the arguments advanced by the appellants. We have already

taken note of those arguments. It is pertinent to point out that at the time of arguments,

learned counsel for the appellants had accepted the legal proposition that the

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legislature is competent to enact the laws retrospectively. However, Mr. Anil Shrivastav

has argued before us that the retrospective amendment does not seek to remove the

ambiguity or correct a cause of invalidity but, in essence, it seeks to impose a fresh

levy of tax. He has also argued that the sole purpose of amendment made from

retrospective effect was to neutralise the effect of the earlier judgment of the Bombay

High Court. We are unable to accept the aforesaid submissions and find that the High

Court has proceeded to deal with this aspect of the matter in a correct perspective.

While repelling the aforesaid contention, the High Court observed that Section 41BB of

the Bombay Sales Tax Act was introduced into this statute in the year 2001. This

provision was prefaced by a non-obstante provision which was to operate

notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any Package Scheme of

Incentives. This Section specifically provided that eligible unit would be entitled to draw

benefits only on that part of its turnover of sales or purchases as may be arrived at by

applying the ratio as that would be prescribed by the State Government to the total

turnover of sales or purchases of the unit in that year. Thus, Section 41BB of the Act

was not an enabling provision, but contained a legislative mandate in the form of

restrictions to the effect that notwithstanding anything contained in any Package

Scheme of Incentives, an eligible unit holding an eligibility certificate shall be eligible to

draw benefits only on that part of its turnover of sales and purchases as would be

arrived at by applying the ratio which was to be prescribed by the State Government.

Therefore, legislative intent behind the aforesaid provision was clearly manifest i.e. to

allow the benefit only on proportional basis. However, at the same time, it was left to

the Government to prescribe the ratio on the basis of which only a part of the turnover

Civil Appeal No. 4491 of 2016 & Ors. Page 18 of 35

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of the sales and purchases would qualify for incentives. Likewise, when MVAT Act was

enacted, identical provision as contained in Section 41BB of the Sales Tax Act, was

incorporated in the form of Section 93(1) of MVAT Act. It is the implementation of this

statutory provision where the Government erred. Though, the Government carried out

that intention by issuing circular dated January 17, 1998 which provided for benefits

only on that part of the turnover of sales or purchases of eligible unit by prescribing the

ratio, the manner of doing the same was faulty. Instead of prescribing the same by way

of Rules, which was the proper procedure, the purpose was sought to be accomplished

by way of an administrative circular in imposing a ceiling on the utilization of incentives

under the 1993 scheme in proportion to the production attributable to the newly

acquired fixed assets. Because of this legal infirmity this circular was set aside by the

High Court. According to the High Court, it is this defect which was sought to be cured

by amending the statutory provision itself by making the said amendment

retrospectively. On the aforesaid basis, the High Court rejected the contention of the

writ petitioners that a new levy was imposed with retrospective effect.

23)It would be of relevance to emphasise that at the time of insertion of Section 41BB by

amendment vide Amendment Act 22 of 2001, the Statement of Objects and Reasons

accompanying the introduction of the Bill specifically stated that the purpose of the

amendment was ‘to restrict grant of incentives in proportion to goods manufactured in

the expansion units located in the backward areas of the States’. Thus, the legislative

intent was manifest by inserting the said provision to provide the incentives to the

eligible units on proportionate basis. Similar intention can clearly be discerned from the

provisions of MVAT Act. We have already reproduced Section 93(1) of the said Act

Civil Appeal No. 4491 of 2016 & Ors. Page 19 of 35

20

which specifically provides for ‘proportionate incentive to an eligible unit in certain

contingencies’.

24)It would also be of significance to take note of relevant provisions in respect of

Package Scheme of Incentives. Chapter XIV of the MVAT Act contains provisions in

regard to the Package Scheme of Incentives. Section 88(a) defines the expression

“Certificate of Entitlement” as a certificate issued by the Commissioner in respect of

sales tax incentives under the relevant Package Scheme of Incentives. The expression

“Eligibility Certificate” is defined in Section 88(c) to mean inter alia a certificate granted

by SICOM or Director of Industries in respect of sales tax incentives under a Package

Scheme of Incentives designed by the State Government. An eligible unit under clause

(b) of Section 88 is defined to mean an industrial unit in respect of which an eligibility

certificate is issued. The expression “Package Scheme of Incentives” under clause (e)

of Section 88 includes the 1988 and 1993 schemes. Section 89(1) stipulates that where

an eligibility certificate has been recommended to an eligible unit by the implementing

agency under any Package Scheme of Incentives declared by the State Government,

such eligible unit may apply for grant of a certificate of entitlement to the

Commissioner. The Commissioner is empowered to grant a certificate of entitlement

under sub-section (2) of Section 89 on being satisfied that the unit satisfies the

requirements as may be prescribed. Section 90(a) stipulates that a certificate of

entitlement would stand cancelled on the date on which: (i) The incentives including the

cumulative quantum of benefits availed of exceed the monetary ceiling fixed for the

eligible unit; or (ii) The period for which a certificate of entitlement was granted to an

eligible unit expires; or (iii) The certificate of registration granted to an eligible unit has

Civil Appeal No. 4491 of 2016 & Ors. Page 20 of 35

21

been cancelled. Subsection (1) of Section 91 stipulates that where a certificate of

entitlement has been granted to a unit under a Package Schemes of Incentives and

such unit is entitled to receive benefits for any period which is to end after the

appointed day, then notwithstanding anything contained in the scheme, benefits shall

be availed of only in accordance with the Act, rules and notifications issued thereunder.

25)It is in the aforesaid backdrop/Scheme of things Section 93(1) follows providing for

proportionate incentives. Once we find that from the very beginning the statutory

scheme itself provided for proportionate incentive and this legislative intent was

expressed even in the Objects and Reasons, it cannot be said that there was no

provision of this nature prior to 2009 and such a provision was inserted for the first time

in the year 2009.

26)Coming to the argument of the appellants that the effect of 2009 amendment was to

neutralise or overrule the decision of the Court, we do not find it to be so. The High

Court has rightly analysed the earlier judgment of the Sales Tax Tribunal in Pee Vee

Textiles case which was followed by the Division Bench of the High Court as well as its

own earlier judgment in Mirc Electronics Limited case. It may be noted that the High

Court in Pee Vee Textiles case recognised the fact, after going through the Statement

of Objects and Reasons, explaining the purpose of Section 41BB in Sales Tax Act in

the following words:

“30. … ‘it is clearly stated that the said section is introduced with a

view to restrict grant of incentives in proportion to the goods

manufactured in the expansion unit located in the backward areas of

the State’ …”

Civil Appeal No. 4491 of 2016 & Ors. Page 21 of 35

22

27)Thus, while rendering the judgment in the case of Pee Vee Textiles, the High Court

accepted that the very intent behind Section 41BB of Sales Tax Act was to restrict grant

of incentive in proportion to the goods manufactured in the expansion unit.

Notwithstanding the same, the only reason for quashing the circular was that the effect

of the aforesaid provision was given in the form of an administrative order, whereas the

law requires that the proper mode was to effectuate the same by framing Rules. This is

the basis of the judgment and it is this basis which has taken away by the legislative

amendment retrospectively. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that intention

was to nullify the judgment of the Court. Clear intention was to rectify the earlier error

committed by the Executive in not implementing the legislative intent in the form of

subordinate legislation i.e. statutory rules and, trying to achieve the same by

administrative action.

28)Counsel for both the sides have cited many judgments on the subject of validating

legislation. In fact, most of these judgments are common, which are referred to by both

the sides. The attempt was to read the ratio of those judgments in their own way.

However, once the factual premise becomes apparent, the law stated in these

judgments clearly leans in favour of the respondent. Instead of referring to all these

judgments, our purpose would be served by taking note of few such judgments which

are directly applicable.

29)In Rai Ramkrishna v. State of Bihar, AIR 1963 SC 1667 which is a judgment of the

Constitution Bench, the principle was explained in the following manner:

“The other point on which there is no dispute before us is that the

Civil Appeal No. 4491 of 2016 & Ors. Page 22 of 35

23

legislative power conferred on the appropriate legislatures to enact

law in respect of topics covered by the several entries in the three

Lists can be exercised both prospectively and retrospectively. Where

the legislature can make a valid law, it may provide not only for the

prospective operation of the material provisions of the said law, but it

can also provide for the retrospective operation of the said provisions.

Similarly, there is no doubt that the legislative power in question

includes the subsidiary or the auxiliary power to validate laws which

have been found to be invalid. If a law passed by a legislature is

struck down by the Courts as being invalid for one infirmity or

another, it would be competent to the appropriate legislature to

cure the said infirmity and pass a validating law so as to make

the provisions of the said earlier law effective from the date

when it was passed. This position is created as firmly established

since the decision of the Federal Court in the case of United

Provinces v. Atiqa Begum. 1940 FCR 110

(emphasis added)”

30)We would also like to quote the following passage from another Constitution Bench

judgment in the case of Epari Chinna Krishna Moorthy v. State of Orissa , AIR 1964

SC 1581:

“10. …The argument is, the power to grant exemption having been

conferred on the State Government it was validly exercised by the

State Government and though the legislature may withdraw such

exemption, it cannot do so retrospectively. It is obvious that if the

State Government which is the delegate of the legislature can

withdraw the exemption granted by it, the legislature cannot be

denied such right. But it is urged that once exemption was validly

granted, the legislature cannot withdraw it retrospectively, because

that would be invalidating the notification itself. We are not impressed

by this argument. What the legislature has purported to do by S.2 of

the impugned Act is to make the intention of the notification clear.

Section 2 in substance declares that the intention of the delegate in

issuing the notification granting exemption was to confine the benefit

of the said exemption only to persons who actually produce gold

ornaments or employ artisans for that purpose. We do not see how

any question of legislative incompetence can come in the present

discussion. And, if the State Government was given the power either

Civil Appeal No. 4491 of 2016 & Ors. Page 23 of 35

24

to grant or withdraw the exemption, that cannot possibly affect the

legislature's competence to make any provision in that behalf either

prospectively or retrospectively. Therefore, there is no substance in

the argument that the retrospective operation of S.2 of the impugned

Act is invalid.”

In present case also, as seen earlier, the legislature had given power to the

State Government to prescribe the ratio/proportion in which the benefit was to be given.

The State Government acted thereupon, but exercised the power in a wrong manner.

In order to achieve what was intended by the statutory provision, the State legislature

itself remedied the situation by amending the Section retrospectively. The ratio of the

aforesaid judgment, thus, squarely applies to the fact situation of the present case.

31)The law on validating legislation was again explained by this Court in Hiralal Ratanlal.

In that case, Section 3-D of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 levied a single point tax on the

turnover of first purchases made by a dealer in the case of foodgrains including cereals

and pulses. A notification was issued providing for a levy on first purchases of

foodgrains at a certain rate. The Appellant in that case was the dealer in split or

processed foodgrains and dal. The legislature enacted validating legislation after a

decision of the Allahabad High Court. This validating legislation was held to be a valid

exercise of the legislature, in the following manner:

“…the amendment of the Act was necessitated because of the

Legislature's failure to bring out clearly in the principal Act its intention

to separate the processed or split pulses from the unsplit or

unprocessed pulses. Further the retrospective amendment became

necessary as otherwise the State would have to refund large sums of

money. The contention that the retrospective levy did not afford any

opportunity to the dealers to pass on the tax payable to the

consumers, has not much validity. The tax is levied on the dealer; the

fact that he is allowed to pass on the tax to the consumers or he is

Civil Appeal No. 4491 of 2016 & Ors. Page 24 of 35

25

generally in a position to pass on the same to the consumer has no

relevance when we consider the legislative competence.”

32)We would also like to reproduce the following discussion from the judgment of this

Court in Bakhtawar Trust v. M.D. Narayan, (2003) 5 SCC 298:

“25. …it is open to the legislature to alter the law retrospectively,

provided the alteration is made in such a manner that it would no

more be possible for the Court to arrive at the same verdict. In other

words, the very premise of the earlier judgment should be uprooted,

thereby resulting in a fundamental change of the circumstances upon

which it was founded.

26. Where a legislature validates an executive action repugnant to

the statutory provisions declared by a court of law, what the

legislature is required to do is first to remove the very basis of

invalidity and then validate the executive action. In order to validate

an executive action or any provision of a statute, it is not sufficient for

the legislature to declare that a judicial pronouncement given by a

court of law would not be binding, as the legislature does not possess

that power. A decision of a court of law has a binding effect unless the

very basis upon which it is given is so altered that the said decision

would not have been given in the changed circumstances.”

33)It may also be useful to refer to the judgment in the case of Indian Aluminium Co. v.

State of Kerala, (1996) 7 SCC 637 wherein the Court culled out the principles laid

down on this aspect by taking note of earlier judgments on the issue. We would like to

reproduce the same:

“56. From a resume of the above decisions the following principles

would emerge:

Civil Appeal No. 4491 of 2016 & Ors. Page 25 of 35

26

(1) The adjudication of the rights of the parties is the essential judicial

function. Legislature has to lay down the norms of conduct or rules

which will govern the parties and the transactions and require the

court to give effect to them;

(2) The Constitution delineated delicate balance in the exercise of

the sovereign power by the legislature, executive and judiciary;

(3) In a democracy governed by rule of law, the legislature exercises

the power under Articles 245 and 246 and other companion articles

read with the entries in the respective lists in the Seventh Schedule to

make the law which includes power to amend the law.

(4) Courts in their concern and endeavour to preserve judicial power

equally must be guarded to maintain the delicate balance devised by

the Constitution between the three sovereign functionaries. In order

that rule of law permeates to fulfil constitutional objectives of

establishing an egalitarian social order, the respective sovereign

functionaries need free play in their joints so that the march of social

progress and order remains unimpeded. The smooth balance built

with delicacy must always be maintained;

(5) In its anxiety to safeguard judicial power, it is unnecessary to be

overzealous and conjure up incursion into the judicial preserve

invalidating the valid law competently made;

(6) The court, therefore, needs to carefully scan the law to find out;

(a) whether the vice pointed out by the court and invalidity suffered by

previous law is cured complying with the legal and constitutional

requirements; (b) whether the legislature has competence to validate

the law; (c) whether such validation is consistent with the rights

guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution.

Civil Appeal No. 4491 of 2016 & Ors. Page 26 of 35

27

(7) The court does not have the power to validate an invalid law or to

legalise impost of tax illegally made and collected or to remove the

norm of invalidation or provide a remedy. These are not judicial

functions but the exclusive province of the legislature. Therefore, they

are not encroachment on judicial power.

(8) In exercising legislative power, the legislature by mere

declaration, without anything more, cannot directly overrule, revise or

override a judicial decision. It can render judicial decision ineffective

by enacting valid law on the topic within its legislative field

fundamentally altering or changing its character retrospectively. The

changed or altered conditions are such that the previous decision

would not have been rendered by the court, if those conditions had

existed at the time of declaring the law as invalid. It is also

empowered to give effect to retrospective legislation with a deeming

date or with effect from a particular date. The legislature can change

the character of the tax or duty from impermissible to permissible tax

but the tax or levy should answer such character and the legislature

is competent to recover the invalid tax validating such a tax on

removing the invalid base for recovery from the subject or render the

recovery from the State ineffectual. It is competent for the legislature

to enact the law with retrospective effect and authorise its agencies to

levy and collect the tax on that basis, make the imposition of levy

collected and recovery of the tax made valid, notwithstanding the

declaration by the court or the direction given for recovery thereof.

(9) The consistent thread that runs through all the decisions of this

Court is that the legislature cannot directly overrule the decision or

make a direction as not binding on it but has power to make the

decision ineffective by removing the base on which the decision was

rendered, consistent with the law of the Constitution and the

legislature must have competence to do the same.”

34)The aforesaid judgment has been followed by this Court in Assistant Commissioner

of Agricultural Income Tax & Ors. v. Netley ‘B’ Estate & Ors., (2015) 11 SCC 462.

Civil Appeal No. 4491 of 2016 & Ors. Page 27 of 35

28

To the same effect is the judgment of this Court in R.C. Tobacco (P) Ltd. v. Union of

India, (2005) 7 SCC 725.

35)Adverting to the arguments of Mr. Ganesh, it may be mentioned at the outset that no

such submissions were raised in the High Court. The thrust of the argument of Mr.

Ganesh was that this amendment has rendered the industrial units disbelieved and

prevented them from recovery of VAT on any part of their production. There has to be

a factual foundation for such an argument. In any case, we do not find any merit in the

argument. It was specifically pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent

that all these appellants have availed the proportionate benefit which was permissible

under the statutory provision. The intention now is to claim benefit on the entire

turnover of their respective expanded undertaking which was, in any case, not

permissible. Furthermore, such an argument of not able to pass on the burden on the

consumer is untenable. Way back in the year 1961, a Constitution Bench of this Court

in J.K. Jute Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1961 SC 1534 laid down the

following principle:

“(i) Where there is a sale of goods, the state legislature is competent

to impose a tax and, subject to constitutional limitations, such a tax

can be imposed even on sales which have taken place prior to the

enactment:

“But where the transaction is one of sale of goods as

known to law, the power of the State to impose a tax

thereon is plenary and unrestricted subject only to any

limitation which the Constitution might impose, and in the

exercise of that power, it will be competent to the

legislature to impose a tax on sales which had taken place

prior to the enactment of the legislation.”

Civil Appeal No. 4491 of 2016 & Ors. Page 28 of 35

29

(ii) Though ordinarily a sales tax is intended to be passed on to the

buyer, the power of the legislature is not conditional on the burden

being passed on:

“It is no doubt true that a sales tax is, according to

accepted notions, intended to be passed on to the buyer,

and provisions authorising and regulating the collection of

sales tax by the seller from the purchaser are a usual

feature of sales tax legislation. But it is not an essential

characteristic of a sales tax that the seller must have the

right to pass it on to the consumer, nor is the power of the

legislature to impose a tax on sales conditional on its

making a provision for sellers to collect the tax from the

purchasers. Whether a law should be enacted, imposing

sales tax, or validating the imposition of sales tax, when the

seller is not in a position to pas it on to the consumer, is a

matter of policy and does not affect the competence of the

legislature. This question is concluded by the decision of

this court in Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. State of

Bihar, (1958) SCR 1355: (AIR 1958 SC 452).”

(iii) The legislature has a plenary power, subject to constitutional

limitations to enact a law which is prospective or retrospective:

“The power of a legislature to enact a law with reference to

a topic entrusted to it, is, as already stated, unqualified

subject only to any limitation imposed by the Constitution.

In the exercise of such a power, it will be competent for the

legislature to enact a law, which is either prospective or

retrospective.”

36) It would also be pertinent to point out that in R.C. Tobacco (P) Ltd. case, this Court

authoritatively pronounced the fact that the dealer upon whom the tax is imposed is not

in a position to pass on tax on the consumers, is of no relevance to the competence of

the legislature. Following observations in this behalf may be noted:

Civil Appeal No. 4491 of 2016 & Ors. Page 29 of 35

30

“48. The petitioners who were admittedly in Group A have refuted this

and contend that their relationship with the large cigarette companies

was on a principal-to-principal basis and that under their agreements

they alone would be liable to pay the excise duty now demanded by

the respondents under Section 154.

49. We are not in a position to determine the disputes raised.

However, we cannot lose sight of the fact that although excise duty

like other indirect taxes may be passed on to the customer of the

goods under the law as it now stands, it is the manufacturer of the

excisable goods to whom the Excise Authorities will look for payment.

How the manufacturer will adjust its liability with its customers does

not concern the respondents nor can they be asked to recover their

dues from persons who may have ultimately taken over the

responsibility to pay the excise duty as a result of an agreement with

the manufacturer. (See in this connection State of Rajasthan v. J.K.

Udaipur Udyog Ltd. [(2004) 7 SCC 673] SCC at p. 692.)”

37)It would also be relevant to point out that in R.C. Tobacco (P) Ltd., this Court upheld

recission of an exemption notification with retrospective effect as originally framed

notification has not provided sufficient safeguards that would have ensured the

achievement of the object underlying the policy of incentives. The Court held that it

was permissible to rectify a defective expression of object of the policy by a

retrospective amendment.

“26. The exemption notifications were issued under Section 5-A of the

Central Excise Act, 1944 as a delegate of Parliament. In a cabinet

form of Government, the executive is expected to reflect the views of

the legislature. It would be impossible for the legislatures to deal in

detail and cater to the innumerable problems which may arise in

implementing a statute. When the power of subordinate legislation is

conferred by Parliament in certain matters it can only lay down the

policy and guidelines and expect that what is done by the executive is

in keeping with such policy. It does of course retain control over its

Civil Appeal No. 4491 of 2016 & Ors. Page 30 of 35

31

delegate and can exercise that control by repealing the action of the

delegate. [Sita Ram Bishambhar Dayal v. State of U.P., (1972) 4 SCC

485 : 1974 SCC (Tax) 294 : (1972) 2 SCR 141; M.K. Papiah &

Sons v. Excise Commr., (1975) 1 SCC 492 : 1975 SCC (Tax) 128]

Consequently, if the executive has failed to carry out the object of

Parliament, such control may be exercised by retrospectively

enacting what the executive ought to have achieved.”

38)In view of the aforesaid factual and legal discussion, reliance by Mr. Ganesh on the

judgments of this Court in West Bengal Hosiery Association & Ors. is totally

untenable as they are not applicable in the context of this case.

39)We, thus, do not find any merit in any of these appeals as we find that High Court has

appropriately dealt with the issue upholding the validity of the impugned amendment.

As a result, these appeals fail and are dismissed with cost.

............................................J.

(A.K. SIKRI)

.............................................J.

(ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE)

NEW DELHI;

MAY 08, 2017.

Civil Appeal No. 4491 of 2016 & Ors. Page 31 of 35

32

REVISED

ITEM NO.1B COURT NO.8 SECTION III

(FOR JUDGMENT

S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Civil Appeal No(s). 4491/2016

EUROTEX INDUSTRIES & EXPORTS LTD & ANR. Appellant(s)

VERSUS

STATE OF MAHARSHTRA & ANR Respondent(s)

WITH

C.A. No. 4492/2016

C.A. No. 4495/2016

C.A. No. 4497/2016

C.A. No. 4499/2016

Date : 08/05/2017 These appeals were called on for pronouncement of

judgment today.

Counsel for the

Parties: Ms. Ramni Taneja, Adv.

Mr. Anil Shrivastav, Adv.

Mr. Arjun Harkauli,Adv.

Mr. Nikhil Nayyar,Adv.

Mr. Prasanth P.,Adv.

Mr. Balbir Singh, Sr. Adv.

Mr. Rajesh Kumar,Adv.

Mr. Krishna Kumar R.S., Adv.

Mr. R.K. Srivastav, Adv.

Mr. K.S. Mahadevan, Adv.

Civil Appeal No. 4491 of 2016 & Ors. Page 32 of 35

33

Mr. Aniruddha P. Mayee,Adv.

Mr. Nishant RamakantraoKatneshwarkar,Adv.

Mr. Kunal A. Cheema, Adv.

Mr. Yogesh K. Ahirrao, Adv.

Hon'ble Mr. Justice A.K. Sikri pronounced the judgment of the

Bench comprising His Lordship and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Abhay Manohar

Sapre.

The appeals are dismissed in terms of the signed reportable

judgment.

Pending application(s), if any, stands di sposed of accordingly.

(Ashwani Thakur) (Mala Kumari Sharma)

COURT MASTER COURT MASTER

(Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file)

Civil Appeal No. 4491 of 2016 & Ors. Page 33 of 35

34

ITEM NO.1B COURT NO.8 SECTION III

(FOR JUDGMENT

S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Civil Appeal No(s). 4491/2016

EUROTEX INDUSTRIES & EXPORTS LTD & ANR. Appellant(s)

VERSUS

STATE OF MAHARSHTRA & ANR Respondent(s)

WITH

C.A. No. 4492/2016

C.A. No. 4495/2016

C.A. No. 4497/2016

C.A. No. 4499/2016

Date : 08/05/2017 These appeals were called on for pronouncement of

judgment today.

Counsel for the

Parties: Ms. Ramni Taneja, Adv.

Mr. Anil Shrivastav, Adv.

Mr. Arjun Harkauli,Adv.

Mr. Nikhil Nayyar,Adv.

Mr. Prasanth P.,Adv.

Mr. Balbir Singh, Sr. Adv.

Mr. Rajesh Kumar,Adv.

Mr. Krishna Kumar R.S., Adv.

Mr. R.K. Srivastav, Adv.

Mr. K.S. Mahadevan, Adv.

Civil Appeal No. 4491 of 2016 & Ors. Page 34 of 35

35

Mr. Aniruddha P. Mayee,Adv.

Mr. Nishant RamakantraoKatneshwarkar,Adv.

Mr. Kunal A. Cheema, Adv.

Mr. Yogesh K. Ahirrao, Adv.

Hon'ble Mr. Justice A.K. Sikri pronounced the judgment of the Bench

comprising His Lordship and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ashok Bhushan.

The appeals are dismissed in terms of the signed reportable judgment.

Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of accordingly.

(Ashwani Thakur) (Mala Kumari Sharma)

COURT MASTER COURT MASTER

(Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file)

Civil Appeal No. 4491 of 2016 & Ors. Page 35 of 35