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CGHC010264772026 2026:CGHC:29555-DB

NAFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

WPCR No. 384 of 2026

1 - Garvit Jain S/o Sh. Manoj Jain Aged About 26 Years R/o 146- A Hari

Nagar, Ashram Delhi – 110014

2 - Anshul Ginotra S/o Sh. Dharmpal Aged About 33 Years R/o 331/ 4

Near Old Bus Stand Krishna Colony, Rohtak, Haryana - 124001

... Petitioners

versus

1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through S H O P.S. Cyber Police Thana

(Range Sarguja) District- Surguja/ Ambikapur, Chhattisgarh Pin Code-

497001

2 - Mr. Rahul Bansal I P S / City S P- Ambikapur, I O Concerned F I R

No. 3/2025 P.S. Cyber Police Thana (Range Sarguja) District- Surguja/

Ambikapur, Chhattisgarh Pin Code- 497001

3 - H C Anshul P.S. Cyber Police Thana (Range Sarguja) District-

Surguja/ Ambikapur, Chhattisgarh 497001

4 - H C Praveen Rathore P.S. Cyber Police Thana Range Sarguja

District- Surguja/ Ambikapur, Chhattisgarh

... Respondents

(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)

For Petitioners :Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, Senior Advocate

assisted by Mr. Nitesh Kumar Jha,

Advocate

For Respondent No.1/State:Mr. Shaleen Singh Baghel, Government

Advocate

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Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice

Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge

Order on Board

Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice

14.07.2026

1.Heard Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, learned Senior Counsel assisted by

Mr. Nitesh Kumar Jha, learned counsel for the petitioners as well as Mr.

Shaleen Singh Baghel, learned Government Advocate, appearing for

the State/respondent No.1.

2.The present writ petition has been preferred under Article 226 of

the Constitution of India read with Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik

Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 seeking quashing of the First Information

Report registered at Cyber Police Station, Range Surguja, District

Surguja (Ambikapur), together with all consequential proceedings

arising therefrom, as also a direction for transfer of investigation to an

independent investigating agency. The FIR came to be registered on the

complaint of one Ravi Mohan Goswami alleging that certain unknown

persons induced him to invest money in the share market through

online applications namely "Money Trade 365" and "Skytrade" on the

assurance of high returns and thereby dishonestly induced him to

transfer an aggregate amount of 21,15,000/- in several transactions.

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On the basis of the said allegations, offences punishable under

Sections 318(4), 317(4), 111, 238 and 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya

Sanhita, 2023, Section 66-D of the Information Technology Act, 2000

and Sections 21(1), 21(2) and 21(3) of the Banning of Unregulated

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Deposit Schemes Act, 2019 came to be registered against unknown

persons. The petitioners has prayed for following relief(s):-

“10.1 Quash the First Information Report (F.I.R.)

bearing Crime No. 3/2025 lodged on 22.07.2025

at Police Station -Cyber Police Thana, (Range-

Sarguja), District-Sarguja/Ambikapur, (C.G.), U/s.

318(4)/3(5)/317(4)/111/238 BNS R/w 66-D IT Act

and Section 21(1), 21(2), 21(3) of BUDS Act and

all consequential proceedings emanating

therefrom qua the Petitioners; And/or

10.2 Transfer the investigation emanating from

the said FIR bearing Crime No. 3/2025 lodged on

22.07.2025 at Police Station -Cyber Police

Thana, (Range-Sarguja), District -Sarguja/

Ambikapur (C.G.), from the Respondent No.2 to

4 to any other independent investigating agency

in any other district of Respondent State. And/or

10.3 Initiate and conduct disciplinary action and

departmental enquiry against the errant and

corrupt of the Respondent State i.e., the

Respondent No.2 to 4 and suspend the errant

officials i.e., the Respondent No.2 to 4 from their

offices. And/or;

10.4 Pass any such further order(s) as this

Hon'ble Court may deem fit and appropriate in

the facts and circumstances of the present case.”

3.It is the case of the petitioners that they are neither named in the

First Information Report nor has any allegation whatsoever been

levelled against them by the complainant. According to the petitioners,

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despite the absence of any accusation, notices under Section 41-A of

the Code of Criminal Procedure (corresponding provisions under the

BNSS) and other coercive measures were initiated against them solely

on the basis of disclosure statements allegedly made by certain co-

accused persons during investigation. It is specifically pleaded that

apart from such disclosure statements, the investigating agency has

neither recovered any incriminating article from the petitioners nor

traced any money trail, digital evidence, bank transaction or

documentary material establishing their nexus with the alleged offences.

4.The petitioners further aver that apprehending arrest, they

approached the competent Courts at Delhi and were granted transit

anticipatory bail by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Rohini

Courts, Delhi vide order dated 28.04.2026, which protection was

subsequently extended on 15.05.2026. During the subsistence of the

said protection, the petitioners travelled from Delhi to Ambikapur on

more than one occasion, joined the investigation, cooperated with the

Investigating Officer and furnished all information sought from them,

whereafter acknowledgements evidencing their participation in the

investigation were also issued. Thereafter, by order dated 19.06.2026

passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Shahdara District,

Karkardooma Courts, Delhi, the petitioners were granted anticipatory

bail after the investigating agency itself admitted before the said Court

that the petitioners were not named in the FIR and that no legally

admissible evidence had surfaced against them except the disclosure

statements allegedly made by co-accused persons.

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5.It is further alleged that the investigation has not been conducted

in a fair, impartial or transparent manner and has been actuated by

mala fides. The petitioners have asserted that the investigating agency

has been indiscriminately apprehending persons from different States,

extracting disclosure statements by subjecting the arrested persons to

custodial coercion and thereafter falsely implicating innocent individuals.

Serious allegations have also been levelled against the Investigating

Officer and other police officials regarding demand and acceptance of

illegal gratification in connection with the present investigation,

whereupon proceedings are stated to have been initiated before the

learned Special Judge (PC Act), CBI, Rouse Avenue Courts, Delhi. On

the aforesaid factual foundation, the petitioners have approached this

Court seeking quashment of the FIR and all consequential proceedings

qua them, or in the alternative, transfer of investigation to an

independent investigating agency.

6.Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr.

Nitesh Kumar Jha, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners

submits that the continuation of the impugned criminal proceedings

constitutes a gross abuse of the process of law inasmuch as the

petitioners are admittedly not named in the First Information Report and

the complainant has not attributed any role whatsoever to them. It is

contended that even after investigation extending for more than one

year and despite filing of the charge-sheet as well as supplementary

charge-sheet, the investigating agency has failed to collect any legally

admissible evidence connecting the petitioners with the alleged

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offences. According to the learned counsel, the petitioners neither

induced the complainant to invest money nor had any interaction with

him, they are not beneficiaries of the alleged amount of 21,15,000/-, no

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recovery has been effected from them and no digital or financial trail

has been traced to them. It is further submitted that, apprehending

arrest solely on the basis of disclosure statements of co-accused

persons, the petitioners had approached the competent Courts at Delhi

and were granted transit anticipatory bail by the learned Additional

Sessions Judge, North-West District, Rohini Courts, Delhi vide order

dated 28.04.2026, which protection was subsequently extended by

order dated 15.05.2026. Thereafter, upon hearing the investigating

agency, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Shahdara District,

Karkardooma Courts, Delhi, by order dated 19.06.2026, granted

anticipatory bail to the petitioners after noticing that they were not

named in the FIR and that no legally admissible evidence had surfaced

against them except the disclosure statements of co-accused persons.

It is submitted that the aforesaid judicial orders, passed after hearing

the Investigating Officer, have attained finality and lend considerable

support to the petitioners' contention that no prima facie case is made

out against them.

7.Reliance is placed upon State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992

Supp (1) SCC 335, particularly Categories (1), (3), (5) and (7), to

contend that where the allegations and material collected during

investigation do not disclose commission of any offence or where the

proceedings are manifestly attended with mala fides, the extraordinary

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jurisdiction of the High Court ought to be exercised to prevent abuse of

process. It is next contended that the petitioners scrupulously complied

with every condition imposed while granting them transit protection.

Pursuant to the orders passed by the Courts at Delhi, they travelled

from Delhi to Ambikapur, Chhattisgarh, appeared before the

Investigating Officer on multiple occasions, joined the investigation,

cooperated fully with the investigating agency and furnished all

information sought from them. The Investigating Officer himself

acknowledged their participation in the investigation by issuing written

acknowledgements. Learned counsel submits that despite such

complete cooperation, the investigating agency has not been able to

recover any incriminating material from the petitioners or collect any

evidence connecting them with the alleged crime. It is, therefore, argued

that the petitioners' conduct throughout demonstrates their bona fides

and completely negates any allegation that custodial interrogation is

either necessary or justified.

8.It is next contended that the entire edifice of the prosecution case

against the petitioners rests solely upon disclosure statements allegedly

made by co-accused persons while in police custody. Learned counsel

submits that such disclosure statements do not constitute substantive

evidence against a co-accused and cannot legally be made the sole

foundation either for arrest or for continuation of criminal proceedings. It

is argued that no recovery has been effected pursuant to the alleged

disclosures insofar as the petitioners are concerned and, therefore, the

same are wholly inadmissible except to the limited extent permissible

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under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. Reliance is placed upon

the recent judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in P. Krishna

Mohan Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, SLP (Crl.) Nos. 7532-

7534 of 2025, wherein it has been observed that statements of an

accused recorded during investigation cannot be used as substantive

material against a co-accused while considering his liberty. Reliance is

also placed upon Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2021) 4 SCC

1, Haricharan Kurmi v. State of Bihar, AIR 1964 SC 1184 and

Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1952 SC 159.

9.Lastly, learned counsel submits that the statutory ingredients of

the offences invoked against the petitioners are wholly absent and, in

any event, the investigation itself stands vitiated by bias and mala fides.

It is argued that none of the ingredients of Sections 318(4), 317(4), 111

or 238 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, or Sections 21(1), 21(2)

and 21(3) of the Banning of Unregulated Deposit Schemes Act, 2019,

are attracted on the allegations appearing in the FIR or the material

collected during investigation. It is further submitted that serious

allegations of corruption, demand and acceptance of illegal gratification

have been levelled against the Investigating Officer and other police

officials, in respect whereof proceedings are pending before the learned

Special Judge (PC Act), CBI, Rouse Avenue Courts, Delhi. Placing

reliance upon Babubhai v. State of Gujarat, (2010) 12 SCC 254,

Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali, (2013) 5 SCC 762, Manohar Lal Sharma v.

Principal Secretary, (2014) 2 SCC 532 and Narmada Bai v. State of

Gujarat, (2011) 5 SCC 79, learned counsel submits that a fair

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investigation is an integral facet of Article 21 of the Constitution and,

where the conduct of the investigating agency itself creates a

reasonable apprehension of bias, this Court ought either to quash the

proceedings qua the petitioners or direct that the investigation be

transferred to an independent investigating agency.

10.On the other hand, Mr. Shaleen Singh Baghel, learned

Government Advocate opposes the writ petition and submits that the

investigation is being conducted strictly in accordance with law and at a

stage when investigation is still in progress, this Court ought not to

exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction either under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India or its inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, to interdict the statutory

powers of investigation. It is contended that although the petitioners

were not named in the First Information Report, their involvement

surfaced during the course of investigation through the disclosure

statements of co-accused persons, digital evidence collected during

investigation, financial transactions and other material presently being

examined by the investigating agency.

11.It is submitted that the petitioners are suspected to be associated

with the operation and management of the fraudulent investment

platforms through which unsuspecting investors were induced to part

with substantial amounts of money and, therefore, the investigation

cannot be stifled merely because the petitioners dispute the allegations.

He further submits that grant of transit anticipatory bail and subsequent

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anticipatory bail by the Courts at Delhi neither amounts to an

adjudication on the merits of the prosecution case nor precludes the

investigating agency from carrying the investigation to its logical

conclusion. It is argued that the observations made in the bail orders

are only prima facie in nature and cannot be construed as binding

findings warranting quashing of the FIR or transfer of investigation. It is

further submitted that the allegations regarding demand of illegal

gratification and bias on the part of the Investigating Officer are wholly

extraneous to the present proceedings, remain unsubstantiated and

cannot form the basis for quashing a criminal case or transferring the

investigation in the absence of any judicial determination establishing

such allegations.

12.Placing reliance upon the settled principles governing interference

at the stage of investigation, learned State counsel submits that the

inherent and writ jurisdiction of this Court is to be exercised sparingly

and only in the rarest of cases where the allegations do not disclose the

commission of any cognizable offence. Since the investigation has

disclosed material requiring further probe and the allegations involve a

large-scale cyber fraud affecting public interest, no case is made out

either for quashing of the FIR or for transfer of investigation, and

consequently, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed.

13.Reliance is placed on State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992

Supp (1) SCC 335; Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of

Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401; Skoda Auto Volkswagen India

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Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2021) 5 SCC 795; and CBI v.

Arvind Khanna, (2019) 10 SCC 686.

14.We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the

material available on record with utmost circumspection.

15.It is trite that the power to quash criminal proceedings at the

threshold is an extraordinary power, required to be exercised sparingly,

with circumspection and only in the rarest of rare cases where the

allegations, even if accepted in their entirety, fail to disclose the

commission of any cognizable offence or where the prosecution is

demonstrably mala fide or constitutes a manifest abuse of the process

of law. At the stage of investigation, this Court does not embark upon an

appreciation of the sufficiency or reliability of the evidence collected by

the investigating agency, nor does it undertake a mini trial to determine

the innocence or guilt of the persons against whom investigation is

being carried on. Such an exercise would amount to trenching upon the

statutory domain of the investigating agency and would be contrary to

the well-settled parameters governing judicial review in criminal matters.

16.The principal contention advanced on behalf of the petitioners is

that they are not named in the First Information Report and that no

legally admissible material has surfaced against them except the

disclosure statements of certain co-accused persons. While such

submissions may undoubtedly constitute relevant considerations at an

appropriate stage of the criminal proceedings, including while

considering discharge or at the stage of framing of charge, they do not,

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by themselves, furnish a legal foundation for quashing the First

Information Report or terminating the investigation in exercise of the

extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court. The correctness, admissibility

and evidentiary value of the material collected during investigation are

matters which fall within the exclusive province of the trial Court after

the investigation reaches its logical conclusion. Likewise, the

submissions relating to the applicability or otherwise of the provisions of

the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and the Banning of Unregulated

Deposit Schemes Act, 2019 involve questions requiring examination

upon completion of investigation and cannot be conclusively

adjudicated in proceedings of the present nature.

17.This Court also finds no justification, on the basis of the material

presently placed before it, to direct transfer of investigation from the

existing investigating agency. Allegations of bias, mala fides, corruption

or unfair investigation undoubtedly deserve serious consideration

whenever substantiated by cogent and convincing material. However,

such allegations cannot be accepted merely on the basis of assertions

made in the writ petition. Save and except placing reliance upon the

pendency of certain proceedings against the investigating officers, no

judicial determination has been brought to the notice of this Court

establishing that the investigation in the present crime has been

conducted in a manner so unfair, tainted or actuated by mala fides as to

completely erode public confidence in the investigative process. The

mere pendency of complaints or collateral proceedings cannot, by itself,

furnish a ground to divest the statutory investigating agency of its

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authority to investigate cognizable offences. The law is equally well

settled that transfer of investigation is an extraordinary remedy, to be

resorted to only when there exists compelling material demonstrating a

real likelihood of miscarriage of justice, which, in the considered opinion

of this Court, is absent in the facts of the present case.

18.The grant of transit anticipatory bail by the competent Courts at

Delhi, followed by the grant of anticipatory bail after hearing the

investigating agency, also does not persuade this Court to exercise its

extraordinary writ jurisdiction. The orders granting anticipatory bail were

rendered in proceedings relating to the liberty of the petitioners and

cannot be construed as recording final findings upon the legality of the

investigation or the sustainability of the allegations contained in the First

Information Report. Equally, the observations made while granting bail

are necessarily prima facie in nature and cannot foreclose the statutory

right of the investigating agency to carry the investigation to its logical

conclusion in accordance with law.

19.The law declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhajan Lal,

(supra), Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. (supra), Skoda Auto

Volkswagen India Pvt. Ltd. (supra), Arvind Khanna (supra) and a

catena of subsequent decisions leaves no manner of doubt that

constitutional courts should ordinarily refrain from interfering with an

ongoing investigation except in exceptional circumstances clearly falling

within the recognised categories. Tested on the touchstone of the

aforesaid principles, this Court is unable to hold that the present case

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falls within any of the exceptional categories warranting quashing of the

First Information Report or transfer of investigation. The contentions

raised by the petitioners pertain essentially to appreciation of evidence,

admissibility of material collected during investigation and the ultimate

culpability of the petitioners, all of which are matters to be examined by

the competent criminal Court in accordance with law after the

investigation culminates in an appropriate report under the provisions of

the BNSS.

20.For all the foregoing reasons, this Court is of the considered view

that the petitioners have failed to establish any jurisdictional error,

manifest arbitrariness, abuse of the process of law or exceptional

circumstance justifying exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction of this

Court either for quashing the impugned First Information Report or for

issuing a direction for transfer of investigation. The investigation shall,

therefore, be permitted to proceed unhindered and in accordance with

law. It is, however, clarified that any observations made in this judgment

are confined solely to the adjudication of the present writ petition and

shall not be construed as an expression on the merits of the criminal

case. The investigating agency shall conduct the investigation fairly,

impartially and uninfluenced by any observation contained herein, while

the petitioners shall remain at liberty to avail such remedies as may be

available to them under law at the appropriate stage.

21.Upon a comprehensive consideration of the pleadings, the

material placed on record, the rival submissions advanced by the

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learned counsel for the parties and the settled principles governing the

exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India read

with Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, this

Court is of the considered opinion that the petitioners have failed to

make out any case warranting interference in the extraordinary writ

jurisdiction of this Court. None of the grounds urged by the petitioners

falls within the well-recognised parameters for quashing of a First

Information Report or for transfer of investigation. The investigation is

still in progress and this Court finds no exceptional circumstance or

manifest abuse of the process of law justifying interdicting the statutory

powers of the investigating agency at this stage. The contentions raised

by the petitioners involve disputed questions of fact, appreciation of

evidence and determination of the evidentiary value of the material

collected during investigation, all of which are matters to be considered

by the competent criminal Court at the appropriate stage in accordance

with law.

22.Consequently, the writ petition, being devoid of substance and

merit, deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. However, it is clarified

that all observations made in this judgment are confined solely to the

adjudication of the issues arising in the present writ petition and shall

not be construed as an expression on the merits of the criminal case

pending investigation. The investigating agency shall proceed with the

investigation independently, objectively and strictly in accordance with

law, uninfluenced by any observations contained herein, while the

petitioners shall remain at liberty to avail such statutory remedies as

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may be available to them at the appropriate stage of the criminal

proceedings.

23.There shall be no order as to costs.

Sd/- Sd/-

(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)

Judge Chief Justice

Anu