W.P.(CRL) 1985/2025 Page 1 of 37

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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Judgment delivered on: 16.04.2026

+ W.P.(CRL) 1985/2025

HARMEET SINGH .....Petitioner

Through: Mr. Lokesh Kumar Mishra with Mr.

Abhishek Kaushik, Mr. Nadeem

Ahmed, Advocates and petitioner in

court.

versus

STATE OF GNCT DELHI AND ANR. .....Respondents

Through: Mr. Anand V Khatri, ASC for the

State with SI Pinki Rana, P.S.:

Malviya Nagar.

R-2 in court.

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ANUP JAIRAM BHAMBHANI

J U D G M E N T

ANUP JAIRAM BHAMBHANI, J.

The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience.

- Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.

The present case is a compelling instance that brings into focus

the prescient words of Justice Holmes, since it exposes the disconnect

between a rigid legal construct and the human lives it seeks to govern.

2. By way of this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of

India read with section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita

2023 („BNSS‟), the petitioner (accused), who is the husband of

respondent No.2 (prosecutrix), seeks quashing of case FIR

No.279/2025 dated 13.06.2025 registered under section 64(1) of the

Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 („BNS‟) and section 6 of the Protection

W.P.(CRL) 1985/2025 Page 2 of 37

of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 („POCSO Act‟) at P.S.:

Malviya Nagar, South Delhi.

3. The petition is premised on the „consent‟ of the complainant, who is

arrayed as respondent No.2 in the petition. It is not disputed that at the

time of commission of the alleged offences, respondent No.2 was

„minor‟ i.e., below the age of 18 years, for which reason an offence

under section 6 of the POCSO Act has also been alleged against the

petitioner.

4. Though otherwise, the matter is based on the consent of the parties, the

factual matrix of the matter that presents certain legal challenges is the

following:

4.1. The offences alleged are stated to have been committed by the

petitioner against respondent No.2 in or about September 2024.

Since the petitioner‟s date of birth is 03.07.2002; and the date of

birth of respondent No.2 is 30.06.2007, admittedly, at the time of

commission of the alleged offences, the petitioner was about 22

years of age, while the prosecutrix was about 17 years old.

4.2. On her own, respondent No.2 has made no complaint against the

petitioner; and the subject FIR came to be registered at the

instance of the doctors at Safdarjung Hospital, New Delhi, where

the prosecutrix had gone for delivering her baby; and the

attending doctors discovered that she was minor. This led the

doctors at Safdarjung Hospital to inform the police, in

compliance with their legal obligation under section 21 of the

POCSO Act.

W.P.(CRL) 1985/2025 Page 3 of 37

4.3. In the petition, the petitioner and respondent No.2 state that they

got married according to Sikh rites and rituals at Ambala,

Haryana on 04.09.2024; and at that time, the petitioner was

about 22 years of age; and the prosecutrix was about 17 years

old. It is further stated that on 12.06.2025 a male child was born

from the wedlock. A copy of Marriage Certificate dated

18.06.2025 has been appended as Annexure-P4 to the petition.

4.4. The petitioner and respondent No.2 are stated to be residing as

spouses alongwith their child, with the petitioner‟s family.

4.5. In the present proceedings, respondent No.2 – the prosecutrix –

has filed an affidavit, stating that she has no grievance against

the petitioner; that she has married him of her own volition; and

is residing happily and peacefully in her matrimonial home. She

has further stated, that their child is born from the wedlock; that

she does not wish to pursue any further proceedings in the

subject FIR; and that she has no objection if the subject FIR and

all proceedings arising therefrom are quashed. Statements to the

above effect have also been recorded before the learned Joint-

Registrar of this court.

4.6. In performance of their duties, upon registration of the subject

FIR, the police have investigated the matter. However, no

chargesheet has been filed in the case, at least as of the date of

the filing of the present petition.

4.7. Yet again, in the course of her interaction with the court in the

present proceedings on 02.02.2026, respondent No.2 has

reiterated her unequivocal support for the quashing of the subject

W.P.(CRL) 1985/2025 Page 4 of 37

FIR and of all proceedings arising therefrom, categorically

stating that not doing so would have disastrous consequences on

her, since the young family that she and the petitioner have

started alongwith their infant would be destroyed if the petitioner

is prosecuted and sentenced to imprisonment. She has said that

the petitioner has committed no offence against her; that she was

a willing participant in the physical relationship with the

petitioner; and if the petitioner is sentenced, it would leave the

prosecutrix and her child bereft of any support and sustenance

alongwith all consequential results.

5. In the above backdrop, the court must deal with the following complex

legal dilemmas:

5.1. Can there be an „offence‟ if no loss or injury has been claimed to

have been suffered by a „victim‟, as statutorily defined?

5.2. Should a penal provision be so applied that it results in grave

consequences on the de-juré victim?

6. It would be instructive to begin with the Statement of Objects and

Reasons of the POCSO Act, which reads as follows:

STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS: Article 15 of

the Constitution, inter alia, confers upon the State powers to make

special provision for children. Further, article 39, inter alia,

provides that the State shall in particular direct its policy towards

securing that the tender age of children are not abused and their

childhood and youth are protected against exploitation and they are

given facilities to develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of

freedom and dignity.

2. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Children,

ratified by India on 11th December, 1992, requires the State Parties

to undertake all appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral

measures to prevent

W.P.(CRL) 1985/2025 Page 5 of 37

(a) the inducement or coercion of a child to engage in any

unlawful sexual activity;

(b) the exploitative use of children in prostitution or other

unlawful sexual practices; and

(c) the exploitative use of children in pornographic

performances and materials.

3. The data collected by the National Crime Records Bureau

shows that there has been increase in cases of sexual offences

against children. This is corroborated by the „Study on Child Abuse:

India 2007‟ conducted by the Ministry of Women and Child

Development. Moreover, sexual offences against children are not

adequately addressed by the existing laws. A large number of such

offences are neither specifically provided for nor are they

adequately penalised. The interests of the child, both as a victim as

well as a witness, need to be protected. It is felt that offences

against children need to be defined explicitly and countered

through commensurate penalties as an effective deterrence.

4. It is, therefore, proposed to enact a self contained

comprehensive legislation inter alia to provide for protection of

children from the offences of sexual assault, sexual harassment and

pornography with due regard for safeguarding the interest and

well being of the child at every stage of the judicial process,

incorporating child-friendly procedures for reporting, recording of

evidence, investigation and trial of offences and provision for

establishment of Special Courts for speedy trial of such offences.

5. The Bill would contribute to enforcement of the right of all

children to safety, security and protection from sexual abuse and

exploitation.

6. The notes on clauses explain in detail the various

provisions contained in the Bill.

7. The Bill seeks to achieve the above objectives.

(emphasis supplied)

7. A child as a „victim‟ is therefore at the centre of the scheme and

purpose of the POCSO Act. However, the POCSO Act does not define

W.P.(CRL) 1985/2025 Page 6 of 37

a „victim‟ in the statute. Instead it relies upon definitions contained in

other statutes. Section 2(2) of the POCSO Act reads as follows:

2. Definitions.—(1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise

requires, —

(2) The words and expressions used herein and not defined

but defined in the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), the Juvenile Justice (Care

and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016) and the

Information Technology Act, 2000 (21 of 2000) shall have the

meanings respectively assigned to them in the said Codes or the

Acts.

8. In light of the residual definition clause referred to above, it would be

relevant to refer to the definition of a “victim” under section 2(wa) of

the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 („Cr.P.C.‟). The Cr.P.C. defines

“victim” as follows:

2. Definitions.—In this Code, unless the context otherwise

requires,—

(wa) “victim” means a person who has suffered any loss or

injury caused by reason of the act or omission for which the

accused person has been charged and the expression “victim”

includes his or her guardian or legal heir;

(emphasis supplied)

9. For completeness, it may be noted that section 2(1)(y) of the BNSS

defines “victim” in almost exactly the same words as section 2(wa) of

the Cr.P.C. Section 2(1)(y) of the BNSS reads thus:

2. .Definitions.— (1) In this Sanhita, unless the context

otherwise requires,—

(y) “victim” means a person who has suffered any loss or

injury caused by reason of the act or omission of the accused

person and includes the guardian or legal heir of such victim;

(emphasis supplied)

W.P.(CRL) 1985/2025 Page 7 of 37

10. From the above definitions, it is evident that for there to be a „victim‟, a

person must have suffered loss or injury by reason of an act or

omission of another, namely the offender.

11. Equally, it is the indisputable position that the consent of a minor

victim is of no legal value; and since a minor cannot give consent,

perhaps it also requires a longer debate to examine if a victim who

subsequently turns major, can condone an act that was done when the

victim was a minor. This court would therefore not delve into the issues

of consent or of ex-post-facto condonation of an act or omission by a

minor.

12. The question that this court would venture to answer in the present case

is as to what would be the correct course of action when a minor who

the law declares to be a victim – who we may call a de-juré victim –

disclaims that she has suffered “ … … any loss or injury caused by

reason of the act or omission of the accused person … …” as required

by the statutory definition of a victim.

13. The essence of the consideration is that there may be cases, where there

is a de-juré victim but no de-facto victim, since no one has complained

that they suffered any injury or loss at the hands of another.

14. In the 4

th

Volume of his scholarly work titled “The Moral Limits of The

Criminal Law,” Joel Feinberg, a social philosopher and professor of

law at the University of Arizona (now deceased) has analysed

situations of „harmless wrongdoing‟ and „victimless crimes‟. Situations

involving consensual adolescent relationships under the POCSO

framework produce what may be described, in Feinberg‟s terms, as a

“crime without a victim.” Even where neither party experiences harm in

W.P.(CRL) 1985/2025 Page 8 of 37

any ordinary sense, and no complaint is forthcoming, the legal

framework operates on a normative assumption that harm inheres in

the act by reason of minority. Feinberg‟s distinction is useful here: not

all wrongs are harms, and not all harms are wrongs, since a harm in the

strict sense requires both a setback to interests of the person wronged

and a violation of their rights. In consensual adolescent relationships,

the lived experience of the parties, that is the absence of felt injury or

grievance, suggests the absence of harm inasmuch as there is no

setback to interests. However, the law treats the minor‟s consent as

legally irrelevant, thereby converting what may be a non-harmful

experience for the minor into a wrong by construing it as a violation of

the minor‟s legally protected rights.

15. This produces a conceptual dissonance: the minor girl is constructed as

a victim not because of any demonstrable harm that she may have

endured, but because the statutory framework denies her capacity for

valid consent. A strict textual approach to the law, when deployed in

cases such as the present one, in effect, prioritises a protective, statute-

based understanding of harm over lived reality, thereby collapsing the

distinction between actual victimhood and presumed vulnerability. The

result is a peculiar scenario where the victim neither claims nor

experiences harm, yet the legal framework insists on her victimhood,

and the offender-status of the accused.

16. The other consideration that would weigh with this court is whether a

court should press-on with pedantic enforcement of the law, with no

heed to the consequences that would befall a victim by such

enforcement. What should the court do if it finds that enforcing the

W.P.(CRL) 1985/2025 Page 9 of 37

letter of the law, would in fact, result in serious re-victimisation of the

de-juré victim, despite the fact that the victim says that she has suffered

no loss or injury at the hands of the accused.

17. On examining their decisions, the view taken by the Supreme Court

and the various High Courts across the country, may be summarised as

follows

1

:

S.No. Case Title

Supreme

Court/Date

Circumstances & Result

1.

K. Kirubakaran vs.

State of T.N.

2025 SCC OnLine SC

2307

28.10.2025

Parties married during the

pendency of appeal against

conviction in the high court;

parties cohabiting; one child;

conviction set aside

2.

Mahesh Mukund Patel

vs. State of U.P.

2025 SCC OnLine SC

614

28.02.2025

Parties married subsequent to

FIR; parties cohabiting; one

child; quashed

S.No. Case Title

High

Court/Date

Circumstances & Result

1.

Akash vs. State of U.P.

2026 SCC OnLine All

1619

Allahabad

HC

01.04.2026

Complainant was

prosecutrix‟s father;

prosecutrix voluntarily left her

house and married the

accused; one child; quashed

1

Cases have been set-out in reverse chronology

W.P.(CRL) 1985/2025 Page 10 of 37

2.

Aalgiya Sandipbhai

Chandubhai vs. State of

Gujarat

CR.MA- 4402/2026

Gujarat HC

01.04.2026

Complainant was

prosecutrix‟s mother; parties

married subsequent to FIR

(prosecutrix then major);

parties cohabiting; quashed

3.

Abhishek vs. State of

H.P

2026 SCC OnLine HP

2332.

Himachal

Pradesh HC

25.03.2026

FIR lodged at the instance of

hospital authorities when the

prosecutrix went for a medical

check-up; parties were

married; two children;

quashed

4.

Munna Harendra Gupta

vs. State of Gujarat &

Anr.

CR.MA- 5953/2026

Gujarat HC

23.03.2026

Parties married and

cohabiting; quashed

5.

Sanju Singh Narwariya

vs. State of M.P.

2026 SCC OnLine MP

2971

Madhya

Pradesh HC

13.03.2026

Complainant was the mother

of the prosecutrix; parties

married; cohabiting; quashed

6.

Kundan Lal vs. State of

H.P.

2026 SCC OnLine HP

1743

Himachal

Pradesh HC

12.03.2026

FIR lodged at the instance of

hospital authorities where the

prosecutrix delivered her child

one year after her marriage

with the accused; parties

cohabiting; quashed

7.

Shalenbor Wahlang vs.

State of Meghalaya

2026 SCC OnLine

Megh 152

Meghalaya

HC

(Division

Bench)

12.03.2026

Complainant was the

grandmother of the

prosecutrix; parties were

married; one child; quashed

W.P.(CRL) 1985/2025 Page 11 of 37

8.

Neelesh vs. State of

M.P.

2026 SCC OnLine MP

3826

Madhya

Pradesh HC

26.02.2026

Parties have married;

cohabiting; quashed

9.

Ravikumar vs. State of

Kerala

2026 SCC OnLine Ker

2987

Kerala HC

25.02.2026

Parties married; cohabiting as

husband and wife; quashed

10.

Mohammad Parwej vs.

State (NCT Of Delhi)

2026 SCC OnLine Del

1030

Delhi HC

25.02.2026

Complainant was the mother

of the prosecutrix; parties

married and cohabiting; three

children; quashed

11.

Chethan Melinamani vs.

State of Karnataka

2026 SCC OnLine Kar

952

Karnataka

HC

25.02.2026

Complainant was the sister of

the prosecutrix; parties

married and cohabiting;

quashed

12.

Akash Yadav vs. State of

M.P.

2026 SCC OnLine MP

1731

Madhya

Pradesh HC

19.02.2026

Parties married and

cohabiting; quashed

13.

Golu Kumar Bharti vs.

State of U.P.

2026 SCC OnLine All

278

Allahabad

HC

06.02.2026

Complainant was the brother

of the prosecutrix; parties

married and cohabiting;

quashed

14.

Anil Pal vs. State of M.P

2026 SCC OnLine MP

640.

Madhya

Pradesh HC

02.02.2026

Parties married and

cohabiting; two children;

quashed

W.P.(CRL) 1985/2025 Page 12 of 37

15.

Prince Raja vs. State of

U.P.

2026 SCC OnLine All

210

Allahabad

HC

02.02.2026

Complainant as the father of

the prosecutrix; parties

married and cohabiting;

quashed

16.

Shadab vs. State of U.P.

2026 SCC OnLine All

119

Allahabad

HC

29.01.2026

Complainant was the father of

the prosecutrix; parties

married and have children;

quashed

17.

Valister vs. State of H.P.

2026 SCC OnLine HP

233

Himachal

Pradesh HC

01.01.2026

Parties voluntarily married

and cohabiting; quashed

18.

Saivan vs. State (NCT of

Delhi)

2025 SCC OnLine Del

9942

Delhi HC

12.12.2025

Complainant was the father of

the prosecutrix; parties

married; prosecutrix was 13

years of age at the time of the

FIR/marriage; NOT

QUASHED

19.

Saurabh vs. State (NCT

of Delhi)

2025 SCC OnLine Del

9249

Delhi HC

26.11.2025

Parties married and did so

voluntarily; fruitless

proceedings; quashed

20.

Prasanjeet Mandal

Alias Denchu vs. State

NCT of Delhi & Anr

CRL.M.C. 8123/2025

Delhi HC

17.11.2025

Parties married subsequent to

FIR; prosecutrix gave birth

when she was 16-17 years of

age; NOT QUASHED

W.P.(CRL) 1985/2025 Page 13 of 37

21.

Aman Gupta vs. State

Govt. Of NCT of Delhi

& Anr.

CRL. M.C. 1469/2025

Delhi HC

28.11.2025

Parties married subsequent to

complaint; prosecutrix gave

birth to her child at 17 years

of age; NOT QUASHED

22.

Wasiullah vs. State of

U.P.

2025 SCC OnLine All

7649

Allahabad

HC

20.11.2025

Complainant was the mother

of the prosecutrix; parties

married and cohabiting; one

child; quashed

23.

Prince Kumar Sharma

& Ors. vs. State NCT of

Delhi,

2025 SCC OnLine Del

8426

Delhi HC

14.11.2025

FIR came to be lodged upon

receiving intimation on

domestic violence helpline;

parties were married and

cohabiting; prosecutrix found

to be minor upon inquiry;

NOT QUASHED

24.

Manikandan vs. State

2025 SCC OnLine Mad

16179

Madras HC

09.09.2025

parties married and have a

child; quashed

25.

J vs. State (NCT of

Delhi)

2024 SCC OnLine Del

9232

Delhi HC

14.10.2024

Complainant was the father of

the prosecutrix; parties

married subsequently; parties

cohabiting for nine years; one

child; quashed

26.

Ranjeet Kumar vs. State

of H.P.

2023 SCC OnLine HP

1625

Himachal

Pradesh HC

08.12.2023

Parties married subsequent to

complaint; parties cohabiting;

quashed

W.P.(CRL) 1985/2025 Page 14 of 37

27.

Rihan vs. State (Govt. of

NCT Delhi) & Anr.

2023 SCC OnLine Del

4436

Delhi HC

25.07.2023

Parties married and

cohabiting; two children;

quashed

28.

Erickson Lyngdoh vs.

State of Meghalaya

2022 SCC OnLine

Megh 648

Meghalaya

HC

05.12.2022

Complaint was lodged at the

instance of the mother of the

prosecutrix who found out the

pregnancy of the prosecutrix

upon medical examination;

parties married subsequently;

one child; quashed

29.

Rajiv Kumar vs. State of

U.P.

2022 SCC OnLine All

1579

Allahabad

HC

21.09.2022

Complainant was the maternal

uncle of the prosecutrix;

parties voluntarily married

and cohabiting; one child;

quashed

18. The predominant view of High Courts across the country therefore

appears to be to quash proceedings where the de-juré victim disclaims

that she has suffered any loss or injury, especially in cases where the

parties have subsequently married and have children, inter-alia to

preserve the future of the parties and of the children borne by them.

The common refrain of the courts across various jurisdictions has been,

that continuing with trial in such cases would be an exercise in futility.

19. The few discordant notes against the view favouring quashing of such

criminal proceedings, arise from the perspective that quashing

proceedings under the POCSO Act by consent of parties would amount

to condoning crimes against minors; premised on the principle that the

consent of a minor is legally irrelevant and the principle that the court

cannot carve-out an exception based on consensual physical

W.P.(CRL) 1985/2025 Page 15 of 37

relationship with a minor, since offences under the POCSO Act are

heinous offences of moral depravity and are crimes against the society.

The view against quashing is also supported by the reasoning that a

crime cannot be retrospectively legalised by settlement or marriage;

and on the basis that judicial endorsement of the under-age marriage

cannot be permitted.

20. But the overwhelming majority of decisions have gone with the view

that overarching considerations of substantial justice must override

didactic enforcement of the statute.

21. Our own High Court has, in at least four cases, refused to quash

proceedings under the POCSO Act based on consent and marriage of

the parties with the following essential reasoning:

21.1. In Saivan vs. State (NCT of Delhi)

2

the Co-ordinate Bench has

said:

“7. This is precisely the kind of matter in which the

statutory framework of the POCSO Act sits uneasily with

lived reality and the tension between the two is stark. The

material placed on record suggests a purported marriage of

the victim at the age of about 13 years and the sexual

relationship between petitioner and respondent started when

she was certainly a child. It is pertinent to note that the

contention of the petitioner that the prosecutrix was a major

at the time of offence is a matter to be determined during the

trial.

* * * * *

“9. Quashing in such case, where there are specific

allegations of rape of minor on the basis of the settlement,

are not desirable. Further, as per the settled law which has

2

2025 SCC OnLine Del 9942

W.P.(CRL) 1985/2025 Page 16 of 37

been consistently held by the Apex Court as well as this

Court in several occasions, the consent of minor is no

consent. Thus, even if respondent no.2 affirms to marriage

with petitioner, it would be deemed as no consent.

“10. This Court has, in unambiguous terms and on

multiple occasions, held that the power under

Section 482 Cr. P.C. cannot be exercised to quash criminal

proceedings on the basis of compromise where the offence is

heinous, not private in nature, and has a serious impact on

society, relying upon the Supreme Court and this Court's

decisions in Laxmi Narayan v. Govt Of Nct, Delhi CRL.

M.C. 3653/2015, RE: Right to Privacy of Adolescents, 2024

INSC 614, Suo Motu Writ Petition (C) No. 3/2023, and State

of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335. These

precedents clearly emphasize that offences involving heinous

and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like

murder, rape, dacoity, etc. transcend the realm of private

disputes and affect the societal conscience at large.

Therefore, when an incident of such nature and gravity is

alleged, it cannot be characterized as a purely private

offence having no serious impact on society.

* * * * *

“14. If the Respondent no.2 has made a false

allegation, then such complainant should be dealt with in

accordance with law.

“15. An order quashing the prosecution in such

circumstances would almost inevitably be perceived as

judicial endorsement of the notion that underage marriages

can be insulated from legal consequences merely because

the parties later present themselves as a settled family.

Courts cannot overlook the real possibility that what

appears to be apparent consent by a 13-year-old may in fact

be the result of familial pressure or entrenched community

expectations. Snuffing out the prosecution at the threshold

would risk conveying the message that child marriages and

sexual relationships with minors can be retrospectively

legitimized by arranging a ceremony and continuing

cohabitation. Such an approach would run squarely

W.P.(CRL) 1985/2025 Page 17 of 37

contrary to the legislative intent underlying both the POCSO

Act and child marriage laws, which are designed to deter

early marriage and prevent sexual exploitation of children.”

21.2. Also, in Prasanjeet Mandal Alias Denchu vs. State NCT of

Delhi & Anr.

3

a learned Single Judge has taken the view:

“7.Prima facie, the fact that the victim gave birth

when she was 16-17 years of age is sufficient to make out the

alleged offence under POCSO Act. High Court while

exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, or even writ

jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India,

cannot legalise the serious crime of sexual intercourse with

a minor on account of “consent”.

“8. It is well-settled that the consent of a minor holds

no relevance as the law itself deems minors as being

incapable of consenting to sexual intercourse. POCSO Act is

helmed on the object of protecting children from being

victimised. When the law itself does not provide for any

exception based on consent, endorsement of underage

pregnancies or marriages will frustrate the very purpose of

the Act. This Court thus cannot lend legitimacy to such

relations by quashing the FIR.”

21.3. Again in Prince Kumar Sharma and Ors. vs. State (NCT of

Delhi) & Anr.

4

a learned Single Judge has very eloquently

articulated his views as follows:

“7. Seeing the victim with her infant child brings

home that these proceedings are tied to the stability of a

young family. At the same time, this is precisely the kind of

matter in which the statutory framework of the POCSO

Act sits uneasily with lived reality and the tension between

the two is stark.

3

Order dated 17.11.2025 in CRL.M.C. No.8123/2025

4

2025 SCC OnLine Del 8426

W.P.(CRL) 1985/2025 Page 18 of 37

“8. The material on record suggests a purported

marriage of the victim at the age of about 16 years and 5

months, and that the sexual relationship between her and

Petitioner No. 1 also commenced when she was certainly a

child. She became pregnant; the paternity of the child is not

in dispute; and the parties are now living together with their

baby as a family unit. On a purely human plane, therefore,

the instinctive response is to ask : if the relationship has

stabilised into a family, the child has been born, and the

victim herself does not seek to criminalise the man, why not

quash the FIR?

“9. The difficulty is that the legal position is not

ambivalent. At the time of the incident, the victim was

indisputably a child as per the definition under the POCSO

Act. The statutory scheme of the Act proceeds on a clear and

deliberate premise. Section 2(1)(d) defines a „child‟ as any

person below the age of 18 years. The offence-creating

provisions, such as Sections 3 and 7, criminalise specified

sexual acts „with a child‟. Unlike Section 375 of the IPC,

these provisions do not employ expressions such as „without

her consent‟ or „against her will‟ as ingredients of the

offence. Once it is shown that the victim was below 18 years

of age on the date of the occurrence and that the physical

acts described in the charge fall within the contours of

Sections 3 or 7, the offence is, in principle, complete.

“10. In other words, the Act does not treat absence of

consent as a constituent element when the victim is a child.

The law proceeds on the footing that a child lacks the legal

capacity to consent to sexual activity, and that any such

activity with a person below 18 is inherently exploitative.

The apparent willingness of the child, howsoever genuine it

may appear on facts, does not carry exculpatory value in

determining guilt. The concept of „age of consent‟ is thus

built into the definition of „child‟ itself; by fixing the age at

18, the Parliament has consciously removed the space for a

defence founded on so-called consensual participation by a

minor.

“11. This approach is reinforced by the presumptions

engrafted in Sections 29 and 30. Where the prosecution

W.P.(CRL) 1985/2025 Page 19 of 37

establishes the foundational facts that the accused committed

the acts charged under the relevant provisions with a person

who is a „child‟, the court is required to presume that the

accused has committed the offence and that the requisite

culpable mental state was present, unless the contrary is

proved. The child‟s statement that he or she „went of his/her

own accord‟ or was in a relationship with the accused may

have a bearing on issues such as bail, sentencing, or the

exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction in rare and hard cases,

but it does not negate the ingredients of the offence under

the POCSO Act.

“12. The Supreme Court, while examining allied

questions under the IPC and POCSO, has consistently

recognised that consent of a person below the statutory age

has no legal efficacy in the context of sexual offences. The

philosophy that underlines POCSO is that of heightened

protection, not neutrality, in respect of adolescent sexuality.

Courts may, therefore, be slow to use the language of

„consensual sex‟ where one party is a child in terms of the

statute. The proper inquiry in such cases is not whether the

minor consented, but whether the prosecution has

established the child‟s age and the occurrence of the

proscribed act; once those elements stand proved, the

supposed consent of the minor cannot be invoked as a

defence to criminal liability.

“13. The present case is not a borderline matter of

age determination, nor is there any genuine doubt on this

aspect emerging from the record. The pregnancy of the

victim, as a result of sexual intercourse with Petitioner No.1,

leaves no real dispute about the occurrence of the sexual act.

Once it is accepted that she was below 18 years of age at the

relevant time, the case falls squarely within the ambit of

the POCSO Act. Under the POCSO Act, read with the then

prevailing provisions of the IPC, any sexual act with a

person under 18 is criminalised per se, without importing

“consent” as a constituent element once the victim is a child.

Since the Parliament has fixed 18 as the age below which

the law refuses to recognise sexual consent, this Court,

exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of

W.P.(CRL) 1985/2025 Page 20 of 37

the Constitution, cannot, in the guise of doing equity, write

in a judge-made exception for “near-majority, consensual

relationships”. To do so would be to cross the line from

interpretation into legislation. Subsequent developments in

the relationship, however compelling in equity, the couple

living together, the birth of a child, the victim’s present

stance, cannot retrospectively legalise conduct which the

law, at the time it occurred, treated as an offence. At this

pre-trial stage, where the essential ingredients of the offence

are disclosed and there is no patent abuse of process, there

is no room for quashing the proceedings.

“14. There is, moreover, a wider institutional

concern. The present case does not involve only two young

persons who chose to live together; the parents of both sides

stand arraigned under the Prohibition of Child Marriage

Act, 2006 on the allegation that they facilitated or condoned

a marriage involving a minor girl. An order quashing the

prosecution in such circumstances would almost inevitably

be perceived as judicial endorsement of the notion that

underage marriages can be insulated from legal

consequences, so long as the parties subsequently present

themselves as a settled family. Courts cannot ignore the

possibility that what appears, on the surface, as voluntary

acquiescence by a 16-year-old may, in fact, be the product of

familial pressure or community expectations, especially once

pregnancy has occurred. To snuff out the prosecution at the

threshold would risk sending a message that child

marriages and sexual relationships with minors can be

retrospectively sanitised by arranging a ceremony and

continuing cohabitation. That would sit squarely at odds

with the legislative purpose of both POCSO and the child

marriage law, which is to deter early marriage and sexual

exploitation of children.

“15. The Court is not indifferent to the victim’s wish

to protect her family. In fact, this Court is moved by the

circumstances, but it is bound by the statute. This is,

therefore, one of those hard cases where the pull of equity

is strong, but the command of the statute is stronger. This

Court, for securing the ends of justice, cannot carve out an

W.P.(CRL) 1985/2025 Page 21 of 37

exception to the statute merely because the victim describes

the relationship as consensual.”

(emphasis supplied)

21.4. In Aman Gupta vs. State (NCT of Delhi)

5

the Co-ordinate

Bench has said:

“5. In the considered view of this Court, offences of

the nature alleged particularly those involving sexual

offences involving children cannot be nullified merely on the

basis of settlements between the parties. Such offences, in the

true sense, cannot be regarded as offences in personam and

the same constitutes a crime against the society at large.

Offences of such nature cannot be extinguished only at the

convenience of the parties or because the victim, at a

subsequent stage, decides to marry the culprit. Any such

compromise or marriage does not ipso facto efface the

gravity of the offence or wipe out the seriousness of the

allegations.

“6. Prima facie, the fact that the victim gave birth

when she was around 17 years of age is sufficient to make

out the alleged offence under POCSO Act. … …

“7. While this Court is sympathetic to the plight of

the parties, in the opinion of this Court, such acts cannot

be legitimised or condoned by exercise of inherent

jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 528 of

the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.”

(emphasis supplied)

21.5. Most importantly, in Ramji Lal Bairwa and Ors. vs. State of

Rajasthan & Ors.,

6

the Supreme Court has also rejected a prayer

for quashing of a POCSO offence based on compromise, with

the following significant observations:

5

2025 SCC OnLine Del 8632

6

(2025) 5 SCC 117

W.P.(CRL) 1985/2025 Page 22 of 37

“9. Considering the conspectus of facts and taking

note of the rival contentions, the following twin questions of

relevance arise for consideration in this appeal:

9.1. (I) Whether a third party to a criminal

proceeding got locus standi to challenge the order

quashing the FIR concerned and all further

proceedings pursuant thereto based on a compromise

arrived at by the parties, in a special leave petition

under Article 136 of the Constitution of India?

9.2. (II) Whether the power to quash criminal

proceedings or complaint or FIR in regard to

heinous and serious offences having serious impact

on society, is exercisable merely because the offender

and victim or parent(s) of the victim arrived at a

compromise, relying on the dictum laid down by this

Court in Gian Singh case [Gian Singh v. State of

Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ)

1188 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 160 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S)

988] ?

* * * * *

“11. The learned Amicus Curiae relied on various

decisions of this Court to drive home the point that when

criminal proceedings are abruptly terminated based on

compromise between the offender and the victim or on behalf

of the victim by the parent(s), despite the alleged offence

being one having an impact on the society and of heinous

and serious in nature and still, the State did not take up the

matter further in accordance with law, ignoring the fact that

such quashment of the proceedings was done disregarding

the opposition of the Public Prosecutor, a public-spirited

person should be having the locus standi to challenge such

an order in the interest of justice. It is furthermore submitted

that in such circumstances if a public-spirited person is non-

suited on the ground of locus standi it would only help the

offender to escape even without facing the trial. Such

situations may result in recurrence of commission of such

offences detrimental to the interests of the society.

* * * * *

W.P.(CRL) 1985/2025 Page 23 of 37

“17. The Objects and Reasons for the enactment of

the POCSO Act, as extracted above, would undoubtedly show

that quashment of proceeding initiated under the POCSO Act

abruptly by invoking the power under Section 482 CrPC

without permitting it to mature into a trial, except on

extremely compelling reasons ex facie mala fide initiated

or initiated solely to settle the score, etc. would go against

the very intention of the legislature behind the enactment. As

noted earlier, it is the inadequacy of the existing laws to

address certain issues relating to sexual offences against the

children that made the legislature to come up with the

aforesaid legislation with a view to protect and respect the

privacy and confidentiality of children and to ensure their

physical, emotional, intellectual and social development.

“18. The POCSO Act also addressed the lack of

provisions defining various offences against the children and

also adequate penal provisions therefor. A careful scanning

of the various provisions under the POCSO Act would reveal

that with a view to achieve the aforesaid objects and

purposes various offences against the children are

specifically defined and provisions for adequate penalisation

are also inserted in the Act. Obviously, rubbing the breast of

a child would constitute an offence of “sexual assault”

under Section 7 of the POCSO Act, punishable with

imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not

be less than three years and may extend to five years and

also fine. They would reveal that the commission of such

offences against the children should be viewed as heinous

and serious. Needless to say, that commission of such

offences cannot be taken lightly as offences of private nature

and in fact, such offences are bound to be taken as offences

against the society.

* * * * *

“37. A bare perusal of the impugned order dated 4-2-

2022 [Vimal Kumar Gupta v. State of Rajasthan, 2022 SCC

OnLine Raj 3564] would reveal that the High Court has

erred in not bestowing proper consideration to the law laid

down in Gian Singh case [Gian Singh v. State of Punjab,

W.P.(CRL) 1985/2025 Page 24 of 37

(2012) 10 SCC 303 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 1188 : (2013) 1

SCC (Cri) 160 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 988] while rendering

the same. The impugned order [Vimal Kumar Gupta v. State

of Rajasthan, 2022 SCC OnLine Raj 3564] would reveal that

the allegations contained in the subject FIR were not at all

even adverted to, before quashing the same…….”

(emphasis supplied)

* * * * *

“44. In view of the very object and purpose of

enacting the POCSO Act, we find no reason to disagree with

the conclusions in SCC OnLine Del para 12 extracted above

in the given Sunil Raikwar case [Sunil Raikwar v. State,

2021 SCC OnLine Del 258]. It is more so, when the

extracted portion from the complaint that was annexed to

the FIR and extracted hereinbefore would reveal that the

accused was making pressure on him not to lodge any

report. Despite giving such statement in the complaint,

within a couple of weeks, the accused managed to

compromise the case with the 4th respondent and his wife.

“45. In the decision relied on by the High Court to

quash the proceedings viz. Gian Singh case [Gian

Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303 : (2012) 4 SCC

(Civ) 1188 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 160 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S)

988] and the decision in Laxmi Narayan case [State of

M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688 : (2019) 2 SCC

(Cri) 706] in unambiguous terms this Court held that the

power under Section 482 CrPC could not be used to quash

proceedings based on compromise if it is in respect of

heinous offence which are not private in nature and have a

serious impact on the society. When an incident of the

aforesaid nature and gravity allegedly occurred in a higher

secondary school, that too from a teacher, it cannot be

simply described as an offence which is purely private in

nature and has no serious impact on the society.

“46. In view of the reasons as aforesaid and in the

light of the decisions referred supra, the impugned order

dated 4-2-2022 of the High Court in Vimal Kumar

W.P.(CRL) 1985/2025 Page 25 of 37

Gupta v. State of Rajasthan [Vimal Kumar Gupta v. State of

Rajasthan, 2022 SCC OnLine Raj 3564], quashing FIR No.

6/2022 dated 8-1-2022 and all further proceedings pursuant

thereto solely on the ground that the accused and the

complainant had settled the matter, invites interference. We

have no hesitation to hold that in cases of this nature, the

fact that in view of compromise entered into between the

parties, the chance of a conviction is remote and bleak also

cannot be a ground to abruptly terminate the investigation,

by quashing FIR and all further proceedings pursuant

thereto, by invoking the power under Section 482 CrPC.”

(emphasis supplied)

It is extremely important to note that Ramji Lal Bairwa was not a

case of a purported compromise of an offence under the POCSO Act

based on the parties subsequently getting married and settling down as

a family with a young child in the picture, as is the case at hand. The

attendant facts and circumstances in Ramji Lal Bairwa were that a

school teacher had assaulted a student; and was then pressuring a

compromise in the matter, which is what led the Supreme Court to hold

against quashing of the offence under the POCSO Act in that case.

22. However, from a close reading of the rulings with similar factual

circumstances as the present case, it can be gathered that the essential

reasoning on which the courts have declined to quash proceedings

involving offences under the POCSO Act are variously: that the

consent of a minor is of no value in law; that an offence once

committed cannot be condoned ex-post-facto; that the Legislature has

left no room for condoning or compromising an offence under the

POCSO Act; and that a High Court cannot, even in exercise of its

inherent jurisdiction or constitutional powers, nullify the legislative

intent behind the POCSO Act.

W.P.(CRL) 1985/2025 Page 26 of 37

23. In fact, in Prince Kumar Sharma the learned Single Judge has lamented

the consequences of being unable to quash proceedings under the

POCSO Act, observing however, that the court is constrained by the

dictate of the statute.

24. In none of these cases, however, has the court considered the aspect as

to whether there was a de-facto victim in the picture, who wanted the

offender to be prosecuted. The jurisprudential basis for the State being

the prosecuting agency in criminal offences is to prevent a criminal

prosecution from descending into an exercise in vengeance, where the

victim goes baying-for-the-blood of the offender; and to maintain

objectivity, neutrality, fairness and a sense of proportion in prosecution

of an offender. On that very premise, the State should also not adopt a

retributive line of action, when the de-juré victim says that she has

suffered no loss or injury and does not seek to proceed against the

offender.

25. To be absolutely sure, this court is not entering upon the realm of

consent of a minor in relation to a POCSO offence; nor into any ex-post

facto condonation of such offence. Though a crime can be reported at

the instance of any complainant, who may not necessarily be the victim

of the offence, in the opinion of this court it is yet central to a

prosecution that there be a de-facto victim in the picture. This court is

of the view that prosecuting a person on the shoulders only of a de-juré

victim would not be the prudent approach; muchless so, when the

consequences of such prosecution would befall the de-juré victim

herself.

W.P.(CRL) 1985/2025 Page 27 of 37

26. The long-deserved primacy to be accorded to a victim in the scheme of

a criminal prosecution, was addressed by the Supreme Court in its

verdict in Jagjeet Singh & Ors. vs. Ashish Mishra @ Monu & Anr.,

7

in the following words :

“22. It cannot be gainsaid that the rights of a victim under

the amended CrPC are substantive, enforceable, and are another

facet of human rights. The victim‟s right, therefore, cannot be

termed or construed restrictively like a brutum fulmen [Ed. : The

literal translation from the Latin approximates to “meaningless

thunderbolt or lightning”, and is used to convey the idea of an

“empty threat” or something which is ineffective.] We reiterate that

these rights are totally independent, incomparable, and are not

accessory or auxiliary to those of the State under the CrPC. The

presence of “State” in the proceedings, therefore, does not

tantamount to according a hearing to a “victim” of the crime.

“23. A “victim” within the meaning of CrPC cannot be

asked to await the commencement of trial for asserting his/her

right to participate in the proceedings. He/She has a legally vested

right to be heard at every step post the occurrence of an offence.

Such a “victim” has unbridled participatory rights from the stage

of investigation till the culmination of the proceedings in an

appeal or revision. We may hasten to clarify that “victim” and

“complainant/informant” are two distinct connotations in criminal

jurisprudence. It is not always necessary that the

complainant/informant is also a “victim”, for even a stranger to the

act of crime can be an “informant”, and similarly, a “victim” need

not be the complainant or informant of a felony.”

(emphasis supplied)

27. Taking cue from the observations of the Supreme Court in Jagjeet

Singh, this court is of the opinion that where there is no de-facto victim,

the commission of a crime remains a mere jurisprudential construct.

This is especially true where a victim herself denies having suffered

7

(2022) 9 SCC 321

W.P.(CRL) 1985/2025 Page 28 of 37

any loss or injury as required under section 2(wa) of the Cr.P.C. or

section 2(1)(y) of the BNSS.

28. In its very recent decision in Ayyub Malik & Anr. vs. State of

Uttarakhand & Anr.,

8

the Supreme Court was dealing with a case

where the High Court of Uttarakhand had dismissed a petition seeking

quashing of criminal proceedings where the accused was charged with

offences under sections 363/368/376(2)(d) of the Indian Penal Code

1860, as well as sections 5(8) and 6 of the POCSO Act. The case arose

when the complainant‟s daughter, about 17 years of age, accompanied

the accused and subsequently married him; and the allegation was that

the daughter was minor at the time of the alleged incident. It was the

contention of the parties that on the date of the marriage both were

major, though at the time when the girl had accompanied the boy, she

was minor.

29. In this broad backdrop, the Supreme Court overturned the order of the

Uttarakhand High Court, with the following observations :

“5.2 A faint attempt was made by learned counsel for the

respondent to try and submit that at the time of incident when the

appellant ran away with appellant No.2, appellant No.2 was a

minor and was not of marriageable age. On the other hand, it is

claimed that the boy and girl had attained marriageable age when

they entered into matrimonial relationship. Whether appellant No.2

was minor of the age little less than the marriageable, whether

appellant No.1 lured appellant No.2 and made her eloped with him

and whether the conduct on the part of appellant No.1 was in the

nature of offence alleged against him or not, are the questions

which all pale into insignificance.

8

2026 INSC 331

W.P.(CRL) 1985/2025 Page 29 of 37

“5.3 The situation is obtained that now the parties

voluntarily got married and started residing and living together to

lead their married life without any complaint. It is noticeable that

when the FIR was filed by the father of appellant No.2 on

01.06.2020, both the appellants had already married according to

their own will and choice. Presently, both are major and almost six

years have elapsed since they are in matrimonial relationship with

each other.

“6. It may be true that fleeing with a girl who is not of

marriageable age and who is minor is an offence under law,

however, the subsequent development of marriage between the two

lovers and the fact that they have been merrily living would

outweigh the need to take the alleged offence or the criminal

proceedings to their logical end. In the fact situation like one

obtained in the present one, continuation of criminal proceedings

against appellant No.1 would become harassing and stand as an

abuse of process of law.

“6.1 Any litigation brings a kind of botheration for

the parties. The uncertainty of the outcome of the litigation

always looms large. When it is a criminal case, its pendency

becomes burdensome and worrisome. For appellant No.1 as

well as appellant No.2, negotiating the criminal

proceedings in a court of law, notwithstanding that both

are now husband and wife living together, would operate

as painful interference in their happy life. The High Court

would have done justice to the parties only by quashing the

criminal proceedings against appellant No.1 initiated by

the complainant-father of appellant No.2.

“7. In K. Kirubakaran v. State of Tamil Nadu [2025 SCC

OnLine SC 2307], where the facts were similar and akin to the

present one, this Court, while quashing the criminal proceedings

against the appellant therein including the conviction and sentence,

quoted Benjamin N. Cardozo, Former Associate Justice of the

Supreme Court of United States, “The final cause of law is the

welfare of society.””

(emphasis supplied)

W.P.(CRL) 1985/2025 Page 30 of 37

30. The essence of the Supreme Court judgment in Ayyub Malik is that

criminal proceedings in the said case ought to have been quashed by

the High Court if the High Court was to “have done justice to the

parties.” The essence of the judgment also is that though on a technical

view of the law, fleeing with a minor girl would be an offence, the

subsequent development of the parties having married and living

together peacefully “outweigh the need to take the alleged offence or

the criminal proceedings to their logical end.” Furthermore, the

Supreme Court has observed that in situations such as the one obtaining

in that case “continuation of criminal proceedings …… would become

harassing and stand as an abuse of process of law.” This court is in

respectful agreement with the articulation of the law by the Supreme

Court in Ayyub Malik. The same was the view of the Supreme Court in

its short order in Mahesh Mukund Patel.

31. This court would only add that pressing-on with a criminal prosecution

when there is no de-facto victim would not only be an exercise in

futility but also an exercise leading to absurdity.

32. In a case such as the present one, the absence of a de-facto victim

effaces the need to take the criminal proceedings forward, since that

would be an exercise to the detriment of the de-juré victim herself.

33. This court would lay special emphasis to point-out that the principal

duty of a court is to do justice; and if unleashing the letter of the law

leads to manifest injustice, a court cannot look the other way. The court

cannot lose sight of the enormity of the consequences that would befall

a victim in a case like the present one. The court cannot ignore the fact

that two lives i.e., of the de-juré victim and her minor child, would be

W.P.(CRL) 1985/2025 Page 31 of 37

completely destroyed if the criminal proceedings against the petitioner

are not quashed.

34. It may also be mentioned that despite repeated remonstrations by the

courts, including by the Supreme Court, the Legislature has not applied

itself to ameliorating the rank injustice that is perpetrated by reason of

innocent actions on the part of young persons in the present context.

Attention may be drawn to the following observations of the Supreme

Court in State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Anurudh & Anr.:

9

“Society also must match institutional reform with moral

awakening. The intent and object of these legislations must be at the

forefront when a person wishes to lodge a complaint thereunder.

The misuse of these laws is a mirror to the opportunistic and self-

centered view that pervades the application of law. It is only

through discipline, integrity and courage that these problems can be

remedied and rooted out. Any legislative amendment or judicial

direction will remain lack-luster without this deeper change.We

have referred to certain instances of the High Courts noting the

misuse/misapplication of the POCSO Act, somewhat in line with the

indices appended to the impugned judgment as also its progenitors.

Considering the fact that repeated judicial notice has been

taken of the misuse of these laws, let a copy of this judgment be

circulated to the Secretary, Law, Government of India, to consider

initiation of steps as may be possible to curb this menace inter alia,

the introduction of a Romeo - Juliet clause exempting genuine

adolescent relationships from the stronghold of this law; enacting

a mechanism enabling the prosecution of those persons who, by

the use of these laws seeks to settle scores etc.”

(emphasis supplied)

35. That being said, this court would also caution against wanton misuse of

„compromise‟ quashing of criminal proceedings by unscrupulous

9

2026 SCC OnLine SC 40; para 19

W.P.(CRL) 1985/2025 Page 32 of 37

offenders against gullible or vulnerable victims. The courts must be

vigilant against offenders who use deceit, stratagem or dishonest

device, to obtain quashing of criminal proceedings in their favour. In

particular, it is necessary to instal strong guardrails and parameters for

consent quashing of criminal proceedings concerning offences under

the POCSO Act.

36. This court is of the view, that though quashing of criminal proceedings

under the POCSO Act is not anathema to the law, such quashing

demands careful and sensitive consideration of the fact situation. When

examining a plea for quashing of an offence under the POCSO Act

based on the consent of a de-juré victim, the court must carefully

evaluate the reasons as to why the victim disclaims any loss or injury to

her and must record its satisfaction inter-alia on the following aspects :

36.1. Based on the circumstances of a given case, the court must be

satisfied that in granting a „no-objection‟ to the quashing of

criminal proceedings, the de-juré victim is genuinely acting on

her own free will and volition and has not been misled,

pressurised or deceived into offering such no-objection;

36.2. Whether the de-juré victim has taken a consistent stand in favour

of closing the case from the inception of the criminal

proceedings, and has disclaimed that she has suffered any loss or

injury at the hands of the offender;

36.3. Whether the circumstances of the case justify an inference that

the acts or omissions that the parties have indulged in, were

volitional on the part of the de-juré victim;

W.P.(CRL) 1985/2025 Page 33 of 37

36.4. Whether the marriage or other arrangement, based on which the

offender and the de-juré victim are seeking closure of criminal

proceedings, evokes confidence on the part of the court; or does

it appear to be a ruse or stratagem of the offender to evade

conviction and punishment;

36.5. Whether the parties have been living together as a family for a

length of time; and whether children are born to the parties,

whose future would also be impacted by a decision not to quash

the criminal proceedings;

36.6. Whether the offender is alleged to have committed any violence

or brutality on the de-juré victim; or has committed any other act

or omission that points to the absence of genuine volition on the

part of the de-juré victim; and if so, is there any medical and

other forensic evidence to show such conduct on the offender‟s

part;

36.7. What was the respective age of the offender and the de-juré

victim at the relevant time; whether both were minor; and what

are the ramifications of the relative age difference and minority;

36.8. This court would hasten to add, that the aforementioned

considerations are only suggestive and far from exhaustive; and

before quashing any criminal proceedings under the POCSO

Act, the court must interact with the parties and arrive at a

subjective satisfaction that the quashing of the case is warranted

on larger considerations of justice and to prevent abuse of the

process of law, as discussed above; and

W.P.(CRL) 1985/2025 Page 34 of 37

36.9. Ultimately, the decision to quash criminal proceedings under the

POCSO Act must be founded on the best interests of the de-juré

victim and the children, if any, born from the union of the

parties.

37. This court would be remiss if it did not answer as to how the view

taken above falls within the ambit of the Supreme Court rulings in the

celebrated cases of Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab

10

and Narinder

Singh & Ors. vs. State of Punjab & Anr.

11

While in the said two

verdicts, the Supreme Court has cautioned against the quashing of

criminal proceedings relating to heinous offences regardless of any

settlement between the victim or victim‟s family and the offender, at

the same time, the Supreme Court, has also emphasized the following :

“61…. … Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no

statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the

guideline engrafted in such power viz. : (i) to secure the ends of

justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what

cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR

may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled

their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each

case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise

of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature

and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental

depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be

fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the

offender have settled the dispute.… … In other words, the High

Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the

interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or

continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse

of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the

victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice,

it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the

10

(2012) 10 SCC 303

11

(2014) 6 SCC 466

W.P.(CRL) 1985/2025 Page 35 of 37

answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court

shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal

proceeding.”

(emphasis supplied)

38. The same sentiment has also been echoed by the Supreme Court in

Narinder Singh.

39. Applying the aforesaid consideration to the facts of the present case,

the following aspects weigh with the court:

39.1. At the time of the alleged commission of the offence,

respondent No.2 was about 17 years and 02 months of age and

the petitioner was about 22 years old ;

39.2. Respondent No.2 never made any complaint to the police

authorities herself and the subject FIR was registered at the

instance of the doctors attending to her at the hospital where

respondent No.2 had gone to deliver the child she had had with

the petitioner;

39.3. From the outset, respondent No.2 has never pressed any charges

against the petitioner; she married him on 04.09.2024,

whereupon they had a child on 12.06.2025; and on the very next

date after the birth of the child, i.e., on 13.06.2025, the subject

FIR came to be registered;

39.4. There is not the remotest allegation that the petitioner was guilty

of any violence, much less any brutality against respondent

No.2;

39.5. In the course of hearing before this court, and during the

interaction with respondent No.2, she has expressed unequivocal

support for quashing of the criminal proceedings against the

W.P.(CRL) 1985/2025 Page 36 of 37

petitioner; she has said that the relationship was the result of her

full consent and concurrence; that parties now need to take care

of their 08-month old baby; and that their young family would be

destroyed if the petitioner is prosecuted in the subject FIR.

40. Upon a conspectus of the foregoing facts and circumstances, and in

particular keeping in mind the enormous consequences that would

befall not only respondent No.2 but also her infant, both of whom

would be left completely bereft of any support and sustenance if the

petitioner were to be imprisoned, this court is persuaded to allow the

present petition.

41. In view of the foregoing discussion, in the opinion of this court, the

right course of action to secure the ends of justice and especially to

prevent re-victimisation of the de-juré victim, would be to quash the

criminal proceedings.

42. Mr. Anand V Khatri, learned ASC (Criminal) confirms that the State

has no objection to the subject FIR being quashed.

43. In the circumstances, this court is of the view that in light of the

consistent, unequivocal and volitional stand taken by respondent No.2,

continuing with the subject FIR and all subsequent proceedings would

not be conducive to the welfare and interests of respondent No.2 and

her infant.

44. Accordingly, case FIR No.279/2025 dated 13.06.2025 registered under

section 64(1) of the BNS and section 6 of the POCSO Act at P.S.:

Malviya Nagar, South Delhi is quashed. All proceedings arising therefrom

also stand closed.

W.P.(CRL) 1985/2025 Page 37 of 37

45. Petition stands disposed-of.

46. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed-of.

ANUP JAIRAM BHAMBHANI, J.

APRIL 16, 2026

V.Rawat/ds