2026 INSC 785

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7067 OF 2026

GAYATREE PATTNAIK FOR

SHREEJITA PATTNAIK APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

ARUNDHATI SAHOO AND ANR. RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

UJJAL BHUYAN, J.

This appeal by special leave is directed against the

judgment and order dated 11.01.2023 passed by the High

Court of Orissa at Cuttack (briefly ‘the High Court’

hereinafter) in MACA No. 283 of 2022 (Gayatree Pattnaik Vs.

Arundhati Sahoo and Anr.).

2. It may be mentioned that against the judgment

and order dated 16.04.2022 passed by the 2

nd Additional

District Judge-cum-3

rd Motor Accident Claims Tribunal,

2

Cuttack in M.A.C. Case No. 572 of 2015 wherein

compensation to the tune of Rs. 30,12,960.00 was awarded

to the appellant alongwith interest at the rate of 6% per

annum from the date of filing of the claim petition, the

aforesaid appeal was filed before the High Court.

3. By the judgment and order dated 11.01.2023,

the High Court disposed of the appeal by enhancing the

compensation by a further amount of Rs. 15,27,840.00,

thus, awarding total compensation of Rs. 45,40,800.00 to

the appellant. Directions have been issued to the insurer i.e.

respondent No. 2 to deposit the entire compensation amount

before the MACT alongwith interest at the rate of 6% per

annum from the date of filing of the claim petition with the

further direction to keep the entire compensation amount in

fixed deposit in the name of the injured Shreejita Pattnaik in

any nationalized bank till she attains the age of majority with

quarterly interest payable in favour of the mother of the

injured i.e. the appellant. The High Court has also directed

that MACT would be at liberty to release any further amount,

if required, for the treatment of the injured.

3

4. Be it stated that appellant herein is the mother

and the natural guardian of the injured claimant Shreejita

Pattnaik, who was about six months old at the time of the

motor accident which occurred on 16.06.2015.

5. This Court vide the order dated 28.08.2023 had

issued notice. Though the dispute between the parties was

referred to the Lok Adalat, the matter could not be settled

whereafter the case was heard on 05.05.2026 when this

Court granted leave.

Facts

6. The claim arises out of a motor vehicular

accident which occurred on 16.06.2015 at about 11:45 AM.

While the injured minor Shreejita Pattnaik was travelling

alongwith her parents Gayatree Pattnaik and Umakanta

Pattnaik in a Hyundai I-10 car bearing registration No. OR-

23-E-0075 towards Sundargarh from Sariapada , a tanker

bearing registration No. OR-05-AT-2751 came from the

opposite direction. It was driven in a very rash and negligent

manner and suddenly swerved towards its right side. In the

process, it violently collided with the car in which the minor

claimant was travelling.

4

6.1. As a result of the collusion, the father Umakanta

Pattnaik and the minor Shreejita Pattnaik suffered multiple

grievous injuries. Both of them were first treated at Kishore

Nagar (Angul) Public Health Centre and then shifted to

Ashwani Hospital, Cuttack. The treatment of the two

continued albeit in different hospitals. In so far the minor

claimant is concerned, she remained admitted at the Apollo

Hospital, Bhubaneswar from 17.06.2015 to 01.07.2015.

Thereafter, she underwent further treatment at Jagannath

Hospital, Bhubaneshwar from 01.07.2015 to 08.07.2015.

The medical records disclose that the minor in jured

continued to receive treatment and rehabilitation

programmes at various medical institutions, such as, All

India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS), Bhubaneshwar,

National Institute of Medical Health and Neuroscience

(NIMHANS), Bengaluru, Swami Vivekananda National

Institute of Rehabilitation, Training and Research, Cuttack

and others specialized centres.

7. It may be mentioned that in connection with the

vehicular accident, Kishore Nagar Police Station Case No. 41

of 2015 came to be registered under Sections 279, 337 and

5

338 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) against the driver

of the offending tanker. Upon completion of investigation,

chargesheet was filed by the police before the competent

court.

8. In the course of and at the end of her prolonged

treatment, minor claimant Shreejita Pattnaik was diagnosed

with severe spinal cord and neurological injuries. As per the

disability certificate, it has been certified that Shreejita

Pattnaik is a case of locomotor disability. She is diagnosed

with post trauma myelopathy with paraplegia . The

percentage of disability has been assessed at 90%. The

disability is permanent in nature and would require a

lifetime of medication and support. In the process, she has

permanently lost her normal bodily functions, requiring

continuous day-to-day assistance, suffering severe

restrictions in mobility and in the process would remain

dependent on others throughout her life.

9. Two complaints came to be filed before the

MACT, one by the father Umakant Pattnaik which came to

be registered as M.A.C. Case No. 571 of 2015, and the other

filed by Gayatri Pattnaik i.e. the mother on behalf of the

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minor claimant Shreejita Pattnaik which came to be

registered as M.A.C. Case No. 572 of 2015.

10. In the present appeal, we are only concerned

with the claim of the minor victim Shreejita Pattnaik, lodged

through her natural guardian i.e. her mother. However, to

complete the narration, we may mention that M.A.C. Case

No. 571 of 2015 was allowed by directing the insurer i.e.

respondent No. 2, the New India Assurance Company

Limited, to pay compensation of Rs. 5,00,000.00 to the

claimant Umakant Pattnaik.

11. In so far M.A.C. Case No. 572 of 2015 is

concerned, MACT vide the judgment and order dated

16.04.2022 held that the accident had occurred due to the

rash and negligent driving of the offending tanker, further

holding the insurer liable to satisfy the award. As already

noted above, upon assessment of the evidence on record,

MACT awarded a total compensation of Rs. 30,12,960.00 to

the claimant Shreejita Pattnaik together with simple interest

at the rate of 6% per annum with effect from the date of filing

of the petition i.e. 24.08.2015.

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12. Aggrieved by the quantum of compensation

awarded by the MACT, the claimant through her natural

guardian and mother preferred MACA No. 283 of 2022 before

the High Court seeking enhancement of compensation under

various heads. By the impugned judgment and order dated

11.01.2023, the High Court partly allowed the appeal. While

modifying the calculation of future loss of earning capacity

by applying the multiplier of 15 instead of 18, as applied by

the MACT, the High Court, however, enhanced the

compensation under various non-pecuniary heads, including

loss of future life expectations, marriage prospects, future

medical treatment and future attendant charges. Consequently,

the total compensation awarded stood enhanced from Rs.

30,12,960.00 to Rs. 45,40,800.00 together with interest at the

rate of 6% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition.

Submissions

13. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant

submits that the compensation awarded by the High Court,

even after enhancement, falls short of the requirement of ‘just

compensation’ as contemplated under the Motor Vehicles

Act, 1988 (briefly ‘the MV Act’ hereinafter) and interpreted by

this Court.

8

13.1. He submits that the injured claimant was only

six months old when the accident occurred on 16.06.2015.

The devastating vehicular accident resulted in severe spinal

cord and neurological injuries to the claimant. She has been

diagnosed with post-trauma myelopathy with paraplegia which

is irreversible and a lifelong medical condition. She has been

certified to be suffering from locomotor disability with the

percentage of disability being assessed at 90%. She would

require lifetime medication and support because she has

become totally immobile. Both the MACT and the High Court

failed to adequately appreciate the nature of injuries suffered

by the injured claimant, her tender age at the time of the

accident and the lifelong consequences flowing therefrom

including the devastating impact of such disability on every

aspect of her life.

13.2. He submits that the High Court erred by

applying a multiplier of 15 instead of 18 as applied by the

MACT. According to him, while dealing with claims involving

children suffering catastrophic permanent disability, the

court is required to adopt a realistic and welfare oriented

approach.

9

13.3. Referring to the evidence of the doctors and the

disability certificate, learned counsel submits that as per the

medical evidence, the claimant would not be able to

discharge her normal day-to-day functions and would

require constant assistance and supervision throughout her

life. Despite noticing the nature of disability and recording

that the child would require an attendant for life, the High

Court awarded only a nominal amount towards future

attendant charges which does not account for the actual

lifelong burden that would be borne by the claimant and her

family.

13.4. Adverting to the decision of this Court in Kajal

Vs. Jagdish Chand

1, learned counsel for the appellant

submits that in cases involving young children who suffer

permanent disability, compensation cannot be confined to

conventional heads alone. The court is required to take into

consideration the lifelong deprivation suffered by the victim,

future care requirements, attendant expenses, loss of

amenities, loss of marital prospects, future medical treatment

and the overall destruction of the quality of life. According to

1

(2020) 4 SCC 413

10

him, the principles laid down in Kajal squarely apply to the

facts of the present case.

13.5. In this connection further reliance has been

placed by the learned counsel for the appellant on a recent

decision of this Court in R. Halle Vs. Reliance General Insurance

Company Limited

2 to contend that while determining

compensation under the MV Act, the approach of the court

should be guided by the principle of awarding just, fair and

reasonable compensation. MV Act is a beneficial piece of

legislation. Therefore, the assessment of compensation should

not be undertaken in a narrow or pedantic manner, particularly

when the victim is a child who has suffered permanent disability

of an exceptionally grave nature.

13.6. He also submits that both MACT and the High

Court failed to sufficiently consider the mental agony,

trauma and the emotional suffering endured not only by the

injured child but also by her parents who would have to

continue enduring such distress throughout the rest of their

lives; besides; the claimant has been effectively deprived of a

2

2026 SCC OnLine SC 433

11

normal childhood and the opportunity to lead an

independent life.

13.7. Learned counsel has also questioned the rate of

interest awarded by the MACT and by the High Court and

submits that 6% interest per annum does not reflect the

prevailing ground situation and the principles governing

grant of compensation in motor accident claims. He submits

that interest ought to have been awarded at the rate of 9%

per annum which would ensure a complete and effective

compensation.

13.8. Summing up his submissions, learned counsel

contends that the impugned judgment and order of the High

Court, though has enhanced the compensation as awarded

by the MACT, however, has failed to award just compensation

commensurate with the nature of disability suffered by the

claimant and the lifelong consequences flowing therefrom.

He, therefore, submits that the compensation so awarded be

suitably enhanced by awarding adequate amounts under the

different heads so as to award ‘just compensation’ to the

injured claimant.

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14. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for

respondent No. 2, M/s New India Assurance Company

Limited, submits that the High Court has substantially

enhanced the compensation awarded to the claimant

under various non-pecuniary heads, enhancing the overall

compensation from Rs. 30,12,960.00 to Rs. 45,40,800.00.

The enhanced compensation awarded by the High Court

adequately takes into account the nature of disability

suffered by the claimant based on the evidence available on

record.

14.1. Learned counsel submits that assessment of

compensation necessarily involves an element of judicial

discretion and approximation. According to him, unless the

award is shown to be manifestly inadequate or contrary to

the settled principles of law, interference by this Court would

not be justified.

14.2. Adverting to the impugned judgment and order of

the High Court, he submits that High Court has granted

additional compensation towards loss of future life expectations,

marriage prospects, amenities, future medical treatment and

attendant charges. Unless the complainant can satisfactorily

13

demonstrate on the basis of the materials on record that the

compensation awarded by the High Court is grossly

inadequate, no interference would be called for. On the

contrary, learned counsel submits that the High Court has

carefully examined the medical evidence, the disability

suffered by the claimant and the future consequences of the

injuries before adequately and substantially enhancing the

compensation.

14.3. Therefore, learned counsel submits that the

impugned judgment and order has awarded a ‘just

compensation’ to the claimant. The enhanced compensation

is just, fair and reasonable. It does not warrant any further

enhancement. Therefore, the appeal may be dismissed.

15. Submissions made by the learned counsel for

the parties have received the due consideration of the Court.

Analysis

16. The facts have already been summed up above.

It is not necessary to reiterate the factual narrative as there

is no dispute. There is no dispute as regards occurrence of

the accident; negligence of the offending vehicle or the

liability of the insurer to satisfy the award. Entitlement of

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the injured claimant to receive compensation also does not

admit of any controversy. However, before we proceed on an

analysis of the rival submissions, it would be apposite to

briefly highlight in a tabular form, the compensation

awarded by the MACT and by the High Court under the

different heads. The same is extracted hereunder:

Head MACT High Court

Medical expenses ₹3,00,000 ₹3,00,000

Future medical treatment ₹3,00,000 ₹5,00,000

Attendant charges ₹30,000 ₹1,30,000

Pain, suffering and loss of

amenities

₹5,00,000

₹ 22,00,000

Loss of marriage prospects /

Future life expectations

₹2,00,000

Conveyance and special diet ₹50,000 ₹ 50,000

Loss of future earnings ₹16,32,960 ₹13,60,800

Total Compensation ₹30,12,960 ₹45,40,800

17. The question which falls for consideration in this

appeal is whether the compensation awarded by the High

Court even after enhancing the compensation awarded by

the MACT meets the requirement of ‘just compensation’

15

within the meaning of the MV Act? Corollary to the above

question is the further question as to whether having regard

to the nature of injuries suffered by the claimant and the

lifelong consequences flowing therefrom, the appellant is

entitled to further enhancement of compensation?

18. The present case concerns a child who has

suffered permanent disability at a tender age and whose

entire future stands altered on account of the injuries

sustained in the accident. In such circumstances, the Court

is required to adopt an approach which is realistic, humane

and consistent with the settled principles governing award

of compensation under the MV Act.

19. There is no manner of doubt that the MV Act is

a beneficial piece of legislation. The provisions relating to

compensation are intended to provide solace and financial

security to victims of motor accidents and their families.

Therefore, the provisions of the MV Act must receive a liberal

and purposive interpretation so as to advance the object

sought to be achieved.

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20. Section 168 of the MV Act deals with award of

compensation by a claims tribunal. Section 168 reads as

follows:

168. Award of the Claims Tribunal.—(1) On receipt

of an application for compensation made under

section 166, the Claims Tribunal shall, after giving

notice of the application to the insurer and after giving

the parties (including the insurer) an opportunity of

being heard, hold an inquiry into the claim or, as the

case may be, each of the claims and, subject to the

provisions of section 163 may make an award

determining the amount of compensation which

appears to it to be just and specifying the person or

persons to whom compensation shall be paid and in

making the award the Claims Tribunal shall specify

the amount which shall be paid by the insurer or

owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident

or by all or any of them, as the case may be:

[***]

(2) The Claims Tribunal shall arrange to deliver

copies of the award to the parties concerned

expeditiously and in any case within a period of fifteen

days from the date of the award.

(3) When an award is made under this section, the

person who is required to pay any amount in terms of

such award shall, within thirty days of the date of

announcing the award by the Claims Tribunal,

deposit the entire amount awarded in such manner as

the Claims Tribunal may direct.

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21. From an analysis of Section 168 of the MV Act, it

is evident that the law requires a claims tribunal to hold an

enquiry complying with the principles of natural justice and

thereafter to make an award determining the quantum of

compensation that may be pai d to the claimant, which

should be just. The expression ‘just compensation’ is not

defined in the MV Act. However, the legislative intent is clear.

Compensation awarded should be just, fair and reasonable.

It should neither be a windfall nor a pittance. Since loss

arising from death or permanent disability cannot be

measured with mathematical precision, some amount of

approximation and judicial discretion is inevitable.

Therefore, the endeavour of the court should be to assess

and award compensation which is realistic and which

reasonably compensates the claimant for the pecuniary as

well as the non-pecuniary losses suffered on account of the

accident.

22. The principles governing determination of ‘just

compensation’ have engaged the attention of the courts since

long. Infact, the principles emerged from the English courts.

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In Phillips v. London & South Western Railway Co.,

3 while

emphasizing that damages must be full and adequate, it has

been held thus:

………..You cannot put the plaintiff back again into

his original position, but you must bring your

reasonable common sense to bear, and you must

always recollect that this is the only occasion on

which compensation can be given. The plaintiff can

never sue again for it. You have, therefore, now to give

him compensation once and for all. He has done no

wrong, he has suffered a wrong at the hands of the

defendants and you must take care to give him full

fair compensation for that which he has suffered.

23. In Divisional Controller, KSRTC v. Mahadeva

Shetty,

4 this Court after observing that perfect compensation

is hardly possible and money cannot renew a physical frame

that has been battered and shattered, the compensation that

is provided should place the injured as far as possible in the

same position financially as he was before the accident, held

as under:

15. ……………. Statutory provisions clearly indicate

that the compensation must be “just” and it cannot be

a bonanza; not a source of profit but the same should

not be a pittance. The courts and tribunals have a

3

(1879) LR 5 QBD 78 (CA)

4

(2003) 7 SCC 197

19

duty to weigh the various factors and quantify the

amount of compensation, which should be just. What

would be “just” compensation is a vexed question.

There can be no golden rule applicable to all cases for

measuring the value of human life or a limb. Measure

of damages cannot be arrived at by precise

mathematical calculations. It would depend upon the

particular facts and circumstances, and attending

peculiar or special features, if any. Every method or

mode adopted for assessing compensation has to be

considered in the background of “just” compensation

which is the pivotal consideration. Though by use of

the expression “which appears to it to be just”, a wide

discretion is vested in the Tribunal, the determination

has to be rational, to be done by a judicious approach

and not the outcome of whims, wild guesses and

arbitrariness. The expression “just” denotes

equitability, fairness and reasonableness, and non-

arbitrariness. If it is not so, it cannot be just.

24. Again, in the case of Syed Basheer Ahamed Vs.

Mohammed Jameel

5, this Court explaining the width of the

power conferred under Section 168 of the MV Act, observed

as follows:

13. Section 168 of the Act enjoins the Tribunal to

make an award determining “the amount of

compensation which appears to be just”. However, the

objective factors, which may constitute the basis of

5

(2009) 2 SCC 225

20

compensation appearing as just, have not been

indicated in the Act. Thus, the expression “which

appears to be just” vests a wide discretion in the

Tribunal in the matter of determination of

compensation. Nevertheless, the wide amplitude of

such power does not empower the Tribunal to

determine the compensation arbitrarily, or to ignore

settled principles relating to determination of

compensation.

25. In the case of Raj Kumar Vs. Ajay Kumar

6, this

Court while examining the general principles relating to

compensation in injury cases vis-à-vis the MV Act, held as

follows:

5. The provision of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (“the

Act”, for short) makes it clear that the award must be

just, which means that compensation should, to the

extent possible, fully and adequately restore the

claimant to the position prior to the accident. The

object of awarding damages is to make good the loss

suffered as a result of wrong done as far as money can

do so, in a fair, reasonable and equitable manner. The

court or the Tribunal shall have to assess the damages

objectively and exclude from consideration any

speculation or fancy, though some conjecture with

reference to the nature of disability and its

consequences, is inevitable. A person is not only to be

compensated for the physical injury, but also for the

6

(2011) 1 SCC 343

21

loss which he suffered as a result of such injury. This

means that he is to be compensated for his inability

to lead a full life, his inability to enjoy those normal

amenities which he would have enjoyed but for the

injuries, and his inability to earn as much as he used

to earn or could have earned.

26. A Constitution Bench of this Court in National

Insurance Company Limited Vs. Pranay Sethi

7 analyzed the

concept of ‘just compensation’ in the following manner:

55. Section 168 of the Act deals with the concept of

“just compensation” and the same has to be

determined on the foundation of fairness,

reasonableness and equitability on acceptable legal

standard because such determination can never be in

arithmetical exactitude. It can never be perfect. The

aim is to achieve an acceptable degree of proximity to

arithmetical precision on the basis of materials

brought on record in an individual case. The

conception of “just compensation” has to be viewed

through the prism of fairness, reasonableness and

non-violation of the principle of equitability…………….

27. This position has been reiterated in Kajal

wherein this Court after referring to Phillips and other cases

observed as under:

7

(2017) 16 SCC 680

22

6. It is impossible to equate human suffering and

personal deprivation with money. However, this is

what the Act enjoins upon the courts to do. The court

has to make a judicious attempt to award damages,

so as to compensate the claimant for the loss suffered

by the victim. On the one hand, the compensation

should not be assessed very conservatively, but on the

other hand, the compensation should also not be

assessed in so liberal a fashion so as to make it a

bounty to the claimant. The court while assessing the

compensation should have regard to the degree of

deprivation and the loss caused by such deprivation.

Such compensation is what is termed as just

compensation. The compensation or damages

assessed for personal injuries should be substantial

to compensate the injured for the deprivation suffered

by the injured throughout his/her life. They should

not be just token damages.

28. The principles governing assessment of

compensation for personal injuries have been explained by

this Court in R.D. Hattangadi Vs. Pest Control (India) Pvt.

Ltd.

8. Acknowledging the difficulties in quantifying human

suffering and loss, this Court has classified damages into

pecuniary and non-pecuniary components and held as

under:

8

(1995) 1 SCC 551

23

9. Broadly speaking while fixing an amount of

compensation payable to a victim of an accident, the

damages have to be assessed separately as pecuniary

damages and special damages. Pecuniary damages

are those which the victim has actually incurred and

which are capable of being calculated in terms of

money; whereas non-pecuniary damages are those

which are incapable of being assessed by arithmetical

calculations. In order to appreciate two concepts

pecuniary damages may include expenses incurred by

the claimant: (i) medical attendance; (ii) loss of earning

of profit up to the date of trial; (iii) other material loss.

So far non-pecuniary damages are concerned, they

may include (i) damages for mental and physical

shock, pain and suffering, already suffered or likely to

be suffered in future; (ii) damages to compensate for

the loss of amenities of life which may include a

variety of matters i.e. on account of injury the

claimant may not be able to walk, run or sit; (iii)

damages for the loss of expectation of life, i.e., on

account of injury the normal longevity of the person

concerned is shortened; (iv) inconvenience, hardship,

discomfort, disappointment, frustration and mental

stress in life.

28.1. Thus, R.D. Hattangadi recognized that apart

from actual monetary loss, compensation must also address

the intangible consequences flowing from bodily injury,

including mental shock, pain and suffering, loss of

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amenities, loss of expectation of life and the inconvenience,

disappointments, frustration and mental stress experienced

by the injured throughout her life.

29. The aforesaid principles were reiterated in Raj

Kumar in the following manner:

6. The heads under which compensation is awarded

in personal injury cases are the following:

Pecuniary damages (Special damages)

(i) Expenses relating to treatment, hospitalisation,

medicines, transportation, nourishing food, and

miscellaneous expenditure.

(ii) Loss of earnings (and other gains) which the

injured would have made had he not been injured,

comprising:

(a) Loss of earning during the period of

treatment;

(b) Loss of future earnings on account of

permanent disability.

(iii) Future medical expenses.

Non-pecuniary damages (General damages)

(iv) Damages for pain, suffering and trauma as a

consequence of the injuries.

(v) Loss of amenities (and/or loss of prospects of

marriage).

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(vi) Loss of expectation of life (shortening of normal

longevity).

*** *** *** *** ***

29.1. The decision in Raj Kumar, thus, brought greater

clarity and structure to the heads of compensation

applicable to personal injury cases. While pecuniary

damages compensate measurable financial losses, non-

pecuniary damages seek to redress the enduring impact of

the injury upon the quality, enjoyment and normal incidents

of life. Together, these heads constitute the framework within

which the courts assess ‘just compensation’ in cases involving

permanent disability arising out of catastrophic injuries due to

the accident.

30. In Kajal also, this Court adverted to the

principles with regard to determination of ‘just

compensation’ in the following manner:

5. The principles with regard to determination of just

compensation contemplated under the Act are well

settled. The injuries cause deprivation to the body

which entitles the claimant to claim damages. The

damages may vary according to the gravity of the

injuries sustained by the claimant in an accident. On

26

account of the injuries, the claimant may suffer

consequential losses such as:

(i) loss of earning;

(ii) expenses on treatment which may include

medical expenses, transportation, special diet,

attendant charges, etc.,

(iii) loss or diminution to the pleasures of life by

loss of a particular part of the body, and

(iv) loss of future earning capacity.

Damages can be pecuniary as well as non-pecuniary,

but all have to be assessed in rupees and paise.

31. Cases involving child victims suffering

permanent or near total disability constitute a distinct and

special category within the law relating to motor accident

compensation. A child, by reason of age, vulnerability and

complete dependence upon others, stands on an altogether

different footing from an adult claimant. The consequences

of a catastrophic injury suffered during childhood are not

confined merely to the immediate physical impairment

caused by the accident. Such injuries alter the entire course

of the child’s existence and affect every subsequent stage of

her life. The law, therefore, cannot evaluate claims involving

27

injured children through the same lens that may ordinarily

be applied in cases involving adults.

32. In Kajal, this Court was dealing with the case of

a twelve-year-old girl who had suffered catastrophic brain

injuries resulting in 100% disability. As a result, her mental

age remained that of a nine-month-old infant and she

became wholly dependent upon others for every aspect of her

existence. Recognizing the exceptional nature of such

claims, this Court observed that compensation in cases

involving children suffering catastrophic injuries cannot be

confined to conventional heads alone. This Court took into

consideration the lifelong deprivation suffered by the victim

and awarded compensation keeping in view her permanent

dependence, future requirements and complete destruction

of normal life.

33. Carrying forward the aforesaid principle, this Court

in Master Ayush Vs. Reliance General Insurance Company

Limited

9 reiterated that children suffering permanent disability

cannot be treated as ordinary non-earning persons merely

because they had not entered into employment on the date of

9

(2022) 7 SCC 738

28

the accident; such victims suffer lifelong consequences.

Therefore, the assessment of compensation must necessarily

account for the future which has been irreversibly impaired.

34. This Court reiterated the same principle in Baby

Sakshi Greola Vs. Manzoor Ahmed Simon

10. It was a claim by

a seven- year-old child who had suffered severe neurological

impairment because of the motor vehicular accident requiring

lifelong care and supervision. While granting enhanced

compensation, this Court recognized that the victim had not

merely suffered physical disability but had effectively been

deprived of a normal adult life and that such injuries affect

companionship, emotional fulfilment, social interaction

which ordinarily gives human life a meaningful existence.

35. Likewise, in Divya Vs. National Insurance

Company Limited

11 where the victim was merely two-years-

old and had suffered almost 100% permanent disability, this

Court noticed that restoration of the child to her pre-accident

condition was impossible. Proceeding on that basis, this

Court enhanced the compensation under several heads

10

(2024) SCC OnLine SC 3692

11

(2024) 12 SCC 436

29

keeping in view the fact that the victim would remain

dependent upon others throughout her life, recognizing that

claims involving severely disabled children necessarily

require consideration of future medical expenses, attendant

charges, loss of amenities and loss of marriage prospects.

36. Reiterating the above principle, this Court in

Hitesh Nagjibhai Patel Vs. Bababhai Nagjibhai Rabari

12, held

that a minor who suffers permanent disability cannot be

equated with a non-earning individual merely because he

was not gainfully employed on the date of the accident. While

dealing with child victims, the law must take into account

the future which has been lost and not merely the status

which existed at the time when the accident occurred.

37. More recently, in Hansraj Vs. Mukesh Nath

13

which concerned a 14-year-old victim who suffered 100%

permanent disability, this Court reiterated the necessity of

adopting a compassionate and realistic approach while

assessing compensation payable to injured children.

Enhanced amounts were awarded towards attendant

12

2025 SCC OnLine SC 3446

13

2026 SCC OnLine SC 812

30

charges, pain and suffering, future medical expenses, loss of

amenities and loss of marriage prospects recognizing that

the victim would require care, support and assistance

throughout the remainder of his life.

38. The common thread running through all these

judgments is the acknowledgment that injuries suffered by

children have consequences which extend far beyond the

immediate physical disability. Such injuries accompany the

victim throughout her life and affect every stage of her

development. The loss suffered is not temporary. It is

lifelong, continuing and irreversible.

38.1. A child who suffers catastrophic injuries loses

much more than physical abilities. The child may lose the

joys and experiences ordinarily associated with childhood

itself. Activities which other children take for granted, like,

playing, running around, attending school, interacting with

friends, participating in social functions and enjoying

ordinary pleasures of life may become permanently

inaccessible.

38.2. Human dignity forms an inseparable component

of life. When a catastrophic injury deprives a child of the

31

ability to perform the ordinary functions independently, the

resulting loss transcends the realm of physical disability and

assumes the character of a continuing deprivation of dignity.

Therefore, the injury affects not merely the body but the very

manner in which life itself is experienced.

38.3. Injured children seeking compensation, therefore, stand

on a distinctly different footing. While determining compensation

in such cases, the courts must remain conscious that what

has been taken away is not merely physical capacity but the

child’s entire future life.

Loss of future earnings

39. Having noticed the principles governing

assessment and grant of compensation in claims involving

injured child victims, let us now deal with the compensation

awarded by the MACT and by the High Court in the present

case under the different heads. First, we take up the head of

‘loss of future earnings’. MACT had awarded Rs.

16,32,960.00 under this head which was reduced by the

High Court to Rs. 13,60,800.00.

40. MACT after accepting the evidence that Shreejita

Pattnaik was having 90% physical disability proceeded to

32

take her notional income as an unskilled labourer which was

Rs. 200.00 per day as per Notification No.323 of 2015 of the

Labour and ESI Department , Government of Odisha.

Accordingly, the annual income was worked out at Rs.

72,000.00 per annum (Rs.200.00 X 30 X 12). This, the MACT

opined, would be the minimum amount Shreejita Pattnaik

would have earned on becoming a major. An addition of 40%

on account of future prospects was added which worked out

to Rs.1,00,800.00 (Rs.72,000.00 + Rs.28,800.00 which is

40% of Rs.72,000.00). Applying the multiplier of 18, MACT

arrived at the figure of Rs. 18,14,400.00. Taking the

disability at 90%, the loss of future earning capacity was

worked out at Rs.16,32,960.00 (Rs.18,14,400.00 X 90/100).

41. High Court did not interfere with the other

parameters except holding that the right multiplier in terms

of the Second Schedule to the MV Act should be 15 and not

18. Accordingly, the compensation amount was reduced by

Rs.2,72,160.00, making the determination of ‘loss of future

earnings’ at Rs.13,60,800.00, instead of Rs.16,32,960.00 as

assessed and awarded by the MACT.

33

42. Three aspects are required to be analysed here.

First is the application of the correct multiplier and second

is the impact of disability. Equally important is the third

aspect i.e. as to what should be taken as the notional income

of the injured child victim.

43. High Court in this case has applied the multiplier

of 15. It is true that in a number of earlier decisions, the

multiplier of 15 was accepted where the age of the victim

happened to be upto 15 years. However, a subtle shift is

discernible in recent cases.

44. In Kajal, this Court examined the Second

Schedule to the MV Act which provides for different

multipliers to be applied corresponding to different age

groups of the claimants and observed that the same can be

used as a guide to be applied in each case. Considering the

age of the claimant in that case, which was twelve years only,

this Court held that the multiplier in that case should be 18.

45. Abhimanyu Partap Singh Vs. Namita Sekhon

14 is

a case where this Court found that the highest multiplier in

14

(2022) 8 SCC 489

34

Schedule II of the MV Act is 18 and it is shown applicable to

two age groups; firstly, to the age group of 15 to 20 years and

secondly, to the age group of 21 to 25 years. In such

circumstances, this Court selected the multiplier of 18 as the

claim related to the age group upto 15 years.

46. Again, in Baby Sakshi Greola, this Court applied

the multiplier of 18 considering the age of the injured child

who was seven years old on the date of the accident. Similarly,

in Hansraj Vs. Mukesh Nath

15, this Court after noting the age

of the injured child as 14 years applied the multiplier of 18.

47. We are of the view that we should follow the

recent trend as the multiplier method acts as a guide to

arrive at a ‘just compensation’ considering the socio -

economic condition of the injured child victim and her

parents. MACT was, therefore, justified in applying the

multiplier of 18 and the High Court erred in altering the

multiplier from 18 to 15. We, therefore, apply the multiplier

of 18.

15

2026 SCC OnLine SC 812

35

48. Next, we turn to the aspect of disability; rather

the concept of permanent disability and its impact upon the

earning capacity of the victim. We need to understand that

in injury cases, the percentage of physical disability certified

by a medical board and the actual loss earning capacity may

not always be identical. In this context, it is important to

understand the distinction between physical disability and

functional disability.

49. In Raj Kumar, this Court explained the concept of

disability in the following manner:

8. Disability refers to any restriction or lack of

ability to perform an activity in the manner

considered normal for a human being. Permanent

disability refers to the residuary incapacity or loss

of use of some part of the body, found existing at

the end of the period of treatment and recuperation,

after achieving the maximum bodily improvement

or recovery which is likely to remain for the

remainder life of the injured. Temporary disability

refers to the incapacity or loss of use of some part

of the body on account of the injury, which will

cease to exist at the end of the period of treatment

and recuperation. Permanent disability can be

either partial or total. Partial permanent disability

refers to a person's inability to perform all the duties

and bodily functions that he could perform before

the accident, though he is able to perform some of

them and is still able to engage in some gainful

activity. Total permanent disability refers to a

person's inability to perform any avocation or

employment related activities as a result of the

accident. The permanent disabilities that may arise

from motor accident injuries, are of a much wider

range when compared to the physical disabilities

36

which are enumerated in the Persons with

Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of

Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 (“the

Disabilities Act”, for short). But if any of the

disabilities enumerated in Section 2(i) of the

Disabilities Act are the result of injuries sustained

in a motor accident, they can be permanent

disabilities for the purpose of claiming

compensation.

49.1. Thus, this Court observed that permanent

disability refers to the residuary incapacity or loss of use of

some part of the body, found existing at the end of the period

of treatment and recuperation, after achieving the maximum

bodily improvement or recovery which is likely to remain for

the remainder life of the injured. Permanent disability can

be either partial or total. Partial permanent disability refers

to a person’s inability to perform all the duties and bodily

functions that he could perform before the accident, though

he is able to perform some of them and is still able to engage

in some gainful activity. Total permanent disability, on the

other hand, refers to a person’s inability to perform any

avocation or employment related activities as a result of the

accident.

49.2. Proceeding further, this Court explained that

where the claimant suffers a permanent disability as a result

37

of injuries, the assessment of compensation under the head

‘loss of future earnings’ would depend upon the effect and

impact of such permanent disability on his earning capacity.

Therefore, what is required to be assessed is the effect of the

permanent disability on the earning capacity of the injured.

As regards ascertainment of the effect of the permanent

disability on the actual earning capacity of the injured, this

Court has held thus:

13. Ascertainment of the effect of the permanent disability

on the actual earning capacity involves three steps. The

Tribunal has to first ascertain what activities the claimant

could carry on in spite of the permanent disability and

what he could not do as a result of the permanent

disability (this is also relevant for awarding compensation

under the head of loss of amenities of life). The second step

is to ascertain his avocation, profession and nature of

work before the accident, as also his age. The third step is

to find out whether (i) the claimant is totally disabled from

earning any kind of livelihood, or (ii) whether in spite of the

permanent disability, the claimant could still effectively

carry on the activities and functions, which he was earlier

carrying on, or (iii) whether he was prevented or restricted

from discharging his previous activities and functions, but

could carry on some other or lesser scale of activities and

functions so that he continues to earn or can continue to

earn his livelihood.

38

50. Therefore, this Court noted in S. Ettiappan Vs. D.

Kumar

16, that High Court had assessed the disability of the

appellant at 70% on the basis of the medical board certificate

without noticing the fact that on account of the said

disability suffered by the claimant, his functional disability

would be 100%.

51. That brings us to the distinction, fine yet

significant, between medical and functional disability. This

Court in Shankar Dutt Vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd.

17

observed that a conceptual distinction has to be drawn

between the medically certified disability resulting out of the

physical injury or impairment on the one hand and the long

term repercussions on the injured, on his or her life and on

the activities, on the other hand. The functional disability is

one which is suffered and felt by the injured in his day-to-

day life or in his avocation, occupation, business or

profession. Proceeding further, this Court observed that the

medical opinion may have suggested that physical

impairment on account of the injury is to particular extent.

However, its functional effect may be greater. In fact, it

16

(2026) 1 TAC 84

17

2026 SCC OnLine SC 1193

39

would be reasonable to assume that the functional

incapacity resulting out of a particular bodily injury may be

higher and greater than what may be medically perceived.

52. Thus, physical disability and functional

disability operate in different fields. Physical disability

denotes the extent of bodily impairment assessed medically.

Functional disability, on the other hand, relates to the effect

of such impairment upon the capacity of the victim to live a

normal life and to pursue gainful employment. In the given

facts of a case, a lesser physical disability may result in a

much higher functional disability and in an appropriate

case, even amount to complete loss of earning capacity.

53. In so far the present case is concerned, there is

no disagreement or dispute as to the extent of disability

suffered by the injured child victim. As per the disability

certificate-Exhibit 35, the injured child Shreejita Pattnaik

has suffered 90% permanent disability due to the motor

vehicular accident, and she has been diagnosed with post-

traumatic myelopathy with paraplegia. The evidence of PW-

3, PW-4 and PW-7, who were the treating doctors of the

injured claimant, establish that disability suffered by

40

Shreejita Pattnaik is permanent and irreversible in nature

and that she would continue to remain dependent on others

for the rest of her life. The medical evidence further discloses

that she would not be able to discharge normal day-to-day

activities independently and would require assistance even

for basic functions. The disability certificate alongwith the

evidence as stated above have been accepted by the MACT

as well as by the High Court. At the time of the accident,

Shreejita Pattnaik was aged about six months. In the

circumstances, though the permanent physical disability

has been assessed and certified at 90%, applying the

functional disability test, it is evident that it would be

impossible for her to engage in any avocation to earn a

livelihood. Her future earning capacity has been completely

destroyed; rather extinguished. Therefore, though the

permanent physical disability has been assessed and

certified at 90%, her functional disability is total i.e. 100%.

Hence, her disability would be taken as 100%.

54. This brings us to the third aspect as to what

should be taken as the notional income of the injured child

victim.

41

55. In Baby Sakshi Greola, this Court after referring

to the earlier decision in Kajal held that in a case of an injured

child claimant suffering permanent disability, taking notional

income would not be the correct approach. Instead, the

minimum wages payable to a skilled workman in the

concerned State has to be taken into consideration because

that would be the minimum amount which she would have

earned on becoming a major.

56. This Court in Hitesh Nagjibhai Patel, observed

that a minor child who suffers death or permanent disability

in a motor vehicle accident cannot be placed in the same

category as a non-earning individual for the purposes of

assessing the amount of compensation because the child was

not engaged in gainful employment at the time of the

accident. In such a case, the minimum wages payable to a

skilled workman as notified for the relevant period in the

respective State where the cause of action arose should be

adopted. This Court clarified thus:

15. For the purpose of emphasis, it is again clarified

here that when a Tribunal or the High Court in appeal,

is concerned with the case involving a child having

suffered injury or having passed away, the calculation

42

of loss of income necessarily has to be made on the

matric of minimum wages payable to a skilled worker

in the respective State at the relevant point of time. It

is our hope that this restatement helps avoiding such

errors and thereby obviates the necessity of this

Court’s interference, applying well -established

principles of law.

57. The accident in question took place on

16.06.2015. Though the MACT applied the State Government

Notification bearing No. 323 of 2015 and took the income of

the injured child as an unskilled labourer, we find that the

said notification had come into effect after the date of the

accident. On the date of the accident, the Notification dated

06.10.2012 issued by the Government of Orissa, as revised

by the Notification dated 16.10.2014, would be applicable.

The MACT had fallen in error in taking the income of the

injured child as an unskilled labourer. Interestingly, the High

Court also found the approach of the MACT to be just and

appropriate. Be that as it may, as per the Notification dated

06.10.2012, the wages payable to a skilled worker was fixed

at Rs. 190.00 per day. By the Notification dated 16.10.2014,

the variable dearness allowance was made payable at the rate

of Rs. 2.50 per day w.e.f. 09.10.2014. Therefore, on the date

43

of the accident, the wages payable to a skilled worker in the

State of Orissa works out to Rs. 192.50 per day. The monthly

income would thus be Rs. 5,775.00. On this basis, the

annual income would be Rs. 69,300.00. Adding 40% towards

future prospects, the annual income becomes Rs. 69,300.00

plus 40% of Rs. 69,300.00, which is Rs. 97,020.00. Applying

the multiplier of 18, the total future income works out to Rs.

17,46,360.00. Taking the permanent functional disability at

100%, the loss of future earning capacity would be Rs.

17,46,360.00. Accordingly, we determine the compensation

payable to the appellant under the head ‘loss of future

earnings’ at Rs. 17,46,360.00.

Attendant charges

58. We next come to the compensation head o f

‘attendant charges’. MACT observed that the father being in

different hospital for his own treatment could not have

looked after the child. Mother also would not have been able

to take care of the child alone. She must have taken the

assistance of one or two attendants for the child. Though the

claimant did not file any document regarding attendant

charges, it was presumed that one to two family members

must have accompanied the injured. Therefore, the

44

attendants should be paid for the loss of their wages and for

the amount(s) they would have spent in hospital for food etc.

Accordingly, MACT held that the claimant would be entitled

to a sum of Rs. 30,000.00 towards attendant charges.

59. High Court held that a sum of Rs. 1,00,000.00

towards future attendant charges should also be granted.

60. We have already noticed that from the evidence

of PW-3, PW-4 and PW-7, it is established that the injured

child Shreejita Pattnaik has suffered post-traumatic

myelopathy with paraplegia resulting in permanent

disability to the extent of 90 percent. However, we have held

that her functional disability would be 100%. The medical

evidence further establishes that Shreejita Pattnaik would

remain dependent upon others throughout her life and

would require constant care, supervision and assistance.

61. In Kajal, this Court found that the method

adopted by the High Court in calculating attendant charges

for the entire life span without applying the multiplier

method was erroneous. This Court was clearly of the view

that the multiplier system should be followed not only for

determining the compensation on account of loss of income

45

but also for determining the attendant charges etc. This is

because the multiplier system factors in the inflation rate,

the rate of interest payable on the lump sum awarded, the

longevity of the claimant and also other issues, such as, the

uncertainty of life. Out of the various alternative methods,

the multiplier system has been recognized as the most

realistic and reasonable method. It ensures better justice

between the parties and thus results in the award of ‘just

compensation’ within the meaning of the MV Act. In the facts

of that case, this Court observed that considering the

condition of the injured child, she would require an

attendant virtually 24 hours a day. This Court assessed the

cost of one attendant at Rs. 5,000.00 per month and held

that the claimant would require two attendants. Thus, the

monthly expenditure on account of the two attendants

would be Rs. 10,000.00. The yearly expenditure would

thereafter come to Rs. 1,20,000.00. Applying the multiplier

of 18, this Court awarded Rs. 21,60,000.00 towards

attendant charges for the entire life of the claimant.

62. This principle was reiterated by this Court in

Baby Sakshi Greola and held that compensation towards

attendant charges should be calculated by taking the wages

46

payable to a skilled attendant on a full-time basis and by

applying the multiplier of 18.

63. Reverting to the facts of this case, the injured

child was merely six months old when the accident had

occurred. While the permanent disability has been certified

at 90 percent, we have already held that her functional

disability is 100 per cent. The evidence on record establishes

that she would remain dependent on others throughout her

life. Taking the attendant c harge of one attendant

conservatively at Rs. 6,000.00 per month, for two attendants

it would be Rs. 1 2,000.00 per month; the annual

expenditure works out to Rs. 1,44,000.00. Applying the

multiplier of 18, the compensation payable under this head

comes to Rs. 25,92,000.00.

64. Accordingly, we determine the compensation

payable under the head of ‘attendant charges’ to the

claimant at Rs. 25,92,000.00.

Pain, suffering and loss of amenities

Loss of marriage prospects

65. MACT awarded a sum of Rs. 5,00,000.00

towards pain, suffering and loss of amenities. Separately

47

MACT awarded Rs. 2,00,000.00 for loss of marriage

prospects of the injured child as the debilitating physical

disability has affected her marriage prospects. The High

Court, after considering the disability of the injured child,

the socio-economic background of her parents and her

expected life span, awarded an additional amount of Rs.

15,00,000.00 to be paid to the injured child Shreejita

Pattnaik towards loss of future life expectations including

marriage prospects and amenities. Thus, MACT had

awarded Rs. 7,00,000.00 (Rs. 5,00,000.00 plus Rs. 2,00,00

0.00) on account of ‘pain, suffering and loss of amenities’ as

well as under the head of ‘loss of marriage prospects’. As

against the combined compensation of Rs. 7,00,000.00,

awarded by the MACT, the High Court granted additional

compensation of Rs. 15,00,000.00 by combining the two

heads, thus enhancing the compensation to Rs. 22,00,000.

00.

66. We enhance the compensation under the

aforesaid combined two heads to Rs. 25,00,000.00. We do

so for the following reasons. While ‘pain and suffering’ is a

familiar expression in motor accident claims jurisprudence,

48

it is not capable of any precise definition. In K.S. Muralidhar

Vs. R. Subbulakshmi

18, this Court, after referring to P.

Ramanatha Aiyar’s Advanced Law Lexicon, observed that

pain and suffering mean physical discomfort and distress. It

includes mental and emotional trauma too for which

damages can be recovered in an accident claim. Though pain

and suffering cannot be measured in monetary terms by

applying any arithmetical formulation, the same can,

however, be awarded in the form of a conventional award.

This Court while acknowledging that there exists no simple

formula for converting pain, suffering, loss of function and

deprivation into monetary terms, however, held that there

are certain factors which are required to be taken into

consideration while awarding compensation under the head

of pain and suffering viz the age of the injured, the unusual

deprivation suffered and the effect thereof on the future life

etc. This Court referred to Kajal and observed that in cases

involving child victims suffering catastrophic disabilities,

applying ordinary principles may not adequately

compensate the victim.

18

2024 SCC Online SC 3385

49

67. At this stage, it would be apposite to advert to

Kajal where this Court held as follows:

27. One factor which must be kept in mind while

assessing the compensation in a case like the present

one is that the claim can be awarded only once. The

claimant cannot come back to court for enhancement

of award at a later stage praying that something extra

has been spent. Therefore, the courts or the Tribunals

assessing the compensation in a case of 100%

disability, especially where there is mental disability

also, should take a liberal view of the matter when

awarding the compensation. While awarding this

amount, we are not only taking the physical disability

but also the mental disability and various other

factors. This child will remain bedridden for life. Her

mental age will be that of a nine-month-old child.

Effectively, while her body grows, she will remain a

small baby. We are dealing with a girl who will

physically become a woman but will mentally remain

a 9-month-old child. This girl will miss out playing

with her friends. She cannot communicate; she

cannot enjoy the pleasures of life; she cannot even be

amused by watching cartoons or films; she will miss

out the fun of childhood, the excitement of youth; the

pleasures of a marital life; she cannot have children

who she can love, let alone grandchildren. She will

have no pleasure. Her's is a vegetable existence.

Therefore, we feel in the peculiar facts and

circumstances of the case even after taking a very

conservative view of the matter an amount payable for

50

the pain and suffering of this child should be at least

Rs 15,00,000.

68. In so far the present case is concerned, the

injured child was only six months old when the accident had

occurred. At an age when life had barely commenced, she

suffered devastating spinal injuries because of the motor

accident resulting in post-traumatic myelopathy with

paraplegia. The disability is permanent and irreversible.

69. MACT had awarded a sum of Rs. 2,00,000.00

towards ‘loss of marriage prospects’. The High Court, as

noticed above, enhanced the compensation by combining

the above two heads to the tune of Rs. 22,00,000.00. We are

of the view that a further enhancement of Rs. 3,00,000.00

making the total compensation under the combined head of

‘pain, suffering and loss of amenities as well as loss of

marriage prospects’ at Rs. 25, 00,000.00 would be justified

in the facts of this case.

Medical expenses

70. Upon consideration of the medical bills and

vouchers, treatment record and documentary evidence ,

MACT awarded a sum of Rs. 3,00,000.00 to the claimant

51

towards ‘medical expenses’. The High Court did not interfere

with the same.

71. Having perused the materials available on

record, we find that the amount awarded towards

‘medical expenses’ is supported by the evidence and does not

warrant further interference. Accordingly, the amount of

Rs. 3,00,000.00 awarded by the MACT and affirmed by the

High Court under the head of ‘medical expenses’ is not

interfered with.

Future medical treatment

72. We also note that MACT awarded a sum of Rs.

3,00,000.00 as expenses towards ‘future medical treatment’.

The High Court after taking note of the permanent disability

suffered by the injured child and the fact that she would

require continued medical care and treatment in future,

enhanced the amount under this head to Rs. 5,00,000.00.

73. Having regard to the debilitating nature of the

injuries suffered by the injured child and the lifelong medical

care and treatment that she would require, we are of the view

that the enhanced amount of Rs. 5,00,000.00 appears to be

inadequate. We, therefore, further enhance the amount of

52

compensation on account of ‘future medical treatment’ by a

further amount of Rs. 5,00,000.00 enhancing the total

amount of compensation under this head to Rs. 10,00,000.

00.

Conveyance and special diet

74. In so far ‘conveyance and special diet’ is

concerned, MACT awarded a sum of Rs. 50,000.00 to the

claimant. The High Court did not interfere with the said

amount. Having regard to the extensive nature of treatment

undergone by the injured child and the prognosis that

she would require medical care and attention, including

treatment, for the rest of her life for which we have enhanced

the amount of compensation under the head ‘future medical

treatment’, we are of the view that commensurate with the

same, the compensation under the head of ‘conveyance and

special diet’ should be enhanced to Rs. 2,00,000.00. We

order accordingly.

75. Thus, the compensation payable to the appellant

under the various heads is re-determined as under:

53

Sl.

No.

Head of Compensation

Amount

Awarded(in

rupees)

1 Loss of income/future earning 17,46,360.00

2 Attendant charges 25,92,000.00

3

Pain, suffering and loss of

amenities as well as loss of

marriage prospects

25,00,000.00

4 Medical expenses 3,00,000.00

5 Expenses for future medical

treatment

10,00,000.00

6 Conveyance and special diet 2,00,000.00

Total Compensation 83,38,360.00

76. Accordingly, the compensation payable to the

appellant by the insurance company stands enhanced from

Rs. 45,40,800.00 to Rs. 83,38,360.00. Appellant shall also

be entitled to interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the

date of filing of the claim petition till realization.

77. Respondent No. 2 i.e. M/s New India Assurance

Company Limited is directed to deposit the entire amount of

compensation as determined supra alongwith accrued

interest within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt

of a copy of this judgment before the 3

rd Motor Accident

Claims Tribunal, Cuttack which shall thereafter disburse

54

the same to the appellant-claimant after following the due

procedure.

78. Impugned judgment of the High Court is

modified to the aforesaid extent. Appeal is accordingly

allowed. However, there shall be no order as to cost.

……………………………J.

[UJJAL BHUYAN ]

……………………………J.

[N.V. ANJARIA]

NEW DELHI;

AUGUST 03, 2026.