2025 INSC 803 CORRECTED

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2894 OF 2025

[Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 9709 of 2024]

GHANSHYAM SONI …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE (GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI)

& ANR. …RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2895 OF 2025

[Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 17951 of 2024]

J U D G M E N T

SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA, J.

1.Leave granted.

SLP (Crl.) No. 9709/2024 & Anr. Page 1 of 20

2.The captioned Appeal is filed assailing the Impugned

Judgment/Final Order dt. 01.04.2024 passed by the High Court

of Delhi in Crl. MC No. 1227/2009 whereby the

Order/Judgment dt. 04.10.2008 passed by Additional Sessions

Judge Delhi (“Sessions Court”) in CR No. 87/2008 discharging

the Appellant for the offence u/s 498A Indian Penal Code, 1860

in FIR No. 1098/2002 dt. 19.12.2002 registered

with PS Malviya Nagar, was set aside.

3.The criminal machinery was set in motion with the

Complaint dt. 03.07.2002 filed by the Complainant

wife/Respondent no.2 culminating into the FIR No. 1098/2002

dt. 19.12.2002 registered with PS Malviya Nagar, against the

Appellant husband and her in-laws for commission of offences

under sections 498A, 406 & 34 IPC. The factual conspectus is

briefly stated as under:

3.1As per the FIR, the marriage between the Appellant

husband and the Complainant wife, Respondent no. 2

herein was solemnized on 28.02.1998 according to

Buddhist rites and ceremonies. It is averred that the entire

cost of the ceremonies had been arranged by the

Complainant, according to the best of their financial

abilities. At the time, both the parties were serving as Sub-

Inspectors with the Delhi Police.

SLP (Crl.) No. 9709/2024 & Anr. Page 2 of 20

3.2It is alleged that soon after her marriage, the

Complainant learnt about the greedy and abusive nature

of the Appellant and his family members, who constantly

taunted her and ridiculed her for bringing insufficient

dowry. Purportedly, the mother-in-law, Smt. Bhagwati

and five of her sisters-in law, namely Geeta, Lata, Misiya,

Hemlata and Gayatri constantly fueled conflict, and

instigated the Appellant against the Complainant. The

father-in-law hurled abuses at the Complainant and her

family, allegedly saying that their family had adopted

Buddhism to simply evade the traditions of dowry.

3.3The Appellant and his family consistently raised

demands for more dowry and allegedly made a specific

demand for Rs. 1.5 Lakhs in cash, a Car and a separate

house for the Appellant amongst other petty things. The

Complainant averred that despite serious effort, her father

was unable to meet the said demands which led to her

being subjected to serious physical & mental atrocities at

the hands of her husband and in-laws.

3.4It is alleged that on 27.04.1999, the Appellant

husband and her mother-in-law, Smt. Bhagwati had

beaten up the Complainant with fists, blows for not

fulfilling their needs. The Complainant who hurt her wrist

in the incident, had to put on a bandage for a month, and

SLP (Crl.) No. 9709/2024 & Anr. Page 3 of 20

her parents took her to their house, where she remained

on medical rest for twenty days. However, even after her

return from her parental home with Rs. 50,000/- in cash,

her late father-in-law and her sisters in law (except one)

berated her for her inability to fulfill their demands and

being a burden on the family.

3.5On 04.09.1999, the Appellant allegedly took out a

dagger and threatened the Complainant that he would kill

her if she failed to fulfill the demands, particularly that of

his sister. It is alleged that on 05.09.1999, the sister-in-

law, Ms. Lata had allegedly threatened the Complainant in

front of the father-in-law and the Appellant husband that

since she is to return to her house in Jaipur in 2-3 days,

her demand of a “mangalsutra” be fulfilled within 2 days,

or else the 3

rd

day would be the last day for the

Complainant in that house. Since she was not able to

fulfill the demands, the Complainant was allegedly beaten

up and thrown out of the matrimonial house on

08.09.1999. The Complainant was not allowed to take

with her any of her belongings including her own

motorcycle, jewelery or clothes and was left to fend for

herself. Aggrieved, she reported the incidents of cruelty

and filed a Complaint on the same day with PS Prasad

Nagar, Delhi vide DD No. 31 dt. 08.09.1999. It is the case

SLP (Crl.) No. 9709/2024 & Anr. Page 4 of 20

of the Complainant that since the incident, she had been

living with her parents.

3.6It is further alleged that on 06.12.1999, the

Complainant while returning from her shift at the Palam

Airport was allegedly beaten up by the Appellant, who

threatened her to withdraw the earlier Complaint alleging

domestic violence against him and his family. The

Complainant, who was pregnant at the time, had allegedly

hit the railing and purportedly sustained an injury on the

right side of the ear. She reported the incident by filing a

Complaint at PS Palam Airport vide DD No. 35 dated

06.12.1999.

3.7The Complainant gave birth to a daughter on

27.04.2000. It is alleged that neither the Appellant nor any

of his family members came to visit her or their new-born

daughter at the hospital or at her parents’ house. Even at

that stage, when the Complainant was in dire need, the

Appellant or his family did not return her belongings. The

Complainant alleges that the Appellant, who did not

bother to visit her own daughter, assaulted the

Complainant wife during the advanced stage of pregnancy

and did not incur any expenditure towards the birth of the

child, and yet enjoyed paternity leave for more than 15

days from the Department.

SLP (Crl.) No. 9709/2024 & Anr. Page 5 of 20

3.8On 03.07.2002, the Complainant filed a formal

Complaint with the Deputy Commissioner of Police,

CAW Cell, New Delhi through proper channels, wherein

she gave elaborate details of the alleged incidents and the

torture meted out to her since her marriage on 28.02.1998.

Pursuant to the said Complaint, FIR No. 1098/2002 dt.

19.12.2002 was registered at PS Malviya Nagar, under

sections 498A, 406 & 34 IPC against the Appellant

husband and her in-laws.

3.9The Charge-sheet in the captioned case was filed on

27.07.2004 under sections 498A, 406 & 34 IPC and the

Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi (“Magistrate”) took

cognizance on the very same day. Vide Order dt.

04.06.2008, the Magistrate framed charges under section

498A read with Section 34 IPC and dropped the charge

under section 406 IPC.

3.10Aggrieved by the Order dt. 04.06.2008 passed by

the Magistrate, the Appellant filed Criminal Revision

Petition No. 87/2008 before the Sessions Court, Delhi.

Apart from the submissions that the allegations against

him and his family are false, it was the assertion of the

Appellant that the alleged incidents of cruelty pertain to

the year 1999, whereas she lodged a Complaint on

03.07.2002 after an inordinate delay of 3 years. It was

SLP (Crl.) No. 9709/2024 & Anr. Page 6 of 20

averred that the cognizance on the Complaint was only

taken on 27.07.2004, which is beyond the limitation

period as provided under section 468 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”).

3.11The Sessions Court vide Order dt. 04.10.2008

within its powers of revision, discharged the Appellant,

his mother and her five sisters for the offences under

section 498A & 34 IPC. It was observed that the

Magistrate had taken cognizance of a time-barred case as

cognizance was taken on 27.07.2004 of the alleged

incidents of cruelty pertaining to the year 1999 i.e. after

five (05) years of the commission of the alleged offence,

whereas the limitation period for an offence punishable

under Section 498A is three (03) years.

1

The Sessions

Court held that the Magistrate did not have the inherent

powers to condone delay under section 473 CrPC at the

time of framing of charges, and even if it was authorized

to condone such delay, it could not have done so in the

present case where the chances of false implication of the

Appellants were apparent.

3.12The Sessions Court further remarked that the

possibility of false implication cannot be ruled out since

the Complainant wife was a police officer trained to

1 Section 468(2)(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973.

SLP (Crl.) No. 9709/2024 & Anr. Page 7 of 20

tackle tough and high-pressure situations and such an

offence in question could not have been committed

against her. The said remarks are reproduced as under:

“In the present case unlike the Ramesh's

case (supra) relied upon by the learned trial

court in the impugned order the

complainant is a police officer and is

supposed to be a tough person used to deal

with hard situations, by virtue of her job

which includes her handling the criminals

besides tough and hard job of police officer.

Such a strong-and tough person is not only

almost immune to be pressurized but also

can be harsh and strong in reaction to other

persons going against her-wishes. A woman

police officer knowing the law and rules

pertaining to crime detection and

investigation and trial before court,

therefore, cannot be equated to an

.oppressed housed wife who is subjected to

cruelty by her husband and in laws and the

aforesaid observation in Arun Vyas’s case

seems to apply to such a wife and not to a

strong woman police officer wife dealing

with hardened criminals daily in discharge

of her official duties. However, it cannot

always be a case that a woman wife working

in police is an aggressor and not subject to

cruelty. She can also be subjected to cruelty

by her husband and in laws. But when she

being conversant with law on the subject

has roped in the five sisters which include

four married sisters of her husband besides

aged mother in law and father in law (since

SLP (Crl.) No. 9709/2024 & Anr. Page 8 of 20

deceased) of the complainant, the possibility

of false implication of accused persons

cannot be ruled out particularly when as

per the statement u/s 161 CrPC of mother of

complainant, the complainant wife came to

her parents in September 199 due to

marriage of her sister but accused husband

did not take her back to matrimonial home.

When the Complainant wife is in full know

of investigation procedure and law and by

living separate from the revisionists since

September 1999 has lodged FIR/Complaint

in 2002, there certainly is unexplained delay

in lodging the FIR.”

3.13Aggrieved thereby, the Complainant filed the

Petition under section 482 CrPC assailing the Judgement

dt. 04.10.2008 before the High Court of Delhi. The High

Court vide Impugned Judgment and final Order dt.

01.04.2024 allowed the Petition, and set aside the Order

dt. 04.10.2008 passed by the Sessions Court, observing

that the findings of the Sessions Court were perverse.

3.14The captioned Appeal is against the Impugned

Judgment and final Order dt. 01.04.2024 passed by the

High Court of Delhi. During the course of the proceedings

before this Court, the Appellant has also filed an

Application under Article 142 of the Constitution of India

seeking quashing of the FIR No. 1098/2002 dt.

19.12.2002.

SLP (Crl.) No. 9709/2024 & Anr. Page 9 of 20

4.It has been argued on behalf of the Appellants that the

High Court had erred in setting aside the Order dt. 04.10.2008

passed by the Sessions Court, which was well-reasoned and

passed after due consideration of the material on record. It was

vehemently argued that the present case was time-barred and the

Magistrate could not have taken cognizance in light of the bar

under Section 468 CrPC. Also, the Magistrate after taking

cognizance on 27.07.2004 could not have reviewed its own

order, subsequently at the stage of framing of charges.

5.Even otherwise, it was contended that the Magistrate can

only condone the said delay only at the time of taking

cognizance and in terms of section 473 CrPC, only after a

proper explanation of delay. It is borne from the record that the

first complaint by the Complainant was lodged on 08.09.1999

and undisputedly, the Complainant has been residing separately

since then. The second Complaint was filed on 06.12.1999

which was withdrawn by the Complainant on 12.12.1999, and it

was only on a Complaint filed on 03.07.2002 that the captioned

FIR No. 1098/2002 dt. 19.12.2002 was registered. It was argued

that since all the three Complaints mention the same incidents of

cruelty in the year 1999, there is no explanation with regard to

the inordinate delay in filing the FIR dt. 19.12.2002, more than

three years after the alleged incidents and the delay could not

have been condoned for any reason whatsoever. It has been

SLP (Crl.) No. 9709/2024 & Anr. Page 10 of 20

urged by the learned counsel that the allegations in the FIR are

false, and no prima facie case can be made out against the

Appellant or his family, even after the perusal of the material on

record.

6.Per contra, it is argued by the learned counsel for the

Complainant/Respondent no. 2 that it cannot be assumed at this

stage when the trial is yet to commence that the Complaints

filed by her are false, simply because she is a police officer.

Since there were specific allegations against the Appellant of

physically and mentally harassing the complainant, it was

argued that the Sessions Court could not have discharged him

without the Appellant standing the test of trial.

7.It was further argued that the last alleged offence was

committed on 06.12.1999, and complaints were filed both on

06.12.1999 and 03.07.2002 which is well-within the three year

limitation period in terms of section 468 CrPC. The relevant

date to compute the limitation period under the said provision is

the date of filing of the Complainant or date of institution of

proceedings, and even otherwise, an offence under section 498A

is a continuing offence, and there are serious allegations made

against the Appellant and his family, even after September or

December 1999.

8.Learned counsel for the State also supports the case of the

prosecution and has prayed for the dismissal of the Appeal.

SLP (Crl.) No. 9709/2024 & Anr. Page 11 of 20

9.We have heard Learned counsel for the parties and have

carefully perused the material on record.

10. A perusal of the FIR shows that the allegations made by

the complainant are that in the year 1999, the Appellant inflicted

mental and physical cruelty upon her for bringing insufficient

dowry. The Complainant refers to few instances of such

atrocities, however the allegations are generic, and rather

ambiguous. The allegations against the family members, who

have been unfortunately roped in, is that they used to instigate

the Appellant husband to harass the Complainant wife, and

taunted the Complainant for not bringing enough dowry;

however, there is no specific incident of harassment or any

evidence to that effect. Similarly, the allegations against the five

out of six sisters that they used to insult the Complainant and

demanded dowry articles from her, and upon failure beat her up,

but there is not even a cursory mention of the incident. An

allegation has also been made against a tailor named Bhagwat

that he being a friend of the Appellant instigated him against the

Complainant, and was allegedly instrumental in blowing his

greed. Such allegations are merely accusatory and contentious in

nature, and do not elaborate a concrete picture of what may have

transpired. For this reason alone, and that the evidence on record

is clearly inconsistent with the accusations, the version of the

Complainant seems implausible and unreliable. The following

SLP (Crl.) No. 9709/2024 & Anr. Page 12 of 20

observation in K. Subba Rao v. State of Telangana

Represented by Its Secretary, Department of Home & Ors.

2

,

fits perfectly to the present scenario:

“6. The Courts should be careful in

proceeding against the distant relatives in

crimes pertaining to matrimonial disputes

and dowry deaths. The relatives of

the husband should not be roped in on the

basis of omnibus allegations unless specific

instances of their involvement in the crime

are made out."

11.As regards the Appellant, the purportedly specific

allegations levelled against him are also obscure in nature. Even

if the allegations and the case of the prosecution is taken at its

face value, apart from the bald allegations without any specifics

of time, date or place, there is no incriminating material found

by the prosecution or rather produced by the complainant to

substantiate the ingredients of “cruelty” under section 498A

IPC, as recently observed in the case of Jaydedeepsinh

Pravinsinh Chavda & Ors. v. State of Gujarat

3

and Rajesh

Chaddha v. State of Uttar Pradesh.

4

The Complainant has

admittedly failed to produce any medical records or injury

reports, x-ray reports, or any witnesses to substantiate her

allegations. We cannot ignore the fact that the Complainant

2 (2018) 14 SCC 452.

3 2024 INSC 960

4 2025 INSC 671.

SLP (Crl.) No. 9709/2024 & Anr. Page 13 of 20

even withdrew her second Complaint dt. 06.12.1999 six days

later on 12.12.1999. There is also no evidence to substantiate the

purported demand for dowry allegedly made by the Appellant or

his family and the investigative agencies in their own prudence

have not added sections 3 & 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act,

1961 to the chargesheet.

12.In this respect, the Sessions Court has applied its judicial

mind to the allegations in the FIR & the material on record, and

has rightly discharged the Appellants of the offences under

section 498A & 34 IPC. Notwithstanding the said observation

by the Sessions Court that the possibility of false implication

cannot be ruled out, the discharge of the Appellant merely

because the Complainant is a police officer is erroneous and

reflects poorly on the judicial decision making, which must be

strictly based on application of judicial principles to the merits

of the case. On the other hand, the High Court vide the

Impugned Order has traversed one step further and overtly

emphasised that simply because the Complainant is a police

officer, it cannot be assumed that she could not have been a

victim of cruelty at the hands of her husband and in-laws. We

agree with the sensitive approach adopted by the High Court in

adjudicating the present case, however a judicial decision cannot

be blurred to the actual facts and circumstances of a case. In this

debate, it is only reasonable to re-iterate that the Sessions Court

SLP (Crl.) No. 9709/2024 & Anr. Page 14 of 20

in exercise of its revisionary jurisdiction and the High Court in

exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under section 482 CrPC,

must delve into the material on record to assess what the

Complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out

even if the allegations are accepted in toto. In the present case,

such scrutiny of the allegations in the FIR and the material on

record reveals that no prima facie is made out against the

Appellant or his family. It is also borne from the record that the

divorce decree of their marriage, has already been passed, and

the same has never been challenged by the Complainant wife,

and hence has attained finality. Upon consideration of the

relevant circumstances and that the alleged incidents pertain to

the year 1999 and since then the parties have moved on with

their respective lives, it would be unjust and unfair if the

Appellants are forced to go through the tribulations of a trial.

13.It is rather unfortunate that the Complainant being an

officer of the State has initiated criminal machinery in such a

manner, where the aged parents-in-law, five sisters and one

tailor have been arrayed as an accused. Notwithstanding the

possibility of truth behind the allegations of cruelty, this

growing tendency to misuse legal provisions has time and again

been condemned by this Court. The observations in Dara

Lakshmi Narayana & Ors. v. State of Telangana & Anr.

5

,

5 2024 INSC 953.

SLP (Crl.) No. 9709/2024 & Anr. Page 15 of 20

Preeti Gupta & Anr. v. State of Jharkhand & Anr.

6

aptly

captures this concern.

14.In addition, we are also of the considered view that the

Complaint dt. 03.07.2002 filed by the Complainant was not time

barred and was filed within the ascribed period of three years

from the date of the commission of the offence. In arguendo,

even if the assertion of the Appellants is considered to be true

that the allegations pertain to the year 1999, and there is no

material change from the first Complaint dt. 08.09.1999 and the

final Complaint dt. 03.07.2002, it cannot be construed that the

same was not within the time frame of limitation simply because

cognizance was taken by the Magistrate two years later vide

Order dt. 27.07.2004.

15.It is a settled position of law that for the computation of

the limitation period under Section 468 CrPC the relevant date is

the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of

prosecution and not the date on which the Magistrate takes

cognizance.

7

The dicta laid down in the case of Bharat

Damodar Kale & Anr. v. State of Andhra Pradesh

8

makes it

unequivocally clear that the Magistrate is well within his powers

to take cognizance of a complaint filed within a period of three

6 [2010] 7 SCC 667.

7 Sarah Mathew Vs Institute Cardio Vascular Diseases by Its Director DR

K. M. Cherian & Ors. [2014] 2 SCC 62.

8 [2003] 8 SCC 559.

SLP (Crl.) No. 9709/2024 & Anr. Page 16 of 20

years from the date of the commission of offence as mandated

under section 468 CrPC. The relevant portion is reproduced as

under:

“50. The Code imposes an obligation on the

aggrieved party to take recourse to

appropriate forum within the period

provided by law and once he takes such

action, it would be wholly unreasonable and

inequitable if he is told that his grievance

would not be ventilated as the court had not

taken an action within the period of

limitation. Such interpretation of law,

instead of promoting justice would lead to

perpetuate injustice and defeat the primary

object of procedural law.

51. The matter can be looked at from

different angle also. Once it is accepted (and

there is no dispute about it) that it is not

within the domain of the complainant or

prosecuting agency to take cognizance of an

offence or to issue process and the only thing

the former can do is to file a complaint or

initiate proceedings in accordance with law,

if that action of initiation of proceedings has

been taken within the period of limitation,

the complainant is not responsible for any

delay on the part of the court or Magistrate

in issuing process or taking cognizance of an

offence. Now, if he is sought to be penalized

because of the omission, default or inaction

on the part of the court or Magistrate, the

provision of law may have to be tested on the

touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution.

It can possibly be urged that such a provision

SLP (Crl.) No. 9709/2024 & Anr. Page 17 of 20

is totally arbitrary, irrational and

unreasonable. It is settled law that a court of

law would interpret a provision which would

help sustaining the validity of law by

applying the doctrine of reasonable

construction rather than making it

vulnerable and unconstitutional by adopting

rule of litera legis. Connecting the provision

of limitation in Section 468 of the Code with

issuing of process or taking of cognizance by

the court may make it unsustainable and

ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution.

52. In view of the above, we hold that for the

purpose of computing the period of

limitation, the relevant date must be

considered as the date of filing of complaint

or initiating criminal proceedings and not

the date of taking cognizance by a

Magistrate or issuance of process by a court.

We, therefore, overrule all decisions in which

it has been held that the crucial date for

computing the period of limitation is taking

of cognizance by the Magistrate/court and

not of filing of complaint or initiation of

criminal proceedings.

53. In the instant case, the complaint was

filed within a period of three days from the

date of alleged offence. The complaint,

therefore, must be held to be filed within the

period of limitation even though cognizance

was taken by the learned Magistrate after a

period of one year. Since the criminal

proceedings have been quashed by the High

Court, the order deserves to be set aside and

is accordingly set aside by directing the

Magistrate to proceed with the case and pass

SLP (Crl.) No. 9709/2024 & Anr. Page 18 of 20

an appropriate order in accordance with law,

as expeditiously as possible.”

16.The following observation in Kamatchi v. Lakshmi

Narayanan

9

also re-iterates the said position, and further holds

that simply because the cognizance is taken at a later stage, but

the Complaint was filed within the specified period from the

commission of the offence, the Complainant cannot be put to

prejudice and her Complaint cannot be discarded as time-barred.

“It is, thus, clear that though Section 468 of the

Code mandates that ‘cognizance’ ought to be

taken within the specified period from the

commission of offence, by invoking the

principles of purposive construction, this Court

ruled that a complainant should not be put to

prejudice, if for reasons beyond the control of

the prosecuting agency or the complainant, the

cognizance was taken after the period of

limitation. It was observed by the Constitution

Bench that if the filing of the complaint or

initiation of proceedings was within the

prescribed period from the date of commission

of an offence, the Court would be entitled to

take cognizance even after the prescribed

period was over.”

17.The observations made by the High Court in respect of

computation of the limitation period is the correct appreciation

of facts, and it is right in holding that “considering the date of

commission of offence as 08.09.1999 and the dale of filing of

complaint as 03.07.2002, this Court finds that the Complaint

9 [2022] 15 SCC 50.

SLP (Crl.) No. 9709/2024 & Anr. Page 19 of 20

was lodged by the Petitioner within a period of two years and

ten months from the date of commission of alleged offence,

which is within. the period of limitation of three years as per

Section 468 of CrPC.”

18. Therefore, this is certainly not a case where the Complaint

or the issuance of process is ex-facie barred by limitation, that

the question of condonation of delay would arise. It is therefore

clarified that the Magistrate had rightly taken cognizance of the

offence under section 498A and the question of applicability or

exercise of powers under section 473 CrPC as erroneously

observed by the Sessions Court, does not even arise and need

not be delved into at this stage.

19. In the interest of justice, and in exercise of our powers

under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, we deem it fit and

appropriate to quash and set aside the FIR No. 1098/2002 dt.

19.12.2002 registered with PS Malviya Nagar and the

Chargesheet dt. 27.07.2004.

20.Both the Criminal Appeals are accordingly allowed.

……………………………………J.

[B.V. NAGARATHNA]

……………………………………J.

[SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA]

NEW DELHI

June 04, 2025.

SLP (Crl.) No. 9709/2024 & Anr. Page 20 of 20