2025 INSC 725 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 7532 OF 2025

P KRISHNA MOHAN REDDY …PETITIONER(S)

VERSUS

THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH ...RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.7533/2025

AND

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.7534/2025

O R D E R

Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 7532-34 of 2025 Page 1 of 35

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITIONS (CRL.) NO. 7533-34 OF 2025

1. Since the issues involved in the two petitions i.e. SLP (Crl.) No. 7532 of 2025

and SLP (Crl.) No. 7533 of 2025 wherein anticipatory bail is being prayed for

are same and the challenge is also to the self-same common impugned order

passed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Amaravati denying

anticipatory to the petitioners, those were taken up for hearing analogously

and are being disposed of by this common order.

2. The petitioners have been denied anticipatory bail by the High Court in

connection with Crime No.21 of 2024 registered at CID Police Station,

\angalagiri, Guntur District for the offence punishable under Sections 409,

420, 12-B read with Sections 34 & 37 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860

respectively (now Sections 316(5), 318(4), 61(2), 3(5) & 3(8) of the Bharatiya

Nyaya Sanhita, 2023) & Sections 7, 7A, 8 and 13(1)(b) and 13(2) of the

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

3. We need not delve much into the case of the prosecution as put up, more

particularly, when the High Court has reproduced the same exhaustively in its

impugned order dated 7-5-2025 passed in Criminal Petition No.4837/2025 and

Criminal Petition No.4838/2025 respectively.

Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 7532-34 of 2025 Page 2 of 35

4. However, with a view to give a fair idea as to the case of the prosecution as

on date, we may just reproduce a portion of the First Information Report which

reads thus: -

“12. The Committee after examining of records found the

following:

1. Suppression of the established popular brands and unfair

discrimination in allocation of OFS.over a period of time

leading to almost disappearance of some brands from the

market. 2. Favorable and preferential allocation of orders

to certain new brands in violations of the existing norms

giving them undue market share and competitive

advantage. 3. The procurement system was shifted to

manual process giving scope for manipulation in OFS

against the previous system of automated OFS

compromising the integrity or the process; 4. The MD,

APSBCL reported that Committee has examined OFS

(order for supply) data from 2018 onwards, detailed in

annexures, but they could not ascertain the motive behind

such discrimination and manipulations observed from the

records and data related to the procurement process and

other issues mentioned in the petitiorier, They

recommended that an external specialized investigation

agency may be advised to take up such action. 5. The MD,

APSBCL on the basis of above committee reported that the

matter may be examined and referred to a Specialized

Agency for further necessary action. 6. The report has been

examined and considering the seriousness of the matter as

per the contents of the enquiry report of the Internal

Committee mentioning suppression of brands, unfair

discrimination preferential allocation OFS violation etc,

the CID, Mangalagiri, AP is requested to take necessary

action for investigation into the matter as recommended by

the Internal Committee and the MD, APSBCL. MUKESH

KUMAR MEENA PRINCIPAL SECRETARY TO

GOVERNMENT TO The Criminal Investigation

Department (CID), Mangalagiri, AP Sc/Sf.

//FORWARDED :: BY ORDER// SECTION OFFICER. The

complainant requested for necessary legal action in this

regard. Copy of the complaint is enclosed herewith.

Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 7532-34 of 2025 Page 3 of 35

13. Action Taken: On 23.09.2024 at 22:00 hrs received an

English typed report of Sri Mukesh Kumar Meena,

Principal Secretary to Government, Andhra Pradesh vide

Memo No.Rev-01/CPE/20/2024-VIG-IV, dated, 20.09:2024

from O/o the Addl.DGP, CID, A.P., along with memo in

C.No.7020/EOW C-14/CID-AP/2024, dated: 23.09.2024

with instructions to register a case. As per the instructions

I registered the same as case in Cr.No.21/2024 U/S 420,

409, 120(B) IPC is registered at CID PS, A.P, Mangalagiri

on 23.09.2024 át 22:00 hrs. The original FIR along with the

complainant's report and enclosures submit to The Hon'ble

Court of III Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate,

Vijayawada and copy of FIR along with complainant's

report and enclosures sent to the 1.0. Sri T.Daiva Prasad,

DSP, CID, RO, Kurnool for investigation and copies to all

concerned.”

5. We heard Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, the learned Senior counsel appearing

for the petitioner namely P. Krishna Mohan Reddy and Mr. Vikas Singh, the

learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner namely K. Dhananjaya

Reddy.

6. On the other hand, we heard Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, Mr. Siddharth Luthra and

Mr. Siddharth Aggarwal, the learned Senior counsel appearing for the State of

Andhra Pradesh.

7. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would vehemently submit

that their clients at the relevant point of time were holding public office. They

were public servants. They have retired from service. However, due to

Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 7532-34 of 2025 Page 4 of 35

political vendetta and bias, they have been arrayed in the alleged crime on the

allegations that they are a part and parcel of a well-hatched criminal

conspiracy.

8. It was further submitted that there is no prima facie case worth the name

against the petitioners. In other words, there is no prima facie case worth the

name at this point of time to deny anticipatory bail.

9. During the course of hearing, it was brought to our notice that both these

petitioners have been cooperating with the investigating agency. Their

statements have been recorded. They have been interrogated and they shall

continue to cooperate with the investigating agency till the charge-sheet is

filed.

10. It was also pointed out, that the investigating agency has been adopting

dubious methods and tactics for the purpose of extracting confessional

statements from different witnesses by adopting third degree methods. It was

pointed out that a Writ Petition had to be filed in the High Court of Andhra

Pradesh at Amaravati seeking necessary relief in this regard and the High

Court has passed an order permitting a lawyer to remain present at the time of

interrogation.

Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 7532-34 of 2025 Page 5 of 35

11. It was further pointed out that at one point of time, the entire issue was looked

into by the Competition Commission and the Competition Commission did

not find anything what is being alleged today by the State.

12. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would submit that it is a fit

case for grant of anticipatory bail, more particularly, when the entire case put

up by the State is actuated by political bias or mala fides.

13. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the State vehemently

submitted that no error not to speak of any error of law could be said to have

been committed by the High Court in denying the anticipatory bail to the

petitioners.

14. They would submit that there is more than a prima facie case against the

petitioners. The investigation is at a very crucial stage. According to the State,

there has been misappropriation of public exchequer to the tune to more than

Rs.3,000 Crore. It was also submitted that the investigating agency may also

deem fit to pray for custodial interrogation if need arises and if some good

valid grounds are made out.

15. In short, the submission on behalf of the State is that at this point of time, this

Court may not exercise its discretionary jurisdiction of grant of anticipatory

Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 7532-34 of 2025 Page 6 of 35

bail as it may have its own implications in the investigation which is in

progress and is at a crucial stage.

16. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone

through the materials on record, we are of the view that we should not exercise

our discretion for the purpose of grant of anticipatory bail. The High Court has

looked into the matter in details and thereafter, declined to grant anticipatory

bail as prayed for.

17. The High Court while reaching the conclusion that more than a prima facie

case has been made out against the petitioners for the purpose of denying

anticipatory bail to them, has observed thus: -

“22. According to the prosecution, the scheme in question

favoured select liquor brands such as Adan and Leela, while

sidelining well-established brands like Pernod Ricard and

McDowell. As a result, several distilleries either shut down

operations or diverted their products to other states Despite

receiving consumer complaints regarding the quality of

alcohol, no remedial measures were undertaken. The

distilleries allegedly employed methods such as

transferring funds to gold traders, procuring GST invoices,

and remitting cash to the accused after deducting

commissions. The investigation has revealed suspicious

transactions amounting to approximately Rs 300-400

crores. In support of these allegations, the prosecution has

produced records suspicious transactions involving Leela

Agro and S.P.Y. Agro; bullion transactions entered into by

Tilak Nagar Industries Limited: bullion invoices and ledger

entries of Arham Bullion and Tiiak Nagar Industries

Limited and details of entities that were found to be non-

existent.

Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 7532-34 of 2025 Page 7 of 35

25. The allegations against the petitioners are that they

were responsible for the discontinuation of popular liquor

brands and the promotion of favoured brands, collecting

approximately Rs.3200 Crores in kickbacks for the liquor

syndicate. The prosecution further claims that, on average,

the accused received Rs.50-60 crores per month in

kickbacks, with A.1 allegedly handing over these amounts

to the petitioners in Crl.P.No.5009 of 2025 and

Crl.P.No.4838 of 2025.

29. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the

Respondent-State argues that the proceedings before the

Competition Commission of India (CCI) pertain to the

period from 2019 to 2021, whereas the allegations against

the accused persons cover the period from 2019 to 2024.

Therefore, the findings recorded by the CCI cannot be

afforded significant weight in this context. The prosecution

has relied upon sale transactions presented in a tabular

form, and the details contained therein, prima facie, support

the prosecution's case.

Brand Quantity in 2018-19 Quantity in 2023-24

McDowell's Brandy 22,73,086 5

Imperial Blue Whisky 20,21,955 7

Kingfisher Beer 1,02,47,566 11,82,388

Budweiser Beer 22,52,195 0

Brand Market share in

2018-19

Market share in

2023-24

McDowell's Brandy 23.41% 2.15%

Kingfisher Beer 29.5% 3.21%

Budweiser Beer 11.43% 1.25%

S.No. Name of the Brand Quantity Intended

1 Ocean Blue Whiskey 2,76,706

2 Daru House Whiskey 68,83,420

3 Supreme Blend Whiskey 77,35,400

4 Brilliant Blend Whiskey 37,30,800

5 9 Sea Horse Whiskey 46,07,733

6 Andhra Gold Whiskey 20,61,711

7 Good Friend Whiskey 27,72,050

8 HD Whiskey 22,02,555

32 This Court views that the investigating officer deserves

a free hand to take the investigation to its logical conclusion

in a case containing severe allegations. With regard to the

Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 7532-34 of 2025 Page 8 of 35

Prosecution's case, the Investigation remains incomplete.

Granting anticipatory bail to the Petitioners could

potentially hinder the ongoing investigation. The

allegations are severe, and the investigating agency has not

yet been able to interrogate the Accused/Petitioners. The

established legal principle is that anticipatory bail is not

granted as a matter of routine; it should only be provided

when the Court is convinced that exceptional circumstances

warrant such an extraordinary remedy.

36. The statements provided by several witnesses have

underscored the petitioners' prima facie involvement in the

criminal conspiracy associated with e Excise Policy. It

cannot lose sight of serious allegations leveled by the

prosecution and the evidences collected during the course

of investigation and presented before this Court, which

prima facie reveal the petitioners ‘role in the offence in

question. The material placed on record, its face, suggests

the petitioners involvement in the offence in question. Given

these circumstances, custodial interrogation is deemed

essential to confront the petitioners with the gathered

evidence and to unravel a broader conspiracy implicating

the accused in the implementation of the Excise Policy.”

18. In view of the aforesaid, it cannot be said that the High Court failed to exercise

its discretion in a judicious manner while declining to grant anticipatory bail

to the petitioners as prayed for.

19. Custodial interrogation is qualitatively more elicitation oriented than

questioning a suspect who is well ensconced with a favourable order under

Section 438. In corruption cases concerning influential persons, effective

interrogation of the suspect is of tremendous advantage in disinterring many

useful information and also materials which are likely to be concealed.

Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 7532-34 of 2025 Page 9 of 35

Success in such interrogation would elude if the suspected person knows that

he is well protected and insulated by a pre-arrest bail order during the time he

is interrogated. Very often interrogation in such condition would reduce to a

mere ritual. The High Court remained alive and very rightly to the

apprehension of the investigating agency that the petitioners would influence

the witnesses, considering particularly the high position they all held at one

point of time.

20. Anticipatory bail to accused in cases of the present nature would greatly harm

the investigation and would impede the prospects of unearthing of the

ramifications involved in the conspiracy. Public interest also would suffer as

a consequence.

21. It was sought to be argued that the petitioners have already joined the

investigation and are fully cooperating with the investigating agency and

therefore, there is no need for custodial interrogation.

22. The petitioners might have been cooperating with the investigation and they

might have been interrogated also by the investigating agency so far but, at

the same time, we should not overlook the fact that by grant of anticipatory

bail, we may come in the way of the investigating agency if at all it wants

custodial interrogation.

Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 7532-34 of 2025 Page 10 of 35

23. As held by this Court in Sumitha Pradeep vs. Arun Kumar C.K. & Anr.

reported in (2022)17 SCC 391 that it would be preposterous as a proposition

of law to say that if custodial interrogation is not required that by itself is

sufficient to grant anticipatory bail. Even in cases where custodial

interrogation may not be required the court is obliged to consider the entire

case put up by the State, more particularly, the nature of the offence, the

punishment provided in law for such offence etc.

24. It is needless to say that for the purpose of custodial interrogation, the

investigating agency has to make out a prima facie case at the time when

remand is prayed for. Whether any case for police remand is made out or not,

it is for the Court concerned to look into.

25. In such circumstances, referred to above, we are of the view that we should

not come in the way of the investigating agency at this point of time and the

investigation should be permitted to proceed further.

26. At this stage, we would like to observe something important.

27. To some extent, the petitioners could be said to have made out a prima facie

case of political bias or mala fides but that by itself is not sufficient to grant

anticipatory bail overlooking the other prima facie materials on record.

Political vendetta or bias if any is one of the relevant considerations while

Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 7532-34 of 2025 Page 11 of 35

considering the plea of anticipatory bail. The courts should keep one thing in

mind, more particularly, while considering the plea of anticipatory bail that

when two groups of rival political parties are at war which may ultimately lead

to litigations, more particularly, criminal prosecutions there is bound to be

some element of political bias or vendetta involved in the same. However,

political vendetta by itself is not sufficient for the grant of anticipatory bail.

The courts should not just look into the aspect of political vendetta and ignore

the other materials on record constituting a prima facie case as alleged by the

State. It is only when the court is convinced more than prima facie that the

allegations are frivolous and baseless, that the court may bring into the element

of political vendetta into consideration for the purpose of considering the plea

of anticipatory bail. The frivolity in the entire case that the court may look into

should be attributed to political bias or vendetta.

Section 30 of the Evidence Act

28. It appears from the impugned order that the High Court looked into few

disclosure statements made by co-accused and according to the High Court,

as such disclosure statements are admissible during trial under Section 30 of

the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for short, the “Evidence Act”) those can also

be looked into at the stage of considering the plea of anticipatory bail or even

regular bail.

Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 7532-34 of 2025 Page 12 of 35

29. The High Court in its impugned order has observed as under:

“20. The prosecution has also relied upon the confessional

statements of co-accused persons to establish the

petitioners' involvement in the commission of the offence.

However, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the

petitioners have strongly opposed the reliance on such

confessional statements, contending that they are

inadmissible in evidence. In contrast, the learned Senior

Counsel for the Respondent/State submits that the

statements made by co-accused persons are subject to

evaluation during trial, and it would be incorrect to contend

that confessional statements made by an accused during

interrogation cannot be considered for the purpose of

connecting other accused persons. This Court is of the view

that such disclosure statements made by co-accused can

indeed be taken into consideration as investigative leads

and. further, may be admissible during trial under Section

30 of the Indian Evidence Act.

21. It is erroneous to say that confessional statement made

by the accused during interrogation cannot be considered

or looked into to connect the other co-accused. Such

disclosure statement of co-accused can certainly be taken

into consideration for providing lead in investigation and

even during trial it is admissible under Section 30 of the

Indian Evidence Act.”

(Emphasis supplied)

30. Since the High Court has touched Section 30 of the Evidence Act, we would

like to say something in this regard. The said provision reads thus: -

“When more persons than one are being tried jointly for the

same offence, and a confession made by one of such persons

affecting himself and some other of such persons is proved,

the court may take into consideration such confession as

against such other person as well as against the person who

makes such confession.”

Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 7532-34 of 2025 Page 13 of 35

31. As per Section 5 of Evidence Act, only those facts or facts in issue which are

considered relevant under Chapter II of the Act would be admissible as

evidence. Section(s) 24 to 30 of the Evidence Act, deals with the relevancy

and admissibility of ‘confessions’ as evidence. Section 24 of the Evidence Act

provides when a confession would be relevant by laying down a negative rule

of relevancy and prescribing the general parameters when a confession would

be considered irrelevant; namely when such confession is caused by either

threat, inducement or promise.

32. Section(s) 28 and 29 of the Evidence Act respectively are an exception to the

aforesaid general rule of relevancy of confessions. Section 28 provides that

where although any threat, inducement or promise was made to cause a

confession, yet if such confession was made after the cessation, removal or

eradication of such improper influence or impression, then such confession

would be relevant. Section 29 on the other hand, expands the test of relevancy

by prescribing a positive rule of when a confession would continue to be

relevant and provides that a confession made under one particular type of

promise i.e., a promise of secrecy or made as a result of any deception,

intoxication or by one’s own volition in response to any question, would not

render such confession irrelevant.

Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 7532-34 of 2025 Page 14 of 35

33. Section 25 of the Evidence Act, goes one step further, by providing that even

if such confession is not hit by Section 24 i.e., it is not the result of any threat,

inducement or promise and thus, considered relevant, still such confession

would be inadmissible if it was made to a police officer. Section 26 and 27 of

the Evidence Act, however, carves out an exception to this. Section 26

provides that, a confession made by the accused to persons other than police

officers would be inadmissible, if it was made whilst he was in police custody,

unless such confession was made in the presence of a magistrate. Whereas,

Section 27 only permits limited use of such statement only to the extent that a

fact is discovered pursuant to disclosure statement which would connect the

accused with the crime with authorship of concealment.

34. Section 30 of the Evidence Act, provides that a confession made by a person

admitting his own guilt and at the same time implicating another person, such

confession “may be taken into consideration” by the court against the maker

as-well as against the person it is being made, if both of them are being “tried

jointly”.

35. The Privy Council in Bhuboni Sahu v. R reported in 1949 SCC OnLine PC

12 explained the significance of the expression “may take into consideration”

used in Section 30. It observed that a “confession” does not come within the

definition of “Evidence” under Section 3 of the Evidence Act, as it is neither

Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 7532-34 of 2025 Page 15 of 35

required to be given on oath, nor in the presence of the co-accused, and the

same cannot be tested by cross-examination. Thus, although a confession

against a co-accused, is not an evidence, yet as per Section 30, a court may

take it into consideration and act upon it. However, the courts must be mindful

that such confessions do not amount to proof, it is only one of the elements in

the consideration of all other facts proved in a particular case, and therefore,

there must be other evidence before such confession is taken into

consideration. [See also: K. Hashim v. State of T.N., (2005) 1 SCC 237; State

(NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600]

36. This Court in Kashmira Singh v. State of M.P reported in (1952) 1 SCC 275

further explained as to when such confession may be taken into consideration

against another co-accused. Placing reliance on the decision of Periyaswami

Moopan, In re. reported in 1930 SCC OnLine Mad 86 it was held that,

“where there is evidence against the co-accused sufficient, if believed, to

support his conviction, then the kind of confession described in Section 30 may

be thrown into the scale as an additional reason for believing that evidence”

and “the proper way is, first, to marshal the evidence against the accused

excluding the confession altogether from consideration and see whether, if it

is believed a conviction could safely be based on it. If it is capable of belief

independently of the confession, then of course it is not necessary to call the

confession in aid. But cases may arise where the Judge is not prepared to act

Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 7532-34 of 2025 Page 16 of 35

on the other evidence as it stands even though, if believed, it would be

sufficient to sustain a conviction. In such an event the Judge may call in aid

the confession and use it to lend assurance to the other evidence and thus

fortify himself in believing what without the aid of the confession he would not

be prepared to accept”. Thus, such a confession can only be pressed into

consideration by the court as a rule of prudence, to lend assurance to the other

evidence against such co-accused.

37. The ingredients or conditions required under Section 30 of the Evidence Act,

before any confession is made to operate against a co-accused are as under: -

(i) there must be joint trial for the same offence;

(ii) it must be a confession;

(iii) the confession must inculpate or implicate the maker and to the same

extent the other accused

(iv) the confession of guilt must be duly proved.

The aforesaid four conditions have to be strictly established. Such

confession cannot be taken into consideration under Section 30 where the

confession itself was not relevant or inadmissible or where a co-accused was

not being tried jointly with the accused person who made the confession or

where he did not make a statement incriminating himself along with the co-

accused. [See Mohd. Khalid v. State of W.B., (2002) 7 SCC 334; Govt. of

NCT of Delhi v. Navjot Sandhu, (2003) 10 SCC 586]

Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 7532-34 of 2025 Page 17 of 35

38. In Suresh Budharmal Kalani v. State of Maharashtra reported in (1998) 7

SCC 337, this Court held that under Section 30 of the Evidence Act a

confession of an accused is relevant and admissible against a co-accused if

both are jointly facing trial for the same offence. However, such confessional

statements of an accused cannot be used against a co-accused in terms of

Section 30 of Evidence Act, for the purpose of framing charges in the absence

of any other evidence to do so. Similarly, where one of the accused has been

discharged, confessional statement of such accused persons cannot be used

against a co-accused, as the pre-condition under Section 30 of the Evidence

Act, namely of there being a joint trial for the same offence is not fulfilled.

39. The High Court has its own understanding of Section 30 of the Evidence Act.

It says that what is admissible under Section 30 can also be looked into at the

stage of considering the plea of anticipatory bail or even regular bail.

However, we are not impressed with the view expressed by the High Court.

We are of the considered opinion that such a confession if any cannot be

looked into at the stage of anticipatory bail or even regular bail for the

following reasons: -

(i) Before a confession is taken into consideration against a co-accused,

the said confession has to be duly proved against the maker. It has to be

clearly established that such confession is not vitiated either by Section

24 of the Evidence Act nor rendered inadmissible by Section 25 thereof,

Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 7532-34 of 2025 Page 18 of 35

which can only be ascertained in the course of trial. It must be clearly

established by leading cogent evidence in the course of the trial before

the case for the prosecution comes to an end. [See: Dipak Bhai

Jagdishchandra Patel v. State of Gujarat & Anr., (2019) 16 SCC 547].

When confession is made before police official, the same cannot be

proved in evidence at all. Statement contemplated under section 30

should be relevant and admissible, and that is the foremost requirement

of section and sine qua non.

(ii) Section 30 of Evidence Act postulates that such a confession can be

taken into consideration only where the accused persons are jointly

tried. The said provision does not merely require that the persons must

be accused of the same offence, but rather requires that they must be

being tried jointly for the said offence. [See: Queen Empress v. Jagat

Chandra Mali, ILR (1894) 22 Cal 50; Naresh v. R, AIR 1938 Cal 479].

Joint trial here refers to the one provided under Section 223 of the Code

of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, the “Cr.P.C.”). Thus, where the

accused persons are either not being tried jointly, or are yet to be

charged for the same offence and thereafter tried together, Section 30

of the Evidence Act would be inapplicable. [See: Badri Prasad

Prajapati v. State of M.P., (2005) Cr.L.J. 1856]. Thus, Section 30 of

the Evidence Act, would not spring into action when the charges are yet

to be framed and the accused persons are yet to be committed to trial,

Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 7532-34 of 2025 Page 19 of 35

and any confession admissible thereunder cannot be taken into

consideration by the courts.

(iii) Assuming for a moment that such a confession can be looked into at the

stage of anticipatory bail or even regular bail, as per Kashmira

Singh (supra), such a confession can only be pressed into consideration

by the court as a rule of prudence, to lend assurance to the other

evidence against such co-accused. Thus, there must exist other evidence

on record, before the court looks into such confession.

40. Where a confessional statement is otherwise excluded or inadmissible by

virtue of Section(s) 25 or 26 of the Evidence Act, respectively, there can be

no question of such confessional statements being made admissible against

another co-accused by stretching it with the help of Section 30 of the Evidence

Act. Section 25 places a complete ban on the making of such confession by

that person whether he is in custody or not. Section 26 lays down that a

confession made by a person while he is in the custody of a police officer shall

not be proved against him unless it is made in the immediate presence of a

Magistrate. [See: Sahib Singh v. State of Haryana, (1997) 7 SCC 231]

Confessional statement contemplated under Section 30 of the Evidence Act,

must be both relevant and admissible in terms of the Evidence Act.

Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 7532-34 of 2025 Page 20 of 35

41. At this stage, we may clarify, with a view to obviate any possibility of

confusion, whether a confession statement of an accused person implicating

another co-accused be taken into consideration against such co-accused in

terms of Section 161 of the Cr.P.C.

42. It is no more res integra that a person who is accused of an offence or named

in the first information report, can be examined by the police and his statement

may be recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C., in this regard reliance may

be placed on the decision of this Court in Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani &

Anr. reported in AIR 1978 SC 1025. However, the question as to whether

such statement of the accused is admissible in law and in what manner can the

same be looked into was explained by this Court in Mahabir Mandal & Ors.

v. State of Bihar reported in AIR 1972 1331, wherein it was held that as per

Section 162 of the Cr.P.C. no statement made by any person to a police officer

in the course of an investigation shall be signed by the person making it or

used for any purpose at any enquiry or trial in respect of any offence under

investigation at the time when such statement was made. The only instance

where such statements may be considered or looked into has been provided in

the Proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 162, which permits the use of such

statement or any part thereof, to contradict such witness in the manner

provided by Section 145 of Evidence Act or in the re-examination of such

Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 7532-34 of 2025 Page 21 of 35

witness for the purpose only of explaining any matter referred to in his cross-

examination.

43. A statement given by an accused to the police under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C.

may be either in the form of a confession or an admission. The Privy Council

in Pakala Narayana Swami v. Emperor reported in (1939) PC 47 explained

that a confession is a statement admitting the offence or at any rate

substantially all the facts which constitute the offence, whereas an admission

is only in respect of a gravely incriminating fact. Even a conclusively

incriminating fact is not of itself a confession. Where such statement is a

confessional statement, the rigour of Section(s) 25 and 26 will apply in full

force, and the said confession would be completely inadmissible as held in

Sahib Singh (supra) and a catena of other decisions of this Court. Where,

however, such statement amounts to an admission, the statement being one

under Section 161, would immediately attract the bar under Section 162 of the

Cr.PC., and the same may be used only for the very limited purpose provided

in the Proviso as held in Mahabir Mandal (supra).

44. We are conscious of a handful of decisions of this Court wherein it has been

held that statements under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. ought to be looked into

by the courts in deciding the question of grant of bail. Indresh Kumar v. State

of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 2411 observed

Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 7532-34 of 2025 Page 22 of 35

that “statements under Section 161 of Cr. P.C. may not be admissible in

evidence, but are relevant in considering the prima facie case against an

accused in an application for grant of bail in case of grave offence”. Similarly,

in Salim Khan v. Sanjai Singh reported in (2002) 9 SCC 670, it was held that

the court is “duty-bound to consider all the statements recorded under Section

161 CrPC, examine the gravity of the offence and also examine the question

of possibility of the accused tampering with the evidence and possibility of

getting the attendance of the accused during trial and then would be entitled

to grant bail to an accused”.

45. However, the aforesaid observations cannot be singled out and construed

devoid of its context. While it is permissible for the courts to examine the

statements recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. for the purpose of

ascertaining whether a prima-facie case has been made out against the accused

and the nature or gravity of the allegations, the same applies only insofar as

such police statements are of witnesses and not accused persons.

46. Both Indresh Kumar (supra) and Salim Khan (supra) have held that in

deciding the question of grant of bail, it is the statements of witness under

Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. that has to be looked into. Nowhere has this Court

held that even the police statements of the accused person under Section 161

Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 7532-34 of 2025 Page 23 of 35

of the Cr.P.C. must also be looked into at the stage of grant of anticipatory or

regular bail.

47. This is because a statement of an accused under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C

stands on a different footing from a police statement of any ordinary witness.

Statements of an accused person under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. by virtue of

ordinarily being in the form of either an admission or a confession cannot be

looked into qua another co-accused, as to say otherwise would be to ignore

the substantive provisions of Section(s) 17, 21, 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act

and the well settled cannons of law of evidence. However, the aforesaid does

not apply, where the statement of an accused under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C

is exculpatory in nature, which we shall discuss later.

48. As per Section(s) 17 read with 21 of the Evidence Act, the general principle

is that an admission may be given as evidence against the maker only and

cannot be used against any other person. The only two exceptions to the

aforesaid rule are in the context of civil disputes, i.e., where a party having a

joint interest with others makes an admission relating to a subject-matter, it

can be used against others or where such admission is sought to be used

against any heir or persons claiming interest through or under the makers of

such admission.

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49. As explained in Pakala Narayana Swami (supra), a confession is one specie

of an admission, this flows from the logic that every confession is an

admission but not every admission is a confession, while admissions in itself

is a specie or type of a statement. As a natural corollary to the aforesaid, any

statement of the accused under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. which is in the form

of an admission that admits any incriminating fact or implicates another

person by such statement, would be governed by the provisions of Section 17

of Evidence Act, more particularly the prohibition of usage of such admissions

against third-persons. An admission by one accused cannot be used against

another co-accused. [See: Chintamani Das v. State, AIR 1970 Ori 100; Sohar

Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1960 Pat 448]. The aforesaid may be looked at

from one another angle, since the Evidence Act, more particularly, Section(s)

17 and 30 clearly stipulate in well-defined terms, when an admission or a

confession, respectively, may be used against another person, the logical

sequitur of the aforesaid is that, except for the manner laid down under the

said provisions, no admission or confession may be used against another

person. Since, Section 17 of the Evidence Act does not postulate the use of an

admission by one accused against another, any statement of the accused under

Section 161 of the Cr.P.C., implicating such co-accused cannot be looked into

by the courts.

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50. Even where the police statement of an accused person under Section 161 of

the Cr.P.C is neither an admission nor a confession, i.e., it is exculpatory in

nature and not inculpatory, such statements can be looked into by the courts

only for the limited purpose of culling out the stance of the accused person

qua the allegations. An exculpatory police statement of an accused person

under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C which at the same time implicates another co-

accused, cannot be relied upon, merely because such statement is not hit by

the safeguards and rigours that apply in respect of inculpatory statements in

the form of an admissions or confessions under the Evidence Act. The

fundamental cannon of criminal jurisprudence is that a statement of one

accused person cannot be used against another co-accused person. The limited

exception to this aforesaid general principle are inculpatory confessions,

where the accused person in his confessional statement not only admits his

own guilt but also implicates another co-accused. The rationale behind this

limited exception as explained in Bhuboni Sahu (supra), is that an admission

by an accused person of his own guilt affords some sort of credibility or

sanction in support of the truth of his confession against others as-well as

himself. An exculpatory statement is an affront to the aforesaid principle.

Thus, an exculpatory statement of an accused person under Section 161 of the

Cr.P.C. can only be looked into for the limited purpose of either culling out

the stance of the accused person qua the allegations or for contradicting the

accused, if the accused chooses to be examined as a witness in terms of Section

Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 7532-34 of 2025 Page 26 of 35

315 of the Cr.P.C. However, such exculpatory statement insofar as it

implicates another co-accused person can in no manner be relied upon by the

courts as against such co-accused as such statements by their nature cannot be

tested by cross-examination if such accused person declines to be a witness in

the trial in terms of Section 315 of the Cr.P.C., and because such exculpatory

statement has no credibility.

51. Such statements at best could be said to be helpful to the investigating

authorities for the purpose of ascertaining that the investigation is proceeding

in the right direction or not, as ordinarily, once the investigation is over, these

statements are neither supplied to the accused along with chargesheet nor

placed on record.

52. Thus, Section 30 itself makes it clear that the whole legal exercise by virtue

of which this provision of law can be made applicable, depends upon the

proving of confession before a court which makes it into an admissible one in

order to implicate the other accused provided the confession given by such

person is established with full strength on the basis of other materials

pertaining to the attendant circumstances. It would necessarily mean that mere

confession alone will not be adequate or sufficient to implicate other persons.

It is incumbent that there are other materials also which would render support

or substantiate the case of the confession. However, it is subject to the standard

Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 7532-34 of 2025 Page 27 of 35

of proving as contemplated by law. If this is the position, the court should look

into the statements alleged to have been given by the co-accused and that too

before a police officer during the course of investigation with great care and

circumspection. The said statements are directly hit by Section 161 of the

Code of Criminal Procedure. Particularly, the statement given by any one of

the accused persons and recorded by the police officer during the course of

investigation cannot be relied upon by the prosecution, except subject to the

limitations provided by Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act. The statement

given by an accused involving himself in the crime and also implicating third

person cannot be proved legally in the court. It will be in direct conflict with

Sections 25 and 26 respectively of the Evidence Act. If such evidence or

confession cannot be proved, then the occasion for utilizing such statement

against another person would not arise.

53. From the above exposition of law, the following emerges: -

(i) A person who is accused of an offence or named in the first information

report, can be examined by the police and his statement may be recorded

under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C., as held in Nandini Satpathy (supra).

(ii) A statement of an accused under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C, would

ordinarily be of two kinds, it may be inculpatory in nature or may be

exculpatory in nature.

Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 7532-34 of 2025 Page 28 of 35

(iii) An inculpatory statement again may be in the form of an admission or

a confession. If such statement admits either a gravely incriminating

fact or substantially all the facts which constitute the offence,

respectively, as held in Pakala Narayana Swami (supra), then it

amounts to confession.

(iv) Where such police statement of an accused is confessional statement,

the rigour of Section(s) 25 and 26 respectively will apply with all its

vigour. A confessional statement of an accused will only be admissible

if it is not hit by Section(s) 24 or 25 respectively and is in tune with the

provisions of Section(s) 26, 28 and 29 of the Evidence Act respectively.

In other words, a police statement of an accused which is in the form of

a confession is per se inadmissible and no reliance whatsoever can be

placed on such statements either at the stage of bail or during trial. Since

such confessional statements are rendered inadmissible by virtue of

Section 25 of the Evidence Act, the provision of Section 30 would be

of no avail, and no reliance can be placed on such confessional

statement of an accused to implicate another co-accused.

(v) A confessional statement of one accused implicating another co-

accused may be taken into consideration by the court against such co-

accused in terms of Section 30 of the Evidence Act, only at the stage of

trial, where (1) the confession itself was relevant and admissible in

terms of the Evidence Act; (2) was duly proved against the maker; (3)

Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 7532-34 of 2025 Page 29 of 35

such confessional statement incriminates the maker along with the co-

accused and; (4) both the accused persons in question are in a joint trial

for the same offence.

(vi) Furthermore, because such confessional statements are not “evidence”

in terms of Section 3 of the Evidence Act as held in Bhuboni

Sahu (supra), such a confession as held in Kashmira Singh (supra) can

only be pressed into consideration by the court as a rule of prudence, to

lend assurance to the other evidence against such co-accused, provided

that aforesaid ingredients or conditions of Section 30 read with

Section(s) 24 to 29 of the Evidence Act, are fulfilled.

(vii) Where the police statement of an accused is in the form of an admission,

such inculpatory statement even if it implicates another co-accused

cannot be taken into consideration against such co-accused in terms of

Section(s) 17 read with 21 of the Evidence Act, as doing so would

militate against the general principle, that an admission may be given

as evidence against the maker alone. The exceptions to the aforesaid

general principle carved out under the Evidence Act, do not permit the

usage of such admission against a co-accused in any scenario

whatsoever.

(viii) Where the police statement of the accused is an exculpatory statement

i.e., it is neither a confession nor an admission, the statement being one

under Section 161, would immediately attract the bar under Section 162

Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 7532-34 of 2025 Page 30 of 35

of the Cr.PC., and the same may be used only for the very limited

purpose provided in the Proviso for the purpose of contradiction or re-

examination of such accused person alone, as held in Mahabir Mandal

(supra). Even if such exculpatory statement of one accused, implicates

another co-accused, the same cannot be taken into consideration against

such co-accused, as there can be no credibility attached to an

exculpatory statement of an accused implicating another co-accused,

more particularly because it is neither required to be given on oath, nor

in the presence of the co-accused, the same cannot be tested by cross-

examination and the exculpatory nature of such statement militates

against the foundational principle that permits taking into consideration

a statement of one accused person against another co-accused as

explained in Bhuboni Sahu (supra), i.e., ‘when a person admits guilt to

its fullest extent either to a certain incriminating fact or substantially

all the facts which constitute the offence, and in doing so exposes

himself and in the process other co-accused persons to the pain and

penalties provided for the guilt, there exists a sincerity and semblance

of sanction for the truthfulness of such statement’.

(ix) Although a handful of decisions of this Court such as Indresh Kumar

(supra) and Salim Khan (supra) have held that statements under Section

161 of the Cr.P.C. ought to be looked into by the courts at the stage of

anticipatory or regular bail for the purpose of ascertaining whether a

Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 7532-34 of 2025 Page 31 of 35

prima-facie case has been made out against the accused and the nature

and gravity of the allegations, yet the aforesaid rule only applies insofar

as such statements under Section 161 were made by witnesses and not

accused persons. A statement of an accused under Section 161 of the

Cr.P.C. stands on a completely different footing from a police statement

of a witness. As already discussed in the foregoing paragraphs, if the

police statement of an accused is inculpatory in nature, its more in the

form of a confession or admission rather than a statement, and the

relevant provisions of Section(s) 17 to 30 of the Evidence Act, will

apply with all its vigour. Where such statement of the accused is

exculpatory in nature, the same can be looked into by the courts only

for the limited purpose of either culling out the stance of the accused

person qua the allegations or for contradicting the accused, if the

accused chooses to be examined as a witness in terms of Section 315 of

the Cr.P.C.. However, such exculpatory statement insofar as it

implicates another accused person cannot be looked into by the courts,

as such statements by their nature cannot be tested by cross-examination

if such accused person declines to be a witness in the trial in terms of

Section 315 of the Cr.P.C., and because such exculpatory statement has

no credibility as explained in Bhuboni Sahu (supra).

(x) Before the court looks into the police statement of any person under

Section 161 of the Cr.P.C for the purpose of anticipatory or regular bail,

Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 7532-34 of 2025 Page 32 of 35

the court must first ascertain whether such person is actually a witness

or an accused person, or likely to be an accused person in respect of the

offence(s) alleged. This is because, there may be situations where a

person while giving his statement under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C may

not be an accused, but later arrayed as one. In such a scenario the courts

must be mindful of the fact that because the investigation is still

ongoing, it is more likely for a person who was originally a witness to

happen to be later arrayed as an accused person. If the court was to

blindly place reliance on statement of such a person merely because he

is not named in the first information report, without first seeing whether

such person is likely to be arrayed as an accused or not, it would lead

to an absurd situation where the statement of such a person may be

relied upon up until such person is arrayed as an accused. We also

caution the courts, where it emerges from the material on record, that

such a person is likely to be arrayed as an accused, the courts should

refrain from expressing any such opinion so that the investigation is not

prejudiced in any manner.

Allegations of third-degree methods

54. Besides the above, we would also like to make ourselves very clear that the

investigating agency shall not adopt any third-degree methods or shall not

Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 7532-34 of 2025 Page 33 of 35

coerce or exert any undue pressure or bring any undue influence on any of the

witnesses or any of the co-accused to make statements that may suit the State.

Tomorrow, if any complaint is made before the court in this context with some

cogent material, be it the trial Court or the High Court or the Supreme Court,

the same shall be viewed very seriously. It is expected of the investigating

agency to carry out a fair, impartial and transparent investigation, more

particularly, in accordance with law.

55. Before we close this matter, we make it further clear that if the petitioners are

ultimately arrested, remanded and thereafter sent to judicial custody and if any

regular bail application is filed, the same shall be considered on its own merits

in accordance with law. It is needless to say that the principles of grant of

anticipatory bail substantially differ from the principles of grant of regular

bail. It is for the Court concerned to apply the correct principles of law so far

as the grant of regular bail is concerned and decide the same accordingly.

56. With the aforesaid, these Special Leave Petitions are disposed of.

57. If the petitioners have any further apprehension that they may be ill-treated,

they can approach the High Court and obtain the very same relief that the High

Court has granted in favour of the other witnesses.

Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 7532-34 of 2025 Page 34 of 35

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO. 7534 OF 2025

1. This petitioner has already been arrested in connection with Crime No.21 of

2024 registered at CID Police Station, Mangalagiri, Guntur District, State of

Andhra Pradesh.

2. We are informed that the petitioner was arrested and remanded to judicial

custody. While reminding him to judicial custody, the investigating officer did

not pray for any police remand. After being remanded to judicial custody,

according to the State, the investigating officer has now moved an application

seeking police remand of the petitioner.

3. We do not say anything in this regard because it will be for the Court

concerned to consider whether once an accused is remanded to judicial

custody whether thereafter the Investigating Officer can pray for police

remand or not.

4. Be that as it may, if any application for regular bail is filed by the petitioner,

the same shall be looked into by the Court concerned on its own merits by

applying the well-settled principles of grant of regular bail in accordance with

law.

5. With the aforesaid, the Special Leave Petition is disposed of.

Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 7532-34 of 2025 Page 35 of 35

6. Pending applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of.

.......................................................... J.

(J.B. Pardiwala)

.......................................................... J.

(R. Mahadevan)

New Delhi;

16

th

May, 2025