2026:HHC:17

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

Cr. Revision No. 120 of 2014

Reserved on: 19.12.2025

Date of Decision: 1.1.2026.

Gurmeet Singh@ Meeta ...Petitioner

Versus

State of HP ...Respondent

Coram

Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.

Whether approved for reporting?

1

No.

For the petitioner : Mr. Karan Singh Kanwar,

Advocate.

For the Respondent/State : Mr. Jitender Sharma,

Additional Advocate General.

Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

The present revision is directed against the judgment

dated 11.4.2014, passed by learned Sessions Judge, Sirmour

District at Nahan, (learned Appellate Court) vide which the

judgment of conviction dated 21.2.2013 and order of sentence

dated 25.2.2013, passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate,

Sirmour District at Nahan (learned Trial Court), were upheld.

(Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they

were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.)

1

Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present

revision are that the police presented a challan against the

accused before the learned Trial Court for the commission of

offences punishable under Sections 353, 332 and 290 of the

Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that the informant HHC

Pradeep Kumar (PW6), Constable Jagat Singh (PW9), HHG Balak

Ram (PW2) and HHG Mohan Singh (not examined) were on a

patrolling duty on 22.1.2008. They reached near the shop of

Kulveer Singh (PW5) located in Mohalla Govindgarh, at about

6.30 PM. Gurmeet Singh (accused) and another person were

consuming liquor outside the shop. Pradeep Kumar (PW6)

advised the accused not to consume liquor at a public place.

Gurmeet Singh became infuriated, caught hold of the

informant’s uniform, and slapped the informant. The informant

sustained injuries to his neck. The button of his shirt was torn.

Another person ran away from the spot. Surinder Kumar (PW1)

rescued the informant from the accused. The matter was

reported to the police. An entry No. 10 (Ex.PW3/B) was

registered in the Police Station. ASI Ram Lal (PW8) went to the

spot to verify the correctness of the information. The informant

made a statement (Ex.PW6/A) which was sent to the Police

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Station, where FIR (Ex.PW8/A) was registered. ASI Ram Nath

(PW8) investigated the matter. He prepared the site plan

(Ex.PW8/C). He seized the liquor bottle (Ex. P3) bearing Mark

‘Lal Kila’, one broken button (Ex. P2) of the uniform, and two

empty glasses (Ex. P4) vide memo (Ex.PW1/A). He sealed the

bottle with seal ‘M’. He put the broken button into a cloth parcel

and sealed the parcel with seal ‘T’. He seized the shirt (Ex. P1)

vide memo (Ex.PW1/B). He put the shirt in a cloth parcel and

sealed the parcel with a seal impression ‘T’. He obtained the seal

impression ‘M’ (Ex.PW8/F) and seal impression ‘T’ (Ex.PW8/E)

on separate pieces of cloth and handed over the seals to Balak

Ram. He filed an application (Ex.PW8/M) for conducting the

medical examination of the informant. Dr S.M. Ali (PW4)

medically examined the victim and found that he had sustained

multiple injuries which could have been caused by beating. He

issued the MLC (Ex.PW4/A). ASI Ram Nath seized the

informant’s posting and transfer orders (Ex.PW7/A and

Ex.PW7/B). He recorded the statements of the remaining

witnesses as per their version. After the completion of the

investigation, a challan was prepared and presented before the

learned Trial Court.

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3. The learned Trial Court charged the accused with the

commission of offences punishable under Sections 353, 332 and

290 read with Section 34 of the IPC, to which he pleaded not

guilty and claimed to be tried.

4. The prosecution examined ten witnesses to prove its

case. Surinder Kumar (PW1) and Kulveer Singh (PW5) did not

support the prosecution’s case. HHG Balak Ram (PW2) and Jagat

Singh (PW9) are the official witnesses to the incident. Constable

Jagjeet Singh (PW3) proved the entry in the daily diary. Dr S.M.

Ali (PW4) medically examined the informant. Pradeep Kumar

(PW6) is the informant/victim. Sudhir Chauhan (PW7) produced

the appointment and posting orders. ASI Ram Nath (PW8)

investigated the matter. ASI Kuldeep Singh (PW10) was working

as MHC with whom the case property was deposited.

5. The accused, in their statements recorded under

Section 313 of Cr.P.C., denied the prosecution’s case in its

entirety. They stated that they were innocent and were falsely

implicated. They did not present any evidence in defence.

6. Learned Trial Court held that the informant’s

testimony was corroborated by other official witnesses. The

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mere fact that independent witnesses did not support the

prosecution’s case was not sufficient to discard it. It was

suggested to the official witnesses that the accused were falsely

implicated because no case of consuming liquor could be made

out under the Excise Act. This suggestion proved the

prosecution’s case that the accused were consuming liquor, and

they were asked not to do so by the police. The recovery of

bottles, glasses and a broken button from the spot supported the

prosecution’s version that the accused were consuming liquor

outside the shop of Kulveer and had beaten the informant. The

statement of Dr S.M. Ali corroborated the informant’s version

regarding the infliction of injuries. Minor contradictions in the

statements were not sufficient to doubt the prosecution’s case.

The informant was proved to be a public servant who was

discharging his official duties. The identity of the other accused

was not proved. Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted the

accused Gurmeet Singh of the commission of an offence

punishable under Section 332 of IPC and sentenced him to

undergo simple imprisonment for six months, pay a fine of

₹1,000/- and, in case of default, to undergo simple

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imprisonment for one month for the commission of the

aforesaid offence.

7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by

the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was

decided by the learned Sessions Judge, Sirmour District at

Nahan, HP (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court

concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court

that the informant’s testimony was corroborated by the official

witnesses and the medical evidence. The fact that the witnesses

did not support the prosecution’s case was not sufficient to

doubt it. Minor contradictions in the statements could not be

used to discard the prosecution’s case. Learned Trial Court had

imposed an adequate sentence, and no interference was required

with the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court.

Hence, the appeal was dismissed.

8. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed

by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present

revision, asserting that the learned Courts below failed to

appreciate the evidence on record. The independent witnesses

did not support the prosecution’s case. The testimonies of

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official witnesses contradicted each other in material

particulars. Learned Trial Court had imposed a harsh sentence.

Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed

and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below

be set aside.

9. I have heard Mr Karan Singh Kanwar, learned

counsel for the petitioner/accused, and Mr Jitender Sharma,

learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent-State.

10. Mr Karan Singh Kanwar, learned counsel for the

petitioners/accused, submitted that the learned Courts below

erred in appreciating the material placed on record. The

testimonies of prosecution witnesses contradicted each other on

material particulars. The possibility of the self-infliction of

injuries could not be ruled out. Learned Trial Court had imposed

a harsh sentence, and the benefit of the Probation of Offenders

Act was wrongly denied to the petitioner/accused. Therefore, he

prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments

and order passed by the learned Courts below be set-aside.

11. Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate

General, for the respondent-State, submitted that the accused

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suggested to the prosecution witnesses that no case under the

Excise Act could be made against the accused, and a false case

was made against him. This suggestion corroborated the

prosecution’s version that the accused were consuming liquor,

and they were prevented by the police officials from doing so.

The learned Courts below have concurrently held that the

prosecution’s case was proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and

this Court should not interfere with the concurrent finding of

fact recorded by the learned Courts below. Hence, he prayed that

the present revision be dismissed.

12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions

made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204:

(2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional

court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent

defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page

207: -

“10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at

the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent

findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a

detailed appreciation of the material and evidence

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brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision

against conviction is not supposed to exercise the

jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of

interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397

of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests

jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the

correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence

or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of

any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the

provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of

jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error

which is to be determined on the merits of individual

cases. It is also well settled that while considering the

same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon

the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those

findings.

14. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v.

Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC

1294, wherein it was observed at page 695:

14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under

Section 397CrPC, which vests the court with the power to

call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the

purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and

regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case.

The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect

or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which

has crept in such proceedings.

15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this

Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460:

(2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986, where scope

of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly

explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13)

“12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the

power to call for and examine the records of an

inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to

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the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order

made in a case. The object of this provision is to set

right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law.

There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not

be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders,

which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful

consideration and appear to be in accordance with law.

If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it

emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked

where the decisions under challenge are grossly

erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions

of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence,

material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is

exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not

exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each

case would have to be determined on its own merits.

13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional

jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one

and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of

the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against

an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to

keep in mind that the exercise of revisional

jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie.

Where the Court is dealing with the question as to

whether the charge has been framed properly and in

accordance with law in a given case, it may be

reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional

jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within

the categories aforestated. Even the framing of the

charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings

under CrPC.”

15. It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8

SCC 165: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the

High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its

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conclusions in the absence of any perversity. It was observed at

page 169:

“12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of

Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the

revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala

v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC

452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275, while considering the scope of the

revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has

laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5)

“5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can

call for and examine the record of any proceedings to

satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety

of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the

jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised

by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of

justice. But the said revisional power cannot be

equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can

it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction.

Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for

the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come

to its conclusion on the same when the evidence has

already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as

the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring

feature is brought to the notice of the High Court

which would otherwise tantamount to a gross

miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned

judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid

standpoint, we have no hesitation in concluding that

the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering

with the conviction of the respondent by

reappreciating the oral evidence. …”

13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and

relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court

in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke,

(2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19. This Court held that

the High Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction,

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shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless

it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non-

consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot

be set aside merely on the ground that another view is

possible. The following has been laid down in para 14:

(SCC p. 135)

“14. … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is

perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly

unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any

relevant material or there is palpable misreading of

records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting

aside the order, merely because another view is

possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an

appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional

jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do

justice in accordance with the principles of criminal

jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under

Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that

of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose

decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be

perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or

glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based

on no material or where the material facts are wholly

ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised

arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere

with the decision in exercise of their revisional

jurisdiction.”

14. In the above case, also a conviction of the accused was

recorded, and the High Court set aside [Dattatray Gulabrao

Phalke v. Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan, 2013 SCC OnLine Bom

1753] the order of conviction by substituting its view. This

Court set aside the High Court's order, holding that the

High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in substituting its

views, and that too without any legal basis.

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16. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh

Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ)

309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205:

“16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional

jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure

Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of

perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for

the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the

evidence on record.

17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v.

Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it

is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional

Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by

a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a

jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is,

therefore, in the negative.”

17. The present revision has to be decided as per the

parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

18. The informant Pradeep Kumar (PW6) stated that he

was on patrolling duty and he saw the accused Gurmeet Singh

and Harbhajan Singh consuming liquor outside the shop of

Kulveer Singh. He asked them as to why they were consuming

liquor in the open. He tried to seize the bottle and the glasses.

The accused caught hold of his neck and pushed him. The

accused also slapped him. He sustained injuries on his neck, and

the button of his shirt was torn. He stated in his cross-

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examination that he started from the Police Post at 5.00 PM. He

reached Mohalla Govindgarh at 6.30 PM. He did not have the

mobile at the time of the incident. Many people usually stand

outside the meat shop. The shop of Kulveer was shut, and no

inquiry was made from him. Gurmeet Singh was sitting outside

the shop. The movement of the traffic was not obstructed. No

inquiry was made in his presence. He knew Gurmeet before the

incident. He denied that he wanted to file a case under the Excise

Act, but no case was made out for one bottle; hence, he falsely

implicated the accused.

19. Learned Courts below had rightly held that the

suggestion made to this witness in the cross-examination that

the informant Pradeep wanted to register a case under the

Excise Act, but no case for the possession of one bottle could be

made, established the presence of the accused and informant on

the spot and the fact that the accused was consuming liquor in a

public place. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

Balu Sudam Khalde v. State of Maharashtra, (2023) 13 SCC 365:

2023 SCC OnLine SC 355 that the suggestion put to the witness

can be taken into consideration while determining the

innocence or guilt of the accused. It was observed at page 382: -

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“34. According to the learned counsel, such suggestions

could be a part of the defence strategy to impeach the

credibility of the witness. The proof of guilt required of

the prosecution does not depend on the satisfaction made

to a witness.

35. In Tarun Bora v. State of Assam [Tarun Bora v. State of

Assam, (2002) 7 SCC 39: 2002 SCC (Cri) 1568], a three-judge

Bench of this Court was dealing with an appeal against the

order passed by the Designated Court, Guwahati, in TADA

Sessions case wherein the appellant was convicted under

Section 365IPC read with Sections 3(1) and 3(5) of the

Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987.

36. In Tarun Bora case [Tarun Bora v. State of Assam, (2002)

7 SCC 39: 2002 SCC (Cri) 1568] , this Court, while

considering the evidence on record, took note of a

suggestion which was put to one of the witnesses and

considering the reply given by the witness to the

suggestion put by the accused, concluded that the

presence of the accused was admitted. We quote with

profit the following observations made by this Court in

paras 15, 16 and 17, respectively, as under: (Tarun Bora v.

State of Assam, (2002) 7 SCC 39: 2002 SCC (Cri) 1568, SCC

pp. 43-44)

“15. The witness further stated that during the assault,

the assailant accused him of giving information to the

army about the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA).

He further stated that on the third night, he was carried

away blindfolded on a bicycle to a different place, and

when his eyes were opened, he could see his younger

brother Kumud Kakati (PW 2) and his wife Smt Prema

Kakati (PW 3). The place was Duliapather, which is about

6-7 km away from his Village, Sakrahi. The witness

identified the appellant, Tarun Bora, and stated that it

was he who took him in an Ambassador car from the

residence of Nandeswar Bora on the date of the incident.

16. In cross-examination, the witness stated as follows:

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‘Accused Tarun Bora did not blind my eyes, nor did he

assault me.’

17. This part of the cross-examination is suggestive of the

presence of the accused, Tarun Bora, in the whole episode.

This will suggest the presence of the accused, Tarun Bora,

as admitted. The only denial is that the accused did not

participate in blindfolding the eyes of the witness, nor did

he assault him.”

37. In Rakesh Kumar v. State of Haryana, (1987) 2 SCC 34:

1987 SCC (Cri) 256, this Court was dealing with an appeal

against the judgment of the High Court affirming the

order of the Sessions Judge whereby the appellant and

three other persons were convicted under Section 302

read with Section 34IPC. While reappreciating the

evidence on record, this Court noticed that in the cross-

examination of PW 4 Sube Singh, a suggestion was made

with regard to the colour of the shirt worn by one of the

accused persons at the time of the incident. This Court,

taking into consideration the nature of the suggestion put

by the defence and the reply, arrived at the conclusion

that the presence of the accused, namely, Dharam Vir, was

established on the spot at the time of the occurrence. We

quote the following observations made by this Court in

paras 8 and 9, respectively, as under (SCC p. 36)

“8. PW 3, Bhagat Singh, stated in his examination-in-

chief that he had identified the accused at the time of the

occurrence. But curiously enough, he was not cross-

examined as to how and in what manner he could identify

the accused, as pointed out by the learned Sessions Judge.

No suggestion was also given to him that the place was

dark and that it was not possible to identify the assailants

of the deceased.

9. In his cross-examination, PW 4 Sube Singh stated that

the accused, Dharam Vir, was wearing a white shirt. It was

suggested to him on behalf of the accused that Dharam Vir

was wearing a cream-coloured shirt. In answer to that

suggestion, PW 4 said it is not correct that Dharam Vir,

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the accused, was wearing a shirt of a cream colour and not

a white colour at that time.’ The learned Sessions Judge

has rightly observed that the above suggestion at least

proves the presence of the accused Dharam Vir on the spot

at the time of occurrence.”

38. Thus, from the above, it is evident that the suggestion

made by the defence counsel to a witness in the cross-

examination, if found to be incriminating in nature in any

manner, would definitely bind the accused, and the

accused cannot get away on the plea that his counsel had

no implied authority to make suggestions in the nature of

admissions against his client.

39. Any concession or admission of a fact by a defence

counsel would definitely be binding on his client, except

for the concession on a point of law. As a legal

proposition, we cannot agree with the submission

canvassed on behalf of the appellants that an answer by a

witness to a suggestion made by the defence counsel in

the cross-examination does not deserve any value or

utility if it incriminates the accused in any manner.”

20. Therefore, the suggestion made to the witness can be

taken into consideration while evaluating the evidence, and

there is no infirmity in considering the suggestion made to the

witnesses.

21. The informant’s testimony is duly corroborated by

the statement (Ex.PW6/A), which was recorded at 7.25 PM

within an hour of the incident. The statement contains the

details of the incident in the same manner as they have been

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deposed by the informant on oath, and the statement provides

valuable corroboration to the informant’s testimony.

22. His testimony is also corroborated by the statement

of Dr S.M. Ali (PW4), who medically examined him on the date of

the incident at 9.10 pm and found multiple injuries on his

person. He noticed the injury on the lower, interior and middle

part of the neck, which could have been caused by beating. He

admitted in his cross-examination that the injury could be

caused by a fall; however, that is an alternative hypothesis and

will not make the prosecution’s case suspect. It was laid down by

the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramakant Rai v. Madan Rai ,

(2003) 12 SCC 395: 2003 SCC OnLine SC 1086, that when the

testimonies of the witnesses are found credible, the medical

evidence pointing to alternative possibilities is not sufficient to

discard the prosecution’s case. It was observed at page 404:

“22. It is trite that where the eyewitnesses' account is

found credible and trustworthy, medical opinion pointing

to alternative possibilities is not accepted as conclusive.

Witnesses, as Bentham said, are the eyes and ears of

justice. Hence, the importance and primacy of the quality

of the trial process. Eyewitnesses' accounts would require

a careful independent assessment and evaluation for their

credibility, which should not be adversely prejudged,

making any other evidence, including the medical

evidence, the sole touchstone for the test of such

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credibility. The evidence must be tested for its inherent

consistency and the inherent probability of the story;

consistency with the account of other witnesses held to be

creditworthy; consistency with the undisputed facts; the

“credit” of the witnesses; their performance in the

witness box; their power of observation, etc. Then the

probative value of such evidence becomes eligible to be

put into the scales for a cumulative evaluation.”

23. Further, the learned Trial Court had rightly pointed

out that a person falling on a hard surface would sustain injuries

on his face and other parts of the body and not on the neck

because the neck is protected by the face and the chest. Hence,

the absence of injuries on the face and chest would make it

difficult to rely upon the cross-examination of this witness that

the injury could have been caused by a fall on a hard surface.

24. HHG Balak Ram (PW2) also corroborated the

informant’s testimony. He stated that the police party went to

Mohalla Govindgarh and found that two persons were

consuming liquor outside the shop of Kulveer Singh. Pradeep

objected, and Gurmeet Singh became infuriated. He caught hold

of the collar of the informant's shirt and slapped him. The

button of the shirt was torn in the incident. The accused ran

away from the spot. He stated in his cross-examination that he

did not know the accused Gurmeet personally. The accused was

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sitting on the roadside, and the traffic was not blocked. Pradeep

Kumar told the accused not to consume liquor in an open place.

He denied that the accused had obstructed the informant in the

discharge of his duty.

25. There is nothing in his cross-examination to show

that he was making a false statement. He is a police official, and

the presumption regarding the correctness of the official acts

applies to him. Thus, the learned Courts below had rightly

accepted his testimony.

26. Jagat Singh (PW9) stated that the police party

reached Mohalla Govindgarh and found that Gurmeet Singh and

another person were consuming liquor outside the shop of

Kulveer. Pradeep told them not to do so. The accused quarrelled

with Pradeep. The shirt and the scarf worn by the informant

were torn in the incident. He stated in his cross-examination

that he had told the police about the tearing of the scarf. He did

not remember the places visited by the police party during the

patrolling. He admitted that the people keep standing on the

road at Mohalla Govindgarh.

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27. The testimony of this witness corroborated the

prosecution’s version. His statement that the scarf of the

informant was torn is not sufficient to discard the prosecution’s

case because it is a minor discrepancy, which is bound to come

with time. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Rajan v. State of

Haryana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1952, that the discrepancies in the

statements of the witnesses are not sufficient to discard the

prosecution case unless they shake the core of the testimonies.

It was observed: -

“32. The appreciation of ocular evidence is a hard task.

There is no fixed or straitjacket formula for the

appreciation of the ocular evidence. The judicially evolved

principles for the appreciation of ocular evidence in a

criminal case can be enumerated as under:

“I. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the

approach must be whether the evidence of the witness,

read as a whole, appears to have a ring of truth. Once

that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary

for the Court to scrutinize the evidence more

particularly keeping in view the deficiencies,

drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence

as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is

against the general tenor of the evidence given by the

witness and whether the earlier evaluation of the

evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief.

II. If the Court before whom the witness gives evidence

had the opportunity to form the opinion about the

general tenor of evidence given by the witness, the

appellate court which had not this benefit will have to

attach due weight to the appreciation of evidence by

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the trial court and unless there are reasons weighty

and formidable it would not be proper to reject the

evidence on the ground of minor variations or

infirmities in the matter of trivial details.

III. When an eye-witness is examined at length, it is

quite possible for him to make some discrepancies. But

courts should bear in mind that it is only when

discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so

incompatible with the credibility of his version that the

court is justified in jettisoning his evidence.

IV. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching

the core of the case, a hyper-technical approach by

taking sentences torn out of context here or there from

the evidence, attaching importance to some technical

error committed by the investigating officer, not going

to the root of the matter, would not ordinarily permit

rejection of the evidence as a whole.

V. Too serious a view to be adopted on mere variations

falling in the narration of an incident (either as

between the evidence of two witnesses or as between

two statements of the same witness) is an unrealistic

approach for judicial scrutiny.

VI. By and large, a witness cannot be expected to

possess a photographic memory and to recall the

details of an incident. It is not as if a videotape is

replayed on the mental screen.

VII. Ordinarily, it so happens that a witness is

overtaken by events. The witness could not have

anticipated the occurrence, which so often has an

element of surprise. The mental faculties, therefore,

cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb the details.

VIII. The powers of observation differ from person to

person. What one may notice, another may not. An

object or movement might emboss its image on one

person's mind, whereas it might go unnoticed on the

part of another.

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IX. By and large, people cannot accurately recall a

conversation and reproduce the very words used by

them or heard by them. They can only recall the main

purport of the conversation. It is unrealistic to expect a

witness to be a human tape recorder.

X. In regard to the exact time of an incident, or the time

duration of an occurrence, usually, people make their

estimates by guesswork on the spur of the moment at

the time of interrogation. And one cannot expect

people to make very precise or reliable estimates in

such matters. Again, it depends on the time sense of

individuals, which varies from person to person.

XI. Ordinarily, a witness cannot be expected to recall

accurately the sequence of events that take place in

rapid succession or in a short time span. A witness is

liable to get confused or mixed up when interrogated

later on.

XII. A witness, though wholly truthful, is liable to be

overawed by the court atmosphere and the piercing

cross-examination by counsel and, out of nervousness,

mix up facts, get confused regarding the sequence of

events, or fill in details from imagination on the spur of

the moment. The subconscious mind of the witness

sometimes operates on account of the fear of looking

foolish or being disbelieved, though the witness is

giving a truthful and honest account of the occurrence

witnessed by him.

XIII. A former statement, though seemingly

inconsistent with the evidence, need not necessarily be

sufficient to amount to a contradiction. Unless the

former statement has the potency to discredit the latter

statement, even if the latter statement is at variance

with the former to some extent, it would not be helpful

to contradict that witness.” [See Bharwada

Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat (1983) 3 SCC

217: 1983 Cri LJ 1096: (AIR 1983 SC 753) Leela Ram v.

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State of Haryana (1999) 9 SCC 525: AIR 1999 SC 3717

and Tahsildar Singh v. State of UP (AIR 1959 SC 1012)”

28. Testimonies of these witnesses are corroborated by

the recovery of the bottle, glasses and a broken button from the

spot. The police also recovered the informant’s shirt, from

which the button was found missing. These circumstances

corroborate the statements of the prosecution witnesses that

the accused were consuming liquor and had assaulted the

informant, breaking the button of his shirt.

29. Surinder Kumar (PW1) did not support the

prosecution’s case. He was permitted to be cross-examined. He

denied that two persons were consuming liquor in Mohalla

Govindgarh. The police objected and gave beatings to the

informant. He denied the previous statement recorded by the

police.

30. Kulveer Singh (PW5) also did not support the

prosecution’s case. He was permitted to be cross-examined. He

denied that he saw the accused consuming liquor outside the

shop. He denied that he objected, and the accused picked up a

quarrel with him. He denied that the police came to the spot, and

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the accused gave beatings to the informant. He denied his

previous statement recorded by the police.

31. ASI Ram Nath (PW8) investigated the matter. He

specifically stated that he had recorded the statements of

Surinder Kumar (Ex.PW8/G) and Kulveer Singh (Ex.PW8/H) as

per their version. This was not challenged in the cross-

examination and is deemed to be accepted as correct. Thus, the

witnesses are shown to have made two inconsistent statements:

one before the police and another before the Court. Both these

statements cannot stand together. Hence, their credit has been

impeached under Section 153(3) of the Indian Evidence Act, and

no reliance can be placed upon their statements in the Court. It

was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sat Paul v. Delhi

Admn., (1976) 1 SCC 727 that where a witness has been

thoroughly discredited by confronting him with the previous

statement, his statement cannot be relied upon. However, when

he is confronted with some portions of the previous statement,

his credibility is shaken to that extent, and the rest of the

statement can be relied upon. It was observed:

“52. From the above conspectus, it emerges clearly that

even in a criminal prosecution, when a witness is cross-

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examined and contradicted with the leave of the court by

the party calling him, his evidence cannot, as a matter of

law, be treated as washed off the record altogether. It is

for the Judge of fact to consider in each case whether, as a

result of such cross-examination and contradiction, the

witness stands thoroughly discredited or can still be

believed regarding a part of his testimony. If the Judge

finds that in the process, the credit of the witness has not

been completely shaken, he may, after reading and

considering the evidence of the witness, as a whole, with

due caution and care, accept, in the light of the other

evidence on the record, that part of his testimony which

he finds to be creditworthy and act upon it. If in a given

case, the whole of the testimony of the witness is

impugned, and in the process, the witness stands squarely

and totally discredited, the Judge should, as a matter of

prudence, discard his evidence in toto.”

32. This Court also took a similar view in Ian Stilman

versus. State 2002(2) ShimLC 16 wherein it was observed:

“12. It is now well settled that when a witness who has

been called by the prosecution is permitted to be cross-

examined on behalf of the prosecution, such a witness

loses credibility and cannot be relied upon by the defence.

We find support for the view we have taken from the

various authorities of the Apex Court. In Jagir Singh v. The

State (Delhi Administration), AIR 1975 Supreme Court 1400,

the Apex Court observed:

"It is now well settled that when a witness, who has

been called by the prosecution, is permitted to be

cross-examined on behalf of the prosecution, the

result of that course being adopted is to discredit

this witness altogether and not merely to get rid of a

part of his testimony.

33. Thus, the testimonies of the independent witnesses

cannot be used for discarding the prosecution’s case.

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34. It was not disputed that the informant was a public

servant. He was discharging his duties at the time of the

incident. The accused Gurmeet Singh gave beatings to him while

he was discharging his duties, and he sustained simple injuries.

Therefore, he was rightly convicted by the learned Trial Court of

the commission of an offence punishable under Section 332 of

the IPC.

35. It was submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in

not extending the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act. This

submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in Siyasaran v. State of M.P., 1994 SCC OnLine SC 4:

1995 Cri LJ 2126 that the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act

cannot be granted to a person for using force on a government

servant. Therefore, the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act

could not have been granted to the accused, and there is no error

in not extending the benefit of the Act to the accused.

36. Learned Trial court imposed a sentence of six months

and a fine of ₹1000/-, and in default to undergo simple

imprisonment for one month. This cannot be said to be

excessive, considering that a public servant was beaten at a

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public place while discharging his duties. Any leniency in such

matters would encourage the people to take the law into their

own hands, and it is impermissible to take a lenient view. Hence,

no interference is required with the sentence imposed by the

learned Trial Court as affirmed by the learned Appellate Court.

37. No other point urged.

38. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it

is dismissed, so also the pending miscellaneous applications, if

any.

39. A copy of this judgment, along with the records of the

learned Courts below, be sent back forthwith.

(Rakesh Kainthla)

Judge

1

st

January, 2026

(Chander)